Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/15/2015 12:58 AM, LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 14:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of quantum probabilities. Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range. One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally likely outcomes (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches; but if a small perturbation is added then there must be many branches to achieve probabilities (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the perturbation the larger the number required. Of course the number required is bounded by our ability to resolve small differences in probability, but in principle it goes as 1/epsilon. I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble. But this somewhat begs the question of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal since we have lost the justification of symmetry. I think this is the measure problem. I believe it's an open question as to whether these systems (angle of rotation of a magnet for example) are continuous or quantised. If quantised then there are merely a (perhaps) very large number of branches but no measure problem. I'm quite willing to say that there can only be finite precision in any physical measurement, so the measurements are effectively quantized even if the theory is built on real numbers. But I don't think that solves the measurement problem. It doesn't justify considering all the possible values equi-probable; that requires some symmetry principle. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: The MGA revisited
On 16 April 2015 at 07:42, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/15/2015 12:58 AM, LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 14:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of quantum probabilities. Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range. One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally likely outcomes (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches; but if a small perturbation is added then there must be many branches to achieve probabilities (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the perturbation the larger the number required. Of course the number required is bounded by our ability to resolve small differences in probability, but in principle it goes as 1/epsilon. I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble. But this somewhat begs the question of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal since we have lost the justification of symmetry. I think this is the measure problem. I believe it's an open question as to whether these systems (angle of rotation of a magnet for example) are continuous or quantised. If quantised then there are merely a (perhaps) very large number of branches but no measure problem. I'm quite willing to say that there can only be finite precision in any physical measurement, so the measurements are effectively quantized even if the theory is built on real numbers. But I don't think that solves the measurement problem. It doesn't justify considering all the possible values equi-probable; that requires some symmetry principle. That wasn't quite what I meant. If the situation is quantised and there is a rational number for each probability then we might for example have a probability of 12345 / 67890 for a given event A (one of two possibilities). This requires (somewhat weirdly, but the logic is OK) that there are 12345 branches in which event A happens, and 67890 - 12345 in which event B happens. All branches are equiprobable, which was my key point. PS I admit this is horrible, as stated! But if all events emerge as macroscopically similar but microscopically distinct, it does at least make sense and avoid the measure-on-infinity problem. PPS see Russell's reply for a different take on this (which I don't quite get, as yet). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving
Re: The MGA revisited
On Wed, Apr 15, 2015 at 12:42:30PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 4/15/2015 12:58 AM, LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 14:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: I believe it's an open question as to whether these systems (angle of rotation of a magnet for example) are continuous or quantised. If quantised then there are merely a (perhaps) very large number of branches but no measure problem. I'm quite willing to say that there can only be finite precision in any physical measurement, so the measurements are effectively quantized even if the theory is built on real numbers. But I don't think that solves the measurement problem. It doesn't justify considering all the possible values equi-probable; that requires some symmetry principle. Brent A continuum of probabilities is not a problem for COMP. UD* (the trace of the UD) is a continuum object (somewhat paradoxically :) - I know a few people have tripped up on that). What is a problem is that measure is not uniquely defined on continuums. It's not even uniquely defined on the real interval [0,1], although there is a standard one we can choose, which correponds to our measuring sticks. What I was trying to get at, though haven't fully succeeded in, is to pin down the measure to a unique possibility by considering symmetries (eg the WM teleporter case) and assigning equipropbability to those. This is how you fix the standard measure on [0,1] - if you assert that [0,0.5] and [0.5,1] have equal measure, and that [0,0.25] and [0.25,0.5] have equal measure and so on down the line, you actually fix the measure of the unit interval to being the standard measure. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 14 April 2015 at 14:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of quantum probabilities. Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range. One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally likely outcomes (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches; but if a small perturbation is added then there must be many branches to achieve probabilities (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the perturbation the larger the number required. Of course the number required is bounded by our ability to resolve small differences in probability, but in principle it goes as 1/epsilon. I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble. But this somewhat begs the question of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal since we have lost the justification of symmetry. I think this is the measure problem. I believe it's an open question as to whether these systems (angle of rotation of a magnet for example) are continuous or quantised. If quantised then there are merely a (perhaps) very large number of branches but no measure problem. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 14:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble. But this somewhat begs the question of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal since we have lost the justification of symmetry. I think this is the measure problem. I believe it's an open question as to whether these systems (angle of rotation of a magnet for example) are continuous or quantised. If quantised then there are merely a (perhaps) very large number of branches but no measure problem. What evidence can be adduced that angle can only take on a discrete set of values? The evidence is very much that space is continuous. Time is not a quantum observable, so it does not make sense to say that it is quantized. So where would angular quantization come from? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 14 Apr 2015, at 04:05, meekerdb wrote: On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of quantum probabilities. Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range. One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally likely outcomes (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches; but if a small perturbation is added then there must be many branches to achieve probabilities (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the perturbation the larger the number required. Of course the number required is bounded by our ability to resolve small differences in probability, but in principle it goes as 1/epsilon. I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble. But this somewhat begs the question of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal We better should not. I am making a pause café right now. The UD does simulate a computation going through my actual state, but with a continuation where I hallucinate that my coffee becomes tea. Well, I hope that the measure of such computations is less than the one in which my coffee gently appears to taste coffee and not tea. since we have lost the justification of symmetry. Yes, that is why we should not consider all those threads as having the same probability. In fact, by the rule Y = II, only those getting highly relatively multiplied have some chance of having a normal and stable measure. I think this is the measure problem. OK. Ah! My coffee tastes coffee! It would not I would bet that I am dreaming in some normal reality, not that computationalism is false. Bruno Brent I know that a branch counting approach to quantum probabilities is disfavoured, though I can't at the moment recall the standard argument. Clearly, the existence of real-valued probabilities, not restricted to rational values, is a strong factor. But there is also the fact that in the two-dimensional Hilbert space associated with spin 1/2 projections, one only ever has two possible outcomes for an experiment -- why should the number of branches one must consider depend on the angle of the magnet? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to
Re: The MGA revisited
On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on this. Why (to keep it simple) would a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes not reproduce the correct probabilities in the MWI? (Or is that a special case where it would?) No, MWI does not predict an infinite number of branches for any measurement. It predicts a number of branches equal to the number of possible distinct outcomes for the measurement. So how does the MWI deal with a measurement with a 3/4 probability of outcome 1 and a 1/4 probability of outcome 2? This was Larry Niven's objection to many worlds back around the time he wrote All the myriad ways and it seems to me that someone else would have noticed it in the intervening 50 years (or whatever) ! How come anyone takes MWI seriously if it's actually supposed to work like this? The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable *to us*. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? I do not take MWI seriously. Yes, I get that :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/13/2015 4:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of quantum probabilities. Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range. One argument against branch counting is that if you have two equally likely outcomes (which can be judged by symmetry) there are two branches; but if a small perturbation is added then there must be many branches to achieve probabilities (0.5-epsilon) and (0.5+epsilon) and the smaller the perturbation the larger the number required. Of course the number required is bounded by our ability to resolve small differences in probability, but in principle it goes as 1/epsilon. I think Bruno's answer to this is that for every such experiment there are arbitrarily many threads of the UD going throught at experiment and this provides the order 1/epsilon ensemble. But this somewhat begs the question of why we should consider the probabilities of all those threads to be equal since we have lost the justification of symmetry. I think this is the measure problem. Brent I know that a branch counting approach to quantum probabilities is disfavoured, though I can't at the moment recall the standard argument. Clearly, the existence of real-valued probabilities, not restricted to rational values, is a strong factor. But there is also the fact that in the two-dimensional Hilbert space associated with spin 1/2 projections, one only ever has two possible outcomes for an experiment -- why should the number of branches one must consider depend on the angle of the magnet? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
LizR wrote: On 14 April 2015 at 00:42, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. In an article published in the 60s (I think) Larry Niven pointed out that the MWI lead to the following situation - if you throw a dice you have 6 outcomes, i.e. 6 branches. But a loaded dice should favour (say) the branch where it lands on 6. Hence the MWI doesn't work. My reaction to this (when I first read it, probably several decades ago now) was that you only have 6 MACROSCOPIC outcomes - like derivations of the second law of thermodynamics, Niven's description of the system relies on microstates being indistinguishable /to us/. But once you take this into account there are more microstates ending with a 6 uppermost - and hence a lot more than 6 branches - the MWI again makes sense using branch counting, at least for non-quantum dice (I may not have known terms like microstates at the time, nor was it called the MWI, but that was basically what I thought). I do not think that classical analogies can ever get to the heart of quantum probabilities. Can't the same be true of any quantum event? The essential requirement is that any quantum event leads to results which can be assigned a rational number, rather than an irrational one. This gives us a finite number of branches, and counting to get the probability. Or do quantum events lead to results with irrational numbered probabilities? Quantum probabilities are not required to be rational: any real value between 0 and 1 is possible. For example, if you prepare a Silver atom in a spin up state then pass it through another S-G magnet oriented at an angle alpha to the original, the probability that the atom will pass the second magnet in the up channel is cos^2(alpha/2). This can take on any real value in the range. I know that a branch counting approach to quantum probabilities is disfavoured, though I can't at the moment recall the standard argument. Clearly, the existence of real-valued probabilities, not restricted to rational values, is a strong factor. But there is also the fact that in the two-dimensional Hilbert space associated with spin 1/2 projections, one only ever has two possible outcomes for an experiment -- why should the number of branches one must consider depend on the angle of the magnet? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 03:19:22PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Yes, but this is not a problem if your ontology is robust. You have the full resources of Platonia available, and all observer moment instantiations happen. There are completed infinities in Platonia? There may be, but they're not needed. Just every finite computation is required, which will happen provided your ontology has unbounded resources. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on this. Why (to keep it simple) would a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes not reproduce the correct probabilities in the MWI? (Or is that a special case where it would?) No, MWI does not predict an infinite number of branches for any measurement. It predicts a number of branches equal to the number of possible distinct outcomes for the measurement. So how does the MWI deal with a measurement with a 3/4 probability of outcome 1 and a 1/4 probability of outcome 2? This was Larry Niven's objection to many worlds back around the time he wrote All the myriad ways and it seems to me that someone else would have noticed it in the intervening 50 years (or whatever) ! How come anyone takes MWI seriously if it's actually supposed to work like this? The classical duplication model of step 3 cannot reproduce quantum probabilities because it relies on branch counting. Well that's OK because it isn't attempting to reproduce quantum probabilities at that point, as far as I know. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 13 Apr 2015, at 07:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If we compare this to FPI in the MW Interpretation of quantum mechanics we see that this is just a branch counting account of quantum probabilities. Now it is well-known that this fails to reproduce the correct quantum probabilities in MWI. So FPI as via Step 3 and FPI as in MWI are intrinsically different. Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on this. Why (to keep it simple) would a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes not reproduce the correct probabilities in the MWI? (Or is that a special case where it would?) No, MWI does not predict an infinite number of branches for any measurement. It predicts a number of branches equal to the number of possible distinct outcomes for the measurement. The classical duplication model of step 3 cannot reproduce quantum probabilities because it relies on branch counting. There are only ever two branches for a measurement in a 2-dim Hilberst space, but the probabilities can take on any real values between 0 and 1. Foe a spin measurement with the appropriate magnet orientation you can have a probability of 1/pi for Up (and 1 - 1/pi for Down). This cannot be reproduced by observer duplication as in step 3. David Deutsh has his own peculiar take on many worlds. Most people would consider his isea of a 'world' to be premature. In the developed MWI, with decoherence, eiselection and the rest, a worl emerges only after decoherence and orthogonalization. In this picture, worlds are disjoint and can never interfere or recombine. When we go to the full dovetailer stage we get multiple copies of the same conscious instant. If we interpret these as repetitions of the same quantum experiment (say a Stern-Gerlach spin measurement), we get some sequences of Up and Down results. I'm not sure I understand this. Why do we need to interpret these copies (an infinite number, if the UD is able to run for an infinite time) as repetitions of the experiment? Personally, I have only compared the MWI with step 3 for John Clark's benefit, since he insists there is some problem with pronouns in step 3, but not in the MWI. The extent to which they are the same is that they produce both FPI from splitting or differentiation of fungible observers. But at this stage there is no need to take this any further. I'm just trying to help Mr Clark get his head around this particular point, and since comp assumes classical computation I wouldn't expect it to reproduce quantum probabilities simplistically - if it's going to work, it needs to produce them as an end result, not be expected to produce them until the entire logic of the argument has been examined. (Bruno claims to have produced some sort of quantum results at the far end of the comp argument, but I haven't got that far myself.) But in so far as the duplication ideas of Step 3 are involved, the Born Rule of quantum probabilities will not be reproduced, since that cannot be obtained by branch counting in the MWI. OK. I believe that this is not the intention of step 3. It's only a metaphorical comparison for people who suffer from pronoun trouble, or only an exact comparison to the extent that both give a form of FPI. To assume this is the final result is to be too quick. But it is introduced as an illustration of FPI, and the comparison with MWI is made. I merely point out that this comparison is not valid. You did not. You take the MWI before Graham refuted it. Deutsch is more right on this than most, even in physics. But, we don't postulate a physical reality, and with UDA-step 7, Deustch view is proved, in comp. That his solution remains valid for QM is what the math should show or refute. As I said in a recent post, I think John Clark's trouble with the use of personal pronouns stems from a hasty glossing of questions of personal identity in brain substitution/duplication scenarios. I find Nozick's closest continuer notion a useful starting point. He takes personal identity to follow the closest continuer of the initial state, provided there is no closer or tied continuation. If there is a tie (as in step 3), the rule is that two new persons are created. I think this solves John's personal pronoun issue. However, this does need to be discussed more fully. OK, but as you seem to have seen, Nozick theory is refuted by computationalism, through steps 2, 3 and 4. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: The MGA revisited
On 13 Apr 2015, at 09:49, LizR wrote: On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on this. Why (to keep it simple) would a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes not reproduce the correct probabilities in the MWI? (Or is that a special case where it would?) No, MWI does not predict an infinite number of branches for any measurement. It predicts a number of branches equal to the number of possible distinct outcomes for the measurement. So how does the MWI deal with a measurement with a 3/4 probability of outcome 1 and a 1/4 probability of outcome 2? This was Larry Niven's objection to many worlds back around the time he wrote All the myriad ways and it seems to me that someone else would have noticed it in the intervening 50 years (or whatever) ! How come anyone takes MWI seriously if it's actually supposed to work like this? The classical duplication model of step 3 cannot reproduce quantum probabilities because it relies on branch counting. Well that's OK because it isn't attempting to reproduce quantum probabilities at that point, as far as I know. Yes. Counting the branching stop to make any sense already at step seven. It works only in the ideal protocol of the first six steps. Getting directly the physical MWI can perhaps be partially done, but then we need to introduce thought experiment with amnesia, to merge the computations, and get the interference. This is not necessary given that we redo the thing mathematically, and indeed derive some quantum logic, without needing to introduce non monotonical logic (to get amnesy). Now, I certainly encourage people interested to try to get most of the quantum without math by adding thought experience with amnesia. Good exercise. That can be used also to understand that personal identity is an indexical illusion (like now, here, this that, etc.). It is *purely* phenomenological, like matter should be after step 8. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
LizR wrote: On 13 April 2015 at 17:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on this. Why (to keep it simple) would a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes not reproduce the correct probabilities in the MWI? (Or is that a special case where it would?) No, MWI does not predict an infinite number of branches for any measurement. It predicts a number of branches equal to the number of possible distinct outcomes for the measurement. So how does the MWI deal with a measurement with a 3/4 probability of outcome 1 and a 1/4 probability of outcome 2? This was Larry Niven's objection to many worlds back around the time he wrote All the myriad ways and it seems to me that someone else would have noticed it in the intervening 50 years (or whatever) ! How come anyone takes MWI seriously if it's actually supposed to work like this? The expansion of the wave function in the einselected basis of the measurement operator has certain coefficients. The probabilities are the absolute magnitudes of these squared. That is the Born Rule. MWI advocates try hard to derive the Born Rule from MWI, but they have failed to date. I think they always will fail because, as has been pointed out, the separate worlds of the MWI that are required before you can derive a probability measure already assume the Born Rule. The argument is at best circular, and probably even incoherent. I do not take MWI seriously. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
LizR wrote: mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If we compare this to FPI in the MW Interpretation of quantum mechanics we see that this is just a branch counting account of quantum probabilities. Now it is well-known that this fails to reproduce the correct quantum probabilities in MWI. So FPI as via Step 3 and FPI as in MWI are intrinsically different. Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on this. Why (to keep it simple) would a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes not reproduce the correct probabilities in the MWI? (Or is that a special case where it would?) No, MWI does not predict an infinite number of branches for any measurement. It predicts a number of branches equal to the number of possible distinct outcomes for the measurement. The classical duplication model of step 3 cannot reproduce quantum probabilities because it relies on branch counting. There are only ever two branches for a measurement in a 2-dim Hilberst space, but the probabilities can take on any real values between 0 and 1. Foe a spin measurement with the appropriate magnet orientation you can have a probability of 1/pi for Up (and 1 - 1/pi for Down). This cannot be reproduced by observer duplication as in step 3. David Deutsh has his own peculiar take on many worlds. Most people would consider his isea of a 'world' to be premature. In the developed MWI, with decoherence, eiselection and the rest, a worl emerges only after decoherence and orthogonalization. In this picture, worlds are disjoint and can never interfere or recombine. When we go to the full dovetailer stage we get multiple copies of the same conscious instant. If we interpret these as repetitions of the same quantum experiment (say a Stern-Gerlach spin measurement), we get some sequences of Up and Down results. I'm not sure I understand this. Why do we need to interpret these copies (an infinite number, if the UD is able to run for an infinite time) as repetitions of the experiment? Personally, I have only compared the MWI with step 3 for John Clark's benefit, since he insists there is some problem with pronouns in step 3, but not in the MWI. The extent to which they are the same is that they produce both FPI from splitting or differentiation of fungible observers. But at this stage there is no need to take this any further. I'm just trying to help Mr Clark get his head around this particular point, and since comp assumes classical computation I wouldn't expect it to reproduce quantum probabilities simplistically - if it's going to work, it needs to produce them as an end result, not be expected to produce them until the entire logic of the argument has been examined. (Bruno claims to have produced some sort of quantum results at the far end of the comp argument, but I haven't got that far myself.) But in so far as the duplication ideas of Step 3 are involved, the Born Rule of quantum probabilities will not be reproduced, since that cannot be obtained by branch counting in the MWI. OK. I believe that this is not the intention of step 3. It's only a metaphorical comparison for people who suffer from pronoun trouble, or only an exact comparison to the extent that both give a form of FPI. To assume this is the final result is to be too quick. But it is introduced as an illustration of FPI, and the comparison with MWI is made. I merely point out that this comparison is not valid. As I said in a recent post, I think John Clark's trouble with the use of personal pronouns stems from a hasty glossing of questions of personal identity in brain substitution/duplication scenarios. I find Nozick's closest continuer notion a useful starting point. He takes personal identity to follow the closest continuer of the initial state, provided there is no closer or tied continuation. If there is a tie (as in step 3), the rule is that two new persons are created. I think this solves John's personal pronoun issue. However, this does need to be discussed more fully. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Apr 09, 2015 at 03:59:41PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: OK. But the problem would be that for any particular realization of a conscious moment at some finite step number there are still an infinite number of uncomputed realizations of the same conscious moment, most of which are in different environments. Are such identical conscious moments at different step numbers distinct? Or different instances of the same moment (hence FPI)? Are they treated differently or summed over? In which case the fact the infinitely many of them are not computed at any given point becomes something of a worry. Yes, but this is not a problem if your ontology is robust. You have the full resources of Platonia available, and all observer moment instantiations happen. There are completed infinities in Platonia? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Thu, Apr 09, 2015 at 03:59:41PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: OK. But the problem would be that for any particular realization of a conscious moment at some finite step number there are still an infinite number of uncomputed realizations of the same conscious moment, most of which are in different environments. Are such identical conscious moments at different step numbers distinct? Or different instances of the same moment (hence FPI)? Are they treated differently or summed over? In which case the fact the infinitely many of them are not computed at any given point becomes something of a worry. Yes, but this is not a problem if your ontology is robust. You have the full resources of Platonia available, and all observer moment instantiations happen. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 10 April 2015 at 13:17, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: I thought I had explained that. But there is a problem about how probabilities are determined that might make it clearer. I haven't found a clear account of this from Bruno, but the following from a discussion of Step 3 in his 2013 paper might be relevant. He is talking about the fact that duplication leads to FPI. Likewise, it is easy to see that if such a self-duplication experiment is iterated, say n times, the majority of the 2n reconstituted people will be unable to compress algorithmically the information bits the got after finally perceiving where they actually were reconstituted. In fact, from their perspectives, via this protocol, the number of times they reach Tokyo (resp. London) will follow the binomial distribution. [...] It leads to an objective probability applied to subjective (first person) outcomes. Later, he says that he will use P(Tokyo) = P(London) = 0.5, if only to settle on a determination. There are a couple of mistakes in this, but they may not be terminal. In the first place it is not clear what Bruno means by iterations of the experiment. If each 'person' is to accumulate a sequence of experiences of Tokyo or London, then after each duplication run, the resulting 'persons' must be returned to Brussels and duplicated again, one copy of the second duplication to Tokyo and one to London. So after the second run there will be 4 copies, not just 2. Likewise, after 3 iterations there will be eight copies; after n iterations there will be 2^n copies, not 2n. These copies will all have distinct sequences of T or L experiences. In fact, every possible sequence, from TT... to LL... will be represented. Over this set, the distribution will indeed follow the binomial with p = 0.5. The fact the the probability is 1/2 is simply a result of the fact that there was one duplication with two possible outcomes for each 'person' at each step. If we compare this to FPI in the MW Interpretation of quantum mechanics we see that this is just a branch counting account of quantum probabilities. Now it is well-known that this fails to reproduce the correct quantum probabilities in MWI. So FPI as via Step 3 and FPI as in MWI are intrinsically different. Does the MWI predict an infinite number of branches from any given measurement? I'm not sure (from FOR) that the MWI predicts branches at all, so much as differentiation within a continuum? Maybe you could expand on this. Why (to keep it simple) would a quantum experiment with two possible outcomes not reproduce the correct probabilities in the MWI? (Or is that a special case where it would?) When we go to the full dovetailer stage we get multiple copies of the same conscious instant. If we interpret these as repetitions of the same quantum experiment (say a Stern-Gerlach spin measurement), we get some sequences of Up and Down results. I'm not sure I understand this. Why do we need to interpret these copies (an infinite number, if the UD is able to run for an infinite time) as repetitions of the experiment? Personally, I have only compared the MWI with step 3 for John Clark's benefit, since he insists there is some problem with pronouns in step 3, but not in the MWI. The extent to which they are the same is that they produce both FPI from splitting or differentiation of fungible observers. But at this stage there is no need to take this any further. I'm just trying to help Mr Clark get his head around this particular point, and since comp assumes classical computation I wouldn't expect it to reproduce quantum probabilities simplistically - if it's going to work, it needs to produce them as an end result, not be expected to produce them until the entire logic of the argument has been examined. (Bruno claims to have produced some sort of quantum results at the far end of the comp argument, but I haven't got that far myself.) But in so far as the duplication ideas of Step 3 are involved, the Born Rule of quantum probabilities will not be reproduced, since that cannot be obtained by branch counting in the MWI. OK. I believe that this is not the intention of step 3. It's only a metaphorical comparison for people who suffer from pronoun trouble, or only an exact comparison to the extent that both give a form of FPI. To assume this is the final result is to be too quick. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 09 Apr 2015, at 09:22, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Yes, I had misread how that works. But who wrote the programs it executes? Who wrote the scheduler? Let us say God. But with computationalism, God needs only to create the natural numbers, and addition, and multiplication. With physicalism God needs to create a physical universe, the psychological universe, the mathematics, the link between, Rubbish. If the physical universe is primary, consciousness supervenes on the physical Then computationalism is false; or there is a flaw in the UDA. I am quite open to the idea, but you have to show were precisely. and the situation is no different than with comp, where you have to explain the appearance of the physical. But up to now, this works, even if it explains physics in the opposite direction as it explains first the quantum weirdness, the the logic of observable, the symmetry of the Hamiltoinian,etc. If you have to appeal to God, then the origin of the physical universe can be no problem for you. Well, I use God in Plato sense: it means the truth we search. Physicalism is way ahead on this comparison. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain as can be seen by the fact that external modifications to the brain modify consciousness, and conscious thoughts modify the brain. The evidence is overwhelming here. I don't see any. The MGA shows that the appeal to a primary universe just cannot work, unless you believe in non-comp sort of magic. Mathematics is developed as a response to distinct but similar things in the physical universe. Again, the origin of mathematics does not present any difficulty for physicalism. Neither does the relationship between the physical and the mathematical. You are quick here. Find the flaw in the UDA. Your argument here seems to be an argument by incredulity, but I gave the reasoning, decomposed in easy steps, so you should be able to say where things get wrong. Search for the MGA in the archive. May be use my last paper(*). I don't find it right now, I think Kim gave a link, with some typo and spelling corrected. The MGA is only referred to in the sane04 paper. Bruno (*) Bruno Marchal. The computationalist reformulation of the mind-body problem, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, Volume 113, Issue 1, September 2013, Pages 127–140 Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Russell Standish wrote: Perhaps you need to study the UD algorithm. For any program x, there will be finitely numbered step on the algorithm when the first instruction is executed. Similarly for the nth step of program x. Presumably, for any given observer moment, only a finite number of steps are required to emulate that observer moment, so the UD will run enough of a given program to emulate any observer moment within a finite amount of CPU time. OK. But the problem would be that for any particular realization of a conscious moment at some finite step number there are still an infinite number of uncomputed realizations of the same conscious moment, most of which are in different environments. Are such identical conscious moments at different step numbers distinct? Or different instances of the same moment (hence FPI)? Are they treated differently or summed over? In which case the fact the infinitely many of them are not computed at any given point becomes something of a worry. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 09 Apr 2015, at 03:16, meekerdb wrote: On 4/8/2015 5:34 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 April 2015 at 11:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the same sense that prime number exist. Which is merely as thought patterns in the brains of physical beings. A large (and familiar on this list) metaphysical leap, which fails to explain how two cultures can discover the same maths, or indeed why maths kicks back at all. I don't think it fails in that respect at all. Different cultures live in the same universe with the same physics. Cultures are made up of entities that compete in the Darwinian sense. So they are bound to have the concept of units, addition, etc. It seems to me that it may more of a problem to explain the conceptualization of arithmetic in Bruno's TOE, even though it's built on arithmetic. The entities in it that are conscious may have Borg like consciousness with no concept of individuals - they are all aware of the truths of arithmetic, so they all have the same thoughts. They are aware of their beliefs/assumption/axioms/theories. They are extensions of arithmetic, like PA + I am in Helsinki + what they can deduce from that. Then, it is shown that hey have a rich theology including physics, so we can compare with the empirical physics. About Mars Rover, I don't know the program, and how much it has self- referential abilities. I doubt Mars Rover is Löbian, so his consciousness might the same as a ... salvia smoker (out of time and without any memory). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 09 Apr 2015, at 07:59, Bruce Kellett wrote: Russell Standish wrote: Perhaps you need to study the UD algorithm. For any program x, there will be finitely numbered step on the algorithm when the first instruction is executed. Similarly for the nth step of program x. Presumably, for any given observer moment, only a finite number of steps are required to emulate that observer moment, so the UD will run enough of a given program to emulate any observer moment within a finite amount of CPU time. OK. But the problem would be that for any particular realization of a conscious moment at some finite step number there are still an infinite number of uncomputed realizations of the same conscious moment, most of which are in different environments. Are such identical conscious moments at different step numbers distinct? Good question. If they can diverge they are distinct. I use the Y = II. If a computation diverge, this bactrack on its past in the UD* (the execution of the UD). Or different instances of the same moment (hence FPI)? Different instances, if they can diverge in principle. But I avoid some difficult question by interviewing the self-referential machine. Are they treated differently or summed over? In which case the fact the infinitely many of them are not computed at any given point becomes something of a worry. I am not sure why, because the first persons are not aware of the UD delays. So, all computations which can diverge are summed over. Again, I prefer to interview the machine, and get general responses constrained by the logic of self-reference. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Apr 2015, at 01:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: One can get as much by adding a few random numbers to any mix. Your 'many worlds' have nothing to do with Everett. Well, if they differ, then either QM is false or comp is false. But it is the whole point: to make thing precise enough so that we can compare them. If you see already that they are different, please give the proof. As far as I can tell, your 'many worlds, or FPI' comes from the observation that infinitely many copies of any particular conscious moment are generated by the dovetailer. These occur in different environments, with different continuations, hence FPI. In comp there is no dynamics relating the different possible continuations of the moment, and there is no connection with measurement or measurement outcomes -- the indeterminacy applies to every conscious moment. In the Everett of MWI interpretation of QM, you have a deterministic wave equation (the SE) which determines the evolution of the wave function. In a measurement interaction, the wave function is expanded in terms of the complete set of eigvenvectors of the measurement operator. Each term in this expansion corresponds to a particular eigenvalue as the result of the measurement. Decoherence then means that interaction with the environment leads to the diagonalization of the corresponding density matrix. So what were once interfering terms in an expansion in Hilbert space evolve into separate worlds, in each of which a different measurement result obtains. I do not see any relationship, or even any real similarity between these two models, apart from the fact that they both give indeterminacy in a deterministic model. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Yes, I had misread how that works. But who wrote the programs it executes? Who wrote the scheduler? Let us say God. But with computationalism, God needs only to create the natural numbers, and addition, and multiplication. With physicalism God needs to create a physical universe, the psychological universe, the mathematics, the link between, Rubbish. If the physical universe is primary, consciousness supervenes on the physical and the situation is no different than with comp, where you have to explain the appearance of the physical. If you have to appeal to God, then the origin of the physical universe can be no problem for you. Physicalism is way ahead on this comparison. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain as can be seen by the fact that external modifications to the brain modify consciousness, and conscious thoughts modify the brain. The evidence is overwhelming here. Mathematics is developed as a response to distinct but similar things in the physical universe. Again, the origin of mathematics does not present any difficulty for physicalism. Neither does the relationship between the physical and the mathematical. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 09 Apr 2015, at 01:29, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: The main point is that for a physical universe to exists in some primary form, you have to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable. Not so. You essentially admit as much in the 'yes doctor' scenario. If you are happy to replace your physical brain with one simulated in a computer, then you are saying that the physical brain is Turing emulable. The relevant part for my consciousness. No need to emulate the whole physics of the brain. This stands to reason if you believe that the brain is essentially classical in its operation -- it is large and warm so quantum effects decohere far too rapidly to have any significant large-scale effect. The operation of this physical object is then completely classical, and determined by physical laws that are deterministic. If you know the laws and the initial conditions, then the future activity of that brain can be completely calculated on a computer. Even if it is a quantum computer. OK. The problem, of course, arises with the requirement that you know, or can determine, the initial conditions. I suggest that this is impossible in principle. Physical limitations are such that in any attempt to extract a complete map of the state of a living brain at any instant, the machinery would destroy the brain *before* any such map could be completed. That is not really relevant. I suppose a high comp level in step 1-6, to ease the argument, but at step seven, we need only the concrete UD, and at step 8 the UD which exist and is run in arithmetic. 'Yes doctor' fails because the necessary starting conditions cannot be realized for physical reasons. OK. But then comp is already false, and you make my point. This does not mean that one cannot create a physical computer that completely models the human brain -- in other words, you could create a conscious human-like entity. But you would necessarily always create a /different/ person in this way, not a copy of an existing person. That depends on the level, and is not relevant for the reversal. Your FPI still rely on just the copies in arithmetic, after step 7 and 8. But whether these means that consciousness is primarily computational or primarily physical is just a matter of which way the rabbit jumps. ? Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 09 Apr 2015, at 01:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the same sense that prime number exist. Which is merely as thought patterns in the brains of physical beings. In which theory? You assume many things. The axioms I gave on numbers did not refer to brains or anything physical. I might ask you to put all your assumption on the table. I think that you confuse numbers, and human conception of the number. If you explain what is a number by a human brain, I will ask you to give me a theory of brain not using the notion of numbers. Perhaps you meant its existence in a physical universe. But we don't know if there is a physical universe, I think we do know that. Your point, it seems, is merely that this is not primary, not that it doesn't exist. Yes, I meant But we don't know if there is a primary physical universe, which is what you were assuming in your answer. and the point, to sum up, is that it will be easier to explain the *appearance* of a physical universe to the entities in arithmetic, than to explain the appearance of arithmetic to physical beings. But you haven't explained the appearance of a physical universe in arithmetic. ? No, I did. All appearances are easily explained, once you assume comp, and understand that arithmetical truth (a tiny part of it) emulates all computations, notably the one which we associate consciousness to. What is hard is to justify the stability, but there are already non trivial results. And then the point is that we have no choice in the matter: if comp is true, even if there is a primary universe, it is useless to invoke it in the explanation. And the appearance of arithmetic in a physical universe is trivially easy to explain -- we abstract the numbers from our experience of objects and of multiple copies of similar objects. No mystery here. The point of MGA is that such an explanation does not work, even in a small primary universe. But the UDA go farer. It shows that if we assume the brain function like a (natural) machine, then we have no choice (unless adding some amount of magic). No need for magic: it is all in the physics. Then you need to find a flaw in step 7 and/or Step 8. And so far there is no evidence that it can produce anything like the physical universe we observe. This shows you are still not reading the work with the necessary attention. There are evidences, of different type. I predict the many worlds appearance a long time before reading Everett and understanding that QM gives some evidence for computationalism (for which evidences also exists). Then the math extract a quantum logic exactly where it must appear. This is all quite trivial, and unimpressive to the physicist. Because he seems to abstract away from the mind-body problem. Please read the proof. Also, getting indeterminacy local non locality, non cloning, symmetry, and with some luck the non linearity from elementary arithmetic (+ comp at the meta-level) is a good beginning, for a theory which does not eliminate consciousness, and explain the difference between the qualia and the quanta. You forget we find the quanta at the place UDA says that if comp is true they must appear. It is not a formalization of the assumed idea of quanta. Most people thought it was impossible, at the start. One can get as much by adding a few random numbers to any mix. Your 'many worlds' have nothing to do with Everett. Well, if they differ, then either QM is false or comp is false. But it is the whole point: to make thing precise enough so that we can compare them. If you see already that they are different, please give the proof. Primary physicality is a lot simpler. Occam's razor to the fore Not at all. It assumes a primary physical reality, a mathemaytical reality, some starnge relation between math and physcis, and between mind and physics. The TOE extracted from computationalism assume only elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent). The relationship between maths and physics is not at all strange or mysterious. We evolved in a
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Apr 2015, at 09:34, Bruce Kellett wrote: I do not see any relationship, or even any real similarity between these two models, apart from the fact that they both give indeterminacy in a deterministic model. The point made is logical. IF comp is true, they have to be the same, and then the math, up to now, confirms it. The logic is that they are different, therefore comp is false. You rely a lot on your absolute faith that comp is true, so in your mind these things have to work. The fact that they don't work is a flaw in the physics according to you -- not that comp is false. I am a physicist, I judge theories by the results they give. If a theory does not agree with observation, then the theory is flawed. Your theory does not give the MWI results, therefore your theory is either deeply flawed or false. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 09 Apr 2015, at 09:34, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Apr 2015, at 01:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: One can get as much by adding a few random numbers to any mix. Your 'many worlds' have nothing to do with Everett. Well, if they differ, then either QM is false or comp is false. But it is the whole point: to make thing precise enough so that we can compare them. If you see already that they are different, please give the proof. As far as I can tell, your 'many worlds, or FPI' comes from the observation that infinitely many copies of any particular conscious moment are generated by the dovetailer. Not really. The DU executes program. if my lmevel is low, it mlight need the rational (with 10^100 decimals) quantum description of the Milky Way. As we cannot know our subst level with certainty, the reasoning must not fix some level a priori. These occur in different environments, with different continuations, hence FPI. In comp there is no dynamics relating the different possible continuations of the moment, Yes, there is. The dynamics is given by the universal numbers which run s the computation. They are those linking the computational states. Then the FPI links the observer moments. Both the computations and the FPI are at play. and there is no connection with measurement or measurement outcomes -- the indeterminacy applies to every conscious moment. In the Everett of MWI interpretation of QM, you have a deterministic wave equation (the SE) which determines the evolution of the wave function. In a measurement interaction, the wave function is expanded in terms of the complete set of eigvenvectors of the measurement operator. Each term in this expansion corresponds to a particular eigenvalue as the result of the measurement. Decoherence then means that interaction with the environment leads to the diagonalization of the corresponding density matrix. So what were once interfering terms in an expansion in Hilbert space evolve into separate worlds, in each of which a different measurement result obtains. I do not see any relationship, or even any real similarity between these two models, apart from the fact that they both give indeterminacy in a deterministic model. The point made is logical. IF comp is true, they have to be the same, and then the math, up to now, confirms it. It would not if there were no incompleteness, if Theatetu's theory could not work on Gödel beweisbar, etc. You need to read the math part, but it is better to settle the complete UDA first, I think. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 09 Apr 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 4/8/2015 4:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: 'Yes doctor' fails because the necessary starting conditions cannot be realized for physical reasons. This does not mean that one cannot create a physical computer that completely models the human brain -- in other words, you could create a conscious human-like entity. But you would necessarily always create a /different/ person in this way, not a copy of an existing person. And not only because of initial conditions, but also because of interaction with the environment. This can't be negligble, because it is what makes the computations of the brain classical (or nearly so) and besides the incidental interactions I think perception is also necessary. Both of these will cause any replicated brain to instantly diverge from it's original. I think this is where Bruno appeals to FPI. But I think it is also why you say that we need to simulate some or all of the environment as well as the brain itself if we are to make sense of personal survival. At the moment, Bruno's dovetailer cannot do this because it picks out only 'conscious moments' and does not find them only in reproducible environments. There is no physics there, so Boltzmann brains outnumber 'people' by infinity to one. Proof? If that is the cse, then computationalism is false. But you need more than the 'number' of realization is arithmetic, you need to define the inside views or the person points of view. This add the constraints whioch up to now show that we have a non trivial physics. I guess I might explain more on this later. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 8 April 2015 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Seems a lot simpler to have a primary physical universe. Then all you have to do is explore it. If simplicity is the key, then it's a lot simpler to have a Newtonian universe. In fact, it's even simpler to have one with just atoms and the void and four (or is it five?) alchemical elements. The only reason to make things as complicated as necessary, (but no more) is because this gives us extra explanatory power that simpler theories lack. Bruno, for example, is trying to explain the nature of consciousness using a relatively simple and uncontroversial theory, and seeing where it leads. If you *start *from where it leads (the UDA and MGA and so on) then of course it looks complicated. But so does GR, if you start from the final equations ... but GR also starts from a very simple principle, and sees where it leads. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the same sense that prime number exist. Perhaps you meant its existence in a physical universe. But we don't know if there is a physical universe, and the point, to sum up, is that it will be easier to explain the *appearance* of a physical universe to the entities in arithmetic, than to explain the appearance of arithmetic to physical beings. But the UDA go farer. It shows that if we assume the brain function like a (natural) machine, then we have no choice (unless adding some amount of magic). And so far there is no evidence that it can produce anything like the physical universe we observe. This shows you are still not reading the work with the necessary attention. There are evidences, of different type. I predict the many worlds appearance a long time before reading Everett and understanding that QM gives some evidence for computationalism (for which evidences also exists). Then the math extract a quantum logic exactly where it must appear. Primary physicality is a lot simpler. Occam's razor to the fore Not at all. It assumes a primary physical reality, a mathemaytical reality, some starnge relation between math and physcis, and between mind and physics. The TOE extracted from computationalism assume only elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent). The UD works a bit on the first execution, then a bit on the second execution, and then comes back on the first, then the second, then the third, and then come back to the first, etc. In that way, the UD executes all computations, including all those who never stop. Yes, I had misread how that works. But who wrote the programs it executes? Who wrote the scheduler? Let us say God. But with computationalism, God needs only to create the natural numbers, and addition, and multiplication. With physicalism God needs to create a physical universe, the psychological universe, the mathematics, the link between, and the UDA shows you need actual infinities to make the binding. Keep in mind that the goal is to explain where the physical *and* psychological laws come from, and what are their relations. Seems a lot simpler to have a primary physical universe. Then all you have to do is explore it. No problem if that is your goal, but the goal in this list is to figure out what reality can be, and get a deeper understanding how and why all this exists at all, and how consciousness is related to physicalness. The main point is that for a physical universe to exists in some primary form, you have to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable. May be you are not interested in the mind-body problem, but that problem is complex, and with comp, to solve it, there is no choice other than abandoning Aristotle theology (used by anti-theist and most muslim and christians, and some others) and come back to Plato's theology, where the physical emerges, or even is a sort of illusion, from arithmetic through the mind of the universal machine. Universal machine have a crazily interesting platonist theology, which is 99,999% pure mathematics, including physics, and so is testable, and that is the main point. Up to now, the tests confirm it. I am not proposing any new theory. I shows results verified by courageous people who just took the time to study the points with some care. That took years. No one doubt that such results can seem shocking for Aristotelian believers (still a vast majority of scientists and believers), as it extends Everett to arithmetic and eventually forces us to come back to Pythagorus' and Plato's type of conception of reality. But that is the scientific adventure: we cannot put the conceptual problems (like the mind-body) under the rug for ever, and some time we must revised our most fundamental belief. I love as much as you the physical universe, and I find nice that its roots and foundation are purely arithmetical. Matter is no more a primitive, but that makes it even more solid, as you can derive its appearance and stability (hopefully) from elementary arithmetic, which is the thing I doubt the
Re: The MGA revisited
meekerdb wrote: On 4/8/2015 4:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: 'Yes doctor' fails because the necessary starting conditions cannot be realized for physical reasons. This does not mean that one cannot create a physical computer that completely models the human brain -- in other words, you could create a conscious human-like entity. But you would necessarily always create a /different/ person in this way, not a copy of an existing person. And not only because of initial conditions, but also because of interaction with the environment. This can't be negligble, because it is what makes the computations of the brain classical (or nearly so) and besides the incidental interactions I think perception is also necessary. Both of these will cause any replicated brain to instantly diverge from it's original. I think this is where Bruno appeals to FPI. But I think it is also why you say that we need to simulate some or all of the environment as well as the brain itself if we are to make sense of personal survival. At the moment, Bruno's dovetailer cannot do this because it picks out only 'conscious moments' and does not find them only in reproducible environments. There is no physics there, so Boltzmann brains outnumber 'people' by infinity to one. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the same sense that prime number exist. Which is merely as thought patterns in the brains of physical beings. Perhaps you meant its existence in a physical universe. But we don't know if there is a physical universe, I think we do know that. Your point, it seems, is merely that this is not primary, not that it doesn't exist. and the point, to sum up, is that it will be easier to explain the *appearance* of a physical universe to the entities in arithmetic, than to explain the appearance of arithmetic to physical beings. But you haven't explained the appearance of a physical universe in arithmetic. And the appearance of arithmetic in a physical universe is trivially easy to explain -- we abstract the numbers from our experience of objects and of multiple copies of similar objects. No mystery here. But the UDA go farer. It shows that if we assume the brain function like a (natural) machine, then we have no choice (unless adding some amount of magic). No need for magic: it is all in the physics. And so far there is no evidence that it can produce anything like the physical universe we observe. This shows you are still not reading the work with the necessary attention. There are evidences, of different type. I predict the many worlds appearance a long time before reading Everett and understanding that QM gives some evidence for computationalism (for which evidences also exists). Then the math extract a quantum logic exactly where it must appear. This is all quite trivial, and unimpressive to the physicist. One can get as much by adding a few random numbers to any mix. Your 'many worlds' have nothing to do with Everett. Primary physicality is a lot simpler. Occam's razor to the fore Not at all. It assumes a primary physical reality, a mathemaytical reality, some starnge relation between math and physcis, and between mind and physics. The TOE extracted from computationalism assume only elementary arithmetic (or Turing equivalent). The relationship between maths and physics is not at all strange or mysterious. We evolved in a physical world, and postulated numbers and arithmetic to order our experiences. Once the idea of axiomatization of arithmetic arose, all the rest followed. It is intimately related to the physical world because it originated there -- as part of our attempt to understand and systematize our experience of that physical world. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/8/2015 5:34 PM, LizR wrote: On 9 April 2015 at 11:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the same sense that prime number exist. Which is merely as thought patterns in the brains of physical beings. A large (and familiar on this list) metaphysical leap, which fails to explain how two cultures can discover the same maths, or indeed why maths kicks back at all. I don't think it fails in that respect at all. Different cultures live in the same universe with the same physics. Cultures are made up of entities that compete in the Darwinian sense. So they are bound to have the concept of units, addition, etc. It seems to me that it may more of a problem to explain the conceptualization of arithmetic in Bruno's TOE, even though it's built on arithmetic. The entities in it that are conscious may have Borg like consciousness with no concept of individuals - they are all aware of the truths of arithmetic, so they all have the same thoughts. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/8/2015 4:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: The main point is that for a physical universe to exists in some primary form, you have to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable. Not so. You essentially admit as much in the 'yes doctor' scenario. If you are happy to replace your physical brain with one simulated in a computer, then you are saying that the physical brain is Turing emulable. This stands to reason if you believe that the brain is essentially classical in its operation -- it is large and warm so quantum effects decohere far too rapidly to have any significant large-scale effect. The operation of this physical object is then completely classical, and determined by physical laws that are deterministic. If you know the laws and the initial conditions, then the future activity of that brain can be completely calculated on a computer. The problem, of course, arises with the requirement that you know, or can determine, the initial conditions. I suggest that this is impossible in principle. Physical limitations are such that in any attempt to extract a complete map of the state of a living brain at any instant, the machinery would destroy the brain *before* any such map could be completed. 'Yes doctor' fails because the necessary starting conditions cannot be realized for physical reasons. This does not mean that one cannot create a physical computer that completely models the human brain -- in other words, you could create a conscious human-like entity. But you would necessarily always create a /different/ person in this way, not a copy of an existing person. And not only because of initial conditions, but also because of interaction with the environment. This can't be negligble, because it is what makes the computations of the brain classical (or nearly so) and besides the incidental interactions I think perception is also necessary. Both of these will cause any replicated brain to instantly diverge from it's original. I am actually interested in Bruno's idea of consciousness; but I'm not clear on whether there is anything useful in axiomatically defining knowledge in terms of provability. What does that tell me about whether my Mars Rover is conscious or not? Brent But whether these means that consciousness is primarily computational or primarily physical is just a matter of which way the rabbit jumps. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
LizR wrote: On 9 April 2015 at 11:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the same sense that prime number exist. Which is merely as thought patterns in the brains of physical beings. A large (and familiar on this list) metaphysical leap, which fails to explain how two cultures can discover the same maths, or indeed why maths kicks back at all. For the same reason that two cultures experience the same physics. Maths doesn't kick back -- only physical objects do that. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 9 April 2015 at 11:16, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. We don't need evidence here. The existence of the universal dovetailer, and of all its finite pieces of executions is already a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Those things exist in the same sense that prime number exist. Which is merely as thought patterns in the brains of physical beings. A large (and familiar on this list) metaphysical leap, which fails to explain how two cultures can discover the same maths, or indeed why maths kicks back at all. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: The main point is that for a physical universe to exists in some primary form, you have to abandon the idea that a brain is Turing emulable. Not so. You essentially admit as much in the 'yes doctor' scenario. If you are happy to replace your physical brain with one simulated in a computer, then you are saying that the physical brain is Turing emulable. This stands to reason if you believe that the brain is essentially classical in its operation -- it is large and warm so quantum effects decohere far too rapidly to have any significant large-scale effect. The operation of this physical object is then completely classical, and determined by physical laws that are deterministic. If you know the laws and the initial conditions, then the future activity of that brain can be completely calculated on a computer. The problem, of course, arises with the requirement that you know, or can determine, the initial conditions. I suggest that this is impossible in principle. Physical limitations are such that in any attempt to extract a complete map of the state of a living brain at any instant, the machinery would destroy the brain *before* any such map could be completed. 'Yes doctor' fails because the necessary starting conditions cannot be realized for physical reasons. This does not mean that one cannot create a physical computer that completely models the human brain -- in other words, you could create a conscious human-like entity. But you would necessarily always create a /different/ person in this way, not a copy of an existing person. But whether these means that consciousness is primarily computational or primarily physical is just a matter of which way the rabbit jumps. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Tue, Apr 07, 2015 at 05:22:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Apr 07, 2015 at 12:51:30PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: So no conscious moment, even in with a dovetailer in Platonia, can ever be completely counterfactually correct, because there will always be related sequences of states that never get to be computed -- no completed infinities even in arithmetic. Hi Bruce, that's not quite right. All computations eventually get computed by the UD within a finite (but unbounded) number of computational steps. Only in a non-robust ontology does this not happen. I think you need to unpack this a little. The dovetailer is running all possible programs. That is an infinite number of programs, much less an infinite number of computational steps. How can you say that there are only a finite number of steps? And I do not know what finite but unbounded means in this context. It has meaning in closed universe models, but scarcely in arithmetic? Perhaps you need to study the UD algorithm. For any program x, there will be finitely numbered step on the algorithm when the first instruction is executed. Similarly for the nth step of program x. Presumably, for any given observer moment, only a finite number of steps are required to emulate that observer moment, so the UD will run enough of a given program to emulate any observer moment within a finite amount of CPU time. However it is unbounded, because if you pick a number N, there will be a program that is not even started by the time N steps of the UD have been executed. Perhaps you could argue that the infinite sum over all computations supporting a given observer moment will never complete in a finite time, but I think that poses a problem for computing the measure (already recognised as an open problem), rather than being an isue per se with UDA 1-7. I have difficulty relating the number of computational steps to any physical time. This UD is running on arithmetic in Platonia. Each step takes no time, it is merely a relation between numbers. But if steps are numbered with successive integers, there is an infinite number of them and it cannot complete. It is not a matter of time, it is a matter of infinite integers: after any number of steps there is still an infinite number left to complete. The measure problem is insoluble without some further input into the model to restrict the possibilities. I probably slip into using the term time for CPU time (which is an algorithmic resource). Of course, for physical computers, this is the same thing, albeit not necessarily linearly related. But when discussing platonic entities, one should be more careful... Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:36, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Apr 2015, at 13:25, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: To be more precise, I should explain you how computations and emulation is defined in arithmetic, in term of the truth of elementary number theoretical relations. A computation will exist through the fact that it is true that some numbers divide some other numbers, and other facts like that. On the contrary, a description of a computation will be a number from which we can extract the description of a sequence of states, but that is different from the states existence being the result of a set of true relation. So you can use these terms in that way. But that does not make 'computation' a dynamical concept. It is not a physical time related concept. But computer, or universal number (or universal combinators) needs only a discrete static time: 0, 1, 2, 3, .. OK, but that is an ordering parameter and it does not make the computational dynamical rather than static. It does not make the computational dynamical in the physical sense, but we don't need that as physics will have to be derived from the first person experience associated to the non physical computation. To ease the understanding, it is better to not assume a primary physical reality, nor to assume it does not exist, and to follow precisely the reasoning. As it is counter-intuitive, it is the only way to avoid the use of some prejudice we can have in such domain. There is no change or movement involved. Arithmetic is completely static, as are the relations between numbers. Block universe are static too. It is the point of a relativity theory. Time and space comes from comparison between clock and meter, nothing can prevent the sigma_1 reality to emulates all those comparisons , and by assuming computationalism, of the conscious entities which make sense of the comparisons. It is similar to the block universe view in that your internal ordering parameter is entirely static. But the analogy is not perfect for what you want to do with comp. The physical block universe is often referred to in terms of two separate points of view: the 'bird' view which is from the outside, It corresponds loosely to what I call the third person point of view, except it is not based on physical notion, like universe. from which (entirely metaphorical) view, the universe is static; and the 'frog' view from within, from which view the universe is dynamical. Here we will have the first person view, but it is a psychological notion, and again, not related a priori with the physical. Indeed, in the math part we get the 1-view with adding p to the provability predicate. To get physics we will need the weaker t, or both t p. But here I anticipate. Note that in Everett Tegmark, the 1-view is given by the relative states, and the 3-view by the universal wave, or matrix. But 1-3 view is a much refined, and psychological notion, than bird and frog. In this case the bird (block) view is completely equivalent to a recording of the experiences of the frog in real time. Here your analogy breaks down. The ultimate 3-view, in the TOE extracted from comp, is the arithmetical reality. It is statical, but is not a recording. the computation exists due to the truth of some relation between numbers, and not from the description of those truth. That is a key difference, which cannot be understood if you have a conventionalist view of mathematics. The arithmetical reality kicks back, and indeed, incompleteness is a product of that difference. Einstein resists to this all his life, but in the book by Pale Yourgreau, I got evidence that eventually Gödel makes him realize that difference. Because the time parameter is defined internally, the recording can be run as often as required by the bird, and the result (and conscious experiences of the frog) are identical every time. There is no consciousness in a recording, or associable to a recording. There is just no computation there, only a description of a computation. I think I will have to make a thread on only this, as it is subtle and people can easily be confused. That is also what is made utterly clear in Gödel's work, but then it is no less subtle, even if it is a particular case of the difference between the number 89 and the description 89. The same thing would happen in the static view of the dovetailer with states ordered by the step number. The whole shebang would be no different from a recording of the same shebang -- That is a reason to doubt in a mono-universe block reality, but the problem is solved with a block multi-universe. I mean that this is conceivable. No problem with arithmetic, which internalize all the counterfactuals, and the computations, by abstraction. This will also solidify the idea that consciousness is an
Re: The MGA revisited
On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Apr 2015, at 13:25, Bruce Kellett wrote: You want a dynamic like in physics, a function from time to space, but in computer science, and to understand the problem here, the dynamics are given by function from N to mind states. You need to give magical ability to a turing machine so that she can distinguish (by its consciousness, in a first person way) the difference between a physical emulation, and an arithmetical emulation. The physical will give rise to the right measure, but not by magic, only because the physical is run by the sum on all computations below its substitution level. But all this is not needed to get the reversal in step seven. So I guess again that you are OK with step seven and see that if a primary physical universe exists and run the UD, then physics is reduced to arithmetic (seen from inside). Do you see that. I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. and it is not running your UD! I think we might notice if it were. I don't believe a physical universe could run a UD, but again, that point is not relevant after the MGA. I think that Russell is right when he suggested that even by step seven your dovetailer has to be running in Platonia, not in a physical embodiment. This has to do with the fact that the dovetailer can never complete. It is running all possible programs and most of these will never complete. So you never complete and get back to running all the steps of early programs in the sequence. So you do not compute all possible instantiations of a conscious moment by any finite time in a physical universe. Or even in Platonia because the idea of a completed infinity of computations makes no sense. Why do you think the universal dovetailer dovetails? For all i, j k, the step phi_i(j)^k is obtained from a bijection between NxNxN and N. The UD works a bit on the first execution, then a bit on the second execution, and then comes back on the first, then the second, then the third, and then come back to the first, etc. In that way, the UD executes all computations, including all those who never stop. So no conscious moment, even in with a dovetailer in Platonia, can ever be completely counterfactually correct, because there will always be related sequences of states that never get to be computed -- no completed infinities even in arithmetic. Physics is not reduced to arithmetic seen from the inside because arithmetic is never completed by the dovetailer or anything else and there are no non-magical ways in which similar states that might give rise to ordered physical laws can ever be be related. The universal dovetailer dovetails. You only ever get out of a model like this what you put in. You have put in arithmetic, so that is what you get out. You will never get physics this way. I do get an embryo of a non trivial physics, by adding the classical axioms/definition of knowledge, and I do provide the axiomatization of the logic of the observable, and I do show that it gives a quantization and a quantum logic, and I do compare it with QM's logic. I even provide theorem provers for most of the logics involved. Computationalism can be wrong, but that is the whole point of the reasoning: we can test it (with some nuance, like assuming we are not in a conspiratorial simulation, ...). Bruno Bruce With occam, a believer in comp can already stop here, and work on the measure problem. But a phsysicalist can still conclude that there is a primary unique universe, and that it can't run the UD, nor any significant part. The step 8 address this situation and shows precisely why invoking a primary physical universe makes it magical, with neuron needing prescience, and movie getting experiences, and indeed nothing getting all experiences. It is good news, as it suggest we might understand the origin of the physical laws, from non physical things, the gluing properties of universal numbers' dreams. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received
Re: The MGA revisited
On 07 Apr 2015, at 08:47, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Apr 07, 2015 at 12:51:30PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: I think that Russell is right when he suggested that even by step seven your dovetailer has to be running in Platonia, not in a physical embodiment. This has to do with the fact that the dovetailer can never complete. It is running all possible programs and most of these will never complete. So you never complete and get back to running all the steps of early programs in the sequence. So you do not compute all possible instantiations of a conscious moment by any finite time in a physical universe. Or even in Platonia because the idea of a completed infinity of computations makes no sense. So no conscious moment, even in with a dovetailer in Platonia, can ever be completely counterfactually correct, because there will always be related sequences of states that never get to be computed -- no completed infinities even in arithmetic. Hi Bruce, that's not quite right. All computations eventually get computed by the UD within a finite (but unbounded) number of computational steps. Yes. Bruce missed the dovetailing part of the universal dovetailing. Only in a non-robust ontology does this not happen. Perhaps you could argue that the infinite sum over all computations supporting a given observer moment will never complete in a finite time, but I think that poses a problem for computing the measure (already recognised as an open problem), rather than being an isue per se with UDA 1-7. OK. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Tue, Apr 07, 2015 at 12:51:30PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: I think that Russell is right when he suggested that even by step seven your dovetailer has to be running in Platonia, not in a physical embodiment. This has to do with the fact that the dovetailer can never complete. It is running all possible programs and most of these will never complete. So you never complete and get back to running all the steps of early programs in the sequence. So you do not compute all possible instantiations of a conscious moment by any finite time in a physical universe. Or even in Platonia because the idea of a completed infinity of computations makes no sense. So no conscious moment, even in with a dovetailer in Platonia, can ever be completely counterfactually correct, because there will always be related sequences of states that never get to be computed -- no completed infinities even in arithmetic. Hi Bruce, that's not quite right. All computations eventually get computed by the UD within a finite (but unbounded) number of computational steps. Only in a non-robust ontology does this not happen. Perhaps you could argue that the infinite sum over all computations supporting a given observer moment will never complete in a finite time, but I think that poses a problem for computing the measure (already recognised as an open problem), rather than being an isue per se with UDA 1-7. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Apr 07, 2015 at 12:51:30PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: So no conscious moment, even in with a dovetailer in Platonia, can ever be completely counterfactually correct, because there will always be related sequences of states that never get to be computed -- no completed infinities even in arithmetic. Hi Bruce, that's not quite right. All computations eventually get computed by the UD within a finite (but unbounded) number of computational steps. Only in a non-robust ontology does this not happen. I think you need to unpack this a little. The dovetailer is running all possible programs. That is an infinite number of programs, much less an infinite number of computational steps. How can you say that there are only a finite number of steps? And I do not know what finite but unbounded means in this context. It has meaning in closed universe models, but scarcely in arithmetic? Perhaps you could argue that the infinite sum over all computations supporting a given observer moment will never complete in a finite time, but I think that poses a problem for computing the measure (already recognised as an open problem), rather than being an isue per se with UDA 1-7. I have difficulty relating the number of computational steps to any physical time. This UD is running on arithmetic in Platonia. Each step takes no time, it is merely a relation between numbers. But if steps are numbered with successive integers, there is an infinite number of them and it cannot complete. It is not a matter of time, it is a matter of infinite integers: after any number of steps there is still an infinite number left to complete. The measure problem is insoluble without some further input into the model to restrict the possibilities. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 07 Apr 2015, at 04:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, Then computationalism is false. But what are your evidence for a *primary* physical universe. That is an axiom by Aristotle, and I believe animals are hard-wired to make some extrapolation here (for not doubting the prey and the predators), but there are no scientific evidence for a *primary* physical object. There is no scientific evidence for a universal dovetailer either. And so far there is no evidence that it can produce anything like the physical universe we observe. Primary physicality is a lot simpler. Occam's razor to the fore The UD works a bit on the first execution, then a bit on the second execution, and then comes back on the first, then the second, then the third, and then come back to the first, etc. In that way, the UD executes all computations, including all those who never stop. Yes, I had misread how that works. But who wrote the programs it executes? Who wrote the scheduler? Seems a lot simpler to have a primary physical universe. Then all you have to do is explore it. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 06 Apr 2015, at 13:25, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Apr 2015, at 07:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2015, at 01:19, Russell Standish wrote: Then what is your definition of a recording? In my eyes, UD* is a recording, particularly a finite portion of it, such as the first 10,000 steps of the first 10,000 programs. You confuse description of computations, which exists in the movies obtained by filming the boolean graph, and the computations themselves, with involves semantic, that is a reality (be it the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic) or a physical reality. Where is the dynamics necessary for computations themselves (as opposed to descriptions of computations) in the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic? I know where the dynamics reside in physical reality. In the truth of the elementary relations which implements a relation between some universal Turing system (universal number) and the program that is implemented. That 'truth' is static. The implementation of a program might be dynamic, but that is because it is implemented on a physical computer that has a physical clock cycle. No, it is dynamic in virtue of a universal machine running it step by step. The physical clock cycle is used in physical implementation, but other can use computable injection in N. I remind you that 'dynamic' means of or relating to force producing motion or active, potent, energetic, forceful; characterized by action or change. In other words, the opposite of static. That is a physicalist account of dynamics. It could be the correct one---I don't know. But even if is the correct one, you have to agree that a diophantine approximation of, let us say the evolution of the milky way + andromeda can exists (unless you presuppose at the start that the Milky Way + andromeda use non computable functions). I don't know that is uses functions at all. Even the three-body problem in Newtonian gravitational dynamics does not have a general closed form solution. Which is a symptom that its set of rational approximations might be Turing universal. But the inverse is easier to prove: a Turing universal machine can emulate all rational approximations of the three-body problem. It is not a 'function' in any standard sense. The system can only be approximated by perturbation theory, and the calculations are different for every set of starting values. There is not a 'function' to be evaluated over some input domain. ? What is the set of staring values, if not the domain of inputs? So your type of dynamics would exist somewhere in the dynamics of some game-of-life pattern, and would appear in the running of a game-of-life Running a game-of-life? Any dynamics there comes from the running -- the clock cycles of the computer on which it is run. It is not intrinsic. I am sorry but you are wrong on this. Computations can be defined in the arithmetical language. It is not intrinsic, but it is intrinsic relatively to a universal number, or to the system assumed at the base (arithmetic, or combinators, etc). pattern emulating the universal dovetailer, which run all game-of- life pattern. Then it would exist in the block-description of the dynamics (digital, discrete) of the universal game of life patter, that you can see as a static infinite cone of some sort. In that case, your acceptance of a block universe, and the way to recover the dynamics internally would work for that pattern. No, it doesn't work like that. The block universe idea arises from special relativity theory -- the fact that Lorentz transformations alter the way in which space and time are interrelated. There is no universal 'time' parameter in that picture, only a local variable 't' that depends on the frame of reference. But that will occur for all emulation of evolving interacting set of universal machine. The UD is intensionally universal: sigma_1 arithmetic emulate all computable processes, indeed, even with oracles. Different notion of times can be defined from inside, in a relative way. Lorentz invariance is a particular case, and it is not excluded nor directly relevant with the fact that arithmetic emulates all computable dynamics. If you accept computationalism, you can understand that a machine emulated cannot feel the difference if the is emulate by a physical u, or an arithmetical u. Yet the point is that by observation they might find evidence that comp is false, because below its computationalist substitution level, the math has to be a sum on all computations (and in that sense QM confirms computationalism). The useful dynamical concepts in relativity are the Lorentz invariants -- quantities that do not depend on the way you slice up separate time and space variables. Time is part of a coordinate system, and you do not have a space-time
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Apr 2015, at 13:25, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: To be more precise, I should explain you how computations and emulation is defined in arithmetic, in term of the truth of elementary number theoretical relations. A computation will exist through the fact that it is true that some numbers divide some other numbers, and other facts like that. On the contrary, a description of a computation will be a number from which we can extract the description of a sequence of states, but that is different from the states existence being the result of a set of true relation. So you can use these terms in that way. But that does not make 'computation' a dynamical concept. It is not a physical time related concept. But computer, or universal number (or universal combinators) needs only a discrete static time: 0, 1, 2, 3, .. OK, but that is an ordering parameter and it does not make the computational dynamical rather than static. There is no change or movement involved. Arithmetic is completely static, as are the relations between numbers. Block universe are static too. It is the point of a relativity theory. Time and space comes from comparison between clock and meter, nothing can prevent the sigma_1 reality to emulates all those comparisons , and by assuming computationalism, of the conscious entities which make sense of the comparisons. It is similar to the block universe view in that your internal ordering parameter is entirely static. But the analogy is not perfect for what you want to do with comp. The physical block universe is often referred to in terms of two separate points of view: the 'bird' view which is from the outside, from which (entirely metaphorical) view, the universe is static; and the 'frog' view from within, from which view the universe is dynamical. In this case the bird (block) view is completely equivalent to a recording of the experiences of the frog in real time. Because the time parameter is defined internally, the recording can be run as often as required by the bird, and the result (and conscious experiences of the frog) are identical every time. The same thing would happen in the static view of the dovetailer with states ordered by the step number. The whole shebang would be no different from a recording of the same shebang -- in fact, it is a recording because it is static from the external view. The experience of time by the internal consciousness emulated is exactly the same for 'reruns' of the same portion of the dovetailer's output by some external 'bird' observer. Now, as I understand it, you want to avoid this conclusion by appealing to the notion of counterfactual correctness. The particular sequence of states is not itself conscious because it is not counterfactually correct -- given a different environment, that sequence of states would give the same conscious experience, not some modified experience. It is just a recording, after all. Your model then appeals to the idea of the infinite number of separate occasions that that same set of internal states occurs in the overall picture of the dovetailer, and you claim that, in some sense, the 'actual' conscious experience is a 'sum' over these separate emulations, even though they be separated by many billions of computational steps of the dovetailer. I put words like 'actual' and 'sum' in scare quotes because I do not think these ideas make much sense. You appeal to techniques like the Feynman sum over paths in QM to make sense of your model. But that analogy fails because the Feynman sum is merely a calculational technique -- it does not correspond to and actual sum of separate really existing things that nature somehow 'performs' to get a particle from A to B. It is a calculational heuristic, and like so much in quantum mechanics, reifying computational tricks leads to endless problems. For example, the Feynman diagrams as used in field theory are terms in a perturbation expansion, they do not have separate independent existence. It is only the sum that is physical, and that same result can be obtained by many other calculational techniques that never mention Feynman diagrams. One problem that occurs to me is: who does this sum over dovetailer states? FPI would suggest that there is no such sum. The future of the 'person' experiencing that conscious moment is indeterminate -- the person cannot predict the future in anything other than a probabilistic way. But that makes each conscious moment unique, and actually a static recording of itself -- just as in the block universe view of physics. Again, FPI of the dovetailer has nothing in common with indeterminacy in quantum mechanics. Mere external similarity does not imply equivalence. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Apr 2015, at 13:25, Bruce Kellett wrote: You want a dynamic like in physics, a function from time to space, but in computer science, and to understand the problem here, the dynamics are given by function from N to mind states. You need to give magical ability to a turing machine so that she can distinguish (by its consciousness, in a first person way) the difference between a physical emulation, and an arithmetical emulation. The physical will give rise to the right measure, but not by magic, only because the physical is run by the sum on all computations below its substitution level. But all this is not needed to get the reversal in step seven. So I guess again that you are OK with step seven and see that if a primary physical universe exists and run the UD, then physics is reduced to arithmetic (seen from inside). Do you see that. I understand what you are claiming, but I do not agree with it. The primary physical universe certainly exists, and it is not running your UD! I think we might notice if it were. I think that Russell is right when he suggested that even by step seven your dovetailer has to be running in Platonia, not in a physical embodiment. This has to do with the fact that the dovetailer can never complete. It is running all possible programs and most of these will never complete. So you never complete and get back to running all the steps of early programs in the sequence. So you do not compute all possible instantiations of a conscious moment by any finite time in a physical universe. Or even in Platonia because the idea of a completed infinity of computations makes no sense. So no conscious moment, even in with a dovetailer in Platonia, can ever be completely counterfactually correct, because there will always be related sequences of states that never get to be computed -- no completed infinities even in arithmetic. Physics is not reduced to arithmetic seen from the inside because arithmetic is never completed by the dovetailer or anything else and there are no non-magical ways in which similar states that might give rise to ordered physical laws can ever be be related. You only ever get out of a model like this what you put in. You have put in arithmetic, so that is what you get out. You will never get physics this way. Bruce With occam, a believer in comp can already stop here, and work on the measure problem. But a phsysicalist can still conclude that there is a primary unique universe, and that it can't run the UD, nor any significant part. The step 8 address this situation and shows precisely why invoking a primary physical universe makes it magical, with neuron needing prescience, and movie getting experiences, and indeed nothing getting all experiences. It is good news, as it suggest we might understand the origin of the physical laws, from non physical things, the gluing properties of universal numbers' dreams. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 6 April 2015 at 08:10, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/5/2015 9:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: If you mean something else by physical, I have no idea what you mean. It is what is studied by physics, mainly through empirical means: the measurable quantities in laboratories. Aristotle (well mainly its followers) assume that the physical reality is irreducible, so that we have to assume primitively physical objects, like atoms, particles, 3d spaces, or today, strings for example. It makes physics the fundamental science (physicalism). I was just saying that arithmetic is not a branch of physics, that numbers, sets, functions, are, by virtue of their definitions, not physical. More below. That's like saying electrons are not physical because they're defined by Dirac's equation. Physical just means we can interact with it in our common, non-solipist world and reach intersubjective agreement about it. It's no more magic than supposing prime numbers exist because they're defined by axiom systems. The difference is between physical and primitively physical - as I would think Bruno knows?! We all agree that the physical universe exists, the question of interest is whether it's primitive, as opposed to being derived from something more fundamental. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 06 Apr 2015, at 07:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2015, at 01:19, Russell Standish wrote: Then what is your definition of a recording? In my eyes, UD* is a recording, particularly a finite portion of it, such as the first 10,000 steps of the first 10,000 programs. You confuse description of computations, which exists in the movies obtained by filming the boolean graph, and the computations themselves, with involves semantic, that is a reality (be it the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic) or a physical reality. Where is the dynamics necessary for computations themselves (as opposed to descriptions of computations) in the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic? I know where the dynamics reside in physical reality. In the truth of the elementary relations which implements a relation between some universal Turing system (universal number) and the program that is implemented. I remind you that 'dynamic' means of or relating to force producing motion or active, potent, energetic, forceful; characterized by action or change. In other words, the opposite of static. That is a physicalist account of dynamics. It could be the correct one---I don't know. But even if is the correct one, you have to agree that a diophantine approximation of, let us say the evolution of the milky way + andromeda can exists (unless you presuppose at the start that the Milky Way + andromeda use non computable functions). So your type of dynamics would exist somewhere in the dynamics of some game-of- life pattern, and would appear in the running of a game-of-life pattern emulating the universal dovetailer, which run all game-of-life pattern. Then it would exist in the block-description of the dynamics (digital, discrete) of the universal game of life patter, that you can see as a static infinite cone of some sort. In that case, your acceptance of a block universe, and the way to recover the dynamics internally would work for that pattern. The FPI makes this a bit more complex, because from the point of view of the self-aware entities emulated in the universal pattern, their real future is not really defined by some location in the pattern, but from all their infinitely many locations in that pattern. To be more precise, I should explain you how computations and emulation is defined in arithmetic, in term of the truth of elementary number theoretical relations. A computation will exist through the fact that it is true that some numbers divide some other numbers, and other facts like that. On the contrary, a description of a computation will be a number from which we can extract the description of a sequence of states, but that is different from the states existence being the result of a set of true relation. It is very much like the difference between the Gödel number of the sentence 3 divides 6, and the true fact that the number 3 divides 6. The first one is a number, and needs some encoding; the second is a truth involving the number 3 and 6, and which does not needs any encoding to be true (only to be communicated). Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Apr 2015, at 07:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2015, at 01:19, Russell Standish wrote: Then what is your definition of a recording? In my eyes, UD* is a recording, particularly a finite portion of it, such as the first 10,000 steps of the first 10,000 programs. You confuse description of computations, which exists in the movies obtained by filming the boolean graph, and the computations themselves, with involves semantic, that is a reality (be it the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic) or a physical reality. Where is the dynamics necessary for computations themselves (as opposed to descriptions of computations) in the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic? I know where the dynamics reside in physical reality. In the truth of the elementary relations which implements a relation between some universal Turing system (universal number) and the program that is implemented. That 'truth' is static. The implementation of a program might be dynamic, but that is because it is implemented on a physical computer that has a physical clock cycle. I remind you that 'dynamic' means of or relating to force producing motion or active, potent, energetic, forceful; characterized by action or change. In other words, the opposite of static. That is a physicalist account of dynamics. It could be the correct one---I don't know. But even if is the correct one, you have to agree that a diophantine approximation of, let us say the evolution of the milky way + andromeda can exists (unless you presuppose at the start that the Milky Way + andromeda use non computable functions). I don't know that is uses functions at all. Even the three-body problem in Newtonian gravitational dynamics does not have a general closed form solution. It is not a 'function' in any standard sense. The system can only be approximated by perturbation theory, and the calculations are different for every set of starting values. There is not a 'function' to be evaluated over some input domain. So your type of dynamics would exist somewhere in the dynamics of some game-of-life pattern, and would appear in the running of a game-of-life Running a game-of-life? Any dynamics there comes from the running -- the clock cycles of the computer on which it is run. It is not intrinsic. pattern emulating the universal dovetailer, which run all game-of-life pattern. Then it would exist in the block-description of the dynamics (digital, discrete) of the universal game of life patter, that you can see as a static infinite cone of some sort. In that case, your acceptance of a block universe, and the way to recover the dynamics internally would work for that pattern. No, it doesn't work like that. The block universe idea arises from special relativity theory -- the fact that Lorentz transformations alter the way in which space and time are interrelated. There is no universal 'time' parameter in that picture, only a local variable 't' that depends on the frame of reference. The useful dynamical concepts in relativity are the Lorentz invariants -- quantities that do not depend on the way you slice up separate time and space variables. Time is part of a coordinate system, and you do not have a space-time model that can be spanned by a coordinate system. The FPI makes this a bit more complex, because from the point of view of the self-aware entities emulated in the universal pattern, their real future is not really defined by some location in the pattern, but from all their infinitely many locations in that pattern. That is, again, an entirely static concept. You have not introduced any time parameter. To be more precise, I should explain you how computations and emulation is defined in arithmetic, in term of the truth of elementary number theoretical relations. A computation will exist through the fact that it is true that some numbers divide some other numbers, and other facts like that. On the contrary, a description of a computation will be a number from which we can extract the description of a sequence of states, but that is different from the states existence being the result of a set of true relation. So you can use these terms in that way. But that does not make 'computation' a dynamical concept. There is no change or movement involved. Arithmetic is completely static, as are the relations between numbers. It is very much like the difference between the Gödel number of the sentence 3 divides 6, and the true fact that the number 3 divides 6. The first one is a number, and needs some encoding; the second is a truth involving the number 3 and 6, and which does not needs any encoding to be true (only to be communicated). 'Communicated'? A transition from a state of not knowing to a state of knowing? But that is a temporal concept, and you have no time variable in your model. The truth that 6 is divisible by 3 does not
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Apr 2015, at 01:19, Russell Standish wrote: Then what is your definition of a recording? In my eyes, UD* is a recording, particularly a finite portion of it, such as the first 10,000 steps of the first 10,000 programs. You confuse description of computations, which exists in the movies obtained by filming the boolean graph, and the computations themselves, with involves semantic, that is a reality (be it the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic) or a physical reality. Where is the dynamics necessary for computations themselves (as opposed to descriptions of computations) in the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic? I know where the dynamics reside in physical reality. I remind you that 'dynamic' means of or relating to force producing motion or active, potent, energetic, forceful; characterized by action or change. In other words, the opposite of static. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 05 Apr 2015, at 01:19, Russell Standish wrote: On Sat, Apr 04, 2015 at 03:35:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2015, at 01:29, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 06:33:52PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote: The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the argument if you assume that ontological reality I guess you mean here: physical ontological reality (assuming it exists). If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia), You really mean: robust physical ontology. No, because the label physical should refer to what is phenomenal, otherwise it doesn't have any meaning. ? But then it seems you assume what we want to prove. Not at all. After quite some to-and-fro with you about what physical actually means, we settled on phenomena (things like matter, forces and the like). As opposed to arithmetic. You need MGA to make things like matter, forces, into a phenomenology. For Aristotelian matter is ontological. Phenomenological is the opposite to ontological. If physics is (purely) phenomenological, then the reversal is done. I have introduced the term robust only for the physical universe (be it ontological or phenomenological). It is just what makes an entire (never ending) physical universal dovetailing possible. That does not make sense. Already by the time you have introduced the term, you have shown that a robust ontology (one capable of running the UD) cannot be physical (ie the phenomena). ? The Church Thesis (true by assumption) shows that what is phenomenal cannot be ontological (or noumenal, to borrow Kant's term), when the ontology is robust. That is pretty much the whole point of UDA1-7. What does it mean than an ontology is robust? UD* is robust in arithmetic by definition. Sure. And if arithmetic is your ontology, your ontology is robust. The point of UDA1-7 is only that if we assume the physical universe run a UD, then physics is a branch of arithmetic/computer science. OK if your replace physical with ontology Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as recordings can be fully counterfactually correct. By adding the inert Klara? But then the physical role of the inert Klara to produce consciousness to the movie is not Turing emulable, and you stop assuming computationalism. But in a robust ontology, the Klaras are no longer inert. They cannot be. I don't know what is a robust ontology. It looks that you mean by this an everything ontology, or a many-world or many states or many computations ontology. Sure. But in that case the Klara are still inert in the relevant branch where we do the reasoning. So I am not sure to see the relevance of the remark here. We cannot seperate the branches in this way. I can understand the role of Klara and counterfactual correctness for the computation and behavior being correct hen change occur, but how could they change the consciousness by being non present when not needed? If they are not needed, then some non-counterfactually correct recordings can be conscious. That is right, but that is the path to the reductio ad absurdum. I don't have a strong opinion on this, as the relevant recordings will be really very complex, but do suspect, along with Brent, that full embodiment in an environment is needed, along with counterfactual correctness. ? Then they are no more recordings, but computation. Then what is your definition of a recording? In my eyes, UD* is a recording, particularly a finite portion of it, such as the first 10,000 steps of the first 10,000 programs. You confuse description of computations, which exists in the movies obtained by filming the boolean graph, and the computations themselves, with involves semantic, that is a reality (be it the static standard model of Peano Arithmetic) or a physical reality. As I point out in my paper, that, physical supervenience, and the MGA entails a robust ontology (ie something like the Multiverse to exist). You mean a primitively physical multiverse? That would already be a quite non trivial result, but I don't see how you get it. Not where physical=phenomenal. UDA7 already proves that a robust ontology cannot be physical. If you mean something else by physical, I have no idea what you mean. It is what is studied by physics, mainly through empirical means: the measurable quantities in laboratories. Aristotle (well mainly its followers) assume that the physical reality is irreducible, so that we have to assume primitively physical objects, like atoms, particles, 3d spaces, or today, strings for example. It makes physics the fundamental science (physicalism). I was just saying that arithmetic is not a branch of physics, that numbers, sets, functions, are, by virtue of their definitions, not physical. More below. IIRC, the discussion went something
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/5/2015 9:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: If you mean something else by physical, I have no idea what you mean. It is what is studied by physics, mainly through empirical means: the measurable quantities in laboratories. Aristotle (well mainly its followers) assume that the physical reality is irreducible, so that we have to assume primitively physical objects, like atoms, particles, 3d spaces, or today, strings for example. It makes physics the fundamental science (physicalism). I was just saying that arithmetic is not a branch of physics, that numbers, sets, functions, are, by virtue of their definitions, not physical. More below. That's like saying electrons are not physical because they're defined by Dirac's equation. Physical just means we can interact with it in our common, non-solipist world and reach intersubjective agreement about it. It's no more magic than supposing prime numbers exist because they're defined by axiom systems. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 05 Apr 2015, at 22:10, meekerdb wrote: On 4/5/2015 9:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: If you mean something else by physical, I have no idea what you mean. It is what is studied by physics, mainly through empirical means: the measurable quantities in laboratories. Aristotle (well mainly its followers) assume that the physical reality is irreducible, so that we have to assume primitively physical objects, like atoms, particles, 3d spaces, or today, strings for example. It makes physics the fundamental science (physicalism). I was just saying that arithmetic is not a branch of physics, that numbers, sets, functions, are, by virtue of their definitions, not physical. More below. That's like saying electrons are not physical because they're defined by Dirac's equation. The point is that if computationalism is correct and if electron are physical, ostensively observable, you have to justify their observability from the global FPI or the logic of stable prediction (given by []p t with p sigma_1). Physical just means we can interact with it in our common, non- solipist world and reach intersubjective agreement about it. No problem, but we need to explain this, without invoking some magical matter selecting magically a computations among others, that is without endowing universal machine with an non Turing emulable ability to distinguish that magic physicalness from the ocean of computations provided by arithmetic (already assumed by physicists). It's no more magic than supposing prime numbers exist because they're defined by axiom systems. Then there is a flaw in the UDA, ... or computationalism is false, and some other universal being is at play, with non Turing emulable power. Calling it Matter or God only escapes the question without answering. Or, we are in a perverse simulation which try to fail us (which I doubt, unless evidences is found like a discrepancy between nature and the logic of the machine-observable. But up to now, it fits. So the matter move and the abandon of comp would be premature. It is the simplest theory for both consciousness, and apparently matter. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Saturday, April 4, 2015, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','meeke...@verizon.net'); wrote: On 4/3/2015 2:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 4 Apr 2015, at 7:32 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/2/2015 4:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the world (although going from the general case of what I call functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational definition then I can find no meaning in the word consciousness. I don't understand how that applies to someone who, for example, is red-green colorblind. Aren't they partial-zombies by your definition? They may come to realize that they don't distinguish the full spectrum, just as we realize we don't see infrared. Supppose the colorblind person used to see colors but lost the ability (as my mother did after cataract surgery)? She realized it by noticing that things that used to be colorful weren't anymore. But like the person born colorblind, she didn't directly experience a qualia of being colorblind. She noticed a difference and there was also an objective change in her ability to discriminate between a colours. A partial zombie would not notice a difference and there would be no test that could find a difference. But what does it mean to say she noticed a difference? Was the noticing a perception of a difference, or was it just remembering that grass and roses aren't named by the same color. The latter could be noticed by someone who had never had color vision (and was in fact well known to my father who was red-green colorblind all his life). If the noticing was just a fact learned in the way anyone might learn a 3p fact, then I think that would still leave my mother a partial zombie by your definition. If you can think of a case where there could be a change that would not be noticed then that's not the example to use. We lose neurons every day and perhaps there is a subtle change in our perceptions as a result, but nobody notices. The example to use in the thought experiment is where the change in qualia would be large enough that the subject would definitely notice. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 04 Apr 2015, at 01:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 4/2/2015 8:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: The only reason that the dovetailer might have to worry about time limitations is if it is actually a physical computer. Physical computers have to contend with such things as physical laws, the finite speed of light, the properties of materials, the generation of heat (entropy) and the need to remove that heat to a safe distance before everything melts down. If your computer is not a physical device, then it has none of these limitations, and there is no such concept available as the 'speed' of the computation, the 'time for each step', or anything of this sort. From our external concrete perspective, the whole thing is instantaneous, or it enters statis at some point and gets nowhere. For a non- physical computer these things are equivalent. So without a physical computer you have no dynamics. A mere ordering of states is still a static thing, and the dovetailer does nothing useful that could not more easily be done by referring to a normal number. Why would it not have the same dynamics as in any Platonia version of physics, e.g. a block universe simulated in a digital computer? The states don't even have to be computed in their inherent time order. Bruno doesn't argue for this -- as far as I can see he moves from a physical computer straight into Platonia, ? No, I often use the block universe to illustrate the similarity here. and I don't move straight into Platonia, I use the MGA, and eventually the math. without any attempt at a justification for the move. You have not answer the question: do you agree that at step 7, and thus in presence of primitive physical universe running a universal dovetailer, physics is reduce to a mathematical problem. Unfortunately for his case, if you start with a physical computer, you have to start with a set of physical laws and that will run this machine composed of physical matter in an orderly manner. It cannot bootstrap itself -- run the machine and this itself generates the laws that enable the machine to run? Argue the self-referential bootstrap, don't just ignore the problem. To avoid such problem, I divided the reasoning in smaller step. I can't comment this without knowing if youe have seen the reversal in step seven. It looks you do. So what you say amount to say that you believe there is something wrong in the MGA. OK, so what is wrong? But a more significant point, it seems to me, is that time in the block universe works by taking some subsystem and using it as a clock. But that can be done in the simulation of the Milky Way, or of any computable solution of some physical laws. And also, in platonia (sigma_1 arithmetical truth), you have a universal clock: the steps of the UD itself. But the clock function is instantiated by showing correlations between the regular dynamics of the clock and the dynamics of the rest of the universe. In other words, the universe has to run according to regular dynamical laws that apply equally to the clock subsystem and to the rest. Without these regular correlations you have no clock, and no time. Digitalness entails the existence of a universal time, given by the ordering of the steps of the UD, which can be defined in arithmetic. Of course, that universal time has only quite indirect relations with possible physical time, which emerge from inside, in the first person view of the entities emulated by the UD. Your argument is not valid. Barbour's solution is rather different, and more ingenious, because he doesn't actually recreate physical time or dynamics. He simply connects otherwise unrelated slices by his 'time capsules'. One can argue for ever whether this actually works, but it is an ingenious possibility. The computer's memories of the entities emulated by the UD (equivalently sigma_1 arithmetic) plays the role of time capsule, and can be defined formally in arithmetic. The problem I see is that Bruno has not made any attempt to argue for any sensible notion of time when he moves into Platonia. I submit a problem for the computationalist. Now you are unfair, because the math part shows the solution (and show it empirically testable). Both a physical time and a subjective time emergence is explained with all details. The fact that you say that I made no attempt is proof that you have not yet begin to study the reasoning, the problem and the illustration of testable solution. He can refer to relations among numbers in arithmetic as 'computations', but that is just a play with words -- there is still no dynamics involved. There is, and as Brent argue correctly, it is similar to any block universe theory, except that I show the block-reality is bigger, immaterial, and might contain white rabbits, and then I show why those white rabbits
Re: The MGA revisited
On 04 Apr 2015, at 01:29, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 06:33:52PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote: The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the argument if you assume that ontological reality I guess you mean here: physical ontological reality (assuming it exists). If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia), You really mean: robust physical ontology. No, because the label physical should refer to what is phenomenal, otherwise it doesn't have any meaning. ? But then it seems you assume what we want to prove. I have introduced the term robust only for the physical universe (be it ontological or phenomenological). It is just what makes an entire (never ending) physical universal dovetailing possible. The Church Thesis (true by assumption) shows that what is phenomenal cannot be ontological (or noumenal, to borrow Kant's term), when the ontology is robust. That is pretty much the whole point of UDA1-7. What does it mean than an ontology is robust? UD* is robust in arithmetic by definition. The point of UDA1-7 is only that if we assume the physical universe run a UD, then physics is a branch of arithmetic/computer science. Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as recordings can be fully counterfactually correct. By adding the inert Klara? But then the physical role of the inert Klara to produce consciousness to the movie is not Turing emulable, and you stop assuming computationalism. But in a robust ontology, the Klaras are no longer inert. They cannot be. I don't know what is a robust ontology. It looks that you mean by this an everything ontology, or a many-world or many states or many computations ontology. But in that case the Klara are still inert in the relevant branch where we do the reasoning. So I am not sure to see the relevance of the remark here. I can understand the role of Klara and counterfactual correctness for the computation and behavior being correct hen change occur, but how could they change the consciousness by being non present when not needed? If they are not needed, then some non-counterfactually correct recordings can be conscious. That is right, but that is the path to the reductio ad absurdum. I don't have a strong opinion on this, as the relevant recordings will be really very complex, but do suspect, along with Brent, that full embodiment in an environment is needed, along with counterfactual correctness. ? Then they are no more recordings, but computation. As I point out in my paper, that, physical supervenience, and the MGA entails a robust ontology (ie something like the Multiverse to exist). You mean a primitively physical multiverse? That would already be a quite non trivial result, but I don't see how you get it. That would be weird because it would prove that if can prove the existence of primitive matter in arithmetic. I am a bit confused. Cheers, Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Sat, Apr 04, 2015 at 03:35:59PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Apr 2015, at 01:29, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 06:33:52PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote: The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the argument if you assume that ontological reality I guess you mean here: physical ontological reality (assuming it exists). If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia), You really mean: robust physical ontology. No, because the label physical should refer to what is phenomenal, otherwise it doesn't have any meaning. ? But then it seems you assume what we want to prove. Not at all. After quite some to-and-fro with you about what physical actually means, we settled on phenomena (things like matter, forces and the like). I have introduced the term robust only for the physical universe (be it ontological or phenomenological). It is just what makes an entire (never ending) physical universal dovetailing possible. That does not make sense. Already by the time you have introduced the term, you have shown that a robust ontology (one capable of running the UD) cannot be physical (ie the phenomena). The Church Thesis (true by assumption) shows that what is phenomenal cannot be ontological (or noumenal, to borrow Kant's term), when the ontology is robust. That is pretty much the whole point of UDA1-7. What does it mean than an ontology is robust? UD* is robust in arithmetic by definition. Sure. And if arithmetic is your ontology, your ontology is robust. The point of UDA1-7 is only that if we assume the physical universe run a UD, then physics is a branch of arithmetic/computer science. OK if your replace physical with ontology Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as recordings can be fully counterfactually correct. By adding the inert Klara? But then the physical role of the inert Klara to produce consciousness to the movie is not Turing emulable, and you stop assuming computationalism. But in a robust ontology, the Klaras are no longer inert. They cannot be. I don't know what is a robust ontology. It looks that you mean by this an everything ontology, or a many-world or many states or many computations ontology. Sure. But in that case the Klara are still inert in the relevant branch where we do the reasoning. So I am not sure to see the relevance of the remark here. We cannot seperate the branches in this way. I can understand the role of Klara and counterfactual correctness for the computation and behavior being correct hen change occur, but how could they change the consciousness by being non present when not needed? If they are not needed, then some non-counterfactually correct recordings can be conscious. That is right, but that is the path to the reductio ad absurdum. I don't have a strong opinion on this, as the relevant recordings will be really very complex, but do suspect, along with Brent, that full embodiment in an environment is needed, along with counterfactual correctness. ? Then they are no more recordings, but computation. Then what is your definition of a recording? In my eyes, UD* is a recording, particularly a finite portion of it, such as the first 10,000 steps of the first 10,000 programs. As I point out in my paper, that, physical supervenience, and the MGA entails a robust ontology (ie something like the Multiverse to exist). You mean a primitively physical multiverse? That would already be a quite non trivial result, but I don't see how you get it. Not where physical=phenomenal. UDA7 already proves that a robust ontology cannot be physical. If you mean something else by physical, I have no idea what you mean. IIRC, the discussion went something like this: Q: What does 'primitively physical' mean? A: The ontology on which you run the UD Q: Oh, so you mean numbers? A: No, number are not physical Q: Then what? A: Things like protons and electrons, magnetic force and so on Q: Oh so like phenomenal things, things we can directly measure? A: Yes. Q: Then if we assume the ontology is rich enough to be able to run the UD, the Church-Turing thesis means that any such ontology will deliver identical phenomenal outcomes, so there is no way of identifying the ontology with what is physical. A: OK. Now let us assume that the 'primitive physical ontology' is not-robust, ie incapable of running a UD Q: Did you mean ontology or the physical? A: Could be both, because the ontological limitations introduced by being non-robust can affect the phenomenal, hence are phenomena in themselves, hence physical. Q: OK. That would be weird because it would prove that if can prove the existence of primitive matter in arithmetic. I am a bit confused. How so? I don't follow you there. Cheers, Bruno Cheers --
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/2/2015 4:33 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2 April 2015 at 08:30, meekerdbmeeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/1/2015 12:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not true then it would be possible to make partial zombies. I think that's the inference we're arguing. It's certainly not obvious to me. It's not obvious that comp can be proved or it's not obvious that if comp were false it would be possible to make partial zombies? If partial zombies are possible then there would be no difference between you having qualia or lacking qualia, There would be no 3p observable difference in other people. Just showing that a partial zombie is possible doesn't show that you are one. A partial zombie would not only show no 3p difference, it would also show no 1p difference. There is no conceptual problem with that in a zombie, but there is in a partial zombie, which by definition has normal feelings and cognition except for its zombified aspect. A person who is otherwise normal immediately knows if he loses a significant aspect of his consciousness, such as his vision or his ability to understand language. Sometimes if neurological damage is severe enough it can damage cognitive ability and the subject develops the delusional belief, anosognosia, that he is normal despite all evidence to the contrary, but that does not invalidate the argument. which is equivalent to saying consciousness does not exist; I think it is equivalent to the idea that some (humans) have souls and some (animals) don't. I don't believe that, but it's logically possible. I think you are not making the distinction between a zombie and a partial zombie. A zombie is not obviously absurd, a partial zombie is. Suppose the were a race of people who experienced the qualia of liver function. That doesn't seem absurd to me. So neither does it seem absurd that I'm a partial zombie relative them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 3 April 2015 at 17:30, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Suppose the were a race of people who experienced the qualia of liver function. That doesn't seem absurd to me. So neither does it seem absurd that I'm a partial zombie relative them. What is absurd is that you have qualia, lose them, but there is no subjective or objective evidence that they have gone. What sense could be given to the word qualia in that case? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 05:10:37PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why are the limitations due to the size and/or age of our present universe relevant if the computation is carried out in Platonia -- on a non-physical UTM? If the computations are carried out on a real physical UTM then consciousness supervenes on the physical universe after all! The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the argument if you assume that ontological reality I guess you mean here: physical ontological reality (assuming it exists). is less than Platonia. You mean, does not contain a concrete universal dovetailing. Platonia might still be bigger than the universal dovetailing. The universal dovetailing is sigma_1 complete, but not sigma_2 complete, ... Usually, I think of platonia as to be the entire arithmetical truth, which is pi_i and sigma_i complete for all i. Ontologicall, we can limit ourselves to sigma_1 complete set. It is the epistemology, physics, and theology, which get much bigger, but they emerge phenomenologically from the sigmz_-truth seen from inside. In such a non-robust universe setting, physical limits are quite relevant. Like Sen Carroll illustrated. Too much Boltzman brain, or a too much big part of the Universal Dovetailing, and prediction needs to take them into account. OK. If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia), You really mean: robust physical ontology. then the MGA is not needed, the first 7 steps of the UDA suffice for Bruno's point. If robust enough to make all Boltzmann brain, which is equivalent with the universal dovetailing, except that it is unclear if they have the right redundancies. No problem with comp, because the redundancies is imposed by the math. Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as recordings can be fully counterfactually correct. By adding the inert Klara? But then the physical role of the inert Klara to produce consciousness to the movie is not Turing emulable, and you stop assuming computationalism. I can understand the role of Klara and counterfactual correctness for the computation and behavior being correct hen change occur, but how could they change the consciousness by being non present when not needed? Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
In that case though you would be liver blind and easily distinguished from people who could talk about what it's like for their liver to produce the sensations it does. I'm colorblind - but that doesn't make me a partial zombie with regard to seeing hues of red. It's easy to tell the difference between me and someone with full color vision. On Fri, Apr 3, 2015 at 2:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/2/2015 4:33 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2 April 2015 at 08:30, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/1/2015 12:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not true then it would be possible to make partial zombies. I think that's the inference we're arguing. It's certainly not obvious to me. It's not obvious that comp can be proved or it's not obvious that if comp were false it would be possible to make partial zombies? If partial zombies are possible then there would be no difference between you having qualia or lacking qualia, There would be no 3p observable difference in other people. Just showing that a partial zombie is possible doesn't show that you are one. A partial zombie would not only show no 3p difference, it would also show no 1p difference. There is no conceptual problem with that in a zombie, but there is in a partial zombie, which by definition has normal feelings and cognition except for its zombified aspect. A person who is otherwise normal immediately knows if he loses a significant aspect of his consciousness, such as his vision or his ability to understand language. Sometimes if neurological damage is severe enough it can damage cognitive ability and the subject develops the delusional belief, anosognosia, that he is normal despite all evidence to the contrary, but that does not invalidate the argument. which is equivalent to saying consciousness does not exist; I think it is equivalent to the idea that some (humans) have souls and some (animals) don't. I don't believe that, but it's logically possible. I think you are not making the distinction between a zombie and a partial zombie. A zombie is not obviously absurd, a partial zombie is. Suppose the were a race of people who experienced the qualia of liver function. That doesn't seem absurd to me. So neither does it seem absurd that I'm a partial zombie relative them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 03 Apr 2015, at 01:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3 April 2015 at 01:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: However, what you call my fuctionalism is a superset of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device animated by God, and preserve consciousness. ... making your functionalism trivial, if you excuse the straightness. It is not trivial because it makes this (if I may say so) rather profound claim: that it is impossible even for God to make a device that reproduces the observable function of the brain without also reproducing any associated consciousness. Roger Penrose proposes that the brain utilises non-computable physics and that therefore it is not possible to reproduce either the observable function of the brain or its consciousness using a digital computer. Yes, he defends non-comp (even non-quantum-comp, unlike Hamerov). This is logically consistent, OK, but this shows you agree that we can't prove comp. Only the generalisation your-functionalism. even if there is no actual evidence for it. John Searle, on the other hand, believes that it is possible to reproduce the observable function of the brain but that this would not necessarily reproduce consciousness. Yes, it is another way to disbelieve in comp: believing in zombie. Given that consciousness actually exists, which entails that there is a difference between being conscious and not being conscious, this is not logically consistent because it would lead to partial zombies. Almost OK. What about someone who say that as long as 1/4 of its biological brain is organic he is fully conscious, but once more that 3/4 of the brain is digital, then it becomes a total zombie. In that case: no partial zombie. (just try to find a logical loophole ..., don't mind to much, I do agree with Chalmers' fading qualia point). It is my contention that the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated consciousness will follow necessarily. OK. I think you get close to prove the half of comp yes doctor, as everybody agrees that we cannot prove Church thesis. (which does not mean we cannot give very powerful evidences for it). Then the proof of yes doctor use the fact that partial zombiness makes no sense, but I think that anosognosia can be used, notably if we believe in things like a consciousness volume (on which the anosognosia would bear on). I don't see how that could make sense. It is sufficient to consider not special cases where the change is small or memory and cognition are deficient, but a general case where the change in consciousness is extreme and the person's cognition is intact. If you claim that it is possible to radically change the consciousness volume without someone noticing then I think that is tantamount to claiming that consciousness does not exist. I agree. The point is logical. Like in MGA, once we argue on reality, we can only present evidences, no proofs. The LHC has not prove the existence of the Higgs boson, nor does Mars Rover and its image prove the existence of Mars, or Apollo 9 the existence of the moon. They just give strong evidence. It would be on that strong sense of proof that my critics would bear on. A bit like Russell's critics on the MGA. I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the world (although going from the general case of what I call functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational definition then I can find no meaning in the word consciousness. You make your point. For some reason, I have still a little doubt, but I might need to just think a bit more. Some of my neurons make strike because they want me sleeping a bit more. My point is that we cannot prove comp, but I agree that even God cannot refute your-functionalism. A perfect zombie does not make sense, but a non-comp person can of course decide that some or other person are zombie or have no soul, but then it is the usual insult of fear of the other. We might also get evidence against comp, like never succeeding in making an artificial brain. That could mean not that comp is false, but that the level might be low. In that case the personal with artificial brains would notice the difference, and some output would be different. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: The MGA revisited
On 03 Apr 2015, at 05:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2015, at 15:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2015, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: Emulation is a dynamical process in time. I wonder where you get a time variable for your UTM. By a variable on the computational steps. It has nothing to do with a physical time a priori. What variable? A simple numbering of steps? But that will not work, or at least, you have hidden an assumption of an external time in your notation. The external time is given by the universal machine running the computation. It can be the basic level (elementary arithmetic, or the universal dovetailer), or it can be some other universal layer, running on some other universal layer, running on some other running on the basic level. At the basic level, we have the block mindscape, like the UD* (the infinite cone of all computations). This does not do the work you require of it. See below. At the end of step 27, move to step 28. That contains an implicit notion of time -- 'ending' and 'moving' are temporal concepts. I do not see that you can remove all traces of the idea of an external temporal parameter. Otherwise the machine could just halt arbitrarily at some point and never know that it had halted. I think you ned to flesh your ideas here out a great deal more. Well, this is a forum, and I explain things already explained with all details in much longer text (which sometime does not help, because busy people tend to skip even more the long texts nowadays). Let me try to help a bit though. Fix some universal programming language, like Fortran, say. Enumerate all programs computing function with 1 argument, p_0, p_1, p_2, Let us denote by [p_i(j)^k] the kième step of the execution of the ième program on argument j, by the universal dovetailer (which dovetails then on all such [p_i(j)^k] . Then we can define, indeed already in Robinson arithmetic, a computation by a sequence of such steps, when i and j are fixed. So a computation is given by the sequence [p_456(666)^0] [p_456(666)^1] [p_456(666)^2] [p_456(666)^3] [p_456(666)^4] etc. This sequence is a subsequence of the general universal dovetailing, which dovetails on all [p_i(j)^k]. It is a computation, only in virtue of the universal dovetailing, and the universal dovetailing can be defined in arithmetic. I can translate the proposition the UD access to [p_345(898786)^89] entirely in term of arithmetic, using only the notion of addition, multiplication, successor (of natural numbers) and 0, and predicate logic. The only external time used is the ordering of the natural number, which is easily translated in arithmetic: x y means Ez(x + z) = y). OK? I got this much from reading your paper and other things you have said. But this, at best, provides and ordering (indexing if you like) Ordering is good, for the step (here k) of the computations. Indexing is usually used for the enumeration of the p_i. on the computational steps. It does not provide a time parameter. I agree. In fact, it is entirely static, and you get no more than some ordering imposed on sequences that can be found in any normal number. you get the proof that the relations between numbers emulate some computation, and the emulation comes from the trueness of this, (be it realized in a universe, or in the arithmletical reality). The emulation does not of the syntactical description of the computations, which we need only to refer to those relation., but which alone in the counting algorithm does not emulate any computations (in the precise technical sense of emulate). The real numbets are even more full of such description, yet that can't emulate a universal Turing machine. Diophantine polynomials on the reals are not Turing universal, yet in the integers, and the natural numbers they are. Let me be more specific in my criticism. In step 7 of your argument you introduce the dovetailer. But you then say Suppose now, for the sake of argument, that our concrete and 'physical' universe is a sufficiently robust expanding universe so that a 'concrete' UD can run forever... Why do you need infinite time in an expanding universe to run the dovetailer if it is not a physical machine? ? The 'concrete' UD is a physical UD. By the way, I did it in 1991. I implement the UD in Lisp, and let it run during two weeks. In step 7, I add the following assumption: 1) there is a primitive physical universe 2) it run the UD. Then you can understand that such a universe needs to be extending for ever, and be robust, because the universal dovetaling involves bigger and bigger programs using greater and greater inputs. The game of life of Conway is Turing universal. The UD can be programmed by a two dimensional pattern in the game of life. Then its dynamics gives a third dimensional
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4 Apr 2015, at 7:32 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/2/2015 4:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the world (although going from the general case of what I call functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational definition then I can find no meaning in the word consciousness. I don't understand how that applies to someone who, for example, is red-green colorblind. Aren't they partial-zombies by your definition? They may come to realize that they don't distinguish the full spectrum, just as we realize we don't see infrared. Supppose the colorblind person used to see colors but lost the ability (as my mother did after cataract surgery)? She realized it by noticing that things that used to be colorful weren't anymore. But like the person born colorblind, she didn't directly experience a qualia of being colorblind. She noticed a difference and there was also an objective change in her ability to discriminate between a colours. A partial zombie would not notice a difference and there would be no test that could find a difference. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/2/2015 4:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the world (although going from the general case of what I call functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational definition then I can find no meaning in the word consciousness. I don't understand how that applies to someone who, for example, is red-green colorblind. Aren't they partial-zombies by your definition? They may come to realize that they don't distinguish the full spectrum, just as we realize we don't see infrared. Supppose the colorblind person used to see colors but lost the ability (as my mother did after cataract surgery)? She realized it by noticing that things that used to be colorful weren't anymore. But like the person born colorblind, she didn't directly experience a qualia of being colorblind. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4 Apr 2015, at 3:14 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 Apr 2015, at 01:18, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 3 April 2015 at 01:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: However, what you call my fuctionalism is a superset of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device animated by God, and preserve consciousness. ... making your functionalism trivial, if you excuse the straightness. It is not trivial because it makes this (if I may say so) rather profound claim: that it is impossible even for God to make a device that reproduces the observable function of the brain without also reproducing any associated consciousness. Roger Penrose proposes that the brain utilises non-computable physics and that therefore it is not possible to reproduce either the observable function of the brain or its consciousness using a digital computer. Yes, he defends non-comp (even non-quantum-comp, unlike Hamerov). This is logically consistent, OK, but this shows you agree that we can't prove comp. Only the generalisation your-functionalism. Yes, comp is false if CT is false. But in that case you would be unable to make a zombie either. even if there is no actual evidence for it. John Searle, on the other hand, believes that it is possible to reproduce the observable function of the brain but that this would not necessarily reproduce consciousness. Yes, it is another way to disbelieve in comp: believing in zombie. Given that consciousness actually exists, which entails that there is a difference between being conscious and not being conscious, this is not logically consistent because it would lead to partial zombies. Almost OK. What about someone who say that as long as 1/4 of its biological brain is organic he is fully conscious, but once more that 3/4 of the brain is digital, then it becomes a total zombie. In that case: no partial zombie. (just try to find a logical loophole ..., don't mind to much, I do agree with Chalmers' fading qualia point). There must then be some crucial indivisible component responsible for the flip (for if it were not indivisible you could still make a partial zombie). It is not inconceivable as a partial zombie is, but it is wildly implausible and probably not consistent with the assumption that consciousness is a naturalistic process in the brain. It is my contention that the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated consciousness will follow necessarily. OK. I think you get close to prove the half of comp yes doctor, as everybody agrees that we cannot prove Church thesis. (which does not mean we cannot give very powerful evidences for it). Then the proof of yes doctor use the fact that partial zombiness makes no sense, but I think that anosognosia can be used, notably if we believe in things like a consciousness volume (on which the anosognosia would bear on). I don't see how that could make sense. It is sufficient to consider not special cases where the change is small or memory and cognition are deficient, but a general case where the change in consciousness is extreme and the person's cognition is intact. If you claim that it is possible to radically change the consciousness volume without someone noticing then I think that is tantamount to claiming that consciousness does not exist. I agree. The point is logical. Like in MGA, once we argue on reality, we can only present evidences, no proofs. The LHC has not prove the existence of the Higgs boson, nor does Mars Rover and its image prove the existence of Mars, or Apollo 9 the existence of the moon. They just give strong evidence. It would be on that strong sense of proof that my critics would bear on. A bit like Russell's critics on the MGA. I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the world (although going from the general case of what I call functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational definition then I can find no meaning in the word consciousness. You make your point. For some reason, I have still a little doubt, but I might need to just think a bit more. Some of my neurons make strike because they want me sleeping a bit more. My point is that we cannot prove comp, but I agree that even God cannot refute your-functionalism. A perfect zombie does not make sense, but a non-comp person can of course decide that some or other person are zombie or have no soul, but then it is the usual
Re: The MGA revisited
meekerdb wrote: On 4/2/2015 8:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: The only reason that the dovetailer might have to worry about time limitations is if it is actually a physical computer. Physical computers have to contend with such things as physical laws, the finite speed of light, the properties of materials, the generation of heat (entropy) and the need to remove that heat to a safe distance before everything melts down. If your computer is not a physical device, then it has none of these limitations, and there is no such concept available as the 'speed' of the computation, the 'time for each step', or anything of this sort. From our external concrete perspective, the whole thing is instantaneous, or it enters statis at some point and gets nowhere. For a non-physical computer these things are equivalent. So without a physical computer you have no dynamics. A mere ordering of states is still a static thing, and the dovetailer does nothing useful that could not more easily be done by referring to a normal number. Why would it not have the same dynamics as in any Platonia version of physics, e.g. a block universe simulated in a digital computer? The states don't even have to be computed in their inherent time order. Bruno doesn't argue for this -- as far as I can see he moves from a physical computer straight into Platonia, without any attempt at a justification for the move. Unfortunately for his case, if you start with a physical computer, you have to start with a set of physical laws and that will run this machine composed of physical matter in an orderly manner. It cannot bootstrap itself -- run the machine and this itself generates the laws that enable the machine to run? Argue the self-referential bootstrap, don't just ignore the problem. But a more significant point, it seems to me, is that time in the block universe works by taking some subsystem and using it as a clock. But the clock function is instantiated by showing correlations between the regular dynamics of the clock and the dynamics of the rest of the universe. In other words, the universe has to run according to regular dynamical laws that apply equally to the clock subsystem and to the rest. Without these regular correlations you have no clock, and no time. Barbour's solution is rather different, and more ingenious, because he doesn't actually recreate physical time or dynamics. He simply connects otherwise unrelated slices by his 'time capsules'. One can argue for ever whether this actually works, but it is an ingenious possibility. The problem I see is that Bruno has not made any attempt to argue for any sensible notion of time when he moves into Platonia. He can refer to relations among numbers in arithmetic as 'computations', but that is just a play with words -- there is still no dynamics involved. And Bruno really does need dynamics in order to make a computational model of consciousness different from a static recording. The MGA is an argument from incredulity -- it is not a valid argument. This is why I have said several times in previous posts that you rely on an underlying notion of physical time, and an underlying physical computer, in order to make your computation dynamic and not static. What you say above does not let you escape from this conclusion, it merely reinforces it. The problem of time is your undoing. I think the UD necessarily takes unlimited time. Given any particular state the UD will visit that state infinitely many times and compute infinitely many different successive states. It doesn't halt, so all the different successor states are never completed. These states may be indexed by some internal time, per Barbour. I agree that the UD, implemented physically, will take an infinite time and will compute an infinite variety of variations on any particular state -- though why we should happen to find ourselves in a state with other people and a physical world remains unexplained. The Boltzmann brain problem is probably worse for Bruno than the white rabbit problem. Nevertheless, without actually providing a solution to the problem of time in his model -- which involves justifying the step from a physical computer running the UD, to Platonia which is static -- Bruno has not, it seems to me, demonstrated that consciousness is a computation in unphysical Platonia. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/2/2015 8:55 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: The only reason that the dovetailer might have to worry about time limitations is if it is actually a physical computer. Physical computers have to contend with such things as physical laws, the finite speed of light, the properties of materials, the generation of heat (entropy) and the need to remove that heat to a safe distance before everything melts down. If your computer is not a physical device, then it has none of these limitations, and there is no such concept available as the 'speed' of the computation, the 'time for each step', or anything of this sort. From our external concrete perspective, the whole thing is instantaneous, or it enters statis at some point and gets nowhere. For a non-physical computer these things are equivalent. So without a physical computer you have no dynamics. A mere ordering of states is still a static thing, and the dovetailer does nothing useful that could not more easily be done by referring to a normal number. Why would it not have the same dynamics as in any Platonia version of physics, e.g. a block universe simulated in a digital computer? The states don't even have to be computed in their inherent time order. This is why I have said several times in previous posts that you rely on an underlying notion of physical time, and an underlying physical computer, in order to make your computation dynamic and not static. What you say above does not let you escape from this conclusion, it merely reinforces it. The problem of time is your undoing. I think the UD necessarily takes unlimited time. Given any particular state the UD will visit that state infinitely many times and compute infinitely many different successive states. It doesn't halt, so all the different successor states are never completed. These states may be indexed by some internal time, per Barbour. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Fri, Apr 03, 2015 at 06:33:52PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Apr 2015, at 00:44, Russell Standish wrote: The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the argument if you assume that ontological reality I guess you mean here: physical ontological reality (assuming it exists). If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia), You really mean: robust physical ontology. No, because the label physical should refer to what is phenomenal, otherwise it doesn't have any meaning. The Church Thesis (true by assumption) shows that what is phenomenal cannot be ontological (or noumenal, to borrow Kant's term), when the ontology is robust. That is pretty much the whole point of UDA1-7. Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as recordings can be fully counterfactually correct. By adding the inert Klara? But then the physical role of the inert Klara to produce consciousness to the movie is not Turing emulable, and you stop assuming computationalism. But in a robust ontology, the Klaras are no longer inert. They cannot be. I can understand the role of Klara and counterfactual correctness for the computation and behavior being correct hen change occur, but how could they change the consciousness by being non present when not needed? If they are not needed, then some non-counterfactually correct recordings can be conscious. I don't have a strong opinion on this, as the relevant recordings will be really very complex, but do suspect, along with Brent, that full embodiment in an environment is needed, along with counterfactual correctness. As I point out in my paper, that, physical supervenience, and the MGA entails a robust ontology (ie something like the Multiverse to exist). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 4/3/2015 2:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 4 Apr 2015, at 7:32 am, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/2/2015 4:18 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the world (although going from the general case of what I call functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational definition then I can find no meaning in the word consciousness. I don't understand how that applies to someone who, for example, is red-green colorblind. Aren't they partial-zombies by your definition? They may come to realize that they don't distinguish the full spectrum, just as we realize we don't see infrared. Supppose the colorblind person used to see colors but lost the ability (as my mother did after cataract surgery)? She realized it by noticing that things that used to be colorful weren't anymore. But like the person born colorblind, she didn't directly experience a qualia of being colorblind. She noticed a difference and there was also an objective change in her ability to discriminate between a colours. A partial zombie would not notice a difference and there would be no test that could find a difference. But what does it mean to say she noticed a difference? Was the noticing a perception of a difference, or was it just remembering that grass and roses aren't named by the same color. The latter could be noticed by someone who had never had color vision (and was in fact well known to my father who was red-green colorblind all his life). If the noticing was just a fact learned in the way anyone might learn a 3p fact, then I think that would still leave my mother a partial zombie by your definition. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 07:07:09AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Which assumes perhaps too strong a form of functionalism and/or digitalism that runs into its own contradiction with 1p consciousness? As pointed out in earlier post: With that move, it is no longer relevant to distinguish recording from person who has 1p experience, zombie question is nonsense, no indexical property, there is correct substitution level, all possible 1p consciousness of all persons supervenes on the recording (everything digital) *or* none at all since recording has no CC and other such funky consequences I can't recall. How is this avoided if everything is one bland sauce of digital? It is not at all obvious that counterfactual correctness (CC) is required for a computation to be conscious. Bruno usually argues that feature is a red herring. If it is, then non-CC recordings are not conscious, and the MGA goes through in the small (non-robust) universe case. But recordings can also be counterfactually correct in principle (in the form of a huge lookup table, for example, in Searles's Chinese Room), or in the form of a precise specification of the quantum wave function, or of a finite chunk of the UD* trace. Modulo the no-cloning theorem, or the Seth Lloyd limit which would prevent such a recording existing in our current universe. Thanks for pushing the question though Russell, as my earlier posts were perhaps less clear on this. I guess you're coming from some ground I can't parse or have missed reading and you have my apology here if so. But zombies can be tricky bastards :-) Where do you draw the line? I'm afraid intuition does not help much in this matter, which is why I say it is a weakness of the MGA. There must be something more to it than just complexity or even Turing universality. Bruno says human-like consciousness requires Lobianity. But I think that's asking for more than just awarenss; it's asking for self-awarness. Which with comp assumptions/environment includes the properties that come with that kind of self-awareness, e.g. incompleteness, machine's silence etc. PGC If I were building a Mars Rover and gave it the ability to learn from its experience by reviewing its memory of events and projecting hypothetical futures, I would be concerned that I had created a sentient being that would forsee its own end. So I would be sure to avoid putting its indefinite survival into its value system. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 01 Apr 2015, at 21:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 1 April 2015 at 22:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Apr 2015, at 02:05, LizR wrote: Well, no, there is no TOE that describes all features of the physical universe yet. But if comp is true, there is. If comp is true, the theory with the axioms Kxy = x + Sxyz = xy(zy), or elementary arithmetic HAVE TO describe all feature of the physical universe. If not comp is false. With comp, we cannot add anything to elementary arithmetic or to any sigma-1 complete set. That is the point of the reasoning. That we don't succeed, or have not yet extracted it is another point. The TOE is there. All the physical (but non geographical, nor historical) feature of physics must be explained by elementary arithmetic, or computationalism is false. That follows from the UDA. OK, but as you say - if comp is true. And I'm not saying you need to prove it's true because I know that's impossible. But as far as I know, no one has yet derived a convincing amount of physics from comp, so we don't yet have convincing evidence that it may well be true, if you see what I mean. (I think Bruce says the same thing in a post i'm about to read!) I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not true then it would be possible to make partial zombies. If partial zombies are possible then there would be no difference between you having qualia or lacking qualia, which is equivalent to saying consciousness does not exist; not just that it is epiphenomenal but that it isn't there at all. So if consciousness exists, comp must be true. That reasoning might asses that comp or your functionalism is provable, but comp, as I defined it, use Church-thesis (if only to get a universal dovetailer), and this gives one way to refute comp: to find a function that human can compute, but no computer could. It is hard to imagine, but it is logically possible (that is why attempt to refute CT continue to be made). Then as I said, anosognosia might make conceivable partial zombiness, making consciousness non-existing, I could agree with this, but the partial zombie might not agree in the sense that it would say: no, my consciousness has not changed (despite some god could say, yes, the volume of its consciousness has drop 1/2, but he can't see that as he is amnesic of its precedent volume of consciousness. Again, this is close to non-sense to me, and eventually I might think that (comp v functionalism) is provable. Interesting point. I will dig on this ... hoping to find sometime. I have to go. Note that (comp v functionalism(yours) = functionalism(yours). It is not Putnam functionalism (which is comp, even with some high level substitution level). You seem going to change my mind on something about comp/functionalism. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 05:34, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 02:48:47AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: I still don't see what MGA pumps intuitively and incorrectly, as you seem to assume that MGA is bad intuition pump, rather than good one that facilitates seeing something tricky. You've not shown that consciousness supervenes on broken gates, you don't treat movies like conscious entities, and haven't pointed towards a recording that is obviously or demonstrably conscious. It is one thing to argue intuitively that playing Casablanca does not instantiate Humphrey Bogart's consciousness. That I would happily agree with. It only involves a few 100KB per second. It is another thing to argue that a precise recording of the firings of every neuron in someone's brain similarly doesn't instantiate consciousness (at around 10^11 neurons per typical human brain, this would be something of the order of 10^16 bytes per second). This is the sort of recording being used in Maudlin's thought experiment/MGA. And obviously, according to COMP, a huge lookup table encoding the machine's output for every possible input for a machine implementing a conscious moment (which is just another type of recording, albeit a very complex one that would exceed the Seth LLoyd bound for the universe) must be conscious. Note this latter type of device was used in Searles Chinese Room argument, and I think needs to be answered the same way Dennett answers the Chinese Room argument. At some point on the complexity scale, recordings go from being not conscious to conscious. Where do you draw the line? I'm afraid intuition does not help much in this matter, which is why I say it is a weakness of the MGA. The intuition pump is that the recording does not contain any computation, which is embarassing for a theory of mind requiring a computation. With stroboscope like argument, such a computation is not even well defined, nor is the time at which the movie is executed. As for the looking-table, it need to be infinite if it implements a universal machine. Consciousness, with comp, can be given to whatever brought that looking table into existence. More on this mater, surely. The problem for the materialist is that he has no material definition of computation. It is always an act of faith in some primitive matter, and then an exploitation of the mathematical notion of computation, and of the fact that matter seems ... Turing universal. Again, it gives magical abilities to Turing machine, and entails the existence of infinitely many zombies in arithmetic. More on this, as I write very quickly (soory for possible typo) as I have to go now. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 07:07:09AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Which assumes perhaps too strong a form of functionalism and/or digitalism that runs into its own contradiction with 1p consciousness? As pointed out in earlier post: With that move, it is no longer relevant to distinguish recording from person who has 1p experience, zombie question is nonsense, no indexical property, there is correct substitution level, all possible 1p consciousness of all persons supervenes on the recording (everything digital) *or* none at all since recording has no CC and other such funky consequences I can't recall. How is this avoided if everything is one bland sauce of digital? It is not at all obvious that counterfactual correctness (CC) is required for a computation to be conscious. Bruno usually argues that feature is a red herring. If it is, then non-CC recordings are not conscious, and the MGA goes through in the small (non-robust) universe case. But recordings can also be counterfactually correct in principle (in the form of a huge lookup table, for example, in Searles's Chinese Room), or in the form of a precise specification of the quantum wave function, or of a finite chunk of the UD* trace. Modulo the no-cloning theorem, or the Seth Lloyd limit which would prevent such a recording existing in our current universe. Why are the limitations due to the size and/or age of our present universe relevant if the computation is carried out in Platonia -- on a non-physical UTM? If the computations are carried out on a real physical UTM then consciousness supervenes on the physical universe after all! Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Apr 2015, at 03:58, Bruce Kellett wrote: The digital simulation of brain functions is achieved on a physical computer after all, which is a physical object itself -- simulating (primitive) physical processes. Assuming a physical object, which I do not (nor do I assume they don't exist). Comp, the hypothesis is nutral on what exist, except for what is needed to have a UTM, so it assumes one UTM, if you want, but not necessarily a physical UTM. You said somewhere that a computation is dynamical, not static, Yes. That is important. But the notion of time needed is only some morphism in N. Compuational steps, which can be define in arithmetic in the relative way. (This has been done with the first intensional variant of provability by Rosser). which is why you rejected the notion that Champernow's number contains all possible computations and hence is a dovetailer: (0,1234567891011 ..) does not emulate anything, despite describing (in some ways) all computations. It describes the computations, but does not emulate them, contrary to arithmetic. That diophantine polynomial describes all computations is very easy to prove. That they emulate all UTMs took 50 years of hard work, and was thought y many being obviously impossible. Emulation is a dynamical process in time. I wonder where you get a time variable for your UTM. By a variable on the computational steps. It has nothing to do with a physical time a priori. All that you say about the UTM and the dovetailer appears to assume an instantiation in some temporal structure. Not at all. I do not see time as a parameter in arithmetic! In other words, your dovetailer has to be running on a physical UTM. Nope. You claim above that it does not have to be physical. I would like you to point me to a non-physical Turing machine that actually runs programs. I.e., not just a description of a Turing machine. You need to understand the difference between syntax and semantic in arithmetic. I will come back on this later. It is not easy to explain as people already confuse easily the number 0 and the symbol 0. I have downloaded your SANE04 paper and will work through it in time. OK. That is rather wise if you want criticize it. A first glance suggests that I will have objections at very many points. I wold be very happy to hear them. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 03:12, LizR wrote: Yes lots of people have said something like that (including me) but the time aspect is addressed in Bruno's argument. (Come to think of it you more or less addressed it yourself by commenting about block universes. A computation can run in a block universe, after all, in the important sense - having different states at different times.) I think some notion of successor relations is all that's needed, or something like that - I'm sure Bruno will explain. Russell is right on this, I omit or abstract away from the fact that the audience might think proof abaout reality, which does not exist. PGC is right too, as not only movie would be able to think, but special relativity would false (by the stroboscope), movie would think all thinking simultaneously, and we might say yes to a doctor putting the movie of a mosquito brain in place of your brain. The problem is that this is logically not refutable, and so we have to be clearer on that. MGA is for people cutting air, and as I said once: the problem is that cutting air is not a boundable activity. as we cannot prove our consistency, the ultimate cutting air person can always say: may be you have just prove that 0 = 1 ... Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 00:29, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Apr 01, 2015 at 01:50:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK, but so you agree that MGA shows that if comp is true, matter is of no use, unless we admit that a complex experience like a human dream can supervene on a very simple trivial activity. Then the MGA intuition pump seems to work well enough, imo. Bruno You have just conceded my point. Then the MGA is not a logical proof (as you have sometimes claimed, and Quentin claimed even more forcefully), but rather an argument by incredulity, or an intuition pump as Daniel Dennett puts it. Nothing wrong with that of course, we just need to know what has actually been achieved. Not really, I have always taken for granted that we cannot prove something about reality, so it was clear for me that MGA use Occam, and can only weaken the use of Occam, not that it proves something about reality. I agree that I should have expanded on this more in the Lille thesis (the only point where I agree with Delahaye). As a proof, MGA proves (informally) something like comp implies non matter or movie can vehiculate any experience. Which is close to a proof that comp implies no-matter to me. But you and Delahaye are right, I should be clearer on this. Point well taken (but already conceded a long time ago, it seems to me). Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 01 Apr 2015, at 21:51, meekerdb wrote: On 4/1/2015 2:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Well, no, there is no TOE that describes all features of the physical universe yet. But if comp is true, there is. If comp is true, the theory with the axioms Kxy = x + Sxyz = xy(zy), or elementary arithmetic HAVE TO describe all feature of the physical universe. If not comp is false. But that's like saying if Catholicism is true then there is a God who's omniscient. You should be more cautious about the modus tollens: There is no TOE hence comp is false. No problem. There is an infinite scheme of TOEs (when we assume comp). I have given three in my recent preceding posts. Combinators, RA and a system of Diophantine equations. If you find something not explainable in one of them, then comp is refuted. That would be the case for classical comp (that is comp + Theaetetus) if you find a quantum tautology not provided by Z1*, S4Grz1, or X1*). It would not be a problem for me if comp is refuted. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 3 Apr 2015, at 12:26 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 02 Apr 2015, at 14:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2 April 2015 at 18:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Anosognosia is the inability to recognise when you have an illness or a disability, usually in the context of neurological or psychiatric disorders. This differs from being a zombie in that behaviour is affected: if the patient suffers from cortical blindness with anosognosia, they are unable to recognise what is in front of them and walk into things. In addition, they not only have the deficit of lacking qualia, they have a specific delusional belief which cannot be shifted despite any evidence they might be presented with. You are right about anosognosia. But my point is that anosognosia might make conceivable partial zombiness, and thus comp or your functionalism false. Again, I agree that it would make consciousness spurious, but that is something to be expected from a computationalist believing in primitive matter. I just try to put myself in the mind of those people believing in both matter and mechanism. Anosognosia involves an additional cognitive deficit which makes the patient deny that he has a problem despite all evidence presented to him. Yes. If you damage enough of the brain, it's not surprising that generalised problems in thinking arise. But the case to consider is a person who has a cicumscribed deficit, say in some sensory modality, without a problem in thinking. That such a person might not notice that he has for example gone blind seems absurd. It could mean that you went blind yesterday, although you can still think and hear and feel, but you haven't noticed it, and you still enjoyed looking at the painting on your office wall this morning. If that is possible, then what is the difference between having visual qualia and not having them? To make it more concrete, if the doctor offered me an artificial brain which would leave me blind but with the guarantee that it would *seem* to me that I was seeing everything exactly the same as now, what reason would there be for me to choose the more expensive model which would allow me to *really* see everything the same as now? It is just that I can logically conceive this (still playing the devil advocate role): The doctor assures me that my behavior will not change, but that my qualia and consciousness intensity will diminish of one halve, but he add that this change is anosognosic so that I will not feel any difference ... until I can afford the better artificial brain. So I say yes to him, and indeed I feel completely happy with the new brain ... until I get enough money for the new brain, which the doctor told me, will make my volume of consciousness back to normal (of course I have no idea at all what that could mean). But once I got the new brain, I realize then that indeed, I was less conscious than before the first brain operation, and that now, I feel like that again. But you would not notice such a difference when you got the new brain, since the outputs are exactly the same. You could set it up in a try-before-you-buy test so that the cheaper and the more expensive visual cortex can be switched in and out of circuit and you would find that both are just the same. If there is a difference in your qualia not only is it impossible for an external observer to notice, it is also impossible for you, the experiencer, to notice. I don't think the word qualia can retain meaning under this sort of assault. Some type of dreams make me thing that such an experience might not be as senseless as ti might seem, and this means that the weird anosognosia condition might, perhaps, give sense to some notion of partial zombiness. Some people in this list defend the idea of volume or degree of consciousness, and if there is anosognosia on such a volume or intensity, it might gives some sense to some notion of partial zombiness, it seems to me (currently). I think anosognosia is a red herring. You might not notice something because the change is too subtle, because you forgot what it was like before, or because (as in anosognosia) your ability to reason is impaired. But the thought experiment is done under ideal circumstances, where the change is large and your ability to think and remember is intact. If you can't notice a change in qualia under such circumstances then I would say that under any reasonable definition of the term there *IS* no change in qualia. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2015, at 15:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2015, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: Emulation is a dynamical process in time. I wonder where you get a time variable for your UTM. By a variable on the computational steps. It has nothing to do with a physical time a priori. What variable? A simple numbering of steps? But that will not work, or at least, you have hidden an assumption of an external time in your notation. The external time is given by the universal machine running the computation. It can be the basic level (elementary arithmetic, or the universal dovetailer), or it can be some other universal layer, running on some other universal layer, running on some other running on the basic level. At the basic level, we have the block mindscape, like the UD* (the infinite cone of all computations). This does not do the work you require of it. See below. At the end of step 27, move to step 28. That contains an implicit notion of time -- 'ending' and 'moving' are temporal concepts. I do not see that you can remove all traces of the idea of an external temporal parameter. Otherwise the machine could just halt arbitrarily at some point and never know that it had halted. I think you ned to flesh your ideas here out a great deal more. Well, this is a forum, and I explain things already explained with all details in much longer text (which sometime does not help, because busy people tend to skip even more the long texts nowadays). Let me try to help a bit though. Fix some universal programming language, like Fortran, say. Enumerate all programs computing function with 1 argument, p_0, p_1, p_2, Let us denote by [p_i(j)^k] the kième step of the execution of the ième program on argument j, by the universal dovetailer (which dovetails then on all such [p_i(j)^k] . Then we can define, indeed already in Robinson arithmetic, a computation by a sequence of such steps, when i and j are fixed. So a computation is given by the sequence [p_456(666)^0] [p_456(666)^1] [p_456(666)^2] [p_456(666)^3] [p_456(666)^4] etc. This sequence is a subsequence of the general universal dovetailing, which dovetails on all [p_i(j)^k]. It is a computation, only in virtue of the universal dovetailing, and the universal dovetailing can be defined in arithmetic. I can translate the proposition the UD access to [p_345(898786)^89] entirely in term of arithmetic, using only the notion of addition, multiplication, successor (of natural numbers) and 0, and predicate logic. The only external time used is the ordering of the natural number, which is easily translated in arithmetic: x y means Ez(x + z) = y). OK? I got this much from reading your paper and other things you have said. But this, at best, provides and ordering (indexing if you like) on the computational steps. It does not provide a time parameter. In fact, it is entirely static, and you get no more than some ordering imposed on sequences that can be found in any normal number. Let me be more specific in my criticism. In step 7 of your argument you introduce the dovetailer. But you then say Suppose now, for the sake of argument, that out concrete and 'physical' universe is a sufficiently robust expanding universe so that a 'concrete' UD can run forever... Why do you need infinite time in an expanding universe to run the dovetailer if it is not a physical machine? You put the words 'physical' and 'concrete' in scare quotes, but that is merely a device to mislead -- you actually are talking about the everyday physical, concrete universe that we all know and love. There is no Platonia here, or else why worry about time limitations and require an infinite expanding universe in order to get all your computations in? In step 8 you introduce the idea that the 'physical universe' really 'exists' and is too small, in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it. You call this move /ad hoc/ and *disgraceful*, but that is again just a rhetorical trick to divert attention from the fact that you really are talking about a physical computer running in our physical universe. In which case, at any finite time from the beginning of the universe the dovetailer will, in general, not have generated any sequence of computations that would correspond to us or anything else. Far from being a disgracefully /ad hoc/ manoeuvre, this actually undoes your whole enterprise. The only reason that the dovetailer might have to worry about time limitations is if it is actually a physical computer. Physical computers have to contend with such things as physical laws, the finite speed of light, the properties of materials, the generation of heat (entropy) and the need to remove that heat to a safe distance before everything melts down. If your computer is not a physical device, then it has none of these limitations,
Re: The MGA revisited
On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 05:10:37PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why are the limitations due to the size and/or age of our present universe relevant if the computation is carried out in Platonia -- on a non-physical UTM? If the computations are carried out on a real physical UTM then consciousness supervenes on the physical universe after all! The whole point of the MGA is to try and close off a gap in the argument if you assume that ontological reality is less than Platonia. In such a non-robust universe setting, physical limits are quite relevant. If we have a robust ontology (ie the full Platonia), then the MGA is not needed, the first 7 steps of the UDA suffice for Bruno's point. Moreover, I would argue that the MGA doesn't even work, as recordings can be fully counterfactually correct. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 3 April 2015 at 01:06, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: However, what you call my fuctionalism is a superset of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device animated by God, and preserve consciousness. ... making your functionalism trivial, if you excuse the straightness. It is not trivial because it makes this (if I may say so) rather profound claim: that it is impossible even for God to make a device that reproduces the observable function of the brain without also reproducing any associated consciousness. Roger Penrose proposes that the brain utilises non-computable physics and that therefore it is not possible to reproduce either the observable function of the brain or its consciousness using a digital computer. This is logically consistent, even if there is no actual evidence for it. John Searle, on the other hand, believes that it is possible to reproduce the observable function of the brain but that this would not necessarily reproduce consciousness. Given that consciousness actually exists, which entails that there is a difference between being conscious and not being conscious, this is not logically consistent because it would lead to partial zombies. It is my contention that the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated consciousness will follow necessarily. OK. I think you get close to prove the half of comp yes doctor, as everybody agrees that we cannot prove Church thesis. (which does not mean we cannot give very powerful evidences for it). Then the proof of yes doctor use the fact that partial zombiness makes no sense, but I think that anosognosia can be used, notably if we believe in things like a consciousness volume (on which the anosognosia would bear on). I don't see how that could make sense. It is sufficient to consider not special cases where the change is small or memory and cognition are deficient, but a general case where the change in consciousness is extreme and the person's cognition is intact. If you claim that it is possible to radically change the consciousness volume without someone noticing then I think that is tantamount to claiming that consciousness does not exist. The point is logical. Like in MGA, once we argue on reality, we can only present evidences, no proofs. The LHC has not prove the existence of the Higgs boson, nor does Mars Rover and its image prove the existence of Mars, or Apollo 9 the existence of the moon. They just give strong evidence. It would be on that strong sense of proof that my critics would bear on. A bit like Russell's critics on the MGA. I think the argument I present does not depend on any fact about the world (although going from the general case of what I call functionalism to what Putnam called machine-state functionalism and you call comp does depend on the physical CT being true). It depends on a very basic operational definition of consciouness: that you know it if you are conscious and you realise if there is a large enough change in your consciousness. If you don't accept this operational definition then I can find no meaning in the word consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 10:30:04AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: The intuition pump is that the recording does not contain any computation, which is embarassing for a theory of mind requiring a computation. With stroboscope like argument, such a computation is not even well defined, nor is the time at which the movie is executed. You may well be right, my point only was that the intuition pump fails at the realistic levels of complexity of the recordings involved. I think Bruce appreciates this at least. As for the looking-table, it need to be infinite if it implements a universal machine. Not for implementing a finite subsequence of a computation as discussed in the MGA. Let us say we're interested in a 10 second sequence of observer moments. Running a program emulating that sequence might involve the machine passing through some 10^15 32 bit states (say - I'm just plucking figures from where the sun don't shine here). Then to add in the counterfactual nature of this, we would just need to create a lookup table with 32 ^ (10 ^ 15) entries in it. Rather large, agreed, but last time I looked, a lot less than infinite. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 2 April 2015 at 18:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Anosognosia is the inability to recognise when you have an illness or a disability, usually in the context of neurological or psychiatric disorders. This differs from being a zombie in that behaviour is affected: if the patient suffers from cortical blindness with anosognosia, they are unable to recognise what is in front of them and walk into things. In addition, they not only have the deficit of lacking qualia, they have a specific delusional belief which cannot be shifted despite any evidence they might be presented with. You are right about anosognosia. But my point is that anosognosia might make conceivable partial zombiness, and thus comp or your functionalism false. Again, I agree that it would make consciousness spurious, but that is something to be expected from a computationalist believing in primitive matter. I just try to put myself in the mind of those people believing in both matter and mechanism. Anosognosia involves an additional cognitive deficit which makes the patient deny that he has a problem despite all evidence presented to him. If you damage enough of the brain, it's not surprising that generalised problems in thinking arise. But the case to consider is a person who has a cicumscribed deficit, say in some sensory modality, without a problem in thinking. That such a person might not notice that he has for example gone blind seems absurd. It could mean that you went blind yesterday, although you can still think and hear and feel, but you haven't noticed it, and you still enjoyed looking at the painting on your office wall this morning. If that is possible, then what is the difference between having visual qualia and not having them? To make it more concrete, if the doctor offered me an artificial brain which would leave me blind but with the guarantee that it would *seem* to me that I was seeing everything exactly the same as now, what reason would there be for me to choose the more expensive model which would allow me to *really* see everything the same as now? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 2 April 2015 at 08:30, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 4/1/2015 12:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not true then it would be possible to make partial zombies. I think that's the inference we're arguing. It's certainly not obvious to me. It's not obvious that comp can be proved or it's not obvious that if comp were false it would be possible to make partial zombies? If partial zombies are possible then there would be no difference between you having qualia or lacking qualia, There would be no 3p observable difference in other people. Just showing that a partial zombie is possible doesn't show that you are one. A partial zombie would not only show no 3p difference, it would also show no 1p difference. There is no conceptual problem with that in a zombie, but there is in a partial zombie, which by definition has normal feelings and cognition except for its zombified aspect. A person who is otherwise normal immediately knows if he loses a significant aspect of his consciousness, such as his vision or his ability to understand language. Sometimes if neurological damage is severe enough it can damage cognitive ability and the subject develops the delusional belief, anosognosia, that he is normal despite all evidence to the contrary, but that does not invalidate the argument. which is equivalent to saying consciousness does not exist; I think it is equivalent to the idea that some (humans) have souls and some (animals) don't. I don't believe that, but it's logically possible. I think you are not making the distinction between a zombie and a partial zombie. A zombie is not obviously absurd, a partial zombie is. not just that it is epiphenomenal but that it isn't there at all. Maybe it isn't. I only know about my own. Brent So if consciousness exists, comp must be true. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 2 April 2015 at 18:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not true then it would be possible to make partial zombies. If partial zombies are possible then there would be no difference between you having qualia or lacking qualia, which is equivalent to saying consciousness does not exist; not just that it is epiphenomenal but that it isn't there at all. So if consciousness exists, comp must be true. That reasoning might asses that comp or your functionalism is provable, but comp, as I defined it, use Church-thesis (if only to get a universal dovetailer), and this gives one way to refute comp: to find a function that human can compute, but no computer could. It is hard to imagine, but it is logically possible (that is why attempt to refute CT continue to be made). If the brain utilises non-computable functions then CT is false and it will not be possible replace part of the brain with a computer, so comp is false. However, what you call my fuctionalism is a superset of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device animated by God, and preserve consciousness. It is my contention that the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated consciousness will follow necessarily. Then as I said, anosognosia might make conceivable partial zombiness, making consciousness non-existing, I could agree with this, but the partial zombie might not agree in the sense that it would say: no, my consciousness has not changed (despite some god could say, yes, the volume of its consciousness has drop 1/2, but he can't see that as he is amnesic of its precedent volume of consciousness. Again, this is close to non-sense to me, and eventually I might think that (comp v functionalism) is provable. Interesting point. I will dig on this ... hoping to find sometime. I have to go. Note that (comp v functionalism(yours) = functionalism(yours). It is not Putnam functionalism (which is comp, even with some high level substitution level). You seem going to change my mind on something about comp/functionalism. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2015, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: Emulation is a dynamical process in time. I wonder where you get a time variable for your UTM. By a variable on the computational steps. It has nothing to do with a physical time a priori. What variable? A simple numbering of steps? But that will not work, or at least, you have hidden an assumption of an external time in your notation. At the end of step 27, move to step 28. That contains an implicit notion of time -- 'ending' and 'moving' are temporal concepts. I do not see that you can remove all traces of the idea of an external temporal parameter. Otherwise the machine could just halt arbitrarily at some point and never know that it had halted. I think you ned to flesh your ideas here out a great deal more. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 15:04, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Apr 2015, at 04:08, Bruce Kellett wrote: Emulation is a dynamical process in time. I wonder where you get a time variable for your UTM. By a variable on the computational steps. It has nothing to do with a physical time a priori. What variable? A simple numbering of steps? But that will not work, or at least, you have hidden an assumption of an external time in your notation. The external time is given by the universal machine running the computation. It can be the basic level (elementary arithmetic, or the universal dovetailer), or it can be some other universal layer, running on some other universal layer, running on some other running on the basic level. At the basic level, we have the block mindscape, like the UD* (the infinite cone of all computations). At the end of step 27, move to step 28. That contains an implicit notion of time -- 'ending' and 'moving' are temporal concepts. I do not see that you can remove all traces of the idea of an external temporal parameter. Otherwise the machine could just halt arbitrarily at some point and never know that it had halted. I think you ned to flesh your ideas here out a great deal more. Well, this is a forum, and I explain things already explained with all details in much longer text (which sometime does not help, because busy people tend to skip even more the long texts nowadays). Let me try to help a bit though. Fix some universal programming language, like Fortran, say. Enumerate all programs computing function with 1 argument, p_0, p_1, p_2, Let us denote by [p_i(j)^k] the kième step of the execution of the ième program on argument j, by the universal dovetailer (which dovetails then on all such [p_i(j)^k] . Then we can define, indeed already in Robinson arithmetic, a computation by a sequence of such steps, when i and j are fixed. So a computation is given by the sequence [p_456(666)^0] [p_456(666)^1] [p_456(666)^2] [p_456(666)^3] [p_456(666)^4] etc. This sequence is a subsequence of the general universal dovetailing, which dovetails on all [p_i(j)^k]. It is a computation, only in virtue of the universal dovetailing, and the universal dovetailing can be defined in arithmetic. I can translate the proposition the UD access to [p_345(898786)^89] entirely in term of arithmetic, using only the notion of addition, multiplication, successor (of natural numbers) and 0, and predicate logic. The only external time used is the ordering of the natural number, which is easily translated in arithmetic: x y means Ez(x + z) = y). OK? Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 14:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2 April 2015 at 18:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Anosognosia is the inability to recognise when you have an illness or a disability, usually in the context of neurological or psychiatric disorders. This differs from being a zombie in that behaviour is affected: if the patient suffers from cortical blindness with anosognosia, they are unable to recognise what is in front of them and walk into things. In addition, they not only have the deficit of lacking qualia, they have a specific delusional belief which cannot be shifted despite any evidence they might be presented with. You are right about anosognosia. But my point is that anosognosia might make conceivable partial zombiness, and thus comp or your functionalism false. Again, I agree that it would make consciousness spurious, but that is something to be expected from a computationalist believing in primitive matter. I just try to put myself in the mind of those people believing in both matter and mechanism. Anosognosia involves an additional cognitive deficit which makes the patient deny that he has a problem despite all evidence presented to him. Yes. If you damage enough of the brain, it's not surprising that generalised problems in thinking arise. But the case to consider is a person who has a cicumscribed deficit, say in some sensory modality, without a problem in thinking. That such a person might not notice that he has for example gone blind seems absurd. It could mean that you went blind yesterday, although you can still think and hear and feel, but you haven't noticed it, and you still enjoyed looking at the painting on your office wall this morning. If that is possible, then what is the difference between having visual qualia and not having them? To make it more concrete, if the doctor offered me an artificial brain which would leave me blind but with the guarantee that it would *seem* to me that I was seeing everything exactly the same as now, what reason would there be for me to choose the more expensive model which would allow me to *really* see everything the same as now? It is just that I can logically conceive this (still playing the devil advocate role): The doctor assures me that my behavior will not change, but that my qualia and consciousness intensity will diminish of one halve, but he add that this change is anosognosic so that I will not feel any difference ... until I can afford the better artificial brain. So I say yes to him, and indeed I feel completely happy with the new brain ... until I get enough money for the new brain, which the doctor told me, will make my volume of consciousness back to normal (of course I have no idea at all what that could mean). But once I got the new brain, I realize then that indeed, I was less conscious than before the first brain operation, and that now, I feel like that again. Some type of dreams make me thing that such an experience might not be as senseless as ti might seem, and this means that the weird anosognosia condition might, perhaps, give sense to some notion of partial zombiness. Some people in this list defend the idea of volume or degree of consciousness, and if there is anosognosia on such a volume or intensity, it might gives some sense to some notion of partial zombiness, it seems to me (currently). Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 14:25, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 2 April 2015 at 18:37, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I don't think it's impossible to prove comp true. If comp were not true then it would be possible to make partial zombies. If partial zombies are possible then there would be no difference between you having qualia or lacking qualia, which is equivalent to saying consciousness does not exist; not just that it is epiphenomenal but that it isn't there at all. So if consciousness exists, comp must be true. That reasoning might asses that comp or your functionalism is provable, but comp, as I defined it, use Church-thesis (if only to get a universal dovetailer), and this gives one way to refute comp: to find a function that human can compute, but no computer could. It is hard to imagine, but it is logically possible (that is why attempt to refute CT continue to be made). If the brain utilises non-computable functions then CT is false I guess you mean non-computable by a computer. But computable by a human. and it will not be possible replace part of the brain with a computer, so comp is false. Yes. That's was my point. However, what you call my fuctionalism is a superset of comp, and it may still be possible to replace part of the brain with a device incorporating a hypercomputer, or even a magical device animated by God, and preserve consciousness. ... making your functionalism trivial, if you excuse the straightness. It is my contention that the only requirement is that this device replicates the I/O behaviour of the part of the brain that it replaces, and any associated consciousness will follow necessarily. OK. I think you get close to prove the half of comp yes doctor, as everybody agrees that we cannot prove Church thesis. (which does not mean we cannot give very powerful evidences for it). Then the proof of yes doctor use the fact that partial zombiness makes no sense, but I think that anosognosia can be used, notably if we believe in things like a consciousness volume (on which the anosognosia would bear on). The point is logical. Like in MGA, once we argue on reality, we can only present evidences, no proofs. The LHC has not prove the existence of the Higgs boson, nor does Mars Rover and its image prove the existence of Mars, or Apollo 9 the existence of the moon. They just give strong evidence. It would be on that strong sense of proof that my critics would bear on. A bit like Russell's critics on the MGA. Bruno Then as I said, anosognosia might make conceivable partial zombiness, making consciousness non-existing, I could agree with this, but the partial zombie might not agree in the sense that it would say: no, my consciousness has not changed (despite some god could say, yes, the volume of its consciousness has drop 1/2, but he can't see that as he is amnesic of its precedent volume of consciousness. Again, this is close to non- sense to me, and eventually I might think that (comp v functionalism) is provable. Interesting point. I will dig on this ... hoping to find sometime. I have to go. Note that (comp v functionalism(yours) = functionalism(yours). It is not Putnam functionalism (which is comp, even with some high level substitution level). You seem going to change my mind on something about comp/ functionalism. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop
Re: The MGA revisited
On 02 Apr 2015, at 08:13, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 07:07:09AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: Which assumes perhaps too strong a form of functionalism and/or digitalism that runs into its own contradiction with 1p consciousness? As pointed out in earlier post: With that move, it is no longer relevant to distinguish recording from person who has 1p experience, zombie question is nonsense, no indexical property, there is correct substitution level, all possible 1p consciousness of all persons supervenes on the recording (everything digital) *or* none at all since recording has no CC and other such funky consequences I can't recall. How is this avoided if everything is one bland sauce of digital? It is not at all obvious that counterfactual correctness (CC) is required for a computation to be conscious. Bruno usually argues that feature is a red herring. I do that in some place, but this is really what Maudlin showed, when keeping materialism and computationalism + the idea that something inactive in a brain during a specific computation would not change the specific consciousness if it were removed. I do that to get the absurdity. But I keep comp, and counterfactual correctness is a bit of the essence of what a computation is. It is what make absurd the idea that a movie could be conscious: it does not enact a computation. It does not need a universal machine to be enactedn unlike any computation. The same movie could correspond to different computations, if we change the universal machine which did that movie, and build an ad hoc different one. If it is, then non-CC recordings are not conscious, and the MGA goes through in the small (non-robust) universe case. But recordings can also be counterfactually correct in principle by adding the inactive Klara? Then we are again back to Maudlin's point. neurons must know which neurons did not trigger them. They need some telepathy. (in the form of a huge lookup table, for example, in Searles's Chinese Room), or in the form of a precise specification of the quantum wave function, or of a finite chunk of the UD* trace. You mean description of them, or they actualization or realization by some reality (arithmetical or physical). You might be slipping from the computation to its description. Bruno Modulo the no-cloning theorem, or the Seth Lloyd limit which would prevent such a recording existing in our current universe. Thanks for pushing the question though Russell, as my earlier posts were perhaps less clear on this. I guess you're coming from some ground I can't parse or have missed reading and you have my apology here if so. But zombies can be tricky bastards :-) Where do you draw the line? I'm afraid intuition does not help much in this matter, which is why I say it is a weakness of the MGA. There must be something more to it than just complexity or even Turing universality. Bruno says human-like consciousness requires Lobianity. But I think that's asking for more than just awarenss; it's asking for self-awarness. Which with comp assumptions/environment includes the properties that come with that kind of self-awareness, e.g. incompleteness, machine's silence etc. PGC If I were building a Mars Rover and gave it the ability to learn from its experience by reviewing its memory of events and projecting hypothetical futures, I would be concerned that I had created a sentient being that would forsee its own end. So I would be sure to avoid putting its indefinite survival into its value system. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit
Re: The MGA revisited
On Wed, Apr 01, 2015 at 08:37:36AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 7:32 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Apr 01, 2015 at 05:17:00AM +0200, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 3:02 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: I have always disagreed with this. The movie+broken gates is still a computation, just a rather simple one. Playing a movie in (eg) SMPlayer is still running a computation. And I have never understood how that doesn't void significance of 1p views. If this is totally tight, correct, mechanistic 3p view, then you get corresponding complete absence of meaning on 1p level of person/machine's discourse. Happy April fool's to you! More seriously though, I haven't the foggiest what you mean. Even your follow on prose doesn't help. Why would the fact that playing a recording is a computation void significance of 1p views? Because it weakens/relativizes the difference between counterfactual possibility instantiating computation and say the numbers/sequences/patterns of a movie on my phone. I really don't know what your push back is. The program consisting of the nop instruction 1000 times in a row, followed by the halt instruction is a perfectly valid program, and running it on a machine is a perfectly valid computation, albeit a rather trivial one. There are no counterfactuals involved. The program will do the same thing regardless of what the CPU registers contain Playing a recording is just a slightly more complex version of the same thing. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
Bruno Marchal wrote: If just one physical law cannot be deduced from them, it means that computationalism is false, and that consciousness requires something else (God, primitive actual matter, or something that we just not yet conceive). I would like to see just one non-trivial physical law that has been deduced from comp. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 01 Apr 2015, at 02:05, LizR wrote: On 1 April 2015 at 03:58, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Mar 2015, at 02:57, LizR wrote: On 29 March 2015 at 21:04, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: As you see, I believe in physicalism, not in Platonia. And I have not yet seen any argument that might lead me to change my mind. One reason that has been suggested is the unreasonable effectiveness of maths as a description of physics. This is Max Tegmark's argument for the Mathematical Universe Hypothesis. To take this to its logical conclusion, if we ever formulate a theory that (as far as we know) describes everything that exists - a real live TOE - then, Tegmark would say, what is there that distinguishes the universe from the, by hypothesis completely accurate, description? His conclusion is nothing, and since the maths description is simpler than the observed universe, the scientific conclusion is that what we observe is a part of a multiverse containing all outcomes of the TOE (this is a bit like Russell's TON, with the equations of the TOE as the almost nothing that actually exists) - and that assuming the universe is anything more than just What the maths looks like from the inside is unnecessary - and untestable - metaphysical speculation. ? On the contary: what arithmetic looks from inside can be made precise when the observer is assumed to be Turing emulable. The math is computer science, with the mathematical definition of computer. As we have remarked previously, Max hasn't really dealt with the observer in his mathematical universe hypothesis. I used the MUH as an example of a reason to believe that one should perhaps prefer Platonia to physicalism because I feel it's a fairly straightforward example, without any need to worry about - for example - the nature of consciousness. OK, but we have to take it into account if we want explain mind and matter. Then the math, to be short, says: it looks like Parmenides, Plotinus, and the mystics. It feels like there is: 1)a big ONE without a name, a part of which is 2) the Intelligible part (and that part is actually far bigger or far more complex than the big ONE, which is relatively simple), and then there is 3) the universal soul, which is the fire in the equation, and actually makes a lot of mess in Platonia, but perhaps the worst is to come, as there are: 4) the intelligible matter (death and taxes), and 5) the sensible matter (which can hurt). Those are the five hypotheses of Parmenides, and they are recovered with the nuances: p []p []p p []p t []p t p That gives eight important distinct modes in which a universal machine can see herself and the math which encompass her. (8, not 5, as three modes inherit the G/G*split). However we don't have such a TOE as yet, Hmm... I guess you have lost your notes diary again. With computationalism, it is a fair simplification to say that each universal machine is a TOE. Any first order specification of any one among them would do the same job, and lead to the same mind-body problem, and the same mind and body solution, but I have chosen elementary arithmetic and SK-combinators to fix the things. Well, no, there is no TOE that describes all features of the physical universe yet. But if comp is true, there is. If comp is true, the theory with the axioms Kxy = x + Sxyz = xy(zy), or elementary arithmetic HAVE TO describe all feature of the physical universe. If not comp is false. With comp, we cannot add anything to elementary arithmetic or to any sigma-1 complete set. That is the point of the reasoning. That we don't succeed, or have not yet extracted it is another point. The TOE is there. All the physical (but non geographical, nor historical) feature of physics must be explained by elementary arithmetic, or computationalism is false. That follows from the UDA. String theory and comp are both attempts at this (from very different starting points) but I don't believe either has reached the point where they can say (for example) the universe should appear to conserve energy, be Lorentz invariant, exhibit a fundamental uncertainty of various quantities, etc. Not really, but a case can be made that we have already explained where the symmetries come from, and thus (by Noether) the (future, when we know what is energy) conservation of energy, the quantum logic, etc. But even without that, comp has given the TOE. That we humans cannot still extract physics is another point. It might take many years, or even millenia, but then we get already the propositional theology, including the logic of the observable, and the reason why the measure exists (the existence of quantization, the symmetry of the physical bottom, the many worlds, etc. The UDA just nullifies the use of any extra-axioms. The physical universe is really in the head of all
Re: The MGA revisited
On 31 Mar 2015, at 17:48, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, April 1, 2015, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Mar 2015, at 22:28, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Tuesday, March 31, 2015, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Mar 2015, at 10:06, LizR wrote: On 30 March 2015 at 19:26, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Fading qualia in the setting of normal behaviour, if logically possible, would destroy the common idea of consciousness that we have. It would mean, for example, that you could have gone blind last week but not realise it. You would look at a painting, describe the painting, have an emotional response to the painting - but lack any visual experience of the painting. If that is possible, what meaning is left to attribute to the word qualia? Well, it would mean that comp is false, because the electronic replacements are not generating any conscious experience despite having their I/O matched to the rest of the brain. Yes, there would be p-zombies. Behaving like conscious person, but without any private knowledge, qualia, sensation or consciousness. And there would also be the possibility of partial p-zombies, which would mean that private knowledge, qualia, sensation and consciousness make no subjective difference, or equivalently that they don't exist. Yes, and this eventually show that we can believe in non- computationalism if we are ready to believe in zombies, and partial zombies. Bruno Did you survive with the artificial brain? Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... Oh, yes, no doubt about that, I feel no difference ... cling ... A partial zombie would mean that you do feel different but you don't notice that you feel different. This applies not only to a difference you might conceivably not notice, like colour reversal, but to a gross sensory or cognitive deficit, such as going completely blind or losing the ability to understand language. It seems to me that if you allow that such things can happen without you or anyone else noticing then the whole idea of consciousness is spurious. I think we agree on this. I have to think more if that can lead to a proof of computationalism, due to possible agnosologia (if that term is correct). I can imagine someone feeling less conscious, but losing all memories of having been more conscious, so that he does not feel the difference (like people becoming blind, but not noticing it). I am just the advocate of the devil, here. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 01 Apr 2015, at 02:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 31 Mar 2015, at 07:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
In a phrase I have used before, It did not spring forth fully
armed, like Athena from Zeus's brow. Numbers were a hard-won
abstraction from everyday physical reality. They do not have any
independent existence.
In which theory? What has independent existence?
The external objective universe, of which we are part.
If it exists. But then you need to abandon computationalism if you
hope to relate that physical universe to your consciousness here and
now.
That is not obvious. It is the point of the UD Argument.
As someone has said, you do not come across a number 5 running
wild in the undergrowth.
I am not sure, when I run I might not count them, but five
incarnate in my feet and hands all the time, and even if I did not
have legs, like a snake, 5 would still be prime, independently of
me thinking about it or not.
You are running into the old problem of universals. You take the
approach of Plato -- the universals are needed to explain the
commonality between all sets of five things (like toes, finger,...),
but even so, you don't see the universal 5 running in the wild --
you see only five toes, or deer, or .. It is equally open to
anyone to take Aristotle's line and hold that five exists only in
sets of five things -- the modern nominalist position.
Assuming there are objects. But then ... (see above).
Two thousand five hundred years of philosophical argument have not
settled this issue,
Progress haev been made, until Aristotle metaphysics has been imposed
through violence, for 1500 years, now.
And the discovery of the universal machine solves the last problem
they met. 1500 years of aristotelian physics have just put the
consciousness problem under the rug.
so no-one need accept your enthusiastic embrace of Plato's account.
It is not part of the hypothesis. Platonism is extracted from
arithmetic. The only platonism used at the start is the belief that
(A v ~A) is true with A being a statement equivalent with the program
i on input j will stop or will not stop.
Other accounts are just as good (in many ways preferable).
No problem. The point is that IF we assume comp, they are refuted, or
epistemologically non sustainable. It is a technical point.
...
But I think we need to distinguish two senses in which something
can be said to exist. There is mathematical existence,
Exist_{math}, and physical existence, Exist_{phys}.
I agree. And those are quite different mode of existence.
I am glad we can agree on something.
Exist_{math} is the set of all implications of a set of axioms and
some rules of inference.
Not at all. That would give only a tiny sigma_1 set. Even
arithmetic is larger than that, and non unifiable in any effective
theory.
I think you underestimate the power of an axiomatic theory.
?
No, it is a theorem. Arithmetic is not axiomatizable.
.
Exist_{phys} is the hardware of the universe.
OK. But then comp is false, there are zombies, etc.
Why do you think that is a problem? They exist only if you create
them.
Well, assuming ~comp, you are back at square zero. I explain how comp
solves the problem (or reduce it to another problem).
I am not defending any truth. I just show that IF computationalism is
TRUE, then we have to extract the physical laws from elementary
arithmetic or from any first order logical specification of any UTM.
You point and say That is a rock, cat, or whatever. In more
sophisticated laboratory settings, you construct models to explain
atomic spectra, tracks in bubble chambers, and so on. The
scientific realist would claim that the theoretical entities
entailed by his most mature and well-tested scientific theories
exist_{phys}, and form part of the furniture of the external
objective physical world.
No, that's when he get wrong, with respect of the computationalist
hypothesis.
You equivocate on this point at different times. I said previously
that, by definition, computationalism is inconsistent with
physicalism. You denied this. But what you say here is exactly this.
Because all my work consists in showing than comp (the idea that my
physical brain is Turing emulable, like a computer) is inconsistent
with physicalism. If I were putting the inconsistency with physicalism
in the definition of comp, my proof could be simplified into: look at
the axiom. Don't confuse the comp thesis, and its highly non trivial
(for most) consequence.
...
So there is a very clear difference between the mathematical and
physical worlds.
Yes, but science has not yet decided which is the most fundamental.
You agree, then, that computationalism is just a hypothesis
Yes. I insist on that all the time. I am not a believer in comp at
all. Nor am I am a disbeliever. I just don't do philosophy, I
Re: The MGA revisited
On 1 April 2015 at 22:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 01 Apr 2015, at 02:05, LizR wrote: Well, no, there is no TOE that describes all features of the physical universe yet. But if comp is true, there is. If comp is true, the theory with the axioms Kxy = x + Sxyz = xy(zy), or elementary arithmetic HAVE TO describe all feature of the physical universe. If not comp is false. With comp, we cannot add anything to elementary arithmetic or to any sigma-1 complete set. That is the point of the reasoning. That we don't succeed, or have not yet extracted it is another point. The TOE is there. All the physical (but non geographical, nor historical) feature of physics must be explained by elementary arithmetic, or computationalism is false. That follows from the UDA. OK, but as you say - if comp is true. And I'm not saying you need to prove it's true because I know that's impossible. But as far as I know, no one has yet derived a convincing amount of physics from comp, so we don't yet have convincing evidence that it may well be true, if you see what I mean. (I think Bruce says the same thing in a post i'm about to read!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The MGA revisited
On 01 Apr 2015, at 03:02, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 07:28:51AM +0100, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The ab asurdo is showing computationalism is incompatible with physical supervenience, not that it is true. In the end by being forced to accept consciousness must supervene on the movie + broken gate... If you believe it, then you've abandon computationalism as a theory of the mind as the movie+broken gates is not a computation... Or you can keep computationalism and abandon physical supervenience QED I have always disagreed with this. The movie+broken gates is still a computation, just a rather simple one. Playing a movie in (eg) SMPlayer is still running a computation. yes, but in the MGA we know the content of the consciousness (usually a dream where the person is flying). So a human dream would supervene on a very simple simple computation, which can be made arbitrary simple. Would say yes to a doctor who suggest to replace your brain with a simple clock? As I see it, the argument still relies on an intuition that the movie+broken gates computation cannot support consciousness. It is an intuition pump, not a proof, and consequently a weakness of the MGA. MGA tackles the application of a theory to a reality. So it cannot leads to a proof, as we can prove nothing about reality, and so we do need some occam razor and intuition pump. The argumpent here can defeat all theories. And static vs dynamic is a red herring, because as Bruce quite rightly points out, a static block Multiverse contains at least one, and by definition all possible conscious entities. OK. Like arithmetic. Again the consciousness is not in any static elementary things, but in the static relations rich enough the give the internal dynamics, and, with luck (= if comp is true) the right relative measures. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
