Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:23:48 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports 
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
> same memories 
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
 and its 
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
 this idea 
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
 what we can 
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
>>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>>> to your 
>>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>>> infinite; not 
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>>> cannot 
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
>>> they also 
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>>> would 
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>>> some like 
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
>> of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions 
 has 
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 

  
>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>>> finite 
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
>>> 10^100 m 
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of 
>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>> think 
>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
>> process. AG 
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to 
> the 
> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
> representing 
> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

 But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
 the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
 that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
 some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
 real number.
  

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
>>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
>>> uncountable (and 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
 introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
 purports 
 to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
 memories 
 and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>>> its 
>>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
>>> this idea 
>>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>>> we can 
>>> see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>> to your 
>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>> infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>> cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>> also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>> would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>> some like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
> of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
 infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

>>>
>>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>>
>>>  
>
>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>> finite 
>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 
>> m 
>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
> process. 
> AG 
>

 Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
 the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
 real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
 representing 
 our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG

>>>
>>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
>>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
>>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
>>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
>>> real number.
>>>  
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
>> variation in outcomes. Does 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:54:13 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports 
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories 
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>> its 
>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
>> idea 
>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>> we can 
>> see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
> to your 
> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; 
> not 
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
> cannot 
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
> also 
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
> some like 
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
 of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
>>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>
>>  

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
> finite 
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 
> m 
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
 universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
 parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
 process. 
 AG 

>>>
>>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
>>> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
>>> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing 
>>> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>>
>>
>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
>> real number.
>>  
>>
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>

You might get universes close to ours, but even this would be hugely 
unlikely given the uncountable assumed number of possibilities, and even a 
close call might mean no 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 5:17 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, > wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the
room; introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more
complications than it purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same
memories and life histories for example. Give me a
break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the
Earth and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world,
ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a
particular assumption about the initial probability
distribution. Can you justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of
the universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the
universe. Maybe it's false; but my question is, is the
strangeness of a Level I multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not
imply that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological
Principle is infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most
probably false, since there is no reason for the initial
conditions to be sufficiently uniform for it to be extrapolated
indefinitely.


Maybe, but I'm still wondering whether the *strangeness* of finite 
structures such as humans being duplicated is an argument against it, 
since it does seem to be most people's first objection to MWI.


But the duplication you seemed to be referring to was that of the 
infinite Type I multiverse. It has been conjectured that this is the 
same as the Type III multiverse of MWI, but that can almost certainly be 
disproved. Strangeness may be one reason why people react against MWI 
and the multiverse, but that is not a relevant argument in serious 
discourse on foundations.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>> its
>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
>> idea
>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>> we can
>> see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
> to your
> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; 
> not
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
> cannot
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
> also
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
> some like
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
 of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
>>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG
>>
>>

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
> finite
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible
 universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the
 parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process.
 AG

>>>
>>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on
>>> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the
>>> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing
>>> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>>
>>
>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am
>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body
>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of
>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a
>> real number.
>>
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of
> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are
> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a
> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and
> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the
> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>
> But the possibilities are not infinite if we only want to reproduce a
finite structure with finite precision.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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To 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 5:20 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, > wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:


On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:


On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:


On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room; introducing Many Worlds
creates hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed
infinite observers with the same memories and
life histories for example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which
everything is duplicated to an arbitrary level of
detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants,
an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of
this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go
far enough, you return to your starting position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite.
Measurements cannot distinguish the two possibilities.
I don't buy the former since they also concede it is
finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that
would likely be infinite in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some like ours, most definitely
not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple
copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse
implies infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes,
why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite
repetitions has been proven, and I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
finite subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius 
of 10^100 m out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.


A lot if 'ifs'!

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>> purports 
>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>> memories 
>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
> its 
> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
> idea 
> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
> we can 
> see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
 hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to 
 your 
 starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; 
 not 
 asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
 cannot 
 distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
 also 
 concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
 likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
 like 
 ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 

>>>
>>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
>>> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>
>
> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>
>  
>>>
 If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
 configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
 finite 
 subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
 out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
>>> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
>>> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process. 
>>> AG 
>>>
>>
>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
>> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
>> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing 
>> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>
>
> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
> real number.
>  
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of our 
universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG

-- 
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
> memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
 idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we 
 can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
>>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
>>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>>> also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
>>> like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
>> everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible
>> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the
>> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process.
>> AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on the
> real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the real
> line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing our
> universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am the
same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body that
are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of some
parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a real
number.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 12:36 AM,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
> memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
 idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we 
 can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
>>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
>>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>>> also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
>>> like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
>> everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible
>> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the
>> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process.
>> AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on the
> real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the real
> line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing our
> universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

There is a paper on this: https://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066

Jason

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
 introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
 purports 
 to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
 memories 
 and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
>>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
>>> idea 
>>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we 
>>> can 
>>> see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>> also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
>> like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
 infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

>>>
>>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>>
>>>  
>
>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite 
>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process. 
> AG 
>

Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on the 
real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the real 
line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number representing our 
universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports 
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories 
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
>> to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
>> inhabitants, 
>> an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument 
>> for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
> like 
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
 everything *in itself* an argument against it? 

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
>>> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>
>>  

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite 
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random process. 
AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>> purports
>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>> memories
>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated
> to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants,
> an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument
> for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
 meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
 position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
 asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
 distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also
 concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
 likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like
 ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG

>>>
>>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
>>> everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>>
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite
>> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>>
>
> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why should
> there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has been
> proven, and I don't believe it. AG
>
> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite
subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m
out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 17:04, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
>>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
>>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
>>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to
>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
>> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that
>> assumption?
>>
>
> The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the
> universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's
> false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an
> *argument* for its falseness?
>
>
> Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not imply
> that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological Principle is
> infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most probably false, since
> there is no reason for the initial conditions to be sufficiently uniform
> for it to be extrapolated indefinitely.
>

Maybe, but I'm still wondering whether the *strangeness* of finite
structures such as humans being duplicated is an argument against it, since
it does seem to be most people's first objection to MWI.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 4:39 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, > wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications
than it purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite
observers with the same memories and life histories for
example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth
and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the
bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you
justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the 
universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe 
it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I 
multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


Just because you can't prove that a hypothesis is false does not imply 
that it is true. Can you prove that the Cosmological Principle is 
infinitely extendible? I suggest that it is most probably false, since 
there is no reason for the initial conditions to be sufficiently uniform 
for it to be extrapolated indefinitely.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports 
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
> memories 
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
 to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, 
 an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument 
 for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
>>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
>>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like 
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
>> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>

If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why should 
there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has been 
proven, and I don't believe it. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
 Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
 with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
 histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to 
>>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an 
>>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a 
>>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
>> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
>> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
> everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
>>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
>>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
>>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to
>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere,
> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting
> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>

OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of
everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, < 
> agrayson2...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to
> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>
>
> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that
> assumption?
>

The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the universe
that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's false;
but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an
*argument* for its falseness?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to 
> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an 
> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a 
> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some like 
ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, > wrote:


You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with
the same memories and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this 
idea an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular 
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify 
that assumption?


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
> histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to an
arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an
infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a
finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 27/11/2017 3:58 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On 24 November 2017 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come
here to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.


What is the "avoid" list?


"Atoms and the Void" after Democritus. The list was set up by Vic 
Stenger to discuss his writings. After he died, the list morphed to 
atvoid2 on Google Groups with many of the original participants.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 24 November 2017 at 10:53, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to
> avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
>

What is the "avoid" list?

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Jason Resch]

We've had the MW vs collapse debate many times on this list, as well as on
FOAR and Extropy-Chat lists. I might suggest searching the history of these
groups to see some of the points and counter points to each issue as I see
many of them repeated here.  I'm including a summary of some of the common
points/arguments here from previous discussions on this list and others.


*On Bell's Inequality:*

On Wednesday, November 30, 2016, Adrian Tymes  wrote:

> > Someone earlier stated Bell's Inequality implies we have to give up one
> of: locality, determinism, or realism. This list is incomplete, we must
> give up one of: locality, determinism, realism, or counterfactual
> definiteness.
>
>
>
> Counterfactual definiteness means experiments have only one outcome. MWI
> gives up counterfactual definiteness and retains locality, determinism and
> realism.
>
But experiments do have only one outcome, as experienced and observed by
> the experimenters.  Any alternate worlds are immeasurable and may as well
> not exist.
>
That's not quite what's meant by counterfactual definiteness though.

Realism, in QM also implies something different from whether or not
something is observable. According to Bohr, only measurements are real.
This view dispenses with a reality external from observers. In MWI, the
universal wave function is real independent of observers or observation.

It is why Einstein asked someone who believed in the Copenhagen
Interpretation "Do you really believe the moon only exists when you're
looking at it?"

In MW, the moon definitely does exist, even when no one is looking at it,
so it is a theory that maintains/restores realism to QM.

All of Einstein's criticisms of QM, that it abandoned realism, locality,
and determinism, are issues that are resolved by MW. I think Einstein would
have enthusiastically embraced it, had he lived to see it.



*On observability of other branches:*

On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 10:48 PM, Adrian Tymes  wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 7:36 PM, Rafal Smigrodzki

 wrote:

> On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 5:56 PM, Adrian Tymes  wrote:

>> But experiments do have only one outcome, as experienced and observed by

>> the experimenters.  Any alternate worlds are immeasurable and may as well

>> not exist.

>

> ### If you were to say that only the observed experimental outcomes exist,

> then you imply there is something qualitatively different between the part

> of the wavefunction we do experience and the parts that we don't.


> Science is all about observability, measurement, and what actually

exists.  If you wish to speculate that something that is never

measurable, observable, or otherwise detectable must still exist, you

need evidence.


The other universes are detectable and they do effect our universe, e.g.
interference patterns.

Furthermore, you must accept the reality of the wave function (and all its
branches) in order to explain how quantum computers work.

Whether we can directly observe some phenomenon or not is irrelevant, we
can't observe the inside of black holes, beyond the cosmological horizon,
the future, things outside our light cone, etc., yet we would all agree
those things exist. What matters is whether these other universes are
predicted to exist and consequences of our best theories.

The evidence for these other branches includes all the evidence we have for
quantum mechanics. Indefensible mental gymnastics are required to believe
in both QM but deny the reality of the wave function and its many histories.



*On quantum computers:*


“Schrödinger also had the basic idea of parallel universes shortly before
Everett, but he didn't publish it. He mentioned it in a lecture in Dublin,
in which he predicted that the audience would think he was crazy. Isn't
that a strange assertion coming from a Nobel Prize winner—that he feared
being considered crazy for claiming that his equation, the one that he won
the Nobel Prize for, might be true.”
-- David Deutsch


> > Furthermore, you must accept the reality of the wave function (and all
> its

> branches) in order to explain how quantum computers work.


> The wave function works just fine in a single world too.


The wave function is a system of many universes, as Feynman said that that
a universal wave function: “must contain amplitudes for all possible worlds
depending on all quantummechanical possibilities in the past and thus one
is forced to believe in the equal reality of an infinity of possible
worlds.”

and Stephen Hawking regarded the MWI as “self-evidently correct”. When the
British actor Ken Campbell, asked him “all these trillions of universes of
the multiverse, are they as real as this one seems to be to me?” Hawking
answered, “Yes According to Feynman's idea, every possible history [of
Ken] is equally real.”

The way single-worlders get around this is by saying the wave function
doesn't refer to anything real, that it is 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 12:55:24 AM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 6:36 PM,  
> wrote:
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast
>> ​ [...]
>>
>
> *​"​Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the "leading 
> cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the "Many-Worlds 
> Interpretation" ​[...] Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed 
> are Stephen Hawking and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann and Richard 
> Feynman. Gell-Mann and Hawking recorded reservations with the name 
> "many-worlds", but not with the theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven 
> Weinberg is also mentioned as a many-worlder​"​ *
>
> https://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#believes
>

Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
but NOT the MWI, which he characterized as "repellent". AG
 

>
> ​But to be fair, Feynman wasn't exactly an enthusiast, I think he 
> believed Many Worlds was the the least bad quantum interpretation but he 
> wasn't really a fan of philosophy and had sympathy for the "shut up and 
> calculate" ​quantum interpretation.
>  
>
>>  
>> ​> ​
>> no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum experiment.
>>
>
> ​Hey you don't have to convince me that an observer is not needed ​for 
> something to exist in one definite state, but then I'm not a fan of 
> Copenhagen.
>

You keep making the same error. The only way to understand double slit 
experiment is via superposition of states, which means no definite state 
before measurement! Does NOT apply to macro objects where interference does 
not manifest. I won't say it again! AG

>   
>  
>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the interference 
>> is destroyed.
>>
>
> ​If the which way information is retained the interference pattern is 
> destroyed, if the information ​
> ​is destroyed then you have interference, and that is what Many Worlds 
> predicts. 
>

??? No interference in which-way experiment. AG 

>   ​
>  
>
>> ​>> ​
>>> The very heart the Copenhagen interpretation is that things do not have 
>>> definite properties 
>>> ​before​
>>>  they are measured,
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Wrong.
>>
>
> * ​"​According to the Copenhagen interpretation, physical systems 
> generally do not have definite properties prior to being measured​"​*
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation
>

You're cherry picking. The statement refers (or should refer) to quantum 
experiments which manifest interference effects and where the system being 
measured is in a superposition of states. AG 

>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum experiments 
>> which manifest interference effects.
>>
>
> I agree, interference effects
> ​ only manifest in special circumstances, when a world splits become 
> different and then the two evolve in such a way that the two become 
> identical again and so merge back together, and that is only likely to 
> happen if the difference between the two worlds is very small; that's why 
> we don't see weird quantum stuff in our macro world, like in the Earth Moon 
> system
>

But since the many worlds are disjoint, we don't SEE anything. Moreover, 
they can't become identical if they differ in what's measured! You have 
embraced a nonsense theory; not even "physics".  AG

 

> .
>
>  John K Clark​
>
> ​
>  
>
>
>>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 11:46:03 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 9:33 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> ​>​
>>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The 
>> electron, say, moves through space as a wave -- which explains the 
>> interference effects due to splitting into two waves, each emanating from 
>> one of the slits
>
>
> ​Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the 
> photographic why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge 
> as one wave should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should? ​
>  
>

It probably is a smudge, consistent with the UP. AG 

>
>   
>> ​> ​
>> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. That is, 
>> the wave collapses into a particle! There is no other reasonable 
>> interpretation of results of the double slit experiment, which demonstrates 
>> the collapse phenomenon for those able to see.
>
>
> ​So tell me exactly what this **observer** thing is. ​
>  
> ​Exactly what is it about observation that allows it to collapse the wave 
> particle? 
>

Dunno. But using MWI without collapse, why do we get some particular value 
and not others? I don't see that a big problem has gone away. AG
 

> How complex does a thing need to be to qualify as a observer? And why do 
> you believe the moon started to orbit the earth 4.5 billion years ago, why 
> do you believe the moon had any definite properties at all 4.5 billion 
> years ago ?   
>

Current theory, based on evidence from Moon materials compared to surface 
materials on Earth, is that the Moon formed after a collision of a 
Mars-sized object many billions of years ago. Of course, the final form of 
the Moon took millions of years to complete. As that process proceeded the 
"Moon" changed a lot, but at each point in time, like any macro object, it 
had definite properties. Not a quantum problem since the system wasn't 
isolated and there is no identifiable interference effects, and no 
superposition of states. AG ​

>
> ​> ​
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>
>  

| those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only 
one, and that's pretty simple.  


As simple as a woman who gives birth to twins, millions of times over and 
then some? AG ​

​> ​
>> Give me a break.
>>
>
> ​No, you get no break from logic.
>

You can see collapse in double slit experiment. No other possible 
interpretation. AG

>
>   John K Clark​
>  
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 6:36 PM,  wrote:


> ​> ​
> Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast
> ​ [...]
>

*​"​Political scientist" L David Raub reports a poll of 72 of the "leading
cosmologists and other quantum field theorists" about the "Many-Worlds
Interpretation" ​[...] Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed
are Stephen Hawking and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann and Richard
Feynman. Gell-Mann and Hawking recorded reservations with the name
"many-worlds", but not with the theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven
Weinberg is also mentioned as a many-worlder​"​ *

https://www.hedweb.com/everett/everett.htm#believes

​But to be fair, Feynman wasn't exactly a enthusiast, I think he believed
Many Worlds was the the least bad quantum interpretation but he wasn't
really a fan of philosophy and had sympathy for the "shut up and calculate"
​quantum interpretation.


>
> ​> ​
> no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum experiment.
>

​Hey you don't have to convince me that an observer is not needed ​for
something to exist in one definite state, but then I'm not a fan of
Copenhagen.



> ​> ​
> If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the interference
> is destroyed.
>

​If the which way information is retained the interference pattern is
destroyed, if the information ​
​is destroyed then you have interference, and that is what Many Worlds
predicts.   ​


> ​>> ​
>> The very heart the Copenhagen interpretation is that things do not have
>> definite properties
>> ​before​
>>  they are measured,
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Wrong.
>

* ​"​According to the Copenhagen interpretation, physical systems generally
do not have definite properties prior to being measured​"​*

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Copenhagen_interpretation


> ​> ​
> Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum experiments
> which manifest interference effects.
>

I agree, interference effects
​ only manifest in special circumstances, when a world splits become
different and then the two evolve in such a way that the two become
identical again and so merge back together, and that is only likely to
happen if the difference between the two worlds is very small; that's why
we don't see weird quantum stuff in our macro world, like in the Earth Moon
system.

 John K Clark​

​



>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 9:33 PM,  wrote:

​>​
>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The
> electron, say, moves through space as a wave -- which explains the
> interference effects due to splitting into two waves, each emanating from
> one of the slits


​Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the
photographic why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge
as one wave should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should? ​



> ​> ​
> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. That is, the
> wave collapses into a particle! There is no other reasonable interpretation
> of results of the double slit experiment, which demonstrates the collapse
> phenomenon for those able to see.


​So tell me exactly what this **observer** thing is. ​

​Exactly what is it about observation that allows it to collapse the wave
particle? How complex does a thing need to be to qualify as a observer? And
why do you believe the moon started to orbit the earth 4.5 billion years
ago, why do you believe the moon had any definite properties at all 4.5
billion years ago ?​

​> ​
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing
> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away
> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life
> histories for example.


If they all have
​
the same memories and life histories
​ then those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only
one, and that's pretty simple.  ​

​> ​
> Give me a break.
>

​No, you get no break from logic.

  John K Clark​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 11:05:17 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 8:21 PM,  
> wrote:
>  
>
>> >> Those who believe in non-locality as established by experimental 
>> evidence, such as Brent and Bruce, and I assume Lawrence as well, do NOT 
>> conclude this implies the future influences the past.
>>
>
> If you also believe in realism then you must believe you have found a 
> flaw in
> ​ 
> Leggett's reasoning when that Nobel Prize winner came up with his 
> inequality. I am all ears!
>  
>
>> ​> 
>> Moreover, as I pointed out clearly, there is no need of an observer for 
>> something to exist.
>> ​ ​
>>
>
> ​I agree, but you're not a fan 
> of Many Worlds so you shouldn't agree. 
>

I don't see how that follows. Feynman, who wasn't an MWI enthusiast, 
clearly argues that no human observer is necessary to perform a quantum 
experiment. If the detector is designed for a which-way measurement, the 
interference is destroyed. This shows the lack of necessity of a human 
observer, a point I've made several times but apparently you didn't read my 
comments carefully. AG 

>  
>
>> ​> ​
>> When the Earth-Moon system formed, there were no observers. Do you doubt 
>> it happened? 
>>
>
> I don't doubt it happened, but you should. The very heart the Copenhagen 
> interpretation is that things do not have definite properties 
> ​before​
>  they are measured,
>

Wrong. You have misinterpreted and over-generalized the results for a class 
of quantum experiments and observations which manifest interference 
effects, such as the double slit. I've already explained it. Do you know 
what a QUANTUM experiment is? Is the Earth-Moon a quantum experiment? If 
so, where are the INTERFERENCE effects? AG
 

> and I don't think there was much measuring going on 4.5 billion years ago. 
> But I don't doubt it happened because as a fan of Many Worlds 
> all I need is to believe a change, any sort of change, could exist 4.5 
> billion years ago. However 
>  a believer in Copenhagen needs to believe something called "measurement" 
> existed 4.5 billion years ago, and I have considerably more doubt about 
> that. 
>

Wrong again. Not an isolated system. Unrelated to double slit results 
which, as I CLEARLY explained, is the cause of your MIS-interpretation. 
Your claim only applies in a special situation of quantum experiments which 
manifest interference effects. Next time you want to make claims about my 
position, please read what I have written. No more shooting from the hip. 
AG 

>
>  John K Clark  ​
>  
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 2:29:22 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The idea 
>>> that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many histories)" 
>>> does not work, and is not really an explanation at all -- you are simply 
>>> evading the issue.
>>>
>>>
>>> Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the linear 
>>> evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not yet seen one 
>>> proof that some action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics, 
>>> although I agree that would be the case if the outcome where unique, as 
>>> EPER/BELL show convincingly.
>>>
>>> Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at a 
>>> distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just want to 
>>> dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice 
>>> is really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds, or one world 
>>> and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your 
>>> poison.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>>
>> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
>> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
>> properly. 
>>
>> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
>> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
>> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
>> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
>> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
>> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
>> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
>> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
>> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>>
>> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
>> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
>> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
>> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
>> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
>> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
>> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>>
>> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
>> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
>> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
>> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
>> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
>> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
>> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
>> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
>> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
>> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
>> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
>> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
>> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
>> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
>> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
>> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
>> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
>> any axiomatic structure.
>>
>>
>> Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to 
>> avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
>> The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether many 
>> worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a purely local 
>> understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models. I have argued that 
>> this is not the case -- that non-locality is inherent in the entangled 
>> singlet state, and many worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think 
>> from what you say above that you might well agree with this position.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the same 
> problem all quantum interpretations suffer from. 
>
>
> I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the collapse 
> axiom) explains the 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 8:21 PM,  wrote:


> >> Those who believe in non-locality as established by experimental
> evidence, such as Brent and Bruce, and I assume Lawrence as well, do NOT
> conclude this implies the future influences the past.
>

If you also believe in realism then you must believe you have found a flaw
in
​
Leggett's reasoning when that Nobel Prize winner came up with his
inequality. I am all ears!


> ​>
> Moreover, as I pointed out clearly, there is no need of an observer for
> something to exist.
> ​ ​
>

​I agree, but you're not a fan
of Many Worlds so you shouldn't agree.


> ​> ​
> When the Earth-Moon system formed, there were no observers. Do you doubt
> it happened?
>

I don't doubt it happened, but you should. The very heart the Copenhagen
interpretation is that things do not have definite properties
​before​
 they are measured, and I don't think there was much measuring going on 4.5
billion years ago. But I don't doubt it happened because as a fan of Many
Worlds
all I need is to believe a change, any sort of change, could exist 4.5
billion years ago. However
 a believer in Copenhagen needs to believe something called "measurement"
existed 4.5 billion years ago, and I have considerably more doubt about
that.

 John K Clark  ​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:22:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 00:15, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
> properly. 
>
> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>
> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>
>
> I agree. But we can trace out locally the prediction possible, and this 
> explains locally the results in the MW view, not so in the mono-universe 
> view which requires some (incomprehensible) action at a distance. That is 
> why I took the Aspect confirmation that QM violate Bell's inequality (well 
> the CHSH's one) as a confirmation of the physical existence of the parallel 
> computations/worlds, and not of action at a distance.
>

The MWI has worlds in superposition, which as you say is preferable to the 
idea of some action at a distance. I have had many email battles with 
people over this, but this idea of action at a distance or its space plus 
time version of retrocausality keeps coming up. It is like shooting ducks 
in a carnival shooting gallery; you can shoot them down but the damned 
things keep popping back up. This does not mean I am a convert to the MWI 
interpretation. In many ways M-theory of D-branes is more friendly to the 
Copenhagen Interpretation, where D-branes are condensates of strings that 
form a classical(like) structure that act in ways as decoherence systems on 
strings. The ψ-epistemic viewpoint has some merits with respect to looking 
at the classical world as a way that information or Bayesian updates can be 
made on quantum systems. The problem of course with this is it leads into a 
sort of quantum solipsism  The converse ψ-ontological perspective avoids 
this classical-quantum dichotomy, but I have always found problems with the 
issue of contextuality. This goes back to my pointing out how MWI fails to 
indicate how an observer is "pushed" into a particular eigenbranch of the 
world and how this occurs at a given time. With the lack of simultaneity in 
special relativity and spacetime in general what is the spatial surface at 
which the world wave function appears to split according to an observer? 
 

>
>
>
>
> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
> any axiomatic structure.
>
>
> I agree and much more can be said. In fact quantum weirdness can be proved 
> to be a consequence of Mechanism (informally with some thought experience), 
> and formally with the Gödel-Löb-Solovay theory of self-reference (which is 
> *the* theory provided by the universal machine itself when looking 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The  
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact  
(many histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation  
at all -- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the  
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not  
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in  
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the  
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.


Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at  
a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just  
want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after  
Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local QM +  
many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non locality.  
Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.



Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do  
not have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that  
is identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are  
replaced with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no  
sense to talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the  
observer makes a measurement that results in a measurement the  
entanglement state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is  
transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, and the  
individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing  
that is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships well;  
they get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped  
up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of it.  
In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and will  
never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness  
with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a  
far more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum  
system is ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding  
information about quantum states. This is the a quantum form of  
Turing's Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing  
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If this is  
the case we may be faced with the prospect there can't ever be a  
complete understanding of the ontic and epistemic nature of quantum  
mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by any axiomatic  
structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here  
to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether  
many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a  
purely local understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models.  
I have argued that this is not the case -- that non-locality is  
inherent in the entangled singlet state, and many worlds does not  
avoid this non-locality. I think from what you say above that you  
might well agree with this position.


Bruce

Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the  
same problem all quantum interpretations suffer from.


I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the collapse  
axiom) explains the violation of inequality in a way which avoids any  
action at a distance, but when we assume one universe, like Einstein  
explains very clearly already in 1927, you get a notion of  
simultaneousness incompatible with special relativity and very minimal  
form of realism.


For me, as a logician, I 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Nov 2017, at 00:15, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The  
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many  
histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation at all  
-- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the  
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not  
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in  
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the  
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.


Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at  
a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just  
want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after  
Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local QM +  
many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non locality.  
Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.



Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not  
have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is  
identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced  
with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no sense to  
talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the observer  
makes a measurement that results in a measurement the entanglement  
state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is transmitted to  
the needle states of the apparatus, and the individual spin degrees  
of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


I agree. But we can trace out locally the prediction possible, and  
this explains locally the results in the MW view, not so in the mono- 
universe view which requires some (incomprehensible) action at a  
distance. That is why I took the Aspect confirmation that QM violate  
Bell's inequality (well the CHSH's one) as a confirmation of the  
physical existence of the parallel computations/worlds, and not of  
action at a distance.






This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing that  
is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships well; they  
get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped up  
around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of it. In  
this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and will never  
be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness with  
respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far  
more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum  
system is ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding  
information about quantum states. This is the a quantum form of  
Turing's Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing  
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If this is  
the case we may be faced with the prospect there can't ever be a  
complete understanding of the ontic and epistemic nature of quantum  
mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by any axiomatic  
structure.


I agree and much more can be said. In fact quantum weirdness can be  
proved to be a consequence of Mechanism (informally with some thought  
experience), and formally with the Gödel-Löb-Solovay theory of self- 
reference (which is *the* theory provided by the universal machine  
itself when looking inward deep enough.
I can give you references if you are interested. And yes, it is  
radical ... for Aristotelian materialists, which believes that physics  
*is* metaphysics. The arithmetical explanation of the quantum is of  
course rather natural for platonic Pythagorean people. What is nice,  
is that the Gödel-Löb logics explains also the quanta as the sharable  
part of a more general consciousness or qualia theory.  You might look  
at:


Marchal B. 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

I am not going to argue for MWI particularly, though I will say a bit next 
paragraph. The idea there are retro-causal influences that underlie 
apparent quantum nonlocality is simply wrong. The Kochen-Specker theorem 
illustrates limits on hidden variables, which means a measurement of an 
observable must be context dependent. In other words the orientation of a 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus is something determined by a classical observer and 
not by quantum mechanics. The four dimensional version of the KS theorem 
involves the 24-cell and its associated Lie group F4. It is curiously less 
complicated than the standard 3 dimensional version of the KS theorem. The 
4-dim version illustrates why it is not possible to replace QM with some 
subquantal wiring in four dimensions --- such as retrocausality. To assume 
a retrocausal structure is to say that an 8 dimensional manifold is 
equivalent to that manifold embeded in one dimension larger. In other words 
8 = 9, which is a contradiction.

The MWI may have connections to the multiverse. Susskind and others have 
speculated on this. It is not clear though whether this is that solid in 
its conclusion --- even just on a theoretical level. The type-I multiverse 
has regions on a flat spatial surface that replicates other regions, where 
there could be other Earths with all of us, but with differences that are 
associated with MWI eigenbranching of histories. These regions must of 
course be causally isolated from each other, lest we admit quantum cloning. 
This might extend to type II multiverse with different cosmologies entirely 
that are related to our world by MWI eigenbranching. 

I am not so sure about these things, though I don't dismiss them. I have 
some issues with all quantum interpretations, and they all appear 
incomplete. With MWI the problem is there is no mechanism for assigning the 
point of an eigenbranch event. If you have the quantum amplitude for the 
decay of a radioactive isotope there is nothing in that process to indicate 
where a decoherent event should occur that in MWI corresponds to this 
eigenbranching. In MWI there is then this yggdrasillian branched world, 
corresponding potentially to the multiverse, but there is nothing in QM 
which tells us how the observer or the phenomenological frame of the world 
is split onto different paths. 

LC

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:00:46 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 2:33:16 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:24:36 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
> The quantum concept of "things only exist when I look at them" originates 
> in the double slit experiment, and is sort-of limited to situations of this 
> type. To calculate the probabilities correctly as Feynman clearly explains 
> in his Lectures, one must calculate |A + B|^2, not (|A|^2  + |B|^2), the 
> latter being OK for classical physics, where A and B are the wf's or 
> amplitudes entering slits A and B respectively. Think of the electron or 
> photon as waves when we don't look, going through both slits and as 
> particles when observed. One way to interpret the first term is to say, 
> "The system is in both A and B states simultaneously, not in either state 
> exclusively." But regardless of the words chosen, one must use the first 
> calculation to make correct quantum predictions. Moreover, AFAIK, the MWI 
> does not avoid this conclusion even if it uses different words. In sum, to 
> make the general claim that QM says "things only exist when I look at them" 
> is misleading, and for most situations like macro events, simply wrong. AG 
>
>>  
>>
>>> ​But it really doesn't matter,​
>>>  as long as there is no logical self contradiction there is nothing 
>>> wrong with bizarre
>>> ​.​
>>> Occam's razor doesn't say we should embrace the least bizarre theory
>>> ​,​
>>> it says we should embrace the simplest theory
>>> ​,​
>>> and
>>> ​ one that doesn't need to explain the collapse is simpler than one that 
>>> does. 
>>>
>>> Unlike Copenhagen Many Worlds has no need to  to explain how when or why 
>>> the wave function collapse
>>> ​s​
>>> because the hypothesized collapse has no observable consequences. The 
>>> wave collapse is a needless complication that does nothing but get rid of 
>>> the multiverse for people who don't like the idea of a multiverse, its 
>>> wheels within wheels rather like the epicycles of old for people who didn't 
>>> like the idea of the planets going around the Sun rather than the Earth.  
>>>
>>> The wave function says the multiverse exists, to get rid of it 
>>> additional complications are needed and those complications do not improve 
>>> the ability to predict experimental results one bit
>>> ​, so they have no point.​
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
>> with; 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 23 Nov 2017, at 23:48, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 2:51:56 PM UTC-7,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence  to fully reify  
the wf in order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E  
quation​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people  
who have to assume that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements  
MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the  
cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results  
of measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement  
will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG

Measured by who?

Doesn't this identical question come up in MWI, but with Many Worlds  
the problem seems to metastasize. AG


Not really. With the MWI the problem is partially solved with the  
Mechanist first person indeterminacy or weakening of i. The only  
problem, in case we use the first person mechanist indterminacy is  
that we have to extract the quantum wave itself from elementary  
arithmetic and its internal logics of self-reference. That has been  
done partially, and up to now the results are confirmed by nature. For  
this I suggest you read my papers.







More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the  
wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles.  
The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to  
say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the  
measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that  
NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without collapse, a  
measurement is a first person experience. In this case, it is  
arguably the same as the experience of being duplicated.


If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state  
(without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be  
able to evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ).



I think I have done this in some later post.



I believe you have misapplied tensor linearity. TIA, AG



Where?




Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws.

That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part  
of the measurement problem. AG


Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe  
correctly (with respect to their first person notion) having done  
measurement, and got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves  
perspectives, all we have is a structured collection of relative  
states (which all exists and are structured in arithmetic, BTW).
An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as  
the observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look  
in the {up + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up 
+down, but if he looks in the {up down} basis; the observer  
consciousness differentiate, in his first person perspective, but  
the solution of the wave describes the two outcomes realized from  
the point of view of each observer. You can't decide to make one of  
them into a zombie.


 I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG

The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?

But this doesn't appear in singlet state, and I don't see why it is  
relevant. How can an observer can be in a superposed state? It's the  
system which is in a superposed state, which is never observed  
AFAIK. AG


Hmm... you seem to endorse Bohr's dualist split of the subject, which  
is exactly what the MWI avoid. The observer is described by by QM, as  
is the system "observer + observed". Linearity of evolution of 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 2:33:16 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:24:36 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 1:16 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> ​> ​
>>> Since your conclusions seem immensely more bizarre than collapse of the 
>>> wf,
>>> ​ ​
>>> your interpretation of what the SE means must be in error.
>>>
>>
>> It's a matter of taste I suppose. To me everything that can happen does 
>> happen is less bizarre than the future influencing the past and things only 
>> existing when I look at them.
>>
>
> REDUX OF PREVIOUS UNREADABLE COMMENT:
> For those who accept the experimental evidence for non-locality, such as 
> Brent and Bruce and probably Lawrence as well, it does NOT imply the future 
> influences the past. How did you reach this conclusion? Further, as 
> examples abound such as the formation of the Earth-Moon system, there were 
> no observers around to witness the event. Do you doubt it happened? I 
> contend you're misinterpreting the results of QM to make and believe such a 
> claim. AG 
>

The quantum concept of "things only exist when I look at them" originates 
in the double slit experiment, and is sort-of limited to situations of this 
type. To calculate the probabilities correctly as Feynman clearly explains 
in his Lectures, one must calculate |A + B|^2, not (|A|^2  + |B|^2), the 
latter being OK for classical physics, where A and B are the wf's or 
amplitudes entering slits A and B respectively. Think of the electron or 
photon as waves when we don't look, going through both slits and as 
particles when observed. One way to interpret the first term is to say, 
"The system is in both A and B states simultaneously, not in either state 
exclusively." But regardless of the words chosen, one must use the first 
calculation to make correct quantum predictions. Moreover, AFAIK, the MWI 
does not avoid this conclusion even if it uses different words. In sum, to 
make the general claim that QM says "things only exist when I look at them" 
is misleading, and for most situations like macro events, simply wrong. AG 

>  
>
>> ​But it really doesn't matter,​
>>  as long as there is no logical self contradiction there is nothing wrong 
>> with bizarre
>> ​.​
>> Occam's razor doesn't say we should embrace the least bizarre theory
>> ​,​
>> it says we should embrace the simplest theory
>> ​,​
>> and
>> ​ one that doesn't need to explain the collapse is simpler than one that 
>> does. 
>>
>> Unlike Copenhagen Many Worlds has no need to  to explain how when or why 
>> the wave function collapse
>> ​s​
>> because the hypothesized collapse has no observable consequences. The 
>> wave collapse is a needless complication that does nothing but get rid of 
>> the multiverse for people who don't like the idea of a multiverse, its 
>> wheels within wheels rather like the epicycles of old for people who didn't 
>> like the idea of the planets going around the Sun rather than the Earth.  
>>
>> The wave function says the multiverse exists, to get rid of it additional 
>> complications are needed and those complications do not improve the ability 
>> to predict experimental results one bit
>> ​, so they have no point.​
>>  
>>
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
> histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>
>>
>> ​ John K Clark​
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 1:19:05 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/25/2017 9:55 AM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> Applying deBroglie's formula, a change in p changes the wave length, and 
> thus the distribution on the screen. That is, the ensemble responds to 
> changes in the wave length due to interference. I therefore deduce that the 
> wave length has a physical effect on the ensemble, but not on individual 
> outcomes. AG
>
>
> That has to have an effect on individual outcomes since those make up the 
> ensemble.  For example, changing the wavelength make some spots on the 
> screen inaccessible to any particle; spots that were accessible before.
>
> Brent
>

Agreed. My original claim was that the wf must have some physicality, aka 
ontic properties, since it effects ensembles. I omitted individual outcomes 
since, given a specific wf, it doesn't seem to directly manifest an effect 
on them. But your point is well taken and tends to affirm my conjecture. AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:24:36 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 1:16 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> Since your conclusions seem immensely more bizarre than collapse of the 
>> wf,
>> ​ ​
>> your interpretation of what the SE means must be in error.
>>
>
> It's a matter of taste I suppose. To me everything that can happen does 
> happen is less bizarre than the future influencing the past and things only 
> existing when I look at them.
>

REDUX OF PREVIOUS UNREADABLE COMMENT:
For those who accept the experimental evidence for non-locality, such as 
Brent and Bruce and probably Lawrence as well, it does NOT imply the future 
influences the past. How did you reach this conclusion? Further, as 
examples abound such as the formation of the Earth-Moon system, there were 
no observers around to witness the event. Do you doubt it happened? I 
contend you're misinterpreting the results of QM to make and believe such a 
claim. AG 
 

> ​But it really doesn't matter,​
>  as long as there is no logical self contradiction there is nothing wrong 
> with bizarre
> ​.​
> Occam's razor doesn't say we should embrace the least bizarre theory
> ​,​
> it says we should embrace the simplest theory
> ​,​
> and
> ​ one that doesn't need to explain the collapse is simpler than one that 
> does. 
>
> Unlike Copenhagen Many Worlds has no need to  to explain how when or why 
> the wave function collapse
> ​s​
> because the hypothesized collapse has no observable consequences. The wave 
> collapse is a needless complication that does nothing but get rid of the 
> multiverse for people who don't like the idea of a multiverse, its wheels 
> within wheels rather like the epicycles of old for people who didn't like 
> the idea of the planets going around the Sun rather than the Earth.  
>
> The wave function says the multiverse exists, to get rid of it additional 
> complications are needed and those complications do not improve the ability 
> to predict experimental results one bit
> ​, so they have no point.​
>  
>

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>
> ​ John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 1:58:35 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/25/2017 7:38 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> * ​> ​>>​ ​ Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine and get 
 some outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes occur in 10 million 
 other universe? *

>>>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> ​I could be wrong but that would be my best guess.​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Is the slot machine duplicated in those 10 million new universes?
>>
>
> ​
> If the Schrodinger 
> ​ ​
> Wave Equation really means what it says then the answer can only be yes.  
> The 
> ​ ​
> Copenhagen 
> ​ ​
> people felt that was 
> ​just ​
> too strange so they stuck stuff into their theory that the mathematics 
> alone didn't say, as a result they got rid of one form of weirdness, the 
> multiverse, but inadvertently created two new forms of weirdness: the 
> future can effect the past and things only exist when you look at them. 
> There is just no way to stamp out the weird from the quantum world and be 
> consistent with experiment.   
>
>
> Many things we consider random are classically deterministic and slot 
> machines are among them.
>
> Brent
>
 
Of course. I was just using that to suggest how ridiculous the MWI scenario 
is. Not to be taken literally. I could have used photons in a double slit 
experiment. AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/25/2017 7:38 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 4:08 PM, >wrote:


*
​>
​>>​
​
Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine and
get some outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes
occur in 10 million other universe? *


​>> ​
​I could be wrong but that would be my best guess.​


​> ​
Is the slot machine duplicated in those 10 million new universes?


​
If the Schrodinger
​ ​
Wave Equation really means what it says then the answer can only be 
yes.  The

​ ​
Copenhagen
​ ​
people felt that was
​just ​
too strange so they stuck stuff into their theory that the mathematics 
alone didn't say, as a result they got rid of one form of weirdness, 
the multiverse, but inadvertently created two new forms of weirdness: 
the future can effect the past and things only exist when you look at 
them. There is just no way to stamp out the weird from the quantum 
world and be consistent with experiment.


Many things we consider random are classically deterministic and slot 
machines are among them.


Brent




​> ​
And the gambler cranking it? And the casino? And the city where
the casino is resident? And Andromeda, and beyond, up to and
including the BB?


​Yes, and that raises ​another question, how can the MWI produce 
finite probabilities if infinite numbers are involved? To make matters 
even worse the infinite numbers involved are not even countable. The 
answer is not all those universes change the probability.


If I paint a number of disks on a wall of various diameters then put a 
blindfold on and throw darts at the wall there are a uncountably

​ ​
infinite number of points that dart could hit, but my eye is not 
perfect so there are only a finite number spots on that wall that I 
can consciously distinguish

​,​
and there are more of those spots in the large disks than the small 
ones so there are more distinguishable versions of me seeing the dart 
hit the larger disk than the smaller.


To get back to the slot machine,
​ ​
if
​ the​
Schrodinger
​ Wave is correct ​
there are more than 10 million versions of me looking at that slot 
machine, infinitely more in fact, but the version of me where a pebble 
on a planet in the Andromeda Galaxy is a quarter inch to the left is 
not consciously discernible by me from a universe where the pebble is 
a quarter inch to the right, and so when I consciously calculate 
probabilities the two

​universes ​
can be lumped together.
​

 John K Clark​






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:24:36 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 1:16 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> Since your conclusions seem immensely more bizarre than collapse of the 
>> wf,
>> ​ ​
>> your interpretation of what the SE means must be in error.
>>
>
> It's a matter of taste I suppose. To me everything that can happen does 
> happen is less bizarre than the future influencing the past and things only 
> existing when I look at them.
>
> Those who believe in non-locality as established by experimental evidence, 
> such as Brent and Bruce, and I assume Lawrence as well, do NOT conclude 
> this implies the future influences the past. Moreover, as I pointed out 
> clearly, there is no need of an observer for something to exist. When the 
> Earth-Moon system formed, there were no observers. Do you doubt it 
> happened? You're misinterpreting the results of QM. AG
>  
>
​But it really doesn't matter,​
>  as long as there is no logical self contradiction there is nothing wrong 
> with bizarre
> ​.​
> Occam's razor doesn't say we should embrace the least bizarre theory
> ​,​
> it says we should embrace the simplest theory
> ​,​
> and
> ​ one that doesn't need to explain the collapse is simpler than one that 
> does. 
>
> Unlike Copenhagen Many Worlds has no need to  to explain how when or why 
> the wave function collapse
> ​s​
> because the hypothesized collapse has no observable consequences. The wave 
> collapse is a needless complication that does nothing but get rid of the 
> multiverse for people who don't like the idea of a multiverse, its wheels 
> within wheels rather like the epicycles of old for people who didn't like 
> the idea of the planets going around the Sun rather than the Earth.  
>
> The wave function says the multiverse exists, to get rid of it additional 
> complications are needed and those complications do not improve the ability 
> to predict experimental results one bit
> ​, so they have no point.​
>  
>
> ​ John K Clark​
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/25/2017 9:55 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
Applying deBroglie's formula, a change in p changes the wave length, 
and thus the distribution on the screen. That is, the ensemble 
responds to changes in the wave length due to interference. I 
therefore deduce that the wave length has a physical effect on the 
ensemble, but not on individual outcomes. AG


That has to have an effect on individual outcomes since those make up 
the ensemble.  For example, changing the wavelength make some spots on 
the screen inaccessible to any particle; spots that were accessible before.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Sat, Nov 25, 2017 at 1:16 PM,  wrote:

​> ​
> Since your conclusions seem immensely more bizarre than collapse of the wf,
> ​ ​
> your interpretation of what the SE means must be in error.
>

It's a matter of taste I suppose. To me everything that can happen does
happen is less bizarre than the future influencing the past and things only
existing when I look at them.
​But it really doesn't matter,​
 as long as there is no logical self contradiction there is nothing wrong
with bizarre
​.​
Occam's razor doesn't say we should embrace the least bizarre theory
​,​
it says we should embrace the simplest theory
​,​
and
​ one that doesn't need to explain the collapse is simpler than one that
does.

Unlike Copenhagen Many Worlds has no need to  to explain how when or why
the wave function collapse
​s​
because the hypothesized collapse has no observable consequences. The wave
collapse is a needless complication that does nothing but get rid of the
multiverse for people who don't like the idea of a multiverse, its wheels
within wheels rather like the epicycles of old for people who didn't like
the idea of the planets going around the Sun rather than the Earth.

The wave function says the multiverse exists, to get rid of it additional
complications are needed and those complications do not improve the ability
to predict experimental results one bit
​, so they have no point.​


​ John K Clark​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 2:19:48 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> If the ensemble's distribution changes as a consequence of changes in the 
> wf, IMO there is reason to believe the wf has ontic properties. That's all 
> I was alleging. AG
>


 ψ-ontology is not consistent with locality, so there can't be causal rules 
involved with measurement outcomes. Ontology does not buy you what you 
might be thinking. ψ-epistemology is not commensurate with classical 
reality, and so there is some need for a classical observer or measurement 
system. This then makes ψ-epistemology not consistent with locality. 

LC

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 7:11:52 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:55:47 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:06:50 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 9:21:14 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 11:15:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
> properly. 
>
> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. 
> The 
> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>
> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any 
> idea 
> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is 
> no 
> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>
> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or 
> epistemic. 
>

 The fact that probability waves evolve and interfere with each other, 
 and effect ensembles but not individual members, is inherently baffling. 
 So 
 the wf can't be completely epistemic since it modifies physical reality. 
 That is, It must be ontic in some respect, but in ways that defy rational 
 analysis. AG

>>>
>>> I think you are falling into a trap that David Hume warns against. 
>>> Causality gives rise to correlation, but correlation is not necessarily the 
>>> result of causality. There is no effect or some causal principle at work 
>>> with either individual wave functions or wave functions in an ensemble of 
>>> experiments. The ensemble of experiments, the classic case being the two 
>>> slit experiment, is meant to deduces the wave nature of the quantum 
>>> physics. It is not there to deduce some causal influence underlying quantum 
>>> nonlocality. 
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> Applying deBroglie's formula, a change in p changes the wave length, and 
>> thus the distribution on the screen. That is, the ensemble responds to 
>> changes in the wave length due to interference. I therefore deduce that the 
>> wave length has a physical effect on the ensemble, but not on individual 
>> outcomes. AG
>>
>
> You continue to make the error of thinking there must be some physical 
> effect in a measurement. 
>

 In a particular measurement outcome?  expressly denied that. I stated the 
physical effect of the wf is only discernible for ensembles. AG

The outcomes will obey a statistical distribution that is reflected in an 
> ensemble of experiments. The statistical distribution is predicted by the 
> nature of the wave function prior to a measurement. The wave function can 
> be interpreted in a ψ-epistemic sense (Copenhagen, Qubism etc) as only 
> telling you what information can be accessed from the quantum system. In a 
> ψ-ontic sense (MWI, Bohm etc) the wave function exists and evolves to 
> define possible outcomes, but the observer is not able to access any 
> predictive information as this necessitates some local hidden variable that 
> does not exist. What outcome happens in any particular measurements is not 
> predictable; there exists no causal principle which can tell you how a 
> particular outcome obtains. 
>

I never alleged otherwise. AG
 

> The occurrence of a statistical distribution of outcomes from an ensemble 
> of measurements does not mean there is some causal influence directing 
> outcomes. 
>

If the ensemble's distribution changes as a consequence of changes in the 
wf, IMO there is reason to believe the wf has ontic properties. That's all 
I was alleging. AG
 

> This distribution only obtains as a consequence of what the wave function 
> tells you (ψ-epistemology) about the system before measurement, 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 11:55:47 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:06:50 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 9:21:14 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 11:15:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:



 I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
 weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
 properly. 

 Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
 two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. 
 The 
 degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
 entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
 spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
 in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
 entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
 and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 

 We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
 entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any 
 idea 
 there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
 fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
 entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
 "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
 sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 

 This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
 thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
 problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or 
 epistemic. 

>>>
>>> The fact that probability waves evolve and interfere with each other, 
>>> and effect ensembles but not individual members, is inherently baffling. So 
>>> the wf can't be completely epistemic since it modifies physical reality. 
>>> That is, It must be ontic in some respect, but in ways that defy rational 
>>> analysis. AG
>>>
>>
>> I think you are falling into a trap that David Hume warns against. 
>> Causality gives rise to correlation, but correlation is not necessarily the 
>> result of causality. There is no effect or some causal principle at work 
>> with either individual wave functions or wave functions in an ensemble of 
>> experiments. The ensemble of experiments, the classic case being the two 
>> slit experiment, is meant to deduces the wave nature of the quantum 
>> physics. It is not there to deduce some causal influence underlying quantum 
>> nonlocality. 
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> Applying deBroglie's formula, a change in p changes the wave length, and 
> thus the distribution on the screen. That is, the ensemble responds to 
> changes in the wave length due to interference. I therefore deduce that the 
> wave length has a physical effect on the ensemble, but not on individual 
> outcomes. AG
>

You continue to make the error of thinking there must be some physical 
effect in a measurement. The outcomes will obey a statistical distribution 
that is reflected in an ensemble of experiments. The statistical 
distribution is predicted by the nature of the wave function prior to a 
measurement. The wave function can be interpreted in a ψ-epistemic sense 
(Copenhagen, Qubism etc) as only telling you what information can be 
accessed from the quantum system. In a ψ-ontic sense (MWI, Bohm etc) the 
wave function exists and evolves to define possible outcomes, but the 
observer is not able to access any predictive information as this 
necessitates some local hidden variable that does not exist. What outcome 
happens in any particular measurements is not predictable; there exists no 
causal principle which can tell you how a particular outcome obtains. The 
occurrence of a statistical distribution of outcomes from an ensemble of 
measurements does not mean there is some causal influence directing 
outcomes. This distribution only obtains as a consequence of what the wave 
function tells you (ψ-epistemology) about the system before measurement, or 
how the wave function evolves as a physical system (ψ-ontology) prior to 
measurement. It is my thinking that QM fails to completely live up to 
either of these.

LC

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:39:00 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  
> wrote:
>
> *​>​>>​ ​Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine and get 
 some outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes occur in 10 million 
 other universe? *

>>>
>>> ​>> ​
>>> ​I could be wrong but that would be my best guess.​
>>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> Is the slot machine duplicated in those 10 million new universes?
>>
>
> ​
> If the Schrodinger
> ​ ​
> Wave Equation really means what it says then the answer can only be yes.
>

Since your conclusions seem immensely more bizarre than collapse of the wf, 
your interpretation of what the SE means must be in error. AG
 

>   The
> ​ ​
> Copenhagen
> ​ ​
> people felt that was 
> ​just ​
> too strange so they stuck stuff into their theory that the mathematics 
> alone didn't say, as a result they got rid of one form of weirdness, the 
> multiverse, but inadvertently created two new forms of weirdness: the 
> future can effect the past and things only exist when you look at them. 
> There is just no way to stamp out the weird from the quantum world and be 
> consistent with experiment.   
>
>
> ​> ​
>> And the gambler cranking it? And the casino? And the city where the 
>> casino is resident? And Andromeda, and beyond, up to and including the BB?
>>
>
> ​Yes, and that raises ​another question, how can the MWI produce finite 
> probabilities if infinite numbers are involved? To make matters even worse 
> the infinite numbers involved are not even countable. The answer is not all 
> those universes change the probability.
>
> If I paint a number of disks on a wall of various diameters then put a 
> blindfold on and throw darts at the wall there are a uncountably
> ​ ​
> infinite number of points that dart could hit, but my eye is not perfect 
> so there are only a finite number spots on that wall that I can consciously 
> distinguish
> ​,​
> and there are more of those spots in the large disks than the small ones 
> so there are more distinguishable versions of me seeing the dart hit the 
> larger disk than the smaller.
>
> To get back to the slot machine,
> ​ ​
> if
> ​ the​ 
> Schrodinger
> ​ Wave is correct ​
> there are more than 10 million versions of me looking at that slot 
> machine, infinitely more in fact, but the version of me where a pebble on a 
> planet in the Andromeda Galaxy is a quarter inch to the left is not 
> consciously discernible by me from a universe where the pebble is a quarter 
> inch to the right, and so when I consciously calculate probabilities the 
> two 
> ​universes ​
> can be lumped together.
> ​ 
>
>  John K Clark​
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:06:50 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 9:21:14 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 11:15:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
>>> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
>>> properly. 
>>>
>>> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
>>> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
>>> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
>>> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
>>> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
>>> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
>>> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
>>> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
>>> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>>>
>>> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
>>> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
>>> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
>>> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
>>> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
>>> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
>>> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>>>
>>> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
>>> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
>>> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
>>>
>>
>> The fact that probability waves evolve and interfere with each other, and 
>> effect ensembles but not individual members, is inherently baffling. So the 
>> wf can't be completely epistemic since it modifies physical reality. That 
>> is, It must be ontic in some respect, but in ways that defy rational 
>> analysis. AG
>>
>
> I think you are falling into a trap that David Hume warns against. 
> Causality gives rise to correlation, but correlation is not necessarily the 
> result of causality. There is no effect or some causal principle at work 
> with either individual wave functions or wave functions in an ensemble of 
> experiments. The ensemble of experiments, the classic case being the two 
> slit experiment, is meant to deduces the wave nature of the quantum 
> physics. It is not there to deduce some causal influence underlying quantum 
> nonlocality. 
>
> LC
>

Applying deBroglie's formula, a change in p changes the wave length, and 
thus the distribution on the screen. That is, the ensemble responds to 
changes in the wave length due to interference. I therefore deduce that the 
wave length has a physical effect on the ensemble, but not on individual 
outcomes. AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  wrote:

*​>​>>​ ​Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine and get some
>>> outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes occur in 10 million other
>>> universe? *
>>>
>>
>> ​>> ​
>> ​I could be wrong but that would be my best guess.​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Is the slot machine duplicated in those 10 million new universes?
>

​
If the Schrodinger
​ ​
Wave Equation really means what it says then the answer can only be yes.
The
​ ​
Copenhagen
​ ​
people felt that was
​just ​
too strange so they stuck stuff into their theory that the mathematics
alone didn't say, as a result they got rid of one form of weirdness, the
multiverse, but inadvertently created two new forms of weirdness: the
future can effect the past and things only exist when you look at them.
There is just no way to stamp out the weird from the quantum world and be
consistent with experiment.


​> ​
> And the gambler cranking it? And the casino? And the city where the casino
> is resident? And Andromeda, and beyond, up to and including the BB?
>

​Yes, and that raises ​another question, how can the MWI produce finite
probabilities if infinite numbers are involved? To make matters even worse
the infinite numbers involved are not even countable. The answer is not all
those universes change the probability.

If I paint a number of disks on a wall of various diameters then put a
blindfold on and throw darts at the wall there are a uncountably
​ ​
infinite number of points that dart could hit, but my eye is not perfect so
there are only a finite number spots on that wall that I can consciously
distinguish
​,​
and there are more of those spots in the large disks than the small ones so
there are more distinguishable versions of me seeing the dart hit the
larger disk than the smaller.

To get back to the slot machine,
​ ​
if
​ the​
Schrodinger
​ Wave is correct ​
there are more than 10 million versions of me looking at that slot machine,
infinitely more in fact, but the version of me where a pebble on a planet
in the Andromeda Galaxy is a quarter inch to the left is not consciously
discernible by me from a universe where the pebble is a quarter inch to the
right, and so when I consciously calculate probabilities the two
​universes ​
can be lumped together.
​

 John K Clark​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 9:21:14 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 11:15:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
>> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
>> properly. 
>>
>> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
>> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
>> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
>> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
>> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
>> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
>> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
>> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
>> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>>
>> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
>> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
>> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
>> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
>> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
>> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
>> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>>
>> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
>> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
>> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
>>
>
> The fact that probability waves evolve and interfere with each other, and 
> effect ensembles but not individual members, is inherently baffling. So the 
> wf can't be completely epistemic since it modifies physical reality. That 
> is, It must be ontic in some respect, but in ways that defy rational 
> analysis. AG
>

I think you are falling into a trap that David Hume warns against. 
Causality gives rise to correlation, but correlation is not necessarily the 
result of causality. There is no effect or some causal principle at work 
with either individual wave functions or wave functions in an ensemble of 
experiments. The ensemble of experiments, the classic case being the two 
slit experiment, is meant to deduces the wave nature of the quantum 
physics. It is not there to deduce some causal influence underlying quantum 
nonlocality. 

LC

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[spudboy100 via Everything List]

Jason, imagine a universe, by physical laws, where its easy to interact with 
other clones of our own universe, and version of earth, but it's far more 
difficult to travel without titanic amounts of energy. So Earth 1 x 119^42nd, 
(ourselves) trades peacefully, with Earth 1 x 20^905, but is in a constant 
state of war, with Earth 1 x 7231 (The Greater Mongolian Empire). In some 
universe, High Everett the 3rd, in a medically, advanced, Earth, is laughing 
his ass off at us :-(  



-Original Message-
From: Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com>
To: Everything List <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, Nov 24, 2017 8:48 pm
Subject: Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM







On Fri, Nov 24, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:





I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction, which is 
simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a simple 
superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> 
describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any direction, and Bob, too 
but the opposite relatively to each others (the notation is misleading). We 
must keep in mind the rotational invariance of the spin. So we the Alice Bob 
situation is more intricate and tedious to describe. 
Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett FAQ by 
Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some times. We have 
copied the relevant details in previous discussions though, so you might try to 
find it in the archives with the key word "Michael", or something. I have 
unfortunately not the time "here and now".  Later perhaps. With Everett, it is 
important to reason independently of the bases in between the measurements.


I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a distance" if we 
assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't see Bell' argument applying 
in the MW context, though.


Bruno








Bruno,


Is this the Many Worlds FAQ you were referring to? 
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html


I think the parts relevant to EPR, Bell Inequality and Locality (for those 
interested) are Q12 and Q32.


Jason


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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the 
>> MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in 
>> some 
>> world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>
>
> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
> he Schrodinger 
> ​Wave ​E
> quation 
> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
> somehow it does. ​
>
>
> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone 
> didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>
> Brent
>

 *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
 based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, 
 in 
 this case in other worlds. *


 That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the 
 waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption 
 that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong 
 for 
 the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von 
 Neumann) depending where you put the cut.

>>>
>>> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
>>> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
>>> realized.*
>>>
>>> What do you mean by realize? 
>>>
>>
>>  *Realized = Measured. AG*
>>
>>
>>
>> Measured by who? 
>>
>
> Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the 
> problem seems to metastasize. AG
>  
>
>> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave is 
>> A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
>> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
>> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
>> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
>> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
>> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
>> being duplicated.
>>
>
> If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state (without 
> the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to evaluate 
> your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am not clear 
> how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a tensor 
> product? TIA AG
>
>
> I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction, 
> which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a 
> simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> 
> |DN> .
>

*Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled pair 
since it is isolated; nor afterward since the system being measured is now 
NOT in a superposition of states.  So your tensor addition is based on 
fallacies, which I infer permeates your general analysis of this situation. 
BTW, please see my last post where I raised additional issues. TY, AG*

>
> In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - 
> |DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any direction, 
> and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others (the notation is 
> misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational invariance of the spin. So 
> we the Alice Bob situation is more intricate and tedious to describe. 
> Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett FAQ by 
> Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some times. We have 
> copied the relevant details in previous discussions though, so you might 
> try to find it in the archives with the key word "Michael", or something. I 
> have unfortunately not the time "here and now".  Later perhaps. With 
> Everett, it is important to reason independently of the bases in between 
> the measurements.
>
> I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a distance" 
> if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't see Bell' 
> argument applying in the MW context, 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Nov 24, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>
> I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction,
> which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a
> simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A>
> |DN> .
>
> In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> -
> |DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any direction,
> and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others (the notation is
> misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational invariance of the spin. So
> we the Alice Bob situation is more intricate and tedious to describe.
> Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett FAQ by
> Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some times. We have
> copied the relevant details in previous discussions though, so you might
> try to find it in the archives with the key word "Michael", or something. I
> have unfortunately not the time "here and now".  Later perhaps. With
> Everett, it is important to reason independently of the bases in between
> the measurements.
>
> I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a distance"
> if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't see Bell'
> argument applying in the MW context, though.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Bruno,

Is this the Many Worlds FAQ you were referring to?
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html

I think the parts relevant to EPR, Bell Inequality and Locality (for those
interested) are Q12 and Q32.

Jason

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in  
order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E  
quation ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have  
to assume that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements  
MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the  
cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results  
of measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement  
will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG



Measured by who?

Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the  
problem seems to metastasize. AG


More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the  
wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles.  
The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to  
say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the  
measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that  
NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without collapse, a  
measurement is a first person experience. In this case, it is  
arguably the same as the experience of being duplicated.


If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state  
(without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be  
able to evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For  
example, I am not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term in the  
sum represent a tensor product? TIA AG


I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction,  
which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (| 
A>)and a simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = | 
A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - | 
DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any  
direction, and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others  
(the notation is misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational  
invariance of the spin. So we the Alice Bob situation is more  
intricate and tedious to describe.
Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett FAQ  
by Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some times.  
We have copied the relevant details in previous discussions though, so  
you might try to find it in the archives with the key word "Michael",  
or something. I have unfortunately not the time "here and now".  Later  
perhaps. With Everett, it is important to reason independently of the  
bases in between the measurements.


I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a  
distance" if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't  
see Bell' argument applying in the MW context, though.


Bruno





Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws.

That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part  
of the measurement problem. AG


Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe  
correctly (with respect to their first person notion) having done  
measurement, and got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves  
perspectives, all we have is a structured collection of relative  
states (which all exists and are structured in arithmetic, BTW).






An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as  
the observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look  
in the {up + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up 
+down, but if he looks in the {up down} basis; the observer  
consciousness differentiate, in his first 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>
>>
>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>
>> You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The idea 
>> that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many histories)" 
>> does not work, and is not really an explanation at all -- you are simply 
>> evading the issue.
>>
>>
>> Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the linear 
>> evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not yet seen one 
>> proof that some action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics, 
>> although I agree that would be the case if the outcome where unique, as 
>> EPER/BELL show convincingly.
>>
>> Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at a 
>> distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just want to 
>> dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice 
>> is really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds, or one world 
>> and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your 
>> poison.
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>
> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
> properly. 
>
> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>
> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>
> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
> any axiomatic structure.
>
>
> Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to 
> avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
> The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether many 
> worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a purely local 
> understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models. I have argued that 
> this is not the case -- that non-locality is inherent in the entangled 
> singlet state, and many worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think 
> from what you say above that you might well agree with this position.
>
> Bruce
>

Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the same 
problem all quantum interpretations suffer from. With MWI there is a nice 
idea of the world continuing on as a complete pure state quantum system, 
but it has the problem that we observers have some restriction on our 
observational domain. This is because we are thrust into some subset of the 
Hilbert space of evolution. It really is a sort of collapse, but rather 
than of an 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 11:15:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>
>> You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The idea 
>> that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many histories)" 
>> does not work, and is not really an explanation at all -- you are simply 
>> evading the issue.
>>
>>
>> Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the linear 
>> evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not yet seen one 
>> proof that some action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics, 
>> although I agree that would be the case if the outcome where unique, as 
>> EPER/BELL show convincingly.
>>
>> Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at a 
>> distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just want to 
>> dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice 
>> is really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds, or one world 
>> and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your 
>> poison.
>>
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>
> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
> properly. 
>
> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>
> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>
> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
>

The fact that probability waves evolve and interfere with each other, and 
effect ensembles but not individual members, is inherently baffling. So the 
wf can't be completely epistemic since it modifies physical reality. That 
is, It must be ontic in some respect, but in ways that defy rational 
analysis. AG
 

> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
> any axiomatic structure.
>
> LC
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The
idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact
(many histories)" does not work, and is not really an explanation
at all -- you are simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the
linear evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not
yet seen one proof that some action at a distance are at play in
quantum mechanics, although I agree that would be the case if the
outcome where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.

Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action
at a distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or
just want to dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But
after Aspect, the choice is really between deterministic and local
QM + many worlds, or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non
locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your poison.


Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have 
the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is 
identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced 
with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk 
about the individual spin particles existing. If the observer makes a 
measurement that results in a measurement the entanglement state is 
"violently" lost, the entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle 
states of the apparatus, and the individual spin degrees of freedom 
replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any 
idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. 
There in fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The 
loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. 
Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins are before the 
measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal action that ties 
the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or 
epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the 
quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they 
do not understand spatial relationships well; they get leashes and 
chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped up around a pole they 
simply can't figure out how to get out of it. In this sense we human 
are simply limited in brain power and will never be able to understand 
QM in some way that has a completeness with respect to causality, 
reality and nonlocality. There is also a far more radical possibility. 
It is that a measurement of a quantum system is ultimately a set of 
quantum states that are encoding information about quantum states. 
This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing Machine that 
emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential 
process. If this is the case we may be faced with the prospect there 
can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and epistemic 
nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by any 
axiomatic structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to 
avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether many 
worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a purely local 
understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models. I have argued 
that this is not the case -- that non-locality is inherent in the 
entangled singlet state, and many worlds does not avoid this 
non-locality. I think from what you say above that you might well agree 
with this position.


Bruce




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The idea 
> that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many histories)" 
> does not work, and is not really an explanation at all -- you are simply 
> evading the issue.
>
>
> Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the linear 
> evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not yet seen one 
> proof that some action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics, 
> although I agree that would be the case if the outcome where unique, as 
> EPER/BELL show convincingly.
>
> Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at a 
> distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just want to 
> dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice 
> is really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds, or one world 
> and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your 
> poison.
>
>
> Bruno
>
> Bruce
>
>
I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
properly. 

Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 

We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
"metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 

This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
any axiomatic structure.

LC

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 2:51:56 PM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the 
>> MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in 
>> some 
>> world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>
>
> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
> he Schrodinger 
> ​Wave ​E
> quation 
> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
> somehow it does. ​
>
>
> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone 
> didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>
> Brent
>

 *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
 based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, 
 in 
 this case in other worlds. *


 That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the 
 waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption 
 that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong 
 for 
 the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von 
 Neumann) depending where you put the cut.

>>>
>>> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
>>> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
>>> realized.*
>>>
>>> What do you mean by realize? 
>>>
>>
>>  *Realized = Measured. AG*
>>
>> Measured by who?
>>
>  
Doesn't this identical question come up in MWI, but with Many Worlds the 
problem seems to metastasize. AG

>  
>
>> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave is 
>> A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
>> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
>> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
>> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
>> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
>> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
>> being duplicated.
>>
>  
If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state (without 
the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to evaluate 
your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). *I believe you have 
misapplied tensor linearity.* TIA, AG

> Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws. 
>>>
>>
>> *That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of the 
>> measurement problem. AG*
>>
>>
>> Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe 
>> correctly (with respect to their first person notion) having done 
>> measurement, and got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves perspectives, 
>> all we have is a structured collection of relative states (which all exists 
>> and are structured in arithmetic, BTW).
>>
>> An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as the 
>>> observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look in the {up 
>>> + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down, but if he looks 
>>> in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness differentiate, in his 
>>> first person perspective, but the solution of the wave describes the two 
>>> outcomes realized from the point of view of each observer. You can't decide 
>>> to make one of them into a zombie. 
>>>
>>
>>  *I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG*
>>
>> The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?
>>
>
But this doesn't appear in singlet state, and I don't see why it is 
relevant. How can an observer can be in a superposed state? It's the system 
which is in a superposed state, which is never observed AFAIK. AG
 

>
>> the evolution is linear and when A looks at the particle: she is 
>> described by (A-up up) + (A-down down).   (with of course 1/sqrt(2) 
>> everywhere).
>>
>> the consciousness of A has differentiated into (A-up) and (A-down). With 
>> Bohr, one among A-up and A-down mysteriously disappears. With Bohm (one 
>> world + a potential simulating the entire Many-world, but "without 
>> 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

 
On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 4:58:20 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Nov 17, 2017 at 4:17 PM,  
> wrote:
>  
>
>> *​> ​How do you distinguish LOCALITY from REALISM?*
>>
>  
> They mean different things. Locality means information can't travel faster 
> than light and the future can't effect the past.​
>  
> ​Realism means a property of something exists in just one state even if is 
> not being observed, for example a unmeasured electron is either spin up or 
> spin down we just don't know which one because we haven't measured it yet, 
> Realism means it is never a mixture of spin up and spin down.  
>  
>
>> *​> ​As I wrote, and you ignored, the constituents of the baseball are in 
>> entangled states,* 
>>
> *with their neighbors to create the macro "object",*
>>
>
> ​Yes, and with emphasis on "states" not "state". All the particles in a 
> baseball are not entangled with each other or with the same object in the 
> environment, ​if they were the atoms would lose their individual identity 
> and the baseball would become a 
>  Bose–Einstein condensate
> ​.​
>
> *​> ​the overall "state" of the object -- if one could be defined -- does 
>> NOT contradict localism or realism*
>>
>
> ​If it's local and realistic and if Bell's Inequality is violated (and we 
> know experimentally that it is) then we know it can't be deterministic. Yes 
> you might want to have all 3, Einstein wanted that too but since Einstein's 
> day experiment has proved you just can't have determinism locality and 
> realism. And that means there is no getting around it, quantum physics is 
> weird.  ​
>  
>  
>
>> ​>> ​
>>> Ignore it? I didn't ignore it I'm the one who pointed it out! Three 
>>> entirely different theories in 3 apparently different areas of physics all 
>>> were forced to come to the exact same conclusion, the Multiverse must exist.
>>>
>>
>> *​> ​I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. 
>> Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some 
>> world.​ ​**I see no reason for this assumption other than an insistence 
>> to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>
>
> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
> he Schrodinger 
> ​Wave ​E
> quation
> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
> somehow it does. ​
>  
>
>> *​> ​Same situation in String Theory; no "must"; simply other possible 
>> universes in the landscape.*
>>
>
> ​String Theory doesn't insist on an infinite number of other universes, 
> but it does insist on at least 10^500 of them and there are only about 
> 10^80 atoms in the observable universe. ​
>  
>
> *​> ​Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine and get some 
>> outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes occur in 10 million other 
>> universe? *
>>
>
> ​I could be wrong but that would be my best guess.​
>

Is the slot machine duplicated in those 10 million new universes? And the 
gambler cranking it? And the casino? And the city where the casino is 
resident? And Andromeda, and beyond, up to and including the BB? Inquiring 
minds want to know. AG 

*​> ​Seems ridiculous to me.*
>>
>
> ​Fine, but keep in mind reality is not obligated to pay attention to your 
> personal incredulity. It would certainly be odd but odd is not the same 
> thing as a logical self contradiction, and we already know whatever turns 
> out to be true it will be odd.  ​
>
> *​> ​Essentially, all calculations and predictions in physics are 
>> approximations. *
>>
>
> ​Is a mathematical model an approximation of a physical hurricane or is 
> the physical hurricane an approximation of the mathematical model? I think 
> the physics is more fundamental than the mathematics.   ​
>  
>  
>
>> *​> ​Can't a Turing Machine calculate some rational numbers in finite 
>> time,*
>>
>
> ​Certainly a Turing Machine can calculate some rational numbers in finite 
> time but very very very few; and it can calculate almost none of the Real 
> Numbers even in infinite time.
>  
>
>> *​> ​Physics uses approximations regularly, always. Does this mean 
>> mathematical knowledge is meaningless; just a "story"?*
>>
>
> ​
> Mathematicians are always saying mathematics is a language, well English 
> is a language too and you can use English to write both fiction and 
> nonfiction, you can even write fantasy stories in English that violate the 
> laws of physics.
> ​ ​
> Some very abstract modern mathematics may be like Harry Potter stories 
> written in the language of mathematics, entertaining 
> ​and ​
> thought provoking 
> ​and maybe even poetic ​
> but having nothing to do with the physical world.  
>  
>
>> *​> ​The fact that PI can't be calculated precisely doesn't mean that 
>> irrational numbers, in this case PI, are irrelevant to physics.*
>>
>
> ​PI is irrational but it is a computable number, you can get arbitrarily 
> close to it by using for example an 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:



 On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:

 * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. 
> Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some 
> world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>

 The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
 ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
 he Schrodinger 
 ​Wave ​E
 quation 
 ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
 somehow it does. ​


 It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone didn't 
 explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.

 Brent

>>>
>>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
>>> based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, in 
>>> this case in other worlds. *
>>>
>>>
>>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the waves. 
>>> It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption that the 
>>> wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong for the 
>>> macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) 
>>> depending where you put the cut.
>>>
>>
>> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
>> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
>> realized.*
>>
>> What do you mean by realize? 
>>
>
>  *Realized = Measured. AG*
>
>
>
> Measured by who? 
>

Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the problem 
seems to metastasize. AG
 

> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave is 
> A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
> being duplicated.
>

If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state (without 
the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to evaluate 
your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am not clear 
how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a tensor 
product? TIA AG

>
> Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws. 
>>
>
> *That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of the 
> measurement problem. AG*
>
>
> Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe correctly 
> (with respect to their first person notion) having done measurement, and 
> got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves perspectives, all we have is a 
> structured collection of relative states (which all exists and are 
> structured in arithmetic, BTW).
>
>
>
>
> An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as the 
>> observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look in the {up 
>> + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down, but if he looks 
>> in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness differentiate, in his 
>> first person perspective, but the solution of the wave describes the two 
>> outcomes realized from the point of view of each observer. You can't decide 
>> to make one of them into a zombie. 
>>
>
>  *I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG*
>
>
> The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?
>
> the evolution is linear and when A looks at the particle: she is described 
> by (A-up up) + (A-down down).   (with of course 1/sqrt(2) everywhere).
>
> the consciousness of A has differentiated into (A-up) and (A-down). With 
> Bohr, one among A-up and A-down mysteriously disappears. With Bohm (one 
> world + a potential simulating the entire Many-world, but "without 
> particles") one among A-up and A-down becomes a zombie, even one lacking a 
> body made of particles, yet, the waves describes them as being alive like 
> you and me, and we can test it (in principle) by making quantum computation 
> with oneself.
>
>
>
>
>
> *So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG*
>>
>> I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in  
order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E quation ​  
about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume  
that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements  
MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results  
of measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement  
will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG



Measured by who? More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state  
up+down: the wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the  
particles. The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are  
you OK to say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that  
the measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that  
NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without collapse, a  
measurement is a first person experience. In this case, it is arguably  
the same as the experience of being duplicated.









Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws.

That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of  
the measurement problem. AG


Just see above. QM describes precisely why the observers believe  
correctly (with respect to their first person notion) having done  
measurement, and got precise outcomes, but from the 3p waves  
perspectives, all we have is a structured collection of relative  
states (which all exists and are structured in arithmetic, BTW).






An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as  
the observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look  
in the {up + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down,  
but if he looks in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness  
differentiate, in his first person perspective, but the solution of  
the wave describes the two outcomes realized from the point of view  
of each observer. You can't decide to make one of them into a zombie.


 I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG


The tensor product is linear, so A(up + down) = (A up) + (A down). OK?

the evolution is linear and when A looks at the particle: she is  
described by (A-up up) + (A-down down).   (with of course 1/sqrt(2)  
everywhere).


the consciousness of A has differentiated into (A-up) and (A-down).  
With Bohr, one among A-up and A-down mysteriously disappears. With  
Bohm (one world + a potential simulating the entire Many-world, but  
"without particles") one among A-up and A-down becomes a zombie, even  
one lacking a body made of particles, yet, the waves describes them as  
being alive like you and me, and we can test it (in principle) by  
making quantum computation with oneself.







So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG
I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware most people  
claims Everett and Copenhagen are differet intepretations, but from  
a metamathematical obvious view: Everett and Copenhagen are  
different theories.


They have identical postulates but Everett adds another non-trivial  
one as I indicated above; namely, that every possible measurement is  
realized, that is measured, in another world. I don't see why you  
insist on denying something so obvious. AG



?

I think you should read Everett. he propose a new formulation of QM,  
and it is copenhagen with the withdrawal of the collapse postulate.


All measurement are realized in the sense that no superposition ever  
collapse, but that it looks in that way from the first person  
perspective of the observer. he reduces the quantum indeterminacy to  
the classical 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 22 Nov 2017, at 04:09, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 7:05 PM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:


​> ​it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent  
because it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of  
probabilities. All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born  
rule in MWI have been shown to be circular


But Copenhagen is no better at deriving the Born Rule​ nor is any  
other quantum interpretation​ although Gleason's Theorem says that  
if the quantum wave function is related to probability then​ the​  
square of the absolute value​ is the only one that doesn't produce  
contradictions. So if you're going to have a probability rule  
involving the wave function its got to be the Born Rule, the  
function cubed or anything else just won't do. But the wave function  
itself is 100% deterministic so why involve probability at all?


By invoking the first person indeterminacy ...



I don't have a very good answer to that nor does anybody else​,​  
but the Many Worlds people have made a better stab at it than most:


https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7577


Like this paper illustrate rather well, assuming the Wave.

If we assume Digital Mechanism in cognitive science, the wave itself  
must be retrieved from the logic of computations (sigma_sentences).  
The logic of yes/no computations provides the quantization necessary  
for that, and this confirms the existence of a very general form of  
Gleason theorem operating in (very elementary) Arithmetic.


Bruno




​ John K Clark​






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2017, at 21:57, John Clark wrote:

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 1:36 AM, Bruce Kellett  wrote:



. ​>> ​Does non locality mean the future influences the past as  
Clark alleged?


​> ​No.

​"​realism plus arrow of time preservation and quantum mechanics  
are not compatible. In other words, quantum mechanics cannot be  
completed with any (local or non-local) hidden variables, provide we  
assume the common sense of the arrow of time.​"


https://arxiv.org/abs/0806.2037​



Interesting, but again, that paper assume one world, and use some  
notion of simultaneous (space-like separated) outcomes, which I am not  
even sure can make any sense in a relativistic quantum mechanics  
(without collapse).


My feeling is that Everett relative state theory prevents "non- 
locality" to make any sense in realms which mix special (and general)  
relativity.


Bruno





​John K Clark​






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 21 Nov 2017, at 06:22, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​ The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum  
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY  
theory to be compatible with experimental results, and one of those  
experiments shows the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that  
violation tells us that for ANY theory to be successful at  
explaining how the world works AT LEAST one of the following  
properties of that theory must be untrue:


1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not  
strictly true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:


"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out  
determinism, or hidden variables. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported  
as ruling out, or at least calling in question, realism. But these  
are all mistakes. What Bell's theorem, together with the  
experimental results, proves to be impossible is not determinism or  
hidden variables or realism, but locality, in a perfectly clear  
sense. What Bell proved, and what theoretical physics has not yet  
properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is non-local."


This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, arxiv: 
1408.1826 He says the same thing in his book and numerous other  
articles where he spells this out in considerable detail.


I read his book. It seems to me that he is aware that this works  
clearly only if we assume that measurement have definite outcome, and  
that it does not apply in the MW view. He is rather explicit on this  
in his book. Stathis' quote seems to assess this. I am not sure  
quantum field theory would make any sense with existing physically non- 
local phenomena. That is why also Bernard d'Espagnat distinguished non- 
separability, and non locality, to avoid a possible confusion between  
non-local appearances and action at a distance.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:19, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 21/11/2017 12:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local.


I am not sure what that means, but I can imagine this could make  
sense in the "one-world" hypothesis, not much in many-worlds, still  
less in many-computations.


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local because it involves two  
particles without specifying any particular separation. Because the  
singlet requires both particles, it is clearly non-separable -- it  
cannot be explained by the purely local properties of the individual  
particles. Non-separability means that changing one of the particles  
influences the other 'instantaneously'. That is non-locality.


A simple argument is that any experimental set-up showing a non- 
locality can be simulated by a classical (local) computer, and the  
simulated observer(s), like all the Bob-Alice pair we get, will all  
(the majority) describe an apparent non-locality, despite we,  
looking patiently at the whole emulation will see that there are  
none.


That argument has been debunked by Brunner et al, arxiv:1303.2849



If that is correct, then Church's thesis is false. Hard to believe.  
Note that a seemingly similar (to Brunner) argument is in Friedman's  
book, but it is invalid. All known quantum phenomenon are computable.  
The one non computable requires a non computable Hamiltonian, of some  
ad-hoc waves, like Nielsen's e-iOt, with O being Chaitin's number. If  
we are digital machines, we can't even recognize as non computable  
such phenomenon.






It actually has nothing to do with whether people meet or not - it  
describes a situation which explicitly violates Einstein's notion  
of local realism: the state of one of the entangled pair is not  
separable from the state of the other distant particle. Non- 
separability here implies non-local influence, or simple non- 
locality. The attempt to claim that non-separability does not  
imply non-locality is mere verbal gymnastics, with no physical  
content.


The singlet state does not describe one pair, but an infinity of  
pairs, having spin (say) in all directions, but correlated in all  
the case verifiable by Bob and Alice when they can interact. I  
would say.


That is a complete misrepresentation of the situation. Only one pair  
is necessary. You are confusing 'pairs' with the rotational symmetry  
of the singlet state, and that is your continuing egregious error.


I beg to differ on this. Not reading the singlet state in that way is  
what makes you believe (egregiously?)  in action at a distance, which  
honestly is close to non-sense to me.


Bruno




Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 21/11/2017 12:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 18/11/2017 12:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Nov 2017, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/15/2017 7:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Nov 2017, at 21:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/14/2017 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Nov 2017, at 22:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 14/11/2017 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Nov 2017, at 23:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

What really annoys me is the continued claim that many  
worlds eliminates the need for non-locality. It does not,  
and neither Bruno nor anyone else has ever produced a  
valid argument as to how many worlds might restore locality.


But nobody has proved that there is non locality in the  
MWI. EPR-BELL proves non-locality apparant in each branch,  
but the MWI avoids the needs of action at a distance to  
explains them. Once Alice and Bob are space-separated,  
their identity are independent. It makes no sense to talk  
of each of them like if they were related, (unless you  
correlate them with a third observer, etc) If they do  
measurement, some God could see that they are indeed no  
more related, but if they decide to come back to place  
where they can compared locally their spin, they will  
always get contact to the corresponding observer with the  
well correlated spin. The independent Alice and Bob will  
never meet because they can't belong to the same branch of  
the multiverse, by the MWI of the singlet state. So Mitra  
is right. Although Bertlmann's socks are tyically not  
working for Bell's violation in a MONO-universe, it works  
again in the MWI, applied in this case to the whole singlet  
state.


Bell has proved non-locality in MWI, every bit as much as in  
each branch separately. You appear not to have grasped the  
significance of the scenario I have argued carefully. Alice  
and Bob are not space-like separated in the scenario I  
outlined. Alice and Bob are together in the same laboratory  
when the second measurement is made. They are necessarily in  
the same world before, and branch in together according to  
Bob's result. Your mumbo-jumbo about them only being able to  
meet in appropriate matching branches does not work here,  
because they are always in the same branch. And there is no  
reason to suppose that their results in some of those  
branches do not violate conservation of angular momentum.


I have no clue what you mean. The singlet state guaranties  
the conservation of angular momentum in all worlds. The  
singlet state describes an infinity of "worlds",  and in each  
of them there is conservation of angular momentum, and it has  
a local common cause origin, the same in all worlds.


But it's not a sufficient 'hidden' variable to explain the  
space-like correlation of measurements.


If the the explanation is based on hidden variable, per branch,  
then there will be non-locality. But the many universe are not  
really hidden variable in the sense of EPR-Bell's, which  
assumes Alice and Bob have the same identity and keep it, when  
they do the space-like measurement, but it seems to me that  
this is a wrong interpretation of the singlet state when we  
suppress any possible collapse. If Alice and Bob are space-like  
separated, they will later only access to the Bob and Alice  
they will locally be able to interact with, and those are "new"  
people, not the original couple.


But that's the point of Bruce's version in which the  
measurements are time-like.  Alice and Bob will have continuity  
of identity and, as he argues, the explanation for the  
correlation of results being stronger than classical must be the  
same.


But there are the same. The singlet state explains this too. The  
mystery is in the apparent space-like separation, where it looks  
like a physical action at a distance plays some role, except that  
this has not been proved in the MW theory.


Again you appeal to the 'apparent space-like separation'. As Brent  
said, the point of my time-like example was that there is no space- 
like separation at any time, so that escape is not available to you.


Without space-like separation, I don't see why invoke a physical  
action at a distance at all.


No, as I pointed out in my original post, a local hidden variable  
explanation for the time-like correlations is available.


I am not sure of this. A local theory can exist, but it will  
contradict QM.




That would mean no more than that QM is incomplete.


It means QM is false, given that QM entails space-like correlation.



The problem is that this explanation is not available in the space- 
like case, and you cannot use one explanation in one place when it  
doesn't work elsewhere.


OK. We agree.



When the singlet particles are produced before separation, they  
cannot know whether they are going to be measured at space-like or  
time-like separations: any hidden 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. 
 Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some 
 world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
 insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*

>>>
>>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>>> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
>>> he Schrodinger 
>>> ​Wave ​E
>>> quation 
>>> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
>>> somehow it does. ​
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone didn't 
>>> explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
>> based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, in 
>> this case in other worlds. *
>>
>>
>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the waves. 
>> It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption that the 
>> wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong for the 
>> macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) 
>> depending where you put the cut.
>>
>
> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
> realized.*
>
> What do you mean by realize? 
>

 *Realized = Measured. AG*

Without collapse, the measurement are described by the quantum laws. 
>

*That's precisely what QM doesn't describe, which constitutes part of the 
measurement problem. AG*

An observer along a superposition up + down, *is* the same state as the 
> observer along up superposed with the observer down, if he look in the {up 
> + down, up - down} basis, "he" will see he is in up+down, but if he looks 
> in the {up down} basis; the observer consciousness differentiate, in his 
> first person perspective, but the solution of the wave describes the two 
> outcomes realized from the point of view of each observer. You can't decide 
> to make one of them into a zombie. 
>

 *I have no idea what you mean. Please try again. AG*

> *So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG*
>
> I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware most people claims 
> Everett and Copenhagen are differet intepretations, but from a 
> metamathematical obvious view: Everett and Copenhagen are different 
> theories.
>

*They have identical postulates but Everett adds another non-trivial one as 
I indicated above; namely, that every possible measurement is realized, 
that is measured, in another world. I don't see why you insist on denying 
something so obvious. AG*
 

> Everett is the SWE, and Copenhagen is SWE + collapse. We might accept that 
> Everett theory has not yet justify all aspects of what could be the 
> physical reality (and provably so if we assume digital mechanism in 
> cognitive science), but, to be short, it is less crazy than any theory 
> making the collapse into a physical phenomenon.
>

 *Why crazy? What we seem to observe IS collapse; that is, all 
probabilities evolving to zero except the measured probability evolving to 
1, by an as-yet unknown physical process. AG  *

> *I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of the 
>> Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the possible universes 
>> finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will be, or have been, realized. 
>> AG*
>>
>>
>> OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state, 
>> many-worlds, etc.).
>>
>
> *Too much parsing! I was trying to explain that the Multiverse of String 
> Theory is manifestly *different* from the Many Worlds of the MWI. AG *
>
>
> Yes. you are right on this. In string theory with collapse (if this could 
> even make sense), you have 10^500 physical realities. In string theory 
> without collapse, you have (10^500 * Infinity) physical realities, at first 
> sight (with mechanism they are just "coherent dreams" (sigma_1 true 
> sentences seen in the Bp & ~Bf mode) by Numbers).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>> Bruno
>>
>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/21/2017 7:09 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 7:05 PM, Bruce Kellett 
>wrote:


​> ​
it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because it
cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. All
attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have
been shown to be circular


But Copenhagen is no better at deriving the Born Rule
​
nor is any other quantum interpretation
​
although Gleason's Theorem says that if the quantum wave function is 
related to probability then

​
the
​
square of the absolute value
​
is the only one that doesn't produce contradictions. So if you're 
going to have a probability rule involving the wave function its got 
to be the Born Rule, the function cubed or anything else just won't 
do. But the wave function itself is 100% deterministic so why involve 
probability at all?


Of course the obvious answer to that is, "It's what we observe." At 
first it was thought that it's the kind of randomness based on ignorance 
and some hidden variable would explain it.  But then it turned out the 
hidden variable would have be non-local.


Brent


I don't have a very good answer to that nor does anybody else
​,​
but the Many Worlds people have made a better stab at it than most:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7577

​ John K Clark​





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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 22/11/2017 2:24 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 6:21 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 22/11/2017 1:01 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 5:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 22/11/2017 12:06 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent 
because it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of 
probabilities. All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born 
rule in MWI have been shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a 
little more about this in his book.


Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic 
theory so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space 
predicts probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the 
Born rule.


I think there is an element of question begging in that.


He's explicitly assuming QM is a probabilistic theory.   That may be 
begging the question for the MWI believer who want it to be 
deterministic and so have to find an explanation for the "apparent" 
randomness.


It's question-begging because the fact that QM is a probabilistic 
theory is not part of the theory, as are the wave function and the 
SE. Probability may be part of Dirac's equipment, but then he does 
not invoke a wave function or the SE.


If you explicitly postulate it, it's not begging any question. It's 
just adding a postulate to make the theory usable...which is what Born 
did.


The point is arguable. Is it /ad hoc/, or /begging the question/? I 
suppose this is coloured by the advocates of MWI who claim that the 
theory is its own interpretation. In Bohr's CI, the Born Rule is 
definitely an /ad hoc/ addition, but then the whole theory was a bit /ad 
hoc/ at that stage.


In the final analysis it probably doesn't matter much, since all 
theories are /ad hoc/ to some extent.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/21/2017 6:21 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 22/11/2017 1:01 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 5:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 22/11/2017 12:06 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent 
because it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of 
probabilities. All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born 
rule in MWI have been shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little 
more about this in his book.


Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic 
theory so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space 
predicts probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the Born 
rule.


I think there is an element of question begging in that.


He's explicitly assuming QM is a probabilistic theory.   That may be 
begging the question for the MWI believer who want it to be 
deterministic and so have to find an explanation for the "apparent" 
randomness.


It's question-begging because the fact that QM is a probabilistic 
theory is not part of the theory, as are the wave function and the SE. 
Probability may be part of Dirac's equipment, but then he does not 
invoke a wave function or the SE.


If you explicitly postulate it, it's not begging any question.  It's 
just adding a postulate to make the theory usable...which is what Born did.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 7:05 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

​> ​
> it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because it cannot
> come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. All attempts to
> derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have been shown to be circular


But Copenhagen is no better at deriving the Born Rule
​
nor is any other quantum interpretation
​
although Gleason's Theorem says that if the quantum wave function is
related to probability then
​
the
​
square of the absolute value
​
is the only one that doesn't produce contradictions. So if you're going to
have a probability rule involving the wave function its got to be the Born
Rule, the function cubed or anything else just won't do. But the wave
function itself is 100% deterministic so why involve probability at all? I
don't have a very good answer to that nor does anybody else
​,​
but the Many Worlds people have made a better stab at it than most:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7577

​ John K Clark​

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

 



On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 2:48:33 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 22/11/2017 1:01 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: 
> > On 11/21/2017 5:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
> >> On 22/11/2017 12:06 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: 
> >>> On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
>  No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because 
>  it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. 
>  All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have 
>  been shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little more about this 
>  in his book. 
> >>> 
> >>> Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic 
> >>> theory so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space 
> >>> predicts probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the Born 
> >>> rule. 
> >> 
> >> I think there is an element of question begging in that. 
> > 
> > He's explicitly assuming QM is a probabilistic theory.   That may be 
> > begging the question for the MWI believer who want it to be 
> > deterministic and so have to find an explanation for the "apparent" 
> > randomness. 
>
> It's question-begging because the fact that QM is a probabilistic theory 
> is not part of the theory, as are the wave function and the SE. 
> Probability may be part of Dirac's equipment, but then he does not 
> invoke a wave function or the SE. 
>
> Bruce 
>

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 2:48:33 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 22/11/2017 1:01 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: 
> > On 11/21/2017 5:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
> >> On 22/11/2017 12:06 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: 
> >>> On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: 
>  No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because 
>  it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. 
>  All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have 
>  been shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little more about this 
>  in his book. 
> >>> 
> >>> Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic 
> >>> theory so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space 
> >>> predicts probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the Born 
> >>> rule. 
> >> 
> >> I think there is an element of question begging in that. 
> > 
> > He's explicitly assuming QM is a probabilistic theory.   That may be 
> > begging the question for the MWI believer who want it to be 
> > deterministic and so have to find an explanation for the "apparent" 
> > randomness. 
>
> It's question-begging because the fact that QM is a probabilistic theory 
> is not part of the theory, as are the wave function and the SE. 
> Probability may be part of Dirac's equipment, but then he does not 
> invoke a wave function or the SE. 
>
> Bruce 
>

Born's rule is one of the postulates of QM, so I don't see how you can deny 
that probability theory is part of QM. I can't recall how probabilities in 
QM are calculated in Dirac's relativistic theory. Maybe you meant the 
Heisenberg picture where there are no wave functions.  AG

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 22/11/2017 1:01 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 5:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 22/11/2017 12:06 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because 
it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. 
All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have 
been shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little more about this 
in his book.


Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic 
theory so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space 
predicts probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the Born 
rule.


I think there is an element of question begging in that.


He's explicitly assuming QM is a probabilistic theory.   That may be 
begging the question for the MWI believer who want it to be 
deterministic and so have to find an explanation for the "apparent" 
randomness.


It's question-begging because the fact that QM is a probabilistic theory 
is not part of the theory, as are the wave function and the SE. 
Probability may be part of Dirac's equipment, but then he does not 
invoke a wave function or the SE.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/21/2017 5:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 22/11/2017 12:06 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because 
it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. 
All attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have 
been shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little more about this in 
his book.


Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic 
theory so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space 
predicts probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the Born 
rule.


I think there is an element of question begging in that.


He's explicitly assuming QM is a probabilistic theory.   That may be 
begging the question for the MWI believer who want it to be 
deterministic and so have to find an explanation for the "apparent" 
randomness.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 22/11/2017 12:06 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because 
it cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. All 
attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have been 
shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little more about this in his 
book.


Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic 
theory so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space 
predicts probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the Born rule.


I think there is an element of question begging in that.

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/21/2017 2:36 PM, John Clark wrote:
It certainly seems to me, and Maudlin gave me no reason to think 
otherwise, that if things are not realistic, if a photon is neither 
horizontally nor vertically polarized until I measure it, if things 
don't fully exist till I observe it them

​,​
then things can be local, although I would be unable even in principle to
​determine
 with 100%
​certainty ​
what
​the​
 electron will do because that depends on what I do and I won't know 
what that is until I do it. 


"Realism" seems to be used to mean two different things.  One, is that 
everything with a measurable attribute has a specific value of that 
attribute before it is measured.  The other is that if two experimenters 
perform the same experiment they will observe the same thing regardless 
of what they think.  If the world is not deterministic this "same thing" 
may be a probability distribution instead of a single value.  The first 
is inconsistent with QM unless you expand the meaning of "thing" to be 
the wave function or Hilbert space ray and "specific value of attribute" 
to mean "specific probability distribution of an attribute".


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/21/2017 4:05 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because it 
cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. All 
attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have been 
shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little more about this in his book.


Omnes takes the very sensible position that QM is a probabilistic theory 
so it predicts probabilities.  if the QM of Hilbert space predicts 
probabilities, the probabilities must be those of the Born rule.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Lawrence Crowell]

The Leggett–Garg inequality is a form of the Bell inequality as the CHSH 
inequality. 

I would say that determinism and locality are related concepts. The two are 
joined sets with an overlap. It would be interesting to examine this.

LC

On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 4:36:51 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 12:22 AM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>  
>
>> ​>> ​
>>> AT LEAST one of the following properties of that theory must be untrue:
>>> 1) Determinism
>>> 2) Locality   
>>> 3) Realism
>>
>>
>> ​> ​
>> You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly 
>> true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:
>>
>> "Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out *determinism*, 
>> or *hidden variables*. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out, 
>> or at least calling in question, *realism*. But these are all mistakes. 
>> What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be 
>> impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but *locality, 
>> *in a perfectly clear sense*. *What Bell proved, and what theoretical 
>> physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is 
>> non-local."
>> ​ a ​
>>
>
>
> He's right, Bell didn't rule
> ​ 
> out determinism
> ​ 
> or realism,
> ​ 
> but if you insist on both there is a 
> ​high ​
> price that must be payed, non-locality
> ​;​
> but Maudlin
> ​ 
> can't seem to get a grip on Many worlds and can't decide if its a local 
> theory or not. And 
> ​B​
> ell isn't the only problem, we now know that the Leggett–Garg inequality
> ​ 
> is also violated and that means the non-locality must be even stranger. It 
> certainly seems to me, and Maudlin gave me no reason to think otherwise, 
> that if things are not realistic, if a photon is neither horizontally nor 
> vertically polarized until I measure it, if things don't fully exist till I 
> observe it them
> ​,​
> then things can be local, although I would be unable even in principle to 
> ​determine
>  with 100% 
> ​certainty ​
> what 
> ​the​
>  electron will do because that depends on what I do and I won't know what 
> that is until I do it.  
>
> He does mention the Superdeterminism
> ​ 
> loophole and I do admit you could have all 3 with that
> ​,​
> but its hard for me to take it seriously because the the initial 
> conditions of the universe would have to be in a very very very specific 
> and rare state. Maybe the conditions 13.8 billion years ago were set up in 
> such a way that today I had to 
> ​place​
>  my polarizing filter in a horizontal direction set up in such a way that 
> Bells inequality was violated but things are still local and realistic. 
> ​Maybe its pointless to even ask what would have happened it I had set it 
> vertically instead because there is no way I could have done it, it was 
> preordained 13.8 billion years ago that I would set it horizontally and 
> doing otherwise would violate​ the laws of deterministic physics. 
> Maybe the universe is a put up job set up just to fool us, but I doubt it.
>
> ​ John K Clark​
> 
>  
>
>
>>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 22/11/2017 9:36 am, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 12:22 AM, Bruce Kellett 
>wrote:


​ >> ​
AT LEAST one of the following properties of that theory must
be untrue:
1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism 



​ > ​
You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not
strictly true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:

"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out
/determinism/, or /hidden variables/. Nowadays, it is sometimes
reported as ruling out, or at least calling in question,
/realism/. But these are all mistakes. What Bell's theorem,
together with the experimental results, proves to be impossible is
not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but /locality, /in
a perfectly clear sense/. /What Bell proved, and what theoretical
physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world
itself is non-local."
​ a ​



He's right, Bell didn't rule
​
out determinism
​
or realism,
​
but if you insist on both there is a
​ high ​
price that must be payed, non-locality
​ ;​
but Maudlin
​
can't seem to get a grip on Many worlds and can't decide if its a 
local theory or not.


No, it seems that for Maudlin MWi is essentially incoherent because it 
cannot come to grips with a sensible account of probabilities. All 
attempts to derive probabilities and the Born rule in MWI have been 
shown to be circular. Maudlin talks a little more about this in his book.



And
​ B​
ell isn't the only problem, we now know that the Leggett–Garg inequality
​
is also violated and that means the non-locality must be even stranger.


I found the paper arxiv:0806.2037 largely incomprehensible. I do not 
know what the authors here mean by 'realism', much less 'crypto 
non-local realism'.


It certainly seems to me, and Maudlin gave me no reason to think 
otherwise, that if things are not realistic, if a photon is neither 
horizontally nor vertically polarized until I measure it, if things 
don't fully exist till I observe it them

​ ,​
then things can be local,


You mean that a local hidden variable account can be given in that case? 
Lapiedra et al. seem to suggest that Bohm's theory cannot work in their 
case, but I think their implementation of an 'arrow of time' 
consideration is not really aplicable in the case of space-like 
separation -- time order is not defined in that case, so there is no 
'arrow of time'.



although I would be unable even in principle to
​determine
 with 100%
​ certainty ​
what
​ the​
 electron will do because that depends on what I do and I won't know 
what that is until I do it.


He does mention the Superdeterminism
​
loophole and I do admit you could have all 3 with that
​ ,​
but its hard for me to take it seriously because the the initial 
conditions of the universe would have to be in a very very very 
specific and rare state. Maybe the conditions 13.8 billion years ago 
were set up in such a way that today I had to

​ place​
 my polarizing filter in a horizontal direction set up in such a way 
that Bells inequality was violated but things are still local and 
realistic.
​ Maybe its pointless to even ask what would have happened it I had 
set it vertically instead because there is no way I could have done 
it, it was preordained 13.8 billion years ago that I would set it 
horizontally and doing otherwise would violate​ the laws of 
deterministic physics.

Maybe the universe is a put up job set up just to fool us, but I doubt it.


I agree that superdeterminism as suggested by 't Hooft is contrived, and 
very unlikely to be the case in reality.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 12:22 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:


> ​>> ​
>> AT LEAST one of the following properties of that theory must be untrue:
>> 1) Determinism
>> 2) Locality
>> 3) Realism
>
>
> ​> ​
> You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly
> true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:
>
> "Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out *determinism*,
> or *hidden variables*. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out,
> or at least calling in question, *realism*. But these are all mistakes.
> What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be
> impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but *locality,
> *in a perfectly clear sense*. *What Bell proved, and what theoretical
> physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is
> non-local."
> ​ a ​
>


He's right, Bell didn't rule
​
out determinism
​
or realism,
​
but if you insist on both there is a
​high ​
price that must be payed, non-locality
​;​
but Maudlin
​
can't seem to get a grip on Many worlds and can't decide if its a local
theory or not. And
​B​
ell isn't the only problem, we now know that the Leggett–Garg inequality
​
is also violated and that means the non-locality must be even stranger. It
certainly seems to me, and Maudlin gave me no reason to think otherwise,
that if things are not realistic, if a photon is neither horizontally nor
vertically polarized until I measure it, if things don't fully exist till I
observe it them
​,​
then things can be local, although I would be unable even in principle to
​determine
 with 100%
​certainty ​
what
​the​
 electron will do because that depends on what I do and I won't know what
that is until I do it.

He does mention the Superdeterminism
​
loophole and I do admit you could have all 3 with that
​,​
but its hard for me to take it seriously because the the initial conditions
of the universe would have to be in a very very very specific and rare
state. Maybe the conditions 13.8 billion years ago were set up in such a
way that today I had to
​place​
 my polarizing filter in a horizontal direction set up in such a way that
Bells inequality was violated but things are still local and realistic.
​Maybe its pointless to even ask what would have happened it I had set it
vertically instead because there is no way I could have done it, it was
preordained 13.8 billion years ago that I would set it horizontally and
doing otherwise would violate​ the laws of deterministic physics.
Maybe the universe is a put up job set up just to fool us, but I doubt it.

​ John K Clark​




>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Tue, Nov 21, 2017 at 1:36 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:


.
>> ​>> ​
>> Does non locality mean the future influences the past as Clark alleged?
>
>
> ​> ​
> No.
>

*​"​realism plus arrow of time preservation and quantum mechanics are not
compatible. In other words, quantum mechanics cannot be completed with any
(local or non-local) hidden variables, provide we assume the common sense
of the arrow of time.​"*

https://arxiv.org/abs/0806.2037​


​John K Clark​






>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world. ​ ​ I see no reason for this assumption  
other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid  
"collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because ​there is  
absolutely nothing in ​t he Schrodinger ​Wave ​E quation ​  
about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume  
that somehow it does. ​


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements  
MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of  
measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will  
be realized.


What do you mean by realize? Without collapse, the measurement are  
described by the quantum laws. An observer along a superposition up +  
down, *is* the same state as the observer along up superposed with the  
observer down, if he look in the {up + down, up - down} basis, "he"  
will see he is in up+down, but if he looks in the {up down} basis; the  
observer consciousness differentiate, in his first person perspective,  
but the solution of the wave describes the two outcomes realized from  
the point of view of each observer. You can't decide to make one of  
them into a zombie.






So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG


I disagree, and Everett would disagree. I am aware most people claims  
Everett and Copenhagen are differet intepretations, but from a  
metamathematical obvious view: Everett and Copenhagen are different  
theories. Everett is the SWE, and Copenhagen is SWE + collapse. We  
might accept that Everett theory has not yet justify all aspects of  
what could be the physical reality (and provably so if we assume  
digital mechanism in cognitive science), but, to be short, it is less  
crazy than any theory making the collapse into a physical phenomenon.







I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of  
the Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the  
possible universes finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will  
be, or have been, realized. AG


OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state,  
many-worlds, etc.).


Too much parsing! I was trying to explain that the Multiverse of  
String Theory is manifestly *different* from the Many Worlds of the  
MWI. AG


Yes. you are right on this. In string theory with collapse (if this  
could even make sense), you have 10^500 physical realities. In string  
theory without collapse, you have (10^500 * Infinity) physical  
realities, at first sight (with mechanism they are just "coherent  
dreams" (sigma_1 true sentences seen in the Bp & ~Bf mode) by Numbers).


Bruno






Bruno

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Brent Meeker]

On 11/20/2017 10:36 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
I meant it as you say. Does non locality mean the future influences 
the past as Clark alleged?


No.


FTL influence between distant events A and B entails that in some 
reference frames A is before B and in others B is before A.  The 
relativity of simultaneity.  The randomness of QM prevents using its 
non-locality from signaling via any FTL influence.  So it kinda depends 
on what you mean by "influence".


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Nov 20, 2017 at 9:38 PM,  wrote:

​> ​
> Due to the uncertainty principle, it's impossible to know the exact state
> of any measuring device or any system being measured.
>

​Yes that's what the uncertainty principle says, the better you  know an
electron's position the worse you know its velocity, but it is not a law of
logic, Heisenberg was assuming that Quantum Mechanics is correct and that
we know all the forces that are acting on the electron. Bell did something
much more general, Bell didn't assume Quantum Mechanics was correct and in
fact his original paper had no Quantum Mechanics in it, just logic and high
school mathematics. Bell was not talking about any specific theory but
instead asked the question  "If the inequality is violated what general
properties must ANY theory that successfully explains the experimental
results have to have and what properties must it not have?". The answer
that Bell found was that it couldn't be deterministic, local and realistic;
AT LEAST one of those 3 things would have to go.  When Bell wrote the paper
he didn't even know if the inequality was violated or not because the
experiment was difficult and had not been done yet.


> ​> ​
> This means that no theory of micro reality can be deterministic or
> realistic,
>

No
​, we might someday get a theory that is both
​ ​
deterministic
​and​
 realistic
​, but Bell tells us it would have to invoke non-local forces. And then the
Leggett–Garg inequality
​ was developed and a few years later it was found experimentally that it
is violated too, and that places further restraints on the nature of those
non-local forces; not only must their strength be undiminished by distance
and operate faster than light but they must also be abel to move against
the arrow of time,  that is to say the future must be able to effect the
past. ​Neither distance in space nor distance in time (in either direction)
lessen the ability of these odd non-local forces to effect things.


> ​> ​
> and this shows (without appealing to Bell experiment results) that hidden
> variables cannot exist to know such states if one agrees that the UP is
> operating.
> ​ ​
> So it's not that God plays dice with the universe; rather, it's impossible *in
> principle* to predict the outcome of any micro experiment.
>

​If things are realistic then an unmeasured electron is either spin up or
spin down, it doesn't matter if we know what it is the important thing is
that God knows, and He knows its spinning in one and only one way. But
since things are realistic then even God can't determine what the electron
will do next with 100% certainty unless He uses one of those very very
weird non-local forces.  ​

 John K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 8:45 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Tue, 21 Nov 2017 at 12:27 pm, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 21/11/2017 11:37 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:


And exactly what is it that you claim has not been
proved in MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there
too: it has never been proved that it does not.
Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that
provided an escape from his theorem, he would have
addressed the issue. The fact that he did not
suggests strongly that you do not have a case.


Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the
experimental results would be the same in MWI, but the
FTL weirdness is eliminated. This is because in MWI the
experimenter can’t prepare a random state,


What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there
are no free variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?


Yes.


As far as I know, the only serious advocate of
superdeterminism as an account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim
Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's arguments in a long exchange with
him on Facebook:

https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398

Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of
conspiracies that would be required in the general case would
be such, that if they were generalized, they would render
science and experimental confirmation of theories meaningless.

I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the
implication that superdeterminism says that all our
scientific theories are necessarily incomplete,
superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything,
since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.


Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:

--quote--
Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements
made far apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate
his inequality if the world is local. But this requires that the
measurements have results in order that there be the requisite
correlations. What if no “measurement” ever has a unique result
at all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur? What would it
even mean to say that in such a situation there is some
correlation among the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is,
of course, the idea of the Many Worlds interpretation. It does
not refute Bell’s analysis, but rather moots it: in this picture,
phenomena in the physical world do not, after all, display
correlations between distant experiments that violate Bell’s
inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. Indeed, the world
does not actually conform to the predictions of quantum theory at
all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts of
experiments have single unique outcomes, which correspond to
eigenvalues), it just seems that way. So Bell’s result cannot get
a grip on this theory.
--endquote--

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf


It is a pity that you did not complete the quotation
Immediately following the passage you quote above, Maulin says:

"That does not prove that Many Worlds is local: it just shows that
Bell's result does not prove that it isn't local. In order to even
address the question of the locality of Many Worlds a tremendous
amount of interpretive work has to be done. This is not the place
to attempt such a task."


Well yes, it could be that there are other reasons why MWI is not 
local, but Maudlin agrees that EPR is not one of them.


That is neither an accurate nor a fair characterization of what Maudlin 
says. He repeats some of the suggestions that have been made for 
considering that Bell's theorem may not apply to MWI, and more or less 
accepts them without analysis. His only comment really is that a lot 
more work needs to be done to determine whether or not the criticisms of 
Bell and Many Worlds can be justified. Maudlin does not, however, 
suggest that EPR experiments do not establish non-locality in MWI, 
independent of Bell's theorem. He leaves the question open; for further 
investigation. I have shown by means of an explicit 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 21 Nov 2017 at 12:27 pm, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 21/11/2017 11:37 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>
>>> On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett <
>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>

 And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW theory?
 Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never been proved that it does
 not. Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an escape
 from his theorem, he would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did
 not suggests strongly that you do not have a case.

>>>
>>> Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results would
>>> be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated. This is because in
>>> MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random state,
>>>
>>>
>>> What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free
>>> variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?
>>>
>>
>> Yes.
>>
>>
>> As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as an
>> account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's arguments
>> in a long exchange with him on Facebook:
>>
>> https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398
>>
>> Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies that
>> would be required in the general case would be such, that if they were
>> generalized, they would render science and experimental confirmation of
>> theories meaningless.
>>
>> I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication that
>> superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are necessarily
>> incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything,
>> since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.
>>
>
> Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:
>
> --quote--
> Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements made far
> apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate his inequality if
> the world is local. But this requires that the measurements have results in
> order that there be the requisite correlations. What if no “measurement”
> ever has a unique result at all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur?
> What would it even mean to say that in such a situation there is some
> correlation among the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is, of course,
> the idea of the Many Worlds interpretation. It does not refute Bell’s
> analysis, but rather moots it: in this picture, phenomena in the physical
> world do not, after all, display correlations between distant experiments
> that violate Bell’s inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. Indeed,
> the world does not actually conform to the predictions of quantum theory at
> all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts of experiments have
> single unique outcomes, which correspond to eigenvalues), it just seems
> that way. So Bell’s result cannot get a grip on this theory.
> --endquote--
>
> https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf
>
>
> It is a pity that you did not complete the quotation Immediately
> following the passage you quote above, Maulin says:
>
> "That does not prove that Many Worlds is local: it just shows that Bell's
> result does not prove that it isn't local. In order to even address the
> question of the locality of Many Worlds a tremendous amount of interpretive
> work has to be done. This is not the place to attempt such a task."
>

Well yes, it could be that there are other reasons why MWI is not local,
but Maudlin agrees that EPR is not one of them.

Thde misrepresentation of Maudlin's position appears to be quite common in
> the Many Worlds community. I don't think Maudlin is completely correct in
> his idea that Bell' result cannot get a grip on the theory -- it can if one
> understands many worlds in terms of superpositions of possible outcomes.
> But that is by the way. What I have presented is a concrete counterexample
> to the contention that Many Worlds is local. Maudlin does not consider this
> counterexample, so that does rather render his comments on MWI moot!
>
>
> Bruce
>
> --
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 5:24 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:50:35 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On 21/11/2017 4:38 pm, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​
The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of
ANY theory to be compatible with experimental results, and
one of those experiments shows the violation of Bell's
Inequality. And that violation tells us that for ANY theory
to be successful at explaining how the world works AT LEAST
one of the following properties of that theory must be untrue:

1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is
not strictly true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:

"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out
/determinism/, or /hidden variables/. Nowadays, it is
sometimes reported as ruling out, or at least calling in
question, /realism/. But these are all mistakes. What Bell's
theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be
impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism,
but /locality, /in a perfectly clear sense/. /What Bell
proved, and what theoretical physics has not yet properly
absorbed, is that the physical world itself is non-local."


Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG


It doesn't 'beg the question'! It might raise the question

Non-local means that disturbing one particle of the singlet
influences the other, at a distance and instantaneously. Read
Maudlin to find out more about what these terms mean.

Bruce


There's an ambiguity in English as to what "beg the question" means.


Not really. Look up Wikipedia for /petitio principii/. It is not 
ambiguous -- just often misused.


I meant it as you say. Does non locality mean the future influences 
the past as Clark alleged?


No.


Does it mean the non existence of local hidden variables?


Yes.

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:50:35 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 21/11/2017 4:38 pm, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: 
>>
>> On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:
>>
>>
>> ​
>> The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum Mechanics, 
>> but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY theory to be 
>> compatible with experimental results, and one of those experiments shows 
>> the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that violation tells us that for 
>> ANY theory to be successful at explaining how the world works AT LEAST one 
>> of the following properties of that theory must be untrue: 
>>
>> 1) Determinism
>> 2) Locality   
>> 3) Realism
>>
>>
>> You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly 
>> true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:
>>
>> "Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out *determinism*, 
>> or *hidden variables*. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out, 
>> or at least calling in question, *realism*. But these are all mistakes. 
>> What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be 
>> impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but *locality, 
>> *in a perfectly clear sense*. *What Bell proved, and what theoretical 
>> physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is 
>> non-local."
>>
>
> Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG
>
>
> It doesn't 'beg the question'! It might raise the question
>
> Non-local means that disturbing one particle of the singlet influences the 
> other, at a distance and instantaneously. Read Maudlin to find out more 
> about what these terms mean.
>
> Bruce
>

There's an ambiguity in English as to what "beg the question" means. I 
meant it as you say. Does non locality mean the future influences the past 
as Clark alleged? Does it mean the non existence of local hidden variables? 
Will read Maudlin. AG 

>
>
>> This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, arxiv:1408.1826 
>> He says the same thing in his book and numerous other articles where he 
>> spells this out in considerable detail.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 4:38 pm, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:

On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​
The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY
theory to be compatible with experimental results, and one of
those experiments shows the violation of Bell's Inequality. And
that violation tells us that for ANY theory to be successful at
explaining how the world works AT LEAST one of the following
properties of that theory must be untrue:

1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not
strictly true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:

"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out
/determinism/, or /hidden variables/. Nowadays, it is sometimes
reported as ruling out, or at least calling in question,
/realism/. But these are all mistakes. What Bell's theorem,
together with the experimental results, proves to be impossible is
not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but /locality, /in
a perfectly clear sense/. /What Bell proved, and what theoretical
physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world
itself is non-local."


Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG


It doesn't 'beg the question'! It might raise the question

Non-local means that disturbing one particle of the singlet influences 
the other, at a distance and instantaneously. Read Maudlin to find out 
more about what these terms mean.


Bruce



This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin,
arxiv:1408.1826 He says the same thing in his book and numerous
other articles where he spells this out in considerable detail.

Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 10:22:44 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>
> On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> ​
> The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum Mechanics, 
> but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY theory to be 
> compatible with experimental results, and one of those experiments shows 
> the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that violation tells us that for 
> ANY theory to be successful at explaining how the world works AT LEAST one 
> of the following properties of that theory must be untrue: 
>
> 1) Determinism
> 2) Locality   
> 3) Realism
>
>
> You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly 
> true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:
>
> "Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out *determinism*, 
> or *hidden variables*. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out, 
> or at least calling in question, *realism*. But these are all mistakes. 
> What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to be 
> impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but *locality, 
> *in a perfectly clear sense*. *What Bell proved, and what theoretical 
> physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical world itself is 
> non-local."
>

Which begs the question; operationally, what does non local mean? AG

>
> This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, arxiv:1408.1826 
> He says the same thing in his book and numerous other articles where he 
> spells this out in considerable detail.
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 12/11/2017 4:34 am, John Clark wrote:


​
The title of this thread is about the consistency of Quantum 
Mechanics, but far more important than QM is the ability of ANY theory 
to be compatible with experimental results, and one of those 
experiments shows the violation of Bell's Inequality. And that 
violation tells us that for ANY theory to be successful at explaining 
how the world works AT LEAST one of the following properties of that 
theory must be untrue:


1) Determinism
2) Locality
3) Realism


You have repeated this claim several times, John, but it is not strictly 
true. Maudlin summarizes it like this:


"Early on, Bell's result was often reported as ruling out /determinism/, 
or /hidden variables/. Nowadays, it is sometimes reported as ruling out, 
or at least calling in question, /realism/. But these are all mistakes. 
What Bell's theorem, together with the experimental results, proves to 
be impossible is not determinism or hidden variables or realism, but 
/locality, /in a perfectly clear sense/. /What Bell proved, and what 
theoretical physics has not yet properly absorbed, is that the physical 
world itself is non-local."


This is from the article Stathis pointed to: Tim Maudlin, 
arxiv:1408.1826 He says the same thing in his book and numerous other 
articles where he spells this out in considerable detail.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, November 10, 2017 at 12:46:09 PM UTC-7, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Nov 9, 2017 at 10:43 AM,  
> wrote:
>
> ​> ​
>> If the measurement problem were solved in the sense being able to predict 
>> exact outcomes,
>>
>
> ​That's not the measurement problem, its determining if how and why 
> observation effects things. ​
>
> ​> ​
>> thus making QM a deterministic theory, would that imply an INCONSISTENCY 
>> in the postulates of QM?
>>
>
> ​It's not just Quantum Mechanics, Bell proved that any theory that is 
> deterministic must ​be nonlocal or non realistic or both, otherwise it 
> would be inconsistent with experimental results. 
>
>  John K Clark 
>

Due to the uncertainty principle, it's impossible to know the exact state 
of any measuring device or any system being measured. This means that no 
theory of micro reality can be deterministic or realistic, and this shows 
(without appealing to Bell experiment results) that hidden variables cannot 
exist to know such states if one agrees that the UP is operating. So it's 
not that God plays dice with the universe; rather, it's impossible *in 
principle* to predict the outcome of any micro experiment. Hence, we are 
forced to develop probabilistic theories of micro reality. Do you agree, 
and if so, how does this effect our understanding of Bell experiments and 
non locality? AG

>
>
>
>
>  
>
>
>
>

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 11:37 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:

On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:


And exactly what is it that you claim has not been
proved in MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there too:
it has never been proved that it does not. Bell was no
fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an
escape from his theorem, he would have addressed the
issue. The fact that he did not suggests strongly that
you do not have a case.


Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental
results would be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is
eliminated. This is because in MWI the experimenter can’t
prepare a random state,


What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no
free variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?


Yes.


As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as
an account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't
Hooft's arguments in a long exchange with him on Facebook:

https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398


Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies
that would be required in the general case would be such, that if
they were generalized, they would render science and experimental
confirmation of theories meaningless.

I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication
that superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are
necessarily incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an
explanation of anything, since anything you observe can be
explained away in this way.


Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:

--quote--
Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements made far 
apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate his 
inequality if the world is local. But this requires that the 
measurements have results in order that there be the requisite 
correlations. What if no “measurement” ever has a unique result at 
all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur? What would it even 
mean to say that in such a situation there is some correlation among 
the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is, of course, the idea of 
the Many Worlds interpretation. It does not refute Bell’s analysis, 
but rather moots it: in this picture, phenomena in the physical world 
do not, after all, display correlations between distant experiments 
that violate Bell’s inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. 
Indeed, the world does not actually conform to the predictions of 
quantum theory at all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts 
of experiments have single unique outcomes, which correspond to 
eigenvalues), it just seems that way. So Bell’s result cannot get a 
grip on this theory.

--endquote--

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf


It is a pity that you did not complete the quotation Immediately 
following the passage you quote above, Maulin says:


"That does not prove that Many Worlds is local: it just shows that 
Bell's result does not prove that it isn't local. In order to even 
address the question of the locality of Many Worlds a tremendous amount 
of interpretive work has to be done. This is not the place to attempt 
such a task."


Thde misrepresentation of Maudlin's position appears to be quite common 
in the Many Worlds community. I don't think Maudlin is completely 
correct in his idea that Bell' result cannot get a grip on the theory -- 
it can if one understands many worlds in terms of superpositions of 
possible outcomes. But that is by the way. What I have presented is a 
concrete counterexample to the contention that Many Worlds is local. 
Maudlin does not consider this counterexample, so that does rather 
render his comments on MWI moot!


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 21 November 2017 at 08:53, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW theory?
>>> Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never been proved that it does
>>> not. Bell was no fool: he did not like MWI, but if that provided an escape
>>> from his theorem, he would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did
>>> not suggests strongly that you do not have a case.
>>>
>>
>> Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results would be
>> the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated. This is because in
>> MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random state,
>>
>>
>> What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free
>> variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
> As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as an
> account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's arguments
> in a long exchange with him on Facebook:
>
> https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398
>
> Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies that would
> be required in the general case would be such, that if they were
> generalized, they would render science and experimental confirmation of
> theories meaningless.
>
> I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication that
> superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are necessarily
> incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything,
> since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.
>

Maudlin also says this about EPR, Bell and MWI:

--quote--
Finally, there is one big idea. Bell showed that measurements made far
apart cannot regularly display correlations that violate his inequality if
the world is local. But this requires that the measurements have results in
order that there be the requisite correlations. What if no “measurement”
ever has a unique result at all; what if all the “possible outcomes” occur?
What would it even mean to say that in such a situation there is some
correlation among the “outcomes of these measurements”? This is, of course,
the idea of the Many Worlds interpretation. It does not refute Bell’s
analysis, but rather moots it: in this picture, phenomena in the physical
world do not, after all, display correlations between distant experiments
that violate Bell’s inequality, somehow it just seems that they do. Indeed,
the world does not actually conform to the predictions of quantum theory at
all (in particular, the prediction that these sorts of experiments have
single unique outcomes, which correspond to eigenvalues), it just seems
that way. So Bell’s result cannot get a grip on this theory.
--endquote--

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1408/1408.1826.pdf

> But for Bell-type experiments in MWI, or elsewhere, one does not have to
>> prepare a random state -- one just prepares a singlet state consisting of
>> two entangled particles. Nothing random about it.
>>
>
> Then one makes a measurement, the outcome of which is uncertain until it
> is done, but - surprisingly - the distal particle seems to “know” about it
> instantaneously. In the MWI there is no uncertainty about the measurement
> in the multiverse as a whole, although there is uncertainty from the point
> of view of individual observers, because they do not know in which branch
> they will end up in.
>
> Bell actually thought that Bohm's deterministic, though non-local, theory
>> was a better bet. But you have not addressed my counterexample to your
>> contention that MWI eliminates non-locality. The time-like measurement of
>> the two entangled particles clearly requires non-locality in order to
>> conserve angular momentum.
>>
>
> There is no question of the distal entangled particle instantaneously
> reacting to a measurement of the proximal particle to conserve angular
> momentum, because the outcome of the measurement was already fixed.
>
>
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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 12:36 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:18, Bruce Kellett wrote:


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local.


I am not sure what that means, but I can imagine this could make sense 
in the "one-world" hypothesis, not much in many-worlds, still less in 
many-computations.


The singlet state is intrinsically non-local because it involves two 
particles without specifying any particular separation. Because the 
singlet requires both particles, it is clearly non-separable -- it 
cannot be explained by the purely local properties of the individual 
particles. Non-separability means that changing one of the particles 
influences the other 'instantaneously'. That is non-locality.


A simple argument is that any experimental set-up showing a 
non-locality can be simulated by a classical (local) computer, and the 
simulated observer(s), like all the Bob-Alice pair we get, will all 
(the majority) describe an apparent non-locality, despite we, looking 
patiently at the whole emulation will see that there are none.


That argument has been debunked by Brunner et al, arxiv:1303.2849


It actually has nothing to do with whether people meet or not - it 
describes a situation which explicitly violates Einstein's notion of 
local realism: the state of one of the entangled pair is not 
separable from the state of the other distant particle. 
Non-separability here implies non-local influence, or simple 
non-locality. The attempt to claim that non-separability does not 
imply non-locality is mere verbal gymnastics, with no physical content.


The singlet state does not describe one pair, but an infinity of 
pairs, having spin (say) in all directions, but correlated in all the 
case verifiable by Bob and Alice when they can interact. I would say.


That is a complete misrepresentation of the situation. Only one pair is 
necessary. You are confusing 'pairs' with the rotational symmetry of the 
singlet state, and that is your continuing egregious error.


Bruce

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 21/11/2017 12:22 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Nov 2017, at 23:11, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 18/11/2017 12:04 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 15 Nov 2017, at 22:10, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/15/2017 7:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Nov 2017, at 21:15, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 11/14/2017 6:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Nov 2017, at 22:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 14/11/2017 2:07 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Nov 2017, at 23:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:

What really annoys me is the continued claim that many worlds 
eliminates the need for non-locality. It does not, and 
neither Bruno nor anyone else has ever produced a valid 
argument as to how many worlds might restore locality.


But nobody has proved that there is non locality in the MWI. 
EPR-BELL proves non-locality apparant in each branch, but the 
MWI avoids the needs of action at a distance to explains them. 
Once Alice and Bob are space-separated, their identity are 
independent. It makes no sense to talk of each of them like if 
they were related, (unless you correlate them with a third 
observer, etc) If they do measurement, some God could see that 
they are indeed no more related, but if they decide to come 
back to place where they can compared locally their spin, they 
will always get contact to the corresponding observer with the 
well correlated spin. The independent Alice and Bob will never 
meet because they can't belong to the same branch of the 
multiverse, by the MWI of the singlet state. So Mitra is 
right. Although Bertlmann's socks are tyically not working for 
Bell's violation in a MONO-universe, it works again in the 
MWI, applied in this case to the whole singlet state.


Bell has proved non-locality in MWI, every bit as much as in 
each branch separately. You appear not to have grasped the 
significance of the scenario I have argued carefully. Alice and 
Bob are not space-like separated in the scenario I outlined. 
Alice and Bob are together in the same laboratory when the 
second measurement is made. They are necessarily in the same 
world before, and branch in together according to Bob's result. 
Your mumbo-jumbo about them only being able to meet in 
appropriate matching branches does not work here, because they 
are always in the same branch. And there is no reason to 
suppose that their results in some of those branches do not 
violate conservation of angular momentum.


I have no clue what you mean. The singlet state guaranties the 
conservation of angular momentum in all worlds. The singlet 
state describes an infinity of "worlds",  and in each of them 
there is conservation of angular momentum, and it has a local 
common cause origin, the same in all worlds.


But it's not a sufficient 'hidden' variable to explain the 
space-like correlation of measurements.


If the the explanation is based on hidden variable, per branch, 
then there will be non-locality. But the many universe are not 
really hidden variable in the sense of EPR-Bell's, which assumes 
Alice and Bob have the same identity and keep it, when they do the 
space-like measurement, but it seems to me that this is a wrong 
interpretation of the singlet state when we suppress any possible 
collapse. If Alice and Bob are space-like separated, they will 
later only access to the Bob and Alice they will locally be able 
to interact with, and those are "new" people, not the original 
couple.


But that's the point of Bruce's version in which the measurements 
are time-like.  Alice and Bob will have continuity of identity and, 
as he argues, the explanation for the correlation of results being 
stronger than classical must be the same.


But there are the same. The singlet state explains this too. The 
mystery is in the apparent space-like separation, where it looks 
like a physical action at a distance plays some role, except that 
this has not been proved in the MW theory.


Again you appeal to the 'apparent space-like separation'. As Brent 
said, the point of my time-like example was that there is no 
space-like separation at any time, so that escape is not available to 
you.


Without space-like separation, I don't see why invoke a physical 
action at a distance at all.


No, as I pointed out in my original post, a local hidden variable 
explanation for the time-like correlations is available. That would mean 
no more than that QM is incomplete. The problem is that this explanation 
is not available in the space-like case, and you cannot use one 
explanation in one place when it doesn't work elsewhere. When the 
singlet particles are produced before separation, they cannot know 
whether they are going to be measured at space-like or time-like 
separations: any hidden variables that are going to explain the 
correlations by some common cause mechanism have to be set in place from 
the start. That is ruled out by simple logic given the time-like 
violations of angular momentum conservation.


And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in MW 

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On 20/11/2017 11:42 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Sun, 19 Nov 2017 at 8:35 am, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:


On 19/11/2017 12:15 am, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Sat, 18 Nov 2017 at 9:11 am, Bruce Kellett
> wrote:


And exactly what is it that you claim has not been proved in
MW theory? Bell's theorem applies there too: it has never
been proved that it does not. Bell was no fool: he did not
like MWI, but if that provided an escape from his theorem, he
would have addressed the issue. The fact that he did not
suggests strongly that you do not have a case.


Bell’s theory applies in the sense that the experimental results
would be the same in MWI, but the FTL weirdness is eliminated.
This is because in MWI the experimenter can’t prepare a random
state,


What do you mean by this? Are you claiming that there are no free
variables in MWI? Some form of superdeterminism?


Yes.


As far as I know, the only serious advocate of superdeterminism as an 
account of QM is Gerard 't Hooft. Tim Maudlin analysed 't Hooft's 
arguments in a long exchange with him on Facebook:


https://www.facebook.com/tim.maudlin/posts/10155670157528398

Maudlin's arguments was basically that the type of conspiracies that 
would be required in the general case would be such, that if they were 
generalized, they would render science and experimental confirmation of 
theories meaningless.


I think Maudlin is quite right here. Apart from the implication that 
superdeterminism says that all our scientific theories are necessarily 
incomplete, superdeterminism is not really an explanation of anything, 
since anything you observe can be explained away in this way.


Bruce




But for Bell-type experiments in MWI, or elsewhere, one does not
have to prepare a random state -- one just prepares a singlet
state consisting of two entangled particles. Nothing random about it.


Then one makes a measurement, the outcome of which is uncertain until 
it is done, but - surprisingly - the distal particle seems to “know” 
about it instantaneously. In the MWI there is no uncertainty about the 
measurement in the multiverse as a whole, although there is 
uncertainty from the point of view of individual observers, because 
they do not know in which branch they will end up in.


Bell actually thought that Bohm's deterministic, though non-local,
theory was a better bet. But you have not addressed my
counterexample to your contention that MWI eliminates
non-locality. The time-like measurement of the two entangled
particles clearly requires non-locality in order to conserve
angular momentum.


There is no question of the distal entangled particle instantaneously 
reacting to a measurement of the proximal particle to conserve angular 
momentum, because the outcome of the measurement was already fixed.




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> * ​> ​ I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the MWI. 
>>> Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in some 
>>> world. ​ ​ **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
>>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>>
>>
>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>> ​there is absolutely nothing in ​t
>> he Schrodinger 
>> ​Wave ​E
>> quation 
>> ​ about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
>> somehow it does. ​
>>
>>
>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone didn't 
>> explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name indicates, 
> based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be measured, in 
> this case in other worlds. *
>
>
> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the waves. 
> It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption that the 
> wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong for the 
> macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) 
> depending where you put the cut.
>

*CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
realized. So I see an additional assumption in the MWI.  AG*

*I reject this hypothesis. What I do concede is that in the case of the 
> Multiverse of String Theory, if time is infinite and the possible universes 
> finite -- 10^500 -- all possible universes will be, or have been, realized. 
> AG*
>
>
> OK, but that is not Everett-Deustch "multiverse" (relative state, 
> many-worlds, etc.).
>

*Too much parsing! I was trying to explain that the Multiverse of String 
Theory is manifestly *different* from the Many Worlds of the MWI. AG *

>
> Bruno
>

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