Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote: I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. What would that mean precisely? It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one David Deutsch, but I am not sure the david deutsch can be OK with this, especially after differentiation. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 1 November 2014 04:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 31 Oct 2014, at 01:34, LizR wrote: I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. What would that mean precisely? It would entail that there are a lot of david deutsch, but only one David Deutsch, but I am not sure the david deutsch can be OK with this, especially after differentiation. I think it means DD (or dd) has reified the wave function. Hence a photon we detect is part of a larger object described by the wave function (with no probabilities involved). He calls the larger, more multiversal version a Photon. IIRC. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:35, meekerdb wrote: On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat (measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in the superposition history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead. Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of the superposition can ever disappear. The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into the environmental degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate classical worlds. My point is that superposition is not a defining attribute of different worlds, it's relative incoherence so subspaces. I have no problem with that. And despite Everett's own opinion on this, I think it was a good idea to call that the relative state theory, instead of the many worlds, which can lead to naïve view of multiple aristotelian worlds, which would be doing the aristotelian error an infinity of times. In arithmetic also, all we have are the relative states, and their relative measures. (cf the ASSA/RSSA old discussion, a recurrent theme on the list). I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). What is his position on Everett? (2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum mechanics is, “OK, but do all these branches of the wavefunction really exist? or are they just mathematical constructs used to calculate probabilities?” Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don’t. Many worlders, when wise avoid the questions, they do exist in the formalism, so if the tehiry is correct, they can't just simply disappear. But it is false or ambiguous to say that the Copenhagenists would say they don't believe that they exist. They believe indeed that one of them exist! That is why they need a mechanism to make disappearing some term in the wave, and they invented the collapse, which is simply a way to say that they believe that QM does not apply to them, or the measuring apparatus, or consciousness, etc. They did not find any evidence that there is a
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 29 Oct 2014, at 22:46, meekerdb wrote: On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's involved in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion. (Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.) Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory) which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one. I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 0.1% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.) That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split. Does the 0.01% imply that the world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of which you have a milkshape? Or does it require that it must split 1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one. I think Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many threads thru the occasion of your whim. But this is different compared to the Helsinki/Moscow/Washington thought experiment. In that case the Moscow and Washington guys are created. But in the UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist timelessly. In the DeWitt-Wheeler equation, time disappears too. In the WM- duplication, guys are created relatively to you, and *that* happens infinitely often in the UD-computations. Like Einstein said, time is an illusion, although a persistent one. Neither Everett, nor Deutsch, nor computationalism solved all problem, we just get the tools to formulate them. Wise many-worlders will not pretend that no collapse explains all weirdness. They just feel like the collapse itself is just too much weird than to be accepted. Here too I am close to Einstein view: I don't see what it could mean to abandon 3p- determinacy and 3p- locality in the physical realm I think we know exactly what it means - it means Copenhagen: randomness and non-locality in spacetime. Copenhagen is Everett + collapse, if I can say dia-chronologically. Randomness and non locality are consequences of the collapse, not of the SWE or still less Dirac equation or quantum field theories. My problem with Copenhagen is that it made measurement an abstract mathematical operation with no physics - which seems like a bad basis for fundamental physics. It makes measurement disobeyng the QM theory, and this without reason, other that its axiom: there is only one classical universe. If you read Bohr, he insisted all the time that the physical realm was the correct on the macroscopic level. before EPR it invokes the perturbation due to the measurement, but Einstein makes that idea nonsensical with the EPR paper. Bohr will concede that the collapse of the wave cannot be mechanical in that sense, and stay very fuzzy of what it can be. Decoherence has allowed the Copenhagen interpretation to go part way in defining measurement, but it is still not complete. Decoherence is nice, but conceptually, Everett got the fundamental idea. Supersposition is contagious by interaction. The rest is a consequence of the linearity of the tensor product, and the linearity of the evolution. Taking partial traces is just like the projection postulate. Yes, like in comp the differentiation of consciousness is the existencial projection made by the sigma_1 computable predicate (semi- computable). Zurek's quantum Darwinism looks promising and it may reach all the way to the mind/body problem. The computationalist one? He has to derive the SWE from addition and multiplication of numbers, or from application and abstraction of lambda-terms, ... Then get the star separation (like Z and Z*, G and G*). But surely, all those taking distnace with the collapse make advance in the bridge between between the computationalist foundation of consciousness and the foundation of the relative matter appearances. Only the amazing QM made me think that computationalism might be plausible, or refutable. Bruno Brent : God does not play dice, and there are no action at a distance, although it might look like that, but only if we abstract away some terms or the superposition. In quantum teleportation, Alice has to send some bit of classical information to tell him which part of the multiple terms wave they share. Bruno To post to this group, send email to everything-
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
I believe David Deutsch says there are lots of photons but only one Photon. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world. The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another universe. If after that the photons hit a photographic plate (or just a brick wall) both photons are destroyed and there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes so they recombine, but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went through the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit only and this causes interference bands. If we hadn't put a photographic plate (or a brick wall) in the photon's path and just let them continue into infinite space the 2 universes would always be different and so never recombine. For statistical reasons we only see interference if the 2 universes are almost identical; although it's logically possible that the universe where Lincoln was not assassinated and our universe could both evolve into a state that was identical and so recombine and cause interference it's astronomically unlikely. Actually astronomically is far too weak a word but infinitely is too strong, this my be the very rare occurrence where a new word might be useful. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat (measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in the superposition history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead. Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of the superposition can ever disappear. The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into the environmental degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate classical worlds. My point is that superposition is not a defining attribute of different worlds, it's relative incoherence so subspaces. I have no problem with that. And despite Everett's own opinion on this, I think it was a good idea to call that the relative state theory, instead of the many worlds, which can lead to naïve view of multiple aristotelian worlds, which would be doing the aristotelian error an infinity of times. In arithmetic also, all we have are the relative states, and their relative measures. (cf the ASSA/RSSA old discussion, a recurrent theme on the list). I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). What is his position on Everett? (2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum mechanics is, “OK, but do all these branches of the wavefunction really exist? or are they just mathematical constructs used to calculate probabilities?” Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don’t. Many worlders, when wise avoid the questions, they do exist in the formalism, so if the tehiry is correct, they can't just simply disappear. But it is false or ambiguous to say that the Copenhagenists would say they don't believe that they exist. They believe indeed that one of them exist! That is why they need a mechanism to make disappearing some term in the wave, and they invented the collapse, which is simply a way to say that they believe that QM does not apply to them, or the measuring apparatus, or consciousness, etc. They did not find any evidence that there is a collapse, nor any senseful criteria for something not obeying QM.. Of course, part of what
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's involved in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion. (Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.) Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory) which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one. I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 0.1% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.) That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split. Does the 0.01% imply that the world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of which you have a milkshape? Or does it require that it must split 1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one. I think Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many threads thru the occasion of your whim. But this is different compared to the Helsinki/Moscow/Washington thought experiment. In that case the Moscow and Washington guys are created. But in the UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist timelessly. In the DeWitt-Wheeler equation, time disappears too. In the WM- duplication, guys are created relatively to you, and *that* happens infinitely often in the UD-computations. Like Einstein said, time is an illusion, although a persistent one. Neither Everett, nor Deutsch, nor computationalism solved all problem, we just get the tools to formulate them. Wise many-worlders will not pretend that no collapse explains all weirdness. They just feel like the collapse itself is just too much weird than to be accepted. Here too I am close to Einstein view: I don't see what it could mean to abandon 3p- determinacy and 3p- locality in the physical realm: God does not play dice, and there are no action at a distance, although it might look like that, but only if we abstract away some terms or the superposition. In quantum teleportation, Alice has to send some bit of classical information to tell him which part of the multiple terms wave they share. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:26, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or whatever). But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that they are separate worlds. But worlds are allowed to recombine in the Everett interpretation. In fact they aren't even well defined, only approximations to what's actually there, at least according to DD (and as usual assuming I understood him correctly). If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world. I would say that below your substitition lebel, there is an infinity of worlds/computations. It is just that your relevant brain state for your consciousness is independent of the fact that the photon go through hole one or two. Maybe Deutsch thinks of it as splitting into two worlds and then recombining at the detector screen. He would say that there is never splitting, but your brain has a long history, and it has favorized the position base, and that can be justified by the decoherence theory. Once the detection has occurred, a spot on the screen, then the split has been amplified and entangled into the environment and is statistically irreversible. Then that defines a classical world (in my view). That world will not recombine with a world in which the spot appears at a different place on the screen. OK. We can define world by set of events closed for interaction. Have you read Zeh's quantum darwinism? He attempts to explain why we perceive a world whose stable observable features are the ones we see. Deutsch has generally just assumed that the observable world must have the classical character we see. Everett and Bohr assumed what variable was classically measurable was defined by the choice of apparatus; but that seems circular. I agree much with Zeh, notably on its account of time. I have not read the more recent publication, but quantum darwinism makes, as computationalism, by generalizing Everett move, lead to a sort of logical evolution of the physical laws. I appreciate also Mittelstaedt different books, and Piron. And thanks to Selesnick, my interest in Finkelstein has been revived. But computatioanalism+computer science approache this from the other side, with a different conception of realitry (more platonist than aristotelian). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 Oct 2014, at 18:35, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first language. No and I am not a member of the grammar police because I often don't well speak English myself, I'm talking about a fundamental error in Bruno's thinking process covered up by the very sloppy use of personal pronouns. In everyday life it's not important to be super careful with pronouns and it's possible to be careless with them without causing ambiguities, but if matter duplicating machines are introduced into the mix extraordinary care must be used and Bruno didn't do so. Where? But I know your answer by heart, and it consists in repeating what I say, but avoiding the 1p and 3p, and 3-1p, etc. distinctions that I introduce. You did not show an error. You attribute me fuzzy things, but your can't refer where I said them, except by quoting half sentences out of their context. However it may be worth looking past how he says it to what he's trying to say. I can't because what he's saying is tightly bound up in the meanings of those personal pronouns and in a world with matter duplicating machines the meaning of those personal pronouns is ambiguous. In UDA I use the common sense notion of first person and third person, specialized in the term of duplication boxes. In AUDA, (the arithmetical translation of the UDA) I use Kleene's second recursion theorem, or the Dx = F(xx, ...) method. I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the nature of the observer in his paper Yes, and when Everett talks about the observer there is never any ambiguity because the laws of physics allow us to see only one thing that fits that description, but that is NOT the case if you have matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought exparament. If that was relevant, add in the protocol in step three that the one reconstituted in Moscow is send to the goulag, and the one reconstituted in Washington is sent to jail, and that they will never meet, nor have any visit. In that case, with your reasoning above, you would accept the uncertainty, but as this is not relevant for the immediate apprehension, as we could relieve you from the goulag and the jail, after all. So you fail to explain us what is the difference. If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend on the past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will appear to have happened after they've happened And that's yet another problem that I didn't mention in my last post, not that predictions have the slightest thing to do with personal identity but Bruno says that the Helsinki man's prediction that John Clark will see Washington AND Moscow has been proven wrong because afterwards the Washington Man said I see only Washington. But what makes Bruno think that the information received by the Washington Man alone (or the Moscow man alone) is enough to evaluate the truth or falsehood of the Helsinki Man's prediction? Because we have agreed that you John Clark survived in both place, and so we take notice of both observation. When they said both W M, they both agree that this failed, and understand (I hope) that if they would have written W v M, but not sure which one, they would have both note that the prediction is correct. Children understand that. You just stop doing the thought experience, like if you died in the process. You did agree that you don't die, you did agree that you will not feel in a superposition of feeling to see both city at once, so, in the thought experience, you can only expect one of the outcome W, or M, never both, or you are no more talking about what you expect in the first person sense. I've asked Bruno this question nineteen dozen times but never received a coherent answer. You did, but keep restating it introducing your ambiguities, avoiding the 1p/3p distinction. you do have to be more careful, because you are only incidentally linked to one copy in Bruno's thought experiment, NO! You're linked to BOTH copies with equal strength, and that's exactly the problem Comp avoids that problem. There is no problem at all. It is enough to read the notes in the diaries, as we don't talk of any more than that, at that step of the reasoning. and is why when Bruno starts saying that after the duplication you
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 30 October 2014 05:50, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world. The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another universe. If after that the photons hit a photographic plate (or just a brick wall) both photons are destroyed and there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes so they recombine, but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went through the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit only and this causes interference bands. If we hadn't put a photographic plate (or a brick wall) in the photon's path and just let them continue into infinite space the 2 universes would always be different and so never recombine. For statistical reasons we only see interference if the 2 universes are almost identical; although it's logically possible that the universe where Lincoln was not assassinated and our universe could both evolve into a state that was identical and so recombine and cause interference it's astronomically unlikely. Actually astronomically is far too weak a word but infinitely is too strong, this my be the very rare occurrence where a new word might be useful. Nicely summarised. In other words any such phenomenon is a split - including the operation of a quantum computer - and some splits can recombine (especially if we arrange things so they do). I didn't think a superposition made sense in Everett because it implies both objects exist in the same (sub)universe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/29/2014 9:50 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 8:26 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world. The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another universe. If after that the photons There's only one photon. hit a photographic plate (or just a brick wall) both photons are destroyed and there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes so they recombine, But there is a difference in the path lengths from the source to detector, which produces the probability pattern for detection. This pattern is one world. If the path lengths were different in different worlds there would be no interference of phases, which is just what happens when you shoot classical particles thru the slits. but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went through the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit only and this causes interference bands. ?? What kind of evidence do you refer to. Delayed quantum eraser experiments show that if there is such evidence, if it's not erased, the interference disappears. If we hadn't put a photographic plate (or a brick wall) in the photon's path and just let them continue into infinite space the 2 universes would always be different and so never recombine. It depends on whether they interact with the environment. In the C70 buckyball experiment, photons that were never detected still localized the buckyballs and destroyed the interference pattern. On the other hand in the Dopfer experiment the idler photon was focused on the detector so that lateral momentum information was erased and the interference pattern was observed. Brent For statistical reasons we only see interference if the 2 universes are almost identical; although it's logically possible that the universe where Lincoln was not assassinated and our universe could both evolve into a state that was identical and so recombine and cause interference it's astronomically unlikely. Actually astronomically is far too weak a word but infinitely is too strong, this my be the very rare occurrence where a new word might be useful. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/29/2014 10:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat (measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in the superposition history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead. Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of the superposition can ever disappear. The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into the environmental degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate classical worlds. My point is that superposition is not a defining attribute of different worlds, it's relative incoherence so subspaces. I have no problem with that. And despite Everett's own opinion on this, I think it was a good idea to call that the relative state theory, instead of the many worlds, which can lead to naïve view of multiple aristotelian worlds, which would be doing the aristotelian error an infinity of times. In arithmetic also, all we have are the relative states, and their relative measures. (cf the ASSA/RSSA old discussion, a recurrent theme on the list). I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). What is his position on Everett? /(2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum mechanics is, “OK, but do all these branches of the wavefunction really exist? or are they just mathematical constructs used to calculate probabilities?” Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don’t. / Many worlders, when wise avoid the questions, they do exist in the formalism, so if the tehiry is correct, they can't just simply disappear. But it is false or ambiguous to say that the /Copenhagenists/ would say they don't believe that they exist. They believe indeed that one of them exist! That is why they need a mechanism to make disappearing some term in the wave, and they invented the collapse, which is simply a way to say that they believe that QM does not apply to them, or the measuring apparatus, or consciousness, etc. They did not find any evidence that there is a collapse, nor any senseful criteria for something not obeying QM.. /Of course, part of what makes the question slippery is that it’s
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/29/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 Oct 2014, at 01:12, meekerdb wrote: On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's /involved/ in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion. (Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.) Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory) which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one. I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 0.1% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.) That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split. Does the 0.01% imply that the world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of which you have a milkshape? Or does it require that it must split 1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one. I think Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many threads thru the occasion of your whim. But this is different compared to the Helsinki/Moscow/Washington thought experiment. In that case the Moscow and Washington guys are created. But in the UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist timelessly. In the DeWitt-Wheeler equation, time disappears too. In the WM-duplication, guys are created relatively to you, and *that* happens infinitely often in the UD-computations. Like Einstein said, time is an illusion, although a persistent one. Neither Everett, nor Deutsch, nor computationalism solved all problem, we just get the tools to formulate them. Wise many-worlders will not pretend that no collapse explains all weirdness. They just feel like the collapse itself is just too much weird than to be accepted. Here too I am close to Einstein view: I don't see what it could mean to abandon 3p- determinacy and 3p-locality in the physical realm I think we know exactly what it means - it means Copenhagen: randomness and non-locality in spacetime. My problem with Copenhagen is that it made measurement an abstract mathematical operation with no physics - which seems like a bad basis for fundamental physics. Decoherence has allowed the Copenhagen interpretation to go part way in defining measurement, but it is still not complete. Taking partial traces is just like the projection postulate. Zurek's quantum Darwinism looks promising and it may reach all the way to the mind/body problem. Brent : God does not play dice, and there are no action at a distance, although it might look like that, but only if we abstract away some terms or the superposition. In quantum teleportation, Alice has to send some bit of classical information to tell him which part of the multiple terms wave they share. Bruno To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another universe. If after that the photons There's only one photon. Not if Everett is correct, if he is then when a photon encounters something, like a wall with 2 slits in it, everything that can happen does happen. And for that to occur you need more than one photon and more than one universe. If the path lengths were different in different worlds there would be no interference If anything is still different when the photon hits the photographic plate there will be no interference. You only see interference if there is a change, a difference, so one universe splits into two and then another change that makes them identical again. Unless the first change is very very small it's almost impossible there will ever be a second change large enough for the 2 universes to become identical again. but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went through the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit only and this causes interference bands. ?? What kind of evidence do you refer to. A interference pattern. Delayed quantum eraser experiments show that if there is such evidence, if it's not erased, the interference disappears That is correct. If the information about which slits the photons went through exists then the 2 universe are still different when the photons hit the plate because the information must be recorded in something physical and whatever the physical medium is the arrangement of something physical will be different, so the 2 universes are not identical and thus do not recombine and no interference pattern forms on the photographic and there is no indication that any photon went through more than one slit. However if the information about which slits the photons went through is erased after they pass the slits but before they hit the photographic plate then there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes, even though there once was, so they recombine and and interfere. There isn't a lot of interference because they were never more than slightly different but there is some and we see it as interference bands on that photographic plate and indications that the photons went through both slits. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/29/2014 6:54 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 5:17 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The universe splits because there is a difference between them, the photon (or electron) goes through the left slit in one universe and the right slit in another universe. If after that the photons There's only one photon. Not if Everett is correct, if he is then when a photon encounters something, like a wall with 2 slits in it, everything that can happen does happen. And for that to occur you need more than one photon and more than one universe. If the path lengths were different in different worlds there would be no interference If anything is still different when the photon hits the photographic plate there will be no interference. You only see interference if there is a change, a difference, so one universe splits into two and then another change that makes them identical again. Unless the first change is very very small it's almost impossible there will ever be a second change large enough for the 2 universes to become identical again. but if we examine history we will see evidence that the photon went through the left slit only and evidence that it went through the right slit only and this causes interference bands. ?? What kind of evidence do you refer to. A interference pattern. That's hardly evidence the photon went thru one slit only. Delayed quantum eraser experiments show that if there is such evidence, if it's not erased, the interference disappears That is correct. If the information about which slits the photons went through exists then the 2 universe are still different when the photons hit the plate because the information must be recorded in something physical and whatever the physical medium is the arrangement of something physical will be different, so the 2 universes are not identical and thus do not recombine and no interference pattern forms on the photographic and there is no indication that any photon went through more than one slit. However if the information about which slits the photons went through is erased after they pass the slits but before they hit the photographic plate No, it's called the /*delayed*/ quantum eraser experiment because the which-way information can be erased /*after*/ they hit the detector arXiv:quant-ph/9903047 v1 13 Mar 1999 Brent then there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes, even though there once was, so they recombine and and interfere. There isn't a lot of interference because they were never more than slightly different but there is some and we see it as interference bands on that photographic plate and indications that the photons went through both slits. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Wed, Oct 29, 2014 at 10:11 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: ?? What kind of evidence do you refer to. A interference pattern. That's hardly evidence the photon went thru one slit only. Of course not it's would be the exact opposite, it's evidence the photon went through both slits. if the information about which slits the photons went through is erased after they pass the slits but before they hit the photographic plate No, it's called the *delayed* quantum eraser experiment because the which-way information can be erased *after* they hit the detector Fine, you record the information about which slit the photons went through then wait ten years, then erase the information. Provided that the recorded information has not interacted with anything in the preceding 10 year, such as you looking at it, then when it is erased there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes and thus they recombine. And so if you then develop the photographic plate a interference pattern will be observed on it. If you didn't erase the information they wouldn't recombine and thus no interference pattern would be found when you developed it. John K Clark. arXiv:quant-ph/9903047 v1 13 Mar 1999 Brent then there is no longer any difference between the 2 universes, even though there once was, so they recombine and and interfere. There isn't a lot of interference because they were never more than slightly different but there is some and we see it as interference bands on that photographic plate and indications that the photons went through both slits. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). What exactly is superposition in the same world in the Everett view? As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or whatever). So a quantum calculation involves a mini multiverse being created and collapsed again under controlled conditions. Have I misunderstood that? TBH I can't actually see what else a superposition *could* be, in the Everett picture (although I assume if you're looking at things from a path integral view or pilot wave (etc) then you have something that really is more or less duplicated in one universe, like Schrodinger's cat in the popular conception being both alive and dead...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first language. However it may be worth looking past how he says it to what he's trying to say. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. No it is not for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the nature of the observer in his paper, but it's a while since I read it. But he does have to explain why an observer sees what he does, why he doesn't experience splitting, and so on. As far as I remember he does so using a similar method to Bruno - giving the observer something like a diary to write his experiences in. 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend on the past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will appear to have happened after they've happened (which is true of measurements in Everett as well). 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word he conveys zero information. I don't think it conveys zero information. But you do have to be more careful, because you are only incidentally linked to one copy in Bruno's thought experiment, rather than strictly linked to one by the laws of physics. a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is uncertain. ??? Sorry I don't understand that sentence. both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. Then why did you answer my post? And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with computers, a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related technology. That seems like you're being deliberately obtuse. Anyone with a theory needs to invent terms for the components, just to keep it manageable. Do you refuse to accept the use of top quark because top has lots of meanings? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in this world the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world' and perhaps every possibility in between. So in the 3p view, all choices balance out. Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory) which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one. (Peter wrote that in his blog) and which seems inconsistent with duplication. Richard On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:01 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat (measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in the superposition history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead. Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of the superposition can ever disappear. I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). What is his position on Everett? Bruno Brent Hence, the fact that comp says that such splitting can occur doesn't disprove comp unless it also disproves Everett. And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms also doesn't show that comp is wrong. It certainly didn't work for Fred Hoyle's attempts to ridicule the Big Bang. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 Oct 2014, at 03:10, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. No it is not for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word he conveys zero information. You are making the use of he ambiguous, by avoiding the precision I gave in term of memory in and outside the teleportation box. Onece you keep the 1p/3p distinction in mind there is no ambiguities at all. The notion of personality is not involved in the reasoning. Yes, I like to talk on this too, but it is another topic, and it has nothing to so with the result described in the sane04 paper. a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is uncertain. ? both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. Comp is a short expression used for computationalism. The precise version I am studying is logically weaker than most of those you can find in the literature. (Except for the behaviourist/ instrumentalist / positivist approach, which are usually abandonned today). So the consequences of that weaker version applies to all other versions, and it makes some of them epistemologically inconsistent (and indeed some conclude that consciousness is an illusion, those are the eliminativists, and seems to me just continuing the Aristotelian tradition of putting the mind under the rug). Computationalism, contrary to what some strong atheists desire, eliminates the notion of primary matter, or physicalism. The physical reality has to be derived from a statistics on all computations. That is the result of the UDA, and I have never had any problem with this, with few exceptions, by people like you who repeat that they have find a flaw, but never published it, or even send it to me, except you, but as people can witness, the argument is nothing but playing with words. precisely, invoking an ambiguity, and avoiding the disambiguation. BTW, we have agrred on the personal identity issue, actually, and in that model, the step 3 still follow, and you did aknowledge, but still criticizing the enterprise: the argument was of the type my two years old niece can do that, but then OK, let us move to step 4. And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they most likely meant. Argument per authority. As Kim said, the step 3 is understood easily by young people. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp I told you that comp is a precise generalization of the term used by the others (awre
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:00, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 15:10, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first language. However it may be worth looking past how he says it to what he's trying to say. Thanks Liz. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. No it is not for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the nature of the observer in his paper, but it's a while since I read it. But he does have to explain why an observer sees what he does, why he doesn't experience splitting, and so on. As far as I remember he does so using a similar method to Bruno - giving the observer something like a diary to write his experiences in. 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend on the past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will appear to have happened after they've happened (which is true of measurements in Everett as well). 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word he conveys zero information. I don't think it conveys zero information. But you do have to be more careful, because you are only incidentally linked to one copy in Bruno's thought experiment, rather than strictly linked to one by the laws of physics. Well, even in Everett that one-one link can break. here John Clark uses the fact that we can interact in between superposed terms, but that is not relevant, as we have explained with many details to which Clark never answered. a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is uncertain. ??? Sorry I don't understand that sentence. You are not alone. both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. Then why did you answer my post? because, amazingly perhaps, Joihn believe in comp. he even argue that non-comp is necessarily crackpot (where I think only it is premature without experimental evidence). I show that a form of classical computationalism is testable. When this one is refuted, we might try to get non-classical version of computationalism before abandoning it. And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with computers, a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related technology. That seems like
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 Oct 2014, at 08:01, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes. There are certainly more people who oppose determinism and free will than determinism and consciousness. But determinism is not a threat for a very reasonable notion of free- will, which is the (self) perception of a spectrum possibilities (concerning my relation with my possible environments), together with the ability to make some choice, and yes, why not, using an algorithm if that can help, with simple rule like if you want a limonade this evening, either look now in your fridge or prepare yourself to take the bike for searching a night-shop). I think that the theory of free-will based on intrinsic indeterminacies does not make sense in a computationalist theory (nor in QM). I don't see how a random generator could add any free-will, nor feeling of free-will. But there is a logical self-indeterminacy which makes sense for any self-observing machine, and that is what creates in the machine's mind the spectrum of possibilities, that is (in the toy theory): sentences of the type t, and it is up to the machine to realize the possibility or not, as far the possible environment permits. Sometimes you have to hurry. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 Oct 2014, at 10:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. Then if I compress you in a small box-prison, you have no more choice, but I am afraid you might be conscious. It is like the cul-de-sac worlds, in the Kripke semantics, where everything is necessary and nothing is possible. It is the type []f (provable false), the consistent inconsistent realities, the type of dreams, wrongness, lies, and death (as geometrically they are cul-de-sac world, in the Kripke semantics). The whole problem comes from the fact that consciousness is maintained in such realities, and the measure problem for the computationalist is to derive the physical reality from the need of justifying long deep lawfull type of physical dreams, in arithmetic. But my simple-minded view of MWI is that whatever choice I make in this world the opposite will be made by the splitting of me in another world' and perhaps every possibility in between. Not really. That would be the case if you rely *all* your decisions to a measurement of polarization of some photon or qubit in the state 1/ sqrt(2) I0 + I1. But if, for some reason, you really prefer the decision based on I1, well, you don't need the quibit the, or prepare it in the state aI0 + bI1, such that a^2 is very close to one, and b^2 very close to zero (with a^2 + b^2 = 1). Feynman randomization does justifies the normal realities. That why both classical eectrionical computer functions, and why we hope that the quantum computer will function too. But that is what a computationalist have to show with an a priori larger instantiation of computations. So in the 3p view, all choices balance out. I think you are too quick here, Richard. Everything consistent happens, but with constrained and different relative proportions, and you have a partial control. Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory) which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one. We certainly hope that the aberrant worlds are not too much frequent. But thank to the smallness of Planck constant, the aberration seems to just change a bit our DNA, and we manage as we can (we befit from them too). Once François Englert asked me why I took the lift, given that with the many-world I can jump through the window. I told him that jumping from one story, the QM probability is high that I will survive with a broken leg, from two stories, I will survive with two broken legs and two or one broken arm, from three stories, I might survive with all arms and legs broken, + the back broken, ... From the eleventh stories, I will survive 100% paralyzed, from 25 stories, I might survive in a brain in a vat, and only God knows where you might survive from 1000 stories. So I think that the lift is more safe. QM *does* look like an mean to get normal worlds above our digital substitution level. (Peter wrote that in his blog) and which seems inconsistent with duplication. You mean Peter Jones? Bruno Richard On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:01 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 October 2014 17:14, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period Not necessarily your consciousness, you can be aware of things in a deterministic universe surely? But probably your free will, yes. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 08:58, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). What exactly is superposition in the same world in the Everett view? You can't identify superpositions as defining worlds. An UP polarized photon is a superposition of a LEFT and RIGHT polarized photon. World has to mean a subspace that isn't coherent, doesn't interfere, with other subspaces. As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or whatever). But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that they are separate worlds. So a quantum calculation involves a mini multiverse being created and collapsed again under controlled conditions. Have I misunderstood that? I'd say that's a rough and possibly misleading metaphor. But read Scott Aaronson. He's a lot more knowledgeable than me and he good at explaining it. Brent TBH I can't actually see what else a superposition /could/ be, in the Everett picture (although I assume if you're looking at things from a path integral view or pilot wave (etc) then you have something that really is more or less duplicated in one universe, like Schrodinger's cat in the popular conception being both alive and dead...) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 3:00 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. If you say so. Maybe this is due to English not being his first language. No and I am not a member of the grammar police because I often don't well speak English myself, I'm talking about a fundamental error in Bruno's thinking process covered up by the very sloppy use of personal pronouns. In everyday life it's not important to be super careful with pronouns and it's possible to be careless with them without causing ambiguities, but if matter duplicating machines are introduced into the mix extraordinary care must be used and Bruno didn't do so. However it may be worth looking past how he says it to what he's trying to say. I can't because what he's saying is tightly bound up in the meanings of those personal pronouns and in a world with matter duplicating machines the meaning of those personal pronouns is ambiguous. I seem to remember that HE (Hugh Everett :-) talks about the nature of the observer in his paper Yes, and when Everett talks about the observer there is never any ambiguity because the laws of physics allow us to see only one thing that fits that description, but that is NOT the case if you have matter duplicating machines as in Bruno's thought exparament. If you look at Bruno's thought experiment it does in fact depend on the past. His talk about prediction is to do with how things will appear to have happened after they've happened And that's yet another problem that I didn't mention in my last post, not that predictions have the slightest thing to do with personal identity but Bruno says that the Helsinki man's prediction that John Clark will see Washington AND Moscow has been proven wrong because afterwards the Washington Man said I see only Washington. But what makes Bruno think that the information received by the Washington Man alone (or the Moscow man alone) is enough to evaluate the truth or falsehood of the Helsinki Man's prediction? I've asked Bruno this question nineteen dozen times but never received a coherent answer. you do have to be more careful, because you are only incidentally linked to one copy in Bruno's thought experiment, NO! You're linked to BOTH copies with equal strength, and that's exactly the problem and is why when Bruno starts saying that after the duplication you will see this but you will not see that its ambiguous drivel. rather than strictly linked to one by the laws of physics. The matter duplicating machine works according to the laws of physics just like everything else. Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is uncertain. ??? Sorry I don't understand that sentence. When I open the door of the duplicating machine chamber not knowing if I am the original or the copy what will I see? I don't know. When I open the front door of my house what will I see? I don't know. both comp and Everett allow for [...] I don't care what comp allows. If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. Then why did you answer my post? Because that's the first time in it you used the silly word comp, up until that point it made some sort of sense even if I didn't agree with it. That seems like you're being deliberately obtuse. Anyone with a theory needs to invent terms for the components, Sometimes new jargon is needed but I'm talking about jargon for jargon's sake. For example, the word subjective has been around for centuries and is understood by everyone, nevertheless the acronym FPI was invented (and 1P) for the same reason government bureaucrats crank out acronyms by the gross; somebody couldn't invent a new idea but they could always invent a new word and they figure that will make them look smart. It doesn't. When too many people start to understand a word (like subjective) there is a tendency to change it to something less comprehensible, particularly if your ideas are confused, contradictory or just plain silly because then what you say sounds deep even when it's not. That's why psychology is so dense with Unnecessarily Pointless and Redundantly Repetitive jargon (UPRR) and Very Stupid Acronyms (VSA), while mathematicians prefers the simplest words they can get away with, like continuous, limit, open, closed, rational, irrational, compact and even simple and complex. Do you refuse to accept the use of
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Tue, Oct 28, 2014 at 5:52 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. Did you make that choice for a reason? If you did it was deterministic if you didn't it was random. If you did it was reasonable if you didn't it was unreasonable. My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period I don't see how that follows nor do I understand why it would matter even if it did because illusions are a perfectly real subjective phenomenon just as consciousness is. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's *involved* in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion. (Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.) Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory) which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one. I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 0.1% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/28/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2014, at 20:58, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. Only if you isolate the subsystem well enough. Imagine that I can isolate my room, where I am, sufficiently, and in that room I succeed in isolating schroedinger cat (prepared in the alive + dead state) in a box. Then, in my isolated room I look at the cat (measuring in the alive/dead base) .QM description is that when I do that measurement, I put myself in the superposition alive + dead. It follows from the linearity of evolution and of the tensor product. You might say that I am in that superposed state in *one* world. But if my room is not sufficiently well isolated, or more normally when I go out of that room, announcing with some joy that the cat is alive, well soon enough, the environment (the building with that room, then city, and you coming for a visit) get in the superposition history of the earth with that Shroedinger car alive + history of the earth with that Shroedinger car dead. Would you still say that it is a superposition in *one* world. Yes, the differentiation of the galaxies will follows, at the speed of light, and I guess there will be two Milky ways colliding with Andromeda, one with archive describing the fact that that Schroedinger cat was alive, and one with the fact that that Schroedinger cat is dead. Would you still say that there is one world? I like to define a physical world (in the quantum theory) by a set of objects/events close for interaction. That makes the many world the literal interpretation of QM. Without collapse, I don't see how the term of the superposition can ever disappear. The superposition doesn't disappear but it becomes dispersed into the environmental degrees of freedom, so FAPP there are separate classical worlds. My point is that superposition is not a defining attribute of different worlds, it's relative incoherence so subspaces. I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). What is his position on Everett? /(2) One of the first questions anyone asks on learning quantum mechanics is, OK, but do all these branches of the wavefunction really exist? or are they just mathematical constructs used to calculate probabilities? Roughly speaking, Many-Worlders would say they do exist, while Copenhagenists would say they don't. Of course, part of what makes the question slippery is that it's not even completely clear what we mean by words like exist! Now, I'd say that quantum computing theory has sharpened the question in many ways, and actually answered some of the sharpened versions --- but interestingly, sometimes the answer goes one way and sometimes it goes the other! So for example, we have strong evidence that quantum computers can solve certain specific problems in polynomial time that would require exponential time to solve using a classical computer. Some Many-Worlders, most notably David Deutsch, have seized on the apparent exponential speedups for problems like factoring, as the ultimate proof that the various branches of the wavefunction must literally exist: if they don't exist, they ask, then where was this huge number factored? where did the exponential resources to solve the problem come from? The trouble is, we've also learned that a quantum computer could NOT solve arbitrary search problems exponentially faster than a classical computer could solve them --- something you'd probably predict a QC could do, if you thought of all the branches of the wavefunction as just parallel processors. If you want a quantum speedup, then your problem needs a particular
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or whatever). But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that they are separate worlds. But worlds are allowed to recombine in the Everett interpretation. In fact they aren't even well defined, only approximations to what's actually there, at least according to DD (and as usual assuming I understood him correctly). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/28/2014 4:12 PM, LizR wrote: On 28 October 2014 22:52, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com mailto:yann...@gmail.com wrote: Liz, I define consciousness as my ability to make choices. That is an unusual definition, and not one I think most people would agree with, although they'd probably agree it's /involved/ in consciousness. But yes, using that definition the MWI makes consciousness an illusion. (Most people call the ability to make choices free will. That is an illusion under the MWI, and indeed most theories of physics.) Bruno responds with the Gaussian (somewhat like measure theory) which suggests that some worlds are less important than this one. I don't know about Bruno but David Deutsch appears to think that some decisions will have a much higher measure in the multiverse than others. So, say, 99.99% of me (so to speak) will have coffee and only 0.01% will decide on a whim to have a milkshake. (And 0.1% will think so hard about it that they spontaneously combust.) That raises the question of how the multiple-worlds split. Does the 0.01% imply that the world must split into 1e5 copies, in one of which you have a milkshape? Or does it require that it must split 1e15 ways so that you can spontaneously combust in one. I think Bruno's UD tries to take care of this by have infinitely many threads thru the occasion of your whim. But this is different compared to the Helsinki/Moscow/Washington thought experiment. In that case the Moscow and Washington guys are created. But in the UD's infinite threads the infinite threads all exist timelessly. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/28/2014 4:30 PM, LizR wrote: On 29 October 2014 06:20, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/27/2014 11:47 PM, LizR wrote: As far as I can make out from David Deutsch's explanations qcs involve a temporary splitting into two or more worlds, (or the equivalent - differentiation or whatever). But to say the split is temporary is to violate the idea that they are separate worlds. But worlds are allowed to recombine in the Everett interpretation. In fact they aren't even well defined, only approximations to what's actually there, at least according to DD (and as usual assuming I understood him correctly). If recombine just means exhibiting interference then I'd say it's just a semantic quibble. When a photon goes thru both of Young's slits and interferes with itself I'd say that happens in one world. Maybe Deutsch thinks of it as splitting into two worlds and then recombining at the detector screen. Once the detection has occurred, a spot on the screen, then the split has been amplified and entangled into the environment and is statistically irreversible. Then that defines a classical world (in my view). That world will not recombine with a world in which the spot appears at a different place on the screen. Have you read Zeh's quantum darwinism? He attempts to explain why we perceive a world whose stable observable features are the ones we see. Deutsch has generally just assumed that the observable world must have the classical character we see. Everett and Bohr assumed what variable was classically measurable was defined by the choice of apparatus; but that seems circular. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 25 October 2014 05:32, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: the only one giving ambiguity is you In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is giving ambiguity; in such a world personal pronouns should only be used with enormous care. It has always been clear that *you should follow the diary and what's written on them*... In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who Quentin Anciaux is giving advice to, nor is it clear which diary should be followed as there are 2, the machine duplicated the diary too, and it was much easier to do than duplicating the brain. But I don't expect you to do so, it would be acknowledging you're an asshole and a troll for years... which you are of course. In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is a asshole and a troll . And isn't a troll that's been around for years a oxymoron, like clearly confused? An Everett multiverse is a matter duplication machine. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal (experienced) world if COMP is true. OK then comp is false. And now that we know that comp is false what's the point of talking about it anymore? So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? This point was originally about real numbers (wasn't it?) You (Russell) said that Bruno has shown that real numbers must be part of the phenomenal world if comp is true, but not ontological (because comp assumes only integer arithmetic and that only with certain operations). I'm not sure if I follow this, but my guess is that comp says that some phenomena we experience can generate an arbitrary string of random digits - as many digits as we care to measure. Or something like that...? I guess that has to be the case if there is first person indeterminacy. Or have I got this completely wrong? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Hence, the fact that comp says that such splitting can occur doesn't disprove comp unless it also disproves Everett. And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms also doesn't show that comp is wrong. It certainly didn't work for Fred Hoyle's attempts to ridicule the Big Bang. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 27 October 2014 07:33, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: Just go reread the thread Re: For John Clark october 2013... or read the last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit about it... (but like he said... who's he ? you ? the great spaghetti monster maybe. You can't tell if you're addicted to something until you try to give it up. I recently gave up sugar. Mainly I did it by imagining that white powder is another, more dangerous drug that I don't wish to put inside the temple of my body. Oddly, ridiculously, almost madly, that seems to have worked. Over the last 2 months I have cut my sugar intake to around the recommended daily allowance (which is about 6 spoonfulls in total - which is something like what you get in a third of a can of coca cola). (Admittedly I may now be addicted to 90% cocoa chocolate...) So, Mr Clark, maybe you could use a similar tactic to give up discussions of comp? Imagine they're talking about something else, something like, say, astrology, that you wouldn't wish to even discuss? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? This point was originally about real numbers (wasn't it?) You (Russell) said that Bruno has shown that real numbers must be part of the phenomenal world if comp is true, but not ontological (because comp assumes only integer arithmetic and that only with certain operations). I'm not sure if I follow this, but my guess is that comp says that some phenomena we experience can generate an arbitrary string of random digits - as many digits as we care to measure. Or something like that...? I guess that has to be the case if there is first person indeterminacy. Or have I got this completely wrong? No, you're right on the money. Real numbers are basically just infinite sequences of random integers, most of which are uncomputable. Which is what FPI is. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 26 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, That is not relevant for the point you made. Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're talking about the sense of self and that has zero to do with predictions, good ones or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about insults. Unless you postulate a unique little universe, all matter of prediction can be verified only from a first person perspective, and that is why Everett introduce a notion of subjective probability, not in the Bayesian sense, but in the computationalist sense. This is explained also by Wheeler. Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too. I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the quality of the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a reasoned argument is John Clark is a poo poo head. Yes, but Quentin (and others) are tired of your enormous bad faith about step 3. Everything is described in the third person, but you avoid interviewing the copies. you talk like you belief that after a 2^n self-duplication, you would be blurred into an indeterminate anomaly, but all the vast majority of the John Clark interviewed witness having seen white noise, in fact it is easy to show they could distinguish a classical iterated duplication, and a quantum one. that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute either. One joke is funny. To repeat it infinitely often is boring. You know perfectly well what is the FPI, but for the newbees: the FPI is the First Person Indeterminacy notion, which is entailed in a classical context, from a first person perspective, in the case of self-duplication. This is explained in the beginning of the sane04 paper http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html and is the thing which motivates me to do mathematics studies instead of biology or philosophy. Then the translation of UDA in the language of the machine adopts a different notion of indeterminacy, purely arithmetically defined, but still motivated by the FPI. In fact it is the particular case of P= 1, (the intensional nuance []p p, with p sigma_1). You have convinced 0 person, or if there is one who get your point, I am willing to listen, but up to now I have been able to debunk all your arguments, which relies in criticizing something for being vague, and mocking the simple notions used (like 1p and 3p pov) which precisely handle the ambiguities you mention. Or, when you got the point and cannot hide it, the critics are ad hominem, and does not justify why you don't tackle the step 4 of the UD argument. Nor do you ever mention the proper theoretical computer science which provides a way to understand the math and the problem, without the FPI. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 27 Oct 2014, at 12:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 11:20:59PM +1300, LizR wrote: On 25 October 2014 12:19, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? This point was originally about real numbers (wasn't it?) You (Russell) said that Bruno has shown that real numbers must be part of the phenomenal world if comp is true, but not ontological (because comp assumes only integer arithmetic and that only with certain operations). I'm not sure if I follow this, but my guess is that comp says that some phenomena we experience can generate an arbitrary string of random digits - as many digits as we care to measure. Or something like that...? I guess that has to be the case if there is first person indeterminacy. Or have I got this completely wrong? No, you're right on the money. Real numbers are basically just infinite sequences of random integers, most of which are uncomputable. Which is what FPI is. Yes. In the case of iterated self-duplication. That leads to randomness. Now the FPI on the sigma_1 arithmetic, or on the UD, which contains much more than simple iterated self-duplication, (it contains all rational approximations of all Heisenberg matrices evolution or waves, ..., and much more), should be physics, notably the physics of what is below our substitution level. Comp predicts/explains why it looks like there are parallel universes/computations below our substitution level. Comp predicts also (I think) a continuous background, if only due to the presence of those stupid iterated duplications of oneself in arithmetic. Bruno -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/27/2014 3:38 AM, LizR wrote: It would be nice if Mr Clark would EITHER stop joining in with discussions just to say that he doesn't care about comp, OR state what he agrees or disagrees with in Bruno's stated argument. Just saying it's obviously wrong doesn't really cut it. So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. It isn't in itself contentious - a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would - that it's a phenomenon experienced from a first person perspective because of the person in question being split into two copies. The phenomena actually map onto each other, because both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed - quantum computers rely on precisely that fact. Quantum computers (of the circuit type) rely on interference to pick out the right solution. Interference implies superposition in the same world. I highly recommend Scott Aaronson's blog http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/ , for straight talk about quantum computing (his book Quantum Computing Since Democritus is also very good). Brent Hence, the fact that comp says that such splitting can occur doesn't disprove comp unless it also disproves Everett. And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms also doesn't show that comp is wrong. It certainly didn't work for Fred Hoyle's attempts to ridicule the Big Bang. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. No it is not for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word he conveys zero information. a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is uncertain. both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with computers, a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related technology. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
My simple-minded view of MWI is that it is deterministic and if it is true then my consciousness is an illusion, period On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 10:10 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Oct 27, 2014 at 6:38 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: So far the only real (non-sarcastic, non-insult-based) objection I've heard comes down to a semantic quibble to do with redefining our concept of an individual person. The entire point of Bruno's proof and all of his bizarre thought experiments is to examine and get rid of that semantic quibble, and yet from page 1 Bruno acts as if the concept of personal identity was already crystal clear even though in his thought experiments such things were stretched about as far as they could go. In such circumstances using person pronouns with abandon as Bruno does without giving them a second thought is just ridiculous. This is exactly the same redefinition that was brought up by Everett in 1957. No it is not for 3 reasons: 1) Everett was trying to explain the strange observations of the Quantum world in a logically cohesive way and to show why Quantum Mechanics was able to make good prediction about future physical events. Everett said nothing about personal identity or consciousness because he didn't need to, and that is the HUGE advantage Many Worlds has over other Quantum interpretations and is the only reason I'm a fan of the MWI. In the other Quantum Interpretations consciousness soon enters the picture, that would be OK if they could explain consciousness but they can't. Everett can't explain consciousness either but he doesn't need to because consciousness has nothing to do with his theory. 2) Like Everett Bruno is also interested in prediction but he seems to think that good predictions are the key to personal identity, and that's just nuts. The sense of self depends on the past not the future. 3) With Everett the meaning of the personal pronoun he is always obvious, it is the only person that we can observe using the laws of physics that fits the description of Bruno Marchal, but in a world with matter duplicating machines there are 2 (or more) people who fit that description, and so the word he conveys zero information. a physicist who believes the MWI to be correct will come to the same conclusions about indeterminacy that someone using Bruno's matter transmitter would Obviously, but a person wouldn't need to believe in the MWI or even be a physicist to know that what is observed when a door is open a door is uncertain. both comp and Everett allow for the possibility that from the third person viewpoint the duplication could be observed If you say so, but I'm not a bit interested in comp and except for a few member of this list I don't think anybody on the planet is either. And of course, making up silly versions of Bruno's acronyms I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with computers, a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related technology. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 28 Oct 2014, at 1:10 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: I didn't make a single one up, they were what Wikipedia or Google though they most likely meant. For example, Wikipedia lists 27 possible means of comp and not one of them has anything to do with intelligence or consciousness or personal identity, and only one had anything to do with computers, a class of Usenet groups devoted to computers and related technology. John K Clark You talk as though Wikipedia and Google represent some kind of Holy Book that contains everything that a person needs to know. They do not. You have once again only succeeded in confirming what an utter shithead you are when it comes to reasoning something through. Even 5th graders know that you only consult Wikipedia as a last resort on anything. Your motivation in everything you write is sheer ego-talk. You want others to lick your ego because of your deep faith in what you alone consider your superior reasoning ability. Licking egos is an equivalent operation to licking arses. I don’t see anything particularly tasty about either in your case. Kim === Kim Jones B.Mus.GDTL Email: kimjo...@ozemail.com.au Mobile:0450 963 719 Landline: 02 9389 4239 Web:http://www.eportfolio.kmjcommp.com Never let your schooling get in the way of your education - Mark Twain -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 24 Oct 2014, at 18:58, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not computable too. Any integer can be calculated with a Turing machine That is ambiguous. You can give an intensional definition of the natural numbers by listing the phi_0, phi_1, phi_2, phi_3, phi_4, phi_5, ..., with the phi_i enumerating effectively the programs with zero argument. All natural numbers will have a definition among those phi_i, and thus are computable *in that sense*, but not all definition of a natural number of that kind will define such a natural number, as some programs will not stop. that has unlimited tape and time, and even with a finite tape and finite time good approximations can be found for the rational numbers and some irrational numbers, even a few transcendental numbers, Yes, all constructive reals can be defined in arithmetic, and even many non constructive one. but for nearly all real numbers not even approximations can be calculated, not even with a infinite tape and infinite time. They're just not computable. In classical analysis, that is correct. In intuitionist analysis, many models satisfy the Brouwer axiom: all functions are continuous, or all functions are computable. In some models: computable = continuous. It is interesting, and even useful for the engineers, but it brings conceptual difficulties in cognitive science (typically it leads to different sorts of solipsisms: it cannot solve the other mind problem, and it is a form of consciousness of the other eliminativism). And if a mechanical process like a Turing Machine can't produce them can the Real numbers have anything to do with physics? I don't claim to have a answer I'm just asking a question. Take the infinite WM self-duplication, it predicts that almost all 2^n, with n large, observers coming from such an experience, and who bet white noise, or non computable sequences, win the bets. So in a classical deterministic context we can justify the presence of non computable randomness in the subjective discourses (the diaries) of the observers involved. Now in front of the whole arithmetical truth, it is an harder question, but we can already ask non trivial question to the machines about this, and get some results. Normally, we should get indeterminacy below our substitution level, and quantum mechanics, when taken literally might confirm this, or refute it.. The computationalist hypothesis, taken with the classical definition of knowledge (the modal logic S4) in the cognitive science is testable. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 24 Oct 2014, at 19:13, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett QM, Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, That is not relevant for the point you made. Our motivation has nothing to do with the fact that Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too. After that you did a valiant effort to save your pount y invoking the fact that in classical duplication we can met, and that is not the case ith QM, but that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI, as others showed to you. more particularly in the continuity of the sense of self, and that has absolutely positively 100% nothing to do with predictions, not good predictions and not bad predictions either. In fact the continuity of self has nothing to do with the future at all, you might not even have a future, all that matters is if you remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday. We agree on that, and this is why the distinction between 1p and 3p used in this context suppress all ambiguities. But it still happen that to verify our theories we make prediction, be it of an eclipse, a spin of an electron, or the content of the diaries of people going out reconstitution boxes, made in the physical realities, or in computations. So a theory, be it on matter and consciousness, and a fortiori for a theory on the relation between consciousness and matter (or matter appearances) has everything to do with prediction. Everett still assume some universal waves, but with computationalism, this cannot help, a machine cannot distinguish all the computable rational approximations of the wave, with the wave itself, but then the quantum wave can only works if it supplant all the other possible computations, and that is what AUDA, or the machine interview (in the Sane2004 paper) begins to compute. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 24 Oct 2014, at 22:02, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Not that it matters if the prediction was correct or not but did the old prediction say who was supposed to see Washington and Moscow? The old prediction was saying BOTH, in the 3p, and indeterminate in the 1p. Now that the John-Clark-Moscow and the John-Clark-washington get the point, they will write, if the experience is reiterated, and if they are asked again Waht they expect: they will answer, and predict W or M. Suddenly he understands the question, and realizes that what city he saw is not enough information to determine if the prediction was correct, Why? not that it makes the slightest difference if it was a good prediction or bad because in dealing with the sense of self only the past and present are important, That is simply not true. If *that* was true, you could say yes to a doctor who will replace your brain with cheese. Mr. He may not even have a future but Mr. He would still feel like he was the same person he was yesterday. and the brain that receives information about Washington will think about Washington, Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Washington, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for him, now. Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4? I too have a marvelous proof, it shows that 1+1 does not equal 2 as had been thought for thousands of years but is actually equal to 1. Can we go on step 4. We talk about the average content of diaries. In the UDA, everything is describable in the third person way. Indeed that is why we can describe all this in arithmetic. Then incompleteness, which is avalaible by the machines (as Gödel already knew) entails the needed mathematical precision for the self-reference. I have seen more than one time that you got the point, and try only to distract us. Move on step 4 please. Bruno Here is my proof: I take a cookie and place it in a red box and put it on a shelf. I take another cookie and place it in a blue box and add it to the shelf. I now open the red box and count the cookies in it and find that there is only 1. Therefore 1+1 =1. QED Question: Can anybody find an error in my proof? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 11:39 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get a arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real Numbers why can't we do the same thing with just one fundamental particle like one electron? Again I'm not claiming to have a answer I'm just asking a question. Assuming that position lies on a continuum, Obviously if position or time lies on a continuum then physics will need a continuum of numbers to do it's job (the Real Numbers). But the big question is are they? There is no experimental evidence to indicate that either is on a continuum and there are lots of theoretical reasons that suggest that they do not. and assuming that our technological prowess shows no bounds to how accurate we can measure something Even if they are on a continuum measuring them to infinite or even arbitrary accuracy could only happen if the laws of physics are not what we think they are. That is of course always possible but invoking new laws of physics should be the last resort not the first. then yes, Given all the above I agree, then yes. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, That is not relevant for the point you made. Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're talking about the sense of self and that has zero to do with predictions, good ones or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about insults. Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too. I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the quality of the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a reasoned argument is John Clark is a poo poo head. that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute either. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
2014-10-26 18:58 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, That is not relevant for the point you made. Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're talking about the sense of self and that has zero to do with predictions, good ones or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about insults. Yes after 5 years of stupid arguments on your side... I gave up you're a troll, and you should just stop posting useless things here. you're talking about the sense of self Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too. I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the quality of the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a reasoned argument is John Clark is a poo poo head. that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute either. Yeah go learn dancing at UDA and gives us a break, you clearly don't give a damn being here. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
Just go reread the thread Re: For John Clark october 2013... or read the last 5 years of John Clark Bullshit... for someone who don't give a damn about comp, that someone spent years of his own life answering bullshit about it... (but like he said... who's he ? you ? the great spaghetti monster maybe. Quentin 2014-10-26 19:27 GMT+01:00 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: 2014-10-26 18:58 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Sun, Oct 26, 2014 at 11:43 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, That is not relevant for the point you made. Like hell it isn't! Everett was talking about predictions, you're talking about the sense of self and that has zero to do with predictions, good ones or bad. As for Quentin, he's talking about insults. Yes after 5 years of stupid arguments on your side... I gave up you're a troll, and you should just stop posting useless things here. you're talking about the sense of self Quentin validly convince everybody that if your refutation was valid for the classical comp FPI, then it is valid on Everett too. I hope that is not true, if it is it doesn't say much about the quality of the people on this list because Quentin's idea of a reasoned argument is John Clark is a poo poo head. that is simply not relevant for the use of the FPI I don't see what it has to do with the Foreign Policy Institute either. Yeah go learn dancing at UDA and gives us a break, you clearly don't give a damn being here. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 12:17:34AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal (experienced) world if COMP is true. OK then comp is false. And now that we know that comp is false what's the point of talking about it anymore? So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? Although I don't know it for certain I strongly suspect that beta decay is not computable, I think it's random; but I think it could provide at best a few dozen digits not a infinite number of digits that the Real Numbers require. But never mind, if you want it to be true then comp is true, or if you prefer it to be false then comp is false. I won't fight you over it because I don't give a damn about comp one way or the other. If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question has an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length of time we're prepared to continue performing this operation. This is not a few dozen digits at best that you claim. The sequence is, as you concur, likely to be not computable, and COMP predicts that such sequences should exist phenomenally. If beta decay arrival times proved to be computable, as (for example) Juergen Schmidhuber suggests, it would actually be a serious blow to COMP, though not quite fatal as we may find some other sequence in nature that is random. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question has an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length of time we're prepared to continue performing this operation. This is not a few dozen digits at best that you claim. Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get a arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real Numbers why can't we do the same thing with just one fundamental particle like one electron? Again I'm not claiming to have a answer I'm just asking a question. The sequence is, as you concur, likely to be not computable If it's not computable it doesn't follow that non-computable numbers must be causing the electrons to do what they do, nothing at all may be causing it to do what it does. After all, there is no law of logic that demands every event have a cause. and COMP predicts that [...] I don't care what COMP predicts, I don't know what it means and even though Bruno invented the word I don't believe he does either. If beta decay arrival times proved to be computable, as (for example) Juergen Schmidhuber suggests, If beta decay is computable then all bets are off. But is it? I would be much more impressed by claims that everything in Quantum Mechanics is computable if somebody would just compute something. it would actually be a serious blow to COMP, If you say so, but I don't care if COMP is dealt a serious blow or not. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 26 Oct 2014, at 1:28 am, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: If you say so, but I don't care if COMP is dealt a serious blow or not. John K Clark You must care you bloody blowhard because you daily go to considerable lengths to show just how important it is to you. It’s rather amusing to see someone write that that they don’t care about what they clearly care about. Talk about self-referentially incorrect. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 10:28:40AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: If you sample the Geiger counter every second, and ask the question has an electron triggered the counter in the previous second, one gets a sequence of zeros and ones, that is bounded only by the length of time we're prepared to continue performing this operation. This is not a few dozen digits at best that you claim. Yes, if you used a arbitrarily large number of electrons you could get a arbitrarily large number of digits, and you could do the same thing with a arbitrarily large number of dice. But if physics works by Real Numbers why can't we do the same thing with just one fundamental particle like one electron? Again I'm not claiming to have a answer I'm just asking a question. Assuming that position lies on a continuum, and assuming that our technological prowess shows no bounds to how accurate we can measure something, then yes, we could continuing measuring the same particle with continuously improved measuring devices, and obtain a noncomputable sequence. But what I proposed with the Geiger counter is easier to do, and sufficient for the point. The sequence is, as you concur, likely to be not computable If it's not computable it doesn't follow that non-computable numbers must be causing the electrons to do what they do, nothing at all may be causing it to do what it does. After all, there is no law of logic that demands every event have a cause. I don't know where you're going with that ramble. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: the only one giving ambiguity is you In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is giving ambiguity; in such a world personal pronouns should only be used with enormous care. It has always been clear that *you should follow the diary and what's written on them*... In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who Quentin Anciaux is giving advice to, nor is it clear which diary should be followed as there are 2, the machine duplicated the diary too, and it was much easier to do than duplicating the brain. But I don't expect you to do so, it would be acknowledging you're an asshole and a troll for years... which you are of course. In a world where matter duplication machines exist it is not clear who is a asshole and a troll . And isn't a troll that's been around for years a oxymoron, like clearly confused? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 Oct 2014, at 21:36, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable, Yes. but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for him, now. Nice. and the brain that receives information about Washington will think about Washington, Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Washington, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for him, now. Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4? and the question which one is you can not be answered because in these circumstances the word you has no unique referent . What? When I go in Washington to interview John-Clark-from-Washington, I use you without no trouble. The same in Moscow. you did survive, but are duplicated. There is no problem for your first person view. That view remains all the time unique from that point of view. Yet, from that first person view, a choice has been made between Washington and Moscow. As comp predicts, you, each of you, get one bit of information, despite no external observer got anyone. The randomness here is guaranty pure private or subjective, or first person. Likewise, in the iterated self-duplication, it is a simple exercise to show that the best bet about the possible experience is that you will live is white noise. It is equivalent with looking a polarized photon split beam, you don't expect it to not split! In front of arithmetic, it is a far more difficult problem, and comp confronts us with it, unless (by the Movie Graph Argument UDA step 8) you give magical special selection power to primary matter (that nobody has ever detect for obvious reason). Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett QM, both the frequentist and those like Deutsch using decision theory. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal (experienced) world if COMP is true. OK then comp is false. And now that we know that comp is false what's the point of talking about it anymore? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 7:10 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not computable too. Any integer can be calculated with a Turing machine that has unlimited tape and time, and even with a finite tape and finite time good approximations can be found for the rational numbers and some irrational numbers, even a few transcendental numbers, but for nearly all real numbers not even approximations can be calculated, not even with a infinite tape and infinite time. They're just not computable. And if a mechanical process like a Turing Machine can't produce them can the Real numbers have anything to do with physics? I don't claim to have a answer I'm just asking a question. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 24 Oct 2014, at 01:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model of the world. But you left out the just. Yes, because if you're going to retreat to a just a model of the world viewpoint then you have to be prepared for the fact that it affects everything else. You're basically postmodernising the entire scientific enterprise. No, I'm just pointing out we can't be sure that something that is part of our model of the world is part of reality; The map is not the territory, but when well used, the map is still a part of the territory. and this is exactly the same as being uncertain that there are real numbers. Yeah, but we might try not doing philosophy. A TOE must just be clear about what is assumed, and what is derived. Physicalist assumes a physical universe, and, too bad, a physical universe is what I want to derive from simpler idea. Physics is a wonderful science of nature, but it assumes what I think we can prove to be an aspect of something else. In spite of Kronecker, the integers are just as much a human invention as the reals. How do you know that? You make that theory. But with computationalism we explain the functioning of the human brain, and even its apparent observable quantum constitution by assuming numbers and relations between numbers. Do you think that when Ramanujan died, the extravagance of the number 24 disappeared? Are you not confusing the human theories and works in their exploration of some realities and that realities. The sum of consecutive odd numbers, starting from zero, gives the square. Do you think that this can be invented? We shouldn't take our models to seriously. We may find a better one next week. Exactly. And the physical primary universe idea might be among those models we might stop taking too much seriously. A refinement of Wigner question is why does group theory play a so crucial role in physics.? Normally this should stem from the symmetry at the sigma_1 bottom (where p - []p is satisfied, and we get a quantization). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Like Quentin explained to you more than once, your reference problem, if it was a valid argument against the FPI, would be valid also about Everett QM, Like I explained to you more than once, Everett was interested in predictions but you are interested in consciousness, more particularly in the continuity of the sense of self, and that has absolutely positively 100% nothing to do with predictions, not good predictions and not bad predictions either. In fact the continuity of self has nothing to do with the future at all, you might not even have a future, all that matters is if you remember being Bruno Marchal yesterday. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Not that it matters if the prediction was correct or not but did the old prediction say who was supposed to see Washington and Moscow? Suddenly he understands the question, and realizes that what city he saw is not enough information to determine if the prediction was correct, not that it makes the slightest difference if it was a good prediction or bad because in dealing with the sense of self only the past and present are important, Mr. He may not even have a future but Mr. He would still feel like he was the same person he was yesterday. and the brain that receives information about Washington will think about Washington, Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Washington, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for him, now. Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4? I too have a marvelous proof, it shows that 1+1 does not equal 2 as had been thought for thousands of years but is actually equal to 1. Here is my proof: I take a cookie and place it in a red box and put it on a shelf. I take another cookie and place it in a blue box and add it to the shelf. I now open the red box and count the cookies in it and find that there is only 1. Therefore 1+1 =1. QED Question: Can anybody find an error in my proof? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
2014-10-24 22:02 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:35 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Moscow, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Not that it matters if the prediction was correct or not but did the old prediction say who was supposed to see Washington and Moscow? Suddenly he understands the question, and realizes that what city he saw is not enough information to determine if the prediction was correct, not that it makes the slightest difference if it was a good prediction or bad because in dealing with the sense of self only the past and present are important, Mr. He may not even have a future but Mr. He would still feel like he was the same person he was yesterday. and the brain that receives information about Washington will think about Washington, Excellent, and so he will write in his diary result of the experience: Washington, after having quickly scratch his old prediction Washington and Moscow. Suddenly he understands the question, and the step 4 makes sense for him, now. Now that everyone understand, we can proceed. So hat about step 4? I too have a marvelous proof, it shows that 1+1 does not equal 2 as had been thought for thousands of years but is actually equal to 1. Here is my proof: I take a cookie and place it in a red box and put it on a shelf. I take another cookie and place it in a blue box and add it to the shelf. I now open the red box and count the cookies in it and find that there is only 1. Therefore 1+1 =1. QED Question: Can anybody find an error in my proof? Easy... John Clark is stupid... another one ? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 12:38:48PM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 6:55 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal (experienced) world if COMP is true. OK then comp is false. And now that we know that comp is false what's the point of talking about it anymore? So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Fri, Oct 24, 2014 at 7:19 PM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal (experienced) world if COMP is true. OK then comp is false. And now that we know that comp is false what's the point of talking about it anymore? So you know for certainty that the arrival times of electrons in a Geiger counter from a beta decay source is computable. How? Although I don't know it for certain I strongly suspect that beta decay is not computable, I think it's random; but I think it could provide at best a few dozen digits not a infinite number of digits that the Real Numbers require. But never mind, if you want it to be true then comp is true, or if you prefer it to be false then comp is false. I won't fight you over it because I don't give a damn about comp one way or the other. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 October 2014 13:23, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently makes me think it deserves a second look. In other words, you've spent a lot of time hurling invective at something you don't actually know anything about. No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's proof and stopped reading when I made the determination that he didn't know what he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I made the wrong decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage capacity I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and Bruno's proof didn't make the cut. Nevertheless, a lot of highly intelligent people (like Brent and Russell) have followed Bruno's proof all the way through, and although they may have issues with it, they don't rail constantly against step 3. You're the only person who does this. Maybe you would like to consider the possibility that these clever people have noticed something that - despite, no doubt, being equally clever - you've missed. There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 October 2014 13:35, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM, the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus couple of real numbers), same for momentum. In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems to be refuted on this point. Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ... To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some finite precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the needle of an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next. Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and eigenvectors drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And even then, countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to. Um, does that mean you agree with me? :-) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs and calculations. So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one determine what it is? Obviously it's larger than Graham's Number (It could become known as Brent's Number!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model of the world. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 Oct 2014, at 04:14, meekerdb wrote: On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM, the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus couple of real numbers), same for momentum. In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems to be refuted on this point. Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ... To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some finite precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the needle of an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next. Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and eigenvectors drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And even then, countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to. But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs and calculations. All depends on what you assume. The idea is: let us start from simple, and if we need something more, we can add more. Once we assume the brain is turing emulable, then it is emulated infinitely often in arithmetic, and the question is more: does this define a unique universe, a unique multiverse, ... or not? Arithmetic needs its Gleason theorem, and the intensional variant of provability shows that the machine dreams might be enough linear and symmetrical for that. Does all physical realities have to exploit Unitary = e^i * (self-adjointness)? Bruno Brent Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 Oct 2014, at 03:41, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Wait? How long should I wait? Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or not. The disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for the search of a proof of Goldbach in ZF, you might have to wait a bit long more. You can bound the running time of the programs with the Busy Beaver function (BB). The answer to your question is : no more than BB(k) seconds where k is the number of bit used to describe the program you ask if it stops or not. I assume a machine doing computational step in one second. If the program is to find the smallest even integer greater than 2 that is not the sum of two primes and then stop, and if there are no even integers greater than 2 that are not the sum of two primes then I will be waiting forever for it to stop and forever be uncertain if Goldbach is true or not. Maybe someday it will find such a number and stop or maybe there is no such number and it will never stop; but the Busy Beaver function is only defined for the class of Turing Machines that eventually stop, and nobody knows if the the Goldbach Turing Machine is of that class or not. And even if it is and Busy Beaver has a meaning for it nobody knows what number BB(k) is and nobody has anyway of calculating it so it does me no good whatsoever. Do you think real numbers exist or do you not? What I think is of no concern to you. Sorry for asking such a personal question. I work in a theory (computationalism + an infinitesimal use of Occam Razor, and the classical theory of knowledge). In that theory, the real numbers do not exist, as what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. But the real numbers still exists at the machine epistemological level. So at the human epistemological level Harry Potter exists. I don't see your point, nor if there is a point. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 23 Oct 2014, at 02:23, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently makes me think it deserves a second look. In other words, you've spent a lot of time hurling invective at something you don't actually know anything about. No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's proof and stopped reading when I made the determination that he didn't know what he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I made the wrong decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage capacity I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and Bruno's proof didn't make the cut. No. You have pretended that something did not follow, but when asked what you have offered until now, as Liz just said, are semantical quibbles. + hand wavings, mockeries of the entire field, and many ad hominem unfair allusions. In the original thesis, as I was told that I might have some jury member allergic to thought experiences, I manage to use them only to motivate the technical definitions of the modal probability one (with S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*). AUDA (the arithmetical UDA), technically does not need UDA. It makes the reasoning embedded in computer science, indeed even in arithmetic. But you are providing evidence that some people propagate rumors like if there was something controversial about what you call my proof, which is only the formulation of a problem, and the attempt of solution is AUDA. To negate the step three, you have to build a robot able to predict its first person diary continuation in a WM-like duplication. As Kim remarked, the impossibility of this can be understood by kids. Then AUDA exploits the fact that we can even explain this to enough rich machine, using the recursion theoretic tools, and defined in mathematics, indeed in arithmetic, what we mean by understand (indeed using Gödel's provability predicate or variants). Do the work John. If not, try at least to be more cautious with the words. Only idiots pronounce judgement on what they do not understand. Want to play that role? Be my guess. The problem for you, is that the very tone that you are using will not help you to change your mind. I do suspect you have had the aha! more than one time, but then you prefer to stop the thinking and come back with your attitude of nobody can doubt physics is the fundamental science. That dogmatic attitude will just prevent your ability to conceive other fundamental theories. Many physicists are open to the idea that physics might eventually be explained mathematically, with or without comp, like on the other side number theorists flirt with fundamental physics, almost for their pure number theoretical motivation. You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable, but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this for having a theory unifying what we can observe and shared, what we can live and experience, what we can conceive, and what we can hope + the minimal amount of the inconceivable (here limited to 0, s(0), s(s(0)) ... with their addition laws and their multiplication laws). Here we is for the ideally arithmetically sound machines. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers, particularly the non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them. And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles and crystalline spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model, but I want to know if the Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but part of our the world . John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's proof and stopped reading when I made the determination that he didn't know what he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I made the wrong decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage capacity I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and Bruno's proof didn't make the cut. Nevertheless, a lot of highly intelligent people (like Brent and Russell) have followed Bruno's proof all the way through, and although they may have issues with it, they don't rail constantly against step 3. You're the only person who does this. As I said I no longer remember what any of the steps were and see no reason to refresh my memory, but if I was the only one to catch a blunder in step 3 then good for me. I do remember that Bruno made a big deal about something he called first person indeterminacy that on first reading seemed utterly ridiculous to me and when questioned extensively about it over a period of many months (I hope never to see Helsinki or Moscow) proved incapable of defending it. He also maintained that the chain of personal identity depends on how accurately your predictions about the future were are rather than remembering who you were yesterday, and that is even more ridiculous. Maybe you would like to consider the possibility that these clever people have noticed something that - despite, no doubt, being equally clever - you've missed. Neither Bruno nor Brent nor Russell nor anybody else has come even close to answering the objections I have to my satisfaction, if fact the defense was so inept it only reinforced my opinion that Bruno didn't know what he was talking about. And I refuse to accept anybody's idea on faith. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble. I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal pronouns, and that is far more than a quibble, it strikes at the very core of his ideas. The entire point of Bruno's proof and accompanied thought experiments is to make words like I and you and he crystal clear. In our normal everyday world such words have little ambiguity; but in a world where matter duplication machines exist ( and the only reason we don't have such machines already is engineering difficulties not scientific difficulties) such words have a LOT of ambiguity. Nevertheless from the very beginning Bruno assumes that even after the duplication everything has already been cleared up and so he says stuff like you will see this and he will predict that. It is not allowed to assume what you're trying to prove. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: You got the idea that consciousness is not localizable, Yes. but it seems that you fail to appreciate the consequences on this I believe it's you who has not integrated the consequences of consciousness not having a location. So it is meaningless to ask what city will you be in?, all that can be said is that the brain that receives information about Moscow will think about Moscow and the brain that receives information about Washington will think about Washington, and the question which one is you can not be answered because in these circumstances the word you has no unique referent . John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
2014-10-23 21:21 GMT+02:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 3:30 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: There are much more interesting objections to Bruno's proof than the one you cite, which appears to be, at best, a semantic quibble. I assume you're referring to Bruno's irresponsible use of personal pronouns, and that is far more than a quibble, it strikes at the very core of his ideas. The entire point of Bruno's proof and accompanied thought experiments is to make words like I and you and he crystal clear. In our normal everyday world such words have little ambiguity; but in a world where matter duplication machines exist ( and the only reason we don't have such machines already is engineering difficulties not scientific difficulties) such words have a LOT of ambiguity. Nevertheless from the very beginning Bruno assumes that even after the duplication everything has already been cleared up and so he says stuff like you will see this and he will predict that. It is not allowed to assume what you're trying to prove. No, the only one giving ambiguity is you... It has always been clear that *you should follow the diary and what's written on them*... But I don't expect you to do so, it would be acknowledging you're an asshole and a troll for years... which you are of course. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs and calculations. So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one determine what it is? I think we invented the integers, so it's up to us whether we want there to be a largest integer. It is certainly is more convenient to reason about some things by assuming there is not, but that's true of real numbers too. Brent Obviously it's larger than Graham's Number (It could become known as Brent's Number!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model of the world. But you left out the just. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model of the world. But you left out the just. Yes, because if you're going to retreat to a just a model of the world viewpoint then you have to be prepared for the fact that it affects everything else. You're basically postmodernising the entire scientific enterprise. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/23/2014 12:36 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs and calculations. So do you think there's a largest integer? If so, how might one determine what it is? I think we invented the integers, so it's up to us whether we want there to be a largest integer. It is certainly is more convenient to reason about some things by assuming there is not, but that's true of real numbers too. I don't know what you mean by invented the integers. And whenever I've asked I get a vague handwavey answer, and then you say you have no viewpoint so it isn't worth arguing with you. So, OK, whatever. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Thu, Oct 23, 2014 at 01:08:37PM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers, particularly the non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them. And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles and crystalline spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model, but I want to know if the Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but part of our the world . John K Clark Bruno's argument shows that they must be a part of the phenomenal (experienced) world if COMP is true. They needn't be ontological, though. But then that's exactly the argument you reject! -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/23/2014 10:08 AM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 10:29 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. I'm more worried about the Real Numbers than the Rational Numbers, particularly the non-computable Real Numbers which are almost all of them. They are non-computable by a Turing machine - which is already assumed to have unlimited tape and time. It is likely that in the real world almost all integers are not computable too. Brent And they're certainly part of our model of the world just as epicycles and crystalline spheres surrounding the Earth were part of the Medieval model, but I want to know if the Real Numbers are part of, not of our model, but part of our the world . John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/23/2014 1:56 PM, LizR wrote: On 24 October 2014 09:09, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/23/2014 12:37 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 October 2014 15:29, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. That isn't too surprising. Anything we can think about is part of a model of the world. But you left out the just. Yes, because if you're going to retreat to a just a model of the world viewpoint then you have to be prepared for the fact that it affects everything else. You're basically postmodernising the entire scientific enterprise. No, I'm just pointing out we can't be sure that something that is part of our model of the world is part of reality; and this is exactly the same as being uncertain that there are real numbers. In spite of Kronecker, the integers are just as much a human invention as the reals. We shouldn't take our models to seriously. We may find a better one next week. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Richard On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/21/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote: On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. Interesting. In Bruno's TOE, real numbers don't exist in the same way as integers, much in the spirit of Kronecker's famous quote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_Kronecker Quantum theory would appear to support Kronecker. Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Brent Relativity is more concerned with real numbers, not to mention continua - but I have a feeling that most physicists would bet on QM as being closer to reality than GR, if pushed. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 21 Oct 2014, at 17:14, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: people proposing a Super Turing Machines are much more vague. I was not proposing any Super Turing machines. I was alluding that the simple algorithm consisting to run a machine and wait if it stops or not is enough toi compute the Halting oracle Wait? How long should I wait? Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or not. The disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for the search of a proof of Goldbach in ZF, you might have to wait a bit long more. You can bound the running time of the programs with the Busy Beaver function (BB). The answer to your question is : no more than BB(k) seconds where k is the number of bit used to describe the program you ask if it stops or not. I assume a machine doing computational step in one second. If it's still going after a million years should I give up and conclude it will never stop, how about a billion, it it's still going after a hundred thousand million billion trillion years how do I know it won't stop in the next 3 seconds? You can bound it by the BB functions, of course, you cannot compute it, but it means that in the limit, you do compute the function. In that sense, time acts as a halting machine oracle. I never pretend that this is feasible, but there is a sense that a universe might do that, or a portion of that. I don't not assume set theory, infinities, etc. So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. Interesting. If so then not everything that mathematics is capable of describing exists, and the same is true of another language, English. Computationalism implies the arithmetical Platonia is quite enough. You can put the real numbers in the machine's epistemology. You don't need ontological real numbers. In nearly every post you say I'm confused, but this time I really am. Do you think real numbers exist or do you not? What I think is of no concern to you. I work in a theory (computationalism + an infinitesimal use of Occam Razor, and the classical theory of knowledge). In that theory, the real numbers do not exist, as what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. But the real numbers still exists at the machine epistemological level. Some can even be physical, and some are only in the mind of the machine, notably as useful tool for reasoning about machines and their behavior, a bit like the use of analysis on problem in (natural) number theory. you need to unstuck your mind in step 3 First you need to fix the first 3 steps. You have already agreed with step 0, 1, 2. Have I? I haven't looked at it in years, You seem to use a lot of energy to not understand. if you put a gun to my head I could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently makes me think it deserves a second look. Your refutation of step 3 confused the first person view [blah blah] Yeah yeah I've heard it all before a thousand times: you're the first human being in the history of the world to realize that there is a difference between the first person and the third person, You said that. The point is that if you accept the definition given, then the FPI is a triviality to prove, and then you can move on step 4. That's all. Bruno and the distinction still confuses the particular first person who is writing this sentence. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 22 Oct 2014, at 05:05, LizR wrote: On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. Interesting. In Bruno's TOE, real numbers don't exist in the same way as integers, much in the spirit of Kronecker's famous quote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_Kronecker Quantum theory would appear to support Kronecker. I am in a period teaching quantum mechanics (and quantum computations), and I agree that Quantum theory would support Kronecker at some level. In fact QM is much more pythagorean than comp, mainly because it defines the probabilities from Pythagoras theorem. But a qubit state seems to need arbitrary complex numbers, and I am not sure we can get rid of them if we assume a real universal wave, even with gravitation. String theory also gives to real numbers some apparent importance. (Total open problem in the comp theory, if that needs to be mentionned. A case exists that some real number appearance exists in the probabilities of continuations). Relativity is more concerned with real numbers, not to mention continua - but I have a feeling that most physicists would bet on QM as being closer to reality than GR, if pushed. I think so. I have never seen a serious proposal to change QM (except the abandon of the collapse 'course, or the adding of non local hidden variable, but they keep QM, just adds things). Even without QM, I think GR is an approximation, like Newton physics. Yet it is amazing how much gravitation is hard to integrate with QM. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM, the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus couple of real numbers), same for momentum. In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems to be refuted on this point. Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ... Bruno Richard On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 10/21/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote: On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. Interesting. In Bruno's TOE, real numbers don't exist in the same way as integers, much in the spirit of Kronecker's famous quote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_Kronecker Quantum theory would appear to support Kronecker. Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Brent Relativity is more concerned with real numbers, not to mention continua - but I have a feeling that most physicists would bet on QM as being closer to reality than GR, if pushed. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:03 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently makes me think it deserves a second look. In other words, you've spent a lot of time hurling invective at something you don't actually know anything about. No, in other words several years ago I started to read Bruno's proof and stopped reading when I made the determination that he didn't know what he was talking about. Nothing Bruno has said since then has made me think I made the wrong decision. And as my brain doesn't not have infinite storage capacity I must pick and choose what to put into long term storage and Bruno's proof didn't make the cut. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM, the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus couple of real numbers), same for momentum. In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems to be refuted on this point. Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ... To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some finite precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the needle of an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next. Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and eigenvectors drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And even then, countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Wait? How long should I wait? Well, it depends which programs you want to know if it stops or not. The disonaur program stopped. In case it is that one. But for the search of a proof of Goldbach in ZF, you might have to wait a bit long more. You can bound the running time of the programs with the Busy Beaver function (BB). The answer to your question is : no more than BB(k) seconds where k is the number of bit used to describe the program you ask if it stops or not. I assume a machine doing computational step in one second. If the program is to find the smallest even integer greater than 2 that is not the sum of two primes and then stop, and if there are no even integers greater than 2 that are not the sum of two primes then I will be waiting forever for it to stop and forever be uncertain if Goldbach is true or not. Maybe someday it will find such a number and stop or maybe there is no such number and it will never stop; but the Busy Beaver function is only defined for the class of Turing Machines that eventually stop, and nobody knows if the the Goldbach Turing Machine is of that class or not. And even if it is and Busy Beaver has a meaning for it nobody knows what number BB(k) is and nobody has anyway of calculating it so it does me no good whatsoever. Do you think real numbers exist or do you not? What I think is of no concern to you. Sorry for asking such a personal question. I work in a theory (computationalism + an infinitesimal use of Occam Razor, and the classical theory of knowledge). In that theory, the real numbers do not exist, as what exists is only 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. But the real numbers still exists at the machine epistemological level. So at the human epistemological level Harry Potter exists. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/22/2014 5:35 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 05:23:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Oct 2014, at 11:37, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, That is certainly true for Schrodinger's equations, but is it also true for matrix theory? Re: real and complex numbers. Why would it be different for the matrix. In non relativistic QM, the position observable in a continuous matrix of complex (and thus couple of real numbers), same for momentum. In a quantized space-time, that might be different. But we don't find good quantization for space-time, I think. Loop gravity seems to be refuted on this point. Note also that if Brent is right that QM assume real numbers, it does not imply that nature (whatever that is) needs them. All what we can measure are rational numbers. Is there a circle in nature. I think plausible that circle exists only in the mind of machine in arithmetic, or they exists as infinite collection of natural numbers with some relations, etc. Well, it has to like that if we assume computationalism, and don't eliminate consciousness to save a primary matter that nobody has seen or even can defined ... To reiterate on Bruno's point, observables corresponding to x or d/dx do not exist in reality. Every measurement made is done to some finite precision - the number of digits of a numerical readout, or the needle of an analogue meter lying between one graduation and the next. Consequently, the actual observables have eigenvalues and eigenvectors drawn from the rational complex numbers. Reals do not exist except as an approximation that is convenient for doing calculations. And even then, countable models of the reals' axioms exist, by virtue of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem. These countable models exist in Bruno's ontology, and suffice for any practical purpose QM is put to. But by the same kind of positivist attitude there's no reason to think that every integer has a successor. It's just a convenient assumption for doing proofs and calculations. Brent Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 10/22/2014 7:12 PM, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Oct 22, 2014 at 1:30 AM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net Quantum mechanics assumes real and complex numbers. Quantum mechanics works very well, but every time we've tested it with experiment the values we put into it and the values we measure after the experiment have only had values at best a dozen or so places to the right of the decimal point. Are we justified in extrapolating from that that it would work just as well if there were a infinite number if digits to the right of the decimal point? I honestly don't know. I think it's just a convenience for reasoning about rational numbers. But then I also think rational numbers are just part of our model of the world. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 18 Oct 2014, at 19:48, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 18, 2014 at 1:22 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Gödel shows that there are solution of Einstein's equation of gravitation with closed timelike curves, making them consistent. But only if you assume that the Universe is rotating, and experimental evidence proves that it is not. And only if you assume that Einstein's General Theory of Relativity is 100% correct, and we know it can't be, it's the best theory of gravity we have but it can't be the final word because it doesn't take Quantum Mechanics into account. I was alluding to the usual time. It tells you which machines stop and which does not stop if you wait a long time enough Turing showed exactly how his machine worked and then proved that his machine can not tell if a arbitrary program will ever stop, Yes I provided this more than once here. It is easy and Post saw this too, before Turing. but people proposing a Super Turing Machines are much more vague. I was not proposing any Super Turing machines. I was alluding that the simple algorithm consisting to run a machine and wait if it stops or not, is enough toi compute the Halting oracle in the limit. This has been proved by Schoenfiled, and is in all textbook on computability (sometimes under the name the modulus lemma: the limit-computable functions are the one computable in the halting oracle. If a machine performed one calculations in the first second, and one calculation in the next 1/2 second and then one calculation in the next 1/4 second etc then if you sum the geometric series you find it has performed a infinite number of calculations in exactly 2 seconds. But the problem is (apart from not specifying how the machine could actually work that fast) is that after 2 seconds the machine is in a unspecified state. Or you could make a computer that made use of the real numbers, it could tell if a arbitrary program will stop or not but I'm not even convinced that real numbers exist in abstract Platonia; and even if they do it's very hard to see how such a machine could ever be built. if a machine can't produce a non-computable number even approximately, (and nearly all the real numbers are non-computable) then it's hard to see how a a non-computable number could have any effect on a machine. I don't not assume set theory, infinities, etc. So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. If so then not everything that mathematics is capable of describing exists, and the same is true of another language, English. Computationalism implies the arithmetical Platonia is quite enough. You can put the real numbers in the machine's epistemology. You don't need ontological real numbers. you need to unstuck your mind in step 3 First you need to fix the first 3 steps. You have already agreed with step 0, 1, 2. Your refutation of step 3 confused the first person view (the diary content of individual people going out of the reconstitution box) and the third person views (the collection of all memory content). The details are in the posts, or in the paper. You did understand sometimes, but then you say it is not great, or not important, but you fail to answer why you don't read the next step 4, then. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: people proposing a Super Turing Machines are much more vague. I was not proposing any Super Turing machines. I was alluding that the simple algorithm consisting to run a machine and wait if it stops or not is enough toi compute the Halting oracle Wait? How long should I wait? If it's still going after a million years should I give up and conclude it will never stop, how about a billion, it it's still going after a hundred thousand million billion trillion years how do I know it won't stop in the next 3 seconds? I don't not assume set theory, infinities, etc. So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. Interesting. If so then not everything that mathematics is capable of describing exists, and the same is true of another language, English. Computationalism implies the arithmetical Platonia is quite enough. You can put the real numbers in the machine's epistemology. You don't need ontological real numbers. In nearly every post you say I'm confused, but this time I really am. Do you think real numbers exist or do you not? you need to unstuck your mind in step 3 First you need to fix the first 3 steps. You have already agreed with step 0, 1, 2. Have I? I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently makes me think it deserves a second look. Your refutation of step 3 confused the first person view [blah blah] Yeah yeah I've heard it all before a thousand times: you're the first human being in the history of the world to realize that there is a difference between the first person and the third person, and the distinction still confuses the particular first person who is writing this sentence. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. Interesting. In Bruno's TOE, real numbers don't exist in the same way as integers, much in the spirit of Kronecker's famous quote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_Kronecker -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 22 October 2014 04:14, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Have I? I haven't looked at it in years, if you put a gun to my head I could no longer even tell you what steps 0, 1, or 2 were or if it was in step 3 that I decided that the entire thing was worthless or if it was in some other step, and nothing you have said more recently makes me think it deserves a second look. In other words, you've spent a lot of time hurling invective at something you don't actually know anything about. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: MGA revisited paper + supervenience
On 22 October 2014 08:40, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 11:14:14AM -0400, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 21, 2014 at 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: So you don't assume the real numbers exist? Indeed. Interesting. In Bruno's TOE, real numbers don't exist in the same way as integers, much in the spirit of Kronecker's famous quote: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leopold_Kronecker Quantum theory would appear to support Kronecker. Relativity is more concerned with real numbers, not to mention continua - but I have a feeling that most physicists would bet on QM as being closer to reality than GR, if pushed. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.