> On Mar 30, 2017, at 3:15 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> So- given the make-up of the posters on this list and their interest [in
> philosophy] then, I don't see the point of bringing up the non-philosophical
> focus of Peirce's work.
I should note that while my own interests are primarily
Jeff, List:
I *think *I get it now--infinitely many parallel lines would all converge
at a single point on the horizon; and there are infinitely many
*potential *collections
of such lines, each of which would converge at a *different *point on the
horizon; so the horizon itself is a *continuum *of
Edwina, Clark, List:
One thing that I am curious about is whether it is feasible to follow
Peirce's lead in expanding the scope of semeiosis from human cognition to
the physico-chemical and biological realms, *without *maintaining Peirce's
distinctive metaphysics of objective idealism--"the physic
Clark - thanks for your comments - and they are indeed very valid.
What I'd like to see, in discussions on the Peirce list, is an
expansion of his work from the focus on human cognition - to the
physico-chemical and biological realms. Peirce himself used his
semiosis in those realms but it doesn
> On Mar 30, 2017, at 8:35 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> I don't see the point of outlining my research on this list - as I'd get
> reactions of 'Peirce didn't say that!' and 'That's Taborsky-semiotics and
> it's not Pure Peirce!...
>
I think my point was just that what gets discussed is la
Edwina, John C., List:
As I already pointed out, according to that quotation, every
Sign/Representamen *has *an Object and *determines* an Interpretant; hence
these are three *distinct *subjects, not three *parts *(or "nodes") of the
Sign *itself*. Here is a passage that makes this even clearer.
Yes, agreed, there are many places where Peirce is using the term
'sign' to refer to the 'representamen'. And the Interpretant can
become a sign/representamen with the original sign as its object. Yes
- in that case, the triad would be the object. In my reading of
Peirce - that is exactly what
The very word *means *signifies something which is in the middle between
two others. Moreover, this third state of mind, or Thought, is a sense of
learning, and learning is the means by which we pass from ignorance to
knowledge.
There are three kinds of signs.
Firstly, there are *likenesses,*
That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly many
places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of the
problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the interpretant
can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way I
John - thanks for the quotation.
I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he
writes, "Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the
function of a sign that it should determine an Interpretant".
Therefore - the sign is, even to exist as such, tr
Jeff, List:
Thanks for once again giving all of us this important reminder. It
probably goes without saying that my focus tends to be on #1; after all,
how can we claim that something we advocate is genuinely Peircean, without
first carefully ascertaining what Peirce's own considered views were?
Jon, Clark, List:
> On Mar 27, 2017, at 8:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
> "lion"? How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
> lion, to such a diagram?
>
With regard to the “differences t
Jon, List,
Thank you. So this was another semantic problem, this time with the term "would"!
30. März 2017 um 20:04 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be.
Jeffrey - if I may comment on your list
1) This would be, to my mind, a difficult analysis. How does one
know 'whether or not it really was the position he adopted...etc'?
That leads to endless volumes of what any philosopher really meant. I
know that this is a big area in philo
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is
the object as a final study would show it to be.
I think that the key word here is *would*. The idea is that the real is
that which *would *come to be known by an infinite community after
indefinite inquiry,
There is much hubris.
Words are defective.
we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us.
There are three kinds of signs.
The word *symbol* has so many meanings that it would be an injury to the
language to add a new one.
In the first figure; the middle is t
Jeffrey, List,
I like you 6 points for orientation how to discuss. I can find an argument of mine from this thread in points 5 and 1. The subject was, that Peirce believed in completely satisfying results due to final study. This applies eg. to dynamical object and final interpretant.
Eg. he wro
John C., List:
I was convinced by our List discussion a few months ago that we should not
draw sharp distinctions between "universes" and "categories" in this
context.
I actually think that what you quoted *only *makes sense if the sign is the
representamen alone. Note that it identifies the mos
Edwina, Jon S., List, All,
As I have suggested on other occasions, it will likely improve the quality of
our discussions if we make our aims clearer when we make a remark or engage in
a line of inquiry. That way, we'll have some assurance that different people
aren't working at cross purposes
Jon A.S., John C.,
In the quotation cited by Jon, it is clear from the context that the word
“subject” is being used as a more technical term for “thing” — i.e. in the
sense of subject given in the Century Dictionary as follows:
7. In metaph.: (a) A real thing to which given characters relat
I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different
metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: R
Clark, list - I think I wasn't clear in my post below. What I meant
to say is that Peirce himself did not use singular terms that meant
'only this' in his work. As John Collier points out - he used 'sign'
and 'representamen'; his use of the three categories were filled
with expansive sy
Clark- again, thanks for your comments.
The fact that Mind and consciousness are often used synonymously is
not - as you point out - part of the Peircean analysis. But to inform
readers that you are using Peircean terms - and not 'general audience
terms - is not the same as the focus on
Clark - thanks for your comments.
The biosemiotics people [and I'm part of that group] are indeed
focused on pragmatics, which is not, I think, quite the same as
'practical applications'. And there's interest in the Peircean
semiosis in the chemico-physical realm and in AI, arti
> On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> In Peirce, we read about semiosis within protoplasm, within crystals, within
> the formation of matter [matter is effete Mind]. None of this deals with
> terminology but with the pragmatic function of semiosis - which Peirce sees,
> as
> On Mar 30, 2017, at 6:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its
> isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But
> Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out, he used his terms in a
> variety
John,
I wish to draw your attention to this part in you mail:
JFS: ... a theory expressed in discrete signs...
This statement presupposes that even signs acting as symbols, are
discrete. Written statements are put down in the form of discrete parts.
But it does not follow that the proposition
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions.
But Peirce wasn't focused on that.
Peirce was certainly not *only *focused on words and defin
John C., List:
*[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that *consists of* the
representamen, object, and interpretant. If there are such
John, list - yes, I agree with your comments.
But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and
definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. As John points out,
he used his terms in a variety of w
Some points interspersed.
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui
Oops, correction. Animals don't do formal logic or science :)
"Imitation as a variation on the pragmatic maxim" should read "Imitation as
a variation of pragmatism (biosemiotic)".
-Original Message-
From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 4:42
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