subject:"Re\: Step 3 \- one step beyond\?"


Dennis Ochei wrote:

One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it isn't even 
coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining combustion without 
reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday notion because it is a 
convenient fiction.


I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer 
concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday 
notion, or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some 
alternative definition of personal identity that is better suited to 
your purposes, then you have to do the necessary analytical work.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is 
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay 
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra 
closest continuer theory.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is 
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay 
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra 
closest continuer theory.

Combustion is the everyday concept and phlogiston was part of that concept's 
definition until someone "redefined" it. At least that's the analogy i was 
going for.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
>> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
>> isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining
>> combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday
>> notion because it is a convenient fiction.
>>
>
> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept.

Not anymore. It was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not
required to take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a
made up explanation that happened to fit the observations available at the
time.

> The closest continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
> unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction.

I wasn't familiar with the concept so I looked at several sources. I will
summarize it in my own words, so that you can please correct me if I
misunderstand something:

In case of branching (through something like duplication machines, body
swaps, non-destructive teleportations, etc..), only one or zero branches
will be the true continuation of the original. In some cases the true
continuation is the one that more closely resembles the original
psychologically, which can be determined by following causality chains. In
the case of a tie, no branch is a true continuation of the original.

Again, please correct me if I am misrepresenting the theory or missing
something important.

If what I said above is correct, this is just akin to a legal definition,
not a serious scientific or philosophical theory. It makes a statement
about a bunch of mushy concepts. What is a "true continuation"? How is the
causality chain introduced by a train journey any different from the one
introduced by a teleportation?

If Everett's MWI is correct, then this theory holds that there is no true
continuation -- every single branching from one observer moment to the next
introduces a tie in closeness. Which is fine by me, but then we can just
ignore this entire "true continuation" business.

> If you want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal
> identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to do the
> necessary analytical work.

There isn't a single reference to "personal identity" that I could find in
the UDA paper. The work does lead to conclusions about personal identity
(as does Everett's MWI) but it doesn't start from there. Please be specific
about what you find incorrect in the reasoning.

Telmo.

>
>
> Bruce
>
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett 
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:


Dennis Ochei wrote:

One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at
him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston.
He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.

I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. 

Not anymore. It was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not 
required to take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a 
made up explanation that happened to fit the observations available at 
the time.


No, phlogiston was a serious scientific theory. It required careful 
experimentation to demonstrate that the theory did not really fit the 
facts easily (you would require negative mass, for instance).



The closest continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. 

I wasn't familiar with the concept so I looked at several sources. I 
will summarize it in my own words, so that you can please correct me if 
I misunderstand something:


In case of branching (through something like duplication machines, body 
swaps, non-destructive teleportations, etc..), only one or zero branches 
will be the true continuation of the original. In some cases the true 
continuation is the one that more closely resembles the original 
psychologically, which can be determined by following causality chains. 
In the case of a tie, no branch is a true continuation of the original.


It involves a lot more than psychological resemblance. The point is that 
personal identity is a multidimensional concept. It includes continuity 
of the body, causality, continuity, access to memories, emotional 
states, value systems, and everything else that goes to make up a unique 
person. Although all of these things change with time in the natural 
course of events, we say that there is a unique person in this history. 
Closest continuer theory is a sophisticated attempt to capture this 
multidimensionality, and acknowledges that the metric one might use, and 
the relative weights placed on different dimensions, might be open to 
discussion. But it is clear that in the case of ties (in whatever metric 
you are using), new persons are created -- the person is not duplicated 
in any operational sense.


Again, please correct me if I am misrepresenting the theory or missing 
something important.


If what I said above is correct, this is just akin to a legal 
definition, not a serious scientific or philosophical theory. It makes a 
statement about a bunch of mushy concepts. What is a "true 
continuation"? How is the causality chain introduced by a train journey 
any different from the one introduced by a teleportation?


If Everett's MWI is correct, then this theory holds that there is no 
true continuation -- every single branching from one observer moment to 
the next introduces a tie in closeness. Which is fine by me, but then we 
can just ignore this entire "true continuation" business.


MWI is in no way equivalent to Bruno's duplication situation. He 
acknowledges this. The point about MWI is that the continuers are in 
different worlds. There is no dimension connecting the worlds, so there 
is no metric defining this difference. Each can then be counted as the 
closest continuer /in that world/ -- with no possibility of conflicts.



If you want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal
identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to do
the necessary analytical work.

There isn't a single reference to "personal identity" that I could find 
in the UDA paper. The work does lead to conclusions about personal 
identity (as does Everett's MWI) but it doesn't start from there. Please 
be specific about what you find incorrect in the reasoning.


Read the COMP(2013) paper. There are many references to personal 
identity in that, including the quote given by Liz: "The notion of the 
first person, or /the conscious knower/, admits the simplest possible 
definition: it is provided by access to basic memories."


In other words, Bruno is using only one dimension of personal identity 
and basing his argument on that, to the exclusion of all the other 
relevant dimensions. This is a serious limitation on the argument since 
two quite different people can share a large proportion of their 
memories, especially if they have lived closely together for many years. 
And yet they suffer from no confusion of their separate identities. 
Access to personal memories (as given in personal diaries) is not an 
adequate criterion for personal identity.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread spudboy100 via Everything List


Closest continuer seems technically plausible, even in the John Hick way. But 
it does point out that identity, cannot, over long enough time, remain the 
same. Are we not closest continuers of the 5 year olds we used to be? Death 
should not be a big problem if the closest continuer is close to 100% accurate, 
to start off at least. Identity over time is the real issue. 
 
 
-Original Message-
From: Dennis Ochei 
To: everything-list 
Sent: Mon, Apr 20, 2015 5:11 am
Subject: Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Closest continuer theory is itself a redefinition of the lay conception and is
frankly absurd. Semiconservative replication doesn't kill me. And the lay
understanding considers teletransportation as equivalent to death, contra
closest continuer theory.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because  
it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for  
explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use  
the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.


I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest  
continuer concept of personal identity is far from an  
unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. If you  
want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal  
identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to do  
the necessary analytical work.


Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in  
which case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are  
you saying that step 4 is not valid?


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 20 Apr 2015, at 13:52, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:

   Dennis Ochei wrote:
   One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
   because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at
   him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston.
   He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient  
fiction.
   I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. Not anymore. It  
was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not required to  
take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a made up  
explanation that happened to fit the observations available at the  
time.


No, phlogiston was a serious scientific theory. It required careful  
experimentation to demonstrate that the theory did not really fit  
the facts easily (you would require negative mass, for instance).



   The closest continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
   unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. I  
wasn't familiar with the concept so I looked at several sources. I  
will summarize it in my own words, so that you can please correct  
me if I misunderstand something:
In case of branching (through something like duplication machines,  
body swaps, non-destructive teleportations, etc..), only one or  
zero branches will be the true continuation of the original. In  
some cases the true continuation is the one that more closely  
resembles the original psychologically, which can be determined by  
following causality chains. In the case of a tie, no branch is a  
true continuation of the original.


It involves a lot more than psychological resemblance. The point is  
that personal identity is a multidimensional concept. It includes  
continuity of the body, causality, continuity, access to memories,  
emotional states, value systems, and everything else that goes to  
make up a unique person. Although all of these things change with  
time in the natural course of events, we say that there is a unique  
person in this history. Closest continuer theory is a sophisticated  
attempt to capture this multidimensionality, and acknowledges that  
the metric one might use, and the relative weights placed on  
different dimensions, might be open to discussion. But it is clear  
that in the case of ties (in whatever metric you are using), new  
persons are created -- the person is not duplicated in any  
operational sense.


Again, please correct me if I am misrepresenting the theory or  
missing something important.
If what I said above is correct, this is just akin to a legal  
definition, not a serious scientific or philosophical theory. It  
makes a statement about a bunch of mushy concepts. What is a "true  
continuation"? How is the causality chain introduced by a train  
journey any different from the one introduced by a teleportation?
If Everett's MWI is correct, then this theory holds that there is  
no true continuation -- every single branching from one observer  
moment to the next introduces a tie in closeness. Which is fine by  
me, but then we can just ignore this entire "true continuation"  
business.


MWI is in no way equivalent to Bruno's duplication situation. He  
acknowledges this. The point about MWI is that the continuers are in  
different worlds. There is no dimension connecting the worlds, so  
there is no metric defining this difference. Each can then be  
counted as the closest continuer /in that world/ -- with no  
possibility of conflicts.


   If you want to revise it to some alternative definition of  
personal
   identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have  
to do

   the necessary analytical work.
There isn't a single reference to "personal identity" that I could  
find in the UDA paper. The work does lead to conclusions about  
personal identity (as does Everett's MWI) but it doesn't start from  
there. Please be specific about what you find incorrect in the  
reasoning.


Read the COMP(2013) paper. There are many references to personal  
identity in that, including the quote given by Liz: "The notion of  
the first person, or /the conscious knower/, admits the simplest  
possible definition: it is provided by access to basic memories."


In other words, Bruno is using only one dimension of personal  
identity and basing his argument on that, to the exclusion of all  
the other relevant dimensions. This is a serious limitation on the  
argument since two quite different people can share a large  
proportion of their memories, especially if they have lived closely  
together for many years. And yet they suffer from no confusion of  
their separate identities. Access to personal memories (as given in  
personal diaries) is not an adequate criterion for personal identity.


Certainly. That is why I insist in saying that the notion of personal  
identity is out-of-topic.
We need only to use

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

I think his problem is that you are using an "impoverished" definition of 
personal identity, the same way an incompatibilist would be annoyed at the 
compatibilist redefinition of free will. I have to admit that as an 
incompatibilist i am annoyed by this move, but in your case i am not bothered 
by it

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest continuer 
or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more psychologically 
like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher fraction of the molecules I 
was made of when I was 5.

Or suppose I get into a matter scanner at time t and it destructively scans me 
and then reconstitutes me. then at some unknown time t+x it creates a 
duplicate. Who is the closest continuer of the me that walked into the scanner 
at t? At all t+y where 0 < y < x the person who walked out of the scanner at 
t+epsilon is the closest continuer. Then at t+x the newly created duplicate 
becomes the closest continuer of me at t and the other person loses their 
personal identity due to something that potentially happened on the other side 
of the universe.

This is already silly without me opening the can of worms that is relativity. 
Which I will now quickly do: As observers in different reference frames will 
disagree to the ordering of events, they will disagree about whether the me who 
walked out of the scanner just after t is the closest continuer. CCT requires 
non-local instantaneous effects on personal identity which simply doesnt play 
nice with relativity.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Dennis Ochei wrote:

No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
fraction of the molecules I was made of when I was 5.

Or suppose I get into a matter scanner at time t and it destructively
scans me and then reconstitutes me. then at some unknown time t+x it
creates a duplicate. Who is the closest continuer of the me that
walked into the scanner at t? At all t+y where 0 < y < x the person
who walked out of the scanner at t+epsilon is the closest continuer.


Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!


Then at t+x the newly created duplicate becomes the closest continuer
of me at t and the other person loses their personal identity due to
something that potentially happened on the other side of the
universe.

This is already silly without me opening the can of worms that is
relativity. Which I will now quickly do: As observers in different
reference frames will disagree to the ordering of events, they will
disagree about whether the me who walked out of the scanner just
after t is the closest continuer. CCT requires non-local
instantaneous effects on personal identity which simply doesnt play
nice with relativity.


Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.

Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it 
isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for 
explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use 
the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.


I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer 
concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday 
notion, or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some 
alternative definition of personal identity that is better suited to 
your purposes, then you have to do the necessary analytical work.


Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in which 
case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are you saying 
that step 4 is not valid?


I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part 
because of an inadequate account of personal identity. You substitute 
part or all of the brain at some level with a Turing machine, but do not 
take appropriate notice of the body bearing the brain. If we are not to 
notice the substitution, we must still have a body that interacts with 
the world in exactly the same way as the original. Under the 
teleportation scenarios, some new body must be created or provided. I 
think that in general the person might notice this.


If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw Sophia 
Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in the 
mirror, you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not everything 
because memories can be lost, or be mistaken.


In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be managed, 
but then you have the problem of the identity of indiscernibles. 
Creating copies that are identical to this level -- identical memories, 
bodies, environments, and so on -- does not duplicate the person -- the 
copies, being identical in all respects, are one person.


I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive 
teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually 
terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest 
continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut. If 
the original is not cut (as in step 5), then that is the continuing 
person, and the duplicate is a new person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 
4 do not make a lot of difference, they just enhance the need for the 
recognition of new persons.


In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in 
logic, but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you 
need for logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do 
not refer to anything in the real world, at best you are trying to 
persuade rhetorically -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are 
talking about has more to do with psychology and/or physics than 
mathematics, so definitions can never be completely precise -- concepts 
in the real world are always corrigible, so tightly constrained logical 
arguments are not available as they are in mathematics.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

> Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!

That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that
teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to the
same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes me at
t+epsilon and that's the confusion.

> Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kGsbBw1I0Rg

You can start at 4 minutes. I'm resisting the urge to suggest that you
don't know what you're talking about

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
>> No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
>> continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
>> psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
>> fraction of the molecules I was made of when I was 5.
>>
>> Or suppose I get into a matter scanner at time t and it destructively
>> scans me and then reconstitutes me. then at some unknown time t+x it
>> creates a duplicate. Who is the closest continuer of the me that
>> walked into the scanner at t? At all t+y where 0 < y < x the person
>> who walked out of the scanner at t+epsilon is the closest continuer.
>>
>
> Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
>
>  Then at t+x the newly created duplicate becomes the closest continuer
>> of me at t and the other person loses their personal identity due to
>> something that potentially happened on the other side of the
>> universe.
>>
>> This is already silly without me opening the can of worms that is
>> relativity. Which I will now quickly do: As observers in different
>> reference frames will disagree to the ordering of events, they will
>> disagree about whether the me who walked out of the scanner just
>> after t is the closest continuer. CCT requires non-local
>> instantaneous effects on personal identity which simply doesnt play
>> nice with relativity.
>>
>
> Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
> transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread LizR

On 20 April 2015 at 21:44, Telmo Menezes  wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>>> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
>>> isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining
>>> combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday
>>> notion because it is a convenient fiction.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept.
>
>
> Not anymore. It was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not
> required to take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a
> made up explanation that happened to fit the observations available at the
> time.
>
> Just the same as any other scientific theory, then!

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original and
2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the original?

Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms
except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>  Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>>
 One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
 isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining
 combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday
 notion because it is a convenient fiction.

>>>
>>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer
>>> concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday
>>> notion, or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some
>>> alternative definition of personal identity that is better suited to your
>>> purposes, then you have to do the necessary analytical work.
>>>
>>
>> Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in which
>> case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are you saying
>> that step 4 is not valid?
>>
>
> I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part
> because of an inadequate account of personal identity. You substitute part
> or all of the brain at some level with a Turing machine, but do not take
> appropriate notice of the body bearing the brain. If we are not to notice
> the substitution, we must still have a body that interacts with the world
> in exactly the same way as the original. Under the teleportation scenarios,
> some new body must be created or provided. I think that in general the
> person might notice this.
>
> If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw Sophia
> Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in the mirror,
> you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not everything because
> memories can be lost, or be mistaken.
>
> In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be managed, but
> then you have the problem of the identity of indiscernibles. Creating
> copies that are identical to this level -- identical memories, bodies,
> environments, and so on -- does not duplicate the person -- the copies,
> being identical in all respects, are one person.
>
> I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
> teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates
> the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so
> there is no continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is
> not cut (as in step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the
> duplicate is a new person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do not make a
> lot of difference, they just enhance the need for the recognition of new
> persons.
>
> In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in logic,
> but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need for
> logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do not refer to
> anything in the real world, at best you are trying to persuade rhetorically
> -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are talking about has more to
> do with psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can
> never be completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always
> corrigible, so tightly constrained logical arguments are not available as
> they are in mathematics.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Dennis Ochei wrote:
Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that 
claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original


It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' (Oxford, 1984).


and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the original?

Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms 
except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year.


When a cell in my arm dies and is replaced, I do not die. When my leg is 
cut off, I do not die. Ordinary survival does not kill the original and 
create a new person -- body replacement is a gradual, continuous process 
which preserves bodily identity.


The teleportation process discussed involves actually destroying 
(cutting or killing) the original and creating a new body at some 
(remote) location. It is arguable whether this new body is sufficiently 
close to the original to constitute a closest continuer -- hence 
Parfit's idea that a new person is always created. If replacement of 
memories in a new body counts as sufficient to constitute a suitable 
closest continuer, that is your choice. But is is not a logical consequence.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Dennis Ochei wrote:

 > Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!

That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that 
teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to 
the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes 
me at t+epsilon and that's the confusion.


Maybe you forgot to mention that part.


Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz

transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kGsbBw1I0Rg

You can start at 4 minutes. I'm resisting the urge to suggest that you 
don't know what you're talking about


I can't load the video. Tell me briefly what your argument against my 
comment about time order along a time-like world line is.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

sigh... Parfit does away with personal identity, replacing it with
psychological connectedness relation R. Past and future selves are not
identical to you, but are new persons that are like you to a high degree.
Your relationship to your past and future selves are much like your
relationship to your siblings. The illusion that you are the same observer
riding through time is caused by memories and being destructively
teleported is as good as ordinary survival because there is no further
question of identity beyond relation R. Lastly, Parfit's Empty
Individualism is not a CCT as it allows branching.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
>> Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
>> claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original
>>
>
> It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' (Oxford,
> 1984).
>
>  and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the
>> original?
>>
>> Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms
>> except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year.
>>
>
> When a cell in my arm dies and is replaced, I do not die. When my leg is
> cut off, I do not die. Ordinary survival does not kill the original and
> create a new person -- body replacement is a gradual, continuous process
> which preserves bodily identity.
>
> The teleportation process discussed involves actually destroying (cutting
> or killing) the original and creating a new body at some (remote) location.
> It is arguable whether this new body is sufficiently close to the original
> to constitute a closest continuer -- hence Parfit's idea that a new person
> is always created. If replacement of memories in a new body counts as
> sufficient to constitute a suitable closest continuer, that is your choice.
> But is is not a logical consequence.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Bruce Kellett wrote:

Dennis Ochei wrote:

 > Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!

That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says 
that teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a 
teleportation to the same location. Or perhaps you missed the part 
were it reconstitutes me at t+epsilon and that's the confusion.


Maybe you forgot to mention that part.


OK, I see now that you reconstitute immediately. That, then is clearly 
the closest continuer. A person reconstructed at some later time is not 
a closest continuer if the original continued or was reconstructed 
immediately -- the original person will have moved on and what he was x 
ago is no longer relevant. The essential point is that time-order along 
a time-like world line is invariant -- t is never before t+x (x>0) for 
any observer.


Bruce


Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz

transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.

https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=kGsbBw1I0Rg

You can start at 4 minutes. I'm resisting the urge to suggest that you 
don't know what you're talking about


I can't load the video. Tell me briefly what your argument against my 
comment about time order along a time-like world line is.


Bruce



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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity

I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete example
with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The train
lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an observer
outside the tunnel, off the train, there will come a point in time when the
train is completely within the tunnel. At this point two guillotines slam
downwards simultaneously at the exit and the entrance of the tunnel and
rise again barely missing the train.

>From a frame on the train, the tunnel is lorentz contracted to be shorter
than the train. The nose of the train is just barely missed by the
guillotine at the exit while the back of the train portrudes from the
tunnel. Some moments later the back of the train enters the tunnel  and the
guillotine at the entrance slams down behind it with the front portruding.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
>>  > Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!
>>
>> That does not preclude me from having a closest continuer. CCT says that
>> teletransportation perserves identity. This is just a teleportation to the
>> same location. Or perhaps you missed the part were it reconstitutes me at
>> t+epsilon and that's the confusion.
>>
>
> Maybe you forgot to mention that part.
>
>  Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
>>>
>> transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.
>>
>> Relativity Paradox - Sixty Symbols
>> 
>>
>> You can start at 4 minutes. I'm resisting the urge to suggest that you
>> don't know what you're talking about
>>
>
> I can't load the video. Tell me briefly what your argument against my
> comment about time order along a time-like world line is.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Dennis Ochei wrote:

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity

I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete 
example with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The 
train lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an 
observer outside the tunnel, off the train, there will come a point in 
time when the train is completely within the tunnel. At this point two 
guillotines slam downwards simultaneously at the exit and the entrance 
of the tunnel and rise again barely missing the train.


 From a frame on the train, the tunnel is lorentz contracted to be 
shorter than the train. The nose of the train is just barely missed by 
the guillotine at the exit while the back of the train portrudes from 
the tunnel. Some moments later the back of the train enters the tunnel 
 and the guillotine at the entrance slams down behind it with the front 
portruding.


The two ends of the train are separated by a space-like interval, not a 
time-like interval.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread meekerdb


On 4/20/2015 3:19 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Dennis Ochei wrote:

No, it's actually completely indeterminant whether I am the closest
continuer or not. There might be a six year old somewhere who is more
psychologically like my 5 year old self than I am and with a higher
fraction of the molecules I was made of when I was 5.

Or suppose I get into a matter scanner at time t and it destructively
scans me and then reconstitutes me. then at some unknown time t+x it
creates a duplicate. Who is the closest continuer of the me that
walked into the scanner at t? At all t+y where 0 < y < x the person
who walked out of the scanner at t+epsilon is the closest continuer.


Huh? The scan was destructive according to your account!


Then at t+x the newly created duplicate becomes the closest continuer
of me at t and the other person loses their personal identity due to
something that potentially happened on the other side of the
universe.

This is already silly without me opening the can of worms that is
relativity. Which I will now quickly do: As observers in different
reference frames will disagree to the ordering of events, they will
disagree about whether the me who walked out of the scanner just
after t is the closest continuer. CCT requires non-local
instantaneous effects on personal identity which simply doesnt play
nice with relativity.


Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.


The information from the scan could be transmitted to spacelike separate reconstruction 
events, in which case you couldn't label one copy as having time precedence over the 
other.  But I don't see what this has to do with anything of metaphysical significance.  
It might present a legalistic problem, but that could be solved just by flipping a coin.


Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/20/2015 3:19 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.


The information from the scan could be transmitted to spacelike separate 
reconstruction events, in which case you couldn't label one copy as 
having time precedence over the other.  But I don't see what this has to 
do with anything of metaphysical significance.  It might present a 
legalistic problem, but that could be solved just by flipping a coin.


True, but then there is no unique closest continuer, so two new persons 
are created. Who inherits the farm? Well, that depends on the will of 
the original, now deceased, person.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is immobile.
Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is uhhh... rather
difficult.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
>> http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity
>>
>> I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a concrete
>> example with a train moving at relativistic speeds through a tunnel. The
>> train lorentz contracts such that it is shorter than the tunnel. To an
>> observer outside the tunnel, off the train, there will come a point in time
>> when the train is completely within the tunnel. At this point two
>> guillotines slam downwards simultaneously at the exit and the entrance of
>> the tunnel and rise again barely missing the train.
>>
>>  From a frame on the train, the tunnel is lorentz contracted to be
>> shorter than the train. The nose of the train is just barely missed by the
>> guillotine at the exit while the back of the train portrudes from the
>> tunnel. Some moments later the back of the train enters the tunnel  and the
>> guillotine at the entrance slams down behind it with the front portruding.
>>
>
> The two ends of the train are separated by a space-like interval, not a
> time-like interval.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

No one cares who inherits the farm. Subjective expectation is the crux of
personal identity. You can't tell me that whether i wake up in Moscow
depends on whether or not a reconstruction event happened at Helsinki
faster than signals can travel between the two.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> meekerdb wrote:
>
>> On 4/20/2015 3:19 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Time order along a time-like world line is invariant under Lorentz
>>> transformations.I suggest that you don't know what you are talking about.
>>>
>>
>> The information from the scan could be transmitted to spacelike separate
>> reconstruction events, in which case you couldn't label one copy as having
>> time precedence over the other.  But I don't see what this has to do with
>> anything of metaphysical significance.  It might present a legalistic
>> problem, but that could be solved just by flipping a coin.
>>
>
> True, but then there is no unique closest continuer, so two new persons
> are created. Who inherits the farm? Well, that depends on the will of the
> original, now deceased, person.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Dennis Ochei wrote:
Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is 
immobile. Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is 
uhhh... rather difficult.


The scanning event is taken as a single point in space-time. Mobility is 
irrelevant. If you create duplicates, they can be sent to space-like 
separated points, as Brent says. But if you simply reconstruct at some 
later time at the same location, then the events are separated by a 
time-like interval. This makes a difference to whether or not the time 
order is unique -- it is for time-like separations.


Bruce

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

Dennis Ochei wrote:

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity

I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a
concrete example with a train moving at relativistic speeds
through a tunnel. The train lorentz contracts such that it is
shorter than the tunnel. To an observer outside the tunnel, off
the train, there will come a point in time when the train is
completely within the tunnel. At this point two guillotines slam
downwards simultaneously at the exit and the entrance of the
tunnel and rise again barely missing the train.

 From a frame on the train, the tunnel is lorentz contracted to
be shorter than the train. The nose of the train is just barely
missed by the guillotine at the exit while the back of the train
portrudes from the tunnel. Some moments later the back of the
train enters the tunnel  and the guillotine at the entrance
slams down behind it with the front portruding.

The two ends of the train are separated by a space-like interval,
not a time-like interval.

Bruce


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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread LizR

I have to say that the point under discussion SHOULD be the nature of
subjective experience, surely? That is, why do we feel as though we have
continuity? (And does the answer to that preclude duplicators etc?)

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Right, mobility is irrelevant. I mispoke.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
>> Oh i see the issue. I didn't realize you'd assume the scanner is
>> immobile. Immobilizing it relative to everything in the universe is uhhh...
>> rather difficult.
>>
>
> The scanning event is taken as a single point in space-time. Mobility is
> irrelevant. If you create duplicates, they can be sent to space-like
> separated points, as Brent says. But if you simply reconstruct at some
> later time at the same location, then the events are separated by a
> time-like interval. This makes a difference to whether or not the time
> order is unique -- it is for time-like separations.
>
> Bruce
>
>  On Monday, April 20, 2015, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relativity_of_simultaneity
>>
>> I thought this was basic relativity 101? The video gives a
>> concrete example with a train moving at relativistic speeds
>> through a tunnel. The train lorentz contracts such that it is
>> shorter than the tunnel. To an observer outside the tunnel, off
>> the train, there will come a point in time when the train is
>> completely within the tunnel. At this point two guillotines slam
>> downwards simultaneously at the exit and the entrance of the
>> tunnel and rise again barely missing the train.
>>
>>  From a frame on the train, the tunnel is lorentz contracted to
>> be shorter than the train. The nose of the train is just barely
>> missed by the guillotine at the exit while the back of the train
>> portrudes from the tunnel. Some moments later the back of the
>> train enters the tunnel  and the guillotine at the entrance
>> slams down behind it with the front portruding.
>>
>> The two ends of the train are separated by a space-like interval,
>> not a time-like interval.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-20 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 08:43:09AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >
> >>Dennis Ochei wrote:
> >>>One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
> >>>because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at
> >>>him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston.
> >>>He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient
> >>>fiction.
> >>
> >>I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest
> >>continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
> >>unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. If you
> >>want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal
> >>identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have
> >>to do the necessary analytical work.
> >
> >Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in
> >which case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or
> >are you saying that step 4 is not valid?
> 
> I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part
> because of an inadequate account of personal identity. You
> substitute part or all of the brain at some level with a Turing
> machine, but do not take appropriate notice of the body bearing the
> brain. If we are not to notice the substitution, we must still have
> a body that interacts with the world in exactly the same way as the
> original. Under the teleportation scenarios, some new body must be
> created or provided. I think that in general the person might notice
> this.
> 
> If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw
> Sophia Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in
> the mirror, you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not
> everything because memories can be lost, or be mistaken.
> 
> In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be
> managed, but then you have the problem of the identity of
> indiscernibles. Creating copies that are identical to this level --
> identical memories, bodies, environments, and so on -- does not
> duplicate the person -- the copies, being identical in all respects,
> are one person.
> 
> I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
> teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually
> terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest
> continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut.
> If the original is not cut (as in step 5), then that is the
> continuing person, and the duplicate is a new person. Time delays as
> in steps 2 and 4 do not make a lot of difference, they just enhance
> the need for the recognition of new persons.
> 
> In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in
> logic, but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions
> you need for logical argument either are not provided, or when
> provided, do not refer to anything in the real world, at best you
> are trying to persuade rhetorically -- there is no logical
> compulsion. What you are talking about has more to do with
> psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can never
> be completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always
> corrigible, so tightly constrained logical arguments are not
> available as they are in mathematics.
> 
> Bruce
> 

There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a
closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for
essentially the same reason that there is always another real number
lying between any two real numbers you care to pick.

So either ontology is not robust (the Peter Jones move),
computationalism is false, or the CCT is false.

Not sure if Bruno needs to more explicit on this robust ontology bit,
as he deemphasises this until step 7.

Anyway, it does seem to me that CCT is attributing some sort of
identity role to physical continuity that is not there with
computational continuity.

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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For mo

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

CCT doesn't have to entail physical continuity. The standard CCT seems to
first use psychological similarty and in the case of ties physical
continuity, but you could also imagine a purely paychological or purely
physical CCT. My problem with CCT is that the rules for ties are ad hoc
legal arbitration that violate locality and to quote Parfit: "A double
survival can't equal death." My problem with similiarity measures is that
you are no longer talking about subjective expectation. Similarity measures
are fine if you throw out subjective expectation as a mere illusion.
However, if you want to retain subjective expectation, then you have to
have an all or none model of personal identity.

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Russell Standish  wrote:

> On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 08:43:09AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > >
> > >>Dennis Ochei wrote:
> > >>>One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
> > >>>because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at
> > >>>him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston.
> > >>>He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient
> > >>>fiction.
> > >>
> > >>I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest
> > >>continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
> > >>unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. If you
> > >>want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal
> > >>identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have
> > >>to do the necessary analytical work.
> > >
> > >Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in
> > >which case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or
> > >are you saying that step 4 is not valid?
> >
> > I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part
> > because of an inadequate account of personal identity. You
> > substitute part or all of the brain at some level with a Turing
> > machine, but do not take appropriate notice of the body bearing the
> > brain. If we are not to notice the substitution, we must still have
> > a body that interacts with the world in exactly the same way as the
> > original. Under the teleportation scenarios, some new body must be
> > created or provided. I think that in general the person might notice
> > this.
> >
> > If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw
> > Sophia Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in
> > the mirror, you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not
> > everything because memories can be lost, or be mistaken.
> >
> > In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be
> > managed, but then you have the problem of the identity of
> > indiscernibles. Creating copies that are identical to this level --
> > identical memories, bodies, environments, and so on -- does not
> > duplicate the person -- the copies, being identical in all respects,
> > are one person.
> >
> > I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
> > teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually
> > terminates the original person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest
> > continuer so there is no continuing person -- the original is cut.
> > If the original is not cut (as in step 5), then that is the
> > continuing person, and the duplicate is a new person. Time delays as
> > in steps 2 and 4 do not make a lot of difference, they just enhance
> > the need for the recognition of new persons.
> >
> > In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in
> > logic, but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions
> > you need for logical argument either are not provided, or when
> > provided, do not refer to anything in the real world, at best you
> > are trying to persuade rhetorically -- there is no logical
> > compulsion. What you are talking about has more to do with
> > psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can never
> > be completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always
> > corrigible, so tightly constrained logical arguments are not
> > available as they are in mathematics.
> >
> > Bruce
> >
>
> There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
> that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
> theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
> discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
> going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a
> closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for
> essentially the same reason that there is always another real number
> lying between any two real numbers you care to pick.
>
> So either ontology is not robust (the Peter Jones move),
> computationalism is false, or the CCT is false.
>
> Not sure if Bruno needs to more explicit on this robust ontology bit,
> as he deemphasises this until step 7.
>
> Anyway, it does

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Russell Standish wrote:


There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a
closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for
essentially the same reason that there is always another real number
lying between any two real numbers you care to pick.


That seems to be saying that there is always a continuer who never 
sleeps. Gets to sound a bit like the quantum suicide scenario -- in MWI 
there is always one branch in which the gun fails to fire.



So either ontology is not robust (the Peter Jones move),
computationalism is false, or the CCT is false.

Not sure if Bruno needs to more explicit on this robust ontology bit,
as he deemphasises this until step 7.

Anyway, it does seem to me that CCT is attributing some sort of
identity role to physical continuity that is not there with
computational continuity.


That seems to be the case. CCT does not specify a particular metric on 
the multiple dimension of personal identity. SO I guess you could weight 
physical continuity above everything else, or you could weight personal 
memories infinitely highly. I do not think that either extreme captures 
what we normally mean by physical identity over time.


I worry about memory loss cases -- whether through disease or trauma. My 
particular concern is with Korsakoff's Syndrome, which was first 
described in advanced alcoholics, but can occur after particular types 
of brain injury. It is characterized by the fact that the person cannot 
lay down new memories. They can't remember from one moment to the next 
things that were said and done. To cover these gaps in memory they 
confabulate all sorts of weird and fanciful stories. Nevertheless, such 
a sufferer may have quite clear childhood memories -- there is just a 
gap of twenty, thirty, or more years in their memory banks. Physically, 
they are of essentially unaltered appearance, and frequently emotional 
and other character traits are intact. When you speak to such a person, 
you can be in no doubt that they are the same person as before the brain 
injury, although the have lost most of their adult memories.


A satisfactory theory of personal identity has to account for such 
cases, and variations thereon.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-21 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 21 April 2015 at 08:43, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>> Dennis Ochei wrote:

 One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
 isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining
 combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday 
 notion
 because it is a convenient fiction.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer
>>> concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday notion,
>>> or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some alternative
>>> definition of personal identity that is better suited to your purposes, then
>>> you have to do the necessary analytical work.
>>
>>
>> Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in which
>> case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are you saying
>> that step 4 is not valid?
>
>
> I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part because
> of an inadequate account of personal identity. You substitute part or all of
> the brain at some level with a Turing machine, but do not take appropriate
> notice of the body bearing the brain. If we are not to notice the
> substitution, we must still have a body that interacts with the world in
> exactly the same way as the original. Under the teleportation scenarios,
> some new body must be created or provided. I think that in general the
> person might notice this.
>
> If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw Sophia Loren
> looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in the mirror, you
> might doubt your own identity. Memories are not everything because memories
> can be lost, or be mistaken.
>
> In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be managed, but
> then you have the problem of the identity of indiscernibles. Creating copies
> that are identical to this level -- identical memories, bodies,
> environments, and so on -- does not duplicate the person -- the copies,
> being identical in all respects, are one person.
>
> I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive teleportation
> scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates the original
> person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so there is no
> continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is not cut (as in
> step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the duplicate is a new
> person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do not make a lot of difference,
> they just enhance the need for the recognition of new persons.

Of course destructive teleportation creates new persons, but the point
is that it doesn't matter, because ordinary life creates new persons
also, though gradually rather than all at once. If you discovered that
some otherwise perfectly normal people had a condition which caused
all of the matter in their body to be replaced overnight during sleep,
rather than gradually over the course of days, and that you were one
of these people, would it bother you? Or would you doubt that it was
so on the grounds that you were pretty sure you were "the same person"
and not a "new person"?

> In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in logic,
> but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need for
> logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do not refer to
> anything in the real world, at best you are trying to persuade rhetorically
> -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are talking about has more to do
> with psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can never be
> completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always corrigible, so
> tightly constrained logical arguments are not available as they are in
> mathematics.

All you have to agree is that it would make no difference to you if
you were perfectly (or close enough) copied. I guess you could
disagree with this but in that case you are deluded about being the
person you believe yourself to be.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-21 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On 21 April 2015 at 09:25, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> Do you have a coherent, non arbitrary theory of personal identity that
>> claims 1) Teletransportation creates a new person, killing the original
>
>
> It is a possible theory. See D Parfit, 'Reasons and Persons' (Oxford, 1984).

Parfit's argument is that if identity is not preserved in these
thought experiments, then identity is not the thing that matters.

>> and 2) Ordinary survival does not create a new person, killing the
>> original?
>>
>> Let me remind you, although you probably know this, that all your atoms
>> except some in your teeth are replaced throughout the course of a year.
>
>
> When a cell in my arm dies and is replaced, I do not die. When my leg is cut
> off, I do not die. Ordinary survival does not kill the original and create a
> new person -- body replacement is a gradual, continuous process which
> preserves bodily identity.

What if the duplicating machine replaced first your head and then a
minute later the rest of your body?

> The teleportation process discussed involves actually destroying (cutting or
> killing) the original and creating a new body at some (remote) location. It
> is arguable whether this new body is sufficiently close to the original to
> constitute a closest continuer -- hence Parfit's idea that a new person is
> always created. If replacement of memories in a new body counts as
> sufficient to constitute a suitable closest continuer, that is your choice.
> But is is not a logical consequence.

There is a difference between natural and artificial replacement, but
in the end in both cases there is a new person and the matter in the
old person has disintegrated. It is not enough to show there is a
difference - you have to explain why it makes a difference to the
philosophical argument.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-21 Thread Dennis Ochei

Right, this is one coherent non-arbitrary view. It's basically what Parfit
put forward in Reason's and Persons.

Kolak's is the other view. Property changes do not destroy identity ever.

Either view says teleportation is the same as ordinary survival.

On Tuesday, April 21, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

> On 21 April 2015 at 08:43, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >>
> >>> Dennis Ochei wrote:
> 
>  One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because it
>  isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for explaining
>  combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't use the everyday
> notion
>  because it is a convenient fiction.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest continuer
> >>> concept of personal identity is far from an unsophisticated everyday
> notion,
> >>> or a convenient fiction. If you want to revise it to some alternative
> >>> definition of personal identity that is better suited to your
> purposes, then
> >>> you have to do the necessary analytical work.
> >>
> >>
> >> Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in which
> >> case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are you saying
> >> that step 4 is not valid?
> >
> >
> > I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false, in part
> because
> > of an inadequate account of personal identity. You substitute part or
> all of
> > the brain at some level with a Turing machine, but do not take
> appropriate
> > notice of the body bearing the brain. If we are not to notice the
> > substitution, we must still have a body that interacts with the world in
> > exactly the same way as the original. Under the teleportation scenarios,
> > some new body must be created or provided. I think that in general the
> > person might notice this.
> >
> > If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw Sophia
> Loren
> > looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in the mirror, you
> > might doubt your own identity. Memories are not everything because
> memories
> > can be lost, or be mistaken.
> >
> > In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be managed, but
> > then you have the problem of the identity of indiscernibles. Creating
> copies
> > that are identical to this level -- identical memories, bodies,
> > environments, and so on -- does not duplicate the person -- the copies,
> > being identical in all respects, are one person.
> >
> > I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive
> teleportation
> > scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually terminates the original
> > person. In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so there is no
> > continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is not cut (as
> in
> > step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the duplicate is a new
> > person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do not make a lot of difference,
> > they just enhance the need for the recognition of new persons.
>
> Of course destructive teleportation creates new persons, but the point
> is that it doesn't matter, because ordinary life creates new persons
> also, though gradually rather than all at once. If you discovered that
> some otherwise perfectly normal people had a condition which caused
> all of the matter in their body to be replaced overnight during sleep,
> rather than gradually over the course of days, and that you were one
> of these people, would it bother you? Or would you doubt that it was
> so on the grounds that you were pretty sure you were "the same person"
> and not a "new person"?
>
> > In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in logic,
> > but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need for
> > logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do not refer
> to
> > anything in the real world, at best you are trying to persuade
> rhetorically
> > -- there is no logical compulsion. What you are talking about has more
> to do
> > with psychology and/or physics than mathematics, so definitions can
> never be
> > completely precise -- concepts in the real world are always corrigible,
> so
> > tightly constrained logical arguments are not available as they are in
> > mathematics.
>
> All you have to agree is that it would make no difference to you if
> you were perfectly (or close enough) copied. I guess you could
> disagree with this but in that case you are deluded about being the
> person you believe yourself to be.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
> --
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-21 Thread LizR

On 21 April 2015 at 14:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Russell Standish wrote:
>
>>
>> There is another way of looking at this. Assume a robust ontology, so
>> that the UD actually runs completely. Then the closest continuation
>> theory coupled with computationalism predicts the absence of any
>> discontinuities of experience, such as what I experience evry night
>> going to sleep. That is because in UD*, there will be always be a
>> closer continuation to one you're currently experiencing (for
>> essentially the same reason that there is always another real number
>> lying between any two real numbers you care to pick.
>>
>
> That seems to be saying that there is always a continuer who never sleeps.


Don't dreams count?

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Apr 2015, at 09:40, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Dennis Ochei wrote:
One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity because  
it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at him for  
explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston. He can't  
use the everyday notion because it is a convenient fiction.


I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept. The closest  
continuer concept of personal identity is far from an  
unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction. If you  
want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal  
identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to  
do the necessary analytical work.
Are you saying that you believe that computationalism is false (in  
which case you can believe in some closer continuer theory), or are  
you saying that step 4 is not valid?


I am suggesting that computationalism is effectively false,


OK. But that is out of the topic.




in part because of an inadequate account of personal identity.


Computationalism by definition makes simple teleportation, and  
duplication, supporting the subjective feeling of personal identity.  
So we don't need any account of personal identity, except the  
acceptance of a an artificial brain, seen as a clinical operation like  
another one. If not you should not even take an aspirin, as you would  
need some adequate account of personal identity to be guarantied that  
you will survive when you take that aspirin, or when you just drink  
water, or even when you do nothing.


The situation would be different for someone claiming having the right  
Turing program for the functioning of the brain, but comp just assumes  
such program exists. Indeed, in the mathematical part, it is proven  
than no machine can know for sure what is its own program, and that is  
why the "it exists" in the definition is non constructive, even  
necessarily non constructive (as Emil Post already saw) and the act of  
saying "yes" ask for some an act of faith.




You substitute part or all of the brain at some level with a Turing  
machine, but do not take appropriate notice of the body bearing the  
brain.


If the body is needed it is part of the 'generalized brain'. Even if  
that is the entire universe (observable or not), the reasoning still  
go through. This should be clear if you have grasped the argument up  
to step 7.




If we are not to notice the substitution, we must still have a body  
that interacts with the world in exactly the same way as the  
original. Under the teleportation scenarios, some new body must be  
created or provided. I think that in general the person might notice  
this.


You need a perceptual body, as in step 6. With computationalism you  
cannot notice the difference introspectively, and that is all what  
counts in the reasoning.






If you woke up in the morning and looked in the mirror and saw  
Sophia Loren looking back at you, or saw your next door neighbour in  
the mirror, you might doubt your own identity. Memories are not  
everything because memories can be lost, or be mistaken.


Not in the protocol used in the reasoning. You distract yourself with  
ideas which are perhaps interesting for some debate, but are not  
relevant to understand that computationalism makes physics into a  
branch of arithmetic.





In total virtual reality scenarios, of course, this could be  
managed, but then you have the problem of the identity of  
indiscernibles. Creating copies that are identical to this level --  
identical memories, bodies, environments, and so on -- does not  
duplicate the person -- the copies, being identical in all respects,  
are one person.


That is correct.

Of course in step 6, the copies diverge because they are simulated in  
simulation of Moscow and Washington. Like in step 7 they will diverge  
on all ... diverging histories.





I am saying that a case could be made that all the destructive  
teleportation scenarios create new persons -- the cut actually  
terminates the original person.


Then you can't accept a digital brain proposed by the doctor, and comp  
is false (which is out of topic).




In step 3 you have a tie for closest continuer so there is no  
continuing person -- the original is cut. If the original is not cut  
(as in step 5), then that is the continuing person, and the  
duplicate is a new person. Time delays as in steps 2 and 4 do not  
make a lot of difference, they just enhance the need for the  
recognition of new persons.


if comp is false, the reasoning just don't apply.





In sum, your argument over these early steps is not an argument in  
logic,


?

An argument is valid, or is not valid.


but an argument of rhetoric. Because the tight definitions you need  
for logical argument either are not provided, or when provided, do  
not refer to anything in the real world, at best you are trying to  
persuade rhetor

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:

What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or 
physics than mathematics,


I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion of 
theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates. The name of 
the field is another topic.


Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason like it 
makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without saying where 
is the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.


I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
(physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model and
reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary assumptions
as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
development of the model is correct.

What is happening in our exchanges is that I am examining what goes into
your model and seeing whether it makes sense in the light of other
knowledge. The actual logic of the development of your model is then of
secondary importance. If your assumptions are unrealistic or too
restrictive, then no matter how good your logic, the end result will not
be of any great value. These wider issues cannot be simply dismissed as
"off topic".

In summary, my objections start with step 0, the "yes doctor" argument.
I do not think that it is physically possible to examine a living brain
in sufficient detail to reproduce its conscious life in a Turing machine
without actually destroying the brain before the process is complete. I
would say "No" to the doctor. So even though I believe that AI is
possible, in other words, that a computer-based intelligence that can
function in all relevant respects like a normal human being is in
principle possible, I do not believe that I can be replaced by such an
AI. The necessary starting data are unobtainable in principle.

Consequently, I think the reasoning in the first steps of your model
could only apply to mature AIs, not to humans. The internal logic of the
model is then not an issue -- but the relevance to human experience is.

Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-22 Thread Dennis Ochei

Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes
should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would
involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a brain prothesis that
would simulate a their function I should say yes doctor. Since modelling
1000 neurons at sufficient detail is possible, I leave it as an excercise
for the reader to demonstrate that simulating a whole brain is possible.

On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>  What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or physics
>>> than mathematics,
>>>
>>
>> I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion of
>> theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates. The name of the
>> field is another topic.
>>
>> Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason like it
>> makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without saying where is
>> the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.
>>
>
> I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
> (physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model and
> reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
> you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary assumptions
> as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
> development of the model is correct.
>
> What is happening in our exchanges is that I am examining what goes into
> your model and seeing whether it makes sense in the light of other
> knowledge. The actual logic of the development of your model is then of
> secondary importance. If your assumptions are unrealistic or too
> restrictive, then no matter how good your logic, the end result will not
> be of any great value. These wider issues cannot be simply dismissed as
> "off topic".
>
> In summary, my objections start with step 0, the "yes doctor" argument.
> I do not think that it is physically possible to examine a living brain
> in sufficient detail to reproduce its conscious life in a Turing machine
> without actually destroying the brain before the process is complete. I
> would say "No" to the doctor. So even though I believe that AI is
> possible, in other words, that a computer-based intelligence that can
> function in all relevant respects like a normal human being is in
> principle possible, I do not believe that I can be replaced by such an
> AI. The necessary starting data are unobtainable in principle.
>
> Consequently, I think the reasoning in the first steps of your model
> could only apply to mature AIs, not to humans. The internal logic of the
> model is then not an issue -- but the relevance to human experience is.
>
> Bruce
>
> --
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>>  What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or physics
>>> than mathematics,
>>>
>>
>> I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion of
>> theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates. The name of the
>> field is another topic.
>>
>> Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason like it
>> makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without saying where is
>> the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.
>>
>
> I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
> (physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model and
> reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
> you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary assumptions
> as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
> development of the model is correct.
>
> What is happening in our exchanges is that I am examining what goes into
> your model and seeing whether it makes sense in the light of other
> knowledge. The actual logic of the development of your model is then of
> secondary importance. If your assumptions are unrealistic or too
> restrictive, then no matter how good your logic, the end result will not
> be of any great value. These wider issues cannot be simply dismissed as
> "off topic".
>
> In summary, my objections start with step 0, the "yes doctor" argument.
> I do not think that it is physically possible to examine a living brain
> in sufficient detail to reproduce its conscious life in a Turing machine
> without actually destroying the brain before the process is complete. I
> would say "No" to the doctor. So even though I believe that AI is
> possible, in other words, that a computer-based intelligence that can
> function in all relevant respects like a normal human being is in
> principle possible, I do not believe that I can be replaced by such an
> AI. The necessary starting data are unobtainable in principle.
>
> Consequently, I think the reasoning in the first steps of your model
> could only apply to mature AIs, not to humans. The internal logic of the
> model is then not an issue -- but the relevance to human experience is.

I don't see why you think it is impossible to scan a brain sufficiently to
reproduce it. For example, you could fix a the brain, slice it up with a
microtome and with microscopy establish all the synaptic connections. That
is the crudest proposal for so-called mind uploading, but it may be
necessary to go further to the molecular level and determine the types and
numbers of membrane proteins in each neuron. The next step would be the at
the level of small molecules and atoms, such as neurotransmitters and ions,
but this may be able to be deduced from information about the type of
neuron and macromolecules. It seems unlikely that you would need to
determine things like ionic concentrations at a given moment, since ionic
gradients collapse all the time and the person survives. In any case, with
the "yes doctor" test you would not be the first volunteer. It is assumed
that it will be well established, through a series of engineering
refinements, that with the brain replacement the copies seem to behave
normally and claim that they feel normal. The leap of faith (which, as I've
said previously, I don't think is such a leap) is that not only will the
copies say they feel the same, they will in fact feel the same.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or  
physics than mathematics,
I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's  
notion of theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates.  
The name of the field is another topic.
Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason  
like it makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without  
saying where is the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.


I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
(physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model  
and

reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary  
assumptions

as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
development of the model is correct.


OK. What you call "model" is what logician call "theory". Logician use  
"model" for a mathematical object playing basically the role of a  
"reality" satisfying the axioms and theorems of the theory. (let us  
keep in mind this to avoid deaf dialog).





What is happening in our exchanges is that I am examining what goes  
into

your model and seeing whether it makes sense in the light of other
knowledge. The actual logic of the development of your model is then  
of

secondary importance. If your assumptions are unrealistic or too
restrictive, then no matter how good your logic, the end result will  
not
be of any great value. These wider issues cannot be simply dismissed  
as

"off topic".

In summary, my objections start with step 0, the "yes doctor"  
argument.
I do not think that it is physically possible to examine a living  
brain
in sufficient detail to reproduce its conscious life in a Turing  
machine
without actually destroying the brain before the process is  
complete. I

would say "No" to the doctor. So even though I believe that AI is
possible, in other words, that a computer-based intelligence that can
function in all relevant respects like a normal human being is in
principle possible, I do not believe that I can be replaced by such an
AI. The necessary starting data are unobtainable in principle.

Consequently, I think the reasoning in the first steps of your model
could only apply to mature AIs, not to humans. The internal logic of  
the
model is then not an issue -- but the relevance to human experience  
is.


Hmm, step seven shows that the practilcaness of the duplication is not  
relevant. I come back on this below.


Another point, given that you seem to accept the weaker thesis of  
strong AI (machine can be conscious), then the UDA works for them,  
they can understand it, and get the same conclusion. So such machine  
would prove correctly that either physics is a branch of arithmetic,  
or they are not machine. But we know that such AI are machine (in the  
comp sense), so that would be an even better proof than UDA, and  
indeed it is actually a good sketch of the mathematical translation of  
UDA in arithmetic.


But we don't need to go in UDA. You are right that the first steps of  
the UDA might not be realist, (although I doubt that too: see Ochei's  
post), but normally you should understand that at step seven, that  
absence of realism is no more a trouble, as the UD generates all  
computations, even the simulation of the whole Milky at the level of  
strings and branes.


The only thing which might perhaps prevent the reasoning to go through  
is if matter plays some non Turing emulable role for the presence of  
consciousness. But then we are no more postulating computationalism.


A rather long time ago, I thought that "UDA" and alike could be used  
to show that computationalism lead to a contradiction. But I got only  
"weirdness", and to test comp we need to compare the the comp  
weirdness and the empirical weirdness. And that is the point. I am not  
a defender of comp, or of any idea. I am a logician saying that IF we  
have such belief, and if we are rational enough, then we have to  
accept this or that consequence.


And, to be sure, I do find comp elegant, as it leads to a simple  
theory of arithmetic: elementary arithmetic.


I will try, (cf my promise to the Platonist Guitar Boy (PGC)) to make  
a summary of the math part (AUDA,, the machine interview), you might  
better appreciate, as it shows how complex the extraction of physics  
is, but how incompleteness leads already rather quickly to MWI and  
some quantum logic that we can compare to the empirical quantum logic.  
In fact we can already "implement" in the comp extracted physics some  
quantum gates, but may be some other could not, and once realized in  
nature that might lead to a refutation of comp or the classical theory  
of knowledge (or we are in a perverse simulation, to be complete). The  
main things is that the a

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-22 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 22 Apr 2015, at 09:26, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons.
Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion
of which would involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a
brain prothesis that would simulate a their function I should say
yes doctor. Since modelling 1000 neurons at sufficient detail is
possible, I leave it as an excercise for the reader to demonstrate
that simulating a whole brain is possible.

I don't think that this is relevant to grasp the consequence of
computationalism, but I agree with you: emulating the brain might be
technologically possible. But it is also quite complex, and the
pioneers of digital, but physical, brain will probably feel quite
"stoned". In particular, we get more and more evidences that the
glial cells plays important regulating roles in the brain, and even
that they transmit information. They have no axons, but they
communicate between themselves trough waves of chemical reactions,
passing from membranes to membranes, and seems to be able to activate
or inhibit the action of some neurons. So I would say yes to a doctor
who emulates the neuron and the glial cells at the level of the
concentration of the metabolites in the cells. That is not for
tomorrow, but perhaps for after tomorrow.

Then with comp, we survive anyway in the arithmetical reality, but
here, the problem is that there is still an inflation of
possibilities, going from backtracking in our life, to becoming a sort
of god. Only the progress in mathematical theology can give more
clues. Plato's proof of the immortality of the soul remains intact in
the arithmetical theology, but in that case, the soul can become
amnesic, and the survival can have a strong "salvia divinorum
experience" look. (You can see the report of such experiences on
Erowid).The little ego might not survive, in that case, but before
vanishing, you can realize internally that you are not the little ego.
That form of personal identity might be an illusion, which can be
consciously stopped. Note that some dream can lead to similar
experience. It impose you a form of selfish altruism, as you realize
that the suffering of the others are yours, in some concrete sense.

Bruno

On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett
wrote:

Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:

What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
physics than mathematics,

I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion
of theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates. The
name of the field is another topic.

Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason like
it makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without saying
where is the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.

I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
(physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model
and

reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary
assumptions

as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
development of the model is correct.

What is happening in our exchanges is that I am examining what goes
into

your model and seeing whether it makes sense in the light of other
knowledge. The actual logic of the development of your model is then
of

secondary importance. If your assumptions are unrealistic or too
restrictive, then no matter how good your logic, the end result will
not
be of any great value. These wider issues cannot be simply dismissed
as

"off topic".

In summary, my objections start with step 0, the "yes doctor"
argument.
I do not think that it is physically possible to examine a living
brain
in sufficient detail to reproduce its conscious life in a Turing
machine
without actually destroying the brain before the process is
complete. I

would say "No" to the doctor. So even though I believe that AI is
possible, in other words, that a computer-based intelligence that can
function in all relevant respects like a normal human being is in
principle possible, I do not believe that I can be replaced by such an
AI. The necessary starting data are unobtainable in principle.

Consequently, I think the reasoning in the first steps of your model
could only apply to mature AIs, not to humans. The internal logic of
the
model is then not an issue -- but the relevance to human experience
is.

Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


On 4/22/2015 12:26 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes should say 
yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would involve damaging the 1000 
neurons and there was a brain prothesis that would simulate a their function I should 
say yes doctor. Since modelling 1000 neurons at sufficient detail is possible, I leave 
it as an excercise for the reader to demonstrate that simulating a whole brain is possible.


The complete neural structure of planaria has been mapped.  But that doesn't capture the 
"consciounsness" of the individual planaria.  You can't tell from the wiring diagram 
whether a particular planaria has learned to take the illuminated fork in the test maze.  
So you might determine the generic brain structure of homo sapiens, but you would not 
thereby capture the consciousness of some particular person.  For that, presumably you 
would need to know the relative strength of all the synapses at a particular moment.


Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-22 Thread Dennis Ochei

Yes, I know it hasn't been done, but i think most people would agree that c
elegans could be scanned or that a small neuroprothesis is possible, which
is enough of a foothold to say uploading thought experiments are relevant
to human experience.

Of course none of this is deeply relevant to comp.

On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/22/2015 12:26 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
>
> Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons.
> Nematodes should say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of
> which would involve damaging the 1000 neurons and there was a brain
> prothesis that would simulate a their function I should say yes doctor.
> Since modelling 1000 neurons at sufficient detail is possible, I leave it
> as an excercise for the reader to demonstrate that simulating a whole brain
> is possible.
>
>
> The complete neural structure of planaria has been mapped.  But that
> doesn't capture the "consciounsness" of the individual planaria.  You can't
> tell from the wiring diagram whether a particular planaria has learned to
> take the illuminated fork in the test maze.  So you might determine the
> generic brain structure of homo sapiens, but you would not thereby capture
> the consciousness of some particular person.  For that, presumably you
> would need to know the relative strength of all the synapses at a
> particular moment.
>
> Brent
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


On 4/22/2015 3:13 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Thursday, April 23, 2015, meekerdb > wrote:


On 4/22/2015 12:26 AM, Dennis Ochei wrote:

Certainly we could scan a nematode, don't you think? 302 neurons. Nematodes 
should
say yes doctor. If I had a brain tumor, rescinsion of which would involve 
damaging
the 1000 neurons and there was a brain prothesis that would simulate a their
function I should say yes doctor. Since modelling 1000 neurons at 
sufficient detail
is possible, I leave it as an excercise for the reader to demonstrate that
simulating a whole brain is possible.


The complete neural structure of planaria has been mapped.  But that 
doesn't capture
the "consciounsness" of the individual planaria.  You can't tell from the 
wiring
diagram whether a particular planaria has learned to take the illuminated 
fork in
the test maze.  So you might determine the generic brain structure of homo 
sapiens,
but you would not thereby capture the consciousness of some particular 
person.  For
that, presumably you would need to know the relative strength of all the 
synapses at
a particular moment.


Yes, and you could possibly do that using a technique resolving detail down to the size 
of macromolecules.


But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness (assuming you 
could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap is particularly significant; a 
concussion also causes a gap.


Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-22 Thread LizR

On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:

>  But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
> consciousness (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see
> that a gap is particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
>

If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic acceleration.)

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:
> On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
>> (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap is
>> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
>
>
> If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
> Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic acceleration.)

Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:

But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
(assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap is
particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.


If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic acceleration.)


Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.


Gaps in consciousness, perhaps. But are there gaps in the ebb and flow 
of brain chemicals, hormones, cell deaths and divisions, ...? Or gaps in 
the flow of the unconscious?


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:

But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
(assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap is
particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.


If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic acceleration.)


Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.


Gaps in consciousness, perhaps. But are there gaps in the ebb and flow of brain 
chemicals, hormones, cell deaths and divisions, ...? Or gaps in the flow of the unconscious?


I'm pretty sure there are gaps in all  biological processes that correspond to any kind of 
thought/perception/awareness in the case of people who are cooled down for heart surgery.


Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-22 Thread LizR

On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

> On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:
> > On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:
> >>
> >> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
> consciousness
> >> (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap
> is
> >> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
> >
> >
> > If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
> > Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic
> acceleration.)
>
> Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
> the course of normal life.
>

But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical
continuity). We're discussing whether scanning a brain and making a
(hypothetically "exact enough") duplicate later would affect the
consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, obviously in this case
for other reasons than physical continuity.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:
But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in 
consciousness
(assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a 
gap is

particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.


If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic 
acceleration.)


Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.


Gaps in consciousness, perhaps. But are there gaps in the ebb and flow 
of brain chemicals, hormones, cell deaths and divisions, ...? Or gaps 
in the flow of the unconscious?


I'm pretty sure there are gaps in all biological processes that 
correspond to any kind of thought/perception/awareness in the case of 
people who are cooled down for heart surgery.


I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all 
brain processes stop under anaesthesia.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 4/22/2015 9:30 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:
> On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>
>> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in consciousness
>> (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap 
is
>> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
>
>
> If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
> Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic acceleration.)

Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.

But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical continuity). We're 
discussing whether scanning a brain and making a (hypothetically "exact enough") 
duplicate later would affect the consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, 
obviously in this case for other reasons than physical continuity.

Of course as Stathis says, "How would you know if your consciousness changed?"  You could 
ask friends and look at documents and check your memories, but it's hard to say what it 
would mean to notice your consciousness changed.  Even if you thought that, maybe it's not 
your consciousness that's different rather it's your memory of how your consciousness used 
to be.  Motorcycle racers have a saying, "The older I get, the faster I was."

Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 23 April 2015 at 14:30, LizR  wrote:
> On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>>
>> On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:
>> > On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:
>> >>
>> >> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
>> >> consciousness
>> >> (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap
>> >> is
>> >> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
>> >
>> >
>> > If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
>> > Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic
>> > acceleration.)
>>
>> Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
>> the course of normal life.
>
>
> But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical
> continuity). We're discussing whether scanning a brain and making a
> (hypothetically "exact enough") duplicate later would affect the
> consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, obviously in this case
> for other reasons than physical continuity.

As I understand it, comp requires simulation of the brain on a digital
computer. It could be that there are processes in the brain that are
not Turing emulable, and therefore it would be impossible to make an
artificial brain using a computer. However, it might still be possible
to make a copy through some other means, such as making an exact
biological copy using different matter.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 23 April 2015 at 14:32, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
>> consciousness
>> (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a
>> gap is
>> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
>
>
> If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
> Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic
> acceleration.)


 Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
 the course of normal life.
>>>
>>>
>>> Gaps in consciousness, perhaps. But are there gaps in the ebb and flow of
>>> brain chemicals, hormones, cell deaths and divisions, ...? Or gaps in the
>>> flow of the unconscious?
>>
>>
>> I'm pretty sure there are gaps in all biological processes that correspond
>> to any kind of thought/perception/awareness in the case of people who are
>> cooled down for heart surgery.
>
>
> I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all brain
> processes stop under anaesthesia.

When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?


-- 
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 14:32, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

meekerdb wrote:

On 4/22/2015 9:22 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:

But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
consciousness
(assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a
gap is
particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.


If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic
acceleration.)


Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.


Gaps in consciousness, perhaps. But are there gaps in the ebb and flow of
brain chemicals, hormones, cell deaths and divisions, ...? Or gaps in the
flow of the unconscious?


I'm pretty sure there are gaps in all biological processes that correspond
to any kind of thought/perception/awareness in the case of people who are
cooled down for heart surgery.


I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all brain
processes stop under anaesthesia.


When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?


That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and discuss 
the implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An 
embryo is not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell 
rupturing might have adverse consequences in the brain.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

>>> I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all brain
>>> processes stop under anaesthesia.
>>
>>
>> When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
>> embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
>> brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
>
>
> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and discuss the
> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An embryo is
> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing might
> have adverse consequences in the brain.

In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
not affect the philosophical questions.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett  wrote:


I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all brain
processes stop under anaesthesia.


When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?


That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and discuss the
implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An embryo is
not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing might
have adverse consequences in the brain.


In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
not affect the philosophical questions.


I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process is 
impossible in principle (for physical reasons).


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?


On 4/22/2015 10:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 14:30, LizR  wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:

On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:

But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
consciousness
(assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a gap
is
particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.


If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic
acceleration.)

Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
the course of normal life.


But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical
continuity). We're discussing whether scanning a brain and making a
(hypothetically "exact enough") duplicate later would affect the
consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, obviously in this case
for other reasons than physical continuity.

As I understand it, comp requires simulation of the brain on a digital
computer. It could be that there are processes in the brain that are
not Turing emulable, and therefore it would be impossible to make an
artificial brain using a computer. However, it might still be possible
to make a copy through some other means, such as making an exact
biological copy using different matter.
But for Bruno's argument to go thru the copy must be digital, so that it's function 
appears in the UD list.


Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 23 April 2015 at 16:39, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 4/22/2015 10:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 23 April 2015 at 14:30, LizR  wrote:
>>>
>>> On 23 April 2015 at 16:14, Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:

 On 23 April 2015 at 11:37, LizR  wrote:
>
> On 23 April 2015 at 11:36, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>> But not without destroying the brain and producing a gap in
>> consciousness
>> (assuming you could produce a working replica).  I don't see that a
>> gap
>> is
>> particularly significant; a concussion also causes a gap.
>
>
> If comp is correct, gaps make no difference. (That would also be Frank
> Tipler's argument for immortality, in the absence of cosmic
> acceleration.)

 Even if comp is incorrect gaps make no difference, since they occur in
 the course of normal life.
>>>
>>>
>>> But they do have to be explained differently (For example by physical
>>> continuity). We're discussing whether scanning a brain and making a
>>> (hypothetically "exact enough") duplicate later would affect the
>>> consciousness of the person involved. Comp says not, obviously in this
>>> case
>>> for other reasons than physical continuity.
>>
>> As I understand it, comp requires simulation of the brain on a digital
>> computer. It could be that there are processes in the brain that are
>> not Turing emulable, and therefore it would be impossible to make an
>> artificial brain using a computer. However, it might still be possible
>> to make a copy through some other means, such as making an exact
>> biological copy using different matter.
>
> But for Bruno's argument to go thru the copy must be digital, so that it's
> function appears in the UD list.

Yes, that's right; but it does not necessarily mean that an artificial
brain preserving your consciousness is impossible if comp is false.


-- 
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-23 Thread meekerdb


On 4/22/2015 11:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett > wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett >
>> wrote:
>>
> I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all
> brain
> processes stop under anaesthesia.


 When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
 embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
 brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
>>>
>>>
>>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and discuss the
>>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An embryo
>>> is
>>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing might
>>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
>>
>>
>> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
>> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
>> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
>> not affect the philosophical questions.
>
>
> I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process is
> impossible in principle (for physical reasons).

Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that suspending 
biological processes then restarting them breaks some physical law, and I don't think 
that it does.


I agree.  But for Bruno's argument I don't think it's even necessary to copy humans.  If 
you just suppose that a conscious, digital AI is possible and that its operation is 
essentially classical, then duplicating its consciousness is not problematic.


Brent

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

I mean you're not asking if the suspension maintained your personality or
your memories or what youe favorite food is. At this point we are assuming
all these things are preserved. Yours is not a question of technical
difficultly What you are instead asking is, will the conscious entity
before and after still be me? The distinction is not physically meaningful.
Not to envoke Newton's flaming laser sword, but it's clear that what you
are asking is an empty question.

If we are going to claim that this suspension annihilates identity, then
who's to say that drinking water doesn't do the same thing? If identity is
some epiphenomena, then who's to say we have it in the first place?

On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
>
> On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >>
> >> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett 
> >> wrote:
> >>
> > I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all
> > brain
> > processes stop under anaesthesia.
> 
> 
>  When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
>  embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
>  brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and discuss
> the
> >>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An embryo
> >>> is
> >>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing
> might
> >>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
> >>
> >>
> >> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
> >> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
> >> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
> >> not affect the philosophical questions.
> >
> >
> > I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process is
> > impossible in principle (for physical reasons).
>
> Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that
> suspending biological processes then restarting them breaks some physical
> law, and I don't think that it does.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-23 Thread Bruce Kellett


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

 > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 >>
 >> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett >

 >> wrote:
 >>
 > I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all
 > brain
 > processes stop under anaesthesia.
 
 
  When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing, the
  embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
  brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
 >>>
 >>>
 >>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and 
discuss the

 >>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An embryo
 >>> is
 >>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing 
might

 >>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
 >>
 >>
 >> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
 >> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
 >> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
 >> not affect the philosophical questions.
 >
 >
 > I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process is
 > impossible in principle (for physical reasons).

Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that 
suspending biological processes then restarting them breaks some 
physical law, and I don't think that it does.


The argument would be that physical laws stop you restarting the 
suspended processes -- the suspension process causes irreversible 
damage, for instance. Irreversible processes are quite plentiful under 
known physical laws.


Bruce

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Short of bringing the brain down to absolute zero, im not sure that
stopping all brain processes is physically meaningful. we could talk about
stopping all action potentials. I think you might see short term memory
loss with this but you can probably reboot.

On Thursday, April 23, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>  >>
>>  >> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett > >
>>  >> wrote:
>>  >>
>>  > I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all
>>  > brain
>>  > processes stop under anaesthesia.
>>  
>>  
>>   When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing,
>> the
>>   embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
>>   brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
>>  >>>
>>  >>>
>>  >>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and
>> discuss the
>>  >>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An
>> embryo
>>  >>> is
>>  >>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing
>> might
>>  >>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
>>  >>
>>  >>
>>  >> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
>>  >> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
>>  >> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
>>  >> not affect the philosophical questions.
>>  >
>>  >
>>  > I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process
>> is
>>  > impossible in principle (for physical reasons).
>>
>> Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that
>> suspending biological processes then restarting them breaks some physical
>> law, and I don't think that it does.
>>
>
> The argument would be that physical laws stop you restarting the suspended
> processes -- the suspension process causes irreversible damage, for
> instance. Irreversible processes are quite plentiful under known physical
> laws.
>
> Bruce
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously
if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however,
if we are still talking about comp then the question of importance is
whether a brain is Turing emulable at any level (which includes whether
physics is Turing emulable). If it is, then either the argument goes
through, or one of Bruno's other premises is wrong, or there is a mistake
in his argument.



On 23 April 2015 at 19:24, Dennis Ochei  wrote:

> Short of bringing the brain down to absolute zero, im not sure that
> stopping all brain processes is physically meaningful. we could talk about
> stopping all action potentials. I think you might see short term memory
> loss with this but you can probably reboot.
>
>
> On Thursday, April 23, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>  >>
>>>  >> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett >> >
>>>  >> wrote:
>>>  >>
>>>  > I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not
>>> all
>>>  > brain
>>>  > processes stop under anaesthesia.
>>>  
>>>  
>>>   When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing,
>>> the
>>>   embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
>>>   brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
>>>  >>>
>>>  >>>
>>>  >>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and
>>> discuss the
>>>  >>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An
>>> embryo
>>>  >>> is
>>>  >>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing
>>> might
>>>  >>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
>>>  >>
>>>  >>
>>>  >> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
>>>  >> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
>>>  >> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
>>>  >> not affect the philosophical questions.
>>>  >
>>>  >
>>>  > I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process
>>> is
>>>  > impossible in principle (for physical reasons).
>>>
>>> Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that
>>> suspending biological processes then restarting them breaks some physical
>>> law, and I don't think that it does.
>>>
>>
>> The argument would be that physical laws stop you restarting the
>> suspended processes -- the suspension process causes irreversible damage,
>> for instance. Irreversible processes are quite plentiful under known
>> physical laws.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Thursday, April 23, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>  >>
>>  >> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett > >
>>  >> wrote:
>>  >>
>>  > I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not all
>>  > brain
>>  > processes stop under anaesthesia.
>>  
>>  
>>   When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing,
>> the
>>   embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
>>   brain would it make any difference in the philosophical discussion?
>>  >>>
>>  >>>
>>  >>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and
>> discuss the
>>  >>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An
>> embryo
>>  >>> is
>>  >>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing
>> might
>>  >>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
>>  >>
>>  >>
>>  >> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
>>  >> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
>>  >> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty does
>>  >> not affect the philosophical questions.
>>  >
>>  >
>>  > I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the process
>> is
>>  > impossible in principle (for physical reasons).
>>
>> Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that
>> suspending biological processes then restarting them breaks some physical
>> law, and I don't think that it does.
>>
>
> The argument would be that physical laws stop you restarting the suspended
> processes -- the suspension process causes irreversible damage, for
> instance. Irreversible processes are quite plentiful under known physical
> laws.
>

Clearly it is *not* physically impossible to suspend a cell and then
restart it unharmed, since it has actually been done. But your whole
argument is beside your point. It's as if I asked what I might expect to
observe if I dropped a ball on the surface of Mars, and you answered that
you couldn't answer the question because humans might be unable to survive
the trip there.


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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

Yeah... we've been off topic for a while...

On Thursday, April 23, 2015, LizR  wrote:

> The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously
> if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however,
> if we are still talking about comp then the question of importance is
> whether a brain is Turing emulable at any level (which includes whether
> physics is Turing emulable). If it is, then either the argument goes
> through, or one of Bruno's other premises is wrong, or there is a mistake
> in his argument.
>
>
>
> On 23 April 2015 at 19:24, Dennis Ochei  > wrote:
>
>> Short of bringing the brain down to absolute zero, im not sure that
>> stopping all brain processes is physically meaningful. we could talk about
>> stopping all action potentials. I think you might see short term memory
>> loss with this but you can probably reboot.
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 23, 2015, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>


 On 23 April 2015 at 16:36, Bruce Kellett >>> > wrote:
  > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  >>
  >> On 23 April 2015 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett >>> >
  >> wrote:
  >>
  > I doubt that. Is the point susceptible of proof either way? Not
 all
  > brain
  > processes stop under anaesthesia.
  
  
   When embryos are frozen all metabolic processes stop. On thawing,
 the
   embryo is usually completely normal. If this could be done with a
   brain would it make any difference in the philosophical
 discussion?
  >>>
  >>>
  >>> That becomes a hypothetical discussion. Let's do it first and
 discuss the
  >>> implications later. I remain sceptical about the possibility. An
 embryo
  >>> is
  >>> not an adult brain. Injecting antifreeze to inhibit cell rupturing
 might
  >>> have adverse consequences in the brain.
  >>
  >>
  >> In anaesthesia (and even in sleep) metabolic processes involved in
  >> consciousness are suspended without damage to the brain. But this
  >> whole list is hypothetical discussion! Mere technical difficulty
 does
  >> not affect the philosophical questions.
  >
  >
  > I think it might -- if the technical issues are such that the
 process is
  > impossible in principle (for physical reasons).

 Then it wouldn't be a mere technical difficulty. You have to show that
 suspending biological processes then restarting them breaks some physical
 law, and I don't think that it does.

>>>
>>> The argument would be that physical laws stop you restarting the
>>> suspended processes -- the suspension process causes irreversible damage,
>>> for instance. Irreversible processes are quite plentiful under known
>>> physical laws.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>> --
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>>
>>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 23 April 2015 at 21:30, Dennis Ochei  wrote:

> Yeah... we've been off topic for a while...
>
> That doesn't worry me in itself, but it does mean that things that aren't
actually relevant to comp may appear to some to be valid arguments against
it. Personally, I'm interested in relevant arguments against comp, and
discussions of whatever other topics may come up, but not in confusing the
two.

Maybe start a new thread?

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

I'll roll one out

On Thursday, April 23, 2015, LizR  wrote:

> On 23 April 2015 at 21:30, Dennis Ochei  > wrote:
>
>> Yeah... we've been off topic for a while...
>>
>> That doesn't worry me in itself, but it does mean that things that aren't
> actually relevant to comp may appear to some to be valid arguments against
> it. Personally, I'm interested in relevant arguments against comp, and
> discussions of whatever other topics may come up, but not in confusing the
> two.
>
> Maybe start a new thread?
>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-23 Thread John Mikes

Stathis:
I am an idealist enough (and an agnostic) to confess to lots and lots of so
far undetected functions (maybe even components  -- outside our 'material'
 --concept) that contribute to the functioning of a human 'brain'(?) as
developed into by now. Scanning goes for known items, composing is
contemplated for known structures (that include known functioning and
functionals as well) so to "scan and reproduce" is but a pius wish *within
our knowledge-base *of today. Maybe ever. The readiness for infinites is a
humanly unknown domain.
I feel it as much more than a linear progressing from 200 (1000?) to 11
billion or so which may be (if only by the huge numbers) above linearity.
AND... it includes the Aristotelian (what I called in a recent post my pun:
"Aris-Total") *mistake* of regarding the 'total' as the composition of
known *material* parts.

Physicists may fall into these traps, mathemaiticians  even more, but
people in 'thinking' areas should not.

Apologies to the physicians and number-churners.

JM

On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 4:17 AM, Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, April 22, 2015, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 00:43, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>  What you are talking about has more to do with psychology and/or
 physics than mathematics,

>>>
>>> I call that theology, and this can be justified using Plato's notion of
>>> theology, as the lexicon Plotinus/arithmetic illustrates. The name of the
>>> field is another topic.
>>>
>>> Also, you are unclear. you argue that comp is false, but reason like it
>>> makes sense, and that the reasoning is non valid, without saying where is
>>> the error. It is hard to figure out what you mean.
>>>
>>
>> I think we are coming from entirely different starting points. From my
>> (physicist's) point of view, what you are doing is proposing a model and
>> reasoning about what happens in that model. Because it is your model,
>> you are free to choose the starting point and the ancillary assumptions
>> as you wish. All that matters for the model is that the logic of the
>> development of the model is correct.
>>
>> What is happening in our exchanges is that I am examining what goes into
>> your model and seeing whether it makes sense in the light of other
>> knowledge. The actual logic of the development of your model is then of
>> secondary importance. If your assumptions are unrealistic or too
>> restrictive, then no matter how good your logic, the end result will not
>> be of any great value. These wider issues cannot be simply dismissed as
>> "off topic".
>>
>> In summary, my objections start with step 0, the "yes doctor" argument.
>> I do not think that it is physically possible to examine a living brain
>> in sufficient detail to reproduce its conscious life in a Turing machine
>> without actually destroying the brain before the process is complete. I
>> would say "No" to the doctor. So even though I believe that AI is
>> possible, in other words, that a computer-based intelligence that can
>> function in all relevant respects like a normal human being is in
>> principle possible, I do not believe that I can be replaced by such an
>> AI. The necessary starting data are unobtainable in principle.
>>
>> Consequently, I think the reasoning in the first steps of your model
>> could only apply to mature AIs, not to humans. The internal logic of the
>> model is then not an issue -- but the relevance to human experience is.
>
>
> I don't see why you think it is impossible to scan a brain sufficiently to
> reproduce it. For example, you could fix a the brain, slice it up with a
> microtome and with microscopy establish all the synaptic connections. That
> is the crudest proposal for so-called mind uploading, but it may be
> necessary to go further to the molecular level and determine the types and
> numbers of membrane proteins in each neuron. The next step would be the at
> the level of small molecules and atoms, such as neurotransmitters and ions,
> but this may be able to be deduced from information about the type of
> neuron and macromolecules. It seems unlikely that you would need to
> determine things like ionic concentrations at a given moment, since ionic
> gradients collapse all the time and the person survives. In any case, with
> the "yes doctor" test you would not be the first volunteer. It is assumed
> that it will be well established, through a series of engineering
> refinements, that with the brain replacement the copies seem to behave
> normally and claim that they feel normal. The leap of faith (which, as I've
> said previously, I don't think is such a leap) is that not only will the
> copies say they feel the same, they will in fact feel the same.
>
>
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>
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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Friday, April 24, 2015, John Mikes  wrote:

> Stathis:
> I am an idealist enough (and an agnostic) to confess to lots and lots of
> so far undetected functions (maybe even components  -- outside our
> 'material'  --concept) that contribute to the functioning of a human
> 'brain'(?) as developed into by now. Scanning goes for known items,
> composing is contemplated for known structures (that include known
> functioning and functionals as well) so to "scan and reproduce" is but a
> pius wish *within our knowledge-base *of today. Maybe ever. The readiness
> for infinites is a humanly unknown domain.
> I feel it as much more than a linear progressing from 200 (1000?) to 11
> billion or so which may be (if only by the huge numbers) above linearity.
> AND... it includes the Aristotelian (what I called in a recent post my pun:
> "Aris-Total") *mistake* of regarding the 'total' as the composition of
> known *material* parts.
>
> Physicists may fall into these traps, mathemaiticians  even more, but
> people in 'thinking' areas should not.
>
> Apologies to the physicians and number-churners.
>
> JM
>

John,

You may be right and there may be brain structures and functions that defy
scanning and reproducing. However, this is straightforward scientific
question, amenable to experimental methods.


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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-23 Thread meekerdb

On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument. Obviously if we've
moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant, however, if we are still
talking about comp then the question of importance is whether a brain is Turing emulable
at any level (which includes whether physics is Turing emulable). If it is, then either
the argument goes through, or one of Bruno's other premises is wrong, or there is a
mistake in his argument.

Well, maybe Bruno can clarify. He always says that physics and consciousness are not
computable; they are some kind of sum or average over countably infinite many threads
going through a particular state of the UD. So it's not that clear what it means that the
brain is Turing emulable in Bruno's theory, even if it is Turing emulable in the
materialist theory. That's part of my concern that the environment of the brain, the
physics of it is relation to the environment, is what makes it not emulable because its
perception/awareness is inherently adapted to the environment by evolution. Bruno tends
to dismiss this as a technicality because one can just expand the scope of the emulation
to include the environment. But I think that's a flaw. If the scope has to be expanded
then all that's proven in step 8 is that, within a simulated environment a simulated
consciousness doesn't require any real physics - just simulated physics. But that's
almost trivial. I say "almost" because it may still provide some explanation of
consciousness within the simulation.

Brent

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

2015-04-23 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:52 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>> Dennis Ochei wrote:
>>
>> One must revise the everyday concept of personal identity
>> because it isn't even coherent. It's like youre getting mad at
>> him for explaining combustion without reference to phlogiston.
>> He can't use the everyday notion because it is a convenient
>> fiction.
>>
>> I don't think phlogiston is an everyday concept.
>> Not anymore. It was made obsolete by a better theory, which was not
>> required to take phlogiston into account, because phlogiston was just a
>> made up explanation that happened to fit the observations available at the
>> time.
>>
>
> No, phlogiston was a serious scientific theory. It required careful
> experimentation to demonstrate that the theory did not really fit the facts
> easily (you would require negative mass, for instance).


I did not say that it wasn't serious. What I said is that it was made up.
Many successful theories start as a creative hypothesis. Usually creative
hypothesis are very constrained by what is known at the time, or, saying it
another way, by common sense. Requiring better theories to fit common sense
would prevent scientific success. When you are dealing with things like
particle accelerators you are already fair removed from our common
experience of what matter is.


>
>
>  The closest continuer concept of personal identity is far from an
>> unsophisticated everyday notion, or a convenient fiction.
>> I wasn't familiar with the concept so I looked at several sources. I will
>> summarize it in my own words, so that you can please correct me if I
>> misunderstand something:
>>
>> In case of branching (through something like duplication machines, body
>> swaps, non-destructive teleportations, etc..), only one or zero branches
>> will be the true continuation of the original. In some cases the true
>> continuation is the one that more closely resembles the original
>> psychologically, which can be determined by following causality chains. In
>> the case of a tie, no branch is a true continuation of the original.
>>
>
> It involves a lot more than psychological resemblance. The point is that
> personal identity is a multidimensional concept. It includes continuity of
> the body, causality, continuity, access to memories, emotional states,
> value systems, and everything else that goes to make up a unique person.
> Although all of these things change with time in the natural course of
> events, we say that there is a unique person in this history. Closest
> continuer theory is a sophisticated attempt to capture this
> multidimensionality, and acknowledges that the metric one might use, and
> the relative weights placed on different dimensions, might be open to
> discussion. But it is clear that in the case of ties (in whatever metric
> you are using), new persons are created -- the person is not duplicated in
> any operational sense.


What part of reality is all of this stuff trying to explain? The entire
"personal identity" business strikes me as an ill-defined problem.


>
>
>  Again, please correct me if I am misrepresenting the theory or missing
>> something important.
>>
>> If what I said above is correct, this is just akin to a legal definition,
>> not a serious scientific or philosophical theory. It makes a statement
>> about a bunch of mushy concepts. What is a "true continuation"? How is the
>> causality chain introduced by a train journey any different from the one
>> introduced by a teleportation?
>>
>> If Everett's MWI is correct, then this theory holds that there is no true
>> continuation -- every single branching from one observer moment to the next
>> introduces a tie in closeness. Which is fine by me, but then we can just
>> ignore this entire "true continuation" business.
>>
>
> MWI is in no way equivalent to Bruno's duplication situation. He
> acknowledges this.


Does he? This statement seems to broad to be meaningful.


> The point about MWI is that the continuers are in different worlds.


So are first person perspectives. I cannot experience your first person
perspective while experiencing mine.


> There is no dimension connecting the worlds, so there is no metric
> defining this difference.


I don't see how that follows. Just because the worlds are mutually
inaccessible by humans doesn't mean we can't define a metric for similarity
between possible worlds.


> Each can then be counted as the closest continuer /in that world/ -- with
> no possibility of conflicts.


What conflict? It's not like me shaking hands with a copy of myself will
create a singularity. The conflict only appears as a limitation of human
language.


>
>
>  If you want to revise it to some alternative definition of personal
>> identity that is better suited to your purposes, then you have to do
>> the

Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?

On 24 April 2015 at 09:54, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 4/23/2015 1:03 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>> The discussion was originally about step 3 in the comp argument.
>> Obviously if we've moved onto something else then comp may not be relevant,
>> however, if we are still talking about comp then the question of importance
>> is whether a brain is Turing emulable at any level (which includes whether
>> physics is Turing emulable). If it is, then either the argument goes
>> through, or one of Bruno's other premises is wrong, or there is a mistake
>> in his argument.
>>
>
> Well, maybe Bruno can clarify.  He always says that physics and
> consciousness are not computable; they are some kind of sum or average over
> countably infinite many threads going through a particular state of the
> UD.  So it's not that clear what it means that the brain is Turing emulable
> in Bruno's theory, even if it is Turing emulable in the materialist
> theory.  That's part of my concern that the environment of the brain, the
> physics of it is relation to the environment, is what makes it not emulable
> because its perception/awareness is inherently adapted to the environment
> by evolution.  Bruno tends to dismiss this as a technicality because one
> can just expand the scope of the emulation to include the environment.  But
> I think that's a flaw.  If the scope has to be expanded then all that's
> proven in step 8 is that, within  a simulated environment a simulated
> consciousness doesn't require any real physics - just simulated physics.
> But that's almost trivial. I say "almost" because it may still provide some
> explanation of consciousness within the simulation.
>

I think you'll find that consciousness isn't computable *if you assume all
the consequences of comp*. But once you've assumed all that, you've already
had to throw out materialism, including brains, so the question is
meaningless.

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Re: Step 3 - one step beyond?