On Jul 13, 2012, at 11:30 AM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Morning, Dave
re: "Clones are a problem for Plurality, and primaries were
invented to dispose of clones within a party"
I'm not sure what clones are, but imagine they are multiple
candidates who seek the same office.
Yes, and lookin
On Jul 10, 2012, at 3:49 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Dave
re: "I would not do away with primaries - instead I would do away
with Plurality and leave primaries to any party that still
saw value in them."
I believe the discussion was more about opening primaries to the
publi
On Jul 10, 2012, at 6:51 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
When runoffs are subjected to criterion analysis, one usually
considers voters to vote in the same order in each round. If they
prefer A to B in the first round, and A and B remain in the second
round, they'll vote A over B in the s
Time to think.
Primaries are a problem.
Primaries were invented to solve an intolerable problem for Plurality
elections - too easy to have multiple candidates for a party, those
candidates having to share the available votes, and thus all losing.
I would not do away with primaries - instea
On Jun 24, 2012, at 8:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
To Democracy Chronicles, EM, and Dave Ketchum:
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Dave Ketchum > wrote:
Quoting from today's Demoncracy Chronicles, 6/24/12:
The basic idea is avoid the situation faced today, where many
candidates
Quoting from today's Demoncracy Chronicles, 6/24/12:
The basic idea is avoid the situation faced today, where many
candidates that are well liked do not get votes because voters
choose the most likely to win candidate instead of their
favorite. Source: Democracy Chronicles (http://s.tt
On May 28, 2012, at 9:17 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
As usual, I don't know what Dave Ketchum means.
Guessing as to what Mike O is assuming, our topic is whether
Approval's inability to indicate such as A>B>C matters. I read the
words below indicating that voters can esti
On May 28, 2012, at 8:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On 27.5.2012, at 22.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You know, that's the Condorcetists' and IRVists' objection to
Approval.
The question is what happens when Approval doesn't let you vote
A>B>C. The
difference is that there is no division to
On May 27, 2012, at 7:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 28.5.2012, at 1.47, Dave Ketchum wrote:
As soon as ability to vote for A=B is in your future you think of
wanting ability to vote for Favorite>Comprmise, as is doable in IRV
- matters only that Favorite is your favorite, not the possibil
On May 27, 2012, at 5:12 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 27.5.2012, at 22.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You know, that's the Condorcetists' and IRVists' objection to
Approval.
The question is what happens when Approval doesn't let you vote
A>B>C. The difference is that there is no division to minor
Thanks Juho, for working to make this dialog more useful!
DWK
On May 21, 2012, at 7:36 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
[Note: Michael Ossipof's message was not a reply to a mail on this
list but to an offline discussion.]
On 21.5.2012, at 23.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I don't know what you mean by
This started as a thread to talk a bit about Condorcet.
That has faded away, and all I see is trivia about Plurality vs
Approval - too trivial a difference between them to support enough
thoughts to be worth writing this much, even less for reading.
DWK
On May 18, 2012, at 9:56 PM, Michael
On May 17, 2012, at 2:09 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Kristofer:
You expressed concern about uncertainty about how to vote in
Approval. Let me re-word what I was trying to say about that:
First, for simplicity let’s say that you belong to a faction that
all prefer and vote as you do. What
Oops - took so long stripping Mike O's zillion words that I forgot to
respond.
On May 16, 2012, at 10:05 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho and Kristofer:
Just a few preliminary words bef
On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho and Kristofer:
Just a few preliminary words before I continue my reply to
Kristofer that I
interrupted a few hours ago:
We all agree that Approval would be much easier to propose and
enact
Responding because you wrote, but with no authority.
On May 12, 2012, at 9:04 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Condorcetists:
You want to quibble forever about which rank-count is the best.
No - we want to move past that.
You object that Approval doesn't let you help your 1st and 2nd
choices
.
(I changed the subject line because the subject line is not intended
to be used to specify who you are writing to. The subject line
should indicate the topic.)
Good point! Also important to say when they posted it, for readers to
look back to the previous post.
Richard Fobe
On Apr 30, 2012, at 7:02 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
On 04/29/2012 04:48 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Computers do well at performing the tasks they are properly told to
perform - better than humans given the same directions. Thus it would
make sense to direct the computers and expect them to do what
any less words.
Dave Ketchum
On Apr 29, 2012, at 3:09 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
What happened to Richard's promise to not read my postings? :-)
Instead of continuing to repeat that he doesn't read them, maybe it
would be better
if he could actually llve up to that promise.
Give
m still unimpressed with Mike O's analysis if this is what it
is. maybe i should un-plonk him, but i dunno why.
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Apr 28, 2012, at 5:04 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
For one thing, Condorcet discourages honesty, because, even if you
top-rank Compromise, top-ranking Favorite too can cause Compromise
to lose to Worse. when ranking Compromise _alone_ in 1st place
would have defeated Worse. To do
diskette and see if the "password" was there, as it would be on the
original. After making the test, put those instructions back into
their hidden form.
Dave Ketchum
On Apr 28, 2012, at 9:28 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
That wasn’t Dave who said that, it was me.
My point was that what is
On Apr 28, 2012, at 12:56 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
First, my apologies to Paul Kislanko, whom I called by the wrong
name when I replied to his posting, a few minutes ago.
_This_ reply is to Dave Ketchum:
Dave:
I'd said:
> How to avoid this problem? Why not repeal the rule th
each given a higher rank is preferred
over each given a lower rank.
Picking the winner is based on the candidate pairs - best is for a
candidate to win all its pairs. Note that, like Approval but unlike
such as IRV, batches of ballots can be counted into arrays and the
arrays summed.
On Apr 22, 2012, at 11:14 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I missed the fact that Dave was answering my question here, and so
I'll reply to his answer:
I'd said:
"Approved" ratings wins. The result? Well, we'd be electing the most
approved candidate, wouldn't we. Who can criticize that?
> Dave
ry complex but it is the foundation of modern life.
What do you think?
From: Dave Ketchum
To: election-methods Methods
Cc: Adrian Tawfik
Sent: Sunday, April 22, 2012 8:41 PM
Subject: Election thinking,
Seemed to me Mike left out some important thoughts - can we do better?
On Apr 21, 2012,
Seemed to me Mike left out some important thoughts - can we do better?
On Apr 21, 2012, at 3:41 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote, as:
Article, with the added paragraph and some better wording
Adrian and EM:
Elections are important to many organizations - and important that
they help the vot
It pays to be careful when rearranging topics.
Here is a quote from Wikipedia, where they have to be careful:
In voting systems, the Smith set, named after John H. Smith, is the
smallest non-empty set of candidates in a particular election such
that each member beats every other candidate out
On Apr 20, 2012, at 5:30 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
I choke when I see IRV called "fine"
[endquote]
Have I ever said that, without qualifying it? No.
I've said that IRV would be fine with an electorate different from
the one tht we now have--an electorate completely free of inclina
How do we identify a monster? Ŭalabio‽ seems to think they are
identifiable. I claim not - Ŭalabio‽ says they got excess ranking -
we can see this after a race (deciding excess ranking identifies a
monster - which even then is a problem only if the supposed monster
got ranked by too many,
I choke when I see IRV called "fine" - it too easily ignores parts of
what the voters say. For example, look at what can happen with A
being much liked, yet IRV not always noticing:
20 A
20 B>A
22 C>A
Joe ?
Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's
63rd). IRV would
On Apr 12, 2012, at 6:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I said that Plurality only lets you rate one candidate. That isn't
true. You're still rating all of the
candidates in Plurality, but you're required to bottom-rate all but
one of them.
Looking ahead, Plurality lets the voter present a sma
more people than anyone else in the
cycle.
ICT or ITC? Your zillion titles are beyond understanding.
ICT would be a better proposal than Condorcet, since it also meets
FBC and CD (it's
defection-resistant, unlike Condorcet). But ICT share's Condorcet's
problems #1 snd
#2,
nking but, unlike
ABucklin or IRV, all that a voter ranks gets counted. Further, any
voter able to match their desires to Plurality or Approval for a
particular election, can vote by those rules and have them counted
with the same power by Condorcet rules.
Dave Ketchum
Mike Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Mar 24, 2012, at 3:49 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Approval can't be improved upon, other than questionably and
doubtfully.
This is a bit much, considering that there are many competing methods
that offer various worthy capabilities.
Looking at the ABucklin that you mention:
Assuming th
other hand, it is very difficult to cause trouble with. The
plotter:
. Needs to know expectable normal vote counts for this collection
of voters and this topic.
. Know the change wanted and get it voted.
. Somehow avoid others, perhaps due to hearing of these proposed
changes, of maki
Many thoughts catch my eye here - I will not attempt to respond to all.
On Mar 22, 2012, at 4:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 03/22/2012 07:57 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
There are plenty of voters who report having to "hold their nose" and
vote only for someone they don't like. They'd al
On Feb 9, 2012, at 9:02 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Robert,
De : robert bristow-johnson
À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Envoyé le : Jeudi 9 février 2012 10h07
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
> On 8.2.2012, at 7.33, robert bris
ounts (the big difference between IRV and Condorcet).
Dave Ketchum
Of course one may also adopt different models in the two layers, two-
party system for the rop level and proportonal representation for
some state level representative bodies. Above I also made the
assumption that the strict tw-p
How did we get here? What I see called Condorcet is not really that.
On Feb 6, 2012, at 10:02 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
...
Say people vote rated ballots with 6 levels, and after the election
you see a histogram of candidate X and Y that looks like this:
(better)
6:Y X
5: Y X
4: YX
3:
ecinct, as in Condorcet, counts
that look "odd" are the most likely locations of trouble.
Dave Ketchum
On Feb 2, 2012, at 9:29 AM, Stephen Unger wrote:
A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
.
. I do not object to such for the purpose of testing methods, but
do object to imposing it on voters in an otherwise normal election -
it adds unneeded complications for those voters.
Dave Ketchum
On Feb 2, 2012, at 8:15 PM, Bruce Gilson wrote:
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 7:45 AM, Jameson Quinn
, as to
winnability.
Dave Ketchum
On Feb 3, 2012, at 2:45 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 10:09 PM, Richard Fobes > wrote:
On 2/2/2012 11:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/02/2012 05:28 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I honestly think that honest rating is easier than hon
On Feb 3, 2012, at 12:31 AM, Clay Shentrup wrote:
As far as I can tell, no amount of evidence will change DaveK's
mind. But it's worth pointing out that Score Voting is superior to
Condorcet in essentially every way.
* Lower Bayesian Regret with any number of strategic or honest voters
NOTE
omething needs doing too late to
attend to with normal nominations. True that voters may do some write-
ins when there is no real need - and I have no sympathy for such
voters - this needs thought.
Dave Ketchum
On Jan 28, 2012, at 3:13 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote
Re: [EM] Propose plain Approval
Looks like your new system is teaching you properly.
I tried printing with smaller characters - and each line filled out
properly.
I tried making the page wider or narrower - still properly got as many
words on each line as would fit.
On Jan 22, 2012, at 10:30 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Th
ht, potential customers get
suspicious as to future marketing.
I do not understand the above claim about majority winners - true that
FPTP voters cannot completely express their desires, but the counters
can, accurately, read what they say with their votes.
Dave Ketchum
That is deb
collections of political parties.
Dave Ketchum
On Dec 12, 2011, at 4:18 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote per: Dave: Re: The
Occupy-Movement:
Dave:
You wrote;
If there is truth in what I read, the US desperately needs
better attention to public safety, including officers, and those
directing them
On Sun, Dec 11, 2011 at 11:14 AM, Dave Ketchum > wrote
per this subject - see at end below.
Leon Smith added reference to http://reformact.org/ - by a group that
offers extensive references and thoughts - worth exploring.
On Dec 11, 2011, at 6:06 PM, James Gilmour wrote: the following ab
s would be such as destructive
competition between Occupy-backing candidates in the Green and
Libertarian parties - if they split the votes of Occupy backers and
thus each lost.
On Dec 11, 2011, at 1:42 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Write-ins can be effective. I hold up proof this year
with the
fight for
a decent new party, as each depends on the other.
More detailed arguments can be found in
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/twoParty.html
<http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/%7Eunger/articles/twoParty.html>
Steve
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing lis
On Dec 7, 2011, at 1:31 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
Dave:
On Dec 6, 2011, at 4:19 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
How to vote in IRV:
When there are completely unacceptable candidates who might
win (I call that condition u/a, for “unacceptable/acceptable”)
You replied:
You DO NOT rank such since,
On Dec 6, 2011, at 4:19 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
How to vote in IRV:
When there are completely unacceptable candidates who might
win (I call that condition u/a, for “unacceptable/acceptable”)
You DO NOT rank such since, if you rank such a candidate, so might
enough others for this one to
e 8 or 9 battles are winnable.
One specific response:
JQ:
3. Some other organization pushes some other system(s), and reaches
a tipping point.
dlw:IOW, they need to reinvent what FairVote's been
working hard to build up for some time...
Yep. It's a lot of work. If voti
Trying one more time to start a sales pitch for switching from IRV to
Condorcet.
On Dec 1, 2011, at 10:18 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 12/1/11 5:14 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:If the cost of campaigning is high enough that only the two
major parties can play the game, then mo
istow-johnson wrote:
The next two are related, though not directly quoted.
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 1:39 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Sat, 2011-11-24 at 10:47 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Initial topic is IRV.
the counterexample, again, is Burlington Vermont. Dems haven't
s
ires little more than that, since
we got there by being near to ties.
Dave Ketchum
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
"Imagination is more important than knowledge."
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
On Nov 21, 2011, at 8:53 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Jameson,
like you I think ratings are simpler and easier for the voter. But
it doesn't matter because ordinal ballots
can be transformed clone free and monotonically into ratings by the
technique I gave in my message
entitled
"Borda Don
ct referenced in the body.
Passing out abbreviation pages would help if their "subject" made them
findable.
Note that one detail in this conversation is sorting out the meaning
of the various identifiers such as ABE.
Dave Ketchum
Jameson
2011/11/19 MIKE OSSIPOFF
You wrote:
Y
On Nov 6, 2011, at 8:41 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote, as Burlington
manifesto:
(Note: The email subject is mostly a joke; I doubt this email will
be coherent and enduring enough to be considered a manifesto. Also,
if you skip to the bottom, I'll talk a bit about how my recently-
proposed 321 voti
that "much".
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 13, 2011, at 8:46 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Ted Stern wrote:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/science/voters-experience-stress-on-election-day-study-finds.html
I remember hearing about other studies showing that making difficult
decisions &qu
Agreed I strayed beyond "consensus statement". You gave me room to
work on some details that need considering in the overall task.
On Nov 9, 2011, at 9:24 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
DLW wrote: In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/pe
On Nov 9, 2011, at 6:26 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/people-before-parties-electoral-reforms.html
My Thoughts about an alternative possible "consensus" statement for
non-electoral analytical types.
On Oct 18, 2011, at 10:13 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Quoting Mike Ossipoff: 'to me, our current public political
elections don't require any strategy decisions, other than "vote for
acceptable candidates and don't vote for the entirely unacceptable
ones."'
Quoting Mike Ossipoff: 'to me, our current public political elections
don't require any strategy decisions, other than "vote for acceptable
candidates and don't vote for the entirely unacceptable ones."'
In the discussions of Approval and ranking, below, Mke's thought
applies to both. In
for Condorcet, but demand of others comparable
quality.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
g of votes
should cause rejection of such methods. Burlington was an example of
IRV failing to read true voter desires.)
Dave Ketchum
On Oct 12, 2011, at 8:57 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
I believe that you imply, in your message copied below, that you
like the fol
es. Therefore a reporting format such as Robert's would be
usable if humans could agree - or even have selectable choices of
formats if enough desire.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 7, 2011, at 1:12 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
still not sure of the efficacy of trying to persuade voter
I finally got around to a bit.
I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo?
Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Contents
When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line,
something, such as indentation, should show start of each item.
I see Enthusia
fail from overweight.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 5, 2011, at 6:53 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Fred Gohlke wrote:
I think it's important for people proposing Electoral Methods to
know (and agree upon) the prize they seek - and not lose sight of
it. I fear I've failed to make that point.
that yet.
Via http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi I looked up NY
election law (ELN). It gets deeply involved in voters nominating
candidates by petition - voters who do not spend all their time at
this complex task - but nothing glaring about party control.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 3
all
done in a reasonable number of days.
"party nomination" relates to primary,, "independent nomination"
relates to independence ignoring party, and "designating petition"
relates to primary - are all used in our law on this.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 2, 2011,
paragraphs and let the readers investigate each method without us
offering any high-level perspective.
--- A voter's view by Dave Ketchum ---
Mark on a ruler those you would be willing to promote toward winning,
assuming those that you prefer drop out for some r
On Aug 31, 2011, at 11:11 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Thank you Dave Ketchum and Peter Zbornik for your excellent
responses to my first draft of the "multiple rounds of voting"
section! I have tried to incorporate your requested improvements,
while attempting to keep it short.
He
Too late this night for fancy words, but hopefully I can express some
useful thoughts.
On Aug 30, 2011, at 4:52 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Here is what I've just written for the new section titled "Multiple
rounds of voting":
--- begin
In highly competitive elections, m
ots, and the winning
candidate must receive a majority of votes."
I question "two or three" - there is no need to dump losers - we care
about winners.
Dave Ketchum
"Almost all of us signing this declaration recommend that an
organization formally adopt a rule that specif
ote can have no useful effect on the outcome
of the election, or on anything else in the objective world.
Again it follows:
(a) What the individual voter thinks is of no importance; or
(b) The election method is flawed.
Which of these statements is true? I think it must be (b).
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 27, 2011, at 9:23 PM, Michael Allan wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Conditions surrounding elections vary but, picking on a simple
example, suppose that, without your vote, there are exactly nR and
nD votes. If that is the total vote you get to decide the election
by creating a majority
On Aug 27, 2011, at 4:22 PM, Michael Allan wrote:
But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote
will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose
otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree?
Dave Ketchum wrote:
TRULY, this demonstrates lack of
about them.
Claim that what I wrote about simplifying Condorcet voting August 24,
2011 3:05:19 PM EDT needs to be seen by more at this point.
Dave Ketchum
Looking at proportional elections:
4) Aren't we in a position to
a) recommend Meek's method ahead of IRV-STV, when it
e not counted as method
differences.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/24 Markus Schulze
Hallo,
I wrote (24 Aug 2011):
> In my opinion, the "Voting Reform Statement"
> endorses too many alternative election methods.
> Opponents will a
A SAD weakness about what is being said.
On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:55 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Michael Allan wrote:
"But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote
will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose
otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you
showing
preference by ranking both with A higher than B is doable here, though
not in FPTP or Approval.
Combinations of the above ranking are permitted, leaving as many as
the voter may choose at the bottom (unranked) level.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:57 PM, Fred Gohlke wrot
On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to
write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the
election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just
providing a checklist of what we approve, I sugges
On Aug 16, 2011, at 9:16 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA.
But as I keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right
answer, it's about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
JQ
2011/8/15 Dave Ke
Strategy thoughts:
Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice: My preference is G but
S is better than any lice. Thus I desire to vote for both G and S
with G preferred.
Plurality - can not vote for both. On days when I expect G to
certainly lose I vote for S to protect, as best I ca
the search is for the "strongest remaining candidate" in the
amended matrix.
On Aug 14, 2011, at 10:03 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 14, 2011, at 6:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Why transfers?
At least, when I said do a CW type search for the strongest
remaining candidate, I
are too weak to deserve a seat.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 14, 2011, at 4:24 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
Message: 2
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 09:31:55 +0100
From: "James Gilmour"
To:
Subject: Re: [EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal
Message-ID:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="
On Aug 13, 2011, at 11:31 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 6:21 PM, Dave Ketchum > wrote:
Glad to see thinking, though we part company on some details.
On Aug 13, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
All current forms of party list proportional representation have
each vo
Glad to see thinking, though we part company on some details.
On Aug 13, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
All current forms of party list proportional representation have
each voter cast a vote for a single party. I say this is inadequate
since a small party can be eliminated and hence d
On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:13 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/5 Dave Ketchum
On Aug 5, 2011, at 10:22 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/5 Dave Ketchum
Brought out for special thought:
rating is easier than ranking. You can express this
computationally, by saying that ranking requires O(n
On Aug 5, 2011, at 10:22 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/5 Dave Ketchum
Brought out for special thought:
rating is easier than ranking. You can express this
computationally, by saying that ranking requires O(n²) pairwise
comparisons of candidates (or perhaps for some autistic savants
who
happened
than that of Michelle Bachmann supporting ranked-choice voting. i
wouldn't vote for her even if she *loved* Condorcet.
We need to communicate that once we get over this hump, we will no
longer have to worry about having to vote for the lesser of two
evils ever again.
An
e pain.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 4, 2011, at 3:20 AM, bob wrote:
--- In rangevot...@yahoogroups.com, "thenewthirdparty"
wrote:
Guys and Gals,
I now see Range Voting as a very important component to getting
third parties elected. But I don't see how the Range Voting group
will eve
I assume this is from Colorado, and have no idea who else has seen it.
I see it as worth considering the thinking, although I AM NOT signing
on as backing any of it.
On Jul 23, 2011, at 11:32 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Knowing of IRV and Condorcet methods of counting ballots, the first
to the specific comments:
2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum
What I see:
. Condorcet - without mixing in Approval.
You need some cycle-breaker. Implicit approval is the only order-N
tiebreaker I know; fundamentally simpler than any order-N²
tiebreaker like minimax. You don't have to call it ap
What I see:
.. Condorcet - without mixing in Approval.
. SODA - for trying, but seems too complex.
. Reject Approval - too weak to compete.
Dave Ketchum
On Jul 8, 2011, at 6:56 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
First, I'd ask people on this list to please stop discussing tax
policy
an turn to Condorcet which:
. Has counting that awards to deserving candidates.
. Can easily handle equal ranking.
. Can learn to award to write-ins (when they are deserving).
Dave Ketchum
I agree with that (as one reason). It is a bit like natural
selection, or a like fight of
s offering.
Dave Ketchum
--Bob Richard
On 7/7/2011 3:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the
argument was that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky
risky from the two leading parties' point of view as methods that
are m
bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jul 7, 2011, at 7:26 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ouch!
i missed it.
. As Kristofer just wrote, Condorcet is a much better method
than IRV for what you are promising - Interesting that Condorcet
offers (more than) the same voter ranking capabilities as IRV, but
does
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