Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Colin Hales]

Hi Mike,
I can give the highly abridged flow of the argument:

!) It refutes COMP , where COMP = Turing machine-style abstract symbol 
manipulation. In particular the 'digital computer' as we know it.
2) The refutation happens in one highly specific circumstance. In being 
false in that circumstance it is false as a general claim.
3) The circumstances:  If COMP is true then it should be able to 
implement an artificial scientist with the following faculties:
   (a) scientific behaviour (goal-delivery of a 'law of nature', an 
abstraction BEHIND the appearances of the distal natural world, not 
merely the report of what is there),

   (b) scientific observation based on the visual scene,
   (c) scientific behaviour in an encounter with radical novelty. (This 
is what humans do)


The argument's empirical knowledge is:
1) The visual scene is visual phenomenal consciousness. A highly 
specified occipital lobe deliverable.
2) In the context of a scientific act, scientific evidence is 'contents 
of phenomenal consciousness'. You can't do science without it. In the 
context of this scientific act, visual P-consciousness and scientific 
evidence are identities. P-consciousness is necessary but on its own is 
not sufficient. Extra behaviours are needed, but these are a secondary 
consideration here.


NOTE: Do not confuse "scientific observation"  with the "scientific 
measurement", which is a collection of causality located in the distal 
external natural world. (Scientific measurement is not the same thing as 
scientific evidence, in this context). The necessary feature of a visual 
scene is that it operate whilst faithfully inheriting the actual 
causality of the distal natural world. You cannot acquire a law of 
nature without this basic need being met.


3) Basic physics says that it is impossible for a brain to create a 
visual scene using only the inputs acquired by the peripheral stimulus 
received at the retina. This is due to fundamentals of quantum 
degeneracy. Basically there are an infinite number of distal external 
worlds that can deliver the exact same photon impact. The transduction 
that occurs in the retinal rod/cones is entirely a result of protein 
isomerisation. All information about distal origins is irretievably 
gone. An impacting photon could have come across the room or across the 
galaxy. There is no information about origins in the transduced data in 
the retina.


That established, you are then faced with a paradox:

(i) (3) says a visual scene is impossible.
(ii) Yet the brain makes one.
(iii) To make the scene some kind of access to distal spatial relations 
must be acquired as input data in addition to that from the retina.

(iv) There are only 2 places that can come from...
   (a) via matter (which we already have - retinal impact at the 
boundary that is the agent periphery)
   (b) via space (at the boundary of the matter of the brain with 
space, the biggest boundary by far).
So, the conclusion is that the brain MUST acquire the necessary data via 
the spatial boundary route. You don't have to know how. You just have no 
other choice. There is no third party in there to add the necessary data 
and the distal world is unknown. There is literally nowhere else for the 
data to come from. Matter and Space exhaust the list of options. (There 
is alway magical intervention ... but I leave that to the space cadets.)


That's probably the main novelty for the reader to  to encounter. But we 
are not done yet.


Next empirical fact:
(v) When  you create a turing-COMP substrate the interface with space is 
completely destroyed and replaced with the randomised machinations of 
the matter of the computer manipulating a model of the distal world. All 
actual relationships with the real distal external world are destroyed. 
In that circumstance the COMP substrate is implementing the science of 
an encounter with a model, not an encounter with the actual distal 
natural world.


No amount of computation can make up for that loss, because you are in a 
circumstance of an intrinsically unknown distal natural world, (the 
novelty of an act of scientific observation).

.
=> COMP is false.
==
OK.  There are subtleties here.
The refutation is, in effect, a result of saying you can't do it 
(replace a scientist with a computer) because you can't simulate inputs. 
It is just the the nature of 'inputs' has been traditionally 
impoverished by assumption born merely of cross-disciplinary blindness.. 
Not enough quantum mechanics or electrodynamics is done by those exposed 
to 'COMP' principles.


This result, at first appearance, says "you can't simulate a scientist". 
But you can! If you already know what is out there in the natural world 
then you can simulate a scientific act. But you don't - by definition  - 
you are doing science to find out! So it's not that you can't simulate a 
scientist, it is just that in order to do it you already have to know 
everything, so you don't want to ...

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[William Pearson]

Hi Colin,

I'm not entirely sure that computers can implement consciousness. But
I don't find your arguments sway me one way or the other. A brief
reply follows.

2008/10/4 Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Next empirical fact:
> (v) When  you create a turing-COMP substrate the interface with space is
> completely destroyed and replaced with the randomised machinations of the
> matter of the computer manipulating a model of the distal world. All actual
> relationships with the real distal external world are destroyed. In that
> circumstance the COMP substrate is implementing the science of an encounter
> with a model, not an encounter with the actual distal natural world.
>
> No amount of computation can make up for that loss, because you are in a
> circumstance of an intrinsically unknown distal natural world, (the novelty
> of an act of scientific observation).
> .

But humans don't encounter the world directly, else optical illusions
wouldn't exist, we would know exactly what was going on.

Take this site for example. http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/

It is impossible by physics to do vision perfectly without extra
information, but we do not do vision by any means perfectly, so I see
no need to posit an extra information source.

  Will


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Vladimir Nesov]

Basically, you are saying that there is some unknown physics mojo
going on. The mystery of mind looks as mysterious as mystery of
physics, therefore it requires mystery of physics and can derive
further mysteriousness from it, becoming inherently mysterious. It's
bad, bad non-science.

-- 
Vladimir Nesov
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Mike Tintner]

Hi Colin,

Many thanks for detailed reply. You seem to be taking a long-winding 
philosophical route to asserting that intelligence depends on consciousness, 
in the sense of what I would call a sensory movie of the world - vision + 
sound/smell/taste etc.


I absolutely agree with that basic assertion - but any philosophical 
argument will have no serious interest IMO for AGI-ers.


The only way to change them is to demonstrate the *unique* properties of 
sensory pictures of the world - and why they CANNOT be reduced to 
logical/mathematical/programming/linguistic form, as AGI-ers still wildly 
delude themselves.


(Obviously evolution has taken consciousness as primary for intelligence and 
vastly more important  than logic or any form of rationality  - but AGI-ers, 
unlike the rest of the scientific world, aren't interested in evolution 
either)..


You're dealing with Helen Keller's here :)  - so you have to show them why a 
movie is essential to intelligence in *their* terms

.



Hi Mike,
I can give the highly abridged flow of the argument:

!) It refutes COMP , where COMP = Turing machine-style abstract symbol 
manipulation. In particular the 'digital computer' as we know it.
2) The refutation happens in one highly specific circumstance. In being 
false in that circumstance it is false as a general claim.
3) The circumstances:  If COMP is true then it should be able to implement 
an artificial scientist with the following faculties:
   (a) scientific behaviour (goal-delivery of a 'law of nature', an 
abstraction BEHIND the appearances of the distal natural world, not merely 
the report of what is there),

   (b) scientific observation based on the visual scene,
   (c) scientific behaviour in an encounter with radical novelty. (This is 
what humans do)


The argument's empirical knowledge is:
1) The visual scene is visual phenomenal consciousness. A highly specified 
occipital lobe deliverable.
2) In the context of a scientific act, scientific evidence is 'contents of 
phenomenal consciousness'. You can't do science without it. In the context 
of this scientific act, visual P-consciousness and scientific evidence are 
identities. P-consciousness is necessary but on its own is not sufficient. 
Extra behaviours are needed, but these are a secondary consideration here.


NOTE: Do not confuse "scientific observation"  with the "scientific 
measurement", which is a collection of causality located in the distal 
external natural world. (Scientific measurement is not the same thing as 
scientific evidence, in this context). The necessary feature of a visual 
scene is that it operate whilst faithfully inheriting the actual causality 
of the distal natural world. You cannot acquire a law of nature without 
this basic need being met.


3) Basic physics says that it is impossible for a brain to create a visual 
scene using only the inputs acquired by the peripheral stimulus received 
at the retina. This is due to fundamentals of quantum degeneracy. 
Basically there are an infinite number of distal external worlds that can 
deliver the exact same photon impact. The transduction that occurs in the 
retinal rod/cones is entirely a result of protein isomerisation. All 
information about distal origins is irretievably gone. An impacting photon 
could have come across the room or across the galaxy. There is no 
information about origins in the transduced data in the retina.


That established, you are then faced with a paradox:

(i) (3) says a visual scene is impossible.
(ii) Yet the brain makes one.
(iii) To make the scene some kind of access to distal spatial relations 
must be acquired as input data in addition to that from the retina.

(iv) There are only 2 places that can come from...
   (a) via matter (which we already have - retinal impact at the 
boundary that is the agent periphery)
   (b) via space (at the boundary of the matter of the brain with 
space, the biggest boundary by far).
So, the conclusion is that the brain MUST acquire the necessary data via 
the spatial boundary route. You don't have to know how. You just have no 
other choice. There is no third party in there to add the necessary data 
and the distal world is unknown. There is literally nowhere else for the 
data to come from. Matter and Space exhaust the list of options. (There is 
alway magical intervention ... but I leave that to the space cadets.)


That's probably the main novelty for the reader to  to encounter. But we 
are not done yet.


Next empirical fact:
(v) When  you create a turing-COMP substrate the interface with space is 
completely destroyed and replaced with the randomised machinations of the 
matter of the computer manipulating a model of the distal world. All 
actual relationships with the real distal external world are destroyed. In 
that circumstance the COMP substrate is implementing the science of an 
encounter with a model, not an encounter with the actual distal natural 
world.


No amount of computation 

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Colin Hales]

Hi Will,
It's not an easy thing to fully internalise the implications of quantum 
degeneracy. I find physicists and chemists have no trouble accepting it, 
but in the disciplines above that various levels of mental brick walls 
are in place. Unfortunately physicists and chemists aren't usually asked 
to create vision!... I inhabit an extreme multidisciplinary zone. This 
kind of mental resistance comes with the territory. All I can say is 
'resistance is futile, you will be assimilated' ... eventually. :-) It's 
part of my job to enact the necessary advocacy. In respect of your 
comments I can offer the following:


You are exactly right: humans don't encounter the world directly (naive 
realism). Nor are we entirely operating from a cartoon visual 
fantasy(naive solipsism). You are also exactly right in that vision is 
not 'perfect'. It has more than just a level of indirectness in 
representation, it can malfunction and be fooled - just as you say. In 
the benchmark behaviour: scientific behaviour, we know scientists have 
to enact procedures (all based around the behaviour called 
'objectivity') which minimises the impact of these aspects of our 
scientific observation system.


However, this has nothing to say about the need for an extra information 
source. necessary for there is not enough information in the signals to 
do the job. This is what you cannot see. It took me a long while to 
discard the tendency to project my mental capacity  into the job the 
brain has when it encounters a retinal data stream. In vision processing 
using computing we know the structure of the distal natural world. We 
imagine the photon/CCD camera chip measurements to be the same as that 
of the retina. It looks like a simple reconstruction job.


But it is not like that at all. It is impossible to tell, from the 
signals in their natural state in the brain, whether they are about 
vision or sound or smell. They all look the same. So I did not 
completely reveal the extent of the retinal impact/visual scene 
degeneracy in my post. The degeneracy operates on multiple levels. 
Signal encoding into standardised action potentials is another level.


Maybe I can just paint a mental picture of the job the brain has to do. 
Imagine this:


You have no phenomenal consciousness at all. Your internal life is of a 
dreamless  sleep.

Except ... for a new perceptual mode called Wision.
Looming in front of you embedded in a roughly hemispherical blackness is 
a gigantic array of numbers.

The numbers change.

Now:
a) make a visual scene out of it representing the world outside: convert 
Wision into Vision.
b) do this without any information other than the numbers in front of 
you and without assuming you have any a-priori knowledge of the outside 
world.


That is the job the brain has. Resist the attempt to project your own 
knowledge into the circumstance. You will find the attempt futile.


Regards,

Colin








William Pearson wrote:

Hi Colin,

I'm not entirely sure that computers can implement consciousness. But
I don't find your arguments sway me one way or the other. A brief
reply follows.

2008/10/4 Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
  

Next empirical fact:
(v) When  you create a turing-COMP substrate the interface with space is
completely destroyed and replaced with the randomised machinations of the
matter of the computer manipulating a model of the distal world. All actual
relationships with the real distal external world are destroyed. In that
circumstance the COMP substrate is implementing the science of an encounter
with a model, not an encounter with the actual distal natural world.

No amount of computation can make up for that loss, because you are in a
circumstance of an intrinsically unknown distal natural world, (the novelty
of an act of scientific observation).
.



But humans don't encounter the world directly, else optical illusions
wouldn't exist, we would know exactly what was going on.

Take this site for example. http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/

It is impossible by physics to do vision perfectly without extra
information, but we do not do vision by any means perfectly, so I see
no need to posit an extra information source.

  Will


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[John LaMuth]

 Original Message - 
  From: Colin Hales 
  To: agi@v2.listbox.com 
  Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2008 3:22 PM
  Subject: Re: [agi] COMP = f

  ...

  You are exactly right: humans don't encounter the world directly (naive 
realism). Nor are we entirely operating from a cartoon visual fantasy(naive 
solipsism). 

  ^^

  It is closer to the latter

  How do you explain the vividness of DREAMS ...

  They have the same desynchronized EEG wave patterns as waking CONS. -- 
indistinguishable ! !

  Solution ?  -- We secrete our own awareness/consciousness --  Solipsism is 
Painless

  JLM

  http://www.forebrain.org 


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

The argument seems wrong to me intuitively, but I'm hard-put to argue
against it because the terms are so unclearly defined ... for instance I
don't really know what you mean by a "visual scene" ...

I can understand that to create a form of this argument worthy of being
carefully debated, would be a lot more work than writing this summary email
you've given.

So, I agree with your judgment not to try to extensively debate the argument
in its current sketchily presented form.

If you do choose to present it carefully at some point, I encourage you to
begin by carefully defining all the terms involved ... otherwise it's really
not possible to counter-argue in a useful way ...

thx
ben g

On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 12:31 AM, Colin Hales
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

> Hi Mike,
> I can give the highly abridged flow of the argument:
>
> !) It refutes COMP , where COMP = Turing machine-style abstract symbol
> manipulation. In particular the 'digital computer' as we know it.
> 2) The refutation happens in one highly specific circumstance. In being
> false in that circumstance it is false as a general claim.
> 3) The circumstances:  If COMP is true then it should be able to implement
> an artificial scientist with the following faculties:
>   (a) scientific behaviour (goal-delivery of a 'law of nature', an
> abstraction BEHIND the appearances of the distal natural world, not merely
> the report of what is there),
>   (b) scientific observation based on the visual scene,
>   (c) scientific behaviour in an encounter with radical novelty. (This is
> what humans do)
>
> The argument's empirical knowledge is:
> 1) The visual scene is visual phenomenal consciousness. A highly specified
> occipital lobe deliverable.
> 2) In the context of a scientific act, scientific evidence is 'contents of
> phenomenal consciousness'. You can't do science without it. In the context
> of this scientific act, visual P-consciousness and scientific evidence are
> identities. P-consciousness is necessary but on its own is not sufficient.
> Extra behaviours are needed, but these are a secondary consideration here.
>
> NOTE: Do not confuse "scientific observation"  with the "scientific
> measurement", which is a collection of causality located in the distal
> external natural world. (Scientific measurement is not the same thing as
> scientific evidence, in this context). The necessary feature of a visual
> scene is that it operate whilst faithfully inheriting the actual causality
> of the distal natural world. You cannot acquire a law of nature without this
> basic need being met.
>
> 3) Basic physics says that it is impossible for a brain to create a visual
> scene using only the inputs acquired by the peripheral stimulus received at
> the retina. This is due to fundamentals of quantum degeneracy. Basically
> there are an infinite number of distal external worlds that can deliver the
> exact same photon impact. The transduction that occurs in the retinal
> rod/cones is entirely a result of protein isomerisation. All information
> about distal origins is irretievably gone. An impacting photon could have
> come across the room or across the galaxy. There is no information about
> origins in the transduced data in the retina.
>
> That established, you are then faced with a paradox:
>
> (i) (3) says a visual scene is impossible.
> (ii) Yet the brain makes one.
> (iii) To make the scene some kind of access to distal spatial relations
> must be acquired as input data in addition to that from the retina.
> (iv) There are only 2 places that can come from...
>   (a) via matter (which we already have - retinal impact at the
> boundary that is the agent periphery)
>   (b) via space (at the boundary of the matter of the brain with space,
> the biggest boundary by far).
> So, the conclusion is that the brain MUST acquire the necessary data via
> the spatial boundary route. You don't have to know how. You just have no
> other choice. There is no third party in there to add the necessary data and
> the distal world is unknown. There is literally nowhere else for the data to
> come from. Matter and Space exhaust the list of options. (There is alway
> magical intervention ... but I leave that to the space cadets.)
>
> That's probably the main novelty for the reader to  to encounter. But we
> are not done yet.
>
> Next empirical fact:
> (v) When  you create a turing-COMP substrate the interface with space is
> completely destroyed and replaced with the randomised machinations of the
> matter of the computer manipulating a model of the distal world. All actual
> relationships with the real distal external world are destroyed. In that
> circumstance the COMP substrate is implementing the science of an encounter
> with a model, not an encounter with the actual distal natural world.
>
> No amount of computation can make up for that loss, because you are in a
> circumstance of an intrinsically unknown distal natural world, (the novelty
> of an act of scientific 

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Matt Mahoney]

--- On Sat, 10/4/08, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>Maybe I can just paint a mental picture of the job the brain has to do.
Imagine this:
>
>You have no phenomenal consciousness at all. Your internal life is of a
dreamless  sleep.
>
>Except ... for a new perceptual mode called Wision. 
>
>Looming in front of you embedded in a roughly hemispherical blackness
is a gigantic array of numbers.
>
>The numbers change.
>
>Now: 
>
>a) make a visual scene out of it representing the world outside:
convert Wision into Vision.
>
>b) do this without any information other than the numbers in front of
you and without assuming you have any a-priori knowledge of the outside
world.
>
>That is the job the brain has. Resist the attempt to project your own
knowledge into the circumstance. You will find the attempt futile. 

By "visual scene", I assume you mean the original image impressed on your 
retina, expressed as an array of pixels. The problem you describe is to 
reconstruct this image given the highly filtered and compressed signals that 
make it through your visual perceptual system, like when an artist paints a 
scene from memory. Are you saying that this process requires a consciousness 
because it is otherwise not computable? If so, then I can describe a simple 
algorithm that proves you are wrong: try all combinations of pixels until you 
find one that looks the same.

-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]




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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Mike Tintner]

Matt:The problem you describe is to reconstruct this image given the highly 
filtered and compressed signals that make it through your visual perceptual 
system, like when an artist paints a scene from memory. Are you saying that 
this process requires a consciousness because it is otherwise not 
computable? If so, then I can describe a simple algorithm that proves you 
are wrong: try all combinations of pixels until you find one that looks the 
same.


Matt,

Simple? Well, you're good at maths. Can we formalise what you're arguing? A 
computer screen, for argument's sake.  800 x 600, or whatever. Now what is 
the total number of (diverse) objects that can be captured on that screen, 
and how long would it take your algorithm to enumerate them?


(It's an interesting question, because my intuition says to me that there is 
an infinity of objects that can be depicted on any screen (or drawn on a 
page). Are you saying that there aren't? - that you can in effect predict 
new objects as yet unconceived,  new kinds of ipods/inventions/evolved 
species, say,  -at least in terms of their representations on a flat 
screen - with an algorithm? ) 





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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 8:37 PM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

> Matt:The problem you describe is to reconstruct this image given the highly
> filtered and compressed signals that make it through your visual perceptual
> system, like when an artist paints a scene from memory. Are you saying that
> this process requires a consciousness because it is otherwise not
> computable? If so, then I can describe a simple algorithm that proves you
> are wrong: try all combinations of pixels until you find one that looks the
> same.
>
> Matt,
>
> Simple? Well, you're good at maths. Can we formalise what you're arguing? A
> computer screen, for argument's sake.  800 x 600, or whatever. Now what is
> the total number of (diverse) objects that can be captured on that screen,
> and how long would it take your algorithm to enumerate them?
>
> (It's an interesting question, because my intuition says to me that there
> is an infinity of objects that can be depicted on any screen (or drawn on a
> page). Are you saying that there aren't? -



There is a finite number of possible screen-images, at least from the point
of view of the process sending digital signals to the screen.

If the monitor refreshes each pixel N times per second, then over an
interval of T seconds, if each pixel can show C colors, then there are

C^(N*T*800*600)

possible different scenes showable on the screen during that time period

A big number but finite!

Drawing on a page is a different story, as it gets into physics questions,
but it seems rather likely there is a finite number of pictures on the page
that are distinguishable by a human eye.

So, whether or not an infinite number of objects exist in the universe, only
a finite number of distinctions can be drawn on a monitor (for certain), or
by an eye (almost surely)

ben g



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Mike Tintner]

Ben,

Thanks for reply. I'm a bit lost though. How does this formula take into 
account the different pixel configurations of different objects? (I would have 
thought we can forget about the time of display and just concentrate on the 
configurations of points/colours, but no doubt I may be wrong).

Roughly how large a figure do you come up with, BTW?

I guess a related question is the old one - given a keyboard of letters, what 
are the total number of works possible with say 500,000 key presses, and how 
many 500,000-press attempts will it (or could it) take the proverbial monkey to 
type out, say, a 50,000 word play called Hamlet?

In either case, I would imagine, the numbers involved are too large to be 
practically manageable in, say, this universe, (which seems to be a common 
yardstick). Comments?   The maths here does seem important, because it seems to 
me to be the maths of creativity - and creative possibilities - in a given 
medium. A somewhat formalised maths, since creators usually find ways to 
transcend and change their medium - but useful nevertheless. Is such a maths 
being pursued?

  On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 8:37 PM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Matt:The problem you describe is to reconstruct this image given the highly 
filtered and compressed signals that make it through your visual perceptual 
system, like when an artist paints a scene from memory. Are you saying that 
this process requires a consciousness because it is otherwise not computable? 
If so, then I can describe a simple algorithm that proves you are wrong: try 
all combinations of pixels until you find one that looks the same.

Matt,

Simple? Well, you're good at maths. Can we formalise what you're arguing? A 
computer screen, for argument's sake.  800 x 600, or whatever. Now what is the 
total number of (diverse) objects that can be captured on that screen, and how 
long would it take your algorithm to enumerate them?

(It's an interesting question, because my intuition says to me that there 
is an infinity of objects that can be depicted on any screen (or drawn on a 
page). Are you saying that there aren't? -


  There is a finite number of possible screen-images, at least from the point 
of view of the process sending digital signals to the screen.

  If the monitor refreshes each pixel N times per second, then over an interval 
of T seconds, if each pixel can show C colors, then there are

  C^(N*T*800*600)

  possible different scenes showable on the screen during that time period

  A big number but finite!

  Drawing on a page is a different story, as it gets into physics questions, 
but it seems rather likely there is a finite number of pictures on the page 
that are distinguishable by a human eye.  

  So, whether or not an infinite number of objects exist in the universe, only 
a finite number of distinctions can be drawn on a monitor (for certain), or by 
an eye (almost surely)


  ben g


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

Ok, at a single point in time on a 600x400 screen, if one is using 24-bit
color (usually called "true color") then the number of possible images is

2^(600x400x24)

which is, roughly, 10 with a couple million zeros after it ... way bigger
than a googol, way way smaller than a googolplex ;-)

This is a large number, but so what?

Of course, the human eye would not be able to tell the difference between
all these different images; that's a whole different story...

I don't see why these middle-school calculations are of interest?? ... this
has nothing to do with any of the philosophical issues under discussion,
does it?

ben

On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 9:22 PM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>  Ben,
>
> Thanks for reply. I'm a bit lost though. How does this formula take into
> account the different pixel configurations of different objects? (I would
> have thought we can forget about the time of display and just concentrate on
> the configurations of points/colours, but no doubt I may be wrong).
>
> Roughly how large a figure do you come up with, BTW?
>
> I guess a related question is the old one - given a keyboard of letters,
> what are the total number of works possible with say 500,000 key presses,
> and how many 500,000-press attempts will it (or could it) take the
> proverbial monkey to type out, say, a 50,000 word play called Hamlet?
>
> In either case, I would imagine, the numbers involved are too large to be
> practically manageable in, say, this universe, (which seems to be a common
> yardstick). Comments?   The maths here does seem important, because it seems
> to me to be the maths of creativity - and creative possibilities - in a
> given medium. A somewhat formalised maths, since creators usually find ways
> to transcend and change their medium - but useful nevertheless. Is such a
> maths being pursued?
>
>
> On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 8:37 PM, Mike Tintner <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:
>
>> Matt:The problem you describe is to reconstruct this image given the
>> highly filtered and compressed signals that make it through your visual
>> perceptual system, like when an artist paints a scene from memory. Are you
>> saying that this process requires a consciousness because it is otherwise
>> not computable? If so, then I can describe a simple algorithm that proves
>> you are wrong: try all combinations of pixels until you find one that looks
>> the same.
>>
>> Matt,
>>
>> Simple? Well, you're good at maths. Can we formalise what you're arguing?
>> A computer screen, for argument's sake.  800 x 600, or whatever. Now what is
>> the total number of (diverse) objects that can be captured on that screen,
>> and how long would it take your algorithm to enumerate them?
>>
>> (It's an interesting question, because my intuition says to me that there
>> is an infinity of objects that can be depicted on any screen (or drawn on a
>> page). Are you saying that there aren't? -
>
>
>
> There is a finite number of possible screen-images, at least from the point
> of view of the process sending digital signals to the screen.
>
> If the monitor refreshes each pixel N times per second, then over an
> interval of T seconds, if each pixel can show C colors, then there are
>
> C^(N*T*800*600)
>
> possible different scenes showable on the screen during that time
> period
>
> A big number but finite!
>
> Drawing on a page is a different story, as it gets into physics questions,
> but it seems rather likely there is a finite number of pictures on the page
> that are distinguishable by a human eye.
>
> So, whether or not an infinite number of objects exist in the universe,
> only a finite number of distinctions can be drawn on a monitor (for
> certain), or by an eye (almost surely)
>
> ben g
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Ben Goertzel, PhD
CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC
Director of Research, SIAI
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

"Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first
overcome "  - Dr Samuel Johnson



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[William Pearson]

2008/10/4 Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> Hi Will,
> It's not an easy thing to fully internalise the implications of quantum
> degeneracy. I find physicists and chemists have no trouble accepting it, but
> in the disciplines above that various levels of mental brick walls are in
> place. Unfortunately physicists and chemists aren't usually asked to create
> vision!... I inhabit an extreme multidisciplinary zone. This kind of mental
> resistance comes with the territory. All I can say is 'resistance is futile,
> you will be assimilated' ... eventually. :-) It's part of my job to enact
> the necessary advocacy. In respect of your comments I can offer the
> following:

I started off doing chemistry at Uni, but I didn't like all the wet
experiments. There are things like the bonds in graphite sheets that
are degenerate, but that is of a completely different nature to the
electrical signals in the brain.

> You are exactly right: humans don't encounter the world directly (naive
> realism). Nor are we entirely operating from a cartoon visual fantasy(naive
> solipsism). You are also exactly right in that vision is not 'perfect'. It
> has more than just a level of indirectness in representation, it can
> malfunction and be fooled - just as you say. In the benchmark behaviour:
> scientific behaviour, we know scientists have to enact procedures (all based
> around the behaviour called 'objectivity') which minimises the impact of
> these aspects of our scientific observation system.
>
> However, this has nothing to say about the need for an extra information
> source. necessary for there is not enough information in the signals to do
> the job. This is what you cannot see. It took me a long while to discard the
> tendency to project my mental capacity  into the job the brain has when it
> encounters a retinal data stream. In vision processing using computing we
> know the structure of the distal natural world. We imagine the photon/CCD
> camera chip measurements to be the same as that of the retina. It looks like
> a simple reconstruction job.

I've never thought computer vision to be simple...

> But it is not like that at all. It is impossible to tell, from the signals
> in their natural state in the brain, whether they are about vision or sound
> or smell. They all look the same. So I did not completely reveal the extent
> of the retinal impact/visual scene degeneracy in my post. The degeneracy
> operates on multiple levels. Signal encoding into standardised action
> potentials is another level.

The locations that the signals travel through would be a strong
indication of what they are about.

It also seems likely that the different signals would have different
statistics. For example somehow the human brain can learn to get
visual data from the tongue with a brainport.
http://vision.wicab.com/index.php

I'm not entirely sure what you are getting at, do you think we are in
superposition with the environment? Would you expect a camera +
signals going through your tongue to preserve that?

> Maybe I can just paint a mental picture of the job the brain has to do.
> Imagine this:
>
> You have no phenomenal consciousness at all. Your internal life is of a
> dreamless  sleep.
> Except ... for a new perceptual mode called Wision.
> Looming in front of you embedded in a roughly hemispherical blackness is a
> gigantic array of numbers.
> The numbers change.
>
> Now:
> a) make a visual scene out of it representing the world outside: convert
> Wision into Vision.
> b) do this without any information other than the numbers in front of you
> and without assuming you have any a-priori knowledge of the outside world.
>
> That is the job the brain has. Resist the attempt to project your own
> knowledge into the circumstance. You will find the attempt futile.

The brain starts with at least some structure that has implicit
knowledge of the outside world (just as bones shows the genome stores
information of what is strong in the world). The Blank slate does not
seem a viable hypothesis.

There are no numbers in the brain or even in a computer it is all
electric signals distributed spatially, temporally and with different
statistics that allow them to be distinguished.

I'd be curious to read your thoughts in a bit more of a structured
format, but I can't get a grasp of what you are trying to say at the
moment, it seems degenerate with other signals :P

  Will


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Abram Demski]

Colin,

At risk of overburdening you with comments to reply to...

The term "computationalism" is not well-defined, but the way I use it,
this argument is irrelevant. Essentially you are arguing that we need
more inputs to compute the desired output. I think the definition of
computation you are using is something like "the hypothesis that we
compute our model of the world from the 5 senses." This is refutable
if you show that we would need a 6th sense to do so, and perhaps you
do in the paper you mention.

Responding to your argument more directly: this sounds like the
standard "reverse optics" argument, except usually the conclusion is
that the added information comes from evolution. You probably have
some specific arguments showing that this is an inadequate information
source, but of course you haven't given them and I will stick to the
standard answer: evolution must be sufficient, because we don't know
of any other information source.

If you could explain in more detail how we can get extra information
by "interfacing with space", that would be ideal.

--Abram Demski

On Sat, Oct 4, 2008 at 12:31 AM, Colin Hales
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Mike,
> I can give the highly abridged flow of the argument:
>
> !) It refutes COMP , where COMP = Turing machine-style abstract symbol
> manipulation. In particular the 'digital computer' as we know it.
> 2) The refutation happens in one highly specific circumstance. In being
> false in that circumstance it is false as a general claim.
> 3) The circumstances:  If COMP is true then it should be able to implement
> an artificial scientist with the following faculties:
>   (a) scientific behaviour (goal-delivery of a 'law of nature', an
> abstraction BEHIND the appearances of the distal natural world, not merely
> the report of what is there),
>   (b) scientific observation based on the visual scene,
>   (c) scientific behaviour in an encounter with radical novelty. (This is
> what humans do)
>
> The argument's empirical knowledge is:
> 1) The visual scene is visual phenomenal consciousness. A highly specified
> occipital lobe deliverable.
> 2) In the context of a scientific act, scientific evidence is 'contents of
> phenomenal consciousness'. You can't do science without it. In the context
> of this scientific act, visual P-consciousness and scientific evidence are
> identities. P-consciousness is necessary but on its own is not sufficient.
> Extra behaviours are needed, but these are a secondary consideration here.
>
> NOTE: Do not confuse "scientific observation"  with the "scientific
> measurement", which is a collection of causality located in the distal
> external natural world. (Scientific measurement is not the same thing as
> scientific evidence, in this context). The necessary feature of a visual
> scene is that it operate whilst faithfully inheriting the actual causality
> of the distal natural world. You cannot acquire a law of nature without this
> basic need being met.
>
> 3) Basic physics says that it is impossible for a brain to create a visual
> scene using only the inputs acquired by the peripheral stimulus received at
> the retina. This is due to fundamentals of quantum degeneracy. Basically
> there are an infinite number of distal external worlds that can deliver the
> exact same photon impact. The transduction that occurs in the retinal
> rod/cones is entirely a result of protein isomerisation. All information
> about distal origins is irretievably gone. An impacting photon could have
> come across the room or across the galaxy. There is no information about
> origins in the transduced data in the retina.
>
> That established, you are then faced with a paradox:
>
> (i) (3) says a visual scene is impossible.
> (ii) Yet the brain makes one.
> (iii) To make the scene some kind of access to distal spatial relations must
> be acquired as input data in addition to that from the retina.
> (iv) There are only 2 places that can come from...
>   (a) via matter (which we already have - retinal impact at the boundary
> that is the agent periphery)
>   (b) via space (at the boundary of the matter of the brain with space,
> the biggest boundary by far).
> So, the conclusion is that the brain MUST acquire the necessary data via the
> spatial boundary route. You don't have to know how. You just have no other
> choice. There is no third party in there to add the necessary data and the
> distal world is unknown. There is literally nowhere else for the data to
> come from. Matter and Space exhaust the list of options. (There is alway
> magical intervention ... but I leave that to the space cadets.)
>
> That's probably the main novelty for the reader to  to encounter. But we are
> not done yet.
>
> Next empirical fact:
> (v) When  you create a turing-COMP substrate the interface with space is
> completely destroyed and replaced with the randomised machinations of the
> matter of the computer manipulating a model of the distal world. All actual
> relatio

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Colin Hales]

Hi all,
This seems to have touched a point of interest. I'll try and address all 
the issues raised in one post. I hope I don't miss any of them. Please 
remind me if I have. Apologies if I don;t reference the originator of 
the query explicitly. You know who you are!


Re 'defining terms'.
1) Yes: Theres pages and pages of background information not in the 
posts. It is the result of thousands of hours of reading and analysis. 
Without it the readership is not 'calibrated' properly and the dialogue 
is bound to have its problems. The reader has only been exposed to about 
1/50th of the total work, so please don;t assume that any of the terms 
are poorly defined. They are only.poorly defined here and so far,


1a) Here's the basics of the term "visual scene". This is long proven 
empirical physiology. I already said: it is the occipital lobe 
deliverable. Very specific neurons, well known, highly documented, are 
responsible. Officially no-one knows 'how'/'why' visual experience 
results  happens. The official position  only declared what does it. 
"Visual Scene" = that construct that is replaced by a roughly 
hemispherical gloom/blackness when you close your eyes. It is highly 
localised to specific neuron populations (occipital V4 does colour, for 
example) and has been studied for decades. Everyone who studies 
cognition should be aware of this empirical knowledge. I do not need to 
specify it further or justify it. The evidence speaks for itself. An 
entire empirical science paradigm call the 'neural correlates of 
consciousness' has been set up specifically to isolate the neural basis. 
All experiential fields are the same. They are all cranial central 
nervous system deliverables. This means audition, haptic, olfaction, 
gustation, vision, situational and primordial emotions and all internal 
imagined versions of these (including the visual imagery in the post by  
JLM). My argument deals only with the visual scene.


1b) So, in answer to another comment from one of the posts: "visual 
scene", specifically: "I assume you mean the original image impressed on 
your retina". No, I do not mean this. The molecular machinations of the 
entire peripheral nervous system, including the 'peripherals' of the 
central nervous system. are 100% empirically proven for 100 years to 
be experientially inert. You do not see with your eyes. Vision occurs in 
the occipital. Please read the literature. Peripheral sensory 
transduction is not experienced. Central perceptual fields are projected 
to the periphery. This is physiology. EG. For the peripheral insult 
sensory transduction, the term nociception is used. PAIN, the 
experience, is added in the CNS and projected (often rather badly) to 
the site of origin. There is an entire collection of nomenclature 
established by physiology to enable descriptive specificity..I should 
not have to provide any more information along these lines. Please read 
the literature. There's lots of it. I can supply refs if you need them.


1c) Computationalism. = _abstract_ symbol manipulation. This is meant in 
specific contrast to the manipulation of  _natural_ symbol manipulation. 
Analog computing is also COMP. This means that all computing based on 
the various calculii are COMP. It means that all machines using any sort 
of abstract mathematical or logical framework where the semantics of the 
symbols need extra documentation... are COMP. The basic defs:

See:
   (i) Moor, J. 'The Dartmouth College Artificial Intelligence 
Conference: The next fifty years', Ai Magazine vol. 27, no. 4, 2006. 87-91.
   (ii) Beer, R. D. 'A Dynamical-Systems Perspective on Agent 
Environment Interaction', Artificial Intelligence vol. 72, no. 1-2, 
1995. 173-215.


RE: The nature of the COMP = false as an argument.
2) I don't intend to formalise the argument any further here. I have 
given the precis. The two papers I mentioned are in review. One of them 
for 18 months already. Very painful. When they come out they can speak 
for themselves.


3) Please do not taint my words with any attributions in respect of 
being 'philosophical'. ;-)  I love reading philosophy and have 
internalised truckloadsbut this is irrelevant...When I say this is 
an empirical argument I mean it. All I do is aggregate well known (but 
hyper-cross-disciplinary) fact into one place. I follow the path of 
least resistance to what it says of the natural world. If the empirical 
evidence said anything else I'd say something else.


4)  I'll say it again: this is an empirical argument... therefore:  If 
you want to helpfully counter the argument then please deliver the novel 
evidence to the contrary that counters the evidence I give and explain 
why. Show references. Point to a history of facts. Then I can respond 
because i have encountered something I must account for which alters the 
implications of the evidence. If this cannot be done then the statements 
you make are empty beliefs and I can do nothing with them. I de

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

To me, computationalism, defined via

"
Computationalism. = _abstract_ symbol manipulation.
"

is an **interpretation** of certain things that occur inside computers
sometimes ...

The fact that this is a bad interpretation, doesn't imply that computer
themselves aren't able to carry out advanced intelligence...

-- Ben G

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 4:28 PM, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>  Hi all,
> This seems to have touched a point of interest. I'll try and address all
> the issues raised in one post. I hope I don't miss any of them. Please
> remind me if I have. Apologies if I don;t reference the originator of the
> query explicitly. You know who you are!
>
> Re 'defining terms'.
> 1) Yes: Theres pages and pages of background information not in the posts.
> It is the result of thousands of hours of reading and analysis. Without it
> the readership is not 'calibrated' properly and the dialogue is bound to
> have its problems. The reader has only been exposed to about 1/50th of the
> total work, so please don;t assume that any of the terms are poorly defined.
> They are only.poorly defined here and so far,
>
> 1a) Here's the basics of the term "visual scene". This is long proven
> empirical physiology. I already said: it is the occipital lobe deliverable.
> Very specific neurons, well known, highly documented, are responsible.
> Officially no-one knows 'how'/'why' visual experience results  happens. The
> official position  only declared what does it. "Visual Scene" = that
> construct that is replaced by a roughly hemispherical gloom/blackness when
> you close your eyes. It is highly localised to specific neuron populations
> (occipital V4 does colour, for example) and has been studied for decades.
> Everyone who studies cognition should be aware of this empirical knowledge.
> I do not need to specify it further or justify it. The evidence speaks for
> itself. An entire empirical science paradigm call the 'neural correlates of
> consciousness' has been set up specifically to isolate the neural basis. All
> experiential fields are the same. They are all cranial central nervous
> system deliverables. This means audition, haptic, olfaction, gustation,
> vision, situational and primordial emotions and all internal imagined
> versions of these (including the visual imagery in the post by  JLM). My
> argument deals only with the visual scene.
>
> 1b) So, in answer to another comment from one of the posts: "visual scene",
> specifically: "I assume you mean the original image impressed on your
> retina". No, I do not mean this. The molecular machinations of the entire
> peripheral nervous system, including the 'peripherals' of the central
> nervous system. are 100% empirically proven for 100 years to be
> experientially inert. You do not see with your eyes. Vision occurs in the
> occipital. Please read the literature. Peripheral sensory transduction is
> not experienced. Central perceptual fields are projected to the periphery.
> This is physiology. EG. For the peripheral insult sensory transduction, the
> term nociception is used. PAIN, the experience, is added in the CNS and
> projected (often rather badly) to the site of origin. There is an entire
> collection of nomenclature established by physiology to enable descriptive
> specificity..I should not have to provide any more information along these
> lines. Please read the literature. There's lots of it. I can supply refs if
> you need them.
>
> 1c) Computationalism. = _abstract_ symbol manipulation. This is meant in
> specific contrast to the manipulation of  _natural_ symbol manipulation.
> Analog computing is also COMP. This means that all computing based on the
> various calculii are COMP. It means that all machines using any sort of
> abstract mathematical or logical framework where the semantics of the
> symbols need extra documentation... are COMP. The basic defs:
> See:
> (i) Moor, J. 'The Dartmouth College Artificial Intelligence Conference:
> The next fifty years', Ai Magazine vol. 27, no. 4, 2006. 87-91.
> (ii) Beer, R. D. 'A Dynamical-Systems Perspective on Agent Environment
> Interaction', Artificial Intelligence vol. 72, no. 1-2, 1995. 173-215.
>
> RE: The nature of the COMP = false as an argument.
> 2) I don't intend to formalise the argument any further here. I have given
> the precis. The two papers I mentioned are in review. One of them for 18
> months already. Very painful. When they come out they can speak for
> themselves.
>
> 3) Please do not taint my words with any attributions in respect of being
> 'philosophical'. ;-)  I love reading philosophy and have internalised
> truckloadsbut this is irrelevant...When I say this is an empirical
> argument I mean it. All I do is aggregate well known (but
> hyper-cross-disciplinary) fact into one place. I follow the path of least
> resistance to what it says of the natural world. If the empirical evidence
> said anything else I'd say something else.
>
> 4)  I'll say it again: 

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Colin Hales]

Hi Vladimir,
I did not say the physics was unknown. I said that it must exist. The 
physics is already known.Empirically and theoretically. It's just not 
recognised in-situ and by the appropriate people. It's an implication of 
the quantum non-locality underpinning electrodynamics. Extensions of the 
physics model to include the necessary effects are not part of the 
discussion and change nothing. This does not alter the argument, which 
is empirical. Please accept and critique it on this basis. I am planning 
an experiment as a post-doc to validate the basic principle as it 
applies in a neural context. It's under development now. It involves 
electronics and lasers and all the usual experimental dross.


BTW I don't do non-science. Otherwise I'd just be able to sit back and 
declare my world view complete and authoritative, regardless of the 
evidence, wouldn't I? That is so not me. I am an engineer If I can't 
build it then I know I don't understand it. Nothing is sacred. At no 
point ever will I entertain any fictional/untestable/magical solutions. 
Like assuming an unproven conjecture is true. Nor will I idolise the 
'received view' as having all the answers and force the natural world to 
fit my prejudices in respect of what 'explanation' entails. Especially 
when major mysteries persist in the face of all explanatory attempts. 
That's the worst non-science you can have... so I'm rather more 
radically empirical and dry, evidenced based but realistic in 
expectations of our skills as explorers of the natural world ...than it 
might appear. In being this way I hope to be part of the solution, not 
part of the problem.


COMP being false make the AGI goal much harder...but much much more 
interesting!


That's a little intro to colin hales for you.

cheers
colin hales
(all done now!)




Vladimir Nesov wrote:

Basically, you are saying that there is some unknown physics mojo
going on. The mystery of mind looks as mysterious as mystery of
physics, therefore it requires mystery of physics and can derive
further mysteriousness from it, becoming inherently mysterious. It's
bad, bad non-science.

  



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Abram Demski]

Colin,

I believe you did not reply to my points? Based on your definition of
computationalism, it appears that my criticism of your argument does
apply after all. To restate:

Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
restatement:

1. We have a visual experience of the world.
2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
to compute one.
3. Therefore, we must get more information.
4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
5. Material is already known to be insufficient, therefore we must
also get spatial info.

Computationalism is assumed to get from #2 to #3. If we do not assume
computationalism, then the argument would look more like this:

1. We have a visual experience of the world.
2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
to compute one.
3. Therefore, our visual experience is not computed.

This is obviously unsatisfying because it doesn't say where the visual
scene comes from; answers range from prescience to quantum
hypercomputation, but that does not seem important to the current
issue.

--Abram


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

Abram,

thx for restating his argument


>
> Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
> restatement:
>
> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
> to compute one.


I do not understand his argument for point 2


>
> 3. Therefore, we must get more information.
> 4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
> 5. Material is already known to be insufficient, therefore we must
> also get spatial info.


ben



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Abram Demski]

Ben,

I have heard the argument for point 2 before, in the book by Pinker,
"How the Mind Works". It is the inverse-optics problem: physics can
predict what image will be formed on the retina from material
arrangements, but if we want to go backwards and find the arrangements
from the retinal image, we do not have enough data at all. Pinker
concludes that we do it using cognitive bias.

--Abram

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 7:28 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Abram,
>
> thx for restating his argument
>
>>
>>
>> Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
>> restatement:
>>
>> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
>> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
>> to compute one.
>
> I do not understand his argument for point 2
>
>>
>> 3. Therefore, we must get more information.
>> 4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
>> 5. Material is already known to be insufficient, therefore we must
>> also get spatial info.
>
> ben
>
> 
> agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 7:41 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Ben,
>
> I have heard the argument for point 2 before, in the book by Pinker,
> "How the Mind Works". It is the inverse-optics problem: physics can
> predict what image will be formed on the retina from material
> arrangements, but if we want to go backwards and find the arrangements
> from the retinal image, we do not have enough data at all. Pinker
> concludes that we do it using cognitive bias.



I understood Pinker's argument, but not Colin Hales's ...

Also, note cognitive bias can be learned rather than inborn (though in this
case I imagine it's both).

Probably we would be very bad at seeing environment different from those we
evolved in, until after we'd gotten a lot of experience in them...

ben



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Abram Demski]

Agreed. Colin would need to show the inadequacy of both inborn and
learned bias to show the need for extra input. But I think the more
essential objection is that extra input is still consistent with
computationalism.

--Abram

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 7:50 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 7:41 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> Ben,
>>
>> I have heard the argument for point 2 before, in the book by Pinker,
>> "How the Mind Works". It is the inverse-optics problem: physics can
>> predict what image will be formed on the retina from material
>> arrangements, but if we want to go backwards and find the arrangements
>> from the retinal image, we do not have enough data at all. Pinker
>> concludes that we do it using cognitive bias.
>
> I understood Pinker's argument, but not Colin Hales's ...
>
> Also, note cognitive bias can be learned rather than inborn (though in this
> case I imagine it's both).
>
> Probably we would be very bad at seeing environment different from those we
> evolved in, until after we'd gotten a lot of experience in them...
>
> ben
>
> 
> agi | Archives | Modify Your Subscription


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 7:59 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Agreed. Colin would need to show the inadequacy of both inborn and
> learned bias to show the need for extra input. But I think the more
> essential objection is that extra input is still consistent with
> computationalism.


Yes.

Also, the visual input to an AGI need not be particularly similar to that of
the human eye ... so if the human brain were somehow getting extra "visual
scene relevant" stimuli from some currently non-suspected source [which I
doubt], this doesn't imply that an AGI would need to use a comparable
source.

Arguably, for instance, camera+lidar gives enough data for reconstruction of
the visual scene ... note that lidar gives more more accurate 3D depth ata
than stereopsis...

ben g



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Trent Waddington]

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 10:03 AM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Arguably, for instance, camera+lidar gives enough data for reconstruction of
> the visual scene ... note that lidar gives more more accurate 3D depth ata
> than stereopsis...

Is that even true anymore?  I thought the big revolution in the last
12 months was that machine learning algorithms are finally producing
better-than-lidar depth estimates (just not in realtime).

Trent


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

cool ... if so, I'd be curious for the references... I'm not totally up on
that area...

ben

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 8:20 PM, Trent Waddington <[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:

> On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 10:03 AM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Arguably, for instance, camera+lidar gives enough data for reconstruction
> of
> > the visual scene ... note that lidar gives more more accurate 3D depth
> ata
> > than stereopsis...
>
> Is that even true anymore?  I thought the big revolution in the last
> 12 months was that machine learning algorithms are finally producing
> better-than-lidar depth estimates (just not in realtime).
>
> Trent
>
>
> ---
> agi
> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
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-- 
Ben Goertzel, PhD
CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC
Director of Research, SIAI
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

"Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first
overcome "  - Dr Samuel Johnson



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[David Hart]

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 10:03 AM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

>
> Arguably, for instance, camera+lidar gives enough data for reconstruction
> of the visual scene ... note that lidar gives more more accurate 3D depth
> ata than stereopsis...
>

Also, for that matter, 'visual' input to an AGI needn't be raw pixels at
all, but could instead be a datastream of timestamped [depth-labeled] edges,
areas, colours, textures, etc. from fully narrow-AI pre-processed sources.
Of course such a setup could be construed to be rougly similar to the human
visual pathway between the retina on one end, though the LGN, and finally to
the layers of the primary visual cortex.

-dave



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Colin Hales]

OK. Last one!
Please replace 2) with:

2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
to construct a visual scene.

Whether or not that 'constuct' arises from computation is a matter of 
semantics. I would say that it could be considered computation - natural 
computation by electrodynamic manipulation of natural symbols. Not abstractions 
of the kind we manipulate in the COMP circumstance. That is why I use the term 
COMP...

It's rather funny: you could redefine computation to include natural 
computation (through the natural causality that is electrodynamics as it 
happens in brain material). Then you could claim computationalism to be true. 
But you'd still behave the same: you'd be unable to get AGI from a Turing 
machine. So you'd flush all traditional computers and make new technology 
Computationalism would then be true but 100% useless as a design decision 
mechanism. Frankly I'd rather make AGI that works than be right according to a 
definition!  The lesson is that there's no pracitcal use in being right 
according to a definition! What you need to be able to do is make successful 
choices.


OK. Enough. A very enjoyable but sticky thread...I gotta work!

cheers all for now.

regards

Colin


Abram Demski wrote:

Colin,

I believe you did not reply to my points? Based on your definition of
computationalism, it appears that my criticism of your argument does
apply after all. To restate:

Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
restatement:

1. We have a visual experience of the world.
2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
to compute one.
3. Therefore, we must get more information.
4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
5. Material is already known to be insufficient, therefore we must
also get spatial info.

Computationalism is assumed to get from #2 to #3. If we do not assume
computationalism, then the argument would look more like this:

1. We have a visual experience of the world.
2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
to compute one.
3. Therefore, our visual experience is not computed.

This is obviously unsatisfying because it doesn't say where the visual
scene comes from; answers range from prescience to quantum
hypercomputation, but that does not seem important to the current
issue.

--Abram


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

I suppose what you mean is something like:

***
The information from the retina is inadequate to construct a representation
of the world around the human organism that is as accurate as could be
constructed by an ideal perceiving-system receiving the same light beams
that the human eye receives.
***

But, so what?

The human mind plainly does NOT have a world-representation of this level of
accuracy.  Our subjectively-perceived visual world is largely made up, as is
convincingly demonstrated by our filled-in blind spots, the raft of optical
illusions, and so forth  We fill in the gaps left by our flawed visual
systems using all sorts of inherited and learned inductive bias...

-- Ben G


On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:05 PM, Colin Hales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

> OK. Last one!
> Please replace 2) with:
>
> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
> to construct a visual scene.
>
> Whether or not that 'constuct' arises from computation is a matter of
> semantics. I would say that it could be considered computation - natural
> computation by electrodynamic manipulation of natural symbols. Not
> abstractions of the kind we manipulate in the COMP circumstance. That is why
> I use the term COMP...
>
> It's rather funny: you could redefine computation to include natural
> computation (through the natural causality that is electrodynamics as it
> happens in brain material). Then you could claim computationalism to be
> true. But you'd still behave the same: you'd be unable to get AGI from a
> Turing machine. So you'd flush all traditional computers and make new
> technology Computationalism would then be true but 100% useless as a
> design decision mechanism. Frankly I'd rather make AGI that works than be
> right according to a definition!  The lesson is that there's no pracitcal
> use in being right according to a definition! What you need to be able to do
> is make successful choices.
>
>
> OK. Enough. A very enjoyable but sticky thread...I gotta work!
>
> cheers all for now.
>
> regards
>
> Colin
>
>
> Abram Demski wrote:
>
>> Colin,
>>
>> I believe you did not reply to my points? Based on your definition of
>> computationalism, it appears that my criticism of your argument does
>> apply after all. To restate:
>>
>> Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
>> restatement:
>>
>> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
>> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
>> to compute one.
>> 3. Therefore, we must get more information.
>> 4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
>> 5. Material is already known to be insufficient, therefore we must
>> also get spatial info.
>>
>> Computationalism is assumed to get from #2 to #3. If we do not assume
>> computationalism, then the argument would look more like this:
>>
>> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
>> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
>> to compute one.
>> 3. Therefore, our visual experience is not computed.
>>
>> This is obviously unsatisfying because it doesn't say where the visual
>> scene comes from; answers range from prescience to quantum
>> hypercomputation, but that does not seem important to the current
>> issue.
>>
>> --Abram
>>
>>
>> ---
>> agi
>> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
>> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
>> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;
>> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> ---
> agi
> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
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-- 
Ben Goertzel, PhD
CEO, Novamente LLC and Biomind LLC
Director of Research, SIAI
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

"Nothing will ever be attempted if all possible objections must be first
overcome "  - Dr Samuel Johnson



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[David Hart]

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 11:05 AM, Colin Hales
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote:

>
> It's rather funny: you could redefine computation to include natural
> computation (through the natural causality that is electrodynamics as it
> happens in brain material). Then you could claim computationalism to be
> true. But you'd still behave the same: you'd be unable to get AGI from a
> Turing machine. So you'd flush all traditional computers and make new
> technology Computationalism would then be true but 100% useless as a
> design decision mechanism. Frankly I'd rather make AGI that works than be
> right according to a definition!  The lesson is that there's no pracitcal
> use in being right according to a definition! What you need to be able to do
> is make successful choices.
>

So, then, the argument is pretty pointless, since it boils down to saying
simply that some people believe that there exist tractable ways to make
Turning Machines manifest AGI, and others that believe there are NOT
tractable ways to make Turing Machines manifest AGI. And of course since
neither can 'prove' their beliefs, discussions on the topic keep going
around in circles.

Or, am I missing something...?

-dave



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Abram Demski]

Thank you Colin, that reply is completely satisfying! In fact, ignore
the email I just sent off-list. (Still not convinced that COMP is
definitely false, but I see how it could be, if you don't want to
count quantum computers as computers, and think the brain harnesses
quantum computation.)

For those watching, a correction is in order: Colin replied to my
argument off-list, but I did not notice and re-posted after Colin's
big long on-list reply to everyone else. So, Colin wasn't actually
ignoring me when I thought he was... :)

--Abram

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:05 PM, Colin Hales
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> OK. Last one!
> Please replace 2) with:
>
> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
> to construct a visual scene.
>
> Whether or not that 'constuct' arises from computation is a matter of
> semantics. I would say that it could be considered computation - natural
> computation by electrodynamic manipulation of natural symbols. Not
> abstractions of the kind we manipulate in the COMP circumstance. That is why
> I use the term COMP...
>
> It's rather funny: you could redefine computation to include natural
> computation (through the natural causality that is electrodynamics as it
> happens in brain material). Then you could claim computationalism to be
> true. But you'd still behave the same: you'd be unable to get AGI from a
> Turing machine. So you'd flush all traditional computers and make new
> technology Computationalism would then be true but 100% useless as a
> design decision mechanism. Frankly I'd rather make AGI that works than be
> right according to a definition!  The lesson is that there's no pracitcal
> use in being right according to a definition! What you need to be able to do
> is make successful choices.
>
>
> OK. Enough. A very enjoyable but sticky thread...I gotta work!
>
> cheers all for now.
>
> regards
>
> Colin
>
>
> Abram Demski wrote:
>>
>> Colin,
>>
>> I believe you did not reply to my points? Based on your definition of
>> computationalism, it appears that my criticism of your argument does
>> apply after all. To restate:
>>
>> Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
>> restatement:
>>
>> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
>> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
>> to compute one.
>> 3. Therefore, we must get more information.
>> 4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
>> 5. Material is already known to be insufficient, therefore we must
>> also get spatial info.
>>
>> Computationalism is assumed to get from #2 to #3. If we do not assume
>> computationalism, then the argument would look more like this:
>>
>> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
>> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
>> to compute one.
>> 3. Therefore, our visual experience is not computed.
>>
>> This is obviously unsatisfying because it doesn't say where the visual
>> scene comes from; answers range from prescience to quantum
>> hypercomputation, but that does not seem important to the current
>> issue.
>>
>> --Abram
>>
>>
>> ---
>> agi
>> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
>> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
>> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;
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>>
>>
>
>
> ---
> agi
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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

Note that quantum computers cannot compute anything except Turing-computable
functions.   Their only difference is that they can compute some things
massively faster, in the average case.

Thus, if a certain body of data is insufficient for a classical computer to
draw a conclusion (given infinite compute time), then it is also inadequate
for a quantum computer to do so.

This does not rule out other odd possibilities, such as that the quantum
brain could somehow possess info about the environment via quantum
entanglement (info that would not be accessible to a classical computer.)

My thoughts on the relation between quantum computing, quantum logic and the
brain are highly eccentric, see:

http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2008/03/can-quantum-logic-apply-to-classical.html

However, my thinking is compatible with the idea that we can create a
superhuman AGI on typical digital computers ... my uncertainty regards the
degree to which a system much more complex than a given observer should be
considered "classical" with respect to that observer.

-- Ben G

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:32 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Thank you Colin, that reply is completely satisfying! In fact, ignore
> the email I just sent off-list. (Still not convinced that COMP is
> definitely false, but I see how it could be, if you don't want to
> count quantum computers as computers, and think the brain harnesses
> quantum computation.)
>
> For those watching, a correction is in order: Colin replied to my
> argument off-list, but I did not notice and re-posted after Colin's
> big long on-list reply to everyone else. So, Colin wasn't actually
> ignoring me when I thought he was... :)
>
> --Abram
>
> On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:05 PM, Colin Hales
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > OK. Last one!
> > Please replace 2) with:
> >
> > 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
> > to construct a visual scene.
> >
> > Whether or not that 'constuct' arises from computation is a matter of
> > semantics. I would say that it could be considered computation - natural
> > computation by electrodynamic manipulation of natural symbols. Not
> > abstractions of the kind we manipulate in the COMP circumstance. That is
> why
> > I use the term COMP...
> >
> > It's rather funny: you could redefine computation to include natural
> > computation (through the natural causality that is electrodynamics as it
> > happens in brain material). Then you could claim computationalism to be
> > true. But you'd still behave the same: you'd be unable to get AGI from a
> > Turing machine. So you'd flush all traditional computers and make new
> > technology Computationalism would then be true but 100% useless as a
> > design decision mechanism. Frankly I'd rather make AGI that works than be
> > right according to a definition!  The lesson is that there's no pracitcal
> > use in being right according to a definition! What you need to be able to
> do
> > is make successful choices.
> >
> >
> > OK. Enough. A very enjoyable but sticky thread...I gotta work!
> >
> > cheers all for now.
> >
> > regards
> >
> > Colin
> >
> >
> > Abram Demski wrote:
> >>
> >> Colin,
> >>
> >> I believe you did not reply to my points? Based on your definition of
> >> computationalism, it appears that my criticism of your argument does
> >> apply after all. To restate:
> >>
> >> Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
> >> restatement:
> >>
> >> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
> >> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
> >> to compute one.
> >> 3. Therefore, we must get more information.
> >> 4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
> >> 5. Material is already known to be insufficient, therefore we must
> >> also get spatial info.
> >>
> >> Computationalism is assumed to get from #2 to #3. If we do not assume
> >> computationalism, then the argument would look more like this:
> >>
> >> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
> >> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
> >> to compute one.
> >> 3. Therefore, our visual experience is not computed.
> >>
> >> This is obviously unsatisfying because it doesn't say where the visual
> >> scene comes from; answers range from prescience to quantum
> >> hypercomputation, but that does not seem important to the current
> >> issue.
> >>
> >> --Abram
> >>
> >>
> >> ---
> >> agi
> >> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
> >> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
> >> Modify Your Subscription: https://www.listbox.com/member/?&;
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> >>
> >>
> >
> >
> > ---
> > agi
> > Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/303/=now
> > RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/303/
> > Modify Your Subscription:
> > https://www.l

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Abram Demski]

Ben,

I think the entanglement possibility is precisely what Colin believes.
That is speculation on my part of course. But it is something like
that. Also, it is possible that quantum computers can do more than
normal computers-- just not under the current theories. Colin hinted
at some physics experiments.

As for your views on quantum probability... I must humbly disagree
with them. I have not read up on this literature, but for now I'm
going to stick with what Wikipedia has told me:

"The more common view regarding quantum logic, however, is that it
provides a formalism for relating observables, system preparation
filters and states. In this view, the quantum logic approach resembles
more closely the C*-algebraic approach to quantum mechanics; in fact
with some minor technical assumptions it can be subsumed by it. The
similarities of the quantum logic formalism to a system of deductive
logic may then be regarded more as a curiosity than as a fact of
fundamental philosophical importance."

--Abram

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:49 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Note that quantum computers cannot compute anything except Turing-computable
> functions.   Their only difference is that they can compute some things
> massively faster, in the average case.
>
> Thus, if a certain body of data is insufficient for a classical computer to
> draw a conclusion (given infinite compute time), then it is also inadequate
> for a quantum computer to do so.
>
> This does not rule out other odd possibilities, such as that the quantum
> brain could somehow possess info about the environment via quantum
> entanglement (info that would not be accessible to a classical computer.)
>
> My thoughts on the relation between quantum computing, quantum logic and the
> brain are highly eccentric, see:
>
> http://multiverseaccordingtoben.blogspot.com/2008/03/can-quantum-logic-apply-to-classical.html
>
> However, my thinking is compatible with the idea that we can create a
> superhuman AGI on typical digital computers ... my uncertainty regards the
> degree to which a system much more complex than a given observer should be
> considered "classical" with respect to that observer.
>
> -- Ben G
>
> On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:32 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>> Thank you Colin, that reply is completely satisfying! In fact, ignore
>> the email I just sent off-list. (Still not convinced that COMP is
>> definitely false, but I see how it could be, if you don't want to
>> count quantum computers as computers, and think the brain harnesses
>> quantum computation.)
>>
>> For those watching, a correction is in order: Colin replied to my
>> argument off-list, but I did not notice and re-posted after Colin's
>> big long on-list reply to everyone else. So, Colin wasn't actually
>> ignoring me when I thought he was... :)
>>
>> --Abram
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 9:05 PM, Colin Hales
>> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> > OK. Last one!
>> > Please replace 2) with:
>> >
>> > 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
>> > to construct a visual scene.
>> >
>> > Whether or not that 'constuct' arises from computation is a matter of
>> > semantics. I would say that it could be considered computation - natural
>> > computation by electrodynamic manipulation of natural symbols. Not
>> > abstractions of the kind we manipulate in the COMP circumstance. That is
>> > why
>> > I use the term COMP...
>> >
>> > It's rather funny: you could redefine computation to include natural
>> > computation (through the natural causality that is electrodynamics as it
>> > happens in brain material). Then you could claim computationalism to be
>> > true. But you'd still behave the same: you'd be unable to get AGI from a
>> > Turing machine. So you'd flush all traditional computers and make new
>> > technology Computationalism would then be true but 100% useless as a
>> > design decision mechanism. Frankly I'd rather make AGI that works than
>> > be
>> > right according to a definition!  The lesson is that there's no
>> > pracitcal
>> > use in being right according to a definition! What you need to be able
>> > to do
>> > is make successful choices.
>> >
>> >
>> > OK. Enough. A very enjoyable but sticky thread...I gotta work!
>> >
>> > cheers all for now.
>> >
>> > regards
>> >
>> > Colin
>> >
>> >
>> > Abram Demski wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Colin,
>> >>
>> >> I believe you did not reply to my points? Based on your definition of
>> >> computationalism, it appears that my criticism of your argument does
>> >> apply after all. To restate:
>> >>
>> >> Your argument appears to assume computationalism. Here is a numbered
>> >> restatement:
>> >>
>> >> 1. We have a visual experience of the world.
>> >> 2. Science says that the information from the retina is insufficient
>> >> to compute one.
>> >> 3. Therefore, we must get more information.
>> >> 4. The only possible sources are material and spatial.
>> >> 5. Material is already known to be

Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 11:16 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Ben,
>
> I think the entanglement possibility is precisely what Colin believes.
> That is speculation on my part of course. But it is something like
> that. Also, it is possible that quantum computers can do more than
> normal computers-- just not under the current theories. Colin hinted
> at some physics experiments.



Well, it is possible that some physical systems can do more than quantum
computers as currently conceived.

However, I think it's better to reserve the term "quantum computers" to
refer to "computers as deemed possible according to quantum mechanics" ...

If Penrose and other radicals are right, then "quantum gravity computers"
may be able to do stuff that quantum computers can't do ... which is
physically sensible since quantum mechanics is known not to be a complete
theory of the physical universe



>
>
> As for your views on quantum probability... I must humbly disagree
> with them. I have not read up on this literature, but for now I'm
> going to stick with what Wikipedia has told me:
>
> "The more common view regarding quantum logic, however, is that it
> provides a formalism for relating observables, system preparation
> filters and states. In this view, the quantum logic approach resembles
> more closely the C*-algebraic approach to quantum mechanics; in fact
> with some minor technical assumptions it can be subsumed by it. The
> similarities of the quantum logic formalism to a system of deductive
> logic may then be regarded more as a curiosity than as a fact of
> fundamental philosophical importance."


Yes, I know that view of course, and I think it's wrong ... but, arguing
that stuff on this list would be too much of a digression, as well as
something I don't have time for tonight ;-)

Will be fun to debate w/you someday though!!

ben g



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Vladimir Nesov]

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 3:19 AM, Colin Hales
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi Vladimir,
> I did not say the physics was unknown. I said that it must exist. The
> physics is already known.Empirically and theoretically. It's just not
> recognised in-situ and by the appropriate people. It's an implication of the
> quantum non-locality underpinning electrodynamics. Extensions of the physics
> model to include the necessary effects are not part of the discussion and
> change nothing. This does not alter the argument, which is empirical. Please
> accept and critique it on this basis. I am planning an experiment as a
> post-doc to validate the basic principle as it applies in a neural context.
> It's under development now. It involves electronics and lasers and all the
> usual experimental dross.
>
> BTW I don't do non-science. Otherwise I'd just be able to sit back and
> declare my world view complete and authoritative, regardless of the
> evidence, wouldn't I? That is so not me. I am an engineer If I can't
> build it then I know I don't understand it. Nothing is sacred. At no point
> ever will I entertain any fictional/untestable/magical solutions. Like
> assuming an unproven conjecture is true. Nor will I idolise the 'received
> view' as having all the answers and force the natural world to fit my
> prejudices in respect of what 'explanation' entails. Especially when major
> mysteries persist in the face of all explanatory attempts. That's the worst
> non-science you can have... so I'm rather more radically empirical and dry,
> evidenced based but realistic in expectations of our skills as explorers of
> the natural world ...than it might appear. In being this way I hope to be
> part of the solution, not part of the problem.
>

You can understand a scene when you watch animated movies on TV, for
pete's sake! There is no physics in reductionist universe that would
know how to patch information about a scene that is thousands of miles
away, years ago, and only ever existed virtually. You can't adapt
known physics to do THAT. You'd need an intelligent meddler. And you
can't escape flaws in your reasoning by wearing a lab coat.

-- 
Vladimir Nesov
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Ben Goertzel]

>  And you
> can't escape flaws in your reasoning by wearing a lab coat.
>

Maybe not a lab coat... but how about my trusty wizard's hat???  ;-)

http://i34.tinypic.com/14lmqg0.jpg



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Vladimir Nesov]

On Mon, Oct 6, 2008 at 9:14 PM, Ben Goertzel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>>  And you
>> can't escape flaws in your reasoning by wearing a lab coat.
>
> Maybe not a lab coat... but how about my trusty wizard's hat???  ;-)
>
> http://i34.tinypic.com/14lmqg0.jpg
>

Don't you know that only clown suit interacts with probability theory
in the true Bayesian way? ;-)
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2007/12/cult-koans.html

-- 
Vladimir Nesov
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://causalityrelay.wordpress.com/


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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Colin Hales]

Excellent. I want one! Maybe they should be on sale at the next 
conference...there's a marketing edge for ya.


If I have to be as wrong as Vladimir says I'll need the right clothes.

:-)
cheers
colin


Ben Goertzel wrote:


 And you
can't escape flaws in your reasoning by wearing a lab coat.


Maybe not a lab coat... but how about my trusty wizard's hat???  ;-)

http://i34.tinypic.com/14lmqg0.jpg

 



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Re: [agi] COMP = false

[Charles Hixson]

Ben Goertzel wrote:



On Sun, Oct 5, 2008 at 7:41 PM, Abram Demski <[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
> wrote:


Ben,

I have heard the argument for point 2 before, in the book by Pinker,
"How the Mind Works". It is the inverse-optics problem: physics can
predict what image will be formed on the retina from material
arrangements, but if we want to go backwards and find the arrangements
from the retinal image, we do not have enough data at all. Pinker
concludes that we do it using cognitive bias.



I understood Pinker's argument, but not Colin Hales's ...

Also, note cognitive bias can be learned rather than inborn (though in 
this case I imagine it's both). 

Probably we would be very bad at seeing environment different from 
those we evolved in, until after we'd gotten a lot of experience in 
them...


ben

I think the initial cognitive biases MUST be built in.

OTOH, clearly early experiences strongly shape the development from the 
built in biases.  (E.g.  experiments on kittens raised in a room with 
only vertical lines, and their later inability to see horizontal lines.)





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