subject:"The problem with physics"



On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 5:04:39 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 9:50 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 4:27:30 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> You are coming close to trolling behaviour, Phil.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>>
>> But isn't someone who posts and doesn't say who they are a troll?
>>
>
> I think my correct name, Bruce Kellett, appears on every post I make. I am 
> not anonymous, and do not seek to hide my identity.
>
>> You have no link to a profile, website, CV, or anything else that I have 
>> ever seen. 
>>
>
> Do you really need an internet profile to be a real person? I am long 
> retired, so none of my professional work is available on line.
>
>> It's like all the anonymous posters in social media - no one knows who 
>> they are.
>>
>
> You judge by the content of the posts. If I have ever engaged in trolling 
> behaviour, then point to that before you start trolling me.
>
> Bruce
>



I have never done anything like that.

And I'm an open book. https://twitter.com/philipthrift

@philipthrift

 

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Re: The problem with physics



On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 5:09:42 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 4:50:55 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 4:27:30 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> People can hold several different theories about different areas of 
>>> science at the same time. Bringing up some bad review of a book by Maudlin 
>>> on space-time theory does not seem to be relevant to the issue at hand, 
>>> which concerned quantum mechanics. Your approach is sometimes known as 
>>> 'poisoning the well', or an ad hominem attack -- bring up some irrelevant 
>>> criticism of a person in order to discredit their views on something quite 
>>> different.
>>>
>>> You are coming close to trolling behaviour, Phil.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But isn't someone who posts and doesn't say who they are a troll?
>>
>> You have no link to a profile, website, CV, or anything else that I have 
>> ever seen. 
>>
>> It's like all the anonymous posters in social media - no one knows who 
>> they are.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>
>  Also nowhere have I "ad hominem" Maudlin. I agree with him:
>
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/HEFlTQYIBoQ/3hDx__qMAgAJ
>
>
> @philipthrift
>



I should say I agree with his essay *How Mathematics Meets the World *in 
general - his approach. 

You were the one that bought up Tim Maudlin. So no one should read what his 
theory is?

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics



On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 4:50:55 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 4:27:30 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>>
>> People can hold several different theories about different areas of 
>> science at the same time. Bringing up some bad review of a book by Maudlin 
>> on space-time theory does not seem to be relevant to the issue at hand, 
>> which concerned quantum mechanics. Your approach is sometimes known as 
>> 'poisoning the well', or an ad hominem attack -- bring up some irrelevant 
>> criticism of a person in order to discredit their views on something quite 
>> different.
>>
>> You are coming close to trolling behaviour, Phil.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
>
>
>
> But isn't someone who posts and doesn't say who they are a troll?
>
> You have no link to a profile, website, CV, or anything else that I have 
> ever seen. 
>
> It's like all the anonymous posters in social media - no one knows who 
> they are.
>
> @philipthrift
>
>
>  
>

 Also nowhere have I "ad hominem" Maudlin. I agree with him:

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/HEFlTQYIBoQ/3hDx__qMAgAJ


@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-12-07 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 9:50 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 4:27:30 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>>
>> You are coming close to trolling behaviour, Phil.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
> But isn't someone who posts and doesn't say who they are a troll?
>

I think my correct name, Bruce Kellett, appears on every post I make. I am
not anonymous, and do not seek to hide my identity.

> You have no link to a profile, website, CV, or anything else that I have
> ever seen.
>

Do you really need an internet profile to be a real person? I am long
retired, so none of my professional work is available on line.

> It's like all the anonymous posters in social media - no one knows who
> they are.
>

You judge by the content of the posts. If I have ever engaged in trolling
behaviour, then point to that before you start trolling me.

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics



On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 4:27:30 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 8:21 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 3:09:08 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 7:50 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
 On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 12:22:01 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 8:55 AM Bruce Kellett  
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics itself is not counterfactually definite. Einstein 
>> was wrong about this. A free electron is described by a wave packet 
>> which 
>> is a superposition of states of definite momentum and position. There is 
>> no 
>> actual "position" for the electron until it interacts with a screen or 
>> some 
>> similar device. This is demonstrated by simple two-slit interference. 
>> There 
>> is no pre-existing position, unless you want to embrace Bohm's pilot 
>> wave 
>> theory, in which the electron does have a definite, though unknown, 
>> position at all times.
>>
>
> I have come across an interesting video
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5D9HkoHScdY
>
> in which Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of 
> others talk about interpretations of quantum mechanics from their 
> different 
> perspective. I found the segment by Tim Maudlin particularly interesting, 
> given his new book on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. His segment 
> starts at about the 10 minute mark. But the other contributions also have 
> some interest -- particularly Philip Ball towards the end (about the 20 
> minute mark).
>
> No definite conclusions are advocated, but it is interesting to hear 
> the different perspectives.
>
> Bruce
>




 Not sure what this is.

>>>
>>> So why did you raise it? You have a habit of throwing irrelevancies 
>>> around, Phil. It is not an endearing trait.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>>
>> It's at the basis of* Tim Maudlin'*s interpretation.
>>
>
> Maudlin's interpretation of what? It does not appear to be relevant to his 
> views on the ontology of quantum mechanics. So it would appear to be 
> irrelevant to the short talk by Maudlin that I referenced.
>
>> "Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of others talk 
>> about interpretations of quantum mechanics from *their* different 
>> perspective."
>>
>>
>> You brought up *Tim Maudlin*'s theory. I didn't. Apparently you don't 
>> know anything about Maudlin's theory. (Which is a trait of yours.)
>>
>
> People can hold several different theories about different areas of 
> science at the same time. Bringing up some bad review of a book by Maudlin 
> on space-time theory does not seem to be relevant to the issue at hand, 
> which concerned quantum mechanics. Your approach is sometimes known as 
> 'poisoning the well', or an ad hominem attack -- bring up some irrelevant 
> criticism of a person in order to discredit their views on something quite 
> different.
>
> You are coming close to trolling behaviour, Phil.
>
> Bruce
>





But isn't someone who posts and doesn't say who they are a troll?

You have no link to a profile, website, CV, or anything else that I have 
ever seen. 

It's like all the anonymous posters in social media - no one knows who they 
are.

@philipthrift


 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-12-07 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 8:21 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 3:09:08 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 7:50 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 12:22:01 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 8:55 AM Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

>
> Quantum mechanics itself is not counterfactually definite. Einstein
> was wrong about this. A free electron is described by a wave packet which
> is a superposition of states of definite momentum and position. There is 
> no
> actual "position" for the electron until it interacts with a screen or 
> some
> similar device. This is demonstrated by simple two-slit interference. 
> There
> is no pre-existing position, unless you want to embrace Bohm's pilot wave
> theory, in which the electron does have a definite, though unknown,
> position at all times.
>

 I have come across an interesting video

 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5D9HkoHScdY

 in which Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of
 others talk about interpretations of quantum mechanics from their different
 perspective. I found the segment by Tim Maudlin particularly interesting,
 given his new book on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. His segment
 starts at about the 10 minute mark. But the other contributions also have
 some interest -- particularly Philip Ball towards the end (about the 20
 minute mark).

 No definite conclusions are advocated, but it is interesting to hear
 the different perspectives.

 Bruce

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not sure what this is.
>>>
>>
>> So why did you raise it? You have a habit of throwing irrelevancies
>> around, Phil. It is not an endearing trait.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>
> It's at the basis of* Tim Maudlin'*s interpretation.
>

Maudlin's interpretation of what? It does not appear to be relevant to his
views on the ontology of quantum mechanics. So it would appear to be
irrelevant to the short talk by Maudlin that I referenced.

> "Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of others talk
> about interpretations of quantum mechanics from *their* different
> perspective."
>
>
> You brought up *Tim Maudlin*'s theory. I didn't. Apparently you don't
> know anything about Maudlin's theory. (Which is a trait of yours.)
>

People can hold several different theories about different areas of science
at the same time. Bringing up some bad review of a book by Maudlin on
space-time theory does not seem to be relevant to the issue at hand, which
concerned quantum mechanics. Your approach is sometimes known as 'poisoning
the well', or an ad hominem attack -- bring up some irrelevant criticism of
a person in order to discredit their views on something quite different.

You are coming close to trolling behaviour, Phil.

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics



On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 3:09:08 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 7:50 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 12:22:01 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 8:55 AM Bruce Kellett  
>>> wrote:
>>>

 Quantum mechanics itself is not counterfactually definite. Einstein was 
 wrong about this. A free electron is described by a wave packet which is a 
 superposition of states of definite momentum and position. There is no 
 actual "position" for the electron until it interacts with a screen or 
 some 
 similar device. This is demonstrated by simple two-slit interference. 
 There 
 is no pre-existing position, unless you want to embrace Bohm's pilot wave 
 theory, in which the electron does have a definite, though unknown, 
 position at all times.

>>>
>>> I have come across an interesting video
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5D9HkoHScdY
>>>
>>> in which Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of 
>>> others talk about interpretations of quantum mechanics from their different 
>>> perspective. I found the segment by Tim Maudlin particularly interesting, 
>>> given his new book on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. His segment 
>>> starts at about the 10 minute mark. But the other contributions also have 
>>> some interest -- particularly Philip Ball towards the end (about the 20 
>>> minute mark).
>>>
>>> No definite conclusions are advocated, but it is interesting to hear the 
>>> different perspectives.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>>
>>



>>
>> Not sure what this is.
>>
>
> So why did you raise it? You have a habit of throwing irrelevancies 
> around, Phil. It is not an endearing trait.
>
> Bruce
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
It's at the basis of* Tim Maudlin'*s interpretation.

"Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of others talk 
about interpretations of quantum mechanics from *their* different 
perspective."


You brought up *Tim Maudlin*'s theory. I didn't. Apparently you don't know 
anything about Maudlin's theory. (Which is a trait of yours.)

@philipthrift
 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-12-07 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Dec 7, 2019 at 7:50 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 12:22:01 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 8:55 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Quantum mechanics itself is not counterfactually definite. Einstein was
>>> wrong about this. A free electron is described by a wave packet which is a
>>> superposition of states of definite momentum and position. There is no
>>> actual "position" for the electron until it interacts with a screen or some
>>> similar device. This is demonstrated by simple two-slit interference. There
>>> is no pre-existing position, unless you want to embrace Bohm's pilot wave
>>> theory, in which the electron does have a definite, though unknown,
>>> position at all times.
>>>
>>
>> I have come across an interesting video
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5D9HkoHScdY
>>
>> in which Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of
>> others talk about interpretations of quantum mechanics from their different
>> perspective. I found the segment by Tim Maudlin particularly interesting,
>> given his new book on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. His segment
>> starts at about the 10 minute mark. But the other contributions also have
>> some interest -- particularly Philip Ball towards the end (about the 20
>> minute mark).
>>
>> No definite conclusions are advocated, but it is interesting to hear the
>> different perspectives.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
>
>
> Not sure what this is.
>

So why did you raise it? You have a habit of throwing irrelevancies around,
Phil. It is not an endearing trait.

Bruce




>
> *Tim Maudlin - Linear Structures*
>
> https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article-abstract/84/1/63/1780015
>
> The standard mathematical account of the sub-metrical geometry of a space
> employs topology, whose foundational concept is the open set. This proves
> to be an unhappy choice for discrete spaces, and offers no insight into the
> physical origin of geometrical structure. I outline an alternative, the
> Theory of Linear Structures, whose foundational concept is the line.
> Application to Relativistic space-time reveals that the whole geometry of
> space-time derives from temporal structure. In this sense, instead of
> spatializing time, Relativity temporalizes space.
>
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219815000842 :
>
> Causal set theory and the theory of linear structures (which has recently
> been developed by Tim Maudlin as an alternative to standard topology) share
> some of their main motivations. In view of that, I raise and answer the
> question how these two theories are related to each other and to standard
> topology. I show that causal set theory can be embedded into Maudlin׳s more
> general framework and I characterise what Maudlin׳s topological concepts
> boil down to when applied to discrete linear structures that correspond to
> causal sets. Moreover, I show that all topological aspects of causal sets
> that can be described in Maudlin׳s theory can also be described in the
> framework of standard topology. Finally, I discuss why these results are
> relevant for evaluating Maudlin׳s theory. The value of this theory depends
> crucially on whether it is true that (a) its conceptual framework is as
> expressive as that of standard topology when it comes to describing
> well-known continuous as well as discrete models of spacetime and (b) it is
> even more expressive or fruitful when it comes to analysing topological
> aspects of discrete structures that are intended as models of spacetime. On
> one hand, my theorems support (a). The theory is rich enough to incorporate
> causal set theory and its definitions of topological notions yield a
> plausible outcome in the case of causal sets. On the other hand, the
> results undermine (b). Standard topology, too, has the conceptual resources
> to capture those topological aspects of causal sets that are analysable
> within Maudlin׳s framework. This fact poses a challenge for the proponents
> of Maudlin׳s theory to prove it fruitful.
>
>
>
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1db1/0fc014a2182a572ad11f4253df26e6c54f0f.pdf
>
> @philipthrift
>

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Re: The problem with physics

On Saturday, December 7, 2019 at 12:22:01 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 8:55 AM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>>
>> Quantum mechanics itself is not counterfactually definite. Einstein was 
>> wrong about this. A free electron is described by a wave packet which is a 
>> superposition of states of definite momentum and position. There is no 
>> actual "position" for the electron until it interacts with a screen or some 
>> similar device. This is demonstrated by simple two-slit interference. There 
>> is no pre-existing position, unless you want to embrace Bohm's pilot wave 
>> theory, in which the electron does have a definite, though unknown, 
>> position at all times.
>>
>
> I have come across an interesting video
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5D9HkoHScdY
>
> in which Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of 
> others talk about interpretations of quantum mechanics from their different 
> perspective. I found the segment by Tim Maudlin particularly interesting, 
> given his new book on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. His segment 
> starts at about the 10 minute mark. But the other contributions also have 
> some interest -- particularly Philip Ball towards the end (about the 20 
> minute mark).
>
> No definite conclusions are advocated, but it is interesting to hear the 
> different perspectives.
>
> Bruce
>

Not sure what this is.

*Tim Maudlin - Linear Structures*

https://academic.oup.com/aristoteliansupp/article-abstract/84/1/63/1780015

The standard mathematical account of the sub-metrical geometry of a space 
employs topology, whose foundational concept is the open set. This proves 
to be an unhappy choice for discrete spaces, and offers no insight into the 
physical origin of geometrical structure. I outline an alternative, the 
Theory of Linear Structures, whose foundational concept is the line. 
Application to Relativistic space-time reveals that the whole geometry of 
space-time derives from temporal structure. In this sense, instead of 
spatializing time, Relativity temporalizes space.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1355219815000842 :

Causal set theory and the theory of linear structures (which has recently 
been developed by Tim Maudlin as an alternative to standard topology) share 
some of their main motivations. In view of that, I raise and answer the 
question how these two theories are related to each other and to standard 
topology. I show that causal set theory can be embedded into Maudlin׳s more 
general framework and I characterise what Maudlin׳s topological concepts 
boil down to when applied to discrete linear structures that correspond to 
causal sets. Moreover, I show that all topological aspects of causal sets 
that can be described in Maudlin׳s theory can also be described in the 
framework of standard topology. Finally, I discuss why these results are 
relevant for evaluating Maudlin׳s theory. The value of this theory depends 
crucially on whether it is true that (a) its conceptual framework is as 
expressive as that of standard topology when it comes to describing 
well-known continuous as well as discrete models of spacetime and (b) it is 
even more expressive or fruitful when it comes to analysing topological 
aspects of discrete structures that are intended as models of spacetime. On 
one hand, my theorems support (a). The theory is rich enough to incorporate 
causal set theory and its definitions of topological notions yield a 
plausible outcome in the case of causal sets. On the other hand, the 
results undermine (b). Standard topology, too, has the conceptual resources 
to capture those topological aspects of causal sets that are analysable 
within Maudlin׳s framework. This fact poses a challenge for the proponents 
of Maudlin׳s theory to prove it fruitful.

https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/1db1/0fc014a2182a572ad11f4253df26e6c54f0f.pdf

@philipthrift 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-12-06 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Nov 27, 2019 at 8:55 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>
> Quantum mechanics itself is not counterfactually definite. Einstein was
> wrong about this. A free electron is described by a wave packet which is a
> superposition of states of definite momentum and position. There is no
> actual "position" for the electron until it interacts with a screen or some
> similar device. This is demonstrated by simple two-slit interference. There
> is no pre-existing position, unless you want to embrace Bohm's pilot wave
> theory, in which the electron does have a definite, though unknown,
> position at all times.
>

I have come across an interesting video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5D9HkoHScdY

in which Gerard 't Hooft, Roger Penrose, Tim Maudlin and a couple of others
talk about interpretations of quantum mechanics from their different
perspective. I found the segment by Tim Maudlin particularly interesting,
given his new book on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. His segment
starts at about the 10 minute mark. But the other contributions also have
some interest -- particularly Philip Ball towards the end (about the 20
minute mark).

No definite conclusions are advocated, but it is interesting to hear the
different perspectives.

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-12-06 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Dec 4, 2019 at 7:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> In the duplicating machine case even after it's all over it's not at all
>> clear who has won because I hear 2 equally loud and equally valid voices
>> demanding that they deserve to receive the title "you”.
>
>
> *> That is right, and it is nice to listen to them both,*
>

I have,

* > as you should (given the definition of first person),*
>

Given the definition and given the circumstances there are now 2 first
persons, and there is nothing indeterminate about that, it's a precise
statement and was correctly predicted to happen yesterday in Helsinki.

> *and when you listen to each of them, you realise that they know
> perfectly who they are.*
>

Yes, one knows they are the Washington  Man and one knows he is the Moscow
Man.

*> The guy in W says “I find myself clearly in W, and could not have
> guessed this in H”,*
>

Nonsense. Yesterday in H anybody could have predicted that the man who saw
W would become the W man, I don't understand  what else somebody should
have said yesterday in H.

*> **and the guy in M says "“I find myself clearly in M, and could not have
> guessed this in H”.*
>

This? In the above "I" is clear, it is the man who saw M, but if "this" in
the above does not mean the man who sees M will become the M Man (which is
easily predictable) then "this" can not be guessed at because nobody knows
what the hell they're suposed to be guessing about. And atop this
ridiculous foundation you have built a huge tower reaching toward the
ethereal heights.

And you wonder why I stopped reading your "proof"!

>
> *both confirms that they got “THE” experience.*
>

Then yesterday in Helsinki it was a ridiculous question to ask "what one
and only one will get THE experience?", it's so ridiculous it wasn't a
question at all, it was just gibberish.

> y*ou can no more invoke a god* [...]
>

And at this point I say goodnight because I know from experience that after
you invoke that particularly ridiculous word (or start babbling about
ancient Greeks) nothing intelligent ever follows.

 John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-12-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 28 Nov 2019, at 16:51, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:43 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> >> In Everett's theory it's easy to specify exactly what the bet is about 
> >> because after its all over it's clear who has won,
> 
> > In each branch. But that is the case in the WM classical duplication too.
> 
> No it is not. In the duplicating machine case even after it's all over it's 
> not at all clear who has won because I hear 2 equally loud and equally valid 
> voices demanding that they deserve to receive the title "you”. 

That is right, and it is nice to listen to them both, as you should (given the 
definition of first person), and when you listen to each of them, you realise 
that they know perfectly who they are. The guy in W says “I find myself clearly 
in W, and could not have guessed this in H”, and the guy in M says "“I find 
myself clearly in M, and could not have guessed this in H”.

> in the Everett case it's clear who won because I hear only one voice that 
> claims to be Mr. You.

Then you need to enter the cut-and-read box. In W you will only one voice, and 
in M too.

> 
> >> there is only one person around who has inherited the grand title of "you”.
> 
> > Same in W, and same in M,
> 
> Right, it's the same except there are 2 people around instead of one; or to 
> put it another way, it's about as far from "the same" as you can get.

It is the same “same” as I will remain the same guy after I finish this 
sentence.

>  
> > except for irrelevant detail (provably irrelevant with mechanism).
> 
> With mechanism! That's your standard catch phrase you use whenever you get 
> into trouble,

It is my working hypothesis (and your’s, as you have already "said yes" to a 
doctor).

> but mechanism just says natural phenomena should be explained by reference to 
> matter

Not at all, or you invoke a non digital-mechanist hypothesis. Once you assume 
you survive a physical brain digital transplant, you can no more invoke a god 
(be it an irreducible matter or a superman in the sky) to identify your 
consciousness with any particular body appearance in arithmetic. You need not 
just a physical universe, but a physical universe + a non-dogital-mechanist 
theory of mind.

> and the laws of motion, and I don't know what proof you're referring to, I 
> hope it's not the silly one with wall to wall personal pronouns and a 
> personal pronoun duplicating machine.
> 
> >> and nobody can make a bet if nobody can pin down exactly what the bet is 
> >> suposed to be about.
> 
> > I bet one dollar with you that you will [...]
> 
> Since "you" duplicating machines are involved that's all that needs to be 
> said, that's enough information to know NOT to make the bet because John 
> Clark refuses to make a bet when John Clark doesn't know exactly, or even 
> approximately, what the hell the bet is.

Just enter the cut-read box. That’s how I discover the first person *plural* as 
my boss wanted me to use the bet procedure for defining the notion of 
probability (he was against the frequentist definition). He got immediately the 
point, and get also the important difference between first person singular and 
the first person plural. The arithmetical entanglement is provided by this 
simple acts: accompanying the candidate in the read-cut box.

> 
> > The prediction is on the first person feeling,
> 
> And because a first person feeling duplicating machine is involved there is 
> no such thing as THE first person feeling.

Of course there is. We just cannot predict which one we live, but it still 
exist, unless you die in the duplicating process.

> 
> > There is nothing as THE first person experience in general. But there is 
> > something like THE first person experience relative to the outcome of the 
> > experience.
> 
> No there is not. The experience had 2 outcomes so it is only meaningful to 
> talk about A first person experience.

The outcome here are the first person experience, and with mechanism, it 
remains clear that in this duplication experience, both lives only one first 
person experience, and obviously, any prediction of the particular place would 
be refuted by one guy, and so cannot do. But both confirms that they got “THE” 
experience. It is as relative than in Everett relative state.

>  
> > Assuming he bet W, the one in W will won, but Mechanism asks us to listen 
> > to both for evaluating the correct prediction. We want both to be correct.
> 
> The bet was what one and only one city will you end up seeing, if both are 
> correct then neither won because the bet was just stupid.

Well, if in Helsinki you bet W, then the fact that the W guy refuted it shows 
that we can lost the bet, locally and indexically, as expected for a notion of 
first person.

Bruno

> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-28 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Nov 28, 2019 at 9:43 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >> In Everett's theory it's easy to specify exactly what the bet is about
>> because after its all over it's clear who has won,
>
>
> *> In each branch. But that is the case in the WM classical duplication
> too.*
>

No it is not. In the duplicating machine case even after it's all over it's
not at all clear who has won because I hear 2 equally loud and equally
valid voices demanding that they deserve to receive the title "you".  in
the Everett case it's clear who won because I hear only one voice that
claims to be Mr. You.

>> there is only one person around who has inherited the grand title of
>> "you”.
>
>
> *> Same in W, and same in M,*
>

Right, it's the same except there are 2 people around instead of one; or to
put it another way, it's about as far from "the same" as you can get.

> *> except for irrelevant detail (provably irrelevant with mechanism).*
>

With mechanism! That's your standard catch phrase you use whenever you get
into trouble, but mechanism just says natural phenomena should be explained
by reference to matter and the laws of motion, and I don't know what proof
you're referring to, I hope it's not the silly one with wall to wall
personal pronouns and a personal pronoun duplicating machine.

>> and nobody can make a bet if nobody can pin down exactly what the bet is
>> suposed to be about.
>
>
> *> I bet one dollar with you that you will* [...]
>

Since "you" duplicating machines are involved that's all that needs to be
said, that's enough information to know NOT to make the bet because John
Clark refuses to make a bet when John Clark doesn't know exactly, or even
approximately, what the hell the bet is.

> *The prediction is on the first person feeling,*
>

And because a first person feeling duplicating machine is involved there is
no such thing as *THE* first person feeling.

*> There is nothing as THE first person experience in general. But there is
> something like THE first person experience relative to the outcome of the
> experience.*
>

No there is not. The experience had 2 outcomes so it is only meaningful to
talk about *A* first person experience.

> *> Assuming he bet W, the one in W will won, but Mechanism asks us to
> listen to both for evaluating the correct prediction. We want both to be
> correct.*
>

The bet was what one and only one city will you end up seeing, if both are
correct then neither won because the bet was just stupid.

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 26 Nov 2019, at 21:11, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/26/2019 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Nov 2019, at 18:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret, 
>>> they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct 
>>> which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes 
>>> observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is 
>>> solely and precisely that it is  expected to work.
>>> --—John von Neumann
>> 
>> That is instrumentalism. It does not work as von Neumann eventually 
>> understood. That is why he defended the idea that consciousness reduce the 
>> wf.
> 
> Which the buckyball Young's slit experiment shows not to work. 

I am not sure the Bucky balls can help von Neumann. It can help those who 
claimed that it is the measurement apparatus which makes the reduction, and in 
that case macroscopic superposition becomes hard tp sustain, and experieùents 
can show them wrong, but by saying that it is consciousness which makes the 
ultimate reduction, I am not sure any experiment can decide anything about 
this. This is a bit like claiming that the other guy in Moscow is simply a 
zombie, which is hard to refute logically although it is non sensical with 
Mechanism.



> So von Neumann would have abandoned that idea.

He would by reading abler simony, which shows rather well that eventually, we 
are led to solipsism when assuming that consciousness is responsible for the 
wave reduction.

Bruno



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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 26 Nov 2019, at 14:49, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 7:11 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> >> thought exparament because there is no way to determine who won and who 
> >> lost or even nail down exactly what the bet was about,
> 
> > No less than in the Everett theory.
> 
> In Everett's theory it's easy to specify exactly what the bet is about 
> because after its all over it's clear who has won,

In each branch. But that is the case in the WM classical duplication too.

> there is only one person that even comes forward and claims to have won.

There are two persons in the wave. The fact that they cannot communicate is not 
relevant. You can easily modify the protocol in step 3 to make the W and M guys 
never meeting after the split.

> This is because there is only one person around who has inherited the grand 
> title of "you”.

Same in W, and same in M, except for irrelevant detail (provably irrelevant 
with mechanism).

> None of that is true with Bruno Marchal's "theory" or in the thought 
> experiment that attempts to prove it;

The thought experiment proves only that physics is reduce to computer science, 
which is a branch of (intensional) arithmetic. We never prove any theory. We 
prove *in* the theory which can only been assumed.

> and nobody can make a bet if nobody can pin down exactly what the bet is 
> suposed to be about.

I bet one dollar with you that you will see W, in Helsinki. Then I accompany 
you in the duplication box.After pushing the button, I open the door, and I 
lost: we are in Moscow. In Washington, A guy looking like me, and a guy looking 
like you get the different outcome, and there the guy looking like me has won, 
but in Moscow, I clearly loss. Both copies on me have understood the bet, and 
clearly assessed the lost and the win in the region concerned.

In arithmetic, the copies also never met, that is why your argument is not 
relevant, and you would understand this by following the whole reasoning, 
indeed of being stuck in step 3.

> 
> >> but the situation is quite different with the MWI because it's unambiguous 
> >> what the bet was about and there is no one around to dispute the outcome.
> 
> > That is not relevant for the prediction on the first person experience, 
> 
> It sure as hell is relevant when you make a bet! You can't go to your bookie 
> after the race and just say "In my mind's eye my horse won" and expect to 
> collect your winnings from him.

The prediction is on the first person feeling, not on something 3p 
descriptible. You change the enunciation of the experience!

> And if that wasn't bad enough in Bruno Marchal's thought experiment there is 
> no such thing as THE first person experience.

There is nothing as THE first person experience in general. But there is 
something like THE first person experience relative to the outcome of the 
experience. Indeed there two of them, and both agrees that their bet “I will 
see only one city but I cannot know which one” was perfect, and, with a bit of 
reflexion, the only one possible in this setting. That is the FIRST-PERSON 
indeterminacy.

>  
> > You can make the WM thought experience with Robots
> 
> How is replacing people with Robots suposed to rescue your drowning theory?  
> If you do then in the WM thought experiment only one Robot will claim to have 
> won,

Assuming he bet W, the one in W will won, but Mechanism asks us to listen to 
both for evaluating the correct prediction. We want both to be correct. With 
some training, the robot will find the correct prediction “only once city, but 
absolutely ignorant about which one in particular I will live. The iteration of 
the experience can help to figure out this.

> but in your thought experiment a gaggle of Robots will come forward all with 
> equally valid claims to have won

Of course not, unless in Helsinki the robot got the right prediction above, in 
which case, they all won. That was the point, and now, they all agree that the 
correct bet was "“I will see only one city but I cannot know which one””.

Bruno

> and you're right back in the ridiculous position you were before.  

> 
>  John K Clark
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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-26 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 11:04 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 20 Nov 2019, at 14:51, John Clark  wrote:
>
>
> "*R**ealism is "counterfactual definiteness", the idea that it is
> possible to meaningfully describe as definite the result of a measurement
> which, in fact, has not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the
> existence of objects, and assign values to their properties, even when they
> have not been measured)*.
>
>
> Yes, that is Einstein’s physical realism. It is implied by Mechanism. It
> should not be confused with physicalism, which assumes that the only
> explanation of physical realism is that there is a primary (irreducible)
> physical reality. With mechanism, the physical realism is entailed by the
> fact that nobody can change the relative measure on all computations in
> arithmetic, no more than changing the value of 666.
> The arithmetical reality makes the physical and statistical
> “counterfactual definiteness” as solid as 2+2=4, or Ex(x+2=4), without any
> need of an ontological commitment on some “universe” or “matter”.
>

Quantum mechanics itself is not counterfactually definite. Einstein was
wrong about this. A free electron is described by a wave packet which is a
superposition of states of definite momentum and position. There is no
actual "position" for the electron until it interacts with a screen or some
similar device. This is demonstrated by simple two-slit interference. There
is no pre-existing position, unless you want to embrace Bohm's pilot wave
theory, in which the electron does have a definite, though unknown,
position at all times.

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/26/2019 4:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Nov 2019, at 18:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:


The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a 
mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  
interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of  
such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is  
expected to work.

    --—John von Neumann


That is instrumentalism. It does not work as von Neumann eventually 
understood. That is why he defended the idea that consciousness reduce 
the wf.


Which the buckyball Young's slit experiment shows not to work.  So von 
Neumann would have abandoned that idea.


Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-26 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Nov 26, 2019 at 7:11 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> in Bruno's idiotic
>
>

> *> The insult again. *
>

The observation again.

>> thought exparament because there is no way to determine who won and who
>> lost or even nail down exactly what the bet was about,
>
>
> *> No less than in the Everett theory.*
>

In Everett's theory it's easy to specify exactly what the bet is about
because after its all over it's clear who has won, there is only one person
that even comes forward and claims to have won. This is because there is
only one person around who has inherited the grand title of "you". None of
that is true with Bruno Marchal's "theory" or in the thought experiment
that attempts to prove it; and nobody can make a bet if nobody can pin down
exactly what the bet is suposed to be about.

>> but the situation is quite different with the MWI because it's
>> unambiguous what the bet was about and there is no one around to dispute
>> the outcome.
>
>
>
> *> That is not relevant for the prediction on the first person experience,
> *
>

It sure as hell is relevant when you make a bet! You can't go to your
bookie after the race and just say "In my mind's eye my horse won" and
expect to collect your winnings from him. And if that wasn't bad enough in
Bruno Marchal's thought experiment there is no such thing as *THE* first
person experience.

> > *You can make the WM thought experience with Robots*
>

How is replacing people with Robots suposed to rescue your drowning
theory?  If you do then in the WM thought experiment only one Robot will
claim to have won, but in your thought experiment a gaggle of Robots will
come forward all with equally valid claims to have won and you're right
back in the ridiculous position you were before.

 John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics


> On 25 Nov 2019, at 20:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, November 25, 2019 at 9:08:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Nov 2019, at 16:48, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In my own formulation 
>> 
>>Program
>>Language
>>Translation
>>Object
>>Substrate
>> 
>> I could identify Substrate with Model (in the mathematical logic sense).
> 
> With Mechanism, the substrate are described by the Models of the Material 
> hypotases: the very object of the number’s dream. It is not an illusion, but 
> it is something emerging from the arithmetical reality.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> That Substrate is made of Dreams of Numbers is, well, dreamy.

Indeed, as it is manifested only through experience, and this thanks to the 
work of some digital machine(s) (maybe run by some analogous machine, that 
remains possible and is perhaps necessary to get rid of the aberrant histories).

But dreams are well defined number relations. The concept of dreams is not 
dreamy. 

Bruno



> 
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Re: The problem with physics


> On 22 Nov 2019, at 09:09, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Well... maybe when you are a 50 years old scientist, you can say that, but 
> this is not the spirit in which science is teached to children or popularized 
> to laymen. The spirit of science popularization is that it gives us the 
> truth, and we should obey or die. If scientists are such moral people, then 
> why they don't tell to their students in the first class of their course that 
> they will only present to them a model ? Instead, they jump right in: "Space 
> is such-and-such, time is such-and-such.". I never heard any professor of 
> mine telling us that they are only presenting us models.

Some do, but are rare. The problem is the implicit confusion between physics 
and metaphysics/theology make by the weak-materialist (the belief in some 
irreducible matter). In physics that is not important, like the switch to 
instrumentalism often made illustrate, but in metaphysics/theology, that 
distinction is crucial.

Bruno 



> 
> On Thursday, 21 November 2019 19:23:27 UTC+2, Brent wrote:
> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret, they 
> mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct which, with 
> the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes observed 
> phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is solely and 
> precisely that it is  expected to work.
> --—John von Neumann
> 
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Re: The problem with physics


> On 21 Nov 2019, at 18:23, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret, they 
> mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct which, with 
> the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes observed 
> phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is solely and 
> precisely that it is  expected to work.
> --—John von Neumann

That is instrumentalism. It does not work as von Neumann eventually understood. 
That is why he defended the idea that consciousness reduce the wf.

Bruno




> 
> On 11/21/2019 12:31 AM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
>> What are the models the models of if not of truth ? If models are not 
>> intended to model truth, then what are they intended to do ? Create a 
>> fantastical world for World of Warcraft ?
>> 
>> On Friday, 15 November 2019 02:03:14 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you find 
>> it.
>> 
>> @philipthrift  
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Re: The problem with physics


> On 21 Nov 2019, at 09:54, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Models are the myths we invent to navigate nature (reality).


Theories are such “myth” (using the logician’s terminology). We need them to do 
anything.

The intended model of those theories is the reality, that we search. We don’t 
know if nature is a part of it, but we can guess it plays some role in it.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 2:31:09 AM UTC-6, Cosmin Visan wrote:
> What are the models the models of if not of truth ? If models are not 
> intended to model truth, then what are they intended to do ? Create a 
> fantastical world for World of Warcraft ?
> 
> On Friday, 15 November 2019 02:03:14 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you find 
> it.
> 
> @philipthrift  
> 
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Re: The problem with physics


> On 21 Nov 2019, at 00:28, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:35 PM UTC-7, scerir wrote:
>> Nevertheless, the SWE does not give a probability without some further 
>> assumptions. Why do you think that MWI advocates spend so much time an 
>> effort trying to derive the Born rule? You cannot get probabilities from the 
>> Schroedinger equation without some additional assumptions.
>> 
>> Bruce
> In his Nobel lecture (The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
> 1954)
> Born writes: "Again an idea of Einstein’s gave me the lead. He had tried to 
> make the duality of particles - light quanta or photons - and waves 
> comprehensible by interpreting the square of the optical wave amplitudes as 
> probability density for the occurrence of photons. This concept could at once 
> be carried over to the psi-function: |psi|^2 ought to represent the 
> probability density for electrons (or other particles). It was easy to assert 
> this, but how could it be proved?" 
> 
> 
> How could any of the postulates of QM "be proved”?

In arithmetic, when assuming Mechanism. QM has to become a theorem or … 
Mechanism is refuted.

The only thing that we cannot prove is x + 0 = x, etc.

Bruno



> All we can do is make assumptions and determine if they give good 
> predictions. (Have you seen my email?) AG 
> 
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Re: The problem with physics


> On 20 Nov 2019, at 23:52, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 2:42 PM 'Brent Meeker'  
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> >>> The problem is not how to calculate probabilities, it's what do the 
> >>> probabilities refer to. 
> 
> >> The best betting strategy to follow if you want to win.
> 
> > Right. 
> 
> So you now think it's clear what the probabilities refer to. Me too.
>  
> > They refer to the result of a measurement. 
> 
> A measurement that does not change physical laws so only one set of them is 
> needed.
>  
> > But as you often note in discussing Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought 
> > experiment, in MWI there is no measurement and there is no result...there 
> > are only results.
> 
> There is no way to make a bet within Bruno's idiotic

The insult again. You were just criticising the use of insult, and then you do 
it. 



> thought exparament because there is no way to determine who won and who lost 
> or even nail down exactly what the bet was about,

No less than in the Everett theory.



> but the situation is quite different with the MWI because it's unambiguous 
> what the bet was about and there is no one around to dispute the outcome.

That is not relevant for the prediction on the first person experience, or you 
add magic to computationalism.

You can make the WM thought experience with Robots, or Programs, and the winner 
will be those using the Pascal Triangle correctly. Of course, they are betting 
with people entering in the copy-annihilating box, to get a first person plural 
relative indeterminacy similar (with resect to the bets) to a quantum 
superposition.

Bruno




> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: The problem with physics


> On 20 Nov 2019, at 14:51, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 12:50 AM Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> >>> I thought one of the attractions of the many worlds theory was that it 
> >>> was realistic -- in the sense that the wave function really exists a a 
> >>> physical object,
> 
> >> I don't know where in the world you got that idea. Even probability is 
> >> pretty abstract but you don't even get that until you take the square of 
> >> the absolute value of the wave function, which contains imaginary numbers 
> >> by the way. How much more different from a physical object do you want?
> 
> > I thought that you had read Sean Carroll's recent book and might, 
> > therefore, have known better than this. On page 32, Carroll writes "First, 
> > we take the wave function seriously as a direct representation of reality, 
> > not just a book-keeping device to help us organize our knowledge. We treat 
> > it as ontological, not epistemic." That is what is meant by wave function 
> > realism.
> 
> All physicists agree that probabilities and imaginary numbers can help 
> represent physical objects and the same is true of the wave function, but no 
> physicist thinks of imaginary numbers or wave functions or probability as 
> physical objects as you claim. And yes, Carroll treats the wave function as 
> ontological not epistemic, and yes, to Carroll the wave function is more that 
> just a bookkeeping device to keep track of what we know and what we don't 
> know, and yes Carroll gives another correct definition of realism. Many 
> Worlds theory does NOT say a photon just before it hits a polarizing filter 
> is in the up or the down polarization and we just don't know which one, it 
> says it really is in both states, it says a particle is NOT always in one and 
> only one definite state, it says the world is not realistic.
> 
> >> A theory is realistic if it says a particle is in one and only one 
> >> definite state both before and after an interaction even if it has not 
> >> been observed. Many Worlds is about as far from that as you can get.
> 
> > That is not wave function realism as used in many worlds. That version of 
> > realism is not even applicable to ordinary "text-book" quantum mechanics; 
> > it is not even Eisteinian realism.
> 
> I have no idea what the difference is between "text-book" realism and 
> "Eisteinian realism" is and I don't think you do either, in physics there is 
> just realism and nonrealism. And you don't give any definition of "Realism" 
> at all, you just say I'm wrong; but Wikipedia agrees with my definition of 
> the word, it says:
> 
> "Realism is "counterfactual definiteness", the idea that it is possible to 
> meaningfully describe as definite the result of a measurement which, in fact, 
> has not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of objects, 
> and assign values to their properties, even when they have not been measured).


Yes, that is Einstein’s physical realism. It is implied by Mechanism. It should 
not be confused with physicalism, which assumes that the only explanation of 
physical realism is that there is a primary (irreducible) physical reality. 
With mechanism, the physical realism is entailed by the fact that nobody can 
change the relative measure on all computations in arithmetic, no more than 
changing the value of 666.
The arithmetical reality makes the physical and statistical “counterfactual 
definiteness” as solid as 2+2=4, or Ex(x+2=4), without any need of an 
ontological commitment on some “universe” or “matter”.

Bruno



> 
> > I know that you like to play dumb, John, and act the troll. 
> 
> So this is your strategy now, if you can't win with the facts or with logic 
> maybe you can win a battle of the insults.
> 
>  John K Clark
> 
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Re: The problem with physics


> On 19 Nov 2019, at 20:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 11/19/2019 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Nov 2019, at 22:14, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11/18/2019 12:20 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
 
 
 On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 1:16:46 PM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
 On Sun, Nov 17, 2019 at 7:43 AM Philip Thrift >>> > wrote:
 
 > Adrian Kent's https://arxiv.org/abs/1305.6565 
 >  "real path quantum theory" RPQT
 
 If you fire electrons at 2 slits and observe the slits then each electron 
 takes a real path through one and only one slit and no interference 
 pattern is produced.  If you fire electrons at 2 slits and do NOT observe 
 the slits then a interference pattern is produced indicating that each 
 electron went through both slits. Thus real path quantum theory needs 2 
 sets of physical laws, one for when things are observed and one when they 
 are not. Many Worlds only needs one set of physical laws, and one set is 
 more parsimonious than two.
>>> 
>>> That's what the evangelists for MWI say.  But in fact some more stuff is 
>>> needed to explain why we see the world as we do, i.e. how probability comes 
>>> into it and why is there a preferred basis.  Maybe this more stuff can be 
>>> derived from Schroedinger's equation, but even to do so seems to require 
>>> additional assumptions.
>> 
>> With mechanism: it requires *less* assumptions. Any physics accepting the 
>> mechanist theory of mind must explain the physical appearance from a measure 
>> on all (relative) computations.
> 
> You frequently use this unconditional form of "must" when you actually mean 
> "must, if my theory is right"  which is trivial.


It is not my theory, it is my theorem. I made precise “With Mechanism”.

I am glad you find it trivial, but you are alone on this. It is simple, but not 
really trivial. It is usually contested by people who are not aware that the 
notion of computation is an arithmetical notion, definable using only 0, s, + 
and *, or even with just the K and S axioms, and a bit of equality rule.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
>> The math required for doing this requires more axioms (like the distribution 
>> of prime number studies seems to require analytical axioms). That is normal, 
>> given incompleteness.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
 And if everything that can happen does happen then unlike its competition 
 Many Worlds doesn't have to explain exactly what a "observation" is or 
 worry about the true nature of consciousness because it has nothing to do 
 with it.
 
 John K Clark  
 
 You're hopelessly deluded. AG 
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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-25 Thread Philip Thrift



On Monday, November 25, 2019 at 9:08:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Nov 2019, at 16:48, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> In my own formulation 
>
>Program
>Language
>Translation
>Object
>Substrate
>
> I could identify Substrate with Model (in the mathematical logic sense).
>
>
> With Mechanism, the substrate are described by the Models of the Material 
> hypotases: the very object of the number’s dream. It is not an illusion, 
> but it is something emerging from the arithmetical reality.
>
> Bruno
>
>


That Substrate is made of Dreams of Numbers is, well, dreamy.

@philipthrift 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-25 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 19 Nov 2019, at 16:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 8:46:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Nov 2019, at 15:28, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, November 18, 2019 at 8:01:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> Then a huge technical problem is that the term “model” is used in opposite 
>>> sense by physicists and logicians, and the sense of “model” used by 
>>> logicians is technical and required some good understanding of what is a 
>>> theory as considered in logic (basically a finite machine, actually).
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I have thought about this almost 50 years, and have come to the conclusion 
>> that 'model' as used in physics to mean a mathematical formulation of a 
>> theory is correct, and that mathematical logicians should have never used 
>> that word for what they are using it for. It should be 'interpretation', 
>> 'semantics', or domain' instead.
>> 
>> So Peano axioms is a model of arithmetic, and is ℕ a possible interpretation 
>> (or semantics, or domain).
> 
> Usually the domain is the set from which the model is built. N is the domain, 
> But the Model is the whole structure set (N, 0, +, *). The interpretation is 
> the function going from the syntactic symbol to diverse object or 
> construction made on the domain.
> 
> In some more vague context, we can use “interpretation”, “semantic” and 
> “model” as quasi synonym. The term “domain” has acquired a more technical 
> sense in the theory of domain by Scott, but very often is used to described 
> the set used in the model.
> 
> Logicians use “model" like painters. The naked model is the reality, and the 
> painting is the syntax or theory pointing to that reality. Physicists use 
> model, like in Toy model, a simplification, or a theory, and is used most of 
> the time as both a theory or its interpretation (taken for granted most of 
> the time, although this has evolved a little bit, notably through the 
> difficulties to interpret QM).
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> Mathematical logicians just goofed up, that's all.
> 
> Logic is mainly the study of proof theory, model theory, and the relations 
> between both. “Model” has acquired a technical meaning. I think the term has 
> been introduced by Löwenheim, probably in his "cornerstone paper” on this 
> subject “Über Möglichkeiten im Relativkalkül” (“On Possibility In the 
> Relative Calculus” in German). 
> 
> A good interesting book on the birth of Model Theory is the book by Calixto 
> Badesa: “The Birth of Model Theory”, 2004, Princeton University Press 
> (translated from Spanish).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> The transition from syntax to semantics is not not as clean as may be 
> thought, but there is mathematical logic and programming language theory and 
> theorem proving systems, each with some different perspective and 
> vocabularies. 
> 
> In my own formulation 
> 
>Program
>Language
>Translation
>Object
>Substrate
> 
> I could identify Substrate with Model (in the mathematical logic sense).

With Mechanism, the substrate are described by the Models of the Material 
hypotases: the very object of the number’s dream. It is not an illusion, but it 
is something emerging from the arithmetical reality.

Bruno




> 
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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-24 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 4:49 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> * "The dependability of counterfactually definite values is a basic
 assumption, which, together with "time asymmetry" and "local causality" led
 to the Bell inequalities. Bell showed that the results of experiments
 intended to test the idea of hidden variables would be predicted to fall
 within certain limits based on all three of these assumptions"*
>>>
>>>
>>> *>>> That is false*.
>>>
>>
>> >> So Wikipedia says one thing and world class authority on Quantum
>> Mechanics Bruce Kellett says the oposite (see reference below). I will
>> let others on this list decide for themselves which one is more likely to
>> be correct,
>>
>
> *> I think the real issue here is* [...]
>

The real issue here is that this is *THE SECOND TIME* in just 4 days where
you, Bruce Kellett, claimed to know more about Quantum Mechanics than
Wikipedia. In addition to the above I gave *ANOTHER* quote that
contradicted something else that you were saying:

"*R**ealism is "counterfactual definiteness", the idea that it is possible
to meaningfully describe as definite the result of a measurement which, in
fact, has not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of
objects, and assign values to their properties, even when they have not
been measured)*."

You dismissed that fact with a wave of your hand and contemptuously said:

*"Gosh, you must have had to troll through an awful lot of stuff on
Wikipedia to find that particular definition of realism."*

If you are as impervious to the influence of facts as a Trump fan is, and
it seems that you are, then I see little reason why I should continue this
debate with you.

*>When a person deliberately deletes relevant context in order to ridicule
> a statement, it is called trolling.*

And if I am just a Troll then you are just feeding the Troll by
continuing to debate with me. I will end by saying I really think you
should follow the advice I gave you in my previous post, although I'm not
sure it's anatomically possible.

 John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-23 Thread Alan Grayson

Question for JC; you want to solve the problem of the evolution of the S's 
equation after a measurement.. If you accept that the wf tells us about 
probablilities, why do you insist the probabilities continue to exist after 
measurement, and thus, that S's equation must continue to exist and the wf 
as well? Once a measurement occurs, we're in the realm of actuality, not 
probability. It's like the horse race where you're wondering which horse 
won, when the winner is apparent. AG

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-23 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sun, Nov 24, 2019 at 1:50 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 5:31 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> then one or both of those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's
> entire point, he proposed an exparament to determine if the assumptions
> were true or not. It turned out they were not.
>

 *>>> But my point was that Bell did not assume counterfactual
 definiteness.*

>>>
>>> >>That was your point?? You just said "*I can provide many references
>>> which claim that Bell did assume counterfactual definiteness*"!
>>>
>>
>> *> You are trolling again.*
>>
>
>  Mr. Kellett, please go fuck yourself.
>

When a person deliberately deletes relevant context in order to ridicule a
statement, it is called trolling.

> >> *All he *[Bell] *assumed was that any possible hidden variables were
 local. So it is locality that is disproven by the experimental results.
 Nothing about counterfactual definiteness or realism, since Bell did not
 assume either of these things*.

>>>
>>> You and Maudlin may believe that but it is certainly a minority
>>> viewpoint:
>>>
>>> *"The dependability of counterfactually definite values is a basic
>>> assumption, which, together with "time asymmetry" and "local causality" led
>>> to the Bell inequalities. Bell showed that the results of experiments
>>> intended to test the idea of hidden variables would be predicted to fall
>>> within certain limits based on all three of these assumptions"*
>>>
>>
>> *> That is false*.
>>
>
> So Wikipedia says one thing and world class authority on Quantum Mechanics 
> Bruce
> Kellett says the oposite (see reference below). I will let others on this
> list decide for themselves which one is more likely to be correct,
>

I think the real issue here is that you are clearly unable to show how and
where Bell assumed counterfactual definiteness, and how that was a crucial
ingredient in the proof of his inequality. When you think about it,
'counterfactual definiteness', as you have defined it in terms of a
particular concept of realism, amounts to nothing more than a particular
hidden variable. Namely, the value of the spin projection that exists
before measurement. So when Bell, in order to derive his inequality,
assumes that any possible hidden variable is local, and that inequality is
violated by experiment, what is ruled out is any form of local hidden
variable.  'Realistic' or 'counterfactually definite' variables are
automatically included. So there is no need for a separate assumption about
such things. Consequently, dropping counterfactual definiteness does not
evade Bell's general conclusion. That is why I can be so definite about
saying that your interpretation is false.

The Wikipedia definition of counterfactual definiteness is fine -- it is
more general than yours, but that does not matter. It is still not
something that Bell assumed, so saying that quantum mechanics, or
many-worlds, or whatever, does not honour counterfactual definiteness has
absolutely no impact ion Bell's result.

Besides, The correct answer in physics, as in anything else, is obtained by
logical argument, not by appeals to authority or citing non-authoratative
Wikipedia articles. The truth is not decided by the majority opinion.

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-23 Thread Philip Thrift



On Saturday, November 23, 2019 at 1:43:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/22/2019 11:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> *Epistemic interpretations of quantum theory have a measurement problem*
>
> Quantum Physics and Logic 2019 - https://qpl2019.org/ 
>
> https://qpl2019.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/QPL_2019_paper_2.pdf
>
> *We have demonstrated that state update under measurement poses a serious 
> challenge to ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory in the 
> ontological models framework: all currently known ψ-epistemic models for 
> full quantum theory in d ≥ 3 cannot faithfully represent*
> *state update. This runs in direct contrast to the prevailing view that 
> ψ-epistemic models provide a compelling explanation of state update.*
>
>
> *Within the ontological models formalism, epistemic*
> *models can be given a precise mathematical definition*
> *called the ψ-epistemic criterion [22]. This precise criterion *
> *allows the possibility of conclusively ruling out this*
> *type of model. Outside of this framework, it is unlikely*
> *that ψ-epistemic models can be precluded with any kind*
> *of certainty; doxastic interpretations, for example, do not*
> *fit neatly into the ontological models framework and thus*
>
>
> *are not necessarily ruled out by these no-go theorems. *Which is why 
> QBism interprets the formalism as being about the beliefs of the person 
> using it.
>
> Brent
>
>
>


https://www.quantamagazine.org/quantum-bayesianism-explained-by-its-founder-20150604/

The usual story of Bell’s theorem is that it tells us the world must be 
nonlocal. That there really is spooky action at a distance. So they solved 
one mystery by adding a pretty damn big mystery! What is this nonlocality? 
Give me a full theory of it. My fellow QBists and I instead think that what 
Bell’s theorem really indicates is that *the outcomes of measurements are 
experiences, not revelations of something that’s already there*. 

@philipthrift 

>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/22/2019 11:15 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 11:59:41 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/22/2019 9:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 7:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List > wrote:

On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:

Why does the act of measurement seem to override the
evolution of Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly
does a "measurement" even mean? Many Worlds is the only
interpretation that can give a credible answer to that question


The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.


Have you ever seen the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph
(arXiv:.3328)?  They prove a theorem that places limitations
on the viability of a purely epistemic interpretation of the wave
function: "Here we show that any model in which a quantum state
represents mere information about an underlying physical state of
the system, and in which systems prepared independently have
independent physical states, must make predictions which
contradict those of quantum theory."


Which continues:

 "The argument depends on few assumptions. One is that a
system has a “real physical state” – not necessarily com-
pletely described by quantum theory, but objective and
independent of the observer. This assumption only needs
to hold for systems that are isolated, and not entangled
with other systems. Nonetheless, this assumption, or
some part of it, would be denied by instrumentalist ap-
proaches to quantum theory, wherein the quantum state
is merely a calculational tool for making predictions con-
cerning macroscopic measurement outcomes."

There is also this paper, which discusses some loopholes the the
assumptions of the PBR theorem:

Implications of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph quantum no-go theorem
Maximilian Schlosshauer, Arthur Fine
(Submitted on 21 Mar 2012 (v1), last revised 27 Jun 2012 (this
version, v3))
Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph introduce a new no-go theorem for
hidden-variables models of quantum theory. We make precise the
class of models targeted and construct equivalent models that
evade the theorem. The theorem requires assumptions for models of
composite systems, which we examine, determining "compactness" as
the weakest assumption needed. On that basis, we demonstrate
results of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. Given compactness and
the relevant class of models, the theorem can be seen as showing
that some measurements on composite systems must have built-in
inefficiencies, complicating its testing.
Comments:    4 pages. v2: tweaked presentation, new title; v3:
minuscule edits to match published version
Subjects:    Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
Journal reference:    Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 260404 (2012)
DOI:    10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.260404
Cite as:    arXiv:1203.4779 [quant-ph]
 (or arXiv:1203.4779v3 [quant-ph] for this version)


Brent




*Epistemic interpretations of quantum theory have a measurement problem*

Quantum Physics and Logic 2019 - https://qpl2019.org/

https://qpl2019.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/QPL_2019_paper_2.pdf

/We have demonstrated that state update under measurement poses a 
serious challenge to ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory in 
the ontological models framework: all currently known ψ-epistemic 
models for full quantum theory in d ≥ 3 cannot faithfully represent/
/state update. This runs in direct contrast to the prevailing view 
that ψ-epistemic models provide a compelling explanation of state update./


/Within the ontological models formalism, epistemic//
//models can be given a precise mathematical definition//
//called the ψ-epistemic criterion [22]. This precise criterion //
//allows the possibility of conclusively ruling out this//
//type of model. Outside of this framework, it is unlikely//
//that ψ-epistemic models can be precluded with any kind//
//of certainty; doxastic interpretations, for example, do not//
//fit neatly into the ontological models framework and thus//
//are not necessarily ruled out by these no-go theorems.

/Which is why QBism interprets the formalism as being about the beliefs 
of the person using it.


Brent/
/






@philipthrift.
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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-23 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 6:42 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> We now know that a measurement is possible without interacting with the
>> thing being measured:
>> Interaction-free measurement
>> 
>> So we could place such a device at one slit in the 2 slit exparament so
>> we would know which slit the photons went through and if we do there
>> will be no interference pattern, but if we turn the device off the
>> interference pattern will come right back. If there is a credible
>> epistemological explanation for this very strange behavior I have never
>> heard it.
>
>


> * > The person who knows the slit detector is on makes a different
> prediction of the screen pattern.*
>

Well sure, but if making correct predictions is all it's interested in then
the "Epistemological Interpretation" is just another name for the "Shut Up
And Calculate Interpretation";  it can offer no explanation as to why the
spot on the photographic plate that the photon decides to land on depends
on what I know or don't know. Why are those two things even connected?

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-23 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 5:31 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

then one or both of those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's
 entire point, he proposed an exparament to determine if the assumptions
 were true or not. It turned out they were not.

>>>
>>> *>>> But my point was that Bell did not assume counterfactual
>>> definiteness.*
>>>
>>
>> >>That was your point?? You just said "*I can provide many references
>> which claim that Bell did assume counterfactual definiteness*"!
>>
>
> *> You are trolling again.*
>

 Mr. Kellett, please go fuck yourself.

>> *All he *[Bell] *assumed was that any possible hidden variables were
>>> local. So it is locality that is disproven by the experimental results.
>>> Nothing about counterfactual definiteness or realism, since Bell did not
>>> assume either of these things*.
>>>
>>
>> You and Maudlin may believe that but it is certainly a minority
>> viewpoint:
>>
>> *"The dependability of counterfactually definite values is a basic
>> assumption, which, together with "time asymmetry" and "local causality" led
>> to the Bell inequalities. Bell showed that the results of experiments
>> intended to test the idea of hidden variables would be predicted to fall
>> within certain limits based on all three of these assumptions"*
>>
>
> *> That is false*.
>

So Wikipedia says one thing and world class authority on Quantum
Mechanics Bruce
Kellett says the oposite (see reference below). I will let others on this
list decide for themselves which one is more likely to be correct,

Counterfactual definiteness


John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 11:59:41 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/22/2019 9:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 7:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>> On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of 
>> Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" even 
>> mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a credible 
>> answer to that question
>>
>>
>> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.
>>
>
> Have you ever seen the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph 
> (arXiv:.3328)?  They prove a theorem that places limitations on the 
> viability of a purely epistemic interpretation of the wave function: "Here 
> we show that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information 
> about an underlying physical state of the system, and in which systems 
> prepared independently have independent physical states, must make 
> predictions which contradict those of quantum theory."
>
>
> Which continues:
>
>  "The argument depends on few assumptions. One is that a
> system has a “real physical state” – not necessarily com-
> pletely described by quantum theory, but objective and
> independent of the observer. This assumption only needs
> to hold for systems that are isolated, and not entangled
> with other systems. Nonetheless, this assumption, or
> some part of it, would be denied by instrumentalist ap-
> proaches to quantum theory, wherein the quantum state
> is merely a calculational tool for making predictions con-
> cerning macroscopic measurement outcomes."
>
> There is also this paper, which discusses some loopholes the the 
> assumptions of the PBR theorem:
>
> Implications of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph quantum no-go theorem
> Maximilian Schlosshauer, Arthur Fine
> (Submitted on 21 Mar 2012 (v1), last revised 27 Jun 2012 (this version, 
> v3))
> Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph introduce a new no-go theorem for 
> hidden-variables models of quantum theory. We make precise the class of 
> models targeted and construct equivalent models that evade the theorem. The 
> theorem requires assumptions for models of composite systems, which we 
> examine, determining "compactness" as the weakest assumption needed. On 
> that basis, we demonstrate results of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem. 
> Given compactness and the relevant class of models, the theorem can be seen 
> as showing that some measurements on composite systems must have built-in 
> inefficiencies, complicating its testing.
> Comments:4 pages. v2: tweaked presentation, new title; v3: minuscule 
> edits to match published version
> Subjects:Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
> Journal reference:    Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 260404 (2012)
> DOI:10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.260404
> Cite as:arXiv:1203.4779 [quant-ph]
>  (or arXiv:1203.4779v3 [quant-ph] for this version)
>
>
> Brent
>



*Epistemic interpretations of quantum theory have a measurement problem*

Quantum Physics and Logic 2019 - https://qpl2019.org/ 

https://qpl2019.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/QPL_2019_paper_2.pdf

*We have demonstrated that state update under measurement poses a serious 
challenge to ψ-epistemic interpretations of quantum theory in the 
ontological models framework: all currently known ψ-epistemic models for 
full quantum theory in d ≥ 3 cannot faithfully represent*
*state update. This runs in direct contrast to the prevailing view that 
ψ-epistemic models provide a compelling explanation of state update.*




@philipthrift. 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/22/2019 9:35 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 7:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:

Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of
Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a
"measurement" even mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation
that can give a credible answer to that question

The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.

Have you ever seen the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph
(arXiv:.3328)? They prove a theorem that places limitations on
the viability of a purely epistemic interpretation of the wave
function: "Here we show that any model in which a quantum state
represents mere information about an underlying physical state of the
system, and in which systems prepared independently have independent
physical states, must make predictions which contradict those of
quantum theory."

Which continues:

"The argument depends on few assumptions. One is that a
system has a “real physical state” – not necessarily com-
pletely described by quantum theory, but objective and
independent of the observer. This assumption only needs
to hold for systems that are isolated, and not entangled
with other systems. Nonetheless, this assumption, or
some part of it, would be denied by instrumentalist ap-
proaches to quantum theory, wherein the quantum state
is merely a calculational tool for making predictions con-
cerning macroscopic measurement outcomes."

There is also this paper, which discusses some loopholes the the
assumptions of the PBR theorem:

Implications of the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph quantum no-go theorem
Maximilian Schlosshauer, Arthur Fine
(Submitted on 21 Mar 2012 (v1), last revised 27 Jun 2012 (this version, v3))
Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph introduce a new no-go theorem for
hidden-variables models of quantum theory. We make precise the class of
models targeted and construct equivalent models that evade the theorem.
The theorem requires assumptions for models of composite systems, which
we examine, determining "compactness" as the weakest assumption needed.
On that basis, we demonstrate results of the Bell-Kochen-Specker
theorem. Given compactness and the relevant class of models, the theorem
can be seen as showing that some measurements on composite systems must
have built-in inefficiencies, complicating its testing.
Comments: 4 pages. v2: tweaked presentation, new title; v3: minuscule
edits to match published version

Subjects: Quantum Physics (quant-ph)
Journal reference: Phys. Rev. Lett. 108, 260404 (2012)
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.108.260404
Cite as: arXiv:1203.4779 [quant-ph]
(or arXiv:1203.4779v3 [quant-ph] for this version)

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 7:02 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of
> Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" even
> mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a credible
> answer to that question
>
>
> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.
>

Have you ever seen the paper by Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph
(arXiv:.3328)?  They prove a theorem that places limitations on the
viability of a purely epistemic interpretation of the wave function: "Here
we show that any model in which a quantum state represents mere information
about an underlying physical state of the system, and in which systems
prepared independently have independent physical states, must make
predictions which contradict those of quantum theory."

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/22/2019 1:33 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 3:02 PM 'Brent Meeker' via 
> wrote:

>>Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution
of Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a
"measurement" even mean? Many Worlds is the only
interpretation that can give a credible answer to that question

/> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer./

We now know thata measurementis possible without interacting with the 
thing being measured:

Interaction-free measurement 

So we could place such a device at one slit in the 2 slit exparament 
so we would know which slit the photons went throughand if we do there 
will be no interference pattern, but if we turn the device off the 
interference pattern willcome right back. If there is a credible 
epistemological explanation for this very strange behavior I have 
never heard it.

The person who knows the slit detector is on makes a different 
prediction of the screen pattern.

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Nov 23, 2019 at 1:14 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 7:18 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *>>> I can provide many references which claim that Bell did assume
 counterfactual definiteness, and this is the reason why his theorem does
 not apply in many-worlds theory. One prominent example is a paper by
 Baylock (arXiv:0902.3827).*

>>>
>>> >> The abstract says "*The view presented in this paper is that the
>>> minimal assumptions behind Bell's inequality are locality and
>>> counterfactual definiteness*", so if Bell can derive his Inequality
>>> from those assumptions but exparament proves that the Inequality is not
>>> true then one or both of those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's
>>> entire point, he proposed an exparament to determine if the assumptions
>>> were true or not. It turned out they were not.
>>>
>>
>> *> But my point was that Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness.*
>>
>
> That was your point?? You just said "*I can provide many references which
> claim that Bell did assume counterfactual definiteness*"!
>

You are trolling again. My comment was in answer to your comment that "Bell
did not assume counterfactual definiteness" was an obviously silly remark.
It was a remark that I made, and continue to make. There are many
references, like to the Baylock paper, which claim that  Bell did assume
this, so it is important to get the facts right -- Bell did not assume
counterfactual definiteness because he had no need to do so. And also,
because counterfactual definiteness is clearly false for quantum mechanics,
it would not be among the list of things he had to assume for his theorem.

> *All he *[Bell] *assumed was that any possible hidden variables were
>> local. So it is locality that is disproven by the experimental results.
>> Nothing about counterfactual definiteness or realism, since Bell did not
>> assume either of these things*.
>>
>
> You and Maudlin may believe that but it is certainly a minority viewpoint:
>
> *"The dependability of counterfactually definite values is a basic
> assumption, which, together with "time asymmetry" and "local causality" led
> to the Bell inequalities. Bell showed that the results of experiments
> intended to test the idea of hidden variables would be predicted to fall
> within certain limits based on all three of these assumptions"*
>

That is false. Bell did assume locality, and also ruled out the idea of
retrocausality. But he had no need to assume counterfactual definiteness.
If you think he did, then it is up to you to show exactly where in his
proof use is made of such an assumption. I am quite sure that you cannot do
this; no-one has ever been able to do this because Bell did not make any
such assumption.

The other overwhelming case against the suggestion that this assumption is
necessary for Bell's theorem, and the associated implication that if you do
not make this assumption, a perfectly local account of the EPR correlations
is possible, is the fact that no one has ever been able to provide this
magical local account of the correlations. If you think it is possible,
produce it! After years of prompting, Bruno has been unable to produce any
such local account. And all the other authors who have made this claim have
likewise failed in their attempts to produce the required local account.
All these many failures tell very much in favour of Maudlin's and my point
that Bell did actually prove that any such local account of the
correlations was impossible.

> Counterfactual definiteness
> 
>
> >> Bell knew exactly what he was assuming, and Baylock's paper came out
>>> 10 years ago but it might just as well have fallen into a Black Hole for
>>> all the effect it had on the physics community. It wasn't exactly earth
>>> shattering.
>>>
>>
>> > *Yes, Baylock's paper has not received much attention -- basically
>> because it is obvious nonsense.*
>>
>
> Then why the hell did you reference it?! Why did you have me waste my time
> reading the abstract if you think it's "obvious nonsense"?
>

So that you could see for yourself that it was obvious nonsense. If all you
read was the abstract, then you might have failed to get that point. But
that is hardly my fault.

> *You are entitled to your own opinions. But you are not entitled to your
>> own facts. Physicists  do not use the term 'realism' to mean
>> 'counterfactual definiteness'.*
>>
>
> If by "realistic" physicists don't mean that an object can be in one and
> only one physical state both before and after an interaction, if they don't
> mean the ability to speak meaningfully of the results of a measurement that
> has not been performed, then what in the world do they mean by "realistic?
>

You show your ignorance of the relevant literature. Scientific realism is a
perfectly well-defined concept. And that is what most people mean by
realism -- there exists an objective

Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread John Clark

On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 3:02 PM 'Brent Meeker' via <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of
>> Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" even
>> mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a credible
>> answer to that question
>
>

*> The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.*

We now know that a measurement is possible without interacting with the
thing being measured:

Interaction-free measurement

So we could place such a device at one slit in the 2 slit exparament
so we would
know which slit the photons went through and if we do there will be no
interference pattern, but if we turn the device off the interference
pattern willcome right back. If there is a credible epistemological
explanation for this very strange behavior I have never heard it.

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/22/2019 6:14 AM, John Clark wrote:
Why does the act of measurement seem to override the evolution of 
Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a "measurement" 
even mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can give a 
credible answer to that question


The epistemological interpretation also gives a credible answer.

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/22/2019 12:22 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 12:06:04 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

On 11/21/2019 9:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those
outcomes are ever observed.

It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The
point was that they can be judged right or wrong/*only*/ if
they are predictions of /*observations.*/ Otherwise they are
like your priest predicting that a donation to the church
will put you in heaven when you die.

Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic
practice that is outside the scientific
model/formulation/theory itself.

A pragmatic practice? So when Eddington measured the
deflection of starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked
himself whether it will be/*useful */to think that his
observation matched Einstein's predict? He should have
thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?

Brent

Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by
humans (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models
predict outcomes in galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models,
they may make predictions of outcomes in other universes where we
don't even live.

In fact they predict all nomologically possible outcomes. Which is
why it is a problem to interpret the Born rule.

*Nomologically possible? What does this mean? I looked it up but don't
get it. AG

Unqualified "possible" is ambiguous. Does it just mean "not
self-contradictory" or does it mean "thinkable" or "I can imagine it in
detail". "Nomological" means consistent with physics, i.e. not
violating any physical "law".

Brent

How human observations relate to models (their predicted
outcomes) is a matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called
agreed-upon scientific practice. But this is not part of the models.

Maybe (I didn't know you were a fan of pragmatism). But
observations are. Otherwise it's just mathematics. In QM they
are even called "observables".

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/22/2019 12:09 AM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
Well... maybe when you are a 50 years old scientist, you can say that,
but this is not the spirit in which science is teached to children or
popularized to laymen. The spirit of science popularization is that it
gives us the truth, and we should obey or die. If scientists are such
moral people, then why they don't tell to their students in the first
class of their course that they will only present to them a model ?
Instead, they jump right in: "Space is such-and-such, time is
such-and-such.". I never heard any professor of mine telling us that
they are only presenting us models.

I have. Maybe my professor, Englebert Schucking, was more honest, or
likely more philosophical.

Brent

On Thursday, 21 November 2019 19:23:27 UTC+2, Brent wrote:

The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to
interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a
mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal
interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification
of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it
is expected to work.
--—John von Neumann

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 7:18 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*>>> I can provide many references which claim that Bell did assume
>>> counterfactual definiteness, and this is the reason why his theorem does
>>> not apply in many-worlds theory. One prominent example is a paper by
>>> Baylock (arXiv:0902.3827).*
>>>
>>
>> >> The abstract says "*The view presented in this paper is that the
>> minimal assumptions behind Bell's inequality are locality and
>> counterfactual definiteness*", so if Bell can derive his Inequality from
>> those assumptions but exparament proves that the Inequality is not true
>> then one or both of those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's entire
>> point, he proposed an exparament to determine if the assumptions were true
>> or not. It turned out they were not.
>>
>
> *> But my point was that Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness.*
>

That was your point?? You just said "*I can provide many references which
claim that Bell did assume counterfactual definiteness*"!

> > *All he *[Bell] *assumed was that any possible hidden variables were
> local. So it is locality that is disproven by the experimental results.
> Nothing about counterfactual definiteness or realism, since Bell did not
> assume either of these things*.
>

You and Maudlin may believe that but it is certainly a minority viewpoint:

*"The dependability of counterfactually definite values is a basic
assumption, which, together with "time asymmetry" and "local causality" led
to the Bell inequalities. Bell showed that the results of experiments
intended to test the idea of hidden variables would be predicted to fall
within certain limits based on all three of these assumptions"*

Counterfactual definiteness

>> Bell knew exactly what he was assuming, and Baylock's paper came out 10
>> years ago but it might just as well have fallen into a Black Hole for all
>> the effect it had on the physics community. It wasn't exactly earth
>> shattering.
>>
>
> > *Yes, Baylock's paper has not received much attention -- basically
> because it is obvious nonsense.*
>

Then why the hell did you reference it?! Why did you have me waste my time
reading the abstract if you think it's "obvious nonsense"?

> > *You are entitled to your own opinions. But you are not entitled to
> your own facts. Physicists  do not use the term 'realism' to mean
> 'counterfactual definiteness'.*
>

If by "realistic" physicists don't mean that an object can be in one and
only one physical state both before and after an interaction, if they don't
mean the ability to speak meaningfully of the results of a measurement that
has not been performed, then what in the world do they mean by "realistic?

> * > As Maudlin points out, such abuse of Bell's argument has led to
> endless stupidity in these discussions.*
>

Maudlin says "*If I had my druthers, 'realist' and 'anti-realist' would be
banned from these foundational discussions*", and that strikes me as a
remarkably silly thing to say. Regardless of what ones philosophy may be
the FACT remains that a word is needed to express the idea that things can
be in one and only one physical state both before and after an interaction,
and a short easily spelled word like "realistic" seems to fit the bill
pretty well, although philosophers like lawyers generally prefer long Latin
phrases for simple ideas.

I also think it's very strange that Maudlin's book on quantum physics has
the very word "Philosophy" in its title and yet it spends virtually no time
on the measurement problem, perhaps the greatest philosophical mystery of
all in Quantum Mechanics. Why does the act of measurement seem to override
the evolution of Schrödinger's wave function, and what exactly does a
"measurement" even mean? Many Worlds is the only interpretation that can
give a credible answer to that question. Maybe that's why Maudlin never
asked the question.

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 1:08:19 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/21/2019 9:54 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> Also models (like Einstein Field Equations) make predictions of outcomes 
> that are at odds with observations 
>
>
> So at last you agree that we use theories to make predictions and we 
> compare them with observations.
>
>
> Sometimes. But nothing (except for some nagging critics in the science 
press) says we have to.

And sometimes we just use them to make science fiction stories.

cf. 
http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/11/can-we-tell-if-theres-wormhole-in-milky.html

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 1:06:04 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/21/2019 9:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are ever 
>> observed.
>>
>>
>> It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was that 
>> they can be judged right or wrong* only* if they are predictions of 
>> *observations.*  Otherwise they are like your priest predicting that a 
>> donation to the church will put you in heaven when you die.
>>
>>
>> Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
>> outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.
>>
>>
>> A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the deflection of 
>> starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether it will be* 
>> useful *to think that his observation matched Einstein's predict?  He 
>> should have thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by humans 
> (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models predict outcomes in 
> galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models, they may make predictions of 
> outcomes in other universes where we don't even live.
>
>
> In fact they predict all nomologically possible outcomes.  Which is why it 
> is a problem to interpret the Born rule.
>
>
> How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes) is a 
> matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon scientific 
> practice. But this is not part of the models.
>
>
> Maybe (I didn't know you were a fan of pragmatism).  But observations 
> are.  Otherwise it's just mathematics.  In QM they are even called 
> "observables".
>
> Brent
>



Throw away any book you have on quantum mechanics that uses the word 
"observables".

@philipthrift 

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread Alan Grayson



On Friday, November 22, 2019 at 12:06:04 AM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/21/2019 9:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are ever 
>> observed.
>>
>>
>> It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was that 
>> they can be judged right or wrong* only* if they are predictions of 
>> *observations.*  Otherwise they are like your priest predicting that a 
>> donation to the church will put you in heaven when you die.
>>
>>
>> Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
>> outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.
>>
>>
>> A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the deflection of 
>> starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether it will be* 
>> useful *to think that his observation matched Einstein's predict?  He 
>> should have thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by humans 
> (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models predict outcomes in 
> galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models, they may make predictions of 
> outcomes in other universes where we don't even live.
>
>
> In fact they predict all nomologically possible outcomes.  Which is why it 
> is a problem to interpret the Born rule.
>

*Nomologically possible? What does this mean? I looked it up but don't get 
it. AG *

> How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes) is a 
> matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon scientific 
> practice. But this is not part of the models.
>
>
> Maybe (I didn't know you were a fan of pragmatism).  But observations 
> are.  Otherwise it's just mathematics.  In QM they are even called 
> "observables".
>
> Brent
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-22 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

Well... maybe when you are a 50 years old scientist, you can say that, but 
this is not the spirit in which science is teached to children or 
popularized to laymen. The spirit of science popularization is that it 
gives us the truth, and we should obey or die. If scientists are such moral 
people, then why they don't tell to their students in the first class of 
their course that they will only present to them a model ? Instead, they 
jump right in: "Space is such-and-such, time is such-and-such.". I never 
heard any professor of mine telling us that they are only presenting us 
models.

On Thursday, 21 November 2019 19:23:27 UTC+2, Brent wrote:
>
> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret, 
> they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct 
> which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes 
> observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is 
> solely and precisely that it is  expected to work.
> --—John von Neumann
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/21/2019 9:54 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 11:42:29 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those
outcomes are ever observed.

It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point
was that they can be judged right or wrong/*only*/ if they are
predictions of /*observations.*/ Otherwise they are like your
priest predicting that a donation to the church will put you
in heaven when you die.

Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic
practice that is outside the scientific
model/formulation/theory itself.

A pragmatic practice? So when Eddington measured the
deflection of starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked
himself whether it will be/*useful */to think that his
observation matched Einstein's predict? He should have thought
about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?

Brent

How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes)
is a matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon
scientific practice. But this is not part of the models.

@philipthrift

Also models (like Einstein Field Equations) make predictions of
outcomes that are at odds with observations

So at last you agree that we use theories to make predictions and we
compare them with observations.

(quantum-scale phenomena, wormholes, etc.), but we still keep them
around. Again, that's *pragmatic philosophy*. They are just tools that
my be replaced by other tools in the future.

Yes, I know how it works.

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/21/2019 9:42 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes
are ever observed.

It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was
that they can be judged right or wrong/*only*/ if they are
predictions of /*observations.*/ Otherwise they are like your
priest predicting that a donation to the church will put you in
heaven when you die.

Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice
that is outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.

A pragmatic practice? So when Eddington measured the deflection
of starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether
it will be/*useful */to think that his observation matched
Einstein's predict? He should have thought about what papers
could be written and chairs endowed?

Brent

Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by
humans (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models predict
outcomes in galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models, they may
make predictions of outcomes in other universes where we don't even live.

In fact they predict all nomologically possible outcomes. Which is why
it is a problem to interpret the Born rule.

How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes) is
a matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon
scientific practice. But this is not part of the models.

Maybe (I didn't know you were a fan of pragmatism). But observations
are. Otherwise it's just mathematics. In QM they are even called
"observables".

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics



On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 11:42:29 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are ever 
>> observed.
>>
>>
>> It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was that 
>> they can be judged right or wrong* only* if they are predictions of 
>> *observations.*  Otherwise they are like your priest predicting that a 
>> donation to the church will put you in heaven when you die.
>>
>>
>> Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
>> outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.
>>
>>
>> A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the deflection of 
>> starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether it will be* 
>> useful *to think that his observation matched Einstein's predict?  He 
>> should have thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by humans 
> (or hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models predict outcomes in 
> galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models, they may make predictions of 
> outcomes in other universes where we don't even live.
>
> How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes) is a 
> matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon scientific 
> practice. But this is not part of the models.
>
> @philipthrift
>


Also models (like Einstein Field Equations) make predictions of outcomes 
that are at odds with observations (quantum-scale phenomena, wormholes, 
etc.), but we still keep them around. Again, that's *pragmatic philosophy*. 
They are just tools that my be replaced by other tools in the future.

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics



On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 6:22:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are ever 
> observed.
>
>
> It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was that 
> they can be judged right or wrong* only* if they are predictions of 
> *observations.*  Otherwise they are like your priest predicting that a 
> donation to the church will put you in heaven when you die.
>
>
> Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
> outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.
>
>
> A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the deflection of 
> starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether it will be* 
> useful *to think that his observation matched Einstein's predict?  He 
> should have thought about what papers could be written and chairs endowed?
>
> Brent
>


Models make predictions of outcomes whether they are observed by humans (or 
hypothetical intelligent beings) or not. The models predict outcomes in 
galaxies far from ours. In multiverse models, they may make predictions of 
outcomes in other universes where we don't even live.

How human observations relate to models (their predicted outcomes) is a 
matter of *pragmatic philosophy*, or so-called agreed-upon scientific 
practice. But this is not part of the models.

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/21/2019 11:28 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 11:36:33 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/20/2019 11:26 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/20/2019 11:49 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 12:59:32 PM UTC-6, Brent
wrote:



On 11/19/2019 11:41 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 3:59:47 PM UTC-6,
Brent wrote:



On 11/19/2019 1:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


 A diffraction pattern emerges in video recordings
of single-photon double-slit experiments whether
anyone sees the video or not. what changes is the
image on the video frame-by-frame. If you take a
video of a an arrow shot from a bow, it follows a
parabolic curve, and what changes is its position
frame-by-frame.


So when your path integral formulation predicts
various probabilities for position of photon
absorptions by the video camera nothing has changed
when positions are actualized in the recording. All
the same probabilities obtain. Which is the MWI view.

Brent




In the cases of *Quantum Measure Theory* (Rafael
Sorkin), *Real Path Quantum Theory* (Adrain Kent), or
-- in another type of formulation -- *Cellular
Automaton Interpretation* [of Quantum Mechanics]
(Gerard 't Hooft), I don't see what "change" means in
your terms.


Those methods assign probabilities (measures) to
specific possible outcomes (measurements).  When one is
observed, it is used as an initial condition for further
predictions.  If it's not observed then further
predictions are conditioned on all the possible
outcomes.  That's a change.

Brent



Except in the theories -- QMT, RPQT -- themselves, nothing
is observed (or needs to be observed), because /there are no
observers/ ("alternative to the textbook formalism of
state-vectors and external *observers*").t



And that's why they fail to predict observations. But they do
assign probabilities to specific events and they condition
those on prior events or not.

Brent




They all make predictions.

/The Schrödinger equation is not the only way to study quantum
mechanical systems and/
/*
*/
/*             make predictions*./
/
/
/The other formulations of quantum mechanics include matrix
mechanics, introduced by Werner Heisenberg, and the *path
integral formulation**, developed chiefly by Richard Feynman.
Paul Dirac incorporated matrix mechanics and the Schrödinger
equation into a single formulation.
/


How will we know whether the predictions are right or not, unless
they are predictions of observations?

Brent



** From path integral formulation to Schrödinger's equation*

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relation_between_Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_equation_and_the_path_integral_formulation_of_quantum_mechanics#From_path_integral_formulation_to_Schr%C3%B6dinger's_equation





They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are 
ever observed.


It's tautalogous that predictions are of "outcomes". The point was that 
they can be judged right or wrong/*only*/ if they are predictions of 
/*observations.*/  Otherwise they are like your priest predicting that a 
donation to the church will put you in heaven when you die.




Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.


A pragmatic practice?   So when Eddington measured the deflection of 
starlight by the Sun, he should have then asked himself whether it will 
be/*useful */to think that his observation matched Einstein's predict?  
He should have thought about what papers could be written and chairs 
endowed?


Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 10:50 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 5:01 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> I can provide many references which claim that Bell did assume
>> counterfactual definiteness, and this is the reason why his theorem does
>> not apply in many-worlds theory. One prominent example is a paper by
>> Baylock (arXiv:0902.3827).*
>>
>
> The abstract says "*The view presented in this paper is that the minimal
> assumptions behind Bell's inequality are locality and counterfactual
> definiteness*", so if Bell can derive his Inequality from those
> assumptions but exparament proves that the Inequality is not true then one
> or both of those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's entire point,
> he proposed an exparament to determine if the assumptions were true or not.
> It turned out they were not.
>

But my point was that Bell did not assume counterfactual definiteness. All
he assumed was that any possible hidden variables were local. So it is
locality that is disproven by the experimental results. Nothing about
counterfactual definiteness or realism, since Bell did not assume either of
these things.

> *Baylock thinks that counterfactual definiteness is one of the minimal
>> assumptions behind the derivation of Bell's inequality.*
>>
>
> Of course he thinks that, everybody thinks that!
>

No, not everybody. The most informed and authoritative view is as I have
stated it above -- Bell did not assume realism or counterfactual
definiteness.

In his recent book (Philosophy of Physics: Quantum Mechanics, 2019),
Maudlin makes this point as strongly as he can.
"Often, when reporting these crucial results, the term 'realist' or
'realistic' is snuck in. Bell, we are told, ruled out all local realistic
theories, for example. And that locution strongly suggests that one can
avoid non locality and evade Bell's result by saying that 'realism' is what
ought to be abandoned. But this suggestion is nonsensical. Bell proves that
no local theory, full stop, can predict violations of his inequality.
Whether some person's attitude toward the theory is one of scientific
realism or not is neither here nor there. If I had my druthers, 'realist'
and 'anti-realist' would be banned from these foundational discussions. And
in my own book, I have my druthers, so I will not mention these terms
again." (Introduction, xiii)

 > *But Baylock's attempt to show exactly how Bell's supposed assumption of
>> counterfactual definiteness led him astray*
>
>
> Led Astray? Bell knew exactly what he was assuming, and Baylock's paper
> came out 10 years ago but it might just as well have fallen into a Black
> Hole for all the effect it had on the physics community. It wasn't exactly
> earth shattering.
>

Yes, Baylock's paper has not received much attention -- basically because
it is obvious nonsense.

> *> You equate 'realism' with counterfactual definiteness. That means, of
>> course, that quantum mechanics is not a realist theory -- which is a rather
>> extreme view, given the empirical success of the theory.*
>>
>
> What the hell?! When quantum physicists use the term "not realistic" it
> has a precise technical meaning, they do not mean the theory does not fit
> the empirical facts, and they are not talking about a Harry Potter story.
>

You are entitled to your own opinions. But you are not entitled to your own
facts. Physicists  do not use the term 'realism' to mean 'counterfactual
definiteness'. As Maudlin points out, such abuse of Bell's argument has led
to endless stupidity in these discussions.

Bruce

> John K Clark
>
>
>> To claim that it does not represent reality is a rather absurd claim.
>> Maudlin (arXiv:1408.1826) points out that it has become fashionable to say
>> that another way to avoid Bell's result and retain locality is to abandon
>> 'realism'. I think you have said much the same on occasion. Maudlin goes on
>> "But such claims never manage to make clear at the same time just what
>> 'realism' is supposed to be, and just how Bell's derivation presupposes it."
>>
>> I think it is better to stick to the commonly accepted view of scientific
>> realism -- the definition I previously gave from Wikipedia. In which case,
>> as Carroll and most others claim, many-worlds is the paradigm 'realist'
>> approach to quantum mechanics the wave function encapsulates what the
>> external world is 'really' like.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 5:01 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*> I can provide many references which claim that Bell did assume
> counterfactual definiteness, and this is the reason why his theorem does
> not apply in many-worlds theory. One prominent example is a paper by
> Baylock (arXiv:0902.3827).*
>

The abstract says "*The view presented in this paper is that the minimal
assumptions behind Bell's inequality are locality and counterfactual
definiteness*", so if Bell can derive his Inequality from those assumptions
but exparament proves that the Inequality is not true then one or both of
those assumptions must be false. That was Bell's entire point, he proposed
an exparament to determine if the assumptions were true or not. It turned
out they were not.


> > *Baylock thinks that counterfactual definiteness is one of the minimal
> assumptions behind the derivation of Bell's inequality.*
>

Of course he thinks that, everybody thinks that!

 > *But Baylock's attempt to show exactly how Bell's supposed assumption of
> counterfactual definiteness led him astray*


Led Astray? Bell knew exactly what he was assuming, and Baylock's paper
came out 10 years ago but it might just as well have fallen into a Black
Hole for all the effect it had on the physics community. It wasn't exactly
earth shattering.


> *> You equate 'realism' with counterfactual definiteness. That means, of
> course, that quantum mechanics is not a realist theory -- which is a rather
> extreme view, given the empirical success of the theory.*
>

What the hell?! When quantum physicists use the term "not realistic" it has
a precise technical meaning, they do not mean the theory does not fit the
empirical facts, and they are not talking about a Harry Potter story.

John K Clark







> To claim that it does not represent reality is a rather absurd claim.
> Maudlin (arXiv:1408.1826) points out that it has become fashionable to say
> that another way to avoid Bell's result and retain locality is to abandon
> 'realism'. I think you have said much the same on occasion. Maudlin goes on
> "But such claims never manage to make clear at the same time just what
> 'realism' is supposed to be, and just how Bell's derivation presupposes it."
>
> I think it is better to stick to the commonly accepted view of scientific
> realism -- the definition I previously gave from Wikipedia. In which case,
> as Carroll and most others claim, many-worlds is the paradigm 'realist'
> approach to quantum mechanics the wave function encapsulates what the
> external world is 'really' like.
>
> Bruce
>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Fri, Nov 22, 2019 at 1:54 AM John Clark  wrote:

>
> Academic discussion?  Mr. Kellett, please stop pretending you have
> demonstrated a deep and profound understanding of this subject that others
> lack, you have done the exact opposite. After saying something as obviously
> true and obviously silly as "*Bell did not assume counterfactual
> definiteness*" your pretence of intellectual superiority makes you look
> even more pompous and ridiculous.
>

I can provide many references which claim that Bell did assume
counterfactual definiteness, and this is the reason why his theorem does
not apply in many-worlds theory. One prominent example is a paper by
Baylock (arXiv:0902.3827). Baylock thinks that counterfactual definiteness
is one of the minimal assumptions behind the derivation of Bell's
inequality. But Baylock's attempt to show exactly how Bell's supposed
assumption of counterfactual definiteness led him astray, so that there can
be a local explanation of the violation of the inequalities, is
incomprehensible.

You equate 'realism' with counterfactual definiteness. That means, of
course, that quantum mechanics is not a realist theory -- which is a rather
extreme view, given the empirical success of the theory. To claim that it
does not represent reality is a rather absurd claim. Maudlin
(arXiv:1408.1826) points out that it has become fashionable to say that
another way to avoid Bell's result and retain locality is to abandon
'realism'. I think you have said much the same on occasion. Maudlin goes on
"But such claims never manage to make clear at the same time just what
'realism' is supposed to be, and just how Bell's derivation presupposes it."

I think it is better to stick to the commonly accepted view of scientific
realism -- the definition I previously gave from Wikipedia. In which case,
as Carroll and most others claim, many-worlds is the paradigm 'realist'
approach to quantum mechanics the wave function encapsulates what the
external world is 'really' like.

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/21/2019 6:53 AM, John Clark wrote:
Reality, as the word is used by quantum physicists, means that after 
an interaction a physical object is always in one and only one state, 
so by that precise meaning of the word Many Worlds is not a realistic 
theory.


I don't understand why you write that.  If there is multiverse, then the 
theory is that the mutliverse is a pure state (ray) in the Hilbert space 
of the multiverse and evolves per the Schroedinger equation alone.


To be in one unique state is only to say something is not in a mixed 
state.  Any pure state is defined by a single ray in Hilbert space. The 
idea that things are in superpositions of states is just a consequence 
of picking the basis states in a way not aligned with the ray.  We do 
this necessarily because in general we don't know the ray and because we 
are interested in what we will measure in the basis for which we can 
construct instruments.


Brent

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Re: The problem with physics



On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 11:36:33 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/20/2019 11:26 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/20/2019 11:49 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 12:59:32 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/19/2019 11:41 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 3:59:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 



 On 11/19/2019 1:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


  A diffraction pattern emerges in video recordings of single-photon 
 double-slit experiments whether anyone sees the video or not. what changes 
 is the image on the video frame-by-frame. If you take a video of a an 
 arrow 
 shot from a bow, it follows a parabolic curve, and what changes is its 
 position frame-by-frame.


 So when your path integral formulation predicts various probabilities 
 for position of photon absorptions by the video camera nothing has changed 
 when positions are actualized in the recording.  All the same 
 probabilities 
 obtain.  Which is the MWI view.

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In the cases of *Quantum Measure Theory* (Rafael Sorkin), *Real Path 
>>> Quantum Theory* (Adrain Kent), or -- in another type of formulation -- 
>>> *Cellular 
>>> Automaton Interpretation* [of Quantum Mechanics] (Gerard 't Hooft), I 
>>> don't see what "change" means in your terms.
>>>
>>>
>>> Those methods assign probabilities (measures) to specific possible 
>>> outcomes (measurements).  When one is observed, it is used as an initial 
>>> condition for further predictions.  If it's not observed then further 
>>> predictions are conditioned on all the possible outcomes.  That's a change.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> Except in the theories -- QMT, RPQT -- themselves, nothing is observed 
>> (or needs to be observed), because *there are no observers* 
>> ("alternative to the textbook formalism of state-vectors and external 
>> *observers*").t
>>
>>
>> And that's why they fail to predict observations.  But they do assign 
>> probabilities to specific events and they condition those on prior events 
>> or not.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>
>
> They all make predictions.
>
> *The Schrödinger equation is not the only way to study quantum mechanical 
> systems and*
>
> * make predictions.*
>
>
> *The other formulations of quantum mechanics include matrix mechanics, 
> introduced by Werner Heisenberg, and the path integral formulation*, 
> developed chiefly by Richard Feynman. Paul Dirac incorporated matrix 
> mechanics and the Schrödinger equation into a single formulation. *
>
>
> How will we know whether the predictions are right or not, unless they are 
> predictions of observations?
>
> Brent
>
>
> ** From path integral formulation to Schrödinger's equation*
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relation_between_Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_equation_and_the_path_integral_formulation_of_quantum_mechanics#From_path_integral_formulation_to_Schr%C3%B6dinger's_equation
>
>  

They make predictions of outcomes whether or not those outcomes are ever 
observed.

Whether predictions are "right" or not is a pragmatic practice that is 
outside the scientific model/formulation/theory itself.

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/20/2019 11:26 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/20/2019 11:49 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 12:59:32 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/19/2019 11:41 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 3:59:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/19/2019 1:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


 A diffraction pattern emerges in video recordings of
single-photon double-slit experiments whether anyone
sees the video or not. what changes is the image on the
video frame-by-frame. If you take a video of a an arrow
shot from a bow, it follows a parabolic curve, and what
changes is its position frame-by-frame.


So when your path integral formulation predicts various
probabilities for position of photon absorptions by the
video camera nothing has changed when positions are
actualized in the recording.  All the same probabilities
obtain.  Which is the MWI view.

Brent




In the cases of *Quantum Measure Theory* (Rafael Sorkin),
*Real Path Quantum Theory* (Adrain Kent), or -- in another
type of formulation -- *Cellular Automaton Interpretation*
[of Quantum Mechanics] (Gerard 't Hooft), I don't see what
"change" means in your terms.


Those methods assign probabilities (measures) to specific
possible outcomes (measurements).  When one is observed, it
is used as an initial condition for further predictions.  If
it's not observed then further predictions are conditioned on
all the possible outcomes.  That's a change.

Brent



Except in the theories -- QMT, RPQT -- themselves, nothing is
observed (or needs to be observed), because /there are no
observers/ ("alternative to the textbook formalism of
state-vectors and external *observers*").t



And that's why they fail to predict observations.  But they do
assign probabilities to specific events and they condition those
on prior events or not.

Brent




They all make predictions.

/The Schrödinger equation is not the only way to study quantum 
mechanical systems and/

/*
*/
/*             make predictions*./
/
/
/The other formulations of quantum mechanics include matrix mechanics, 
introduced by Werner Heisenberg, and the *path integral formulation**, 
developed chiefly by Richard Feynman. Paul Dirac incorporated matrix 
mechanics and the Schrödinger equation into a single formulation.

/


How will we know whether the predictions are right or not, unless they 
are predictions of observations?


Brent



** From path integral formulation to Schrödinger's equation*
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relation_between_Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_equation_and_the_path_integral_formulation_of_quantum_mechanics#From_path_integral_formulation_to_Schr%C3%B6dinger's_equation
/
/

@philipthrift
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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret,
they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct
which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes
observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct
is solely and precisely that it is expected to work.

--—John von Neumann

On 11/21/2019 12:31 AM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
What are the models the models of if not of truth ? If models are not
intended to model truth, then what are they intended to do ? Create a
fantastical world for World of Warcraft ?

On Friday, 15 November 2019 02:03:14 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:

But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when
you find it.

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 6:51 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>> You're talking about two different things that deal with different
>> subjects. I'm talking about counterfactual definiteness and the subject of
>> that is nature, it either has counterfactual definiteness or it doesn't and
>> only experiment can determine which:
>> "*In quantum mechanics, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability
>> to speak "meaningfully" of the definiteness of the results of measurements
>> that have not been performed (i.e., the ability to assume the existence of
>> objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).
>> The term "counterfactual definiteness" is used in discussions of physics
>> calculations, especially those related to the phenomenon called quantum
>> entanglement and those related to the Bell inequalities*."
>>
>
> *> The trouble is that this emphasis on counterfactual definiteness is
> peculiar to a particular approach to Bell's theorem. Bell did not assume
> counterfactual definiteness,*
>

Of course Bell didn't assume counterfactual definiteness aka Reality!! Bell
proposed a experiment that would help us figure out if counterfactual
definiteness was true or not. Bell proved that if Superdeterminism is
untrue and his exparament shows that a inequality he found is violated then
Reality and Locality (hidden variables) can not both be true, although both
could be false. About 15 years after he had this idea techniques had
improved enough to actually perform the experiment, and it turned out that
Bell's Inequality is indeed violated.

> * > In fact, quantum theory explicitly rejects counterfactual definiteness
> as defined above.*
>

It does now thanks to Bell and the scientists who performed the very
difficult experiment. But before that many physicists, including Einstein
and Schrödinger
and De Broglie, thought the strange behavior of electrons in the 2 slit
exparament could be totally explained by local hidden variables. It turned
out they were wrong.

*>> " Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the
>> content of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both
>> observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences.*
>> "
>>
>
> *> Sure, but whether or not the many-worlds theory explicitly embraces the
> realism of the wave function*
>

The wave function is not a physical object, and no theory about anything
says nothing is real because if it did there would be nothing in the theory
to study. And you could forget about the wave function entirely if you
wanted and reformulate the Many Worlds theory in the language of
Heisenberg's Matrix Mechanics instead because the two methods are
mathematically equivalent. Reality, as the word is used by quantum
physicists, means that after an interaction a physical object is always in
one and only one state, so by that precise meaning of the word Many Worlds
is not a realistic theory.

*> You ignore the content of the best thought on the subject, and
> consistently misrepresent the meanings of common terms as referring to your
> own self-serving definitions. By not actually listening to, and responding
> to, what the other person is saying, you are engaging in trolling behaviour
> -- no matter what you actually believe. Your responses appear to be
> designed merely to annoy and provoke strong rejoinders. That is not the way
> of academic discussion.*
>

Academic discussion?  Mr. Kellett, please stop pretending you have
demonstrated a deep and profound understanding of this subject that others
lack, you have done the exact opposite. After saying something as obviously
true and obviously silly as "*Bell did not assume counterfactual
definiteness*" your pretence of intellectual superiority makes you look
even more pompous and ridiculous.

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

Thanks. I'll do.

On Thursday, 21 November 2019 13:21:01 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> Read *Being and Nothingness*, Jean Paul Sartre
>
> 691 pages -  
> http://dhspriory.org/kenny/PhilTexts/Sartre/BeingAndNothingness.pdf
>
> @philipthrift
>
>

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Re: The problem with physics


Read *Being and Nothingness*, Jean Paul Sartre

691 pages -  
http://dhspriory.org/kenny/PhilTexts/Sartre/BeingAndNothingness.pdf

@philipthrift

On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 4:49:50 AM UTC-6, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> What about those people that have the desire to know the truth ? What 
> should they do with their lives ?
>
> On Thursday, 21 November 2019 11:39:56 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> To make technology: to go to the moon, to make air conditioning, 
>> smartphones, TVs, ...
>>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

What about those people that have the desire to know the truth ? What 
should they do with their lives ?

On Thursday, 21 November 2019 11:39:56 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> To make technology: to go to the moon, to make air conditioning, 
> smartphones, TVs, ...
>

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Re: The problem with physics


To make technology: to go to the moon, to make air conditioning, 
smartphones, TVs, ...

@philipthrift

On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 3:28:21 AM UTC-6, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Why are we doing this ?
>
> On Thursday, 21 November 2019 10:54:59 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Models are the myths we invent to navigate nature (reality).
>>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

Why are we doing this ?

On Thursday, 21 November 2019 10:54:59 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> Models are the myths we invent to navigate nature (reality).
>

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Re: The problem with physics



Models are the myths we invent to navigate nature (reality).

@philipthrift

On Thursday, November 21, 2019 at 2:31:09 AM UTC-6, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> What are the models the models of if not of truth ? If models are not 
> intended to model truth, then what are they intended to do ? Create a 
> fantastical world for World of Warcraft ?
>
> On Friday, 15 November 2019 02:03:14 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you 
>> find it.
>>
>> @philipthrift  
>>
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

What are the models the models of if not of truth ? If models are not 
intended to model truth, then what are they intended to do ? Create a 
fantastical world for World of Warcraft ?

On Friday, 15 November 2019 02:03:14 UTC+2, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> But good luck in life finding the absolute truth! Let us know when you 
> find it.
>
> @philipthrift  
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-21 Thread 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List

What does wf mean ? 

Otherwise, yes, you are right. The problem is that most people do stuff 
(science or other things) solely for social status. In our culture, to be 
scientist is seen as cool, as a hallmark of intelligence. So stupid people 
in order to compensate, they do what all people do to compensate for 
shortcomings: they put on a mask. So they become scientists, even though 
they don't understand the purpose of science, and then they think of 
themselves as being smart, when in fact they are stupid.

On Friday, 15 November 2019 00:25:16 UTC+2, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> The problem with physics is physicists ! Yeah, that's my conclusion after 
> many years of studying, arguing and reading. Many, perhaps most, attribute 
> ontological character to what is epistemological; namely the wf. This leads 
> to all kinds of conceptual errors, and ridiculous models and conjectures -- 
> such as MW, particles being in two positions at the same time, radiioactive 
> sources that are simultanously decayed and undecayed, and so forth. The wf 
> gives us information about the state of a system and nothing more. Sorry to 
> disappoint. AG
>

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/20/2019 11:49 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 12:59:32 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/19/2019 11:41 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 3:59:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/19/2019 1:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>  A diffraction pattern emerges in video recordings of single-photon 
>>> double-slit experiments whether anyone sees the video or not. what changes 
>>> is the image on the video frame-by-frame. If you take a video of a an arrow 
>>> shot from a bow, it follows a parabolic curve, and what changes is its 
>>> position frame-by-frame.
>>>
>>>
>>> So when your path integral formulation predicts various probabilities 
>>> for position of photon absorptions by the video camera nothing has changed 
>>> when positions are actualized in the recording.  All the same probabilities 
>>> obtain.  Which is the MWI view.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In the cases of *Quantum Measure Theory* (Rafael Sorkin), *Real Path 
>> Quantum Theory* (Adrain Kent), or -- in another type of formulation -- 
>> *Cellular 
>> Automaton Interpretation* [of Quantum Mechanics] (Gerard 't Hooft), I 
>> don't see what "change" means in your terms.
>>
>>
>> Those methods assign probabilities (measures) to specific possible 
>> outcomes (measurements).  When one is observed, it is used as an initial 
>> condition for further predictions.  If it's not observed then further 
>> predictions are conditioned on all the possible outcomes.  That's a change.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Except in the theories -- QMT, RPQT -- themselves, nothing is observed (or 
> needs to be observed), because *there are no observers* ("alternative to 
> the textbook formalism of state-vectors and external *observers*").t
>
>
> And that's why they fail to predict observations.  But they do assign 
> probabilities to specific events and they condition those on prior events 
> or not.
>
> Brent
>
>


They all make predictions.

*The Schrödinger equation is not the only way to study quantum mechanical 
systems and*

* make predictions.*

*The other formulations of quantum mechanics include matrix mechanics, 
introduced by Werner Heisenberg, and the path integral formulation*, 
developed chiefly by Richard Feynman. Paul Dirac incorporated matrix 
mechanics and the Schrödinger equation into a single formulation. *

** From path integral formulation to Schrödinger's equation*
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relation_between_Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_equation_and_the_path_integral_formulation_of_quantum_mechanics#From_path_integral_formulation_to_Schr%C3%B6dinger's_equation


@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread Alan Grayson



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 5:22:55 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/20/2019 3:28 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:35 PM UTC-7, scerir wrote: 
>>
>> Nevertheless, the SWE does not give a probability without some further 
>> assumptions. Why do you think that MWI advocates spend so much time an 
>> effort trying to derive the Born rule? You cannot get probabilities from 
>> the Schroedinger equation without some additional assumptions. 
>>
>> Bruce 
>>
>> In his Nobel lecture (The statistical interpretation of quantum 
>> mechanics, 1954)
>> Born writes: "Again an idea of Einstein’s gave me the lead. He had tried 
>> to make the duality of particles - light quanta or photons - and waves 
>> comprehensible by interpreting the square of the optical wave amplitudes as 
>> probability density for the occurrence of photons. This concept could at 
>> once be carried over to the psi-function: |psi|^2 ought to represent the 
>> probability density for electrons (or other particles). It was easy to 
>> assert this, but how could it be proved?" 
>>
>
> How could any of the postulates of QM "be proved"? All we can do is make 
> assumptions and determine if they give good predictions. (Have you seen my 
> email?) AG 
>
> Of course it was "proven" in the empirical sense of being used to 
> successfully predict observations.
>
> Brent
>

Obviously; that's what I wrote. Did you even read it? But the same applies 
to Born's rule! AG

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/20/2019 3:28 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:35 PM UTC-7, scerir wrote:

Nevertheless, the SWE does not give a probability without some
further assumptions. Why do you think that MWI advocates spend so
much time an effort trying to derive the Born rule? You cannot
get probabilities from the Schroedinger equation without some
additional assumptions.

Bruce

In his Nobel lecture (The statistical interpretation of quantum
mechanics, 1954)
Born writes: "Again an idea of Einstein’s gave me the lead. He had
tried to make the duality of particles - light quanta or photons -
and waves comprehensible by interpreting the square of the optical
wave amplitudes as probability density for the occurrence of
photons. This concept could at once be carried over to the
psi-function: |psi|^2 ought to represent the probability density
for electrons (or other particles). It was easy to assert this,
but how could it be proved?"

How could any of the postulates of QM "be proved"? All we can do is
make assumptions and determine if they give good predictions. (Have
you seen my email?) AG

Of course it was "proven" in the empirical sense of being used to
successfully predict observations.

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 10:37 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >>I have no idea what the difference is between "text-book" realism and
>>> "Eisteinian realism" is and I don't think you do either, in physics there
>>> is just realism and nonrealism. And you don't give any definition of
>>> "Realism" at all, you just say I'm wrong; but Wikipedia agrees with my
>>> definition of the word, it says:
>>> "*R**ealism is "counterfactual definiteness", the idea that it is
>>> possible to meaningfully describe as definite the result of a measurement
>>> which, in fact, has not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the
>>> existence of objects, and assign values to their properties, even when they
>>> have not been measured)*.
>>>
>>
>> *> Gosh, you must have had to troll through an awful lot of stuff on
>> Wikipedia to find that particular definition of realism.*
>>
>
> Mr. Kellett, I am not a troll, if I didn't believe that what I'm saying
> has a better than even chance of turning out to be right I would not be
> saying it.
>
> * > I suggest you look for "scientific realism" instead of that
>> self-serving nonsense.*
>>
>
> You're talking about two different things that deal with different
> subjects. I'm talking about counterfactual definiteness and the subject of
> that is nature, it either has counterfactual definiteness or it doesn't and
> only experiment can determine which:
>
> "*In quantum mechanics, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability
> to speak "meaningfully" of the definiteness of the results of measurements
> that have not been performed (i.e., the ability to assume the existence of
> objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).
> The term "counterfactual definiteness" is used in discussions of physics
> calculations, especially those related to the phenomenon called quantum
> entanglement and those related to the Bell inequalities*."
>

The trouble is that this emphasis on counterfactual definiteness is
peculiar to a particular approach to Bell's theorem. Bell did not assume
counterfactual definiteness, and counterfactual definiteness is a
characteristic of classical mechanics -- it has never been assumed as part
of quantum theory. In fact, quantum theory explicitly rejects
counterfactual definiteness as defined above.

Counterfactual definiteness
> 
>
> But the subject of scientific realism is not the nature of the universe
> but the nature of human theories:
>
> *" Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content
> of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and
> unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences.*"
>

Sure, but whether or not the many-worlds theory explicitly embraces the
realism of the wave function as a description of the actual content of the
universe is what this discussion was about. It is not about classical
mechanics, or about counterfactual definiteness.

> *Scientific realism
> *
>
>  > *Insults are often the only possible response to trolling behaviour.*
>
>
> Mr. Kellett, did it ever occur to you that somebody who disagrees with you
> might actually believe in what they say just as strongly as you do?
>

You ignore the content of the best thought on the subject, and consistently
misrepresent the meanings of common terms as referring to your own
self-serving definitions. By not actually listening to, and responding to,
what the other person is saying, you are engaging in trolling behaviour --
no matter what you actually believe. Your responses appear to be designed
merely to annoy and provoke strong rejoinders. That is not the way of
academic discussion.

Bruce

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Re: The problem with physics

On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>>I have no idea what the difference is between "text-book" realism and
>> "Eisteinian realism" is and I don't think you do either, in physics there
>> is just realism and nonrealism. And you don't give any definition of
>> "Realism" at all, you just say I'm wrong; but Wikipedia agrees with my
>> definition of the word, it says:
>> "*R**ealism is "counterfactual definiteness", the idea that it is
>> possible to meaningfully describe as definite the result of a measurement
>> which, in fact, has not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the
>> existence of objects, and assign values to their properties, even when they
>> have not been measured)*.
>>
>
> *> Gosh, you must have had to troll through an awful lot of stuff on
> Wikipedia to find that particular definition of realism.*
>

Mr. Kellett, I am not a troll, if I didn't believe that what I'm saying has
a better than even chance of turning out to be right I would not be saying
it.

* > I suggest you look for "scientific realism" instead of that
> self-serving nonsense.*
>

You're talking about two different things that deal with different
subjects. I'm talking about counterfactual definiteness and the subject of
that is nature, it either has counterfactual definiteness or it doesn't and
only experiment can determine which:

"*In quantum mechanics, counterfactual definiteness (CFD) is the ability to
speak "meaningfully" of the definiteness of the results of measurements
that have not been performed (i.e., the ability to assume the existence of
objects, and properties of objects, even when they have not been measured).
The term "counterfactual definiteness" is used in discussions of physics
calculations, especially those related to the phenomenon called quantum
entanglement and those related to the Bell inequalities*."

Counterfactual definiteness

But the subject of scientific realism is not the nature of the universe but
the nature of human theories:

*" Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude toward the content
of our best theories and models, recommending belief in both observable and
unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences.*"

*Scientific realism
*

 > *Insults are often the only possible response to trolling behaviour.*

Mr. Kellett, did it ever occur to you that somebody who disagrees with you
might actually believe in what they say just as strongly as you do?

John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread Alan Grayson



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 3:00:35 PM UTC-7, scerir wrote:
>
> Nevertheless, the SWE does not give a probability without some further 
> assumptions. Why do you think that MWI advocates spend so much time an 
> effort trying to derive the Born rule? You cannot get probabilities from 
> the Schroedinger equation without some additional assumptions. 
>
> Bruce 
>
> In his Nobel lecture (The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
> 1954)
> Born writes: "Again an idea of Einstein’s gave me the lead. He had tried 
> to make the duality of particles - light quanta or photons - and waves 
> comprehensible by interpreting the square of the optical wave amplitudes as 
> probability density for the occurrence of photons. This concept could at 
> once be carried over to the psi-function: |psi|^2 ought to represent the 
> probability density for electrons (or other particles). It was easy to 
> assert this, but how could it be proved?" 
>

How could any of the postulates of QM "be proved"? All we can do is make 
assumptions and determine if they give good predictions. (Have you seen my 
email?) AG 

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Re: The problem with physics

On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 2:42 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>>> *The problem is not how to calculate probabilities, it's what do the
> probabilities refer to. *
>
> >> The best betting strategy to follow if you want to win.
>
> * > Right.  *
>

So you now think it's clear what the probabilities refer to. Me too.

> *> They refer to the result of a measurement.  *
>

A measurement that does not change physical laws so only one set of them is
needed.

>
> *> But as you often note in discussing Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought
> experiment, in MWI there is no measurement and there is no result...there
> are only results.*
>

There is no way to make a bet within Bruno's idiotic thought exparament
because there is no way to determine who won and who lost or even nail down
exactly what the bet was about, but the situation is quite different with
the MWI because it's unambiguous what the bet was about and there is no one
around to dispute the outcome.

 John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread 'scerir' via Everything List

> Nevertheless, the SWE does not give a probability without some further 
> assumptions. Why do you think that MWI advocates spend so much time an effort 
> trying to derive the Born rule? You cannot get probabilities from the 
> Schroedinger equation without some additional assumptions.
> 
> Bruce
> 

In his Nobel lecture (The statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics, 1954)
Born writes: "Again an idea of Einstein’s gave me the lead. He had tried to 
make the duality of particles - light quanta or photons - and waves 
comprehensible by interpreting the square of the optical wave amplitudes as 
probability density for the occurrence of photons. This concept could at once 
be carried over to the psi-function: |psi|^2 ought to represent the probability 
density for electrons (or other particles). It was easy to assert this, but how 
could it be proved?"

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Thu, Nov 21, 2019 at 12:52 AM John Clark  wrote:

>
> I have no idea what the difference is between "text-book" realism and
> "Eisteinian realism" is and I don't think you do either, in physics there
> is just realism and nonrealism. And you don't give any definition of
> "Realism" at all, you just say I'm wrong; but Wikipedia agrees with my
> definition of the word, it says:
>
> "*R**ealism is "counterfactual definiteness", the idea that it is
> possible to meaningfully describe as definite the result of a measurement
> which, in fact, has not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the
> existence of objects, and assign values to their properties, even when they
> have not been measured)*.
>

Gosh, you must have had to troll through an awful lot of stuff on Wikipedia
to find that particular definition of realism. I suggest you look for
"scientific realism" instead of that self-serving nonsense.

Scientific realism involves the two basic positions. First, it is a set of
claims about the features of an ideal scientific theory; an ideal theory is
the sort of theory science aims to produce. Second, it is the commitment
that science will eventually produce theories very much like an ideal
theory and that science has done pretty well thus far in some domains. It
is important to note that one might be a scientific realist regarding some
sciences while not being a realist regarding others.

According to scientific realism, an ideal scientific theory has the
following features:

   - The claims the theory makes are either true or false, depending on
   whether the entities talked about by the theory exist and are correctly
   described by the theory. This is the semantic
    commitment of scientific
   realism.
   - The entities described by the scientific theory exist objectively and
   mind-independently. This is the metaphysical
    commitment of scientific
   realism.
   - There are reasons to believe some significant portion of what the
   theory says. This is the  epistemological
    commitment.

Combining the first and the second claim entails
 that an ideal
scientific theory says definite things about genuinely existing entities.
The third claim says that we have reasons to believe that many scientific
claims about these entities are true, but not all.

Bruce
PS. Insults are often the only possible response to trolling behaviour.

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/20/2019 11:49 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 12:59:32 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/19/2019 11:41 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 3:59:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 11/19/2019 1:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:


 A diffraction pattern emerges in video recordings of
single-photon double-slit experiments whether anyone sees
the video or not. what changes is the image on the video
frame-by-frame. If you take a video of a an arrow shot from
a bow, it follows a parabolic curve, and what changes is its
position frame-by-frame.


So when your path integral formulation predicts various
probabilities for position of photon absorptions by the video
camera nothing has changed when positions are actualized in
the recording.  All the same probabilities obtain.  Which is
the MWI view.

Brent




In the cases of *Quantum Measure Theory* (Rafael Sorkin), *Real
Path Quantum Theory* (Adrain Kent), or -- in another type of
formulation -- *Cellular Automaton Interpretation* [of Quantum
Mechanics] (Gerard 't Hooft), I don't see what "change" means in
your terms.


Those methods assign probabilities (measures) to specific possible
outcomes (measurements).  When one is observed, it is used as an
initial condition for further predictions.  If it's not observed
then further predictions are conditioned on all the possible
outcomes.  That's a change.

Brent



Except in the theories -- QMT, RPQT -- themselves, nothing is observed 
(or needs to be observed), because /there are no observers/ 
("alternative to the textbook formalism of state-vectors and external 
*observers*").t




And that's why they fail to predict observations.  But they do assign 
probabilities to specific events and they condition those on prior 
events or not.


Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, November 20, 2019 at 12:59:32 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/19/2019 11:41 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 3:59:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/19/2019 1:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>  A diffraction pattern emerges in video recordings of single-photon 
>> double-slit experiments whether anyone sees the video or not. what changes 
>> is the image on the video frame-by-frame. If you take a video of a an arrow 
>> shot from a bow, it follows a parabolic curve, and what changes is its 
>> position frame-by-frame.
>>
>>
>> So when your path integral formulation predicts various probabilities for 
>> position of photon absorptions by the video camera nothing has changed when 
>> positions are actualized in the recording.  All the same probabilities 
>> obtain.  Which is the MWI view.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> In the cases of *Quantum Measure Theory* (Rafael Sorkin), *Real Path 
> Quantum Theory* (Adrain Kent), or -- in another type of formulation -- 
> *Cellular 
> Automaton Interpretation* [of Quantum Mechanics] (Gerard 't Hooft), I 
> don't see what "change" means in your terms.
>
>
> Those methods assign probabilities (measures) to specific possible 
> outcomes (measurements).  When one is observed, it is used as an initial 
> condition for further predictions.  If it's not observed then further 
> predictions are conditioned on all the possible outcomes.  That's a change.
>
> Brent
>


Except in the theories -- QMT, RPQT -- themselves, nothing is observed (or 
needs to be observed), because *there are no observers* ("alternative to 
the textbook formalism of state-vectors and external *observers*").

@philipthrift

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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 11/20/2019 2:43 AM, John Clark wrote:


On Tue, Nov 19, 2019 at 5:14 PM 'Brent Meeker'  
> wrote:


> /The problem is not how to calculate probabilities, it's what do
the probabilities refer to. /


The best betting strategy to follow if you want to win.


Right.  They refer to the result of a measurement.  But as you often 
note in discussing Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment, in MWI 
there is no measurement and there is no result...there are only results.


Brent



John K Clark





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Re: The problem with physics

2019-11-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 11/19/2019 11:41 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Tuesday, November 19, 2019 at 3:59:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 11/19/2019 1:43 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

A diffraction pattern emerges in video recordings of
single-photon double-slit experiments whether anyone sees the
video or not. what changes is the image on the video
frame-by-frame. If you take a video of a an arrow shot from a
bow, it follows a parabolic curve, and what changes is its
position frame-by-frame.

So when your path integral formulation predicts various
probabilities for position of photon absorptions by the video
camera nothing has changed when positions are actualized in the
recording. All the same probabilities obtain. Which is the MWI view.

Brent

In the cases of *Quantum Measure Theory* (Rafael Sorkin), *Real Path
Quantum Theory* (Adrain Kent), or -- in another type of formulation --
*Cellular Automaton Interpretation* [of Quantum Mechanics] (Gerard 't
Hooft), I don't see what "change" means in your terms.

Those methods assign probabilities (measures) to specific possible
outcomes (measurements). When one is observed, it is used as an initial
condition for further predictions. If it's not observed then further
predictions are conditioned on all the possible outcomes. That's a change.

Brent

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Re: The problem with physics

On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 12:50 AM Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

>>> I thought one of the attractions of the many worlds theory was that it
>>> was realistic -- in the sense that the wave function really exists a a
>>> physical object,
>>>
>>
>> >> I don't know where in the world you got that idea. Even probability
>> is pretty abstract but you don't even get that until you take the square of
>> the absolute value of the wave function, which contains imaginary numbers
>> by the way. How much more different from a physical object do you want?
>>
>
> > *I thought that you had read Sean Carroll's recent book and might,
> therefore, have known better than this. On page 32, Carroll writes "First,
> we take the wave function seriously as a direct representation of reality,
> not just a book-keeping device to help us organize our knowledge. We treat
> it as ontological, not epistemic." That is what is meant by wave function
> realism.*
>

All physicists agree that probabilities and imaginary numbers can help
represent physical objects and the same is true of the wave function, but
no physicist thinks of imaginary numbers or wave functions or probability
as physical objects as you claim. And yes, Carroll treats the wave function
as ontological not epistemic, and yes, to Carroll the wave function is more
that just a bookkeeping device to keep track of what we know and what we
don't know, and yes Carroll gives another correct definition of realism.
Many Worlds theory does NOT say a photon just before it hits a polarizing
filter is in the up or the down polarization and we just don't know which
one, it says it really is in both states, it says a particle is NOT always
in one and only one definite state, it says the world is not realistic.

>> A theory is realistic if it says a particle is in one and only one
>> definite state both before and after an interaction even if it has not been
>> observed. Many Worlds is about as far from that as you can get.
>>
>
> *> That is not wave function realism as used in many worlds. That version
> of realism is not even applicable to ordinary "text-book" quantum
> mechanics; it is not even Eisteinian realism.*
>

I have no idea what the difference is between "text-book" realism and
"Eisteinian realism" is and I don't think you do either, in physics there
is just realism and nonrealism. And you don't give any definition of
"Realism" at all, you just say I'm wrong; but Wikipedia agrees with my
definition of the word, it says:

"*R**ealism is "counterfactual definiteness", the idea that it is possible
to meaningfully describe as definite the result of a measurement which, in
fact, has not been performed (i.e. the ability to assume the existence of
objects, and assign values to their properties, even when they have not
been measured)*.

*> I know that you like to play dumb, John, and act the troll. *

So this is your strategy now, if you can't win with the facts or with logic
maybe you can win a battle of the insults.

 John K Clark

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Re: The problem with physics