On 21/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/20/08, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > On 21/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard
> > > misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though
On 2/20/08, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 21/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard
> > misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given
> > Lanier's vagueness and unclarit
On 21/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard
> misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given
> Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the
> amazing coincidence of a genuine
John Ku wrote:
By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard
misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given
Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the
amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a
rainstorm, i
On 2/20/08, Stan Nilsen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> It seems that when philosophy is implemented it becomes like nuclear
> physics e.g. break down all the things we essentially understand until
> we come up with pieces, which we give names to, and then admit we don't
> know what the names identi
Quoting Vladimir Nesov <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
On Feb 20, 2008 6:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The possibility of mind uploading to computers strictly depends on
functionalism being true; if it isn't then you may as well shoot
yourself in the head as undergo a destructive
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 20/02/2008, Eric B. Ramsay <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
During the late 70's when I was at McGill, I attended a public talk given by Feynman on
quantum physics. After the talk, and in answer to a question posed from a member of the
audience, Feynman said something
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 20/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
I am aware of some of those other sources for the idea: nevertheless,
they are all nonsense for the same reason. I especially single out
Searle: his writings on this subject are virtually worthless. I hav
Vladimir Nesov wrote:
On Feb 20, 2008 6:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The possibility of mind uploading to computers strictly depends on
functionalism being true; if it isn't then you may as well shoot
yourself in the head as undergo a destructive upload. Functionalism
(i
On Feb 20, 2008 6:13 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> The possibility of mind uploading to computers strictly depends on
> functionalism being true; if it isn't then you may as well shoot
> yourself in the head as undergo a destructive upload. Functionalism
> (invented, and la
On 20/02/2008, Eric B. Ramsay <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> During the late 70's when I was at McGill, I attended a public talk given by
> Feynman on quantum physics. After the talk, and in answer to a question posed
> from a member of the audience, Feynman said something along the lines of :" I
During the late 70's when I was at McGill, I attended a public talk given by
Feynman on quantum physics. After the talk, and in answer to a question posed
from a member of the audience, Feynman said something along the lines of :" I
have here in my pocket a prescription from my doctor that forbi
On 20/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I am aware of some of those other sources for the idea: nevertheless,
> they are all nonsense for the same reason. I especially single out
> Searle: his writings on this subject are virtually worthless. I have
> argued with Searle t
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 19/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Sorry, but I do not think your conclusion even remotely follows from the
premises.
But beyond that, the basic reason that this line of argument is
nonsensical is that Lanier's thought experiment was rigged i
On 19/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Yes, you've shown either that, or that even some occasionally
> intelligent and competent philosophers sometimes take seriously ideas
> that really can be dismissed as obviously ridiculous -- ideas which
> really are unworthy of careful thought w
On 2/18/08, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> By the way, Lanier's idea is not original. Hilary Putnam, John Searle,
> Tim Maudlin, Greg Egan, Hans Moravec, David Chalmers (see the paper
> cited by Kaj Sotola in the original thread -
> http://consc.net/papers/rock.html) have all con
On 19/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sorry, but I do not think your conclusion even remotely follows from the
> premises.
>
> But beyond that, the basic reason that this line of argument is
> nonsensical is that Lanier's thought experiment was rigged in such a way
> that a
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 18/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[snip]
But again, none of this touches upon Lanier's attempt to draw a bogus
conclusion from his thought experiment.
No external observer would ever be able to keep track of such a
fragmented computation an
On 18/02/2008, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> My interpretation of Chalmers is the opposite. He seems to say that either
> machine consciousness is possible or human consciousness is not.
Right, Chalmers is a functionalist first and foremost. His "fading
qualia" thought experiment is
--- John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/17/08, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Nevertheless we can make similar reductions to absurdity with respect to
> > qualia, that which distinguishes you from a philosophical zombie. There
> is no
> > experiment to distinguish whether y
On 18/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The last statement you make, though, is not quite correct: with a
> jumbled up sequence of "episodes" during which the various machines were
> running the brain code, he whole would lose its coherence, because input
> from the world wo
On 2/17/08, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Nevertheless we can make similar reductions to absurdity with respect to
> qualia, that which distinguishes you from a philosophical zombie. There is no
> experiment to distinguish whether you actually experience redness when you see
> a red o
--- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 17/02/2008, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > I believe his target is the existence of consciousness. There are many
> proofs
> > showing that the assumption of consciousness leads to absurdities, which I
> > have summarized at
--- John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > > I would prefer to leave behind these counterfactuals altogether and
> > > try to use information theory and control theory to achieve a precise
> > > understanding of what it is for something to
Matt Mahoney wrote:
--- Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
When people like Lanier allow themselves the luxury of positing
infinitely large computers (who else do we know who does this? Ah, yes,
the AIXI folks), they can make infinitely unlikely coincidences happen.
It is a commonl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
The first problem arises from Lanier's trick of claiming that there is a
computer, in the universe of all possible computers, that has a machine
architecture and a machine state that is isomorphic to BOTH the
--- Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> When people like Lanier allow themselves the luxury of positing
> infinitely large computers (who else do we know who does this? Ah, yes,
> the AIXI folks), they can make infinitely unlikely coincidences happen.
It is a commonly accepted practi
On 18/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sure, pretty much anything could be used as a symbol to represent
> anything else, but the representing would consist in the network of
> causal interactions that constitute the symbol manipulation, not in
> the symbols themselves. (And certainly
On 2/17/08, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> If computation is multiply realizable, it could be seen as being
> implemented by an endless variety of physical systems, with the right
> mapping or interpretation, since anything at all could be arbitrarily
> chosen to represent a tape
On 17/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Can you clarify this? What do you mean by "any computation can be
> mapped onto any physical system"? I take it to be uncontroversial that
> computations are multiply realizable or can be implemented by
> different physical substrates but I don't
On 2/17/08, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In the final extrapolation of this idea it becomes clear that if any
> computation can be mapped onto any physical system, the physical
> system is superfluous and the computation resides in the mapping, an
> abstract mathematical object
On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> The first problem arises from Lanier's trick of claiming that there is a
> computer, in the universe of all possible computers, that has a machine
> architecture and a machine state that is isomorphic to BOTH the neural
> state of a bra
On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > I would prefer to leave behind these counterfactuals altogether and
> > try to use information theory and control theory to achieve a precise
> > understanding of what it is for something to be the standard(s) in
> > terms of which we are abl
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
Lanier's rainstorm argument is spurious nonsense.
That's the response of most functionalists, but an explanation as to
why it is spurious nonsense is needed. And some such as Hans Moravec
have actually conc
--- John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > The result will not be pretty. The best definition (not solution) of
> > friendliness is probably CEV ( http://www.singinst.org/upload/CEV.html )
> which
> > can be summarized as "our wish if we knew
On 17/02/2008, Richard Loosemore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Lanier's rainstorm argument is spurious nonsense.
That's the response of most functionalists, but an explanation as to
why it is spurious nonsense is needed. And some such as Hans Moravec
have actually conceded that the argument is val
Eric B. Ramsay wrote:
I don't know when Lanier wrote the following but I would be interested
to know what the AI folks here think about his critique (or direct me to
a thread where this was already discussed). Also would someone be able
to re-state his rainstorm thought experiment more clearly
On 17/02/2008, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I believe his target is the existence of consciousness. There are many proofs
> showing that the assumption of consciousness leads to absurdities, which I
> have summarized at http://www.mattmahoney.net/singularity.html
> In mathematics, it
On 2/16/08, Matt Mahoney <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I believe his target is the existence of consciousness. There are many proofs
> showing that the assumption of consciousness leads to absurdities, which I
> have summarized at http://www.mattmahoney.net/singularity.html
> In mathematics, it sh
On 17/02/2008, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Stathis: Sure, you can't interact with the raindrop computation, but that
> doesn't mean it isn't conscious
>
> Perhaps this conversation helps define something of consciousness - i.e. to
> be conscious, you have to be able to form and HOLD
--- John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On 2/15/08, Eric B. Ramsay <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > http://www.jaronlanier.com/aichapter.html
>
>
> I take it the target of his rainstorm argument is the idea that the
> essential features of consciousness are its information-processing
> p
Stathis: Sure, you can't interact with the raindrop computation, but that
doesn't mean it isn't conscious
Perhaps this conversation helps define something of consciousness - i.e. to
be conscious, you have to be able to form and HOLD a
representation/impression of the world around you, which co
On 16/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In order to really fix this example, it seems he would have to posit
> asteroids whose gravitational effects on each other are genuinely isomorphic
> to all the causal interactions the physical particles making up our brain
> have on each othe
On 16/02/2008, Kaj Sotala <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> However, despite what is claimed, not every physical process can be
> interpreted to do any computation. To do such an interpretation, you
> have to do so after the fact: after all the raindrops have fallen, you
> can assign their positions fo
On 2/15/08, Eric B. Ramsay <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> I don't know when Lanier wrote the following but I would be interested to
> know what the AI folks here think about his critique (or direct me to a
> thread where this was already discussed). Also would someone be able to
> re-state his rain
--- "Eric B. Ramsay" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I don't know when Lanier wrote the following but I would be interested to
> know what the AI folks here think about his critique (or direct me to a
> thread where this was already discussed). Also would someone be able to
> re-state his rainstorm
On 2/16/08, Eric B. Ramsay <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I don't know when Lanier wrote the following but I would be interested to
> know what the AI folks here think about his critique (or direct me to a
> thread where this was already discussed). Also would someone be able to
> re-state his rai
I don't know when Lanier wrote the following but I would be interested to know
what the AI folks here think about his critique (or direct me to a thread where
this was already discussed). Also would someone be able to re-state his
rainstorm thought experiment more clearly -- I am not sure I get
48 matches
Mail list logo
