Re: STEP 3

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 7/21/2019 9:12 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote:


On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik mailto:danialso...@gmail.com>> wrote:






Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy
is by claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once,
but that will need some telepathy hardly compatible with the
idea that the level of substitution was correctly chosen.

So, do you die or not in the step 3?


I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and
let's find out -- you go first.


Let me rephrase the question:

Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?


According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is 
cut. The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a 
delay, or in several different places.


The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original 
disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view 
of personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of 
previous states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the 
question of whether the original dies or not depends on the details of 
your theory of personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest 
continuer" theory, if the duplicate has an equivalent body and 
environment, then a single continuer is the closest continuer of the 
original, and can be considered the same person in some sense. Nozik's 
argument is that if there are two or more continuers, and there is a 
tie in the relevant sense of "closeness", then each continuer is a new 
person, and the original no longer exists (dies).


So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your 
simplistic assumptions allow:  it is actually an empirical question as 
to whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than 
armchair philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans 
are indeed possible and we perform the experiment, before we 
pontificate absolutely on what will or will not happen.


Given the limitations on quantum level measurements, it is certain that 
the continuer will not be identical.  But I'm not identical with Brent 
Meeker of yesterday or last year or of 1939.  I have a continuous causal 
connection with those Brent Meekers and I have some similarities (DNA 
for example).  So it hardly makes sense to demand a sharp answer to 
"What will you experience." in a duplication experiment when we don't 
even have a sharp definition of "you".  And it doesn't even take 
something as scifi as a duplicator to raise the question.  I might have 
a stroke tonight and lose my ability to recognize names.  Will I be the 
same person tomorrow?  I will have some of the same memories, but not 
all.  Will I experience being Brent Meeker or not?


Brent



As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of 
assuming this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are 
building in make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does 
any of it comport with our usual understandings of personal identity 
and other matters.


Bruce
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Re: subjective experience

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik  wrote:
>
>I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply
> can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed
> computations are already "out >there,”
>
> If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the
> equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe
> that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves
> the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the
> prime number.
>
>
This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a
domain with an ontology, Bruno. Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated
assertion that people confuse "2+2=4" with 2+2=4.  What you refer to here
is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a dog, namely a 4-legged
mamal that barks and greets you affectionately at the door. That is, the
name is not the same as the physical object. But that distinction does not
exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism (the fact that the integers are
not independently existing objects), the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as
2+2=4. There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship
expressed in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic"
has no content. Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these
computations than it proves the existence of the moon.

in some sort of Platonic superspace.
>
>
> Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no
> objection to what is taught in primary school.
>

There you go again, Bruno: re-defining terms so that you are always right.
"Realism", or more particularly, "arithmetical realism" means no such
thing, Students are taught elementary calculations and multiplication
tables in primary school, they are not taught philosophical platonism,.

Bruce

>

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Re: STEP 3

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:55 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik  wrote:
>
>
> 
>
>
>
>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by
>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need
>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of
>> substitution was correctly chosen.
>>
>> So, do you die or not in the step 3?
>>
>
> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's
> find out -- you go first.
>
>
> Let me rephrase the question:
>
> Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?
>

According to the protocol, you are scanned, and then the original is cut.
The scanned data is then reconstituted; locally, or after a delay, or in
several different places.

The simplest interpretation of the "cut" phase is that the original
disappears, i.e., dies. If you take a slightly more sophisticated view of
personal identity, depending on a lot more the just memories of previous
states, but depending also on bodily continuity, then the question of
whether the original dies or not depends on the details of your theory of
personal identity. For example, in Nozik's "closest continuer" theory, if
the duplicate has an equivalent body and environment, then a single
continuer is the closest continuer of the original, and can be considered
the same person in some sense. Nozik's argument is that if there are two or
more continuers, and there is a tie in the relevant sense of "closeness",
then each continuer is a new person, and the original no longer exists
(dies).

So, as Dan points out, there is a lot more to this scenario than your
simplistic assumptions allow:  it is actually an empirical question as to
whether the "person" continues unaltered or not. So rather than armchair
philosophising, we should wait until the relevant brain scans are indeed
possible and we perform the experiment, before we pontificate absolutely on
what will or will not happen.

As for assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT), it is not a matter of assuming
this. It is a matter of whether the assumptions that you are building in
make sense or not. And that is an empirical matter. Does any of it comport
with our usual understandings of personal identity and other matters.

Bruce

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Re: subjective experience

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 6:16:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and 
 Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.

 Brent

>>>
>>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
>>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
>>> clear and meaningful.
>>>
>>>
>>> But does it have a clear answer?  
>>>
>>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
>>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
>>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
>>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
>>> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, 
>>> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
>>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
>>> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
>>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
>>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
>>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/
>>
>>
>> "The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum 
>> state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do 
>> multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually 
>> come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without 
>> any additional assumptions."
>>
>>
>> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
>> probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
>> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And 
>> what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's 
>> cat box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different 
>> times the decay might occur?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all 
> types should be removed from physics.
>
> So there would be no "continuum of worlds".  The way I think about it 
> (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just 
> think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: 
> There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of 
> them.
>
>
> That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule.  If 
> you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings 
> (probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC 
> program.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> (God plays Monte Carlo.)
>
> @philipthrift
>
>

Maybe it ends up being basically the same Monte Carlo programming.

Monte Carlo sampling from the quantum state space

https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.7805
https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.7806

@philipthrift

 

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Re: subjective experience

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees
Moscow and Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person
/plural/.

Brent


Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it,
if you accept frequency interpretation of probability as you
should also for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.


But does it have a clear answer?

The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's
straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the
world splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are
equi-probable).  But what if there are two possibilities and
one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world split
into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the
same, can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And
what if there are two possibilities, but one of them is very
unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand chance.  Does the world then
split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the probability of one
event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  But
if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens
infinitely many times and there is no natural measure of
probability.

Brent




Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.



http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/




"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the
quantum state, whether you like it or not. The next question
would be, do multiple-world superpositions of the form written
[above] ever actually come into being? And the answer again is:
*yes, automatically*, without any additional assumptions."


But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and
how does probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign
probabilities to branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead
of deriving it)?  And what about continuous processes like
detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat box?  Is a continuum of
worlds produced corresponding to the different times the decay
might occur?

Brent



Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of 
all types should be removed from physics.


So there would be no "continuum of worlds".  The way I think about it 
(without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just 
think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo 
program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual 
infinity of them.


That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule. If 
you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings 
(probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC 
program.


Brent




(God plays Monte Carlo.)

@philipthrift

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Re: subjective experience

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and 
>>> Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
>> clear and meaningful.
>>
>>
>> But does it have a clear answer?  
>>
>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
>> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, 
>> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
>> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
>
>
>
> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/
>
>
> "The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum 
> state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do 
> multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually 
> come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without 
> any additional assumptions."
>
>
> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
> probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And 
> what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's 
> cat box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different 
> times the decay might occur?
>
> Brent
>


Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all 
types should be removed from physics.

So there would be no "continuum of worlds".  The way I think about it 
(without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just 
think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: 
There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of 
them.


(God plays Monte Carlo.)

@philipthrift

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Re: subjective experience

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees Moscow
and Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person /plural/.

Brent


Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you
accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also
for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.


But does it have a clear answer?

The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's
straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the world
splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are
equi-probable).  But what if there are two possibilities and one
is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world split into three,
two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, can they
really be two.  Aren't they just one? And what if there are two
possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say
one-in-a-thousand chance.  Does the world then split into 1001
worlds?  And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so
then we need infinitely many worlds. But if there are infinitely
many worlds then every event happens infinitely many times and
there is no natural measure of probability.

Brent




Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.


http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/


"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum 
state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do 
multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever 
actually come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, 
automatically*, without any additional assumptions."


But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And 
what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in 
Schroedinger's cat box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding 
to the different times the decay might occur?


Brent

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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 20:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.
>> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept
> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's
> clear and meaningful.
>
>
> But does it have a clear answer?
>
> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if
> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we
> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two
> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world
> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same,
> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two
> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand
> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the
> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.
> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely
> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>
> Brent
>


Well there is always an infinity of worlds at each split but the density of
every possible results should conform to the partition.

Either probabilities have no meaning in the mwi and duplication experiment
or they do, but you can't says as JC holds that they're meaningful in the
MWI case and not in the duplication experiment because you could meet your
doppelganger... That makes no sense.

Quentin

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> 
> .
>

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Re: Observation versus assumption

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 7/21/2019 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Jul 2019, at 22:08, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 7/20/2019 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jul 2019, at 00:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything 
List  wrote:



On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural (and arises 
thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we cannot doubt (as 
Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is immaterial. There is not 
scientific instrument that can detect consciousness.

That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as conscious, 
unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day.  The myth that consciousness is 
a mystery is part hubris

Then mechanism cures that “hubris”. It could be hubris at Descartes’ time, 
where many thought that consciousness was a human thing, and animals have no 
souls. But today, many attribute consciousness to many animals, and mechanism 
makes the point that consciousness begins with Turing universality, and 
self-consciousness with Gödel-Löbianity.





(we are too special to be understood) and part an exaggerated demand for 
understanding.

With mechanism, consciousness is simple, as it is explained by the distinction 
between all modes of the self that the machine can be aware of.

That's where I disagree.  These two propositions cannot both be true:

1) Consciousness is what I directly experience without mediating 
inference.


2) Consciousness is the Loebian inference implicit in theories of 
computation (as defined by Bruno).


You must be careful as I did not say “1)” exactly, nor “2).

1) is that consciousness is immediately knowable, without the need of 
a reasoning to get the conclusion. It is typical of all experience.

How is that different than what I wrote?



And 2) that immediate inference comes from the logic of [o]p =   []p & 
<>t & p, and is proved to be immediate by using the fact that [o]p 
does not entail [o][o]p.


But that's not what you have said earlier.  You said that 2) was an 
axiom of consciousness.  "Immediate inference" is a contradiction in 
terms and I disagree that proofs define consciousness.









The problem which remains is only in deriving the “stable persistent and 
sharable dreams” from the web of dreams in arithmetic (which cannot be avoided 
if you accept to link consciousness to the person related to the relevant 
computations).


What "person"?  Where did "person" come from?


The person defined by all the modes of the self imposed by 
incompleteness.


But that's a Bruno-definition.  It might have a grain of truth in 
it...but there is a huge gap to be spanned between that definition and 
the meaning of "person" in a simple sentence like "Bruno is a person".  
Words have meanings and if you're going to introduce technical 
definitions of common words then you are obliged to show that the 
technical definition has the same extension.


So the person can be 3p identified with []p, and its first person is 
determined by []p , and the other hypostases. The observable is 
given by []p & <>p with p sigma_1, etc.







There's no scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an 
electron either.  But with the electron we're happy to have an effective theory 
that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery mongering about 
consciousness makes us demand something more that mere measurement and 
prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory.

Assuming a physical reality,


It's not an "assumption" when it's supported empirically.


Show me the paper. The only test that I know is the one I have given. 
I think I am the first to show that this is even testable.


(Be careful Brent, I suspect you are taking the whole of physics as an 
empirical support of Primary Matter) but that is an assum^ption is 
metaphysics, not in physics.


You are the only person I know who ever mentions "primary matter"...and 
I know a lot of physicists.




You have logicians attitude that everything must start from 
axioms...which are assumptions.


In difficult metaphysical subject, that is wiser, to avoid confusion 
of level, etc. Yes. I studied logic for that very reason.


It is convenient, especially if you purport to give words special 
technical meanings which then divorces then from the experience that 
engendered them.









but in that case mechanism becomes inconsistent, as I have shown.


No. You have argued it.  But your argument also implies that physics 
is necessary.   So if it shows physics is unreal, that's a 
contradiction.  So it's a reductio.  A reductio indicates something 
is wrong with the argument; but it doesn't tell you what.




Physics became necessary in the phenomenology, and necessarily Not in 
the ontology. So there is no contradiction.


You equivocate on "ontology".  It means whatever exists.  But you want 
it to mean an axiomatic minimum.  But you're 

Re: Observation versus assumption

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 2:48:49 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 3:14 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> A "machine" associated with the lambda calculus is the SECD machine
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SECD_machine 
>> 
>> The machine was the first to be specifically designed to evaluate lambda 
>> calculus  expressions. 
>>
>
> And in the very first line of the article you recommend it calls it a 
> "virtual machine". There is nothing virtual about a read write head and a 
> paper tape, that sort of machine is as non-virtual as the diesel engine on 
> a tug boat.
>
> John K Clark
>


*virtual, hypothetical, theoretical, abstract *- both the Turing machine 
and SECD machine are merely that.

*No one in computer science refers to the Turing machine as an actual 
machine.*

Turing machine, hypothetical computing device 
- https://www.britannica.com/technology/Turing-machine

A Turing machine refers to a hypothetical machine proposed by Alan M. Turing
- http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Turing_machine

A Turing machine is a theoretical computing machine 
- http://mathworld.wolfram.com/TuringMachine.html

A Turing machine is a mathematical model of computation that defines an 
abstract machine, 
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_machine

 
@philipthrift

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 3:14 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

A "machine" associated with the lambda calculus is the SECD machine
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SECD_machine
> 
> The machine was the first to be specifically designed to evaluate lambda
> calculus  expressions.
>

And in the very first line of the article you recommend it calls it a
"virtual machine". There is nothing virtual about a read write head and a
paper tape, that sort of machine is as non-virtual as the diesel engine on
a tug boat.

John K Clark

>
>

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Re: subjective experience

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.  
>> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
> clear and meaningful.
>
>
> But does it have a clear answer?  
>
> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, 
> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>
> Brent
>



Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.


http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/


"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum state, 
whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world 
superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? 
And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without any additional 
assumptions."


@philipthrift 

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 10:18:18 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 8:34 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> >> According to my dictionary a "entity" is an independent thing with 
>>> distinct properties, in this case one of those properties is it can be 
>>> implemented PHYSICALLY, a property that a sequence of squiggles in Lambda 
>>> Calculus does not have.
>>
>>  
>
> *> Why would a set of quadruplets be more "physically implementable" than 
>> a lambda expression?*
>>
>
> It wouldn't, but a set of quadruplets is not the only or the best way to 
> think about the operation of a Turing Machine, you can also think about it 
> physically, something that you CAN NOT DO with Lambda Calculus. That's why 
> computer makers don't put Lambda Calculus textbooks in their machines but 
> instead put in silicon microprocessors that work the way Turing outlined.  
> And that's why Alan Turing is a hero among computer nerds and why Alonzo 
> Church is not.
>
>  John K Clark
>




A "machine" associated with the lambda calculus is the SECD machine

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SECD_machine 


The machine was the first to be specifically designed to evaluate lambda 
calculus  expressions. 
 
@philipthrift

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 9:59:12 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:

> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 8:30 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> In general
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/
>> *Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects.*
>
>
> That is an idiotic and meaningless definition, which is not at all unusual 
> in philosophy. Meaning needs contrast but by that definition EVERYBODY 
> believes in Platonism because (unless solipsism is true) everybody has 
> thoughts and thoughts are abstract. And most people believe in other 
> abstract stuff too, like big, fast, distant, and old. 
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>>
 
Other abstractions: ghostly, supernatural, demonic, godly, spiritual, 
mathematical, ...

If abstractions are not implemented 

  https://gustavus.edu/mcs/max/concrete-abstractions.html

 they remain merely fictions.

@philipthrift

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Re: subjective experience

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees Moscow and
Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person /plural/.

Brent


Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you 
accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for 
MWI, it's clear and meaningful.


But does it have a clear answer?

The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two 
possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the 
same, can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there 
are two possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say 
one-in-a-thousand chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  
And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need 
infinitely many worlds.  But if there are infinitely many worlds then 
every event happens infinitely many times and there is no natural 
measure of probability.


Brent

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:22 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *>>> The Turing Machine is not the simplest implementation of a physical
>> computer, *
>>
>
> >> You haven't told me about a simpler on
>
> > *I did. (The combinators),*
>

No you did not. You showed me something simpler but it was not something
that could make a calculation.

John K Clark





>

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Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*> (and I infer “to support genuine consciousness”).*


And every time in the history of the world a change
in consciousness resulted in a change in the physical state of a brain and
a change in the physical state of a brain resulted in a change in
consciousness.

*> If not, then it is even more weird why you want for matter, given that
> the computation are realised in arithmetic,*


And not once in the history of the world has anyone observed a
computation being made in nothing but a change in arithmetic. In fact
nobody has ever observed a change in arithmetic period.

>>> the whole video game is executed through pure number relation
>
>

 >> Incorrect.  The whole video game is executed through
>> voltage differences in the microprocessor.
>
>

> *You can implement it,*


You've got it backwards. The numbers don't emulate the voltages in
the microprocessor, the voltages in the microprocessor emulate the numbers.

>> We can use the language of mathematics to help us understand how those
>> voltage differences effect each other, and we can if we wish interpret
>> those voltage differences as numbers.
>
>

*> In your theory which assumes a physical universe.*


The only thing I assume is that if something works then it works and
if something doesn't work then it doesn't work. Making calculations with
the help of matter works, making calculations without matter doesn't work.

And that is your cue to refute what I just said by referring to a textbook
that will never be able to calculate 2+2.

>>>
> *See the combinator thread for a precise disproof of this.*



>> Ah yes, that legendary post
>
> >*Ad hominem.  Boring.*


What's boring is your referring to posts that don't exist, your constant
whining and using that incredibly pompous Latin phrase.

>> post of yours that plugs all the holes in your theory and proves
> that everything I've said is wrong, the post that you've been talking about
> for the better part of a decade, the post that NOBODY HAS EVER SEEN.



*> I just said that I have proven that the giving of the lambda expressions
> [x][y]x (which does the same job as K) and [x][y][z]xz(yz) *


I agree, "[x][y]x" does indeed *do* the same job as "K) and
[x][y][z]xz(yz)" because both ASCII sequences *do* precisely NOTHING and
0=0 so they both *do* exactly the same thing. Nothing.

>>The logical operation of every computer ever made can be reduced to a
>> Turing Machine.
>
>

>*True but irrelevant.*


How in the world is that fact irrelevant?!

*> Actually it makes my point, but usually, thanks to our physical laws
> (and transistors) the boolean operation will be used to simulate a Turing
> machines.*


Boolean operations don't simulate Turing Machines, Turing Machines simulate
Boolean operations.

>> Ironically to rebut my accusation that you keep changing the meaning of
>> "Aristotle theology" you introduced the concept of  "Aristotle's
>> second God"; I've never heard anybody mention that before, but I admit you
>> know more about Greek silly ideas than I do.
>
>

> *The first God is Aristotle first mover it is *[...]


Bruno, I did ask you not to tell me, I've given up keeping track of
your constantly mutating definitions of common words and invented phrases
and acronyms used by nobody but you.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 9:29 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> LISP machines were just Turing Machines
>
>
> > *Nonsense.*
>

OK let me see if I've got this right: you think it is nonsense to believe
that a Turing Machine could simulate a computer that became obsolete more
than 30 years ago. Is that what you're saying? Is that the hill you're
willing to die on?


> I am telling you that matter is needed to make that happen, in this
>>> case the matter in the microprocessor of the computer that is running the
>>> video game that is using Bitcoins as money.
>>
>>
>> >>> But why?
>>
> >> Why what?
>
>
> > *Why assuming primary matter, *
>

I don't care if you assume "primary matter" or not regardless of what that
piece of philosophical gobbledygook happens to mean today. I am just
telling you that matter is needed to mine Bitcoins that you can use to buy
stuff.


> > what is it, and how would that make a computation more real than others?
>

A Bitcoin that can be used to buy a car is real, and a calculation used to
mine that Bitcoin is more real than a calculation that lacks this Bitcoin
mining car buying property.

> *> Why to make that assumption,*
>>
> >> What assumption?
>


*> The assumption that there is a physical universe, and that in
> metaphysics* [...]
>

If you've taught me one thing it's that metaphysics is crap, so assume
anything you like about it, I don't care.

John K Clark

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Re: STEP 3

[PGC]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:55:52 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> 
>
>
>  
>
>> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by 
>> claiming that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need 
>> some telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of 
>> substitution was correctly chosen.
>>
>> So, do you die or not in the step 3?
>>
>
> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's 
> find out -- you go first.  
>
>
>
> Let me rephrase the question:
>

That's the thing though, some folks won't. 

And for those people all you got is "you don't have an argument, you're a 
weak materialist blah blah blah", when one can reject all argumentation at 
its root and state plainly that you lack evidence/tractability for the 
extraordinary claims of however you choose to sell  mathematical 
philosophy/personal mysticism, themselves uninformed by advanced/recent 
discussion on many philosophical, linguistic, metaphysical, even 
mathematical fronts, this week.
 
Then your discourse tries to make out some perceived metaphysical 
commitment which is then embedded and assimilated by UDA/personal mysticism 
somewhere but you have no answer to those that say: "No. Evidence is not 
convincing, problem has tractability issues, consciousness discussions can 
be manipulated and veer into charlatan territory etc." which I've 
maintained for years now. 

The forced nature with which you try ceaselessly to assimilate discourses 
of others + claim fellow members as trophies for your mysticism: evidence 
that you guys are ideologues. You can't have a person refuse to consent 
that UDA/your personal mysticism fails to have merit. That's why it 
appears, and for all practical purposes IS, synonymous with a con game and 
pseudoscientific "discussion". There is certitude here, which by your own 
measures is I guess evidence of "the right kind of scientific attitude". PGC

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 8:46 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >There is nothing abstract or immaterial about a paper tape and a
>> read/write head, but everything is abstract and immaterial about a
>> sequence of ASCII characters in Lambda calculus.
>
>
> *> Or about Turing quintuplets.*
>

Turing quintuplets are abstract and immaterial, a Turing Machine is not.


> *> You keep confusing a digital machine, its code, its physical
> implementation, …*
>

You keep confusing stuff that can *do* things from stuff that can not. A
sequence of ASCII characters can't *do* anything unless it interacts with a
brain made of matter that obeys the laws of physics, and the exact same
thing is true of digital machine code. Lambda  Calculus and Turing
quintuplets can't *do* anything unless they interact with the physical
brain of a mathematician, but a Turing Machine needs nothing else that is
physical because it is already physical. All by itself a Turing Machine can
simulate Turing quintuplets but Turing quintuplets CAN NOT simulate a
Turing Machine, therefore a Turing Machine is more profound and fundamental
and Turing quintuplets are a superficial way to think about it.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 8:39 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> No it does not work because machines have inputs and outputs but "lambda
>> expressions" have neither
>
>
> > What???
>

No it does not work because machines have inputs and outputs but "lambda
expressions" have neither

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 8:34 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> According to my dictionary a "entity" is an independent thing with
>> distinct properties, in this case one of those properties is it can be
>> implemented PHYSICALLY, a property that a sequence of squiggles in Lambda
>> Calculus does not have.
>
>

*> Why would a set of quadruplets be more "physically implementable" than a
> lambda expression?*
>

It wouldn't, but a set of quadruplets is not the only or the best way to
think about the operation of a Turing Machine, you can also think about it
physically, something that you CAN NOT DO with Lambda Calculus. That's why
computer makers don't put Lambda Calculus textbooks in their machines but
instead put in silicon microprocessors that work the way Turing outlined.
And that's why Alan Turing is a hero among computer nerds and why Alonzo
Church is not.

 John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 8:30 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

In general
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/
> *Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects.*


That is an idiotic and meaningless definition, which is not at all unusual
in philosophy. Meaning needs contrast but by that definition EVERYBODY
believes in Platonism because (unless solipsism is true) everybody has
thoughts and thoughts are abstract. And most people believe in other
abstract stuff too, like big, fast, distant, and old.

John K Clark


>

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Jul 2019, at 22:08, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 11:31 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> A Turing Machine is compatible with both pure mathematics and pure 
> >> physics, but Lambda Calculus is compatible only with pure mathematics. 
>  
> Why?
> 
> Ask Alonzo Church the inventor of Lambda Calculus who admitted it's true, and 
> so did Godel. 

True for the pedagogy, false for the conceptual and mathematical complexity.


>  
> > The so called LISP machine implements combinators and lambda expression
> 
> LISP machines were just Turing Machines


Nonsense.




> that incorporated common subroutines used in the LISP language in HARDWARE to 
> enabled them to run faster, but by the early 1990's microprocessors had 
> gotten so fast that cheap home computers ran faster than any dedicated LISP 
> machine and that's why nobody makes them anymore. 
>  
> >>I am telling you that matter is needed to make that happen, in this case 
> >>the matter in the microprocessor of the computer that is running the video 
> >>game that is using Bitcoins as money. 
> 
> > But why? 
> 
> Why what?

Why assuming primary matter, what is it, and how would that make a computation 
more real than others?



> 
> > Why to make that assumption,
> 
> What assumption?

The assumption that there is a physical universe, and that in metaphysics we 
have to make that assumption.

Why do you assume that matter is not explainable from non physical notion?



> 
>   >> Consciousness? What the hell does that have to do with the price of 
> eggs?  
> 
> > You are the one saying that we need matter for a computation to happen
> 
> Because every computation ever observed in the history of the world has 
> required matter.

We have to explain observable by using “all computation”, when we assumed 
mechanism, which is what make your argument circular here.

I stop here, because I have already answered all other comments in other posts.

Bruno 



> 
> > (and I infer “to support genuine consciousness”).
> 
> And every time in the history of the world a change in consciousness resulted 
> in a change in the physical state of a brain and a change in the physical 
> state of a brain resulted in a change in consciousness.
> 
> > If not, then it is even more weird why you want for matter, given that the 
> > computation are realised in arithmetic,
> 
> And not once in the history of the world has anyone observed a computation 
> being made in nothing but a change in arithmetic. In fact nobody has ever 
> observed a change in arithmetic period.
> 
>> >>>  the whole video game is executed through pure number relation
>> 
> >> Incorrect.  The whole video game is executed through voltage differences 
> >> in the microprocessor.
> 
> > You can implement it,
> 
> You've got it backwards. The numbers don't emulate the voltages in the 
> microprocessor, the voltages in the microprocessor emulate the numbers.
> 
> >> We can use the language of mathematics to help us understand how those 
> >> voltage differences effect each other, and we can if we wish interpret 
> >> those voltage differences as numbers.
> 
> > In your theory which assumes a physical universe.
> 
> The only thing I assume is that if something works then it works and if 
> something doesn't work then it doesn't work. Making calculations with the 
> help of matter works, making calculations without matter doesn't work.
> 
> And that is your cue to refute what I just said by referring to a textbook 
> that will never be able to calculate 2+2.
>> > See the combinator thread for a precise disproof of this.
> 
> Ah yes, that legendary post
>  
> >Ad hominem.  Boring.
> 
> What's boring is your referring to posts that don't exist, your constant 
> whining and using that incredibly pompous Latin phrase. 
> 
> >> post of yours that plugs all the holes in your theory and proves that 
> >> everything I've said is wrong, the post that you've been talking about for 
> >> the better part of a decade, the post that NOBODY HAS EVER SEEN.
> 
> > I just said that I have proven that the giving of the lambda expressions 
> > [x][y]x (which does the same job as K) and [x][y][z]xz(yz) 
> 
> I agree, "[x][y]x" does indeed *do* the same job as "K) and [x][y][z]xz(yz)" 
> because both ASCII sequences *do* precisely NOTHING and 0=0 so they both *do* 
> exactly the same thing. Nothing.
> 
> >>The logical operation of every computer ever made can be reduced to a 
> >>Turing Machine.
> 
> >True but irrelevant.
> 
> How in the world is that fact irrelevant?!
> 
> > Actually it makes my point, but usually, thanks to our physical laws (and 
> > transistors) the boolean operation will be used to simulate a Turing 
> > machines.
> 
> Boolean operations don't simulate Turing Machines, Turing Machines simulate 
> Boolean operations.
> 
> >> Ironically to rebut my accusation that you keep changing the meaning of 
> >> "Aristotle theology" you introduced the concept of  

Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 16:40, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 5:21 AM Telmo Menezes  > wrote:
> 
> >> X is a Turing Machine if and only if for any given input to X there exists 
> >> a Turing Machine that will produce the same output as X does with the same 
> >> input.
> 
> > Ok, but then you can replace "Turing Machine" above with "von Neumann 
> > Machine" or "GPU" and it still works.
> 
> You could if you wanted to because unlike Lambda calculus Turing Machines, 
> von Neumann Machines, and GPUs can all be implemented physically; but if 
> you're only interested in philosophy then you wouldn't want to because you 
> would just be inserting in tons of additional engineering details needed to 
> make computers economically viable.   
> 
> Only?! If X is Turing Complete then a Turing Machine can emulate X and X can 
> emulate a Turing Machine.
> 
> > Yes, but the Turing Machine has no special status in relation to any other 
> > Turing complete system.
> 
> It is the simplest Turing complete system.
>  
> >> Do you know of anything simpler that can make calculations than read a 
> >> square, erase what you read and then print either a 0 or a 1 on it 
> >> depending on your state, then change into another state depending on what 
> >> you read, then either halt or move right or left and read another square.
> 
> > Simple in what sense?
> 
> The amount of information needed to describe its most basic operation.
> 
> > I can think of physical implementations of computers that simpler in the 
> > sense that they do not require some sort of writing device,
> 
> Any computer is going to need memory to store the program and usually there 
> will be data too, and memory involves reading and writing.
>  
> > motors to move the tape,
> 
> Any computer with more than one bit of memory is going to need to move the 
> place where it reads and writes.
> 
> > some sort of sensor to read the state,
> 
> Any computer is going to have to have internal states that change, and that 
> change can't be random, the change must depend on its current state and the 
> next bit of information it reads.
>  
> > then some mechanism to make the decision on how to activate the motors and 
> > writing device. I gave you one: Domino. It only requires objects falling 
> > over other objects. Or the billiard ball computer, which only requires the 
> > physical collision of balls inside tubes.
> 
> The position of the billiard balls are the memory and determine the state of 
> the machine, however the 2D position of a billiard ball can't be described by 
> just one bit of information as a square on Turing's tape can be. So a 2D 
> billiard ball computer is considerably more complicated than a 1D paper tape, 
> but if you like the billiard balls that's fine because unlike Lambda Calculus 
> it can be implemented physically.
> 
> > I'm sure it is possible to create computational surfaces made of lattices 
> > of very simple molecules.
> 
> I'm sure of that too but there is nothing simple about molecules or the 2D 
> surface of 3D lattices
> 
> > The Turing Machine is not the simplest implementation of a physical 
> > computer,
> 
> You haven't told me about a simpler one.


I did. (The combinators), but you have confuse them with words, which they are 
not. 

The theory of combinators is entirely axiomatised by 

The 2 axioms:

1) Kxy = x
2) Sxyz = xz(yz)

And the 3 rules

 3) If x = y and x = z, then y = z
 4) If x = y then xz = yz
 5) If x = y then zx = zy


You should be able to see that SKKx = x whatever combinator x represents. 

SKKx = Kx(Kx) by 2) 
Kx(Kx) = x by 1)

SKK compute the identity function.


See the combinator thread where I have proved the Turing universality. Or ask 
for more.

A precise logical specification of the Turing machine is much more complex.

Bruno





> 
> > it is (perhaps?) the simplest implementation that uses explicit memory and 
> > sequential computations.
> 
> If it has no memory and can't make sequential computations then you might 
> have a calculator but you don't have a computer.
>  
> > These two things make it easier for us to reason about its computations, 
> > and that is all. It is not the "fundamental" computer.
> 
> If its the easiest for us to understand then it is the simplest, if it can't 
> be made any simpler, any more elementary, without loosing important 
> properties then it is fundamental because that's what the word means.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jul 2019, at 13:48, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 2:14 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> >> If matter (nouns) exist then something other than matter must exist too, 
> >> namely the relationship between matter (adjectives). I think both John 
> >> Clark and Philip Thrift are adjectives not nouns despite what our grade 
> >> school teachers told us. John K Clark
> 
> > Anyone who says relations are existing immaterial entities couldn't 
> > possible criticize Bruno Marchal's theory.
> 
> I say if nouns exist then the properties of those nouns (adjectives) must 
> exist too.
> 
> Bruno Marchal says nouns don't exist


Never said this. Just to be clear.

All what I might ahem said is that IF we assume Mechanism, then Primary matter 
has no role that we can related to the observable (and so are like the 
invisible horse pulling the cars, or even contradictory (with very weak form of 
Occam).


Bruno



> but adjectives do even though they're describing the properties of things 
> that don't exist. 
> 
> I say that does not make one bit of sense.
> 
> Therefore I have demonstrated you are wrong, it is possible to criticize 
> Bruno Marchal's theory. I just did it.
> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 7:34:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Jul 2019, at 13:55, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 6:33 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> > *A Turing machine is a mathematical entity,*
>
>
> According to my dictionary a "entity" is an independent thing with 
> distinct properties, in this case one of those properties is it can be 
> implemented PHYSICALLY, a property that a sequence of squiggles in Lambda 
> Calculus does not have.
>
>
>
> Why would a set of quadruplets be more "physically implementable" than a 
> lambda expression?
>
> That makes no sense.  Both are first interpret in a von Neuman-Suze 
> machine, and then physically intepreteted in a some physical boolean+ graph.
>
> Bruno
>
>
BTW here is the UTM implemented in different languages:

https://rosettacode.org/wiki/Universal_Turing_machine

@philipthrift 

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 22:08, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/20/2019 1:44 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 20 Jul 2019, at 00:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural (and arises 
 thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we cannot doubt (as 
 Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is immaterial. There is not 
 scientific instrument that can detect consciousness.
>>> That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as conscious, 
>>> unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day.  The myth that consciousness 
>>> is a mystery is part hubris
>> 
>> Then mechanism cures that “hubris”. It could be hubris at Descartes’ time, 
>> where many thought that consciousness was a human thing, and animals have no 
>> souls. But today, many attribute consciousness to many animals, and 
>> mechanism makes the point that consciousness begins with Turing 
>> universality, and self-consciousness with Gödel-Löbianity.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> (we are too special to be understood) and part an exaggerated demand for 
>>> understanding.
>> With mechanism, consciousness is simple, as it is explained by the 
>> distinction between all modes of the self that the machine can be aware of. 
> That's where I disagree.  These two propositions cannot both be true:
> 
> 1) Consciousness is what I directly experience without mediating inference.
> 
> 2) Consciousness is the Loebian inference implicit in theories of computation 
> (as defined by Bruno).

You must be careful as I did not say “1)” exactly, nor “2).

1) is that consciousness is immediately knowable, without the need of a 
reasoning to get the conclusion. It is typical of all experience. 

And 2) that immediate inference comes from the logic of [o]p =   []p & <>t & p, 
and is proved to be immediate by using the fact that [o]p does not entail 
[o][o]p. 



> 
>> The problem which remains is only in deriving the “stable persistent and 
>> sharable dreams” from the web of dreams in arithmetic (which cannot be 
>> avoided if you accept to link consciousness to the person related to the 
>> relevant computations). 
> 
> What "person"?  Where did "person" come from?

The person defined by all the modes of the self imposed by incompleteness. So 
the person can be 3p identified with []p, and its first person is determined by 
[]p , and the other hypostases. The observable is given by []p & <>p with p 
sigma_1, etc. 



> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> There's no scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an 
>>> electron either.  But with the electron we're happy to have an effective 
>>> theory that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery mongering 
>>> about consciousness makes us demand something more that mere measurement 
>>> and prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory.
>> Assuming a physical reality, 
> 
> It's not an "assumption" when it's supported empirically. 

Show me the paper. The only test that I know is the one I have given. I think I 
am the first to show that this is even testable.

(Be careful Brent, I suspect you are taking the whole of physics as an 
empirical support of Primary Matter) but that is an assum^ption is metaphysics, 
not in physics.



> You have logicians attitude that everything must start from axioms...which 
> are assumptions.

In difficult metaphysical subject, that is wiser, to avoid confusion of level, 
etc. Yes. I studied logic for that very reason.



> 
>> but in that case mechanism becomes inconsistent, as I have shown.
> 
> No. You have argued it.  But your argument also implies that physics is 
> necessary.   So if it shows physics is unreal, that's a contradiction.  So 
> it's a reductio.  A reductio indicates something is wrong with the argument; 
> but it doesn't tell you what.
> 

Physics became necessary in the phenomenology, and necessarily Not in the 
ontology. So there is no contradiction.




>> 
>> Consciousness is simple, because computer science somehow predicts it, 
>> easily from incompleteness + Theaetetus.
> 
> You have assumed that you can define it to be something simple


I assume YD + CT. 




> and then you argue that because this simple thing has one or two similarities 
> to the very complex thing we experience as consciousness it is therefore the 
> same thing.

Absolutely not. I don’t do this even for the natural numbers, as we know that 
we cannot define them “univocally” at all.



>   Even though in addition to similarities it also has some glaring 
> differences, such as being timeless, such as knowing all logical inferences, 
> such as existing independent of a matter.

To fuzzy. I can agree and disagree. I don’t see the relevance.




> 
>> 
>> It is matter the real hard problem in the mind-body problem, but we are not 
>> aware 

Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 21:52, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/20/2019 1:32 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>> 
>> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019, at 22:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>> 
>>> On 7/19/2019 4:49 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 I share their perplexity. The idea of immaterialism is natural (and
 arises thousands of years ago), because the only thing that we cannot
 doubt (as Descartes pointed out) -- our consciousness -- is
 immaterial. There is not scientific instrument that can detect
 consciousness.
>>> That's not really true. Of course doctors assess patients as conscious,
>>> unconscious, in coma, or brain dead every day.
>> Yes, but all of this doctor-stuff takes place in the theater of your own 
>> consciousness. There is no evidence of any reality beyond conscious 
>> experience.
> 
> So the doctors decision about you has nothing to do with reality.

That does not follow.

Bruno 



> And you see no problem with that kind of reasoning.  It appears to me that 
> you are willing to discount everything as evidence for anything else.  All 
> that counts as evidence is experience and it can only be evidence for itself.
> 
>> We only know about the first person, not the third. The problem with the 
>> materialist / emergentist framing of consciousness is that it demotes what 
>> is directly known in favor of a model (third person objective reality), of 
>> which we don't really know the ontological status.
> 
> Ontologies are always model dependent.
> 
>> 
>>> The myth that
>>> consciousness is a mystery is part hubris (we are too special to be
>>> understood)
>> I know, this idea that we have been going from a process of humbling 
>> experiences, by discovering that the earth is not the center of the 
>> universe, and then how infinitesimally small we are compared to the all 
>> shebang, and then that we are just animals, etc. Several of my friends are 
>> very attached to this idea. They love to think poetically about "how 
>> insignificant they feel" when they realize how small we are, how devoid of 
>> anything special. I have to be honest, I don't particularly care for any of 
>> this stuff one way or the other.
> 
> My point has nothing to do with humbling experiences.  It is that we think we 
> have understanding of a lot of physics because we can use to for predictions. 
>  But when a neuroscientist finds he can predict what a subject will think 
> when a certain brain point is stimulated that's dismissed as not really 
> evidence for a material basis for thought because...well thought is special.  
> My point is that we demand some kind of intuitively satisfying explanation of 
> thought that is "better" than mere prediction...yet in all the rest of 
> science we think the ability to predict means we know reality.  I think both 
> are off the mark.
> 
>> 
>> I don't know if we are special. Compared to what? All I say is that all that 
>> appears to exist, exists within my conscious experience. The rest, I can 
>> always doubt.
> 
> What you doubt is what is inferred from your direct experience.  But what is 
> this process of inference?  Ideas pop into my consciousness with no conscious 
> inference of them all the time.
> 
>> What is this "I" I refer to? Also don't know. I suspect it's the same "I" 
>> you refer to, but in a different branch, in a different set of 
>> circumstances. These things that I am saying are tautologies, trivial 
>> observations. The fact that some people find them so absurd or perplexing 
>> makes me thing that there is religious belief involved, even though the 
>> religion in question does not necessarily have a name.
>> 
>>> and part an exaggerated demand for understanding. There's no
>>> scientific instrument that can detect the wave function of an electron
>>> either.  But with the electron we're happy to have an effective theory
>>> that tells us when the detector will click or not. Mystery mongering
>>> about consciousness makes us demand something more that mere measurement
>>> and prediction, something that doesn't exist for any theory.
>> The idea of a wave function of an electron, scientific instruments, 
>> detectors, mystery mongering, all of this takes place -- at least for me, 
>> and I know of nothing else -- within the phenomenon I am curious about. 
>> That's what makes it special.
> 
> And I'm suggesting that it is your curiosity that makes it special. If you 
> were that curious about why the wave function of an electron is what Dirac 
> said it is, if you were willing to just keep asking "Why?", you'd find that 
> special too.  Bruno wants this curiosity to bottom out on computation because 
> he thinks he understands computation.
> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Telmo.
>> 
>>> Brent
> 
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 15:22, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 4:54 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> Where is the physical implementation?  JavaScript needs hardware, without 
> >> that it's just a sequence of squiggles that can't calculate 2+2. A Turing 
> >> Machine IS hardware.
> 
> > Of course not. The definition given by Turing is [...]
> 
> The operation of a given diesel engine does not change if you change the 
> definition of a diesel engine, and the same holds true for the engine 
> designed by Mr.Turing. 
> 
> > a quintuplets
> 
> A diesel engine can produce work, the thermodynamic equations describing the 
> operation of a diesel engine can not. A Turing Machine can make calculations, 
> but "a quintuplets" can not.
>  
> > You can see an hardware computer as a abstract immaterial Turing machine
> 
> There is nothing abstract or immaterial about a paper tape and a read/write 
> head, but everything is abstract and immaterial about a sequence of ASCII 
> characters in Lambda calculus.


Or about Turing quintuplets. You keep confusing a digital machine, its code, 
its physical implementation, …

You are confused, and you are confusing the others. All universal machine are 
finite abstract set of quadruplets. The infinite tape and head “ are sort of 
super to make it easy to understand that the formalism imitate well a human 
doing a computation with a pen and paper.

All Digital machine/number are finite object. The universal Turing machine is 
one special finite set of quadruplets. See Turing’ papers, or any books on this.

Bruno

> 
>   John K Clark
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 14:55, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 4:18 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> X is a Turing Machine if and only if for any given input to X there exists 
> >> a Turing Machine that will produce the same output as X does with the same 
> >> input.
> 
> > That works for a lambda expression to.
> 
> No it does not work because machines have inputs and outputs but "lambda 
> expressions" have neither

What???




> and are just a sequence of squiggles


Of course not, you make your repeated confusion between 2 and “2”, but you 
could do it for the universa Turing machine quadruplets.




> that never change and mean nothing unless a brain made of matter that obeys 
> the laws of physics is added into the mix.  

Only if the whole is blessed with Holy Spirit. 

You cannot invoke a metaphysical commitment in reasoning. 





> 
> > You confuse the mathematical notion of Turing machine, with its general 
> > sense,
> 
> You confuse the fact that a "general sense" can't *do* anything but a machine 
> can. And a paper tape and read/write head doesn't know or need to know 
> anything about mathematical notation other than 1 and 0. It just knows it can 
> print one of those two symbols and then either halt or move right or left; 
> and that's all it needs.
> 
> >All universal machine/formalisme can emulate all universal machine/formalism.
> 
> What in the world is machine/formalism?! It sounds to me like big/little or 
> possible/impossible or "this statement is false".
> 
> >> Do you know of anything simpler that can make calculations than read a 
> >> square, erase what you read and then print either a 0 or a 1 on it 
> >> depending on your state, then change into another state depending on what 
> >> you read, then either halt or move right or left and read another square.
> 
> > Yes, combinators are simpler, and lambda expression too. It is just simple 
> > substation. Can you imagine something simpler that 
> 
> K x y = x
> S x y z = x z (y z)
> ?
> 
> Yes, I can indeed imagine something simpler than that, seventeen times 
> simpler to be exact, it is this:
> *
> I only used one ASCII character while you used 17; my character can't 
> calculate anything but neither can your 17.


In have no idea what you mean by “*”, but above you clearly confuse "K x y = x 
S x y z = x z (y z)” and K x y = x S x y z = x z (y z).

Bruno



> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 13:55, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 6:33 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> > A Turing machine is a mathematical entity,
> 
> According to my dictionary a "entity" is an independent thing with distinct 
> properties, in this case one of those properties is it can be implemented 
> PHYSICALLY, a property that a sequence of squiggles in Lambda Calculus does 
> not have.


Why would a set of quadruplets be more "physically implementable" than a lambda 
expression?

That makes no sense.  Both are first interpret in a von Neuman-Suze machine, 
and then physically intepreteted in a some physical boolean+ graph.

Bruno










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> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 7:15:31 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 7:58 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> Sounds like you are a proponent of noun-adjective dualism!*
>> *(Just another version of a material-immaterial dualism.)*
>>
>
> Maybe but I really don't know. To tell the truth I haven't been keeping up 
> to date on the latest philosophical bafflegab terminology. But if a dualist 
> is somebody who thinks the words "noun" and "adjective" mean different 
> things then I'm a dualist.  
>
>  John K Clark
>


In general

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/


*Platonism is the view that there exist such things as abstract objects.*

(see section on *relations*)

@philipthrift 

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 13:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 2:58:02 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Jul 2019, at 14:40, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:28:10 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> ...
>> 
>> By assuming the existence of (primary) Matter, you lose the possibility to 
>> explain it, and you loss the mean to use the mechanist theory of mind, 
>> without providing a conceptually clear non-mechanist theory of mind.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> If a mathematical/logical theory can explain experience (the catchall for 
>> consciousness, selfness, qualia, etc.) then that is that and we an all go 
>> home.
> 
> The experience is explained in the CTM. It is a semantical fixed point. It 
> explains why machine will introduce a word to describe a truth that they know 
> but cannot prove to others or even define in any 3p way.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> (If we didn't have experience, then we wouldn't be worrying about in the 
>> first place!)
>> 
>> But if it can't, then it is something itself needs a home, and that home is 
>> matter,
> 
> But the whole point is that it can. Machines have already a quite rich theory 
> of consciousness, and even God when taken in the original large sense (not in 
> the fairy tales sense which is con artistry).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>> 
>> (Unless experiences are ghosts from an immaterial realm.)
> 
> 
> The "machinist" approach to (theory of) consciousness is the one taken at 
> MIRI and CSAIL/MIT, with higher-order (modal) programming language theory, 
> theorem provers, and fixed-point (monadic) semantics.
> 
> I think it's ultimately incomplete. 

But even on elementary arithmetic (and still less on anything less elementary) 
all effective theories are incomplete.

Incompleteness is rather reassuring, as it play a role for making the machine 
able to refute a large class of reductionist conception (on machine and 
numbers). 

Bruno




> 
> @philiptrhift
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jul 21, 2019 at 7:58 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

*> Sounds like you are a proponent of noun-adjective dualism!*
> *(Just another version of a material-immaterial dualism.)*
>

Maybe but I really don't know. To tell the truth I haven't been keeping up
to date on the latest philosophical bafflegab terminology. But if a dualist
is somebody who thinks the words "noun" and "adjective" mean different
things then I'm a dualist.

 John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

[Philip Thrift]

On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 6:49:25 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 2:14 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> >> If matter (nouns) exist then something other than matter must exist 
>>> too, namely the relationship between matter (adjectives). I think both John 
>>> Clark and Philip Thrift are adjectives not nouns despite what our grade 
>>> school teachers told us. John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> > *Anyone who says relations are existing immaterial entities couldn't 
>> possible criticize Bruno Marchal's theory.*
>>
>
> I say if nouns exist then the properties of those nouns (adjectives) must 
> exist too.
>
> Bruno Marchal says nouns don't exist but adjectives do even though they're 
> describing the properties of things that don't exist. 
>
> I say that does not make one bit of sense.
>
> Therefore I have demonstrated you are wrong, it is possible to criticize 
> Bruno Marchal's theory. I just did it.
>
>  John K Clark
>



Sounds like you are a proponent of *noun-adjective* dualism!

(Just another version of a material-immaterial dualism.)

@philipthrift 

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STEP 3

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jul 2019, at 08:11, Dan Sonik  wrote:
> 
> 



> 
>  
> Or, if you don’t die, the only way to avoid the indeterminacy is by claiming 
> that you will feel to be at both city at once, but that will need some 
> telepathy hardly compatible with the idea that the level of substitution was 
> correctly chosen.
> 
> So, do you die or not in the step 3?
> 
> I don't know -- build a DDTR machine from all that great math and let's find 
> out -- you go first.  


Let me rephrase the question:

Assuming digital mechanism (YD + CT) do you die in the step 3?


Bruno




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Re: Observation versus assumption

[John Clark]

On Fri, Jul 19, 2019 at 2:14 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>> If matter (nouns) exist then something other than matter must exist too,
>> namely the relationship between matter (adjectives). I think both John
>> Clark and Philip Thrift are adjectives not nouns despite what our grade
>> school teachers told us. John K Clark
>>
>
> > *Anyone who says relations are existing immaterial entities couldn't
> possible criticize Bruno Marchal's theory.*
>

I say if nouns exist then the properties of those nouns (adjectives) must
exist too.

Bruno Marchal says nouns don't exist but adjectives do even though they're
describing the properties of things that don't exist.

I say that does not make one bit of sense.

Therefore I have demonstrated you are wrong, it is possible to criticize
Bruno Marchal's theory. I just did it.

 John K Clark

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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 11:16 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>>


 On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
 > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
 > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it
 is
 > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
 > experience.
 >
 > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
 factual.

 But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second
 person
 plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
 the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
 they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
 duplication thought experiments.


>>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
>>> subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>>
>>
>> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
>> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
>> duplicated bodies.
>>
>>
>> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>>
>
> No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees
> Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
>
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.
> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>
> Brent
>

Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept
frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's
clear and meaningful.

Quentin

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> 
> .
>

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Re: subjective experience

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 7/20/2019 11:16 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> a écrit :




On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> a écrit :



On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> a écrit :



On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism,
so you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you
cannot survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two
cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to
be after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything
is simply factual.

But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based
on second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in
English. In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural,
and in New York
they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used
in discussing
duplication thought experiments.


Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in
both subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need
of youse...

Quentin


Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find
youse-self is "Washington and Moscow."


It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not
on the duplicated bodies.


The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.


No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees 
Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.


I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees Moscow and 
Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person /plural/.


Brent

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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:16, Quentin Anciaux  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>>


 On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
 > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
 > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it
 is
 > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
 > experience.
 >
 > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
 factual.

 But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second
 person
 plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
 the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
 they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
 duplication thought experiments.


>>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
>>> subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>>
>>
>> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
>> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
>> duplicated bodies.
>>
>>
>> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>>
>
> No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees
> Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
>
If you say that after pushing the button your pov will be Washington and
Moscow, it's false, as your POV will be only Moscow or only Washington,
there are no next POV of yourself who sees both in the same POV.

>
>> Brent
>>
>> --
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>> "Everything List" group.
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>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7baa8c1a-4dcf-3ac9-4427-edd6fc14ecde%40verizon.net
>> 
>> .
>>
>

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Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
>>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>>> > experience.
>>> >
>>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>>> factual.
>>>
>>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
>>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>>> duplication thought experiments.
>>>
>>>
>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
>> and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>
>
> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
> duplicated bodies.
>
>
> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>

No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees Washington,
none that sees Washington and Moscow.

>
> Brent
>
> --
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> 
> .
>

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Re: subjective experience

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> a écrit :




On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:



Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> a écrit :



On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so
you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot
survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two
cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be
after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is
simply factual.

But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on
second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in
English.  In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in
New York
they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in
discussing
duplication thought experiments.


Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...

Quentin


Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find
youse-self is "Washington and Moscow."


It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in 
Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the 
duplicated bodies.


The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.

Brent

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Re: subjective experience

[Dan Sonik]

On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 5:16:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:17:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>> It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
>>
>
> Thank you.
>
>  
>
>> But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s 
>> posts. At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there 
>> is a mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
>>
>
> On the contrary, I just think the criticism has fallen on deaf ears -- 
> reading some of these threads puts me in mind of those unfortunate 
> individuals who are struck with agnosia. No matter how blatant and 
> paramount the input for people with this condition, they simply pass it 
> over, unaware of what is right under their noses. 
>
>>
>> So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of 
>> the Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If 
>> you want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no 
>> problem with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
>> 
>>
>> Sure, I'll take a crack. Referring to your paper... 
>
> "Computationalism", or "comp" for short-- the idea that 1) our brains are 
> made of some digitally fungible units
>
>
>
> That is already a bit implicitly physicalist. Once, I suggested to abandon 
> the expression “made of” because it is misleading. But OK, I will not cut 
> the air. Computationalism is just the digital version of Descartes 
> mechanism. Once (informal and colloquial) version is that there is no magic 
> nor use of any actual infinities in the brain (that will entail later that 
> there are some infinities at play for the mind, soul or consciousness).
>
>
>
> (at a level of description which is unknowable) 
>
>
> Yes, although that is proved later.
>
>
> such that if some or all of it were replaced it would make no difference 
> to that individual 2) computers themselves are equivalent at some level of 
> description (Church Turing hypothesis) 3) arithmetical realism -- true 
> statements about numbers are true absent any observers. Step 1: 
> Computationalism implies the possibility of teleportation "in principle" -- 
> that, according to you, is sufficient to prove your conclusion. 
>
>
> I prove only at step 1 that computationalism entails the possibility of 
> (classical) teleportation. (I am unsure which conclusion is alluded here).
>
 
I don't know that it does -- I think there would have to be a contribution 
from quantum mechanics in order to derive that entailment. The three 
premises alone are not strong enough to do the work you want them to, from 
what I can see.  Teleportation is not just a theoretical problem, it's also 
an engineering problem -- this distinction is something I see you elide 
quite frequently, eg. in your hand waving responses to JKC. And I'm not 
sure what "classical teleportation" could mean -- quantum physics might 
allow some form of teleportation, but classical physics would almost 
certainly forbid it, no? Wouldn't you have to manage the conservation of 
matter/energy law that is the cornerstone of classical physics? 

 

> To be clear, I never try to prove computationalism to be true. It is my 
> working hypothesis. I study the consequences, and show them testable and 
> well tested by QM (which proves nothing of course).
>
>
> Step 2: Consider the difference between the first and third person 
> perspectives, where the third person perspective is ascertained from a 
> record contained in a personal diary. 
>
>
> By an observer which does not enter the cut-and-copy bow. 
>

Sorry, what is a "cut-and-copy bow"? 
 

> The important point here is the definition of the first person view, which 
> is the content of the diary that the candidate take with him in the 
> teleportation box. That plays an important role in the sequel.
> The first person is also the content of a diary. 
>
 
No, it's not. I can read diaries I wrote from years ago, and I would hardly 
say that they are equivalent to my "first person view." Not in any sense of 
the term equivalent that I can think of, anyway. 

 

> It is 3P operational approximation of the first person experience: the 
> personal diary content. Everett use something equivalent.
> In step two: a delay is intrigued in the reconstitution, 
>

Can't scan "a delay is intrigued in the reconstitution..."  Do you mean 
introduced? 

 

> and the point is that the delay is measurable in the 3p view, but is 
> able,nt from the 1p diary: the first person is not aware of the delay. That 
> is used again in step 4. You seem to have pass this.
>
>
> To return to the point JKC 

Re: subjective experience

[Quentin Anciaux]

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>> > experience.
>> >
>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>> factual.
>>
>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>> duplication thought experiments.
>>
>>
> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
> and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>
> Quentin
>
>
> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self is
> "Washington and Moscow."
>

It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
duplicated bodies.

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
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