subject:"Re\: subjective experience"



> On 26 Jun 2020, at 00:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> There isn't much more that's been said about the (underdeterminative) nature 
> of theories beyond what Duhem, Quine said decades ago.

Quine is a materialist? He said this in the frame of Aristotle philosophy. He 
missed the fact that incompleteness makes some “essence” back in science, like 
the greeks saw much earlier. So, Quine explanation can’t work when we assume 
Descartes, Darwin, etc. He needs a non mechanical mind, which, BTW, 
re-introduced some “essence” too, in metaphysics (where the essence are the 
most troubling, I would say).

Bruno



> 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/
> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9b3bdf06-6232-45ff-ada5-8bb9316923a8o%40googlegroups.com.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/71DDD9F2-EB23-4E48-B80F-B65889937C81%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience



> On 25 Jun 2020, at 23:06, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2020 1:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>>> Explanations" are a dime dozen.  > > > > Prediction is the gold standard.
>>> Brent
>> Though "predictions are overvalued":
>> 
>> http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html
>> 
>> 
>> (They do not determine theories.)
> 
> But they determine what theories are wrong.  Most of Sabine's essay is 
> incoherent.  She makes up examples in which someone predicts many contrary 
> results, as though that's an example of prediction by a theory.   Then she 
> says the important thing is "explanatory power", but neglects to point out 
> that "God did it." has perfect explanatory power.

?

God did it, or “there is a universe” have 0 explanatory power.

I have no clues why you say that “God did it” has some explanatory power, 
unless you think about a precise theory of God explaining how God did, but that 
will be much more than “God did it”.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8345f6fa-4e0a-2aa3-7b19-a86066c11cea%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0D59FA2A-AA39-4636-827C-DA0B5649E3F2%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience



> On 25 Jun 2020, at 20:02, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/25/2020 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 From your irreducible material universe in which you seem to believe?
>>> 
>>> Where did I say "irreducible"?  I'm not in the belief business.  I'm in the 
>>> finding out business.
>> 
>> A scientist can only propose a theory, and means of verification, and a 
>> finite number of evidences for it. Someone doubting the interest of the 
>> theory must either refute it, or find something simpler, or something with 
>> wider range of explanations. I think we agree on all this.
> 
> No we don't.  It's not sufficient to be simpler unless it also has the same 
> or greater scope of predictions that are at least as accurate.  
> "Explanations" are a dime dozen.  Prediction is the gold standard.

Prediction of what? You seem again to confuse physics and metaphysics, which is 
the Aristotelian metaphysics.

Practically, we predict only number relation. Prediction is necessary, as I 
said, but a simplet theory with a greater range of explanation is always better 
in the fundamental science, and that is the case for Mechanism in metaphysics, 
and perhaps in physics too in some far future. In metaphysics, physicalism is 
basically incomplete, if not refuted, as it needs to abandon Mechanism, (and 
thus Descartes, Darwin, etc. 


Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/569d6e0d-458a-ede0-84b0-aeb4af6923b3%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1700F3EA-BF46-484B-89EC-2FBC8430B191%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2020-06-25 Thread Philip Thrift



There isn't much more that's been said about the (underdeterminative) nature of 
theories beyond what Duhem, Quine said decades ago.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-underdetermination/

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9b3bdf06-6232-45ff-ada5-8bb9316923a8o%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2020-06-25 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 6/25/2020 1:29 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



Explanations" are a dime dozen.  > > > > Prediction is the gold standard.
Brent

Though "predictions are overvalued":

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html


(They do not determine theories.)


But they determine what theories are wrong.  Most of Sabine's essay is 
incoherent.  She makes up examples in which someone predicts many 
contrary results, as though that's an example of prediction by a 
theory.   Then she says the important thing is "explanatory power", but 
neglects to point out that "God did it." has perfect explanatory power.


Brent



@philipthrift




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8345f6fa-4e0a-2aa3-7b19-a86066c11cea%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2020-06-25 Thread Philip Thrift



> Explanations" are a dime dozen.  > > > > Prediction is the gold standard.

> Brent

Though "predictions are overvalued":

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2020/05/predictions-are-overrated.html


(They do not determine theories.)

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/99f2002a-2d27-42ab-af0f-fce746253876o%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2020-06-25 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 6/25/2020 8:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

From your irreducible material universe in which you seem to believe?


Where did I say "irreducible"?  I'm not in the belief business.  I'm 
in the finding out business.


A scientist can only propose a theory, and means of verification, and 
a finite number of evidences for it. Someone doubting the interest of 
the theory must either refute it, or find something simpler, or 
something with wider range of explanations. I think we agree on all this.


No we don't.  It's not sufficient to be simpler unless it also has the 
same or greater scope of predictions that are at least as accurate.  
"Explanations" are a dime dozen.  Prediction is the gold standard.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/569d6e0d-458a-ede0-84b0-aeb4af6923b3%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

> On 20 Jul 2019, at 22:32, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/20/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
 "I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple different 
 kinds of things; there is only the wave function of the universe. As an 
 emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize the wave function as 
 describing multiple worlds."

 So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.
 At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).
>>> 
>>> "Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as 
>>> "stuff".  The contentious question seems to be where conscious thoughts 
>>> fall in the ontology.  Are they processes realized by stuff (Vic), or do 
>>> they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno),
>> 
>> Elementary arithmetic is that realm, and I ask you: how it could be 
>> separated, and mostly:  from what? 
> 
> From others metaphysical ontologies: materialism, idealism, theism,…

OK. So the point here is that when we assume Mechanism, those other realm can 
no more be used. It will like adding something in the ontology, which becomes 
incapable of linking our experience with it. It is like adding an ontology to 
claim that the theory is incomplete because it fails to explain that ontology 
(in the case where we got a phenomenological explanation, like with Mechanism).

> 
>> From your irreducible material universe in which you seem to believe?
> 
> Where did I say "irreducible"?  I'm not in the belief business.  I'm in the 
> finding out business.

A scientist can only propose a theory, and means of verification, and a finite 
number of evidences for it. Someone doubting the interest of the theory must 
either refute it, or find something simpler, or something with wider range of 
explanations. I think we agree on all this.

> 
>> 
>> Why invoke such a thing.
> 
> I didn't invoke anything.  I just attempted to clarify the different theories 
> at play.
> 
>> It is not used in physics. It is used in physicalism, which until now just 
>> put the mind-body problem under the rug. With mechanism, we have a “simple” 
>> explanation of consciousness, and a “simple” explanation of where the 
>> observable comes from, and we can test it.
>> 
>> Your use of metaphysics is like the pseudo-religious one. You claim that 
>> your god (Matter) is enough to not do the experimental testing.
> 
> And you sound like a theist seeking out heretics.

Maybe I was wrong, but it seems that sometimes you assume more than elementary 
arithmetic in your argument. I might have been wrong and confuse with the post 
of someone else, in which case I apologise. 

(I fail to see your point, as it looked critical with respect of what I am 
trying to convey). I might have made a general remark on the materialists, who 
very often take the ontological universe for granted, or talk like some 
“science” would have decided between Plato’s conception of reality-and-reserach 
and Aristotle’s materialist theology (Aristotle makes utterly clear that it 
assumes a primitive physical universe, in its Metaphysics Treatises, notably 
when mocking Plato for its alleged duplication of "the real object in nature” 
and they immaterial universal (mathematical) shape or number.

There are no heretics. There are people who reason validly and people who 
reason non validly (in diverse, possibly large, domain of investigation).

My point is just that when we assume a very weak form of digital mechanism (the 
one already used by Darwin), then the metaphysical assumption of weak 
Materialism (the ontological existence of a matter irreducible to anything 
else), or physicalism (the doctrine according to which the fundamental 
metaphysical-ontological science is physics) are no more defensible. The 
physical laws have a reason, an origin, an explanation. And the Löbian machine 
finds it “in its head”, and find the means and the needs to distinguish the 
justifiable parts, from the non justifiable parts, and the many hybrids. 

The “real bomb” is Gödel-Post-Turing-Kleene-Church discovery of the universal 
machineries and the universal machines. The rest is mathematical logic, or, 
just by adding YD to make things more vivid, mathematical theology. The only 
act of faith, and link with consciousness, is in the "Yes Doctor" act of faith. 
No machine can provably find its own code, and if the doctor claims to know 
which machine you are, you know that it is a con-artist.

Bruno

> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
>

Re: subjective experience



> On 20 Jul 2019, at 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you will 
>> not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive being in two 
>> cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is quite natural to 
>> ask yourself where you could feel to be after the experience.
>> 
>> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
> 
> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person 
> plural and second person singular being the same word in English. 

That is the very reason why we need to be cautious and to make clear if we talk 
about the first person experience (which we know to be singular for both 
copies), or if we talk about the third person soul or body, in which case it is 
a plural.

(Second person = third person, of course).




> In the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York they 
> say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing duplication 
> thought experiments.


You need only the 1/3 distinction, to derive informally the first person 
indeterminacy. 

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97119976-636e-0aa8-ad49-6ce07669a108%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3A9335AB-385E-4661-A6A0-5875F8A31A24%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience


> On 22 Jul 2019, at 13:45, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 7:28 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 22 Jul 2019, at 07:01, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik > > wrote:
>>> >I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply 
>>> >can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed 
>>> >computations are already "out >there,”
>> 
>>> If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the 
>>> equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe 
>>> that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves 
>>> the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the 
>>> prime number.
>> 
>> 
>> This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a domain 
>> with an ontology, Bruno.
> 
> It is not a conflation. It is a necessary conclusion. 
> 
> It is a clear conflation - necessay for no one. 

I don’t see the argument.



> 
> 
>> Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated assertion that people confuse "2+2=4" 
>> with 2+2=4. 
> ? (Yes, some people just did it many times just recently, but I don’t see the 
> relation with the ontological existence).
> 
> Don't you, now. Maybe that explains quite a lot of what you are missing.


I don’t see an argument here.



>  
> 
>> What you refer to here is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a 
>> dog, namely a 4-legged mammal that barks and greets you affectionately at 
>> the door. That is, the name is not the same as the physical object.
> 
> The name of an object is not the same as the object (physical or not).
> 
>> But that distinction does not exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism (the 
>> fact that the integers are not independently existing objects),
> 
> But that is not among my assumption. My assumption is (at the meta-level) 
> only YD and CT.
> 
> Who said it was among your assumptions? I state it as a fact that must be 
> taken into account.

Which facts? The primitive material existence?

That is not a fact, but a string axiom in metaphysics, for which there has 
never been an atom of evidence. Just a 1500 years of conflation of the notion 
of matter, in which we all believe, and primary matter, which is what mechanism 
put in doubt.




>  
> Then, from this we show that the TOE is “only” elementary arithmetic, or 
> combinators, or any first order specification of a universal machinery, or 
> universal machine.
> 
> But that "proof" requires exactly the conflation of an existential quantifier 
> with an ontology.

Counter examples: all the “E” used in all modes of the selves describes 
phenomenological existence, and none ontological existence, except the first 
(arithmetical truth).





> The difference between "2+2=4" and 2+2=4 is that one is the name for the 
> other. But the name is all that exists, so these are identical.

Even before Gödel, that was a big mistake. After Gödel, it means you have no 
idea of what the science of logic is studying. 





>  
>> the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as 2+2=4.
> 
> That is a huge mistake (even for a nominalist). It is beyond ridiculous.
> 
> That is your mistake, not mine.

No. You are saying that “2+2=4” is the same as the fact that 2 + 2 is 4.





>  
>> There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship expressed 
>> in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic" has no 
>> content.
> 
> Hmm… I *can* agree. It is a shortcut for the model (N, 0, +, *, s) satisfies 
> all the condition for the computations to be relatively run.
> 
> The theory consisting of (N, 0, +, *, s)

(N, 0, +, *, s) is not a theory. It is a structured set, called a model. 




> is sufficiently rich for one to write down all arithmetical computations.

The sigma_1 truth is enough for this. N = (N, 0, +, *, s) is much more than 
that. To be sure. But neither the sigma_1 truth, nor N can be used by anyone to 
write down things. Those are realities able to satisfied, or not, some 
sentences made in a theory.




> But that does not bring these computations into existence -- you require pen 
> and paper and intelligence, or something equivalent, to do that. The 
> computations do not exist in the abstract.


You do philosophy at the place you are asked to not do philosophy. For AR, if 
you agree that x + 4 = 10 has a solution, that is enough to understand that you 
are emulated in arithmetic, and if you can explain me how a universal machine 
can distinguish by introspection an emulation of itself in arithmetic from an 
emulation in a “material” or “real” reality, you are welcome to elaborate on 
this.




> 
>> Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these computations than 
>> it proves the existence of the moon.
> 
> In the Aristotelian metaph

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-22 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Mon, Jul 22, 2019 at 7:28 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 22 Jul 2019, at 07:01, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik  wrote:
>>
> >I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply
>> can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed
>> computations are already "out >there,”
>>
>> If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the
>> equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe
>> that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves
>> the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the
>> prime number.
>>
>>
> This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a
> domain with an ontology, Bruno.
>
>
> It is not a conflation. It is a necessary conclusion.
>

It is a clear conflation - necessay for no one.


> Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated assertion that people confuse "2+2=4"
> with 2+2=4.
>
> ? (Yes, some people just did it many times just recently, but I don’t see
> the relation with the ontological existence).
>

Don't you, now. Maybe that explains quite a lot of what you are missing.


>
> What you refer to here is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a
> dog, namely a 4-legged mammal that barks and greets you affectionately at
> the door. That is, the name is not the same as the physical object.
>
>
> The name of an object is not the same as the object (physical or not).
>
> But that distinction does not exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism
> (the fact that the integers are not independently existing objects),
>
>
> But that is not among my assumption. My assumption is (at the meta-level)
> only YD and CT.
>

Who said it was among your assumptions? I state it as a fact that must be
taken into account.


> Then, from this we show that the TOE is “only” elementary arithmetic, or
> combinators, or any first order specification of a universal machinery, or
> universal machine.
>

But that "proof" requires exactly the conflation of an existential
quantifier with an ontology. The difference between "2+2=4" and 2+2=4 is
that one is the name for the other. But the name is all that exists, so
these are identical.


> the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as 2+2=4.
>
>
> That is a huge mistake (even for a nominalist). It is beyond ridiculous.
>

That is your mistake, not mine.


> There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship
> expressed in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic"
> has no content.
>
>
> Hmm… I *can* agree. It is a shortcut for the model (N, 0, +, *, s)
> satisfies all the condition for the computations to be relatively run.
>

The theory consisting of (N, 0, +, *, s) is sufficiently rich for one to
write down all arithmetical computations. But that does not bring these
computations into existence -- you require pen and paper and intelligence,
or something equivalent, to do that. The computations do not exist in the
abstract.

Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these computations than
> it proves the existence of the moon.
>
>
> In the Aristotelian metaphysics, that might be given some sense, but you
> cannot invoke your metaphysics in a work in metaphysics.
>

Oh dear. So all your work is a futile waste of time, then, is it? You
invoke your metaphysics all the time. I reject your metaphysics in order to
criticize it, by adopting a more reasonable metaphysical attitude.


> That is the same, in metaphysics, as saying that the structure (N, +)
> refutes group theory, in mathematics.
>

No, it is not. Sarcasm is not your strong point, Bruno.


> in some sort of Platonic superspace.
>>
>>
>> Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no
>> objection to what is taught in primary school.
>>
>
> There you go again, Bruno: re-defining terms so that you are always right.
>
>
> Ad hominem
>

Bullying yet again, Bruno. That only goes to show that you have no
reasonable rebuttal of my point.


> + I only show how weak the realist assumption is.
>
> "Realism", or more particularly, "arithmetical realism" means no such
> thing, Students are taught elementary calculations and multiplication
> tables in primary school, they are not taught philosophical platonism,.
>
>
> Of course. But we do metaphysics, and it is important to understand that
> the metaphysics is in CT and “yes doctor”, not in the arithmetical realism,
> which is used only to make sense of CT (needed to make mathematical precise
> sense of “digital”).
>

Without arithmetical realism (defined in the usual way, not as in
Brunospeak), you cannot get all computations  as existing in arithmetic,
and the dovetailer does not ever get off the ground. So your metaphysics is
strongly built in from the start. So don't you dare criticize me for my
metaphysics.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to

Re: subjective experience

> On 22 Jul 2019, at 07:01, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik  > wrote:
>> >I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply 
>> >can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed 
>> >computations are already "out >there,”
> 
>> If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the 
>> equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe that 
>> the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves the 
>> existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the prime 
>> number.
> 
> 
> This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a domain 
> with an ontology, Bruno.

It is not a conflation. It is a necessary conclusion. 

> Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated assertion that people confuse "2+2=4" 
> with 2+2=4. 

? (Yes, some people just did it many times just recently, but I don’t see the 
relation with the ontological existence).

> What you refer to here is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a dog, 
> namely a 4-legged mamal that barks and greets you affectionately at the door. 
> That is, the name is not the same as the physical object.

The name of an object is not the same as the object (physical or not).

> But that distinction does not exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism (the 
> fact that the integers are not independently existing objects),

But that is not among my assumption. My assumption is (at the meta-level) only 
YD and CT.

Then, from this we show that the TOE is “only” elementary arithmetic, or 
combinators, or any first order specification of a universal machinery, or 
universal machine.

> the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as 2+2=4.

That is a huge mistake (even for a nominalist). It is beyond ridiculous.

> There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship expressed 
> in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic" has no 
> content.

Hmm… I *can* agree. It is a shortcut for the model (N, 0, +, *, s) satisfies 
all the condition for the computations to be relatively run.

> Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these computations than it 
> proves the existence of the moon.

In the Aristotelian metaphysics, that might be given some sense, but you cannot 
invoke your metaphysics in a work in metaphysics.

That is the same, in metaphysics, as saying that the structure (N, +) refutes 
group theory, in mathematics.

> 
>> in some sort of Platonic superspace.
> 
> Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no 
> objection to what is taught in primary school.
> 
> There you go again, Bruno: re-defining terms so that you are always right.

Ad hominem + I only show how weak the realist assumption is.

> "Realism", or more particularly, "arithmetical realism" means no such thing, 
> Students are taught elementary calculations and multiplication tables in 
> primary school, they are not taught philosophical platonism,.

Of course. But we do metaphysics, and it is important to understand that the 
metaphysics is in CT and “yes doctor”, not in the arithmetical realism, which 
is used only to make sense of CT (needed to make mathematical precise sense of 
“digital”).

Bruno 

> 
> Bruce
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRsLk6y3xtR65U4MSjL8qHWf86Ak%3DVPruB_CKWL_MgLcQ%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/482F9F70-E1AC-40AD-A636-7204475FC7F2%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience


> On 22 Jul 2019, at 01:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
 I didn't say there was.  I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington.  
 "Youse-self" is second person plural.
 
 Brent
 
 Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
 frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
 clear and meaningful.
>>> 
>>> But does it have a clear answer?  
>>> 
>>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
>>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
>>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
>>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
>>> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, 
>>> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
>>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
>>> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
>>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
>>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
>>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> "The potential for multiple worlds is always there in the quantum state, 
>>> whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world 
>>> superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? 
>>> And the answer again is: yes, automatically, without any additional 
>>> assumptions."
>> 
>> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
>> probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
>> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And what 
>> about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat 
>> box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times 
>> the decay might occur?
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all 
>> types should be removed from physics.
>> 
>> So there would be no "continuum of worlds".  The way I think about it 
>> (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just think 
>> of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: There 
>> will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of them.
> 
> That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule.  If 
> you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings 
> (probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC 
> program.

Only if is deduced from the sigma_1-measure problem, or Mechanism has to be 
andonned.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> 
>> (God plays Monte Carlo.)
>> 
>> @philipthrift
>> 
>> -- 
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
>> .
>> To view this discussion on the web visit 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com
>>  
>> .
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e5887b44-cfb8-b332-0f91-cfad73acb776%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an emai

Re: subjective experience


> On 22 Jul 2019, at 01:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>> I didn't say there was.  I said youse-self sees Moscow and Washington.  
>>> "Youse-self" is second person plural.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
>>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
>>> clear and meaningful.
>> 
>> But does it have a clear answer?  
>> 
>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world split 
>> into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, can they 
>> really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
>> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
>> 
>> 
>> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> "The potential for multiple worlds is always there in the quantum state, 
>> whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world 
>> superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? 
>> And the answer again is: yes, automatically, without any additional 
>> assumptions."
> 
> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
> probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And what 
> about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat 
> box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different times 
> the decay might occur?
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all 
> types should be removed from physics.

Like computationalism forbid the axiom of infinity for the basic ontology. 
Recently I have realised that even the induction axiom have to be removed. 
There are only part of the observers’ code, and yes, the phenomenology needs 
the axiom induction, and the axiom of infinity, etc.



> 
> So there would be no "continuum of worlds”. 

That is because Tegmark remains physicalist, and still believe in physical 
world. Here mechanism differs; there is a continuum of parallel histories, and 
we might need ZF + Large-cardinal to do its mathematic.




> The way I think about it (without getting into the formality of computable 
> analysis) is to just think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum 
> Monte Carlo program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an 
> actual infinity of them.

Yes, you need that to keep an ontological reality, but this will entail a 
continuum of zombies in the arithmetical reality, and eventually you will need 
to say “No” to the doctor, or to claim that CT is false (which you did), so no 
problem. You are working in a non-mechanist theory. It is coherent with 
ontological matter, and holy water …

Bruno



> 
> 
> (God plays Monte Carlo.)
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6E074D91-0314-499B-9CF7-36B6571337D6%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-22 Thread Philip Thrift



On Monday, July 22, 2019 at 12:01:31 AM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
>> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik > 
>> wrote:
>>
> >I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply 
>> can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed 
>> computations are already "out >there,”
>>
>> If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the 
>> equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe 
>> that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves 
>> the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the 
>> prime number.
>>
>>
> This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a 
> domain with an ontology, Bruno. Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated 
> assertion that people confuse "2+2=4" with 2+2=4.  What you refer to here 
> is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a dog, namely a 4-legged 
> mamal that barks and greets you affectionately at the door. That is, the 
> name is not the same as the physical object. But that distinction does not 
> exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism (the fact that the integers are 
> not independently existing objects), the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as 
> 2+2=4. There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship 
> expressed in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic" 
> has no content. Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these 
> computations than it proves the existence of the moon.
>
> in some sort of Platonic superspace.
>>
>>
>> Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no 
>> objection to what is taught in primary school.
>>
>
> There you go again, Bruno: re-defining terms so that you are always right. 
> "Realism", or more particularly, "arithmetical realism" means no such 
> thing, Students are taught elementary calculations and multiplication 
> tables in primary school, they are not taught philosophical platonism,.
>
> Bruce
>



*Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these computations than 
it proves the existence of the moon.*

Of course the moon is a numerical entity, the result of some (numerical) 
computation. :)

Once one posits numerical reality as producing (computing) things, then one 
is saying arithmetic is a programming language, and then the issue is what 
sort of semantics it has, e.g.

The operational semantics for a programming language describes how a valid 
program is interpreted as sequences of computational steps. These sequences 
then *are* the meaning of the program. 
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_semantics

The semantics of a program leads down to some sort of machinery, which in 
numerical reality are platonic machines - which basically have all the 
properties of the material machines that PLT operational semantics 
addresses (no pun intended).


*they are not taught philosophical platonism*


Of course they are. When students are told numbers exist, that is the 
beginning of their brainwashing by platonism.

@philipthrift
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/593b3158-9127-44ab-9fb2-913aa23710fe%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sat, Jul 20, 2019 at 8:16 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik  wrote:
>
>I think the main "leap of faith" that you make (and many others simply
> can't, because it >appears absurd) is somehow thinking that the completed
> computations are already "out >there,”
>
> If you agree that 2+2=4 implies Ex(x+2 = 4), or more simply that the
> equation x+2=0 has a solution in the integers, then you have to believe
> that the computations all exists in arithmetic. Peano Arithmetical proves
> the existence of those computations, like it proves the existence of the
> prime number.
>
>
This is your standard conflation of the Existential Quantifier over a
domain with an ontology, Bruno. Or, equivalently, your oft-repeated
assertion that people confuse "2+2=4" with 2+2=4.  What you refer to here
is the fact that the word "dog" is not actually a dog, namely a 4-legged
mamal that barks and greets you affectionately at the door. That is, the
name is not the same as the physical object. But that distinction does not
exist for arithmetic -- given nominalism (the fact that the integers are
not independently existing objects), the name "2+2=4" is the same thing as
2+2=4. There is no object that differs from the name of the relationship
expressed in 2+2=4. The claim "that all computations exist in arithmetic"
has no content. Peano arithmetic no more "proves" the existence of these
computations than it proves the existence of the moon.

in some sort of Platonic superspace.
>
>
> Not at all? Realism in arithmetic is only the statement that you have no
> objection to what is taught in primary school.
>

There you go again, Bruno: re-defining terms so that you are always right.
"Realism", or more particularly, "arithmetical realism" means no such
thing, Students are taught elementary calculations and multiplication
tables in primary school, they are not taught philosophical platonism,.

Bruce

>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRsLk6y3xtR65U4MSjL8qHWf86Ak%3DVPruB_CKWL_MgLcQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 6:16:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and 
 Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.

 Brent

>>>
>>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
>>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
>>> clear and meaningful.
>>>
>>>
>>> But does it have a clear answer?  
>>>
>>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
>>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
>>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
>>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
>>> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, 
>>> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
>>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
>>> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
>>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
>>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
>>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
>>
>>
>>
>> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/
>>
>>
>> "The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum 
>> state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do 
>> multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually 
>> come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without 
>> any additional assumptions."
>>
>>
>> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
>> probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
>> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And 
>> what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's 
>> cat box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different 
>> times the decay might occur?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all 
> types should be removed from physics.
>
> So there would be no "continuum of worlds".  The way I think about it 
> (without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just 
> think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: 
> There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of 
> them.
>
>
> That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule.  If 
> you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings 
> (probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC 
> program.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> (God plays Monte Carlo.)
>
> @philipthrift
>
>

Maybe it ends up being basically the same Monte Carlo programming.

Monte Carlo sampling from the quantum state space

https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.7805
https://arxiv.org/abs/1407.7806

@philipthrift

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3bec5f99-4727-4eb6-9f29-8682caebdb58%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 7/21/2019 4:06 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees
Moscow and Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person
/plural/.

Brent


Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it,
if you accept frequency interpretation of probability as you
should also for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.


But does it have a clear answer?

The MWI has it's own problems with probability. It's
straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the
world splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are
equi-probable).  But what if there are two possibilities and
one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world split
into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the
same, can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And
what if there are two possibilities, but one of them is very
unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand chance.  Does the world then
split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the probability of one
event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  But
if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens
infinitely many times and there is no natural measure of
probability.

Brent




Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.



http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/




"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the
quantum state, whether you like it or not. The next question
would be, do multiple-world superpositions of the form written
[above] ever actually come into being? And the answer again is:
*yes, automatically*, without any additional assumptions."


But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and
how does probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign
probabilities to branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead
of deriving it)?  And what about continuous processes like
detecting the decay in Schroedinger's cat box?  Is a continuum of
worlds produced corresponding to the different times the decay
might occur?

Brent



Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of 
all types should be removed from physics.


So there would be no "continuum of worlds".  The way I think about it 
(without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just 
think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo 
program: There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual 
infinity of them.


That would just be equivalent to weighting them with the Born Rule. If 
you're going to have worlds generated per a MC program with weightings 
(probabilities) then why not just have world generated per the Born MC 
program.


Brent




(God plays Monte Carlo.)

@philipthrift

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google 
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send 
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com 
.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e5887b44-cfb8-b332-0f91-cfad73acb776%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 4:39:28 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and 
>>> Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
>> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
>> clear and meaningful.
>>
>>
>> But does it have a clear answer?  
>>
>> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
>> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
>> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
>> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
>> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, 
>> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
>> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
>> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
>> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
>> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
>> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.
>
>
>
> http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/
>
>
> "The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum 
> state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do 
> multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually 
> come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without 
> any additional assumptions."
>
>
> But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
> probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
> branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And 
> what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in Schroedinger's 
> cat box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding to the different 
> times the decay might occur?
>
> Brent
>


Tegmark could be on the mark by taking the position that infinities of all 
types should be removed from physics.

So there would be no "continuum of worlds".  The way I think about it 
(without getting into the formality of computable analysis) is to just 
think of the worlds being generated as in a quantum Monte Carlo program: 
There will be lots of worlds randomly made, but not an actual infinity of 
them.


(God plays Monte Carlo.)

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7277434f-bdf0-4423-807a-d46b9b46c1e8%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 7/21/2019 12:30 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees Moscow
and Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person /plural/.

Brent


Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you
accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also
for MWI, it's clear and meaningful.


But does it have a clear answer?

The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's
straightforward if there are just two possibility and so the world
splits into two (and we implicitly assume they are
equi-probable).  But what if there are two possibilities and one
is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world split into three,
two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, can they
really be two.  Aren't they just one? And what if there are two
possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say
one-in-a-thousand chance.  Does the world then split into 1001
worlds?  And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so
then we need infinitely many worlds. But if there are infinitely
many worlds then every event happens infinitely many times and
there is no natural measure of probability.

Brent




Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.


http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/


"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum 
state, whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do 
multiple-world superpositions of the form written [above] ever 
actually come into being? And the answer again is: *yes, 
automatically*, without any additional assumptions."


But then the question is how many worlds (the 1/pi problem) and how does 
probability come into it?  Do we have to just assign probabilities to 
branches (using the Born rule as an axiom instead of deriving it)?  And 
what about continuous processes like detecting the decay in 
Schroedinger's cat box?  Is a continuum of worlds produced corresponding 
to the different times the decay might occur?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/a56ffaa7-793c-2e05-3198-34a95bcb9e3a%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 20:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.
>> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept
> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's
> clear and meaningful.
>
>
> But does it have a clear answer?
>
> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if
> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we
> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two
> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world
> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same,
> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two
> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand
> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the
> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.
> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely
> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>
> Brent
>


Well there is always an infinity of worlds at each split but the density of
every possible results should conform to the partition.

Either probabilities have no meaning in the mwi and duplication experiment
or they do, but you can't says as JC holds that they're meaningful in the
MWI case and not in the duplication experiment because you could meet your
doppelganger... That makes no sense.

Quentin

> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3574adc1-ee06-84a1-e29d-f8cc73c48be5%40verizon.net
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kApmZ4wDCc_J5i6gAFOetPs9mUK6Jg_Jpz6PiTzsyTBxOw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, July 21, 2019 at 1:18:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.  
>> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept 
> frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's 
> clear and meaningful.
>
>
> But does it have a clear answer?  
>
> The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
> there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
> implicitly assume they are equi-probable).  But what if there are two 
> possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
> split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the same, 
> can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there are two 
> possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say one-in-a-thousand 
> chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  And what if the 
> probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need infinitely many worlds.  
> But if there are infinitely many worlds then every event happens infinitely 
> many times and there is no natural measure of probability.
>
> Brent
>



Sean Carroll is the multiple-worlds dude. He would have an answer.


http://www.preposterousuniverse.com/blog/2014/06/30/why-the-many-worlds-formulation-of-quantum-mechanics-is-probably-correct/


"The potential for *multiple worlds* is always there in the quantum state, 
whether you like it or not. The next question would be, do multiple-world 
superpositions of the form written [above] ever actually come into being? 
And the answer again is: *yes, automatically*, without any additional 
assumptions."


@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/46929bcc-7706-460d-b0d3-43d58b868865%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 7/21/2019 1:09 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees Moscow and
Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person /plural/.

Brent


Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you 
accept frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for 
MWI, it's clear and meaningful.


But does it have a clear answer?

The MWI has it's own problems with probability.  It's straightforward if 
there are just two possibility and so the world splits into two (and we 
implicitly assume they are equi-probable). But what if there are two 
possibilities and one is twice as likely as the other?  Does the world 
split into three, two of which are the same?  If two worlds are the 
same, can they really be two.  Aren't they just one?  And what if there 
are two possibilities, but one of them is very unlikely, say 
one-in-a-thousand chance.  Does the world then split into 1001 worlds?  
And what if the probability of one event is 1/pi...so then we need 
infinitely many worlds.  But if there are infinitely many worlds then 
every event happens infinitely many times and there is no natural 
measure of probability.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3574adc1-ee06-84a1-e29d-f8cc73c48be5%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-21 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 11:16 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>>


 On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
 > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
 > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it
 is
 > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
 > experience.
 >
 > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
 factual.

 But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second
 person
 plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
 the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
 they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
 duplication thought experiments.


>>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
>>> subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>>
>>
>> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
>> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
>> duplicated bodies.
>>
>>
>> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>>
>
> No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees
> Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
>
>
> I didn't say there was.  I said *youse-self* sees Moscow and Washington.
> "Youse-self" is second person *plural*.
>
> Brent
>

Ok but no need of youse, the question is clear without it, if you accept
frequency interpretation of probability as you should also for MWI, it's
clear and meaningful.

Quentin

> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/019eacfa-a751-3809-46e8-cbc029cc54af%40verizon.net
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kAqN5KHA1v2kdo%3DujMcDk0JiPo6fJZ%3DuhjTyGTyO97iMVQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 7/20/2019 11:16 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> a écrit :

On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> a écrit :

On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> a écrit :

On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism,
so you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you
cannot survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two
cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to
be after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything
is simply factual.

But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based
on second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in
English. In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural,
and in New York
they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used
in discussing
duplication thought experiments.

Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in
both subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need
of youse...

Quentin

Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find
youse-self is "Washington and Moscow."

It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not
on the duplicated bodies.

The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.

No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees 
Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.

I didn't say there was.  I said */youse-self/* sees Moscow and 
Washington.  "Youse-self" is second person /plural/.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/019eacfa-a751-3809-46e8-cbc029cc54af%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:16, Quentin Anciaux  a
écrit :

>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>>


 On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
 > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
 > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it
 is
 > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
 > experience.
 >
 > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
 factual.

 But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second
 person
 plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
 the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
 they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
 duplication thought experiments.


>>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
>>> subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>>
>>> Quentin
>>>
>>>
>>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>>
>>
>> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
>> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
>> duplicated bodies.
>>
>>
>> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>>
>
> No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees
> Washington, none that sees Washington and Moscow.
>
If you say that after pushing the button your pov will be Washington and
Moscow, it's false, as your POV will be only Moscow or only Washington,
there are no next POV of yourself who sees both in the same POV.

>
>> Brent
>>
>> --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To view this discussion on the web visit
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7baa8c1a-4dcf-3ac9-4427-edd6fc14ecde%40verizon.net
>> 
>> .
>>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kAqJPzC1-a8WsVdN_knGPePzDVV8gkZj9YP%3Dm%2BE4UX%2B52w%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 08:12, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
>>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>>> > experience.
>>> >
>>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>>> factual.
>>>
>>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
>>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>>> duplication thought experiments.
>>>
>>>
>> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
>> and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self
>> is "Washington and Moscow."
>>
>
> It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
> Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
> duplicated bodies.
>
>
> The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.
>

No there is two unique pov, one that sees Moscow, one that sees Washington,
none that sees Washington and Moscow.

>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7baa8c1a-4dcf-3ac9-4427-edd6fc14ecde%40verizon.net
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kAoju5dQ8y%2BQQd_DMobET0b_QaZS7%3DzuvynbUpXWFVecyA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 7/20/2019 10:59 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> a écrit :

On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> a écrit :

On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so
you know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot
survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two
cities, so it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be
after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is
simply factual.

But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on
second person
plural and second person singular being the same word in
English.  In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in
New York
they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in
discussing
duplication thought experiments.

Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both
subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...

Quentin

Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find
youse-self is "Washington and Moscow."

It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in 
Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the 
duplicated bodies.

The pov gets duplicated with the bodies.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7baa8c1a-4dcf-3ac9-4427-edd6fc14ecde%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread Dan Sonik



On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 5:16:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:17:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi Dan,
>>
>> It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
>>
>
> Thank you.
>
>  
>
>> But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s 
>> posts. At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there 
>> is a mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
>>
>
> On the contrary, I just think the criticism has fallen on deaf ears -- 
> reading some of these threads puts me in mind of those unfortunate 
> individuals who are struck with agnosia. No matter how blatant and 
> paramount the input for people with this condition, they simply pass it 
> over, unaware of what is right under their noses. 
>
>>
>> So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of 
>> the Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If 
>> you want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no 
>> problem with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
>> 
>>
>> Sure, I'll take a crack. Referring to your paper... 
>
> "Computationalism", or "comp" for short-- the idea that 1) our brains are 
> made of some digitally fungible units
>
>
>
> That is already a bit implicitly physicalist. Once, I suggested to abandon 
> the expression “made of” because it is misleading. But OK, I will not cut 
> the air. Computationalism is just the digital version of Descartes 
> mechanism. Once (informal and colloquial) version is that there is no magic 
> nor use of any actual infinities in the brain (that will entail later that 
> there are some infinities at play for the mind, soul or consciousness).
>
>
>
> (at a level of description which is unknowable) 
>
>
> Yes, although that is proved later.
>
>
> such that if some or all of it were replaced it would make no difference 
> to that individual 2) computers themselves are equivalent at some level of 
> description (Church Turing hypothesis) 3) arithmetical realism -- true 
> statements about numbers are true absent any observers. Step 1: 
> Computationalism implies the possibility of teleportation "in principle" -- 
> that, according to you, is sufficient to prove your conclusion. 
>
>
> I prove only at step 1 that computationalism entails the possibility of 
> (classical) teleportation. (I am unsure which conclusion is alluded here).
>
 
I don't know that it does -- I think there would have to be a contribution 
from quantum mechanics in order to derive that entailment. The three 
premises alone are not strong enough to do the work you want them to, from 
what I can see.  Teleportation is not just a theoretical problem, it's also 
an engineering problem -- this distinction is something I see you elide 
quite frequently, eg. in your hand waving responses to JKC. And I'm not 
sure what "classical teleportation" could mean -- quantum physics might 
allow some form of teleportation, but classical physics would almost 
certainly forbid it, no? Wouldn't you have to manage the conservation of 
matter/energy law that is the cornerstone of classical physics? 

 

> To be clear, I never try to prove computationalism to be true. It is my 
> working hypothesis. I study the consequences, and show them testable and 
> well tested by QM (which proves nothing of course).
>
>
> Step 2: Consider the difference between the first and third person 
> perspectives, where the third person perspective is ascertained from a 
> record contained in a personal diary. 
>
>
> By an observer which does not enter the cut-and-copy bow. 
>

Sorry, what is a "cut-and-copy bow"? 
 

> The important point here is the definition of the first person view, which 
> is the content of the diary that the candidate take with him in the 
> teleportation box. That plays an important role in the sequel.
> The first person is also the content of a diary. 
>
 
No, it's not. I can read diaries I wrote from years ago, and I would hardly 
say that they are equivalent to my "first person view." Not in any sense of 
the term equivalent that I can think of, anyway. 

 

> It is 3P operational approximation of the first person experience: the 
> personal diary content. Everett use something equivalent.
> In step two: a delay is intrigued in the reconstitution, 
>

Can't scan "a delay is intrigued in the reconstitution..."  Do you mean 
introduced? 

 

> and the point is that the delay is measurable in the 3p view, but is 
> able,nt from the 1p diary: the first person is not aware of the delay. That 
> is used again in step 4. You seem to have pass this.
>
>
> To return to the p

Re: subjective experience

Le dim. 21 juil. 2019 à 02:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>
>
>
> Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :
>
>>
>>
>> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
>> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
>> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
>> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
>> > experience.
>> >
>> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
>> factual.
>>
>> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
>> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
>> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
>> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
>> duplication thought experiments.
>>
>>
> Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
> and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...
>
> Quentin
>
>
> Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self is
> "Washington and Moscow."
>

It can't be because the 1 pov is unique in each subject and is in
Washington or Moscow, not in both. The question is on that, not on the
duplicated bodies.

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8f9e6750-7105-95a3-07f0-0ae8f9776a68%40verizon.net
> 
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kApSEQNfW4bzN%2BZS2dU897O8miJSx-UNoifx-DAssojZNA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 7/20/2019 1:32 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> a écrit :

On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you
know you
> will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
> being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so
it is
> quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
> experience.
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply
factual.

But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second
person
plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
duplication thought experiments.

Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both 
subject, and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...

Quentin

Seems to me the answer to the question where will youse find youse-self 
is "Washington and Moscow."

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8f9e6750-7105-95a3-07f0-0ae8f9776a68%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread Philip Thrift



On Saturday, July 20, 2019 at 5:16:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
>
>
>
Thinking of counterfactuals: In the Sorkin/Dowker quantum physics as a 
*stochastic 
calculus of histories*, histories are the counterfactuals.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8e1973b5-7970-491a-a478-6812e647c081%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

Le sam. 20 juil. 2019 à 22:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> a écrit :

>
>
> On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you
> > will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive
> > being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is
> > quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the
> > experience.
> >
> > There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.
>
> But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person
> plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In
> the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York
> they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing
> duplication thought experiments.
>
>
Even if there is a duplication, the 1pov is still unique in both subject,
and the question bears on this 1 pov. No need of youse...

Quentin

>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97119976-636e-0aa8-ad49-6ce07669a108%40verizon.net
> .
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kAr-EtLd-No2O_hQAgonYpagJ6OMERbKLsGFs7YHDF6%3DKQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 7/20/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
"I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple 
different kinds of things; *there is only the wave function of the 
universe*. As an emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize 
the wave function as describing /multiple worlds/."


So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.
At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).


"Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as 
"stuff".  The contentious question seems to be where conscious 
thoughts fall in the ontology.  Are they processes realized by stuff 
(Vic), or do they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno),


Elementary arithmetic is that realm, and I ask you: how it could be 
separated, and mostly:  from what?


From others metaphysical ontologies: materialism, idealism, theism,...


From your irreducible material universe in which you seem to believe?


Where did I say "irreducible"?  I'm not in the belief business.  I'm in 
the finding out business.




Why invoke such a thing.


I didn't invoke anything.  I just attempted to clarify the different 
theories at play.


It is not used in physics. It is used in physicalism, which until now 
just put the mind-body problem under the rug. With mechanism, we have 
a “simple” explanation of consciousness, and a “simple” explanation of 
where the observable comes from, and we can test it.


Your use of metaphysics is like the pseudo-religious one. You claim 
that your god (Matter) is enough to not do the experimental testing.


And you sound like a theist seeking out heretics.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0b2a40aa-dbb8-3fad-6108-79fb17aed475%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 7/20/2019 3:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you 
will not die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive 
being in two cities and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is 
quite natural to ask yourself where you could feel to be after the 
experience.


There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.


But as JKC endlessly points out, this a confusing based on second person 
plural and second person singular being the same word in English.  In 
the south, they say "ya'll" for second person plural, and in New York 
they say "youse".  I suggest that one of these be used in discussing 
duplication thought experiments.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97119976-636e-0aa8-ad49-6ce07669a108%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 3:48:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> "I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple different 
> kinds of things; *there is only the wave function of the universe*. As an 
> emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize the wave function as 
> describing *multiple worlds*."
>
> So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.
> At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).
>
>
> "Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as 
> "stuff".  The contentious question seems to be where conscious thoughts 
> fall in the ontology.  Are they processes realized by stuff (Vic), or do 
> they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno), do they constitute a 
> separate realm(pt), do they constitute everything(Cosmin)?
>
> Brent
>



Actually I was unfair to Sean. The "stuff" of Sean is not the wave function 
(a mathematical fiction), but *multiple worlds*, which it "approximates".

He sometimes talks about (incorrectly) the wave function as being real 
(which it isn't). It's the *multiple worlds* that are the real stuff in 
Sean's World.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/de005f84-bbcd-4406-9aa4-0c09fc130955%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> "I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple different 
>> kinds of things; there is only the wave function of the universe. As an 
>> emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize the wave function as 
>> describing multiple worlds."
>> 
>> So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.
>> At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).
> 
> "Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as 
> "stuff".  The contentious question seems to be where conscious thoughts fall 
> in the ontology.  Are they processes realized by stuff (Vic), or do they 
> exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno),

Elementary arithmetic is that realm, and I ask you: how it could be separated, 
and mostly:  from what? 
>From your irreducible material universe in which you seem to believe?

Why invoke such a thing. It is not used in physics. It is used in physicalism, 
which until now just put the mind-body problem under the rug. With mechanism, 
we have a “simple” explanation of consciousness, and a “simple” explanation of 
where the observable comes from, and we can test it.

Your use of metaphysics is like the pseudo-religious one. You claim that your 
god (Matter) is enough to not do the experimental testing.

Bruno




> do they constitute a separate realm(pt), do they constitute 
> everything(Cosmin)?
> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e34f9de3-ad3c-e238-69ad-c5d18685e49a%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FBFF642E-4678-4992-AD67-65256984C175%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Jul 2019, at 22:47, Dan Sonik  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:17:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Dan,
> 
> It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
> 
> Thank you.
> 
>  
> But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s posts. 
> At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there is a 
> mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
> 
> On the contrary, I just think the criticism has fallen on deaf ears -- 
> reading some of these threads puts me in mind of those unfortunate 
> individuals who are struck with agnosia. No matter how blatant and paramount 
> the input for people with this condition, they simply pass it over, unaware 
> of what is right under their noses. 
> 
> So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of the 
> Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If you 
> want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no problem 
> with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
> 
> 
> Sure, I'll take a crack. Referring to your paper... 
> 
> "Computationalism", or "comp" for short-- the idea that 1) our brains are 
> made of some digitally fungible units

That is already a bit implicitly physicalist. Once, I suggested to abandon the 
expression “made of” because it is misleading. But OK, I will not cut the air. 
Computationalism is just the digital version of Descartes mechanism. Once 
(informal and colloquial) version is that there is no magic nor use of any 
actual infinities in the brain (that will entail later that there are some 
infinities at play for the mind, soul or consciousness).

> (at a level of description which is unknowable)

Yes, although that is proved later.

> such that if some or all of it were replaced it would make no difference to 
> that individual 2) computers themselves are equivalent at some level of 
> description (Church Turing hypothesis) 3) arithmetical realism -- true 
> statements about numbers are true absent any observers. Step 1: 
> Computationalism implies the possibility of teleportation "in principle" -- 
> that, according to you, is sufficient to prove your conclusion.

I prove only at step 1 that computationalism entails the possibility of 
(classical) teleportation. (I am unsure which conclusion is alluded here).
To be clear, I never try to prove computationalism to be true. It is my working 
hypothesis. I study the consequences, and show them testable and well tested by 
QM (which proves nothing of course).

> Step 2: Consider the difference between the first and third person 
> perspectives, where the third person perspective is ascertained from a record 
> contained in a personal diary.

By an observer which does not enter the cut-and-copy bow. The important point 
here is the definition of the first person view, which is the content of the 
diary that the candidate take with him in the teleportation box. That plays an 
important role in the sequel.
The first person is also the content of a diary. It is 3P operational 
approximation of the first person experience: the personal diary content. 
Everett use something equivalent.
In step two: a delay is intrigued in the reconstitution, and the point is that 
the delay is measurable in the 3p view, but is able,nt from the 1p diary: the 
first person is not aware of the delay. That is used again in step 4. You seem 
to have pass this.

> Step 3: Assume you are a person being teleported -- you are told beforehand 
> you will be teleported to either Washington or Moscow, with a 50 50 chance. 
> The question is then put to the person about to be teleported -- where will 
> YOU end up... 

“You” in the indexical first person sense, which means here, what will be 
written in the personal diaries.

> 
> As far as I can tell there have been two main criticisms of this thought 
> experiment up to this point. 
> 
> First, the question "where will YOU end up" is poorly formed in a 
> counterfactual world of duplicating machines.

Why? You will push on a button. You assume mechanism, so you know you will not 
die, and you know that with mechanism, you cannot survive being in two cities 
and seeing simultaneously the two cities, so it is quite natural to ask 
yourself where you could feel to be after the experience.

There are no relevant counterfactuals here. Everything is simply factual.

> There is no more YOU if YOU can be copied. There has to be a You-1 and a 
> You-2, and the use of basic pronouns (that have evolved in a world absent of 
> perfect duplicating machines) elides this distinction. 

But we agree, in the 3p description,  that you-1 is still you, and you-2 is 
still you

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 7/19/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 3:48:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:



On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

"I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple
different kinds of things; *there is only the wave function of
the universe*. As an emergent approximation it’s useful to
characterize the wave function as describing /multiple worlds/."

So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave
function.
At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).


"Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify
as "stuff".  The contentious question seems to be where conscious
thoughts fall in the ontology.  Are they processes realized by
stuff (Vic), or do they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno),
do they constitute a separate realm(pt), do they constitute
everything(Cosmin)?

Brent





If Sean said 'everything is waves', that could be materialist.

But if by 'wave function' he means a mathematical entity (How is a 
'function' not a mathematical entity?), he is purely a Platonist.


I don't think it is necessarily Platonic.  Plato believed there were 
perfect forms and the world we perceive consists of imperfect 
instantiations of those forms.  There is no reason to say the wave 
function of the universe is more perfect than what we can see and 
measure.  Presumably it is just as "perfect" or "imperfect" as what we 
see and measure and so may just be "the stuff" the world is made of.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2f42f92d-88e8-84e7-25d6-61fd031058ed%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-19 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 3:48:16 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> "I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple different 
> kinds of things; *there is only the wave function of the universe*. As an 
> emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize the wave function as 
> describing *multiple worlds*."
>
> So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.
> At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).
>
>
> "Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as 
> "stuff".  The contentious question seems to be where conscious thoughts 
> fall in the ontology.  Are they processes realized by stuff (Vic), or do 
> they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno), do they constitute a 
> separate realm(pt), do they constitute everything(Cosmin)?
>
> Brent
>




If Sean said 'everything is waves', that could be materialist.

But if by 'wave function' he means a mathematical entity (How is a 
'function' not a mathematical entity?), he is purely a Platonist.


@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/883a226a-c1cd-48b5-9cea-b37eb0ddfb5a%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 7/19/2019 12:33 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
"I’m happy to be described as a monist. There aren’t multiple 
different kinds of things; *there is only the wave function of the 
universe*. As an emergent approximation it’s useful to characterize 
the wave function as describing /multiple worlds/."


So for Sean Carroll, reality is a mathematical entity: a wave function.
At least Thales believed in stuff (matter).


"Stuff" is sufficiently vague that the wave-function could qualify as 
"stuff".  The contentious question seems to be where conscious thoughts 
fall in the ontology.  Are they processes realized by stuff (Vic), or do 
they exist in a separate Platonic real(Bruno), do they constitute a 
separate realm(pt), do they constitute everything(Cosmin)?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e34f9de3-ad3c-e238-69ad-c5d18685e49a%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-19 Thread Dan Sonik

On Friday, July 19, 2019 at 6:17:56 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Hi Dan,
>
> It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this.
>

Thank you.

> But you are a bit short of argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s 
> posts. At least John Clark told us where in the reasoning he thinks there 
> is a mistake, but has not yet been able to explain it, or convince anybody.
>

On the contrary, I just think the criticism has fallen on deaf ears -- 
reading some of these threads puts me in mind of those unfortunate 
individuals who are struck with agnosia. No matter how blatant and 
paramount the input for people with this condition, they simply pass it 
over, unaware of what is right under their noses. 

>
> So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of 
> the Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If 
> you want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no 
> problem with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
> 
>
> Sure, I'll take a crack. Referring to your paper... 

"Computationalism", or "comp" for short-- the idea that 1) our brains are 
made of some digitally fungible units (at a level of description which is 
unknowable) such that if some or all of it were replaced it would make no 
difference to that individual 2) computers themselves are equivalent at 
some level of description (Church Turing hypothesis) 3) arithmetical 
realism -- true statements about numbers are true absent any observers. 
Step 1: Computationalism implies the possibility of teleportation "in 
principle" -- that, according to you, is sufficient to prove your 
conclusion. Step 2: Consider the difference between the first and third 
person perspectives, where the third person perspective is ascertained from 
a record contained in a personal diary. Step 3: Assume you are a person 
being teleported -- you are told beforehand you will be teleported to 
either Washington or Moscow, with a 50 50 chance. The question is then put 
to the person about to be teleported -- where will YOU end up... 

As far as I can tell there have been two main criticisms of this thought 
experiment up to this point. 

First, the question "where will YOU end up" is poorly formed in a 
counterfactual world of duplicating machines. There is no more YOU if YOU 
can be copied. There has to be a You-1 and a You-2, and the use of basic 
pronouns (that have evolved in a world absent of perfect duplicating 
machines) elides this distinction. 

The second problem seems to be that computations absent any form of 
instantiation don't "DO" anything -- in order for a computation to be 
performed, it must be instantiated in some hardware, and therefore the 
domain of physics is larger than the domain of mathematics, because the 
details of implementing a Turing machine in the real world are just as if 
not more important than the kinds of computations you will end up feeding 
it.

Over and above these criticisms, however, is the recurrently identified 
insistence on using words with completely arbitrary definitions that do not 
map to how most of the rest of the English speaking community use them -- 
God, theology, machine, materialism/primary matter as examples -- and it 
seems that this move signals a bit of bad faith on your part, or at least a 
willingness to obfuscate in order to avoid inconvenient (and yet quite 
legitimate) counterpoints many have raised over the years. Again, I am 
reminded of agnosia sufferers. 

> About Aristotle primary substance, I am not sure I understand your remark. 
> I discuss this on many groups on antic philosophy, and, you are the first 
> to make this very astonishing remark. You might need to revise Aristotle's 
> “Metaphysics” which is all about this  (beware the different translations 
> though).
>

I'm not sure what is so "astonishing" about the remark. Seeing a flying 
saucer land and 5 little grey beings come out? That would be astonishing to 
me. A world where we could be teleported from Helsinki to Moscow? 
Astonishing. Making a possibly incorrect claim about Aristotelian 
hermeneutics... eh, not that astonishing. And I think you might have meant 
to say "review" rather than "revise," -- to revise is to edit something 
with the goal of making it clearer or better. I wouldn't want to take on 
the job of editing Aristotle (although, God knows, he did need an editor). 
If I recall correctly, Aristotle thought the world was made of 5 elements, 
each telelogically drawn to their own place in the natural order of things. 
So that's 5 substances, not one -- it's not a monism, and therefore to 
conflate it with materialism and continually refer to it as Aristotelian 
belief in primary substance seems a

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Dan,

It is OK to be critical. I always welcome this. But you are a bit short of 
argument. You seem convince by John Clark’s posts. At least John Clark told us 
where in the reasoning he thinks there is a mistake, but has not yet been able 
to explain it, or convince anybody.

So, if you understand his critics of the step 3 in the 8-steps version of the 
Universal Dovetailer argument, you are welcome to explain it to us. If you 
want, I re-explain the argument, but most people in this list have no problem 
with it, so you might insist, or just read it here:
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

About Aristotle primary substance, I am not sure I understand your remark. I 
discuss this on many groups on antic philosophy, and, you are the first to make 
this very astonishing remark. You might need to revise Aristotle's 
“Metaphysics” which is all about this  (beware the different translations 
though).

Concerning Craig Weinberg, we have agreed on everything. He just choose the 
option “weak-materialism” instead of mechanism, but seem to understand there 
incompatibility. Most of its philosophy is very close to what I extract from 
the theaetetus’ definition of knowledge, when applied to Gödel’s provability 
predicate (which I motivate either through thought experiments or by referring 
to Plato). We opus quasi everyday since the dialog on Facebook, as Craig seems 
to prefer.

Please, explain John Clark’s argument, if you understand it. Brent has 
acknowledge having no problem up to step 6, and is unclear (or undecided 
perhaps) on step 7.

You might ignored like many that all computations occurs in already a tiny 
segment of the arithmetical reality: the truth of the sigma_1 sentences (which 
is indeed equivalent to a universal dovetailing). That is required for step 
seven. This is well known by logicians since almost Gödel’s 1931 paper. That 
makes the believer in “Matter"forced to explain how their “Matter” can 
influence or interfere with the statistics on computations which are run in 
arithmetic (where “run” is taken in the sense of Church, Kleene, Turing, etc.

Bruno

> On 19 Jul 2019, at 05:18, Dan Sonik  wrote:
> 
> Bravo PGC. Very Well Said. 
> 
> Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never 
> amount to a "theory of everything..." 
> 
> Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically committed 
> idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' commitment 
> that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a metaphysical 
> absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with it... well, 
> that's a Turing TarPit right there. 
> 
> And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian 
> assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, please? 
> From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even once 
> remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" sense 
> of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that distinction in his 
> lexicon!!! In his metaphysics, he talks of "particulars," not "matter" per 
> se, unless you think this is based on his idea of one of the four forms of 
> causation. And he argued that all four need to be present before a thing 
> comes to be (efficient, formal, teleological, final). Nowhere does he mention 
> the very modern (i.e. post-Descartes) idea of "matter" in this metaphysic. 
> 
> Please defend your claims philologically, and not by way of obscure 
> mathematical formula supposedly designed to lead us to some sort of ultimate 
> Platonic conclusion. And also not by way of convenient redefinitions of 
> common words (God, matter, machine) that leave most people in a dust of 
> confusion. (but maybe that's your intent?)
> 
> I can already feel you writing... "but the hypothesis of mechanism dictates 
> that ... x must be y " ... "numbers must have dreams, and they must be 
> us... " the hypostases of the ultimate one talked about by plotinus (which 
> numbered 8) must be the only way if we assume mechanism... " 
> 
> ENOUGH! 
> 
> Your rhetoric and constant pompous references to your previous posts have 
> chased many great minds away from this list. (Craig Weinberg comes to mind.) 
> And I mostly come here to see John Clark constantly body slam you with 
> respect to the question of hardware implementation of computations... which 
> you never answer... like a true cultist... "Go back to step 3" -- fuck step 
> three. There are no matter duplicating machines. There is no "absolute first 
> person perspective"... referred to by a pronoun "I". And even if there were a 
> matter duplicating machine, it would have to be made of "matter" (pace John 
> Clark) and so couldn't simply just happen by virtue of the mathematical 
> formalism. (Remember Pythagoras? See where he ended up? Not because what he 
> said was true... because it was ANNOYINGLY FALSE) Therefo

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-19 Thread Philip Thrift




>
> On Thursday, July 18, 2019 at 10:18:38 PM UTC-5, Dan Sonik wrote:
>>
>> Bravo PGC. Very Well Said. 
>>
>> Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never 
>> amount to a "theory of everything..." 
>>
>> Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically 
>> committed idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' 
>> commitment that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a 
>> metaphysical absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with 
>> it... well, that's a Turing TarPit right there. 
>>
>> And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian 
>> assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, 
>> please? From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even 
>> once remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" 
>> sense of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that 
>> distinction in his lexicon!!! In his metaphysics, he talks of 
>> "particulars," not "matter" per se, unless you think this is based on his 
>> idea of one of the four forms of causation. And he argued that all four 
>> need to be present before a thing comes to be (efficient, formal, 
>> teleological, final). Nowhere does he mention the very modern (i.e. 
>> post-Descartes) idea of "matter" in this metaphysic. 
>>
>> Please defend your claims philologically, and not by way of obscure 
>> mathematical formula supposedly designed to lead us to some sort of 
>> ultimate Platonic conclusion. And also not by way of convenient 
>> redefinitions of common words (God, matter, machine) that leave most people 
>> in a dust of confusion. (but maybe that's your intent?)
>>
>> I can already feel you writing... "but the hypothesis of mechanism 
>> dictates that ... x must be y " ... "numbers must have dreams, and they 
>> must be us... " the hypostases of the ultimate one talked about by plotinus 
>> (which numbered 8) must be the only way if we assume mechanism... " 
>>
>> ENOUGH! 
>>
>> Your rhetoric and constant pompous references to your previous posts have 
>> chased many great minds away from this list. (Craig Weinberg comes to 
>> mind.) And I mostly come here to see John Clark constantly body slam you 
>> with respect to the question of hardware implementation of computations... 
>> which you never answer... like a true cultist... "Go back to step 3" -- 
>> fuck step three. There are no matter duplicating machines. There is no 
>> "absolute first person perspective"... referred to by a pronoun "I". And 
>> even if there were a matter duplicating machine, it would have to be made 
>> of "matter" (pace John Clark) and so couldn't simply just happen by virtue 
>> of the mathematical formalism. (Remember Pythagoras? See where he ended up? 
>> Not because what he said was true... because it was ANNOYINGLY FALSE) 
>> Therefore, your mind experiment is done as far as practical consequences. 
>> So what? Who cares? What are we even doing here?
>>
>> God bless John Clark for fighting this nonsense. 
>>
>> Remember what this list was meant to do -- CULTIVATE THEORIES OF 
>> EVERYTHING... NOT "Cultivate what conforms to Bruno's idea of a Theory of 
>> Everything Is." 
>>
>> And, please, no disrepect to any of the other participants on this 
>> thread. I have followed you all for so long (10+) years that you are all 
>> family (including Bruno, you silly bastard)
>>
>> I love the salutary conclusions that seem to emerge from your 
>> speculations, Bruno, I really do... but so much effort has been dedicated 
>> to trying to make you see that you have blindspots (Brent Meeker, John 
>> Clark, Craig Weinberg) and you never modify your theory to cover them, you 
>> only insist that they don't understand your genius plan. 
>>
>> Let me ask you: if you are the only car traveling in a certain direction 
>> (let's call it North) and you encounter multiple cars traveling at other 
>> directions (namely, South), are the other guys driving in the wrong 
>> direction? Or are you? 
>>
>> And before anyone charges me of just dropping in uninvited, my claimed 
>> 10+ years experience a lie, I have posted here before, in different guises. 
>> I'll leave it up to the readers (if they're interested) in figuring out who 
>> I am.
>>
>> Doesn't matter now, though, my anonymity is blown. 
>>
>> Please be kind (or not, this is the internet, after all...) 
>>
>> Anyway, I found it irresistible to drop in and let you all know I love 
>> you all and this forum, and Bruno too for being so god damned STUBBORN!! 
>> But it's looking like you might need to re evaluate some stuff? 
>>
>> Go ahead, cut me up in the comments...
>>
>>
>>
>

[corrected]

To defend Thales, he was one of the ancient materialists, like the atomist 
materialists Democritus and Epicurus who defined matter differently. 
(Thales was a wave theorist vs. a particle theorist. :)) He may have been 
wrong about water:

https://w

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-19 Thread Philip Thrift



On Thursday, July 18, 2019 at 10:18:38 PM UTC-5, Dan Sonik wrote:
>
> Bravo PGC. Very Well Said. 
>
> Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never 
> amount to a "theory of everything..." 
>
> Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically 
> committed idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' 
> commitment that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a 
> metaphysical absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with 
> it... well, that's a Turing TarPit right there. 
>
> And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian 
> assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, 
> please? From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even 
> once remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" 
> sense of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that 
> distinction in his lexicon!!! In his metaphysics, he talks of 
> "particulars," not "matter" per se, unless you think this is based on his 
> idea of one of the four forms of causation. And he argued that all four 
> need to be present before a thing comes to be (efficient, formal, 
> teleological, final). Nowhere does he mention the very modern (i.e. 
> post-Descartes) idea of "matter" in this metaphysic. 
>
> Please defend your claims philologically, and not by way of obscure 
> mathematical formula supposedly designed to lead us to some sort of 
> ultimate Platonic conclusion. And also not by way of convenient 
> redefinitions of common words (God, matter, machine) that leave most people 
> in a dust of confusion. (but maybe that's your intent?)
>
> I can already feel you writing... "but the hypothesis of mechanism 
> dictates that ... x must be y " ... "numbers must have dreams, and they 
> must be us... " the hypostases of the ultimate one talked about by plotinus 
> (which numbered 8) must be the only way if we assume mechanism... " 
>
> ENOUGH! 
>
> Your rhetoric and constant pompous references to your previous posts have 
> chased many great minds away from this list. (Craig Weinberg comes to 
> mind.) And I mostly come here to see John Clark constantly body slam you 
> with respect to the question of hardware implementation of computations... 
> which you never answer... like a true cultist... "Go back to step 3" -- 
> fuck step three. There are no matter duplicating machines. There is no 
> "absolute first person perspective"... referred to by a pronoun "I". And 
> even if there were a matter duplicating machine, it would have to be made 
> of "matter" (pace John Clark) and so couldn't simply just happen by virtue 
> of the mathematical formalism. (Remember Pythagoras? See where he ended up? 
> Not because what he said was true... because it was ANNOYINGLY FALSE) 
> Therefore, your mind experiment is done as far as practical consequences. 
> So what? Who cares? What are we even doing here?
>
> God bless John Clark for fighting this nonsense. 
>
> Remember what this list was meant to do -- CULTIVATE THEORIES OF 
> EVERYTHING... NOT "Cultivate what conforms to Bruno's idea of a Theory of 
> Everything Is." 
>
> And, please, no disrepect to any of the other participants on this thread. 
> I have followed you all for so long (10+) years that you are all family 
> (including Bruno, you silly bastard)
>
> I love the salutary conclusions that seem to emerge from your 
> speculations, Bruno, I really do... but so much effort has been dedicated 
> to trying to make you see that you have blindspots (Brent Meeker, John 
> Clark, Craig Weinberg) and you never modify your theory to cover them, you 
> only insist that they don't understand your genius plan. 
>
> Let me ask you: if you are the only car traveling in a certain direction 
> (let's call it North) and you encounter multiple cars traveling at other 
> directions (namely, South), are the other guys driving in the wrong 
> direction? Or are you? 
>
> And before anyone charges me of just dropping in uninvited, my claimed 10+ 
> years experience a lie, I have posted here before, in different guises. 
> I'll leave it up to the readers (if they're interested) in figuring out who 
> I am.
>
> Doesn't matter now, though, my anonymity is blown. 
>
> Please be kind (or not, this is the internet, after all...) 
>
> Anyway, I found it irresistible to drop in and let you all know I love you 
> all and this forum, and Bruno too for being so god damned STUBBORN!! But 
> it's looking like you might need to re evaluate some stuff? 
>
> Go ahead, cut me up in the comments...
>
>
>

o defend Thales, he was one of the ancient materialists, like the atomist 
materialists Democritus and Epicurus who defined matter differently. 
(Thales was a wave theorist vs. a particle theorist. :)) He may have been 
wrong about water:

https://www.iep.utm.edu/thales/

*The problem of the nature of matter, and its transformation into the 
myriad things o

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-18 Thread Dan Sonik

Bravo PGC. Very Well Said. 

Delusions of reality as based in a purely mathematical scheme will never 
amount to a "theory of everything..." 

Just another quaint, historically bounded, and deeply ontologically 
committed idea with absolutely no practical relevance, much like Thales' 
commitment that "all is water" or Anaximander's idea of the "apeiron" as a 
metaphysical absolute. Sounds great on paper... try to do something with 
it... well, that's a Turing TarPit right there. 

And just a further comment to Bruno's constant use of "Aristotelian 
assumption" of "primary matter." Can I have primary source citation, 
please? From what I recall of my Aristotle, a fair bit of it, I can't even 
once remember him talking about "matter" in the ordinary, "post-Cartesian" 
sense of the term. And you know why? Because he didn't have that 
distinction in his lexicon!!! In his metaphysics, he talks of 
"particulars," not "matter" per se, unless you think this is based on his 
idea of one of the four forms of causation. And he argued that all four 
need to be present before a thing comes to be (efficient, formal, 
teleological, final). Nowhere does he mention the very modern (i.e. 
post-Descartes) idea of "matter" in this metaphysic. 

Please defend your claims philologically, and not by way of obscure 
mathematical formula supposedly designed to lead us to some sort of 
ultimate Platonic conclusion. And also not by way of convenient 
redefinitions of common words (God, matter, machine) that leave most people 
in a dust of confusion. (but maybe that's your intent?)

I can already feel you writing... "but the hypothesis of mechanism dictates 
that ... x must be y " ... "numbers must have dreams, and they must be 
us... " the hypostases of the ultimate one talked about by plotinus (which 
numbered 8) must be the only way if we assume mechanism... " 

ENOUGH! 

Your rhetoric and constant pompous references to your previous posts have 
chased many great minds away from this list. (Craig Weinberg comes to 
mind.) And I mostly come here to see John Clark constantly body slam you 
with respect to the question of hardware implementation of computations... 
which you never answer... like a true cultist... "Go back to step 3" -- 
fuck step three. There are no matter duplicating machines. There is no 
"absolute first person perspective"... referred to by a pronoun "I". And 
even if there were a matter duplicating machine, it would have to be made 
of "matter" (pace John Clark) and so couldn't simply just happen by virtue 
of the mathematical formalism. (Remember Pythagoras? See where he ended up? 
Not because what he said was true... because it was ANNOYINGLY FALSE) 
Therefore, your mind experiment is done as far as practical consequences. 
So what? Who cares? What are we even doing here?

God bless John Clark for fighting this nonsense. 

Remember what this list was meant to do -- CULTIVATE THEORIES OF 
EVERYTHING... NOT "Cultivate what conforms to Bruno's idea of a Theory of 
Everything Is." 

And, please, no disrepect to any of the other participants on this thread. 
I have followed you all for so long (10+) years that you are all family 
(including Bruno, you silly bastard)

I love the salutary conclusions that seem to emerge from your speculations, 
Bruno, I really do... but so much effort has been dedicated to trying to 
make you see that you have blindspots (Brent Meeker, John Clark, Craig 
Weinberg) and you never modify your theory to cover them, you only insist 
that they don't understand your genius plan. 

Let me ask you: if you are the only car traveling in a certain direction 
(let's call it North) and you encounter multiple cars traveling at other 
directions (namely, South), are the other guys driving in the wrong 
direction? Or are you? 

And before anyone charges me of just dropping in uninvited, my claimed 10+ 
years experience a lie, I have posted here before, in different guises. 
I'll leave it up to the readers (if they're interested) in figuring out who 
I am.

Doesn't matter now, though, my anonymity is blown. 

Please be kind (or not, this is the internet, after all...) 

Anyway, I found it irresistible to drop in and let you all know I love you 
all and this forum, and Bruno too for being so god damned STUBBORN!! But 
it's looking like you might need to re evaluate some stuff? 

Go ahead, cut me up in the comments...

On Thursday, July 18, 2019 at 5:06:10 AM UTC-5, PGC wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, July 17, 2019 at 9:58:31 AM UTC+2, telmo wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> I don’t understand well what you say. 
>>
>>
>> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
>>
>>
>>
>> Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem 
>> at

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-18 Thread PGC

On Wednesday, July 17, 2019 at 9:58:31 AM UTC+2, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
>
> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> I don’t understand well what you say. 
>
>
> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
>
>
>
> Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem 
> attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.
>
>
> That is just bullying, Bruno. You accuse everyone who disagrees with you 
> of ad hominem attacks.
>
>
> That is a lie and you know it.
>

All of us can read. I saw the ad hominem remark applied to Bruce's posts by 
Bruno multiple times. Read what Bruno said: "Just tell me what you don’t 
understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem attack. It bores everybody, 
and distract from the thread." He admits to not understanding and then 
assumes authority and my consent to solicit his advice as some high priest 
of theories of everything. You approach someone like that in the real 
world, them always forcing their game on you, anybody with self-respect 
would tell him to take a hike: I don't buy high priest discourse and refuse 
to participate in folks' delusions of themselves. That's the ad hominem.

> And you should be ashamed of yourself for saying it. I challenge you to 
> find one instance on this mailing list where Bruno accused anyone of ad 
> hominem without having been directed insulted: "pee pee theories", "you 
> don't make sense", "nobody knows what you're talking about", etc etc. I 
> know you won't produce this example because it doesn't exist, and I also 
> know that you will just avoid the topic and focus on the next insult / 
> patronizing comment.
>
> Well, I have been participating in this mailing list on and off for more 
> than one decade, and more or less the only original ideas being discussed 
> here come from Bruno. I have witnessed multi-year threads discussing what 
> he is saying in great detail, so clearly some people must have some idea of 
> what he is saying.
>

Interpersonal discourse is never this simple. On an open list you guys 
whine about dissent while lamenting lack of loyalty to Bruno for having 
"more or less the only original ideas here". That insults every participant 
including those of us who've found their way here without agendas of 
grooming followers into some professorial trip of personal mysticism 
presented as truth writ large. 

As if the list existed only in virtue of Bruno's generosity towards lesser 
people. I disagree because I've seen original thought from Telmo and most 
participants, while seeing the list as a place for folks to practice and 
enjoy banter *with disagreement and dissent* on theoretical/scientific 
topics.  

What this conspiracy type arguing performs discursively: Of course, targets 
for confidence tricks and conspiratorial discourse have blind faith in 
"debate/discourse" of their guru. Targets of such discourse are always 
framed as experts on the correct side of a victimized history. That's the 
poisonous reward: compensation at some later point, which is similar to the 
afterlife promise from any exploitative discourse. Cult charlatan territory 
is what this discourse toys with. In an age of disinformation you don't 
cede to believing what you read. You criticize or leave.

No need to worry because nobody's here for your loyalty. You can keep 
sipping the kool aid of choice from the one guru of pure mathematical 
truth, originality, and perfection. Nobody will take that away from you 
because what's left to take? You've already given it all away. Including in 
recent weeks admitting to replacing notions of evidence with emotional 
appeals to the "correct, truthful attitude" along with disqualifying your 
and other members' own originality here today. Bruno's originality? I 
interpret history independently and see no evidence beyond speculative 
mathematical philosophy and a combinator result. Duplicating, machines, 
quantum logic, immortality all standard stuff with a few precisions on 
details. But original? Read more and at least try to test your own 
assertions. There's not much here and everybody here can do better.

As if Bruno's approaches were the only thing under the sun. Get out there, 
question everything, and get after things. Don't believe what you read but 
read more outside zones of comfort. Do your thing. Read other things than 
internet chat! If you want platonism as metaphysics, then go out and fight 
in your local city councils and beyond. Realize your abilities to find and 
rally more consensus for your cause, its implication to the world and other 
people; and get out there. Instead his discourse in this setting implies 
the pursuit of the right attitude by sitting on our butts, playing 
professor uninvited, reading only his posts, the whole day splitting hairs

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-17 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Wed, Jul 17, 2019, at 00:37, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
>>> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:

 I don’t understand well what you say. 
>>> 
>>> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
>> 
>> 
>> Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem 
>> attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.
> 
> That is just bullying, Bruno. You accuse everyone who disagrees with you of 
> ad hominem attacks.

That is a lie and you know it. And you should be ashamed of yourself for saying 
it. I challenge you to find one instance on this mailing list where Bruno 
accused anyone of ad hominem without having been directed insulted: "pee pee 
theories", "you don't make sense", "nobody knows what you're talking about", 
etc etc. I know you won't produce this example because it doesn't exist, and I 
also know that you will just avoid the topic and focus on the next insult / 
patronizing comment.

Well, I have been participating in this mailing list on and off for more than 
one decade, and more or less the only original ideas being discussed here come 
from Bruno. I have witnessed multi-year threads discussing what he is saying in 
great detail, so clearly some people must have some idea of what he is saying. 
Maybe the limitation is on your side?

You insist on rigor when you talk to Bruno (as you should), and then you side 
with someone who produced exactly zero arguments, that writes long and 
incoherent rants that aim only at insulting Bruno for personal reasons. Unlike 
John Clark for example. Say what you will, but I have never seen John Clark 
side with bullshit just because "the enemy of my enemy is my friend". Give me a 
break here. You are about as far from having a scientific attitude as I am from 
becoming the next Miss Universe.

Telmo.

> 
> Bruce 
> 

> --
>  You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
>  To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>  To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTxpwRL61EB933u_11ByXy46My6VYOxXHbcdPOGssws_w%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/33500e7e-531d-4e29-811a-e3c414eff853%40www.fastmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-17 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le mer. 17 juil. 2019 à 00:37, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I don’t understand well what you say.
>>>
>>
>> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
>>
>>
>>
>> Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem
>> attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.
>>
>
> That is just bullying, Bruno. You accuse everyone who disagrees with you
> of ad hominem attacks.
>
> Bruce
>

What you're doing is in french "C'est l'hôpital qui se fout de la charité"
or "paille/poutre"... The bullies whining about being accused of bullying,
what a joke.

The PGC email is just a long email of insults, not a discussion, yours are
similar... what do you expect ? So either you reframe this into a
discussion or you continue to bully, insult and don't expect anything new
here.

Quentin

> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTxpwRL61EB933u_11ByXy46My6VYOxXHbcdPOGssws_w%40mail.gmail.com
> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAMW2kAqFjf90ZfX6uZepGkBYtSkiX9v0%3DoEmnnWoqKjkd5RjSA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-16 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Jul 17, 2019 at 12:55 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
>
> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> I don’t understand well what you say.
>>
>
> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.
>
>
>
> Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem
> attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.
>

That is just bullying, Bruno. You accuse everyone who disagrees with you of
ad hominem attacks.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLTxpwRL61EB933u_11ByXy46My6VYOxXHbcdPOGssws_w%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 16 Jul 2019, at 13:44, PGC  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 14 Jul 2019, at 15:01, PGC > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
>>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>>> 
>>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
>>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>>> 
>>> "Mechanism" is not refutable.
>> 
>> Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that 
>> physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed 
>> some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by 
>> comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the 
>> observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its 
>> “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.
>> 
>> 
>> Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise. 
>> 
>> A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed fields 
>> up to the present day, which conveniently don't include philosophical 
>> (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite them, if you hold 
>> yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and aesthetic developments 
>> - "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear aesthetic/personal 
>> standard of evidence - and would never pass any university 
>> department/academic panel worth its salt. 
> 
> I don’t understand well what you say. 
> 
> Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally.


Just tell me what you don’t understand specifically, and avoid ad hominem 
attack. It bores everybody, and distract from the thread.

Bruno




> It changes every week to accommodate the latest discourse. 
> 
> The whole discursive setup you practice here, with transparent ideological 
> vilification of alleged physicalists and victimization of some allegedly holy 
> platonic side depends on one thing: distance. At least a perceived distance. 
> It depends on people not knowing each other and therefore on folks willing to 
> fear and blame each other because your discourse isn't informed to the 
> contrary.
> 
> That's a highly warped and sad, cynical view of the world. I hope you do 
> better for yourself and those around you. 
> 
> You're being dismissive to the world + yourself: Who questions peoples’ 
> alleged attachments to “Aristotle hypothesis” or whatever the flavor of the 
> week or month is? 
> 
> Who assumes themselves to have a mandate to interfere in how other people 
> parse reality? Who tries to force everybody's discourse into their own 
> interpretations without asking? I'm telling you for years: it's rude. Quit 
> the games. Respect people along with yourself. You care about your work? Then 
> work on building consensus - listen and read others as equals - instead of 
> trying to conquer discourse. Folks that force their topics and 
> interpretations each and every chance they get lack good faith in others and 
> themselves. The hyper polite humble non-aggressive style doesn't fool 
> anybody. The academic "with mechanism - we xyz blah blah" => there is no "we" 
> or "mechanism" with your monologues of some entitled feeling leader and 
> agreements from a few credulous minions. 
> 
> Everybody knows that violence can be hidden in the most neutral, 
> non-aggressive discourse. 
> 
> Do yourself the favor of being you, instead of the muppet of some alleged 
> platonism. Stop robbing time from yourself and members of this list with this 
> kind of discourse. PGC
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/63aab716-bef0-48fb-a358-4ddaa289840f%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/53760440-1E54-4D12-90ED-EF7A42612DF3%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 15 Jul 2019, at 15:39, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 6:31:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 14 Jul 2019, at 11:53, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> If brains (or future biomachines) are standard Turing, then we can make a 
>> conscious robot out of standard processors.
> 
> OK.
> 
> The expression is a bit fuzzy. I would say that we can make a physical robot 
> capable of manifesting consciousness relatively to us.
> 
> This is needed to avoid the idea that it is the physical activity in the 
> brain robot which would “create” consciousness. The consciousness of the 
> robot is eventually explained by (infinitely many) number relations, which 
> are independent of time, physics, etc.
> 
>> That is the great leap of faith. 
> 
> I can agree, yes. That is why I insist all the time that Mechanism is an 
> hypothesis, first in the cognitive science, then in metaphysics.
> 
> Anyone asserting that science has proven Mechanism, or that we know that 
> Mechanism is true is a con scientist. The machine already know this.
> 
>> Panpsychism is the conservative view that only with particular material 
>> complexes consciousness exits.
> 
> My goal is to figure out what is matter and where it comes from. That is one 
> of the main reason why I do not assume matter at the start. I don’t know what 
> it is, and I doubt it exists ontologically, especially once you know that the 
> tiny very elementary part of arithmetic emulate *all* computations, in a 
> redundant fashion with a precise mathematical structure (indeed seemingly 
> rather close to what quantum mechanics already seem to described, but that 
> will need infinitely many confirmation, like all thesis on some reality.
> 
>> One can simulate thermonuclear fusion in a supercomputer, but it's not real. 
>> Same with consciousness.
> 
> Assuming non mechanism, and assuming a primary physical reality, you are 
> right, but out of the scope of my working hypothesis. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> For Galen Strawson (NYTimes op-ed)
> 
>  Consciousness Isn’t a Mystery. It’s Matter. 
> 
> 
> In any case, matter is a mystery. For Kant, it is unexplainable. Perhaps it 
> will be forever unexplainable (and surprising).
> 
> But arithmetic is also a mystery (Gregory Chaitin)
> 
> The Limits of Reason 
> 
> 
> So we may never know anything, we can just be and do.  


Yes, but we can derive the numbers (and the partial computable function) from 
very simple theory, like from the axiom Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz), and with 
mechanism this is enough to drive the appearance of matter in a way that we can 
test.

Then, for matter, we have much complex theories, which have nit yet been 
successfully unify, and which requires much stronger  mathematical axioms.

Chaitin is not entirely correct on the limit of reason, but he got the biology 
right. That would be too long and irrelevant to expand here.

In science we always need some initial faith in some axiom, but with mechanism, 
the two axioms above are enough for the ontology (that is for the assumption). 
From there we get the observers, and physics is derived from the mathematics of 
what is observable for those observers (that we get by listening to what they 
already says in arithmetic).

If Kxy = x, and Sxyz = xz(yz) seem to strange, you can take the axiom of 
Robinson Arithmetic instead. No need to assume more than:

1) 0 ≠ s(x)
2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y)
3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) 
4) x+0 = x
5) x+s(y) = s(x+y)
6) x*0=0
7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

But here you need to add the full axiomatisation of first order logic 
(predicate calculus).

With the combinator, you need only the following theory (no need of logic!):

1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C
2) If A = B then AC = BC
3) If A = B then CA = CB
4) KAB = A
5) SABC = AC(BC)


For quantum physics, you need a much large initial segment of set theory, which 
is a stringer mathematical theory (much more assumptions).

Bruno



> 
> 
> @philipthrift
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e14f420c-f084-43b5-a040-aa4788c0cf86%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googleg

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-16 Thread PGC

On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 1:53:11 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Jul 2019, at 15:01, PGC > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
>>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>>>
>>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
>>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>>>
>>
>> "Mechanism" is not refutable.
>>
>>
>> Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies 
>> that physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics 
>> (indeed some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) 
>> by comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the 
>> observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its 
>> “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.
>>
>>
> Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise. 
>
> A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed 
> fields up to the present day, which conveniently don't include 
> philosophical (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite 
> them, if you hold yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and 
> aesthetic developments - "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear 
> aesthetic/personal standard of evidence - and would never pass any 
> university department/academic panel worth its salt. 
>
>
> I don’t understand well what you say. 
>

Nobody, including yourself, understands what you say generally. It changes 
every week to accommodate the latest discourse. 

The whole discursive setup you practice here, with transparent ideological 
vilification of alleged physicalists and victimization of some allegedly 
holy platonic side depends on one thing: distance. At least a perceived 
distance. It depends on people not knowing each other and therefore on 
folks willing to fear and blame each other because your discourse isn't 
informed to the contrary.

That's a highly warped and sad, cynical view of the world. I hope you do 
better for yourself and those around you. 

You're being dismissive to the world + yourself: Who questions peoples’ 
alleged attachments to “Aristotle hypothesis” or whatever the flavor of the 
week or month is? 

Who assumes themselves to have a mandate to interfere in how other people 
parse reality? Who tries to force everybody's discourse into their own 
interpretations without asking? I'm telling you for years: it's rude. Quit 
the games. Respect people along with yourself. You care about your work? 
Then work on building consensus - listen and read others as equals - 
instead of trying to conquer discourse. Folks that force their topics and 
interpretations each and every chance they get lack good faith in others 
and themselves. The hyper polite humble non-aggressive style doesn't fool 
anybody. The academic "with mechanism - we xyz blah blah" => there is no 
"we" or "mechanism" with your monologues of some entitled feeling leader 
and agreements from a few credulous minions. 

Everybody knows that violence can be hidden in the most neutral, 
non-aggressive discourse. 

Do yourself the favor of being you, instead of the muppet of some alleged 
platonism. Stop robbing time from yourself and members of this list with 
this kind of discourse. PGC

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/63aab716-bef0-48fb-a358-4ddaa289840f%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-15 Thread Philip Thrift



On Monday, July 15, 2019 at 6:31:51 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Jul 2019, at 11:53, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> If brains (or future biomachines) are standard Turing, then we can make a 
> conscious robot out of standard processors.
>
>
> OK.
>
> The expression is a bit fuzzy. I would say that we can make a physical 
> robot capable of manifesting consciousness relatively to us.
>
> This is needed to avoid the idea that it is the physical activity in the 
> brain robot which would “create” consciousness. The consciousness of the 
> robot is eventually explained by (infinitely many) number relations, which 
> are independent of time, physics, etc.
>
> That is the great leap of faith. 
>
>
> I can agree, yes. That is why I insist all the time that Mechanism is an 
> hypothesis, first in the cognitive science, then in metaphysics.
>
> Anyone asserting that science has proven Mechanism, or that we know that 
> Mechanism is true is a con scientist. The machine already know this.
>
> Panpsychism is the conservative view that only with particular material 
> complexes consciousness exits.
>
>
> My goal is to figure out what is matter and where it comes from. That is 
> one of the main reason why I do not assume matter at the start. I don’t 
> know what it is, and I doubt it exists ontologically, especially once you 
> know that the tiny very elementary part of arithmetic emulate *all* 
> computations, in a redundant fashion with a precise mathematical structure 
> (indeed seemingly rather close to what quantum mechanics already seem to 
> described, but that will need infinitely many confirmation, like all thesis 
> on some reality.
>
> One can simulate thermonuclear fusion in a supercomputer, but it's not 
> real. Same with consciousness.
>
>
> Assuming non mechanism, and assuming a primary physical reality, you are 
> right, but out of the scope of my working hypothesis. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

For Galen Strawson (NYTimes op-ed)


   1.  Consciousness Isn’t a Mystery. It’s Matter. 
   



In any case, matter is a mystery. For Kant, it is unexplainable. Perhaps it 
will be forever unexplainable (and surprising).

But arithmetic is also a mystery (Gregory Chaitin)

The Limits of Reason 



So we may never know anything, we can just be and do.  


@philipthrift
 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e14f420c-f084-43b5-a040-aa4788c0cf86%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience


> On 15 Jul 2019, at 00:24, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Jul 14, 2019 at 11:01 PM PGC  > wrote:
> On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC > wrote:
>> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>> 
>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>> 
>> "Mechanism" is not refutable.
> 
> Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that 
> physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed 
> some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by 
> comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the 
> observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its 
> “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.
> 
> 
> Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise. 
> 
> A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed fields 
> up to the present day, which conveniently don't include philosophical 
> (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite them, if you hold 
> yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and aesthetic developments - 
> "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear aesthetic/personal 
> standard of evidence - and would never pass any university 
> department/academic panel worth its salt. 
> 
> Anybody with even an inclination of the complexity involved in the sweeping 
> generality of the claims purporting to explain the origin of physical laws, 
> reality, existence etc. - even a failed literature bachelor -  would red flag 
> the ubiquitous truth assignments, the lack of verifiability, and ask for 
> extraordinary amounts - and measures of proof along with consequences of an 
> alleged metaphysics. Results. Not non-results, particularly as semantically, 
> the whole enterprise can be interpreted as anti-scientific, as well as a 
> confidence trick.
> 
> Technically, it might have passed in isolated, less rigorous settings in the 
> past. But ethically, philosophically, linguistically, metaphysically, 
> physically? Today, in 2019? Sorry, but folks would laugh at the coarse 
> takeover attempt of the scientific enterprise with such an innocent, 
> personalized conception of evidence, science etc. They'd ask to be shown the 
> goods and your non-answer is clear. An infinite amount of posting/explanation 
> won't change it. Science is a "show me" kind of enterprise. You overrate 
> explanations and excuses. PGC   
> 
> Well said, PGC. I couldn't agree more, and I couldn't have said it half as 
> well.

Can you explain it? I don’t understand. I don’t see a point, unless you agree 
you would see a defense of physicalism, which explains your attachement to 
Aristotle metaphysical hypothesis (a primitively irreducible physical reality).

PGC is supposed to defend Platonism, and you defend Aristotle, so I am not sure 
on what you are agreeing. 

Don’t hesitate to clarify, but keep in mind that I do not assume, neither the 
existence of a physical primary universe, nor its non existence. I assume only 
what I need to define computationalisme, and this needs only Church’s thesis 
(and thus very elementary arithmetic) and the “yes doctor” practical leap of 
faith.

Bruno






> 
> Bruce 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRq_LxK0ABx5Ei%3D4qFdLLuEyAb_gAV76HtNBq%2Bvb2Jjmw%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/AF651275-8766-4B72-9AC1-067464D6CCCF%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience


> On 14 Jul 2019, at 15:01, PGC  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>> 
>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>> 
>> "Mechanism" is not refutable.
> 
> Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that 
> physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed 
> some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by 
> comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the 
> observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its 
> “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.
> 
> 
> Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise. 
> 
> A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed fields 
> up to the present day, which conveniently don't include philosophical 
> (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite them, if you hold 
> yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and aesthetic developments - 
> "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear aesthetic/personal 
> standard of evidence - and would never pass any university 
> department/academic panel worth its salt. 

I don’t understand well what you say. 

I show that mechanism has empirical consequences, so that we can test it. 
Fitting with the observation made metaphysics into an experimental science.

I don’t see what problem it could have for any university scientific 
department; Even in Brussels, they have not criticise this (in Brussels, the 
problem came from a philosopher who invoked its person metaphysical conviction, 
like the church did in his time.

The work done shows mainly that the mind-body problem is NOT solved, but show a 
beginning of solution, and the testing possible. Nature, unfortunately, does 
not yet distinguish which of the three quantum logics which have been found is 
the one closer to the physicists one (who got also more than one), and this 
means that a lot of works remains. But the contrary would have been astonishing.




> 
> Anybody with even an inclination of the complexity involved in the sweeping 
> generality of the claims purporting to explain the origin of physical laws, 
> reality, existence etc. - even a failed literature bachelor -  would red flag 
> the ubiquitous truth assignments, the lack of verifiability, and ask for 
> extraordinary amounts - and measures of proof along with consequences of an 
> alleged metaphysics. Results. Not non-results, particularly as semantically, 
> the whole enterprise can be interpreted as anti-scientific, as well as a 
> confidence trick.
> 
> Technically, it might have passed in isolated, less rigorous settings in the 
> past. But ethically, philosophically, linguistically, metaphysically, 
> physically? Today, in 2019? Sorry, but folks would laugh at the coarse 
> takeover attempt of the scientific enterprise with such an innocent, 
> personalized conception of evidence, science etc. They'd ask to be shown the 
> goods and your non-answer is clear. An infinite amount of posting/explanation 
> won't change it. Science is a "show me" kind of enterprise. You overrate 
> explanations and excuses. PGC   

Then may be show us. It is vague and negative, which makes me suspect .. what? 
The abandon of Platonism, or of Mechanism? If that is the case, is it Church 
thesis or “yes doctor”.  I miss the message. It would be better to make 
specific comments, without a dismissive tone which is distracting and confusing.

Bruno 



> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c25422c7-f0b9-4148-a750-6b6cc4f0e1f5%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09DF4020-5814-464C-98DA-EF415C4F046F%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

> On 14 Jul 2019, at 14:45, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/13/2019 1:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> And it doesn't comport with your definition.
>> I am intersted in knowing why you say that. Which part doesn’t comport ?
> 
> For one thing, it isn't consciousness OF anything.   Conscious thoughts are 
> about things, they refer.

I still don’t understand why you say that?

The difference between (consciousness) and (consciousness of something) is 
similar to the difference between (consistency) and (consistency of something), 
and this one is made clear by the difference between <>t and <>p.

Of course it is more subtile than that, because consistency (a 3p notion) is 
not consciousness (an 1p notion). So, for different form of consciousness you 
must take the corresponding diamond in the relevant notion of self (hypostase).

Incompleteness introduces all those nuances which are rich and variate, and 
accommodates different discourses on consciousness. The advantage is that, by 
construction (and modulo the infinite testing and confirmation by nature, of 
course), we do get a theory of matter with a mechanistically coherent identity 
thesis, which is lacking in physics (not even addressed, except timidly by 
quantum physics, and notably by Everett who made clear his intent to use 
Mechanism, but Everett was unaware that this forces him to explain how the 
multiverse emerges from the canonical many-computations in (sigma_1) 
arithmetic).

Bruno

> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1206cc9c-e3f6-52eb-2d75-8b250d75d2da%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4CD90D8C-3329-4325-A02E-A516414A6B50%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience


> On 14 Jul 2019, at 11:53, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 4:08:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Jul 2019, at 23:40, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 3:41:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 20:38, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 9:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 
 I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
 believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny 
 mockery in violent hate and defamation).
 
 Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
 specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
 you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain 
 it here.
 
 
 
 I was thinking we (real) materialists are mocked today. :)
>>> 
>>> Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are 
>>> boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is 
>>> implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just 
 information [number] processing, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, 
 Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's anti-materialists.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. 
>>> Without Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that 
>>> primitive matter concept.
>>> 
>>> It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I don’t 
>>> need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of Matter 
>>> which would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction (using 
>>> very small amount of Occam razor).
>>> 
>>> Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is 
>>> far more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and 
>>> Consciousness seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are 
>>> better to avoid when doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.
>>> 
>>> IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from 
>>> nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet 
>>> been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a 
>>> malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There are 3 things:
>>> 
>>> Logica
>>> Qualia
>>> Matter
>> 
>> With Mechanism, those are explained in the phenomenology, so we do not need 
>> to assume them, except the minimal amont to define what is a digital 
>> machine, and that minimal amount is elementary combinator theory, or 
>> elementary arithmetic, etc. 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> The first 2 are not real without the 3rd.
>> 
>> That sentence is too vague. I can agree and disagree, depending of the 
>> theory used.
>> 
>> 
>>> Without the 1st, the 3rd would be without order and would disintegrate. 
>>> Without the 2nd, there would be no conscious beings made of the 3rd. 
>>> 
>>> One can't untie the Trinity Knot of Being.
>> 
>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>> 
>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There are all kinds of machines, including biomachines*. All machines are 
>> all made of matter. If someone has an immaterial machine, then they should 
>> show it.
>> 
>> I think the original sin of philosophy occurred when numbers, counting, 
>> arithmetic, logic, mathematics were abstracted away from their material home.
> 
> 
> That is not an argument. 
> 
> If those biomachines are Turing emulable, they are emulated in infinitely 
> many exemplars in the arithmetical reality.
> 
> It is not a sin, but an ontological commitment is not a valid way to argue; 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> * Cornell Scientists Create Lifelike Biomachines That Eat, Grow, And Race 
>> Competitively
>> April 22, 201 (via @HotHardware)
>> https://hothardware.com/news/cornell-scientists-create-lifelike-biomachines-evolve
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Dan Luo [professor of biological and environmental engineering at Cornell]  
>> and his team developed a biomaterial that was placed into a nanoscale 
>> scaffolding. The material then autonomously emerged to "arrange itself – 
>> first into polymers and eventually mesoscale shapes. Acting much like slime 
>> molds, the biomaterial was able to move under its own power, moving forward 
>> against a l

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-14 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Sun, Jul 14, 2019 at 11:01 PM PGC  wrote:

> On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC  wrote:
>>
>> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some
>>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>>>
>>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and
>>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>>>
>>
>> "Mechanism" is not refutable.
>>
>>
>> Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies
>> that physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics
>> (indeed some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible)
>> by comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the
>> observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its
>> “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.
>>
>>
> Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise.
>
> A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed
> fields up to the present day, which conveniently don't include
> philosophical (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite
> them, if you hold yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and
> aesthetic developments - "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear
> aesthetic/personal standard of evidence - and would never pass any
> university department/academic panel worth its salt.
>
> Anybody with even an inclination of the complexity involved in the
> sweeping generality of the claims purporting to explain the origin of
> physical laws, reality, existence etc. - even a failed literature bachelor
> -  would red flag the ubiquitous truth assignments, the lack of
> verifiability, and ask for extraordinary amounts - and measures of proof
> along with consequences of an alleged metaphysics. Results. Not
> non-results, particularly as semantically, the whole enterprise can be
> interpreted as anti-scientific, as well as a confidence trick.
>
> Technically, it might have passed in isolated, less rigorous settings in
> the past. But ethically, philosophically, linguistically, metaphysically,
> physically? Today, in 2019? Sorry, but folks would laugh at the coarse
> takeover attempt of the scientific enterprise with such an innocent,
> personalized conception of evidence, science etc. They'd ask to be shown
> the goods and your non-answer is clear. An infinite amount of
> posting/explanation won't change it. Science is a "show me" kind of
> enterprise. You overrate explanations and excuses. PGC
>

Well said, PGC. I couldn't agree more, and I couldn't have said it half as
well.

Bruce

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAFxXSLRq_LxK0ABx5Ei%3D4qFdLLuEyAb_gAV76HtNBq%2Bvb2Jjmw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-14 Thread PGC

On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 11:00:30 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>>
>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>>
>
> "Mechanism" is not refutable.
>
>
> Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies 
> that physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics 
> (indeed some quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) 
> by comparing the physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the 
> observation. Up to now, thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its 
> “many-histories” interpretation, Mechanism fits with the observation.
>
>
Retrodiction plus the usual oversimplification. What a surprise. 

A historically nuanced view encompassing developments in all supposed 
fields up to the present day, which conveniently don't include 
philosophical (assemble Greek scholars for your interpretations and cite 
them, if you hold yours truly to be wrong), metaphysical, literal, and 
aesthetic developments - "mechanism fitting with observation" is an unclear 
aesthetic/personal standard of evidence - and would never pass any 
university department/academic panel worth its salt. 

Anybody with even an inclination of the complexity involved in the sweeping 
generality of the claims purporting to explain the origin of physical laws, 
reality, existence etc. - even a failed literature bachelor -  would red 
flag the ubiquitous truth assignments, the lack of verifiability, and ask 
for extraordinary amounts - and measures of proof along with consequences 
of an alleged metaphysics. Results. Not non-results, particularly as 
semantically, the whole enterprise can be interpreted as anti-scientific, 
as well as a confidence trick.

Technically, it might have passed in isolated, less rigorous settings in 
the past. But ethically, philosophically, linguistically, metaphysically, 
physically? Today, in 2019? Sorry, but folks would laugh at the coarse 
takeover attempt of the scientific enterprise with such an innocent, 
personalized conception of evidence, science etc. They'd ask to be shown 
the goods and your non-answer is clear. An infinite amount of 
posting/explanation won't change it. Science is a "show me" kind of 
enterprise. You overrate explanations and excuses. PGC   

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c25422c7-f0b9-4148-a750-6b6cc4f0e1f5%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-14 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 7/13/2019 1:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

And it doesn't comport with your definition.

I am intersted in knowing why you say that. Which part doesn’t comport ?


For one thing, it isn't consciousness OF anything.   Conscious thoughts 
are about things, they refer.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1206cc9c-e3f6-52eb-2d75-8b250d75d2da%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-14 Thread Philip Thrift



On Sunday, July 14, 2019 at 4:08:29 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Jul 2019, at 23:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 3:41:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 20:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 9:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
 believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny 
 mockery in violent hate and defamation).

 Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. 
 Ask specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find 
 false. 
 If you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to 
 explain it here.



>>> I was thinking we* (real) materialists* are mocked today. :)
>>>
>>>
>>> Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are 
>>> boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is 
>>> implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just* 
>>> information [number] processing*, including consciousness" 
>>> [SeanCarroll, Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's 
>>> *anti-materialists*.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. 
>>> Without Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that 
>>> primitive matter concept.
>>>
>>> It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I 
>>> don’t need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of 
>>> Matter which would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction 
>>> (using very small amount of Occam razor).
>>>
>>> Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is 
>>> far more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and 
>>> Consciousness seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are 
>>> better to avoid when doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.
>>>
>>> IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from 
>>> nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet 
>>> been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a 
>>> malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> There are 3 things:
>>
>> Logica
>> Qualia
>> Matter
>>
>>
>> With Mechanism, those are explained in the phenomenology, so we do not 
>> need to assume them, except the minimal amont to define what is a digital 
>> machine, and that minimal amount is elementary combinator theory, or 
>> elementary arithmetic, etc. 
>>
>>
>>
>> The first 2 are not real without the 3rd. 
>>
>>
>> That sentence is too vague. I can agree and disagree, depending of the 
>> theory used.
>>
>>
>> Without the 1st, the 3rd would be without order and would disintegrate. 
>> Without the 2nd, there would be no conscious beings made of the 3rd. 
>>
>> One can't untie the *Trinity Knot of Being*.
>>
>>
>> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
>> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>>
>> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
>> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> There are all kinds of machines, including biomachines*. All machines are 
> all made of matter. If someone has an immaterial machine, then they should 
> show it.
>
> *I think the original sin of philosophy occurred when numbers, counting, 
> arithmetic, logic, mathematics were abstracted away from their material 
> home.*
>
>
>
> That is not an argument. 
>
> If those biomachines are Turing emulable, they are emulated in infinitely 
> many exemplars in the arithmetical reality.
>
> It is not a sin, but an ontological commitment is not a valid way to 
> argue; 
>
>
>
>
>
> * Cornell Scientists Create Lifelike Biomachines That Eat, Grow, And Race 
> Competitively
> April 22, 201 (via @HotHardware)
>
> https://hothardware.com/news/cornell-scientists-create-lifelike-biomachines-evolve
>
> Dan Luo [professor of biological and environmental engineering at 
> Cornell]  and his team developed a biomaterial that was placed into a 
> nanoscale scaffolding. The material then autonomously emerged to "arrange 
> itself – first into polymers and eventually mesoscale shapes. Acting much 
> like slime molds, the biomaterial was able to move under its own power, 
> moving forward against a liquid flow of energy.
>
> Not surprisingly, the researchers pitted these new bio machines against 
> one another in competitive races – because, why not? Given the 
> self-locomotive properties of each and t

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 13 Jul 2019, at 23:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 3:41:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 20:38, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 9:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
>>> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny 
>>> mockery in violent hate and defamation).
>>> 
>>> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
>>> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
>>> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain 
>>> it here.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I was thinking we (real) materialists are mocked today. :)
>> 
>> Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are 
>> boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is 
>> implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just 
>>> information [number] processing, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, Max 
>>> Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's anti-materialists.
>> 
>> 
>> They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. Without 
>> Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that primitive 
>> matter concept.
>> 
>> It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I don’t 
>> need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of Matter which 
>> would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction (using very 
>> small amount of Occam razor).
>> 
>> Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is far 
>> more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and Consciousness 
>> seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are better to avoid when 
>> doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.
>> 
>> IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from 
>> nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet 
>> been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a 
>> malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There are 3 things:
>> 
>> Logica
>> Qualia
>> Matter
> 
> With Mechanism, those are explained in the phenomenology, so we do not need 
> to assume them, except the minimal amont to define what is a digital machine, 
> and that minimal amount is elementary combinator theory, or elementary 
> arithmetic, etc. 
> 
> 
>> 
>> The first 2 are not real without the 3rd.
> 
> That sentence is too vague. I can agree and disagree, depending of the theory 
> used.
> 
> 
>> Without the 1st, the 3rd would be without order and would disintegrate. 
>> Without the 2nd, there would be no conscious beings made of the 3rd. 
>> 
>> One can't untie the Trinity Knot of Being.
> 
> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
> 
> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) 
> Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There are all kinds of machines, including biomachines*. All machines are all 
> made of matter. If someone has an immaterial machine, then they should show 
> it.
> 
> I think the original sin of philosophy occurred when numbers, counting, 
> arithmetic, logic, mathematics were abstracted away from their material home.


That is not an argument. 

If those biomachines are Turing emulable, they are emulated in infinitely many 
exemplars in the arithmetical reality.

It is not a sin, but an ontological commitment is not a valid way to argue; 


> 
> 
> 
> * Cornell Scientists Create Lifelike Biomachines That Eat, Grow, And Race 
> Competitively
> April 22, 201 (via @HotHardware)
> https://hothardware.com/news/cornell-scientists-create-lifelike-biomachines-evolve
> 
> Dan Luo [professor of biological and environmental engineering at Cornell]  
> and his team developed a biomaterial that was placed into a nanoscale 
> scaffolding. The material then autonomously emerged to "arrange itself – 
> first into polymers and eventually mesoscale shapes. Acting much like slime 
> molds, the biomaterial was able to move under its own power, moving forward 
> against a liquid flow of energy.
> 
> Not surprisingly, the researchers pitted these new bio machines against one 
> another in competitive races – because, why not? Given the self-locomotive 
> properties of each and the total randomness of the environments (and of the 
> machines themselves), the team says that the race outcomes and eventual 
> winners were always dynamic.
>

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 13 Jul 2019, at 12:31, PGC  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
> 
> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) 
> Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
> 
> "Mechanism" is not refutable.

Digital Mechanism is not refutable by introspection. But as it implies that 
physics, and notably the logic of the observable obeys some logics (indeed some 
quantum logic), it can be refuted (or judged less plausible) by comparing the 
physical principles extracted from Mechanism with the observation. Up to now, 
thanks to the “quantum weirdness” and its “many-histories” interpretation, 
Mechanism fits with the observation.





> Who could refute that working works?

Digital Mechanism is the idea that the brain is Turing emulable, with 
consciousness and personal identity preserved at some level of description.

Bruno



> Personal mysticism/philosophy as long as the means to test it enjoy the same 
> ontological status as duplicating machines and ideal quantum computers; 
> wishful thinking until credible evidence exists.
> 
> It's clear you get off selling people a bill of goods, posing as a worldwide 
> expert on this list for years, as you don't have the means to test for 
> yourself what you attack "physicalists" for believing. 
> 
> None of this is about "debate". That's the con. Everybody knows and justifies 
> their miseries to themselves. Falsities and ambiguities perpetuated in some 
> validation screen addiction, instead of accomplishment, effort, respect, and 
> risk. All we need is the semblance of "debate".
> 
> You need to confirm your positions to yourselves? And you're looking to do so 
> on the internet? Lol it's 2019. PGC
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/37a3c0e7-9c24-45ae-bb12-730f5c091398%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/EE7D60D0-4BE9-474D-A941-B800FCE2F726%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-13 Thread Philip Thrift



On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 3:41:00 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Jul 2019, at 20:38, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 9:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
>>> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny 
>>> mockery in violent hate and defamation).
>>>
>>> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
>>> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
>>> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain 
>>> it here.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I was thinking we* (real) materialists* are mocked today. :)
>>
>>
>> Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are 
>> boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is 
>> implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just* 
>> information [number] processing*, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, 
>> Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's *anti-materialists*.
>>
>>
>>
>> They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. 
>> Without Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that 
>> primitive matter concept.
>>
>> It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I 
>> don’t need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of 
>> Matter which would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction 
>> (using very small amount of Occam razor).
>>
>> Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is 
>> far more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and 
>> Consciousness seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are 
>> better to avoid when doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.
>>
>> IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from 
>> nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet 
>> been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a 
>> malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
> There are 3 things:
>
> Logica
> Qualia
> Matter
>
>
> With Mechanism, those are explained in the phenomenology, so we do not 
> need to assume them, except the minimal amont to define what is a digital 
> machine, and that minimal amount is elementary combinator theory, or 
> elementary arithmetic, etc. 
>
>
>
> The first 2 are not real without the 3rd. 
>
>
> That sentence is too vague. I can agree and disagree, depending of the 
> theory used.
>
>
> Without the 1st, the 3rd would be without order and would disintegrate. 
> Without the 2nd, there would be no conscious beings made of the 3rd. 
>
> One can't untie the *Trinity Knot of Being*.
>
>
> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>
> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

There are all kinds of machines, including biomachines*. All machines are 
all made of matter. If someone has an immaterial machine, then they should 
show it.

*I think the original sin of philosophy occurred when numbers, counting, 
arithmetic, logic, mathematics were abstracted away from their material 
home.*



* Cornell Scientists Create Lifelike Biomachines That Eat, Grow, And Race 
Competitively
April 22, 201 (via @HotHardware)
https://hothardware.com/news/cornell-scientists-create-lifelike-biomachines-evolve

Dan Luo [professor of biological and environmental engineering at Cornell]  
and his team developed a biomaterial that was placed into a nanoscale 
scaffolding. The material then autonomously emerged to "arrange itself – 
first into polymers and eventually mesoscale shapes. Acting much like slime 
molds, the biomaterial was able to move under its own power, moving forward 
against a liquid flow of energy.

Not surprisingly, the researchers pitted these new bio machines against one 
another in competitive races – because, why not? Given the self-locomotive 
properties of each and the total randomness of the environments (and of the 
machines themselves), the team says that the race outcomes and eventual 
winners were always dynamic.

Besides their racing antics and ability to sustain themselves, the Cornell 
researchers also witnessed their new machines grow, decay and eventual die 
(after two cycles of synthesis) like true living organisms.

“The designs are still primitive, but they showed a new route to create 
dynamic machines from biomolecules," added Shogo Hamada, a research 
associate from the Luo lab. "

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-13 Thread PGC

On Saturday, July 13, 2019 at 10:41:00 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some 
> sense, and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.
>
> If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and 
> (weak) Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.
>

"Mechanism" is not refutable. Who could refute that working works? Personal 
mysticism/philosophy as long as the means to test it enjoy the same 
ontological status as duplicating machines and ideal quantum computers; 
wishful thinking until credible evidence exists.

It's clear you get off selling people a bill of goods, posing as a 
worldwide expert on this list for years, as you don't have the means to 
test for yourself what you attack "physicalists" for believing. 

None of this is about "debate". That's the con. Everybody knows and 
justifies their miseries to themselves. Falsities and ambiguities 
perpetuated in some validation screen addiction, instead of accomplishment, 
effort, respect, and risk. All we need is the semblance of "debate".

You need to confirm your positions to yourselves? And you're looking to do 
so on the internet? Lol it's 2019. PGC

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/37a3c0e7-9c24-45ae-bb12-730f5c091398%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-13 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 12 Jul 2019, at 20:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 9:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
>> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery 
>> in violent hate and defamation).
>> 
>> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
>> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
>> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it 
>> here.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I was thinking we (real) materialists are mocked today. :)
> 
> Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are 
> boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is 
> implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just 
>> information [number] processing, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, Max 
>> Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's anti-materialists.
> 
> 
> They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. Without 
> Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that primitive 
> matter concept.
> 
> It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I don’t 
> need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of Matter which 
> would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction (using very 
> small amount of Occam razor).
> 
> Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is far 
> more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and Consciousness 
> seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are better to avoid when 
> doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.
> 
> IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from 
> nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet 
> been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a 
> malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There are 3 things:
> 
> Logica
> Qualia
> Matter

With Mechanism, those are explained in the phenomenology, so we do not need to 
assume them, except the minimal amont to define what is a digital machine, and 
that minimal amount is elementary combinator theory, or elementary arithmetic, 
etc. 


> 
> The first 2 are not real without the 3rd.

That sentence is too vague. I can agree and disagree, depending of the theory 
used.


> Without the 1st, the 3rd would be without order and would disintegrate. 
> Without the 2nd, there would be no conscious beings made of the 3rd. 
> 
> One can't untie the Trinity Knot of Being.

I need a formula, and means to test it experimentally. Just to make some sense, 
and compare with the consequence of Mechanism.

If you disagree with the proof of the incompatibility of Mechanism and (weak) 
Materialism, it would be nice to explain why.

Bruno




> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ad50f7e3-7e92-4dda-8a28-02d2f8473031%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/85FEAEAC-8E71-4CE1-8FD4-A6F48C05F7EF%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 12 Jul 2019, at 21:18, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/12/2019 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> I have only precise definition and theorem. You can always cricicze 
>> definitions, but then provide better one please.
> 
> When you are defining something that everyone supposedly knows, then the 
> definition is ostensive.  A descriptive definition must pick out that thing 
> from all the possible known things.
> 
>> 
>> The definition given here justify why ([]p & <>t & p) describe qualia, and 
>> why we recover quanta from the wearability of some type of qualia among 
>> different universal machine.
> 
> No, it only shows there are some common attributes between the model and 
> qualia.  You have picked out those attributes and claimed they define 
> consciousness.  But they don't define (demarcate) the consciousness we know 
> ostensively.

I am not sure we can “define” consciousness, or even anything, ostensively. We 
can give examples only. If you tell me “that is the moon” ostensively, then 
when seeing Mars, I will say “oh, there is a moon too there too”. You will need 
to add an infinity of precision to get near an ostensive *definition*. And then 
I could wake up, also.

By a “definition", I mean a formula of arithmetic, or a meta-formula (using 
also some arithmetical set not definable in arithmetic, but definable in set 
theory, say).

We cannot define, in your sense of definition, what is a natural number. But 
that is not a problem for mechanism, or for reasoning on all this. Mathematical 
logic is the science which has solved all issues here, but I am aware it is not 
so easy. The problem us that mathematical logic is not well taught. All my 
books claim on the back cover that it is readable for philosophers, but I am 
not sure this is taught to philosophers, and still less to physicists or even 
to most mathematicians.

We should try to avoid referring to ontological commitment, make clear on what 
we agree, and proceed. 

Bruno

> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/48987066-19a3-8cb4-b0b5-035e04d92db3%40verizon.net.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/FC98824F-20A2-434D-92EA-3B7BAFF534EB%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-13 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 12 Jul 2019, at 21:10, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/12/2019 2:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 11 Jul 2019, at 19:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 7/11/2019 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = 
>> xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave 
>> some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me.
> Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.
 Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given 
 (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then 
 SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology 
 applicable to it.
>>> But I don't agree that your definition defines consciousness.  And part of 
>>> the reason for that it doesn't include being conscious of something.  And I 
>>> don't even know what "non-definable without invoking truth" means.  Since 
>>> "truth" is, according to you, undefinable that would seem to say your 
>>> definition of consciousness says it's undefinable.
>> But we do have a good intuition of what is truth for simple Löbian machine, 
>> like we have a good intuition of the arithmetical truth.
> 
> And we have an even better intuition of what is consciousness. 

Natural number is conceptually clearer and simpler than consciousness (on which 
the human fight since day one). When I was young the term “consciousness” was 
said to be prohibited in science. Some scientists still believe so. 



> And it doesn't comport with your definition.

I am intersted in knowing why you say that. Which part doesn’t comport ?





> 
>> Indeed without that intuition, there is no second order arithmetic, that is 
>> there is no Analysis, no “limits”, no topology on the reals. And all this 
>> can be formed in super-rich theory, like set theory.
>> 
>> I know it is subtle matter. But with mechanism, consciousness is shown non 
>> definable in exactly the sense of Tarski theorem on the non definability of 
>> the arithmetical truth, and consciousness becomes “meta-definable” in 
>> analysis or second order logic.
>> 
>> Consciousness is “<>t” (consistency) but as seen from the first person 
>> perspective (which is more close to <>t < t, making it trivial in that 
>> perspective, like we feel it to be).
>> Now, consciousness of something is given by just <>p < p.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Elsewhere you rely on the common sense idea that everybody you're 
>>> communicating with knows consciousness "from the inside", which is 
>>> independent of your definition.
>> ?
>> 
>> No it is part. It is the “indubitable” part, and in the “immediately 
>> knowable” part.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> And for your definition to work you would need to show that it not only 
>>> describes the first person experience of consciousness,
>> OK. That is the knowledge part. Glad you see this.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> but also that it doesn't describe anything else.
>> Why should I?
>> 
>> As I explained to Bruce, this is just impossible. Not just for 
>> consciousness, but already for the simple natural numbers. Nobody can give a 
>> definition of the natural numbers which would be true only for the natural 
>> numbers and not something else. We cannot eliminate the non standard models.
>> 
>> Some would say: "- come on, we can define the natural numbers in ZF set 
>> theory", but that would be true if they were non non standard model of set 
>> theory.
>> 
>> By definition, a standard model of ZF is a model where the least infinite 
>> ordinal is supremum (borne supérieur) of the finite ordinal as defined by 
>> von Neumann induction (0 = { }, n+1 = n U {n}).
>> 
>> With mechanism, we can “prove" in (ZF + some large cardinal) that to define 
>> consciousness is equivalent to define the natural numbers, and that this is 
>> just totally impossible for any (standard) machine. I put “prove” in quote, 
>> because that large cardinal has to be *very* large, and we can’t exclude 
>> that it is so large that it makes make set theory inconsistent. I am working 
>> on this since sometimes (formalising the whole Mechanist philosophy in some 
>> model of ZF).
>> 
>> 
>>> Yet you're saying it also describes the consequences of two equations.
>> It is not a description. It is just that in the theory RA or SK, we get all 
>> computations, and so we get consciousness by computationalism, intuitively 
>> *and* in the sense that we get the machines which are confronted to some 
>> true, immediately knowable, indubitable, yet non definable and non provable 
>> proposition.
> 
> But that's my complaint that you have not defined consciousness. You have 
> defined computations.  But not all computations are consciousness.  It's like 
> saying "A coun

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-12 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 7/12/2019 2:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


I have only precise definition and theorem. You can always cricicze 
definitions, but then provide better one please.


When you are defining something that everyone supposedly knows, then the 
definition is ostensive.  A descriptive definition must pick out that 
thing from all the possible known things.




The definition given here justify why ([]p & <>t & p) describe qualia, 
and why we recover quanta from the wearability of some type of qualia 
among different universal machine.


No, it only shows there are some common attributes between the model and 
qualia.  You have picked out those attributes and claimed they define 
consciousness.  But they don't define (demarcate) the consciousness we 
know ostensively.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/48987066-19a3-8cb4-b0b5-035e04d92db3%40verizon.net.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-12 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 7/12/2019 2:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Jul 2019, at 19:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
wrote:

On 7/11/2019 3:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
wrote:

On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz) + S
≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some posts ago) is
already as much conscious than you and me.

Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.

Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given (true,
knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then SK+induction
*is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology applicable to it.

But I don't agree that your definition defines consciousness. And part of the reason for that it
doesn't include being conscious of something. And I don't even know what "non-definable
without invoking truth" means. Since "truth" is, according to you, undefinable that
would seem to say your definition of consciousness says it's undefinable.

But we do have a good intuition of what is truth for simple Löbian machine,
like we have a good intuition of the arithmetical truth.

And we have an even better intuition of what is consciousness. And it
doesn't comport with your definition.

Indeed without that intuition, there is no second order arithmetic, that is
there is no Analysis, no “limits”, no topology on the reals. And all this can
be formed in super-rich theory, like set theory.

I know it is subtle matter. But with mechanism, consciousness is shown non
definable in exactly the sense of Tarski theorem on the non definability of the
arithmetical truth, and consciousness becomes “meta-definable” in analysis or
second order logic.

Consciousness is “<>t” (consistency) but as seen from the first person perspective
(which is more close to <>t < t, making it trivial in that perspective, like we feel
it to be).
Now, consciousness of something is given by just <>p < p.

Elsewhere you rely on the common sense idea that everybody you're communicating with
knows consciousness "from the inside", which is independent of your definition.

No it is part. It is the “indubitable” part, and in the “immediately knowable”
part.

And for your definition to work you would need to show that it not only
describes the first person experience of consciousness,

OK. That is the knowledge part. Glad you see this.

but also that it doesn't describe anything else.

Why should I?

As I explained to Bruce, this is just impossible. Not just for consciousness,
but already for the simple natural numbers. Nobody can give a definition of the
natural numbers which would be true only for the natural numbers and not
something else. We cannot eliminate the non standard models.

Some would say: "- come on, we can define the natural numbers in ZF set
theory", but that would be true if they were non non standard model of set theory.

By definition, a standard model of ZF is a model where the least infinite
ordinal is supremum (borne supérieur) of the finite ordinal as defined by von
Neumann induction (0 = { }, n+1 = n U {n}).

With mechanism, we can “prove" in (ZF + some large cardinal) that to define
consciousness is equivalent to define the natural numbers, and that this is just
totally impossible for any (standard) machine. I put “prove” in quote, because that
large cardinal has to be *very* large, and we can’t exclude that it is so large that
it makes make set theory inconsistent. I am working on this since sometimes
(formalising the whole Mechanist philosophy in some model of ZF).

Yet you're saying it also describes the consequences of two equations.

It is not a description. It is just that in the theory RA or SK, we get all
computations, and so we get consciousness by computationalism, intuitively
*and* in the sense that we get the machines which are confronted to some true,
immediately knowable, indubitable, yet non definable and non provable
proposition.

But that's my complaint that you have not defined consciousness. You
have defined computations. But not all computations are consciousness.
It's like saying "A country in Europe" is a definition of Belgium.

It looks like “time” when addressed by St-Augustin. He was taking about
subjective time, to be sure, and describe it as what he knows the most, yet get
utterly confused when attempting to describe or define it. Consciousness is
like that: it is what we know the best, yet we are incapable to define it,

Then why pretend you have defined it?

and indeed, like the numbers, we need it to describe it. In a sense
consciousness is the virtuous irreducible circle. Then with mechanism, it can
be shown to be a fixed point of a transformation of the machine, that the
machine cannot named or described.

That's like saying you've found a country in Europe; therefore it is

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-12 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 9:52:30 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
>> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny 
>> mockery in violent hate and defamation).
>>
>> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
>> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
>> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain 
>> it here.
>>
>>
>>
> I was thinking we* (real) materialists* are mocked today. :)
>
>
> Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are 
> boolean, or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is 
> implicitly or explicitly physicalist/materialist.
>
>
>
>
> Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just* 
> information [number] processing*, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, 
> Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's *anti-materialists*.
>
>
>
> They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. 
> Without Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that 
> primitive matter concept.
>
> It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I don’t 
> need the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of Matter 
> which would be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction (using 
> very small amount of Occam razor).
>
> Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is 
> far more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and 
> Consciousness seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are 
> better to avoid when doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.
>
> IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from 
> nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet 
> been shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a 
> malevolent simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

There are 3 things:

Logica
Qualia
Matter

The first 2 are not real without the 3rd. Without the 1st, the 3rd would be 
without order and would disintegrate. Without the 2nd, there would be no 
conscious beings made of the 3rd. 

One can't untie the *Trinity Knot of Being*.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/ad50f7e3-7e92-4dda-8a28-02d2f8473031%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

ERRATA:


> On 12 Jul 2019, at 11:56, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 12 Jul 2019, at 03:12, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 11:09 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> > On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> > >> > > wrote:
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > 
>>> > On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> >> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = 
>>> >> xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave 
>>> >> some posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me.
>>> > 
>>> > Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.
>>> 
>>> Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given 
>>> (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then 
>>> SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology 
>>> applicable to it.
>>> 
>>> Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often 
>>> criticised you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and 
>>> claim identity.
>> 
>> 
>> Not identity, but equivalence.
>> 
>> Is not identity an equivalence relationship? You are chopping logic.
> 
> Identity is an equivalence, but equivalence is not an identity. You are 
> confusing p -> q and q -> p.
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> Conscience is a general term, like cat and dog are both quadrupeds mammals. 
>> You are criticising the axiomatic method.
>> 
>> Science is not axiomatic.
> 
> Of course. But it can use the axiomatic method.
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> I certainly do not identify the many consciousness possible, as numerous as 
>> possible persons, human or not, and in fact, the works shows the existence 
>> of very variate forms of consciousness. 
>> 
>> It is not because both dog and cat are quadrupeds mammals that Dog = Cat.
>> 
>> No, one can point to many more dissimilarities than there are similarities. 
>> So your attempt at equivalence or identity between your pathetically 
>> inadequate definition of consciousness and your combinator logic fails at 
>> every level.
> 
> Where? Specifically.
> 
> (But your use of “pathetically” suggest me that you have not yet studied the 
> subject, and that your agenda is just a destructive one, you don’t seem 
> interested in the problem).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> In other words, you have not 'explained' consciousness -- you are not even 
>> talking about consciousness as usually understood.
> 
> Can you explain what is missing? Or if you know a better theory (than 
> Mechanism).
> 
> I have only precise definition and theorem. You can always cricicze 
> definitions, but then provide better one please.
> 
> The definition given here justify why ([]p & <>t & p) describe qualia, and 
> why we recover quanta from the wearability

I meant “sharability” of course. 



> of some type of qualia among different universal machine.

I meant “machines”.

Sorry for my spelling (and the aggravation due to the automatic speller).

Each time you see “Sexy”, please replace by Sxyz. 

Pfft….

Bruno



> 
> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery 
> in violent hate and defamation).
> 
> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it 
> here.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> But if you are OK that consciousness is characterised by the quasi axiomatic 
>> I give, then all universal machine can be said to be conscious, and the 
>> Löbian machine can be said to be self-conscious.
>> 
>> I reject your definition of consciousness as totally inadequate. As Brent 
>> points out, it does not even begin to cover important aspects of 
>> consciousness, such as awareness of an environment.
> 
> Not only it explains awareness of an environment, but it explains why that 
> the observable with respect of that environment obeys quantum logic 
> (formally), and even more simply, why the universal machine executed in 
> arithmetic discover soon or later the “many-worlds” appearances.
> 
> Also, physics fails on this. It miss awareness, and use a brain-mind identity 
> thesis which is incompatible with Mechanism to link the experimental evidence 
> with the first person view. And that is obvious with mechanism, but well 
> known by the expert, even without Mechanism. It is called the mind-body 
> problem.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>>> Very poor logic, I must say.
>> 
>> It is called the axiomatic method, and it is the jewel brought by modern 
>> logic. The idea is to characterise things by searching some principles on 
>> wh

Re: subjective experience

> On 12 Jul 2019, at 12:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery 
> in violent hate and defamation).
> 
> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it 
> here.
> 
> 
> 
> I was thinking we (real) materialists are mocked today. :)

Where? Maybe the naïve one, who still believe that the observable are boolean, 
or something like that. But the paradigm today in metaphysics is implicitly or 
explicitly physicalist/materialist.

> 
> Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just 
> information [number] processing, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, Max 
> Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's anti-materialists.

They have to, if Digital Mechanism is assumed, that has been proven. Without 
Mechanism, it is unclear to me if we can really make sense of that primitive 
matter concept.

It is worst than in the Napoleon-Laplace dialog. I cannot say that I don’t need 
the hypothesis of Matter, I have to say that any notion of Matter which would 
be related to my consciousness leads to a contradiction (using very small 
amount of Occam razor).

Let us pursue the testing. To assume Matter (and what would that be?) is far 
more premature. To invoke it in our explanation of Nature and Consciousness 
seems to me quite premature. Ontological commitment are better to avoid when 
doing science, especially so in metaphysics-theology.

IF the three of S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*, described in my papers, depart from 
nature, well, some oracle or matter might be at play, but that has not yet been 
shown. An hard computationalist will only deduce that we are in a malevolent 
simulation, like when seeing the pixels in a video game.

Bruno

> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5811bcec-f208-493e-85ff-b2e87127c480%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9B0DF8C2-633E-4E32-B562-766B96768311%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: subjective experience

2019-07-12 Thread Philip Thrift



On Friday, July 12, 2019 at 4:56:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist 
> believers, until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny 
> mockery in violent hate and defamation).
>
> Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
> specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If 
> you know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain 
> it here.
>
>
>
I was thinking we* (real) materialists* are mocked today. :)

Physicists (and even philosophers) have gone over to "It's all just* 
information [number] processing*, including consciousness" [SeanCarroll, 
Max Tegmark, etc.], thus becoming  today's *anti-materialists*.

@philipthrift

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/5811bcec-f208-493e-85ff-b2e87127c480%40googlegroups.com.

Re: subjective experience

> On 12 Jul 2019, at 03:12, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 11:09 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 11 Jul 2019, at 14:23, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 8:40 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> > On 10 Jul 2019, at 23:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> > > > > wrote:
>> > 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > On 7/10/2019 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> >> The machine define by the two following equations Kxy = x and Sxyz = 
>> >> xz(yz) + S ≠ K, and with the combinator induction axiom (that I gave some 
>> >> posts ago) is already as much conscious than you and me.
>> > 
>> > Which in it self is a reductio of your theory.
>> 
>> Why? If you agree with the definition of consciousness that I have given 
>> (true, knowable, non provable, non definable without invoking truth) then 
>> SK+induction *is* provably conscious, and indeed has the G/G* theology 
>> applicable to it.
>> 
>> Come now. That is just the cat=dog argument for which I have often 
>> criticised you. You take a superficial resemblance between two things and 
>> claim identity.
> 
> 
> Not identity, but equivalence.
> 
> Is not identity an equivalence relationship? You are chopping logic.

Identity is an equivalence, but equivalence is not an identity. You are 
confusing p -> q and q -> p.

>  
> Conscience is a general term, like cat and dog are both quadrupeds mammals. 
> You are criticising the axiomatic method.
> 
> Science is not axiomatic.

Of course. But it can use the axiomatic method.

>  
> I certainly do not identify the many consciousness possible, as numerous as 
> possible persons, human or not, and in fact, the works shows the existence of 
> very variate forms of consciousness. 
> 
> It is not because both dog and cat are quadrupeds mammals that Dog = Cat.
> 
> No, one can point to many more dissimilarities than there are similarities. 
> So your attempt at equivalence or identity between your pathetically 
> inadequate definition of consciousness and your combinator logic fails at 
> every level.

Where? Specifically.

(But your use of “pathetically” suggest me that you have not yet studied the 
subject, and that your agenda is just a destructive one, you don’t seem 
interested in the problem).

> In other words, you have not 'explained' consciousness -- you are not even 
> talking about consciousness as usually understood.

Can you explain what is missing? Or if you know a better theory (than 
Mechanism).

I have only precise definition and theorem. You can always cricicze 
definitions, but then provide better one please.

The definition given here justify why ([]p & <>t & p) describe qualia, and why 
we recover quanta from the wearability of some type of qualia among different 
universal machine.

I have been mocked for twenty years on this, by dogmatic materialist believers, 
until I proved the point (which has transformed the funny mockery in violent 
hate and defamation).

Everyone would benefit of making the discussion emotionally neutral. Ask 
specific question on what you don’t understand, or what you find false. If you 
know a better (meta)definition of consciousness, maybe try to explain it here.

> 
> But if you are OK that consciousness is characterised by the quasi axiomatic 
> I give, then all universal machine can be said to be conscious, and the 
> Löbian machine can be said to be self-conscious.
> 
> I reject your definition of consciousness as totally inadequate. As Brent 
> points out, it does not even begin to cover important aspects of 
> consciousness, such as awareness of an environment.

Not only it explains awareness of an environment, but it explains why that the 
observable with respect of that environment obeys quantum logic (formally), and 
even more simply, why the universal machine executed in arithmetic discover 
soon or later the “many-worlds” appearances.

Also, physics fails on this. It miss awareness, and use a brain-mind identity 
thesis which is incompatible with Mechanism to link the experimental evidence 
with the first person view. And that is obvious with mechanism, but well known 
by the expert, even without Mechanism. It is called the mind-body problem.

>  
>> Very poor logic, I must say.
> 
> It is called the axiomatic method, and it is the jewel brought by modern 
> logic. The idea is to characterise things by searching some principles on 
> which we agree about those things, letting open that we might later add 
> incompatible proposition to gives different examples of the thing, like we 
> could add “barking” to "quadruplet mammals” if we want distinguish dog from 
> cat.
> 
> And we could add "interacting with an environment", or "capable of autonomous 
> action", or "can pass a Turing Test" to the list of characteristics of 
> consciousness. None of these additional features are satisfied by your 
> combinators,

Do

Re: subjective experience