[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R
I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not social scientists. John From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience is. They don’t do it very well. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R
Helmut, Lists, I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the ecologists with whom I work for the evidence. Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general. I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case. The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above. John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R John, Stan, lists, In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers you mentioned (John). Cheers, Helmut Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Helmut, Lists, Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on boundary conditions and self-organization and thus is basically information based. I also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web page. One that might be particularly useful here is Self-organization, individuation and identityhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/SOIIF.PDF, Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex systemhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdfshttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdf. In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds. Complexity, Difference and Identity: an Ethical Perspectivehttp://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/book/978-90-481-9186-4. 2010 Berlin: Springer. Obviously, I don’t think that “self” is hard to grasp scientifically, if you accept self-organization as a possibility. Maturana does not, and thus leaves self (and thus his notion of autopoiesis) rather lame. I would say, though, that some form of self-production is required for a self, but not self-reproduction, though it may often be a part of self-production. Cheers, John From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: May 25, 2015 5:53 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Aw
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8498] Re: Natural Propositions,
Correct, Frederik. I mistyped. It is nice to have some agreement, since I have had this dispute for some time now. Perhaps needless to say, I think your book really clears up some things that otherwise might seem mysterious about Peirce's views. John From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: April 27, 2015 5:09 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8498] Re: Natural Propositions, Dear John, lists, Den 27/04/2015 kl. 21.49 skrev John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za : In my case, at least, as I have said several times before, perceptions without judgements seem to be pretty near possible, except maybe in some extremely altered states of consciousness. I look out the window, and I can't help but see a telephone pole, not a hodge-podge of colours and shapes. Our seeing is of specific things in general classifications, at least almost always. Anything that suggests there is something on which that is based is a hypothesis, or at least an act of thought that ignores the generalities and concentrates on the specificities. It is not an easy act of thought, either. It takes considerable effort or training in most cases. Agreed. (you mean impossible rather than possible in the first period, right?) We not only se a telephone pole - we se there is this telephone just there, at exactly this and that position in our visual 3-D surroundings. Perception is typically propositional (In ch. 5 of Natural Propositions I run through the arguments that this is even neurally hardwired in the ventral/dorsal split in the senses). To claim we first perceive uninterpreted colors or forms is not correct as pertaining to the large majority of everyday perceptions. Of course such things may happen, in dreams, illusions, ecstasy, surprises, etc. but marginally and momentarily only. To believe we generally first see such phenomena is to substitute a perception theory for what we actually experience. But we may train ourselves to focus upon such firstnesses by prescission - painters, e.g. have to practice such a procedure meticulously ... but that is isolating firstness from its nesting in second- and thirdnesses. Best F - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8497] Re: Natural Propositions,
that the whole alone is something, and its components, however essential to it, are nothing. [End quote from CP 1.422] [] When we say that qualities are general, are partial determinations, are mere potentialities, etc., all that is true of qualities reflected upon; but these things do not belong to the quality-element of experience. [End quote from CP 1.425] Best, Ben On 4/27/2015 2:33 PM, John Collier wrote: I am not denying 1ns. Never have. I claim it does not stand on its own, and as a result cannot itself be foundational. It requires further mental actions to pick out 1ns. It is not manifested in itself. It is not given. It cannot be the foundation for an epistemology. You seem to still be misunderstanding my use of abstraction. I am using it in the time honoured way initiated by Locke as partial consideration. Berkeley missed this and thought of ideas as little pictures, so we can't have an idea of man because every man has specific characteristics. Locke had already answered this. Yesterday I saw a man in the bushes. I did not see his colour, the number of limbs (though it was at least two) or a bunch of other things. I have no problem saying this was a perceptual experience. But it must have involved judgment. I know there must have been things that I experienced that led to this, but I couldn't well say what they were, since that would bring them under generalities, which aren't 1ns. But I further maintain that 1ns is useless for thought, because thought requires generalities. Perhaps that is what you don't like. John From: Gary Richmond Sent: April 27, 2015 2:12 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8485] Re: Natural Propositions, John, You first wrote: the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). But now you say that you agree with Frederik's analysis. But I do not think that Frederik is saying that there is so such thing in itself as an experience of firstness, but that we must prescissively abstract it out if we are to focus on in certain analyses. Frederik has just written that he does not deny 1ns. You however seem to to saying that it is merely an abstraction, has its being as an abstraction, has no other reality than that. Again, this does not appear to me to be how Frederik sees it (he'll correct me, I'm sure, if I'm wrong). All he seems to be saying is that for some analytical purposes it is helpful to prescissively abstract 1ns from the other two categories. Best, Gary Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690tel:718%20482-5690 On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 9:13 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8478] Re: Natural Propositions,
Gary, lists, However I don't deny the reality of 1ns, my claim is that they must be abstracted in Locke's sense of partial consideration, which is similar if not identical to Peirce's notion of precission. Basically, I think the Frederik has it right. This is the argument I have been trying to make for some years now. It has implications for phenomenology or phaneroscopy concerning the nature of them as sciences that I believe to be important. Ultimately I think it is necessary for understanding Peirce's form of realism. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 26, 2015 8:38 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce-L 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8478] Re: Natural Propositions, Frederik, lists, You write, But pain involves secondness. No doubt. I had already written there is certainly secondness involved in my unexpected sudden eye pain example. But, unless one wants to deny the reality of 1ns, as apparently John would, then one must admit that pain--and, as Peirce says, each unique instance of pain--has its own distinct character, it's unique quality (firstness). And are the three phenomenoloogical categories ever found apart from the others in reality? Peirce says no (although one may predominate). So to say that pain involves secondess doesn't deny firstness at all as I see it. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 4:50 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Dear Gary, lists - But pain involves secondness - it is not imagined pain - you refer to real pain which implies there's something actually acting in your eye - so it is not the pure quality, it is quality coupled with the insistence of secondness. Your blinking eye works in order to get rid of the existing particle, not only to address a quality of feeling. By the same token, pain involves thirdness - the complex of pain and blinking reflex has a purpose, that of cleaning your eye, and behind that is a biological habit acquired over millenia of selection. So the felt pain is only prescinded from this background ... that would be my version ... Qualities without secondness are but possibilities ... Best F Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.46 skrev Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com : John, I experience qualities as such and often before I've labeled them x, y, or z. Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits my eye. Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience pain before I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things differently. Best, Gary - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8466] Re: Natural Propositions,
Agreed, Frederik. I think this is really important. John From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: April 26, 2015 6:41 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8466] Re: Natural Propositions, ps - Peirce's three distinctions are subtypes of partial consideration - F Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.37 skrev John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za : Gary, I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,
Jeff, I don't disagree with what you say here. My own path for some time has been to follow a minimal path of metaphysics adequate for current science. The basic ideas are in the book Every Thing Must Go, except that I disagree with my coauthors in that they accept the possibility of static structures. I limit myself to dynamic structures. Many of my recent papers are titled A Dynamical Approach to ... The position puts observers into the world as dynamical entities and thus is inherently realist. It is no accident that at the beginning of the book we refer to a version of Peirce's pragmatic maxim. John -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: April 26, 2015 5:06 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions, Lists, The conversation about whether or not there are real general properties, natural kinds, habitual regularities an/or laws in nature--and where such things might or might not be at work governing actual things--continues to surface on both lists with remarkable regularity. It would seem that there is something at work behind the scenes that forces the conversation back to these kinds of questions. Having said that, we should probably take note of the fact that, for Peirce, there is no way to settle these kinds of questions based upon empirical evidence and the methods of the special sciences alone. On his account, the basic questions pose problems in the normative science of logic. Any empirically grounded explanations that seem to involve convictions about the reality or lack thereof about some kind of general thing in one area of inquiry or another rests, ultimately, on claims about the nature of the validity of different kinds of reasonings and what is presupposed by those forms of reasoning. So, on Peirce's view, it is reasonable to suppose that the community of scientists who are working in the special sciences do tend make claims about the real nature of generals. This does seem to fit what many physicists, chemists, biologists, economists (etc.) say in many cases. They ask, for instance if the principles articulated in their theories adequately explain the regularities that are observed. But philosophers and special scientists alike will be wasting their breath if they think this fact about the conviction of the special scientists settles the matter as to whether or not those claims are adequately justified. Similarly, those who are skeptical about the truth of claims about the real nature of generals in one area of inquiry or another can point to difficulties we face when trying to show that abductive, deductive or inductive arguments are themselves well grounded. But they, too, will be wasting their breath if they think that empirical evidence and the methods of the special sciences will settle these claims about the validity of the forms of reasoning and the related assumptions about the nature of the real. Notice that is not just Peirce, but Plato, Aristotle, Plontinus, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mill and Hegel as well, who all agree that when it comes to such questions about fundamental principles of reasoning and the underlying assumptions about such reasoning, that these kinds of questions can't be settled in the special sciences (e.g., in psychology, biology, sociology, or what have you). As such, philosophers who want to model their inquiries on a scientific approach need to think hard about how they might use something like an experimental method to find the truth about these kinds of questions. Having developed competing theories of logic, we can then see what kinds of metaphysical theories naturally follow from such competing accounts. In turn, we can see if the competing theories of logic and metaphysics square with the ongoing practice and results of the different special sciences. For what it is worth, I think it would be worth the effort needed to separate these different arguments for or against the reality of generals--at least insofar as we'd like to continue the debate in a manner that is respectful of the larger philosophical context in which Peirce was working. We can, of course, follow the lead of others, such as Heidegger, who suggest that the entire tradition in logic and metaphysics rests on some deep confusions and mistakes. If some are following such a track, or trying to forge their own path in this kind of direction, it would be good to lay their cards on the table so that we will have a better idea why they are saying the things they do. --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:55 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L Subject: [biosemiotics:8468] Re
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,
Jerry, your reply makes no sense. It makes no cogent criticism of what I said. Read the book and then maybe we can talk about this, but so far you are putting words together that have no relevance to my position. Frankly, In resent this. John From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: April 27, 2015 11:25 AM To: Peirce-L Cc: John Collier Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions, John: you write: I limit myself to dynamic structures. then: . I use it in the physical, not the mathematical sense. Your very simple answer is precisely why I find your thinking to be superficial. Your usage is NOT in the PHYSICAL sense. Your ignore the deep and fundamental conundrum that exists in physical thought and representation of nature and the concept of force. It is not a unitary concept. Force is at least a triadic concept, and perhaps a fouth or fifth order concepts. The multiple concepts of force are a consequence of physical measurements. Your views of physical representation of force are more than two centuries out of date. This conundrum is the profound dynamical difference origins in the difference between Newton's Law and Coulomb's law. Your response is not good physics, not good science, not persuasive and certainly not compelling. IMNSHO Cheers Jerry On Apr 27, 2015, at 9:02 AM, John Collier wrote: The answer is very simple, Jerry. We can interact only with dynamical structures (at least obeying Newton's third law), so they are the only things that could conceivably make a difference to experience (pragmatic maxim). Perhaps we mean something different by dynamical. I use it in the physical, not the mathematical sense. John From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: April 27, 2015 10:58 AM To: Peirce-L Cc: John Collier Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions, John: On Apr 27, 2015, at 8:24 AM, John Collier wrote: I limit myself to dynamic structures. Why? Such an assertion indicates to me that your thinking is superficial. As I have noted before, it is attempting to work a cross-word puzzle by using only the across clues. Why does the puzzle writer give you the down clues? Or, on a mathematical plane, attempting to solve partial differential equations without defining the variables. Or, studying human physiology without a knowledge of anatomy. Or, studying evolutionary theory without DNA. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions
Nice catch, Jeff. Perhaps there is a textual basis for my difference with Gary (and Søren). John -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: April 26, 2015 2:11 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions Gary R., John, Lists, Here is what Peirce says in his essay on Telepathy (CP 7.604) as he tries to clarify the division he is drawing between percept and perceptual judgment: Analysis of the experience of the chair as it appears before me now. a. The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind. b. It essentially embodies no intentions of any kind. c. It does not stand for anything. d. It obtrudes itself upon my gaze, but not as a deputy of something else, not as anything. e. It is very insistent, for all its silence. f. It would be useless for me to say I don't believe in the chair. g. It disturbs be, more less. h. I can't dismiss is, as I would a fancy i. I can only get rid of it by an exertion of physical force. j. It is a forceful thing. Yet it offers no reason, defence, or excuse for its presence (in my experience, in its existence). k. It does not pretend to any right to be there. l. It silently forces itself upon me (no further brute cause of which this seems to be the effect). m. Such is the precept. Key question: now, what is its logical bearing upon knowledge and belief? This can be summed up in three precepts: 1. It contributes something positive (the chair has four legs, a back, a yellow color, a green cushion. Each of these things is a predicate of the subject this thing. To learn that the subject actually has these predicates is a contribution to our belief and knowledge). 2. It compels the perceiver to acknowledge it. 3. It neither offers any reason for such acknowledgement nor makes any pretension to reasonableness. Taking these points together, it appears to me that the first part consists in an analysis of what appears to us when we see something like a pillow sitting on a chair. The analysis seems to be guided by the phenomenological account of the elemental categories. The second part, where he formulates the three precepts, looks to me like a hypothesis about the nature of the percept. Gary claims that the percept is a rhematic iconic qualisign, but Peirce claims in (c) that percepts do not stand for anything else. As such, they are not representations. Later in this essay, however, Peirce characterizes the percipuum as an interpretation of the percept. In order for the percipuum to be an interpretation of the percept, doesn't the percept have to function as some kind of representamen? How can we reconcile the apparent tension between claims that Peirce is making about the nature of the percept and its relation to the percipuum and the perceptual judgment? --Jeff Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2015 9:37 AM To: Gary Richmond; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce-L Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions, Gary, I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 26, 2015 1:05 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions, John, The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a rhematic iconic qualisign. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments. Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out). John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions,
The answer is very simple, Jerry. We can interact only with dynamical structures (at least obeying Newton's third law), so they are the only things that could conceivably make a difference to experience (pragmatic maxim). Perhaps we mean something different by dynamical. I use it in the physical, not the mathematical sense. John From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: April 27, 2015 10:58 AM To: Peirce-L Cc: John Collier Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8468] Re: Natural Propositions, John: On Apr 27, 2015, at 8:24 AM, John Collier wrote: I limit myself to dynamic structures. Why? Such an assertion indicates to me that your thinking is superficial. As I have noted before, it is attempting to work a cross-word puzzle by using only the across clues. Why does the puzzle writer give you the down clues? Or, on a mathematical plane, attempting to solve partial differential equations without defining the variables. Or, studying human physiology without a knowledge of anatomy. Or, studying evolutionary theory without DNA. Cheers Jerry - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8485] Re: Natural Propositions,
I am not denying 1ns. Never have. I claim it does not stand on its own, and as a result cannot itself be foundational. It requires further mental actions to pick out 1ns. It is not manifested in itself. It is not given. It cannot be the foundation for an epistemology. You seem to still be misunderstanding my use of abstraction. I am using it in the time honoured way initiated by Locke as partial consideration. Berkeley missed this and thought of ideas as little pictures, so we can't have an idea of man because every man has specific characteristics. Locke had already answered this. Yesterday I saw a man in the bushes. I did not see his colour, the number of limbs (though it was at least two) or a bunch of other things. I have no problem saying this was a perceptual experience. But it must have involved judgment. I know there must have been things that I experienced that led to this, but I couldn't well say what they were, since that would bring them under generalities, which aren't 1ns. But I further maintain that 1ns is useless for thought, because thought requires generalities. Perhaps that is what you don't like. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 27, 2015 2:12 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8485] Re: Natural Propositions, John, You first wrote: the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). But now you say that you agree with Frederik's analysis. But I do not think that Frederik is saying that there is so such thing in itself as an experience of firstness, but that we must prescissively abstract it out if we are to focus on in certain analyses. Frederik has just written that he does not deny 1ns. You however seem to to saying that it is merely an abstraction, has its being as an abstraction, has no other reality than that. Again, this does not appear to me to be how Frederik sees it (he'll correct me, I'm sure, if I'm wrong). All he seems to be saying is that for some analytical purposes it is helpful to prescissively abstract 1ns from the other two categories. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Mon, Apr 27, 2015 at 9:13 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Agreed, Frederik. I think this is really important. John From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: April 26, 2015 6:41 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce-L 1 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8466] Re: Natural Propositions, ps - Peirce's three distinctions are subtypes of partial consideration - F Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.37 skrev John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za : Gary, I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8467] Re: Natural Propositions,
No, I definitely classify my sensations as I have them. I did have one weird experience where I did not classify a colour while I was on DMT, so I think I get the idea. People have noted how quick I am at picking things out - it happens automatically for me. It is an empirical question how the sensory system works. First it distinguishes differences. People working on it haven't got much further except for vision, which definitely classifies before things are conscious (Lettvin et al, Marr), so shapes come preclassified. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 26, 2015 1:47 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [biosemiotics:8467] Re: Natural Propositions, John, I experience qualities as such and often before I've labeled them x, y, or z. Walking along the street on a windy day a sharp dust particle hits my eye. Although there is certainly some secondness involved, I experience pain before I think 'pain'. Maybe other people do experience such things differently. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 12:37 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Gary, I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 26, 2015 1:05 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions, John, The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a rhematic iconic qualisign. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690tel:718%20482-5690 On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments. Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out). John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. Frederik, lists, Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper The Scent of Truth (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. Nathan writes: The importance of perception is that in what Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of text, at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an intellectual component into consciousness. We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, and we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . (CP 7.643) We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and secondness, are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other' that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness. What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of the word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A judgment involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of inference identified by Peirce
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions,
Gary, I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where abstraction is understood as Locke's partial consideration. At least that is the way I seem to experience things myself. Perhaps others are different. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 26, 2015 1:05 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce-L Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8454] Re: Natural Propositions, John, The percept within the perceptual judgment--as I noted Nathan Houser as saying--is a firstness. The percept is not an abstraction. As a sign its a rhematic iconic qualisign. Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 8:41 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments. Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out). John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. Frederik, lists, Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper The Scent of Truth (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. Nathan writes: The importance of perception is that in what Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of text, at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an intellectual component into consciousness. We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, and we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . (CP 7.643) We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and secondness, are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other' that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness. What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of the word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A judgment involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at this primitive level of thought. Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational, so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called) by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences' (CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived) to the maxim: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.' (CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2) These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw, Cathy Legg wrote that in the QA of a paper she presented at APA recently she was asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She thought it was a good question. I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in the paragraph just above provides a neat answer: it is the sensory component in perception). Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch.
I find this discussion very interesting. In it deals with some issues that I have raised in the past about the experience of firstness. I maintained there is no such thing in itself (except as an abstraction). These passages and discussion seem to me to confirm that view in a way that I have no problem with. What we work with, when we work with perceptions, are judgments. Furthermore, this is also in line with what I have said about abduction coming first. In order to deal with sensations we must classify them, which requires and abduction. We can't do other kinds of reasoning without this first classification (right or wrong, as it may turn out). John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: April 25, 2015 2:46 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8438] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. Frederik, lists, Frederik, thank you for these very helpful remarks. Coincidentally. on the recommendation of Torkild Thellefsen I've recently read Nathan Houser's paper The Scent of Truth (Semiotica 153 - 1/4 (2005), 455 - 466). I recommended the paper to Ben Udell, so he may sound in on this as well. Nathan writes: The importance of perception is that in what Peirce calls ''the perceptual judgment'' it attaches the equivalent of text, at the propositional level, to sensations, and, in so doing, introduces an intellectual component into consciousness. We know nothing about the percept otherwise than by testimony of the perceptual judgment, excepting that we feel the blow of it, the reaction of it against us, and we see the contents of it arranged into an object, in its totality . . . (CP 7.643) We might say that sensations, composed of elements of firstness and secondness, are apprehended on a higher plane, where the feeling component is recognized as characteristic of (a sign of ) something else (the 'other' that is indexically indicated by the element of secondness). Perception adds a symbolical component to consciousness and in so doing introduces the mediatory element constitutive of thirdness. What is the essential ingredient or element in the elevation of sensations to perceptions or, in other words, in the movement from the second level of consciousness to the third level? The clue is in Peirce's use of the word 'judgment' to distinguish the perceptual element that serves as the starting point of knowledge from its pre-intellectual antecedents. A judgment involves an act of inference or, at any rate, nearly so, and in what else could we expect to find the source of intellect? Of the three kinds of inference identified by Peirce, it is only abduction that can operate at this primitive level of thought. Strictly speaking, according to Peirce, perceptual judgments are the result of a process that is too uncontrolled to be regarded as fully rational, so one cannot say unequivocally that perceptual judgments arise from sensations (or percepts, as the sensory component in perception is called) by an act of abductive inference, but Peirce insisted that 'abductive inference shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of demarcation between them' and that 'our first premisses, the perceptual judgments, are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences' (CP 5.181). This helps explain Peirce's commitment (somewhat reconceived) to the maxim: 'Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.' (CP 5.181). (The scent of truth, 461-2) These passages seem to support what you just wrote. Do you agree? Btw, Cathy Legg wrote that in the QA of a paper she presented at APA recently she was asked exactly what is a percept in the perceptual judgment. She thought it was a good question. I think Nathan's parenthetical remark in the paragraph just above provides a neat answer: it is the sensory component in perception). Best, Gary [Gary Richmond] Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 1:19 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote: Dear Gary, lists In the discussion of this P quote : If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the general, I grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in our very perceptual judgments, and all reasoning, so far as it depends on necessary reasoning, that is to say, mathematical reasoning, turns upon the perception of generality and continuity at every step (CP 5.150) it may be too easy to get the impression that as there is no immediate consciousness of generality, there must be, instead, perception as immediate consciousness of First- and Secondness from which generatlity is then, later, construed by acts of inference, generalization etc. But that would be to conform Peirce to the schema of logical empiricism
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8412] Re: Natural Propositions,
Bob, The problem I see with that is it assumes that the classes on which the induction works are given already. This is also a problem with Bayesian methods. One of the problems in science is that the classes are often not obvious, and scientific work often involves reclassifications. In the case of people working with different paradigms (say, for example, of information), the problem can be intractable until some overarching view is found or constructed. Everyday concepts like emeralds and green may not seem to cause any trouble, but then there is Nelson Goodman's (in)famous grue paradox. Abduction comes first because it gives the conditions for belonging to a class (one that is to be hoped to be scientifically useful). Best, John From: Bob Logan [mailto:lo...@physics.utoronto.ca] Sent: April 23, 2015 12:55 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 Subject: [biosemiotics:8412] Re: Natural Propositions, Could not a process of induction not lead to abduction. I see a few cases and then I create a hypothesis based on the pattern I observed by induction. The pattern arises through induction after which I formulate or abduce a hypothesis (funny verb abduce that I never encountered before but if one can deduce and induce why not abduce). Of course if one's abduction is too wild there is the danger of abductio ad absurdum. __ Robert K. Logan Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/loganhttp://www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publicationshttp://www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications On 2015-04-23, at 11:12 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote: I agree with Howard's introduction of a concept of complementarity. I only suggest further that the incompatibility between induction and abduction is also not absolute. The debate about Bohr's complementarity is a propos here. Is complementarity a simple juxtaposition, or is there some dynamic relation between the processes being operated in reasoning? Joseph - Original Message - From: Howard Patteemailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Frederik Stjernfeltmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu%201 Sent: Thursday, April 23, 2015 6:24 AM Subject: [biosemiotics:8408] Re: Natural Propositions, At 12:57 AM 4/23/2015, Joseph Brenner wrote: Peirce's 'lumping' of the alleged opposites of induction and abduction is, rather the recognition that the opposition between them is not so absolute, and indeed they have 'a common feature'. Further, if the criterion for judgement is only the effectiveness of the arguments they yield, this is not the difference between yes and no. This is my answer to Howard's question. Thank you, Joseph, for a very pragmatic answer with which I agree. I still prefer to think of induction and abduction as a case of complementarity -- two logically incompatible views, both irreducible one to the other, but both necessary in the search for truth.. Howard - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: What is information and how is it related to 'entropy' ?
I am inclined to agree, Jerry, but I think your concept of entropy is too narrow. Thermodynamics has been subsumed under statistical mechanics which is both more general and more powerful. Boltzmann grounded it in what he called the complexions of a system, by which he meant the independent physical variants. The maximal entropy of a system macrostate occurs when all of its complexions are equally likely, in accord with the famous Boltzmann equation. Heat capacities and the like can in principle be calculated from these (Maxwell made some pretty good progress during his lifetime), as can other special cases. But I would submit that anything that has Boltzmann complexions will have an entropy with all of the properties that are general to entropy (1st Law, 2nd Law, 3rd Law in particular). This is not true of entropies that are not based on physical complexions, most notoriously the Shannon entropy. However, I fear the battle to restrict 'entropy' at the very least to cases that involve the three laws of thermodynamics (which incidentally are only true statisitically) was lost a long time ago. Regards, John -Original Message- From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: April 6, 2015 8:14 PM To: A. Mani; Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: What is information and how is it related to 'entropy' ? Dear Professor Mani: Your post is an excellent example of how the meaning of a unique scientific term, coined for an exact reason to be consistent with a particular theory, changes it meaning by adding adjectives that demand a separate meaning. neighbourhood systems, extensions to fuzzy sets Neither of these meanings is related to thermo-dynamics. Probably not related to temporal direction either if my reading of your usage of: contribute to specific perspectives of understanding the ontology of information semantics relative the systems if correct. To understand these usages, one must have a grasp of the essential relations between mathematics and thermodynamics. Neither of these two terms relate to the essential nature of either heat capacity or temporal direction, do they? The persistent attempt to extend the concept of entropy to being a driving force for evolution/emergence is simply beyond the pale of scientific meaning. In this case, after the context of heat capacity and temporal direction are sacrificed , mathematics itself is left behind. Or, do you see this as otherwise? My plea is simple. If scientists wish to denote a new concept, then coin a new word or at least a phrase that places the meaning in context. Of course, this plea will often follow on deaf ears. My question to you is: Is it possible to use a crisp form of hybrid logic to separate your meanings of entropy from thermodynamic entropy? Cheers Jerry On Apr 6, 2015, at 3:06 PM, A. Mani wrote: On Sat, Apr 4, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: From a mathematical point of view, an entropy or uncertainty measure is simply a measure on distributions that achieves its maximum when the distribution is uniform. It is thus a measure of dispersion or uniformity. Measures like these can be applied to distributions that arise in any given domain of phenomena, in which case they have various specialized meanings and implications. When it comes to applications in communication and inquiry, the information of a sign or message is measured by its power to reduce uncertainty. The following essay may be useful to some listers: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information Adding to the discussion entropy has been extended to neighbourhood systems, granulations with the intent of capturing roughness and information uncertainty in rough set theory. There are extensions to fuzzy sets as well. These measures essentially contribute to specific perspectives of understanding the ontology of information semantics relative the systems The measures implicitly assume a frequentist position - the probabilistic connections are not good enough. When fuzzy granulations are used, then the interpretation (by analogy with probabilistic idealisation) breaks down further. Regards A. Mani Prof(Miss) A. Mani CU, ASL, AMS, ISRS, CLC, CMS HomePage: http://www.logicamani.in Blog: http://logicamani.blogspot.in/ http://about.me/logicamani sip:girlprofes...@ekiga.net - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists
Quite, Clark. We have some people who still believe meaning is fully determined and that one can determine truth or falsity thereby. This is a view that does not understand how language works. Peirce recognized that making meanings clear was a process, not an endpoint. This is an endpoint that at present does not exist, and I think there is little reason to think it will exist in the near future. In the meantime we have to keep out options open. To do other is to close down creativity (see my Informal Pragmatics and Linguistic Creativityhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Informal%20pragmatics%20and%20Linguistic%20Creativity%20version2.pdf, South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014 for my most recent statement) and, as I argued in a recent post, just push the problem further back. The article uses Peirce, of course. Best, John From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: April 2, 2015 7:22 PM To: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists On Apr 2, 2015, at 11:00 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.netmailto:jawb...@att.net wrote: An empirical proposition is falsifiable if a counterexample is logically possible. When we go for a long enough time without observing a counterexample, which may involve creating experimental conditions under which a counterexample should occur, then we begin to believe that there is some natural constraint ruling against it and we act on that belief as if it were true. And it may well be - time will tell. One of Popper's problems was that he did not always distinguish the logical status of an unfalsifiable proposition from the psychological status of a proposition that some people do not wish to disbelieve. Just coming back and *way* behind in posts. But I agree that the problem with logical positivism and in particular Popper's purported refutation was confusing logical status with the more complicated issues. Popper notes that logical positivism treats laws in a logical form like All X is Y so a single counter-example refutes it but a slew of positive examples don't confirm it. This seems really insightful until you move from the logical form to the question of doing the reduction to the logical form. Then you find that everything is so theory laden that a falsification is no better than a confirmation. So for instance if you had a measurement that the Newton's law was wrong (ignoring relativity for now) do you say you're refuted Newton or do you assume there's an other body out there or something else you've missed? Quine gets at this. While Quine has his own problems he does avoid a lot of the oversimplifications of the logical positivists or most of their first generation of critics. Honestly I've long thought the Vienna Circle just took a series of missteps by missing several of Peirce's key insights. (To be fair Peirce just wasn't well known and most of pragmatism was seen through the lens of James who tended not to follow Peirce's logic) While the positivists adopt a verification account quite similar to the pragmatic maxim how they use it goes very much against the spirit of it. Albeit in a different direction from how James used it. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists
Jon, There is a tradition through neoPlatonist, medieval Arabic thought and Leibniz through more recently to various physicists that is in tune with the paper I posted about. The methodology is fairly well established. It is the results of the paper that are of concern. Though I originally posted it to reflect two discussions on the list previously, the origin of time and the nature of information. John From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: March 31, 2015 9:00 PM To: John Collier Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Subject: Re: Article on origin of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists John, List, Ontological questions are always interesting but aside from the weak bonds of some putative anthropic principle they don't bear that heavily on methodological questions. Whether we view the Big Bang as a singular haecceity, a spontaneous occurrence, or simply inexplicable, our current beliefs about the origin of the universe have arisen through applications of the inquiry process progressing through the millennia from primitive to fully scientific forms. Those beliefs may change tomorrow afternoon or a hundred years from now as new evidence pops up or accumulates over time but if and when they do it will be through further applications of the same tradition of inquiry. Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Mar 30, 2015, at 11:47 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Dear lists, The following article is relevant to issues of “What came before the Big Bang?”, the evolution of laws in the universe and some others. It cites, among others, David Layzer and myself, and generally follows the approaches that we have argued for. It also brings together other related material from other sources related to symmetry breaking (information formation, and, if on a cosmic scale, law formation). In particular it invokes the “no boundary conditions” requirement for a satisfactory cosmological theory (favoured by Hawking, Smolin, Layzer and many other cosmologists). The authors give this condition as that the universe originated in a singularity that is not knowable, since it contains no information. Information, here, is of course the physicists’ notion of “it from bit”, used in cosmology, the study of black holes and in some branches of Quantum Theory (quantum computation and quantum field theory in particular), according to which energy and matter are incidental, and information (distinctness) is fundamental. The paper is Spontaneous Creation of the Universe Ex Nihilo Maya Lincoln Electronic Address: maya.linc...@processgene.commailto:maya.linc...@processgene.com Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel Avi Wasser Electronic Address: awas...@research.haifa.ac.ilmailto:awas...@research.haifa.ac.il Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel It can be found online with a good search engine. The paper is a sketch of the theory rather than a theory (as they say “a first step”). I don’t think it differs all that much from David Layzer’s views, judging by my discussions with him about twenty years ago. But perhaps it is more boldly stated. I am not satisfied that it really resolves the issue of why there is something rather than nothing, but if it does, it makes the existence of the Universe necessary rather than contingent. Cheers, John John Collier, Philosophy, UKZN, Durban 4041 http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe
Steven, I am not just asserting it, I am pointing to research traditions with empirical results. The researchers involved are not idealists in any sense I can see. You are stubbornly holding on to your idea of information and it is blinding you to how the idea has been used by physicists for several decades now. I don’t expect you to follow the work, but I take exception to you dissing it when you clearly do not understand its basis, as evidenced by your attributing incorrect attributes to it. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 7:55 PM To: John Collier Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe If there is anything that I have learned at all, ever and anywhere, it is that because people think for a long time that it is so, it does not make it so. This is why humanity invented the scientific method and it is the entire reason for Epistemology as a discipline ... to keep us honest. You may persuade yourself of anything at all in its absence. The basis of this method is Empiricism, the actual measurement of motion. If this is what the discussion reduces to then I am happy and I do not care what you call it as long as we understand that there is a distinction, a necessary distinction, between the conception of measure, the idea, and the world. Because, for example, measure is discrete, it does not follow that the subject of the measure is, in fact, discrete. The power of assertion must stand aside. I understand the power of information as an IDEA, just as I understand the power of the notion of communication as an IDEA, but neither can have existential status unless you are a strict idealist and assert that ideas exist. From my point of view, Ideas must become the subject of Empirical measure - we must, as we have done for gravitation and electromagnetism, measure the motions produced by ideas. Given that ideas are necessarily measurable in this way, they cannot be first anywhere - denying strict Idealism as the basis of the world. Asserting it is otherwise makes no sense. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 2:30 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: “It from bit.” Information as the ground of “stuff”. Well I guess you have to have a modicum of understanding of the physics (my original field). To understand what is meant by the slogan it helps to study the writings on the topic of Wheeler, Gell-Mann and Seth Lloyd, and the literature on Hawking radiation helps (I’d stay away from Paul Davies’ work, which is too idealistic for my taste and probably yours). I have been thinking of information as “stuff” since I was an undergraduate, and I have also talked with a number of these people or their students, and was able to match the idea up with my understanding of physics. I suppose these interactions were important to my understanding in the way that Kuhn argues that membership in a research group is required to fully understand how a research program can be carried forward. I’ve been asked on occasion what entropy is in job interviews and I have to say that you can’t understand it in a few words. You need to work with it, dealing with real problems. Some very smart people I know got it wrong in their undergraduate physics and physical chemistry course. It is not an easy concept. The relationship between entropy and information (as stuff) is at least as difficult, but opens the door to understanding information as stuff. BY the way, one of my students, Scott Muller, took my ideas of intrinsic information and origin of information through symmetry breaking much further than I did in his PhD thesis, published as Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information https://books.google.com.br/books?id=oMFsko4E9FQCpg=PA89lpg=PA89dq=asymmetry+principle+of+information+mullersource=blots=lO024N84sasig=1LDiHZu1Jyet8ABBpTPZ3NJ-UUchl=ensa=Xei=9LsZVdn8C8P3yQS-4YDQAQved=0CCYQ6AEwAQ#v=onepageq=asymmetry%20principle%20of%20information%20mullerf=false Scott uses group theory to show that information content is not a relative quantity, as Jaynes thought, but is specific to the asymmetries in a structure. He gives a number of simple examples, but the argument is fairly abstract. But as I was suggesting above, the meat is really in the applications to real cases and the capacity to extend them to other cases. Scott’s background is in physical chemistry (PhD), philosophy (PhD) and programming (his occupation). That said, so far the article I initiated this discussion with is a step too far for me. But it does illustrate, right or wrong, that time needn’t exist prior to the universe, and that there is another, logical, sense of priority. If we accept Rosen’s idea of logic mirroring causal connection, then this latter is a form of causal priority. The problem I see
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe
Sorry, Steven, I don't see any ad hominem fallacy here, I was stating that it didn't make sense to continue this discussion since your preconceptions blind you to views that don't fit them in this case. The reasons to me are fairly obvious, but if I am correct, you would not be able to see them. So further discussion is pointless. I don't grasp poetry very well, and most others can see that, but it isn't an ad hominem fallacy for someone to say that I won't understand something because I don't understand poetry very well. In any case, I see the problem as working from different paradigms, which are also pragmatically incommensurable. I wrote my PhD topic on the issue, so I am pretty good at detecting incommensurability. As Kuhn, argues, the only way out is to go native, which is what I advised you to do, but you do not see the point, dismissing the work I suggested, which I am sure makes sense to you from your perspective. Otherwise, maybe, you are just being stubborn, but I don't think so. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.com stevenzen...@gmail.com on behalf of Steven Ericsson-Zenith ste...@iase.us Sent: 01 April 2015 23:03 To: John Collier Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe Perhaps it is not I that will not accept (the ad hominem) of anything that does not fit my conceptions? You are making unjustified accusations as far as I can see - and this is not merely because my own opinions differ from the mainstream of physics on information theory. I am certainly able to understand an argument even if I disagree with it. In fact, I see nothing in what you have said to actually disagree with, except in the matter of the ideal. And so we, you and I, are an example here. Information, as you said, is necessary (or base covariant) distinctions, observable/measurable in behavior. Shannon's mathematics is informative, it highlights the nature of distinctions and the quantifiable limits of their apprehension (their transmission). For me, at least, communication is an idea and not something that actually happens. It is something that we speak about. In apprehension, Shannon's work is informative in the above way, it tells us more about what is happening. It informs us concerning the nature of information and it is for this reason that it is the corner stone of modern information theory. In information theory it is important to understand the separation of ideas: i.e., the message from the messenger. Regards, Steven On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 1:35 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: I think we will have to agree to disagree, Steven. You are going to object to anything that doesn’t fit your notion of information. The trend is pretty obvious. I said before that I thought your preconceptions do not allow you to see other approaches, and I now take that as confirmed. So further discussion on this is pointless. Fortunately that doesn’t make discussion on other issues a problem. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: April 1, 2015 5:29 PM To: John Collier Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe Yes, I understood all this going in. Seth Lloyd, whom I like very much, is more less grounded than I'd like. Muller's thesis, with all respect, did not impress me. Where, exactly, was the error I supposedly made? :-) Characterizing black hole behavior is an evolving dynamic, far from resolved. It is an assumption on the part of theorists that information cannot be lost, but the evidence appears to the contrary. I'm not even sure that the discussion has a consistent reference. What they mean, from my point of view, when they say information cannot be lost is that processes are reversible, but there is, in fact, no evidence at all that processes should be reversible in the way described - Susskind's wishful thinking of wait forever and it must happen aside. There is a failure here to understand the nature and scale of combinortorics. Steven On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 1:12 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Steven, I I suggest the work by the physicists I have mentioned, and also Scott Muller’s book on information. Shannon was brilliant in communication theory, but communication theory is not information theory. You can find the idea of distinctions making a difference in writings of Arabic philosophers like ibn Arabi and later in Leibniz, who Arabi indirectly influenced. The applications of the ideas by more recent physicists are designed
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe
I think we will have to agree to disagree, Steven. You are going to object to anything that doesn’t fit your notion of information. The trend is pretty obvious. I said before that I thought your preconceptions do not allow you to see other approaches, and I now take that as confirmed. So further discussion on this is pointless. Fortunately that doesn’t make discussion on other issues a problem. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: April 1, 2015 5:29 PM To: John Collier Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe Yes, I understood all this going in. Seth Lloyd, whom I like very much, is more less grounded than I'd like. Muller's thesis, with all respect, did not impress me. Where, exactly, was the error I supposedly made? :-) Characterizing black hole behavior is an evolving dynamic, far from resolved. It is an assumption on the part of theorists that information cannot be lost, but the evidence appears to the contrary. I'm not even sure that the discussion has a consistent reference. What they mean, from my point of view, when they say information cannot be lost is that processes are reversible, but there is, in fact, no evidence at all that processes should be reversible in the way described - Susskind's wishful thinking of wait forever and it must happen aside. There is a failure here to understand the nature and scale of combinortorics. Steven On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 1:12 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Steven, I I suggest the work by the physicists I have mentioned, and also Scott Muller’s book on information. Shannon was brilliant in communication theory, but communication theory is not information theory. You can find the idea of distinctions making a difference in writings of Arabic philosophers like ibn Arabi and later in Leibniz, who Arabi indirectly influenced. The applications of the ideas by more recent physicists are designed to explain and predict things like the activity at the boundaries of black holes (information cannot disappear is a basic tenet of the problem they are investigating – obviously this is not Shannon information, which certainly can disappear). Seth Lloyd goes a step further and hypothesizes the world is a quantum computer. Information, of course, is a distinction that makes a difference. Shannon’s work is an application of the basic idea of information. But it is a relatively restricted (nongeneric) application, though within the restrictions there are a lot of cases. Mathematically Shannon's formalism has been shown to be equivalent to algorithmic information theory and some other formats that don’t presuppose either probability or combinatorics (Chaitin, Kolmogorov, Ingarden). But of course common mathematical models don’t imply sameness of kind in the real world. So it is possible to use the combinatoric version of Shannon’s approach and apply it (via group theory) to intrinsic information (Muller) and to the information flows at the boundaries of black holes (though “boundary” is a bit misleading). Lloyd discusses this case in his book Programming the Universe - Random House, which is a semi-popular introduction. His PhD thesis was Black Holes, Demons and the Loss of Coherence: How complex systems get information, and what they do with it.http://meche.mit.edu/documents/slloyd_thesis.pdf (Ph.D. thesis). The Rockefeller Universityhttps://www.wikiwand.com/en/The_Rockefeller_University. IIn any case, as you say, this has little to do with biological information or biosemiotics, which does involve things like coding (transfer RNA encodes information in DNA, for example, which eventually decoded in ribosomes to make proteins, though the code is certainly not 1-1). I gave an account of biological information flow that does not invoke Shannon, but does deal with semantic aspects (I have previously recommended the work on distributed information flow this is based on to Sung). In fact one of the more slippery problems for the people who work on information flow (mostly at Stanford) is how to incorporate Shannon information. Intuitively it seems obvious, but it is mathematically tricky. Conceptually tricky is how to integrate information flow through a channel with biosemiotics. A group of us have one paper that addresses the issue, with some examples. It can be found on my web page if anyone is interested (published in Biosemiotics). I think a lot more work is required. Regards, John From: stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: April 1, 2015 3:50 PM To: John Collier; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists
Oh, I think they make sense. The question is whether the mathematics can do what the authors claim. This requires a bit deeper analysis than you have shown, so I retain my belief that you are considering what they say as having interpretation that fits your usages, and probably not theirs. Of course you would not be able to see this if I am right. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 3:04 PM To: John Collier Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Edwina Taborsky; Biosemiotics; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists That is not the source of my criticism. My criticism is toward the mathematics, that make not sense what so ever. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 11:03 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Steven, You can use words however you want, but to criticize a view because it uses words differently than you do and to put your own interpretation on it is just silly, and should be dismissed and disregarded. There is certain information in the paper. Like all information it requires interpretation to be meaningful. You seem not to understand this. I think there are severe problems with the paper, but the ones you find laughable are very much beside the point. Irrelevant. To be dismissed as pointless. Misconceived. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 2:35 PM To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Biosemiotics; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edumailto:peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists Information is a way of speaking about that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause. Where I use the term knowledge in the general Liberal Physicalist sense to refer to that which determines subsequent action. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 10:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Steven - are you saying that information 'is nothing'? Edwina - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson-Zenithmailto:ste...@iase.us To: Biosemioticsmailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu)mailto:peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Sent: Monday, March 30, 2015 1:22 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists Stunningly comical. Energy from information ... an unplausible mathematical description of something from nothing. It goes to show what you get from an ungrounded purely mathematical education. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 9:47 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Dear lists, The following article is relevant to issues of “What came before the Big Bang?”, the evolution of laws in the universe and some others. It cites, among others, David Layzer and myself, and generally follows the approaches that we have argued for. It also brings together other related material from other sources related to symmetry breaking (information formation, and, if on a cosmic scale, law formation). In particular it invokes the “no boundary conditions” requirement for a satisfactory cosmological theory (favoured by Hawking, Smolin, Layzer and many other cosmologists). The authors give this condition as that the universe originated in a singularity that is not knowable, since it contains no information. Information, here, is of course the physicists’ notion of “it from bit”, used in cosmology, the study of black holes and in some branches of Quantum Theory (quantum computation and quantum field theory in particular), according to which energy and matter are incidental, and information (distinctness) is fundamental. The paper is Spontaneous Creation of the Universe Ex Nihilo Maya Lincoln Electronic Address: maya.linc...@processgene.commailto:maya.linc...@processgene.com Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel Avi Wasser Electronic Address: awas...@research.haifa.ac.ilmailto:awas...@research.haifa.ac.il Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel It can be found online with a good search engine. The paper is a sketch of the theory rather than a theory (as they say “a first step”). I don’t think it differs all that much from David Layzer’s views, judging by my discussions with him about twenty years ago. But perhaps it is more boldly stated. I am not satisfied that it really resolves the issue of why there is something rather than nothing, but if it does, it makes the existence of the Universe necessary rather than contingent. Cheers
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists
Steven, You can use words however you want, but to criticize a view because it uses words differently than you do and to put your own interpretation on it is just silly, and should be dismissed and disregarded. There is certain information in the paper. Like all information it requires interpretation to be meaningful. You seem not to understand this. I think there are severe problems with the paper, but the ones you find laughable are very much beside the point. Irrelevant. To be dismissed as pointless. Misconceived. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 2:35 PM To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Biosemiotics; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists Information is a way of speaking about that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause. Where I use the term knowledge in the general Liberal Physicalist sense to refer to that which determines subsequent action. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 10:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Steven - are you saying that information 'is nothing'? Edwina - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson-Zenithmailto:ste...@iase.us To: Biosemioticsmailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu)mailto:peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Sent: Monday, March 30, 2015 1:22 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists Stunningly comical. Energy from information ... an unplausible mathematical description of something from nothing. It goes to show what you get from an ungrounded purely mathematical education. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 9:47 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Dear lists, The following article is relevant to issues of “What came before the Big Bang?”, the evolution of laws in the universe and some others. It cites, among others, David Layzer and myself, and generally follows the approaches that we have argued for. It also brings together other related material from other sources related to symmetry breaking (information formation, and, if on a cosmic scale, law formation). In particular it invokes the “no boundary conditions” requirement for a satisfactory cosmological theory (favoured by Hawking, Smolin, Layzer and many other cosmologists). The authors give this condition as that the universe originated in a singularity that is not knowable, since it contains no information. Information, here, is of course the physicists’ notion of “it from bit”, used in cosmology, the study of black holes and in some branches of Quantum Theory (quantum computation and quantum field theory in particular), according to which energy and matter are incidental, and information (distinctness) is fundamental. The paper is Spontaneous Creation of the Universe Ex Nihilo Maya Lincoln Electronic Address: maya.linc...@processgene.commailto:maya.linc...@processgene.com Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel Avi Wasser Electronic Address: awas...@research.haifa.ac.ilmailto:awas...@research.haifa.ac.il Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel It can be found online with a good search engine. The paper is a sketch of the theory rather than a theory (as they say “a first step”). I don’t think it differs all that much from David Layzer’s views, judging by my discussions with him about twenty years ago. But perhaps it is more boldly stated. I am not satisfied that it really resolves the issue of why there is something rather than nothing, but if it does, it makes the existence of the Universe necessary rather than contingent. Cheers, John John Collier, Philosophy, UKZN, Durban 4041 http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists
Not enough detail to understand what your beef with it is, Steven. They refer to some plausible work that argues that information is logically prior to matter and energy (not temporally on most accounts) and time (or at least temporal direction). What I have trouble with is the idea that the distinction between being and not being is forced into existence in a random but self-organizing way (all possibilities being present – what determines the possibility space?). It is a commonplace in several mystical traditions I have studied, but while I think it is mathematically possible (it isn’t contradictory), I don’t find it satisfying. This is not sufficient reason to dismiss it, though, I think. Better people than me have found it believable, but I remain sceptical, perhaps a fault of my understanding. I have no problem with the model if QM (or something succeeding it that includes all four fundamental forces) is presumed, which they don’t do. The presumption of original quantum fluctuations is basically Layzer’s view, with varyingly complex bubbles distinguished by chance through distinctions (symmetry breaking) in the quantum field, whatever constitutes it. I have no problem with that, though I don’t think we know what constitutes the universal quantum field yet, since we haven’t explained quantum gravity, dark matter or dark energy, but the process of symmetry breaking and emergence of new forms (like the very early separation of matter and energy) are fairly well confirmed, and presumably the preceding processes are similar. What exactly is your beef? John From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 3:33 PM To: John Collier Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Edwina Taborsky; Biosemiotics; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists I understand what you say but that really is not it. I do try to interpret mathematical physics in non-philosophical ways. The base assumptions have no justification and the mathematical leaps are simply not credible. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 11:08 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Oh, I think they make sense. The question is whether the mathematics can do what the authors claim. This requires a bit deeper analysis than you have shown, so I retain my belief that you are considering what they say as having interpretation that fits your usages, and probably not theirs. Of course you would not be able to see this if I am right. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 3:04 PM To: John Collier Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Edwina Taborsky; Biosemiotics; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edumailto:peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists That is not the source of my criticism. My criticism is toward the mathematics, that make not sense what so ever. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 11:03 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Steven, You can use words however you want, but to criticize a view because it uses words differently than you do and to put your own interpretation on it is just silly, and should be dismissed and disregarded. There is certain information in the paper. Like all information it requires interpretation to be meaningful. You seem not to understand this. I think there are severe problems with the paper, but the ones you find laughable are very much beside the point. Irrelevant. To be dismissed as pointless. Misconceived. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.commailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 2:35 PM To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenith; Biosemiotics; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edumailto:peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists Information is a way of speaking about that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause. Where I use the term knowledge in the general Liberal Physicalist sense to refer to that which determines subsequent action. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 10:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Steven - are you saying that information 'is nothing'? Edwina - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson-Zenithmailto:ste...@iase.us To: Biosemioticsmailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu)mailto:peirc
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8156] Re: Article on origina of the universe
with the outline provided by John Collier. To me, information has nothing to do with the secondary level of speaking about something. And of course, no requirement therefore for 'adding to knowledge' and 'identifying cause'. Those are secondary levels. Edwina - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson-Zenithmailto:ste...@iase.us To: Edwina Taborskymailto:tabor...@primus.ca Cc: Steven Ericsson-Zenithmailto:ste...@iase.us ; Biosemioticsmailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu)mailto:peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Sent: Monday, March 30, 2015 1:35 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists Information is a way of speaking about that which adds to knowledge and identifies cause. Where I use the term knowledge in the general Liberal Physicalist sense to refer to that which determines subsequent action. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 10:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca wrote: Steven - are you saying that information 'is nothing'? Edwina - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson-Zenithmailto:ste...@iase.us To: Biosemioticsmailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Peirce Discussion Forum (peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu)mailto:peirc...@iulist.iupui.edu) Sent: Monday, March 30, 2015 1:22 PM Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8138] Article on origina of the universe relevant to some recent discussions on these lists Stunningly comical. Energy from information ... an unplausible mathematical description of something from nothing. It goes to show what you get from an ungrounded purely mathematical education. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 9:47 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Dear lists, The following article is relevant to issues of “What came before the Big Bang?”, the evolution of laws in the universe and some others. It cites, among others, David Layzer and myself, and generally follows the approaches that we have argued for. It also brings together other related material from other sources related to symmetry breaking (information formation, and, if on a cosmic scale, law formation). In particular it invokes the “no boundary conditions” requirement for a satisfactory cosmological theory (favoured by Hawking, Smolin, Layzer and many other cosmologists). The authors give this condition as that the universe originated in a singularity that is not knowable, since it contains no information. Information, here, is of course the physicists’ notion of “it from bit”, used in cosmology, the study of black holes and in some branches of Quantum Theory (quantum computation and quantum field theory in particular), according to which energy and matter are incidental, and information (distinctness) is fundamental. The paper is Spontaneous Creation of the Universe Ex Nihilo Maya Lincoln Electronic Address: maya.linc...@processgene.commailto:maya.linc...@processgene.com Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel Avi Wasser Electronic Address: awas...@research.haifa.ac.ilmailto:awas...@research.haifa.ac.il Affiliation: University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel It can be found online with a good search engine. The paper is a sketch of the theory rather than a theory (as they say “a first step”). I don’t think it differs all that much from David Layzer’s views, judging by my discussions with him about twenty years ago. But perhaps it is more boldly stated. I am not satisfied that it really resolves the issue of why there is something rather than nothing, but if it does, it makes the existence of the Universe necessary rather than contingent. Cheers, John John Collier, Philosophy, UKZN, Durban 4041 http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe
“It from bit.” Information as the ground of “stuff”. Well I guess you have to have a modicum of understanding of the physics (my original field). To understand what is meant by the slogan it helps to study the writings on the topic of Wheeler, Gell-Mann and Seth Lloyd, and the literature on Hawking radiation helps (I’d stay away from Paul Davies’ work, which is too idealistic for my taste and probably yours). I have been thinking of information as “stuff” since I was an undergraduate, and I have also talked with a number of these people or their students, and was able to match the idea up with my understanding of physics. I suppose these interactions were important to my understanding in the way that Kuhn argues that membership in a research group is required to fully understand how a research program can be carried forward. I’ve been asked on occasion what entropy is in job interviews and I have to say that you can’t understand it in a few words. You need to work with it, dealing with real problems. Some very smart people I know got it wrong in their undergraduate physics and physical chemistry course. It is not an easy concept. The relationship between entropy and information (as stuff) is at least as difficult, but opens the door to understanding information as stuff. BY the way, one of my students, Scott Muller, took my ideas of intrinsic information and origin of information through symmetry breaking much further than I did in his PhD thesis, published as Asymmetry: The Foundation of Information https://books.google.com.br/books?id=oMFsko4E9FQCpg=PA89lpg=PA89dq=asymmetry+principle+of+information+mullersource=blots=lO024N84sasig=1LDiHZu1Jyet8ABBpTPZ3NJ-UUchl=ensa=Xei=9LsZVdn8C8P3yQS-4YDQAQved=0CCYQ6AEwAQ#v=onepageq=asymmetry%20principle%20of%20information%20mullerf=false Scott uses group theory to show that information content is not a relative quantity, as Jaynes thought, but is specific to the asymmetries in a structure. He gives a number of simple examples, but the argument is fairly abstract. But as I was suggesting above, the meat is really in the applications to real cases and the capacity to extend them to other cases. Scott’s background is in physical chemistry (PhD), philosophy (PhD) and programming (his occupation). That said, so far the article I initiated this discussion with is a step too far for me. But it does illustrate, right or wrong, that time needn’t exist prior to the universe, and that there is another, logical, sense of priority. If we accept Rosen’s idea of logic mirroring causal connection, then this latter is a form of causal priority. The problem I see is not the use of the information concept, but the basis of the distinction space and what determines it. The paper gives nothing but existence and non-existence, which is pretty spare. John From: stevenzen...@gmail.com [mailto:stevenzen...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Steven Ericsson-Zenith Sent: March 30, 2015 5:50 PM To: John Collier Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8162] Re: Article on origina of the universe Here's my problem with this. Simply stating that information is stuff is insufficient. It from Bit is a cute slogan but nowhere (and I mean NOWHERE) near good enough. Steven On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Yeh, the sort of information talked about in the article is “stuff”. It from bit. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.camailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: March 30, 2015 5:18 PM To: Biosemiotics; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:8156] Re: Article on origina of the universe Steven - I'd agree that information is, as it exists, an action. In my view, matter only exists as 'organized' and thus is in a differentiated form, which is to say, it is 'in-formation'. BUT this organization operates within networked interactions; in other words - there is no such thing as, for example, an isolate 'bit' of matter unconnected to other matter. Everything is interactive, is networked, is in that sense, 'in action' and in interaction. So, I would say that this is an 'active description of information'. Not a passive definition. i don't think that energy or matter exist per se. They exist only as in-formed, as organized into a particular differentiated unit - i.e, as information. As we know, energy exists in our universe only as matter (Einstein)...and I'm agreeing that this matter isn't unorganized but is organized into a differentiation from other matter. However, you and I disagree on the meaning of information. You seem to say that it is 'ideas'; while I am defining information as organized matter. The analytic outline of this organized matter, the conscious sign of this organized matter - is an 'idea'. But that is secondary to the basic ontological reality that is information..i.e., that organized unit
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Bayes and abduction
Ironic, yes, and it shows how dependent Bayes methods are on priors. Pick bad priors (and that can even involve assigning equal probability to all unknowns) and with a bit of bad luck you can end up in a self-confirming loop. But usually it works. My Bayesian spam detector (actually Microsoft's which is really stupid in the information it uses, and keeps blocking people on the Peirce list). John -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: March 26, 2015 7:25 PM To: Danko Nikolic Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Bayes and abduction PS. I know how to spell Bayes but my autospellbot, which is very likely a Bayesbot, thinks that a very unlikely sequence of letters. Ironic, no? Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Mar 26, 2015, at 4:24 PM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Danko, List, Bates' Rule is a mathematical theorem, that is, a deductive transformation that can at best preserve the information in the data. Thus it is explicative where abduction and induction are ampliative. This is an old controversy that Peirce had with, I think it was the Neyman-Pearson school of thought? There used to be a lot of literature and some understanding of this point among AI folk, but that may be forgotten now. That happens periodically . Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com On Mar 26, 2015, at 1:30 PM, Danko Nikolic danko.niko...@googlemail.com wrote: Dear, There was one more question that bugged me while writing the paper on practopoiesis: There has been a lot of work on Bayesian inference in the brain. So, my fear was that people who worked on Bayesian aspects of brain computation would argue that all the issues regarding logical abduction have been addressed through Bayesian-related work. First, I have to say that my fear was not really grounded and for a strange reason. It turned out that all the experts on Bayesian inference who I talked to have never heard of logical abduction. That was kind of sad, but still did not solve the problem. My intuition is that abduction is much more than Bayesian inference, but I have hard time defending this stance. Can anybody tell me more about that relation? If one shows that a neural circuit performs Bayesian inference, has it been automatically shown that the circuit can perform logical abduction? I guess not. But I would like to know more about that. The way I treated the issue in the paper was that I discussed primarily abduction and then briefly mentioned Bayes at the end as related. I am not sure whether I could have done a better job. Thank you very much. Best regards, Danko -- Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolić Web: http://www.danko-nikolic.com Mail address 1: Department of Neurophysiology Max Planck Institut for Brain Research Deutschordenstr. 46 60528 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY Mail address 2: Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies Wolfgang Goethe University Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1 60433 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY Office: (..49-69) 96769-736 Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209 Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327 danko.niko...@gmail.com - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8114] Re: Pragmatism About Theoretical Entities
Thanks, Frederik. I think that to properly call a view Platonist it must reject the existence of particulars in favour of universals. Russell fits this description because fairly early in his (long) career he explicitly rejected particulars, and argued that instances were combinations of compossible universals (whence his structuralism, and perhaps a contraction to individuals). One can be a Platonist about some domains but not others. For example there are Platonists about numbers and other parts of mathematics (Gödel), and there are the opposite about numbers (Mill and Phillip Kitcher, for example), but not necessarily about scientific laws. Hartrey Field famously rejected numbers altogether, at least with respect to the world of science. His motivation was an extreme nominalism. Peirce was not a Platonist in the sense above, with his distinction between existing and being real. I suppose (no reason to think otherwise so far) that this extends to signs. But I am not quite sure how he slices it to get a position that is more extreme than (weaker than?) Duns Scotus, which is pretty weak, but still allows universals that are not instantiated. Or perhaps I am missing what he means by 'extreme' here. I parted company with my coauthors of All Things Must Go over the existence of structures that don't interact, for of which in principle we could have no knowledge. This seemed to me to violate a Peircean principle that they started the book with, which is basically the pragmatic principle. In any case, we agree on openness of universals. Regards, John From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: March 17, 2015 8:22 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Cc: Jon Awbrey; Peirce Discussion Forum (PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu) Subject: [biosemiotics:8114] Re: Pragmatism About Theoretical Entities Dear John, lists, It may not be extreme, but I think that most current realist metaphysicians (ones who accept universals as real, like myself and David Armstrong, for example) take a line closer to the Duns Scotus one. The more extreme view seems to most to be difficult to distinguish from Platonism (e.g., my otherwise hero Bertrand Russell, who came to reject particulars entirely). This isn't to say that universals are not open-ended at any time, and that something can come to fall under a universal. I think the crux about P's realism is exactly this: that universals are open-ended at any time. He does not himself identify this with Platonism. But what is Platonism exactly, other than a pejorative which many positions use to profile themselves against? However, Frederik, there are two slippery terms in your answer that I would like more elucidation on, contracted in and comprise. My understanding of Armstrong, for example, does not have universals comprised of instances, but their reality does depend on their instantiation. Myself, I take a view slightly weaker than Armstrong in one sense, but stronger in another, and think that universals are made necessary only by logic (including 2nd order logic) or instantiation, in which case they are identical to natural kinds. I would not use the word comprise to describe this. Funnily, you address the same terms in my short summary as did Jon Awbrey. Contracted is just referring to Peirce - to his late revision of his diamond example from How to make our ideas clear: Even Duns Scotus is too nominalistic when he says that universals are contracted to the mode of individuality in singulars, meaning, as he does, by singulars, ordinary existing things. The pragmaticist cannot admit that. (1905, 8.208) Interestingly, a bit later in the same paper he addresses your issue about things, here understood as absolute individuals which he takes not to exist: For I had long before declared that absolute individuals were entia rationis, and not realities. As to comprise, I shall not insist on that term, the important idea is just that P takes universals to be continua and so to exceed any possible amount of individual realizations. Best F - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] RE: Pragmatism About Theoretical Entities
Lists, It may not be extreme, but I think that most current realist metaphysicians (ones who accept universals as real, like myself and David Armstrong, for example) take a line closer to the Duns Scotus one. The more extreme view seems to most to be difficult to distinguish from Platonism (e.g., my otherwise hero Bertrand Russell, who came to reject particulars entirely). This isn't to say that universals are not open-ended at any time, and that something can come to fall under a universal. However, Frederik, there are two slippery terms in your answer that I would like more elucidation on, contracted in and comprise. My understanding of Armstrong, for example, does not have universals comprised of instances, but their reality does depend on their instantiation. Myself, I take a view slightly weaker than Armstrong in one sense, but stronger in another, and think that universals are made necessary only by logic (including 2nd order logic) or instantiation, in which case they are identical to natural kinds. I would not use the word comprise to describe this. This is one area that I have been sceptical of Peirce's metaphysics since I first found it as an undergraduate over 40 years ago, and my scepticism has yet to be put to rest. I do believe, unlike many contemporary metaphysicians, in the existence of (some) properties (often called tropes). In fact I believe they are more fundamental than things, whose fundamental existence (here like Russell) I reject. Best, John -Original Message- From: Frederik Stjernfelt [mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk] Sent: March 11, 2015 6:19 PM To: Jon Awbrey; Peirce Discussion Forum (PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu); biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatism About Theoretical Entities Dear Jon, lists - You're right about the economy principle. But it is interesting when it was first articulated as an explicit doctrine. Calling Peirce's realism extreme, I was only quoting the man, calling himself a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe (5.470) The extremity lies in that P considered himself more realist than Dus Scotus because he rejected his idea that univerals are contracted in particulars (P claimed that universals comprise more than any possible number of particular instantiations). Best F Den 11/03/2015 kl. 21.25 skrev Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net : Inquiry Blog http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-theoretical- entities-1/ Peirce List JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467 FS:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15800 Frederik, List, Welcome one more time to the fray, where you'll find a rich array of loose threads to tangle with and loose thoughts to wrangle with, against the day, ever looming, of weaving whole cloth a Persian rug. I think we can safely stipulate that Principles Of Intellectual Economy (POIE) have been with us from the time when poets and philosophers first drew breath, or swords, as the case my be. I was becoming concerned from the tenor of our discussions about nominalism and realism that we were drifting to extremes -- I don't think of Peirce as promoting any kind of extreme realism as I don't think pragmatism is about extremes. So I gave it my best try at writing up a balanced account of the opposing pans, nominalism and realism, placing the pragmatic maxim at the examen or fulcrum. Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations Their Relatives
Jon, List, Yes, that is pretty much what I concluded. In some earlier work I pointed out that you need to take into consideration closure conditions to be certain of what entity the function is for the sake of. It might be survival of the individual, or the lineage, or population, or ? I am now working on function in ecology on a grant from Brazil; I am now on my third three month period in Brazil. Ecology is the hardest so far. I previously did a couple of papers on individuation in ecology with an ecologist, and that was hard enough. In any case, we seem to be on the same wavelength. Initial reaction among the biosemiotics crowd was mixed, and the group eventually split over issues related at least. The other group now calls themselves code biology. I maintain they are presupposing thirds even though they deny it. Their leader considers Peircean semiotics unscientific. My topic this year for the Biosemiotics Gathering is Are genes signs and if so what are they signs of? Cheers, John -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: March 5, 2015 2:01 PM To: John Collier; Helmut Raulien; Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Relations Their Relatives Re: John Collier At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15782 John, List, That is a very nice paper! It was something of a bio-trope back when I was spending a lot more time in the company of bio-sci folk to say that the phenotype was just a device for reproducing the genotype, and I think that is more or less a turn on the symmetry issue that you mention. Reading that in a Peircean frame of mind, I took it to mean that the real object of the process was neither nucleic acids nor amino acids nor proteins but some pragma of evolution about which they all turned. Regards, Jon On 3/5/2015 9:29 AM, John Collier wrote: I would agree with Jon on this. I argued that control theory/ information theory can result in a symmetry problem for explaining biological function, and that a particular notion of autonomy provides thirds (in a particular way) for biological systems. The paper is at Explaining Biological Functionality : Is Control Theory Enough? http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Final%20SAJP_30%281%29_Collier%5B1%5D.pdf South African Journal of Philosophy. 2011, 30(4): 53-62. It can also be found on the South African Journal of Philosophy site. John academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Hi Jon, What would you call the whole triadic relation in that case? I have assumed that Peirce introduced 'representamen' to avoid the potential confusion, but he isn't consistent by any means. (His care about terminology was not always manifested.) I suppose we could use 'sign triplet', being the irreducible triplet containing the sign. What do you think is best? John -Original Message- From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: February 1, 2015 5:48 AM To: Peirce List Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations Sung, List, I think it best to use the word sign in a way that relates as naturally as possible to its ordinary use. Of course we expect a technical formalization of an informal concept to sharpen up the root idea and cast new light on its meaning, but we do that all the better to serve the original purpose of using that word. So I can but recommend using sign to mean a thing 's' that has an object 'o' and an interpretant sign 'i' in an ordered triple of the form (o, s, i) that is an element of a sign relation L that is a subset of a cartesian product O x S x I, for a given object domain O, sign domain S, and interpretant sign domain I. If you try your suggestion on any other sort of relation, say, the dyadic relations indicated by brother, father, mother, I think you will see the sort of confusion that would be caused. Regards, Jon An excellent post, Jon. So, it may be useful to distinguish between two 'signs' (or designations) of the sign -- (i) the Sign (capital letter S, as adopted by Edwina) defined as the irreducible set of three elements, object, representamen, and interpretant, and (ii) the sign (small letter s) defined as synonymous with the representamen. If we adopt this convention, the following statement would hold: The Sign is to the sign what a set is to one of its elements. (013015-10) A corollary to Statement (013115-11) would be Conflating the Sign and the sign is akin to conflating a set and its elements.(013015-11) All the best. Sung On Sat, Jan 31, 2015 at 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote: Re: John Collier JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15541 JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15549 JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15557 JC: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15565 John, List, Peirce's concept of determination is apt enough if understood in all its implications and ramifications, but it does get some interpreters locked into absolutist, behaviorist, causalist, determinist, dyadicist, essentialist ways of thinking, especially if they are bent that way to begin with. A less narrow path to understanding is through the concept of constraint, especially as used in classical cybernetics and mathematical systems theory. Constraint is present in a system in measure as the set of likely occurrences subsets the set of conceivable occurrences. Constraint, determination, information, and relation are all affairs of sets and systems of elements, not single elements taken out of context. Sets and systems of elements have properties that their member elements do not. That is why it is important to understand a sign relation as a set of triples, not a single triple. Irreducibility, whether compositional or projective, is a property of the set, not of individual triples. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8047] Re: Triadic Relations
Ben, I guess I should have said more about my view on cardinals. My argument involved a temple in which there were bowls of pebbles. Whenever there was a need to do an exchange the priests would use one-to-one correspondences with objects and the bowls to establish equality, and addition and differences are established by remainders. We can also do multiplication, but division is a problem in many cases. Anyway, I envisioned it as very practical. But nobody needs to know what the abstract numbers are; they just use them. I would agree that through abstraction we could develop a system that is a lot easier to use. John From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: January 31, 2015 8:45 PM To: John Collier; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8047] Re: Triadic Relations John C., Gary F., Well, clearly I'm not familiar enough with Putnam's argument. As regards different directions of determination as 'constraint', it might be sufficient to distinguish level from meta-level. If a given object always has a certain index accompanying it, by which people usually interpret there to be the object, then at a theoretical (meta) level, the object is itself an index (for the theorist) of an object that is the index at the primary level. Might the cases that you're alluding to come down to that sort of thing? - semioses about semioses? and that at the primary level, the same two objects might be object, index for one mind, and index, object, for the other mind. Too many generals? That's like saying too many relations. We tend to confine our attention to those that are nontrivial, or have some novelty of aspect, or have what Peirce called verisimilitude, or have plausibility (if inference generally lacked all those characters it would be worthless) as well as something like testability, explorability, etc., at least testability in principle. I don't worry about an excess of generals or relations because I don't think of them as existing like atoms in a finite space. Mathematical possibilities are endless, what's wrong with that? What I've said about numbers doesn't involve any particular view as to set theory versus ordinals. You're talking about how to define numbers, I'm talking about when one works with them, and how one can refer to them whether one regards them as sets of units or as sets of sets or as ordinals. Best, Ben On 1/31/2015 12:57 PM, John Collier wrote: Comments intertwined. Thanks for the effort, but it doesn’t really help with what is worrying me. From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: January 31, 2015 7:08 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8047] Re: Triadic Relations John C., Gary F., John, you wrote, [JC] As far as the process goes, since we have no way to grasp an object except through signs, it seems very strange to me to say that the object determines the sign or its parts through a process of any sort. This is especially true when the object is a general, which is an abstraction (however real). That would be rather like saying that the number twelve determines the number of eggs I bought today. [End quote] The number twelve doesn't determine or compel you to buy twelve rather than eleven eggs. But the number twelve does determine (in Peirce's sense of 'determine') the twelve eggs as a representative instance of twelve in general - rather than of eleven or thirteen in general - to an interpreting mind. If a cloud reminds you of a certain person's face, that person's face does not determine or compel the cloud to physically shape itself into the appearance of that person's face. Instead that person's face determines the cloud, in the happenstance shape that it already has, into being an iconic representamen of the person's face for you. The person's face achieves this through your individual collateral experience of the person's face. That's where the line, as it were, of triadic causation or determination or influence runs. That cloud is an icon to you but not the kind that comes already physically attached to an index designating or pointing to the person's face; your collateral experience supplies the index in your individual mind. Quite, Ben. But it doesn’t get at what worries me. Your cloud example suggests that there could be any number of generals. As I said to Gary in my recent reply to him, if there are any numbers of generals then we might as well be nominalists. My approach to cardinal numbers, which is not that odd historically, says that it is all the twelve numbered sets that determine the number twelve, not the other way around. The way you put it is too Platonic for my taste. You wrote, [JC] As far as Peirce€™s definition of a sign in terms of determination goes, it certainly doesn€™t preclude determination also
RE: [PEIRCE-L] FW: [biosemiotics:8047] Re: Triadic Relations
Gary, Lists,
Real generals can be abstractions. This goes back to Locke’s partial
consideration, and is the pre-answer to Berekely’s objections to Locke’s
approach to ideas. Berkeley objected that if we think of a man it must have a
specific number of legs, etc. Locke’s pre-answer is that we ignore those things
that very (partial consideration) when we think of a man in a non-specific way.
Peirce’s “precision” is the same idea, I think, though he nowhere credits Locke
to the best of my knowledge. So, horse as a general is abstract, which doesn’t
preclude its being real. Hence my problem about abstractions as objects that
determine representamens.
Unfortunately I deal mostly with scientists and analytic philosophers who most
definitely use the notion of determination similarly to the way I do. In any
case, neither your nor Ben’s clarification of the use of determine in Peirce’s
sense helps with the problem in the last sentence of the paragraph above, at
least for me. It just replaces something I don’t understand to my satisfaction
with a word that I don’t understand to my satisfaction.
An interesting question, I think, is how many real and fundamental generals are
there. I am inclined to think there is one, distinction. I’ve written a little
about this. Stephen Wolfram, Seth Lloyd, John Wheeler, Murray Gell Mann and a
host of others have proposed that as well. If there is any number of real and
fundamental generals, we might as well be nominalists. Such are my worries.
John
From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: January 31, 2015 7:11 PM
To: 'Peirce Discussion Forum'; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] FW: [biosemiotics:8047] Re: Triadic Relations
John, OK, I think this gets us to the heart of the disagreement. You say that
“Peircean objects are often abstractions that we can only grasp through signs.
This is not the case, I think, with gravity.” I think differently.
Like Peirce, I think that all cognition is through signs — more specifically,
through those copulations of icons and indices which Peirce called Dicisigns,
or “natural propositions” as Frederik Stjernfelt calls them. All facts are
abstractions drawn from a vastly complex and multidimensional reality, and are
ipso facto signs. “Gravity” too is a sign, and an abstraction, but the dynamic
object of a proposition in which that word plays a necessary part is no
abstraction; it’s a real general that we can only grasp through such signs. All
scientific inquiry is semiotic; experiments too are signs, questions put to
nature. I doubt that we can grasp the reality of gravitation, or any other type
of phenomenon, without experiments of some kind.
You may be right about “the usual notion of determining in both logic and
science.” I’m not expert enough in those fields to say, and maybe the
dictionaries I cited are wrong. But it’s clear from the above that your usage
habits also differ from mine with respect to the words “object” and “sign”.
Polyversity strikes again! All I can say is that the usage habits I’ve acquired
under the influence of Peirce make sense to me, and serve my communicative
purposes well enough that I’m not about to abandon them. I suppose you can say
the same of your own usage habits, acquired under other influences. And I can’t
argue with that.
gary f.
} A path is made by people walking on it; things are so because they are called
so. [Chuangtse 2] {
www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htmhttp://www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ gnoxics
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 31-Jan-15 10:19 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman; Peirce Discussion Forum
(PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edumailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu);
'biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] FW: [biosemiotics:8047] Re: Triadic Relations
My problem, Gary, is that Peircean objects are often abstractions that we can
only grasp through signs. This is not the case, I think, with gravity.
Personally, I have adopted what I call “dynamical realism”, the idea that only
those things are real that are dynamical, or can be explained in dynamical
terms. This is a program, not a definition of what is acceptable. If we can
take what appear to be abstractions and give them a dynamical explanation
(which can then be tested in principle, because we have interactive access only
to dynamical things, and to dynamical things because they can be interacted
with), then I have no problem. But before that is carried out, as it has been
with gravity, I don’t think we can understand what it means for an abstraction
to determine anything. And I don’t think we should talk about what we don’t
understand the meaning of, except maybe to express a wish and a hope. I see
Ben’s reference to evolution in his response to me as one way of cashing out
this hope, which is in many cases not adequately satisfied (a lot of bad
evolutionary psychology out there, which I am taking a long time to try to
avoid in my work on evolutionary
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8065] Re: Triadic Relations
Gary, Lists In logic the simplest case of determination I can think of is P - Q. I this case, on the condition, or limitation to the scope of P, Q. I don't think this helps your case, Gary. It occurs to me that there is a sense of 'determine' in which we determine something (e.i., we determine P to be true, or to be the case). This is weaker than the above, but it usually has a human subject and involves mental action of a certain sort. I've just determined that rain is coming down in sheets. I'd better go close my windows :) John From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: January 31, 2015 10:25 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8065] Re: Triadic Relations Howard, John, lists, As an addendum to my remarks about Peirce being extremely scrupulous (not scupulous) in his use of words, I should mention that according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the verb determine when used in logic means To limit by adding differences; to limit in scope. Now, compare that to the definition given by Peirce in the Century Dictionary about 50 years earlier: In logic, to explain or limit by adding differences. So yes, Abduction is just constrained (informed) guessing, as Howard put it. And a guess is explanatory to the extent that it is constrained, narrowed down, limited, determined by the reality it aims to explain. Our collateral experience of the phenomenon in question adds differences to our existing model (sign) of the universe, differences which make a difference in the model, making it a less vague. Models are not created ex nihilo. Or if they are, they are neither testable nor fallible, nor are they informative. gary f. From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: 31-Jan-15 2:48 PM To: 'biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee'; 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [biosemiotics:8065] Re: Triadic Relations Howard, you say Obviously nature puts constraints on our models, but that is far from determining our models - but on the contrary, that is very close (maybe as close as you can get, without using the word) to what Peirce means by saying that the dynamic object determines the sign. As Vincent Colapietro put it, The function of the dynamic object is not to generate but to constrain a series of interpretants. Nature, or that aspect of it to which we are paying attention, is the dynamic object of our model of that aspect, which is obviously a sign (primarily an iconic sign, by the way). Informational signs (dicisigns) are those which make some difference to the complex of models which we call our mind(s). And signs are the only things that can inform us. Evidently you, like John, move mainly in professional circles where the normal use of determine implies determinism. But if you want to understand what Peirce is saying - or any writer who was extremely scupulous in his use of words and a leading expert on their usage by others - then you can't rule out a usage which differs from the one that happens to suit your habits. Especially when your accustomed usage would not make sense in the contexts where Peirce used the term - such as his definitions of sign. gary f. From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com] Sent: 31-Jan-15 2:15 PM To: Gary Fuhrman; biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List' Subject: [biosemiotics:8065] Re: Triadic Relations At 12:17 PM 1/31/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Howard, So you don't believe that the real world, nature as it is beyond our models, places any constraints on abduction? or on any kind of inference? HP: Obviously nature puts constraints on our models, but that is far from determining our models, which is the issue. Abduction is just constrained (informed) guessing. That is not determinism. We can make different models of the same reality. Howard gary f. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
FW: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
This is the message that Ben mentioned that I missed sending to the list. I miss my old mailer. I also miss the relative reliability we had in our email before the power blackouts started en mass at the beginning of the year. Only two more years of them to go (sigh). From: John Collier Sent: January 30, 2015 12:15 PM To: 'Benjamin Udell' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations Thanks Ben. Your answer avoids the problems that I found with Gary’s answer. For the reasons I discussed in that answer I am uncomfortable with the “determination” talk, and I think I will avoid it in any case and use something more precise for the situations I deal with. In particular the idea of the object determining in Peirce undermines Putnam’s idea that “meaning is determined by us if it is determined by anything” that supports (but I think does not ensure) his argument for internal realism as opposed to metaphysical realism. Peirce was a metaphysical realist. But I wrote and published about this in 1990 without relying on the concept of determination, and I think I will continue that way. Back in those days I was inspired by Peirce (as I was in my dissertation in 1984), but avoided invoking him directly because of the confusion of interpretations. Putnam and Rescher, in particular, struck me as having got Peirce decidedly wrong, but even now they pull a lot of weight. John From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: January 29, 2015 10:10 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations John C., lists, John, you wrote, I guess I have trouble making sense of the notion of determination here. I know you are saying what Peirce says; that isn’t at issue for me. What bothers me is that without an interpretant there is no representamen, so the interpretant is necessary for the representamen. It isn’t sufficient, since there may be two or more representamens (ma?) with the same interpretant. So if sufficiency is necessary and sufficient for determination, then the interpretetant does not determine the representamen. There can be two representamens (or more) for the same object, so we have the same situation. So here it seems to me that the object does not determine the representamen. But then I think, similarly, the same representamen could have different interpretations, which would imply different objects, but the object is selected by the interpretant (isn’t it?) which seems to me to be determination. So I am no more clear than before. It seems to matter where you start. Or maybe there is a better notion of determination that resolves this that I have missed. On the word 'representamen' (I never miss an opportunity): Representamina (reprəzenTĂmina, rhymes with stamina) and Representamens (reprəzenTĀmənz, rhymes with laymen's) are both used as plurals by Peirce and John Deely. http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/rsources/representamen.htmhttp://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/rsources/representamen.htm . These words come from repraesentamen, repraesentaminis, etc., used in New Latin by Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff, among others. What is it that somebody once said? - I didn't have time to write more briefly. Anyway, something that has what it needs - connection to an object, resemblance to an object - in order to function as a representamen is in that sense at least a potential representamen. Traces of a forgotten language are potentially symbolic expressions to a mind today, as they actually were to minds past. It is often convenient to speak of such things as representamina even if they go actually uninterpreted, they still potentially help to bring truths, true propositions, to light, from latency to patency, or from potentiality to actual embodiment in a mind. Peirce somewhat widened the sphere of semiotic operation with his notion of a quasi-mind. Really key: Peirce doesn't mean 'determine' in a deterministic sense. Sometimes he speaks of semiotic determination as an influence. So 'necessary' and 'sufficient' are not the key ideas here. Even where a premiss set and a conclusion set are sufficient for each other, that's not enough to determine what inference will actually be made, when various inferences through equivalences could be made from the same premisses. If the same object leads at length to _conflicting_ interpretants, the interpretants can't all be valid or true or corresponding to the object. One or more of the interpretants may result from noise; they may have an unrecognized object (the source of the noise). If one has enough collateral experience, one may recognize that interfering object. The noise may have been introduced surreptitiously and deliberately. And so on. Generally interpretation involves selecting aspects of objects and signs for interpretation. That in and of itself doesn't affect or determine the dynamical objects as they really are. This comes down
RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
I find this a bit weird, Gary and Edwina. Perhaps it is just the fine details. I once published This requires a triadic production of what Peirce calls the interpretant, a relation in which the sign (representamen) bears some variety of correspondence to its reference through the immediate object of the sign (ground), which is an idea corresponding to the object not in all its respects, but only under certain considerations1 (Peirce CP 2:2282, 1940 p. 275; see Figure 1 below). Footnote 1: Peirce refers to ideas as to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk, suggesting Platonism. This can be replaced (relatively) uncontroversially with Locke's notion of abstract ideas based in partial consideration, or, in more modern and less psychologistic terms, as situations (Barwise and Perry 1983). I take it that the analogue to the Platonic idea Peirce talks about is the object of the sign, which is what Gary quotes, so I don't get the reference to qualia at all. I am just trying to understand what is going on here, and especially what is at stake. Frege's propositions are also Platonic in nature, arguably, and are the sense of sentences on the accounts I was taught by people like Boolos, Firth and Kaplan. I was once warned about comparing Peirce to analytic philosophers, but I also found that warning more than a little mysterious. John From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: January 28, 2015 4:29 AM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign Edwina, list, Just a few comments interleaved. I was only commenting on one of the questions brought about by Janos' post, so I'll only address that below: ET: 2) I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' - which is how Janos was describing the representamen-in-Firstness. The Platonic idea is akin to generalization and that is not the same as 'qualia'. Generalizations do indeed have the capacity to 'be possible' in actualization. Again, that's not the same as the sensual nature of 'qualia'. Therefore, I reject also your view that such Platonism is akin to Firstness. I think that two descriptions you provide, of the Platonic idea and the 'first universe' are not comparable to each other. The Platonic 'idea' as Peirce employs it need not be akin to 'qualia'--you make it seem as if 'qualia' exhausted Peirce's associations with firstness. Indeed, more primitiveeven than qualities is the idea of possibility as 1ns. But, in fact, Peirce offers myriad associations and connotations for firstness. Here are some from A Guess at the Riddle (I've added emphasis to them for quick reference): The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. . . .(CP 1.356). The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The first must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence -- that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it (CP 1.357). And it is Peirce who says that the sign stands for something to a sort of idea which I have sometimes called the ground of the sign. So if you say that you reject that notion of the ground of the representamen being understood as a kind of Platonic idea (as you just did) then you are rejecting Peirce's understanding of what the representamen is. You can do that, of course, but then you perhaps shouldn't be making the strong claims that you sometimes that your semiotics is Peircean. So, again a snippet from the 1897 passage I earlier quoted: CSP: The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. Idea is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense ET: A 'quality or general attribute' is not the same thing as the sensate feeling of Firstness. So, again, I would refer you to the many associations of firstness other than
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Ben, List, I believe that a weaker is required for an ordered triple. Any finite set can be ordered. The Axiom of Choice, which is controversial, implies that any set including infinite ones can be ordered. The order need not be anything like 'more' or 'less' in any intuitive sense. For example in a function, like f=ma, m,a is an ordered pair, one from one domain and another from another domain such that their product is in another domain which is the range of the function. Obviously, under the Newtonian interpretation m and a are not either more or less than the other in any intuitive (or even nondegenerate) sense. I think that this is worth remembering when thinking of Peircean triads in particular. I would go further than saying that we should not think of object, sign and interpretant as falling dominos, since I am not at all clear that there is a unique order of semiotic determination. This follows from the way I understand irreducible triads as not fully computable, and hence inherently open-ended. Best, John -Original Message- From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: January 28, 2015 7:07 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations Jeff, Jon, lists, I think that all that is required for an ordered triple, or an ordering of any length, is a rough notion of 'more' or 'less', for example an ordering of personal preferences, and this is enough for theorems, for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem. Exact quantities are not required. In the case of object, sign, interpretant, insofar as the object determines the sign to determine the interpretant to be determined by the object as the sign is determined by the object, the order of semiotic determination is 'object, sign, interpretant', although object, sign, interpretant are not to be understood as acting like successive falling dominoes. Best, Ben On 1/27/2015 2:08 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: [] Here is the starting question: Doesn't the notion of an ordered triple require that we already have things sorted out in such a way that we are able to ascribe quantitative values to each subject that is a correlate of the triadic relation? [] - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
List, Sung, This diagram is not of a Peircean triad, but of reducible dyadic Sausserian communication. Of course in this system it works out as Sung describes, but it is not relevant to Peircean semiotics. John From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji Sent: January 28, 2015 7:06 PM To: John Collier Cc: Peirce Discussion Forum (PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu); biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign John, Gary R, Edwina, Jeff, lists, I wan to address the question whether or not the representamen can be viewed as a process. To do this, I will use the communication between the utterer and the hearer (which Peirce often used) as a concrete model of semiosis: f g Utterer --- Sound Hearer | ^ | | |___| h Figure 1. The communication between the utterer and hearer. f = vocalization of ideas; g = interpretation of sound pattern; h = information flow. f g Utterer --- Sound Hearer (Object)(Sign) (Interpretant) | ^ | | |__| h Figure 2. The postulate that communication is a token of semiosis viewed as a type called irreducible triad, commutative triangle or mathematical category. f = sign produciton; g = sign interpretation; h = information flow. If Figure 2 is right, we can conclude that The sign, also called the representamen, is a carrier of information, such as spoken (012815-1) or written words. Several corollaries of (012815-1) may be inferred: The representamen is not a process, just as written words are not. (012815-2) The sign is the name given to the process of semiosis which is irreducibly triadic; i.e., the(012815-3) three processes of sign production (f), sign interpretation (g) and information flow (h) must commute as defined in the mathematical theory of categories. Semiosis can be described as an example of the input-transformation-output (ITO) process from (012815-4) the point of view of the hearer, in which case the sign is an 'input', the sign-induced brain processes in the hearer is 'transformation' and the response of the hearer would be the 'output'. A similar ITO process can be envisioned for the utterer but not for the representamen such as written words, since words are equilibrium structures that are prevented by the laws of thermodynamics from performing any work, including transformation and mediation. All the best. Sung On Wed, Jan 28, 2015 at 2:18 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: Dear list, If you want to look at the representamen as dynamical (which I am pretty sure that Perice sanctions (I don't have relevant quotes handy), then it is, I would think, a state, not a process. To be a process it has to change its state, but it does not. I am pretty sure that Edwina has said nothing that implies anything different, so contrary to Sung, and perhaps Gary, there is agreement on this. I see no need for introducing extraneous factors to Peirce's theory of signs to make sense of this. However interesting they might be, they are not essential. IN particular I find complementarity here to have no explanatory power. At best it merely restates something that can be understood more directly (such as that each abstraction such as a representamen, has a dynamical correlate. John From: sji.confor...@gmail.commailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.commailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji Sent: January 28, 2015 5:02 AM To: PEIRCE-L Cc: biosemiotics Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign Gary R wrote: The Representamen functions. . . as a process? Semiosis may perhaps be seen as a process, but the Representamen? Maybe this is required by your input-mediation-output wff version of semiosis, but I know of no one else who sees it like
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations
Ben, List, I guess I have trouble making sense of the notion of determination here. I know you are saying what Peirce says; that isn’t at issue for me. What bothers me is that without an interpretant there is no representamen, so the interpretant is necessary for the representamen. It isn’t sufficient, since there may be two or more representamens (ma?) with the same interpretant. So if sufficiency is necessary and sufficient for determination, then the interpretetant does not determine the representamen. There can be two representamens (or more) for the same object, so we have the same situation. So here it seems to me that the object does not determine the representamen. But then I think, similarly, the same representamen could have different interpretations, which would imply different objects, but the object is selected by the interpretant (isn’t it?) which seems to me to be determination. So I am no more clear than before. It seems to matter where you start. Or maybe there is a better notion of determination that resolves this that I have missed. Puzzled, John From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: January 29, 2015 7:23 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations John C., Jeff, lists, John, You're right, in the sense of 'ordered pair' (e.g., such that, in set theory, _relation_ is defined as ordered pair), it's true that there's no intuitive sense of 'more' or 'less' or 'earlier' or 'later' to which the relation appeals as a rule. Every arbitrary sequence is ordered in a sense; the order for the sequence is given by the sequence itself and it may or may not follow some pattern of an iterated operation or the like. I thought that Jeff had an ordering rule in mind but maybe he didn't. I too said that we should not think of the object, sign, and interpretant as 'falling dominoes'. It's because falling dominoes are dyadic in action, while semiosis is triadic. You also say, I am not at all clear that there is a unique order of semiotic determination [End quote] The process of semiotic determination is what _defines_ sign, object, and interpretant. Some first thing (the sign) is determined by some second thing (the object) to determine some third thing (the interpretant) to be related to the second thing (object) as the first thing (sign) is related to the second thing (object). The order of semiotic determination directly reflects that. Insofar as something acts as a _source_ of semiotic determination, it is a semiotic object. A sign is a kind of means or mediator of semiotic determination, and an interpretant is a kind of end - usually a secondary end insofar as in its turn it is usually also a sign, a mediator toward further interpretation. (Peirce somewhere discusses the 'ultimate logical interpretant' which brings semiosis to a close and is not a sign, at least not a sign in the semiosis that leads to it, but a disposition to conduct thenceforward.) Best, Ben On 1/29/2015 3:52 AM, John Collier wrote: Ben, List, I believe that a weaker is required for an ordered triple. Any finite set can be ordered. The Axiom of Choice, which is controversial, implies that any set including infinite ones can be ordered. The order need not be anything like 'more' or 'less' in any intuitive sense. For example in a function, like f=ma, m,a is an ordered pair, one from one domain and another from another domain such that their product is in another domain which is the range of the function. Obviously, under the Newtonian interpretation m and a are not either more or less than the other in any intuitive (or even nondegenerate) sense. I think that this is worth remembering when thinking of Peircean triads in particular. I would go further than saying that we should not think of object, sign and interpretant as falling dominos, since I am not at all clear that there is a unique order of semiotic determination. This follows from the way I understand irreducible triads as not fully computable, a! nd hence inherently open-ended. Best, John -Original Message- From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: January 28, 2015 7:07 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Relations Jeff, Jon, lists, I think that all that is required for an ordered triple, or an ordering of any length, is a rough notion of 'more' or 'less', for example an ordering of personal preferences, and this is enough for theorems, for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem. Exact quantities are not required. In the case of object, sign, interpretant, insofar as the object determines the sign to determine the interpretant to be determined by the object as the sign is determined by the object, the order of semiotic determination is 'object, sign, interpretant', although object, sign, interpretant
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Relations
Jerry, I specifically referred to the Newtonian interpretation as an example, which you excised. My point was that the ordering here does not imply any intuitive order in terms of greater or less than. The order of the numbers in the domains is a separate issue from the ordering of the parametres in the Newtonian function. Everything you say I can accept as accurate inasmuch as I understood it, but my reaction was why is this relevant? Any finite set can be put into a transitive relation (well-ordering theorem), but there are so many it is trivial. Most of these orderings would not be considered intuitive orderings. This would differ if you make restrictions on the domain that are strong enough, but I think that this would ultimately lead to presupposing the ordering (presumably on the basis of something else, either mathematical or empirical), which is where the real issue lies. On some interpretations the result will be an intuitive greater than or less than relation; other times it will not be. The overall point is that transitivity is not best interpreted in terms of greater than or less than, although you could arbitrarily (and thus vacuously) define it that way. Sometimes this is done in set theory to guide intuitions, such as in fixed point theorems (there is an x such that f(x) = x) and the like when we use iterations to find the fixed point, getting closer and closer. This works best (as a practical method) when the domains and ranges are already well-ordered, or at least partial ordered. I taught set theory from Suppes' Axiomatic Set Theory, but it was some time ago, and I am a bit rusty, but I don't think my set theoretic intuitions have gone off. It just takes a lot more effort now to do a proof and make myself analytically clear. I think I see your point about eh two ways of representing chemical processes. It seems to me that one has an intuitive order, but the other does not. Digging into my long unpracticed mineralogy, it seems to me that the atomic weights approach would constrain the chemical formula approach, but there are a lot of other constraints like valence and so on. Best, John -Original Message- From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: January 29, 2015 11:07 PM To: Peirce-L Cc: Benjamin Udell; John Collier Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Relations John, List: For example in a function, like f=ma, m,a is an ordered pair, one from one domain and another from another domain such that their product is in another domain which is the range of the function. Huh? Yes, as stated, I agree with your sentence. And that a function can be defined as an order pair between two mathematical objects. But, there is nothing in either mathematics or physics that requires the pair of symbols, m and a to be ordered as m multiplied by a as to be distinguished from the pair a multiplied by m. Both calculations give the same number for force, do they not? The usual requirement for ordering, at least as I understand it, is the sense of a transitive relation, abc or abc. A practical example of ordering is the counting all possible combinations of pairs of parentheses, aligned along the a number line such as the Catalan numbers are generated. Further, the concept of ordered pairs or ordered triplets, or... does NOT REQUIRE an extension to higher counts, such as the set of all integers. I point these distinctions out because the concept of order is used in a DRAMATICALLY different manner in the chemical sciences, even in the 19th Century views of CSP, as evidenced by the routine use of molecular formula as contrasted with molecular weights. Think about it... do these two chemical terms imply the same concept of order or ordered pairs? By way of contrast, physical symbols, such as those you use, as well as many, many other physical symbols, pre-suppose that the concept of order and number are virtually synonymous, as amply documented by the International System of Units. At least until catastrophe/chaos/fractal theories arrived in the 1960s - 1970s. In pure philosophical discourse (metaphysics?) it would appear to me that the concept of order is a matter of personal judgment. Consequently, the discipline has an unending source of stimulations about the relative importance of different ideas and the difference that makes a difference. Would you disagree with this generality? Cheers Jerry On Jan 29, 2015, at 2:52 AM, John Collier wrote: Ben, List, I believe that a weaker is required for an ordered triple. Any finite set can be ordered. The Axiom of Choice, which is controversial, implies that any set including infinite ones can be ordered. The order need not be anything like 'more' or 'less' in any intuitive sense. For example in a function, like f=ma, m,a is an ordered pair, one from one domain and another from another domain such that their product is in another domain which
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8004] Degeneracy article
-4701tel:732-445-4701 www.conformon.nethttp://www.conformon.net/ On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 4:00 AM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: There is a fairly good paper dealing with the issue of degeneracy in biology at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cplx.21534/abstract The issue came up previously on this list. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign
Dear list, If you want to look at the representamen as dynamical (which I am pretty sure that Perice sanctions (I don't have relevant quotes handy), then it is, I would think, a state, not a process. To be a process it has to change its state, but it does not. I am pretty sure that Edwina has said nothing that implies anything different, so contrary to Sung, and perhaps Gary, there is agreement on this. I see no need for introducing extraneous factors to Peirce's theory of signs to make sense of this. However interesting they might be, they are not essential. IN particular I find complementarity here to have no explanatory power. At best it merely restates something that can be understood more directly (such as that each abstraction such as a representamen, has a dynamical correlate. John From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji Sent: January 28, 2015 5:02 AM To: PEIRCE-L Cc: biosemiotics Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question about the triadic relation of Sign Gary R wrote: The Representamen functions. . . as a process? Semiosis may perhaps be seen as a process, but the Representamen? Maybe this is required by your input-mediation-output wff version of semiosis, but I know of no one else who sees it like this, the representamen as an active. . .process that abstracts and generalizes and uses these generalizations to 'interpret' the incoming sensate data from the object. Now, it seems significant, from a semiotic point of view, that two eminent experts on Peircean semiotics should disagree on the meaning of as basic a term as representamen and its relation to Firstness. Would this perhaps support the suggested PIRPUS (Principle of the Insufficiency of Reading Peirce for Understanding Signs) ? Can this problem in the Peircean scholarship be remedied by extending the mostly 19th-century Peircean theory of signs to include the 21st-century principle of complementarity originating from the 20th-century physics ? The seed of complementarity may be already sown by Peirce in his primitive definition of the sign, in the form of what he called the ground of the reprsentemen, which may be interpreted as the context of discourses. This idea may be represented as a diagram/algebraic equation: New (or Extended) Semiotics = Peircean Semiotics + Bohr's Complementarity (or Moebius strip) (012715-10) With all the best. Sung On Tue, Jan 27, 2015 at 9:29 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Edwina, list, Just a few comments interleaved. I was only commenting on one of the questions brought about by Janos' post, so I'll only address that below: ET: 2) I also reject that the Platonic 'idea' is akin to 'qualia' - which is how Janos was describing the representamen-in-Firstness. The Platonic idea is akin to generalization and that is not the same as 'qualia'. Generalizations do indeed have the capacity to 'be possible' in actualization. Again, that's not the same as the sensual nature of 'qualia'. Therefore, I reject also your view that such Platonism is akin to Firstness. I think that two descriptions you provide, of the Platonic idea and the 'first universe' are not comparable to each other. The Platonic 'idea' as Peirce employs it need not be akin to 'qualia'--you make it seem as if 'qualia' exhausted Peirce's associations with firstness. Indeed, more primitiveeven than qualities is the idea of possibility as 1ns. But, in fact, Peirce offers myriad associations and connotations for firstness. Here are some from A Guess at the Riddle (I've added emphasis to them for quick reference): The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything nor lying behind anything. . . .(CP 1.356). The idea of the absolutely first must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The first must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence -- that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent.
RE: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?
Contraries and contradictories and versions of opposition are to be found in many elementary logic texts. One I used many years ago for teaching that contains a description of the square of opposition and relates it to modern logic (modern universal quantification does not imply existence, but the Aristotelean version does) is Wes Salmon’s Logic, which is still current. Venn diagrams (or a version thereof) are usually used now to convey contradiction (the logically impossible, or the empty set of propositions). See https://www.google.co.za/url?sa=trct=jq=esrc=ssource=webcd=1cad=rjauact=8ved=0CBwQFjAAurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FLogic-Prentice-Hall-Foundations-Philosophy-Series%2Fdp%2F013540021Xei=dgq-VPbvDs7KOfbNgbAGusg=AFQjCNH_W925CzKQr3eXjYdsZS5FxBagLAsig2=F1cn3ewZOaaZdMo7s38fxgbvm=bv.83829542,d.ZWU for Logic. There are many other suitable texts with the same methods. I have used several through the years in my logic teaching. There is nothing controversial involved, so nothing has changed since Logic was first published many decades ago. John From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: January 20, 2015 7:08 AM To: Peirce List Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis? Jerry, I was posting about a hexagon and a hexadecagon (not really, two of its corners were internal) of opposition many years ago at peirce-l before I learned that they had all been found as obvious many years before. The hexadecagon (which looks like a shadow of a tesseract) were covered by some fellow in _Studies in the Logic of Charles S. Peirce_. I just don't feel like digging through boxes to find the logic text book where I first learned about contraries, contradictories, etc. But I believe that it's covered well enough in Quine's _Methods of Logic_. Best, Ben On 1/19/2015 11:51 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List, Ben: Let's look at the history of your posts on this topic: Jan. 17: I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of 'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Jan. 17: I guess I should have said 'diametrical opposite' instead of 'diametrical contrary' which is an atypical phrase. 'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: Jan. 17: A pair of contraries consists of two propositions such as 'John is blue' and 'John is quiet and not blue', Jan. 17. I won't provide references, look at 20th-Century logic text books. Ex cathedra. BTW, I find the 21st Century extensions of the Square of Oppositions to the Hexagon of oppositions and higher order geometric representations of logical geometry. See works on para-consistent logics and by Jean-Yves Béziauhttp://link.springer.com/search?facet-author=%22Jean-Yves+B%C3%A9ziau%22. Cheers Jerry On Jan 19, 2015, at 10:16 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Gary F., Lists, You’ve provided a sketch of some of the developments you see in Peirce’s account of how we should interpret the two sides of the sheet of assertion. One amendment I’d like to add to your sketch is that, as early as the Lowell Lectures of 1903, Peirce described a book of multiple sheets that are tacked together at the corners. As such, he was already thinking of multiple related pages where things are being asserted and denied as related actualities, necessities and possibilities. The idea of using both sides of a single sheet is important for the following reasons. As we know, the development of the existential graphs is largely motivated by the goal of drawing on topological ideas as a way of gaining a more graphical system of logic than is available using a more symbolic and algebraic approach. Let me ask: what is the topological import of having a system that uses two separate sides of a sheet? My hunch is that the two sides are being treated as separate (literally, disconnected in some respects) because they are not being conceived as part of a single non-orientable surface. That is, the topology of the sheet does not have one or more cross-caps. As such, it has the topological characteristic of a sphere or a torus (perhaps with more than one hole in the donut) that is orientable with respect to the two sides of the surface. The reason I point out that Peirce was already describing a book with many sheets in 1903 is that, from the get-go with the gamma graphs, he was consistently moving back and forth between a simple system with one page and a more complex version with multiple pages. We shouldn’t be surprised to find Peirce doing this. Like any good mathematician, he is moving from a more complex version of a problem that is stated in a higher number of dimensions (say 3, 4 or more) to a simpler version of the problem stated in only 2 dimensions—and then back up again to a system of higher dimensions once we’ve cleared matters up by working with the simpler case. Let’s separate two sets
[PEIRCE-L] FW: CFP: Diagrams as Vehicles of Scientific Reasoning
This may be of interest to members of the Peirce List. Sorry for my silence recently. My email program I use for posting stopped working and I have had to move everything over to a new program. Rolling electricity load shedding hasn't helped, with consequent failure of backup systems (including my desktop at home, but also the University) making things worse. I had to send this through a circuitous route which I can't use for direct posts to either list (or the post gets rejected - actually this is a test to see if this method works). John Forwarded Message Subject: CFP: Diagrams as Vehicles of Scientific Reasoning Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 12:07:10 -0500 From: Center for Philosophy of Science pittc...@pitt.edumailto:pittc...@pitt.edu Reply-To: pittc...@pitt.edumailto:pittc...@pitt.edu Organization: Center for Philosophy of Science To: John Collier ag...@ncf.camailto:ag...@ncf.ca [cid:part1.03040205.06040209@ncf.ca][cid:part2.06020609.07070200@ncf.ca] CFP: Diagrams as Vehicles of Scientific Reasoning 20 December 2014 Deadline Approaches This interdisciplinary workshop seeks to expand our understanding of the ways in which diagrams contribute to scientific reasoning through analysis of diagrams used in actual scientific research and theoretical accounts and experimental investigations of the ways scientists construct or reason with diagrams. Keynote speakers will be Nancy Nersessian, Mary Hegarty, Christian Schunn, and Andrea Woody. The workshop will be held April 10-12, 2015 at the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh. Call for papers: http://www.pitt.edu/~pittcntr/Events/All/Conferences/others/other_conf_2014-15/04-10-15_diagrams/diagrams-cfp.htmlhttp://www.pitt.edu/%7Epittcntr/Events/All/Conferences/others/other_conf_2014-15/04-10-15_diagrams/diagrams-cfp.html Organizing Committee: William Bechtel (Chair), Sara Green, Nicholaos Jones, James Lennox, Nancy Nersessian, and Sarah Roe. Questions can be directed to William Bechtel (bech...@ucsd.edumailto:bech...@ucsd.edu). - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6
Yes, I was thinking of activity that goes through the environment, including through unexpected channels. That is why I used distributed through the environment, though I see what I said could be read as if the environment is an agent. I will try to clarify the other things you are puzzled about as we move on. However the organism brings things to the environment which the environment either responds to favourably or not. This is also true of lineages, which have a certain degree of autonomy (they must, because some biological functions serve the lineage, not individual organisms). As Frederik pointed out there is the further, in bacteria there is also no clear distinction between organism and lineage, which strengthens the case for lineage autonomy in this case. Lastly, it has been pretty proven that bacteria mutate faster under harsh conditions (part of the endobiosemiotics leaking out) which enhances lineage survival. There is a lot more. John From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: November 19, 2014 9:11 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce Discussion Forum' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6 Good introduction, John. I don't have much to say about your two large questions, so I'll leave those for others who are better prepared to offer answers, and just focus on this point: [JC]: Frederik argues that the bacteria individually do not have semiotic self-control, as there is not even any monitoring of the process. He suggests there might be some degree of semiotic self-control in the bacterial lineage over evolutionary time, but this is also limited. I would like to note that selection requires action by the environment as well as the organisms, so if there is any semiotic self-control through selection it is at least in part distributed through the environment. [GF]: I would say that selection requires dynamic processes to be taking place in the environment, but i would not say that it requires action by the environment, because I don't see the environment as being an autonomous agent in the sense that an organism must be in order to survive and reproduce in that environment. Perhaps you are thinking of niche construction or something like that, which does affect selection, but that must involve the organism's agency, no? - and I don't see why it must involve any other agency (though of course it may, and often does, involve actions of other organisms). Nor do I see why the semiotic self-control of a lineage, involving selection as well as agency, has to be distributed through the environment. Actually I'm not even sure what that would mean. (Likewise, I don't know what you mean when you ask about complex endobiosemiotics leaking out into its umwelt.) gary f. From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: 18-Nov-14 3:16 AM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce Discussion Forum Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions 6 Still problems with my normal email system, so I am sending this by an alternate route. You may get further copies eventually. Sorry in advance. Folks, I am a bit indisposed right now due to snowballing problems concerning visas, and also three attacks on my money accounts in Canada, one of which was successful (all by traditional phone calls and faxes impersonating me). I have to leave South Africa by next Friday. I will be going to Vienna for a while and should have email there, but I will be absent while travelling. Chapter 6 deals with the evolution of semiotic self-control. I will briefly summarize the introduction and the first two sections in this post, which deal with the importance and centrality of dicisigns to and for biosemiotics. These sections set the stage for the later development of a theory and explanation of semiotic self-control grounded in biology and later psychology and society. Semiotic self-control involves the formation and use of dicisigns, whereas the most primitive dicisigns in biology are innate and inflexible (except in lineages over evolutionary time). Nonetheless they show the basic structure of more sophisticated and flexible dicisigns in terms of connecting perception and action in the form of an argument. Functionality is mentioned throughout as a background condition, but the argument is not entirely clear, though it is clear that basic biological functionality is the contribution to survival (either individual or lineage). Something else that I find unclear is how far back this role for dicisigns goes (perhaps exactly as far back as functionality, or to the origin of codes, or both). These are two large questions I would like to see addressed. Perhaps Frederik has something to say about them that goes further than his book (so far). So the sections, starting with the introduction: The introduction argues for the pre-eminence of dicisigns in biology right from the beginning. The alternative view from, for example Deacon
[PEIRCE-L] Natural propositions Chapter 6
Hi, I have a longish post on chapter 6 in my other mail system, but it is suddenly giving me a SSL negotiation rejected, though it worked fine three hours ago. I will try again tomorrow morning. If it doesn't work then I will try to transfer it to this system, but it has no record of my posting, which would be a nuisance. I would also lose the formatting. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism, etc.
Well, Edwina, I am not going to list specks of evidence, you need to read the literature. I got it primarily through studying distributed cognition, especially to teach it for several years in our cognitive science programme. Key words are distributed social knowledge, scaffolding, and bootstrapping. These all have technical meanings in distributed cognition, and I won’t try to explain them in an email list context; they require extensive study. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: November 15, 2014 10:09 PM To: John Collier; sb; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism, etc. John - I'd certainly like to see the empirical evidence that concludes that IF you write a document out rather than cut-and-paste it, THEN, you will understand it better. And I'd like to see the empirical evidence that IF you make mistakes when you are writing it out, THEN, these mistakes are not due to your own misunderstandings but are instead due to 'the dictates' of one's culture. I wasn't aware that we are merely shadows of a culture. I know that in totalitarian and fascist regimes, humans are expected to be just that; mimetic clones of an ideology - but in a free society, individuals are expected to operate with the capacity of their own reason, their own life experiences and their own capacity to reflect on and analyze their own individual actions. And the comment that Peirce incorrectly linked individuality with mistakes. Of course he did so; only the individual acts - either in error or correctly. And, I'd like to see evidence that the mistakes we make are 'a cultural issue'? Since when is our individual psyche, our individual psychological nature and personal nature/experience removed from all causality - and the causality of our mistakes in life are kicked off to 'culture'??? So - no-one is responsible for anything anymore; it's all due to 'our culture'. No - I don't accept these axioms. Edwina - Original Message - From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za To: sbmailto:peirc...@semiotikon.de ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 2:41 PM Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism, etc. Stefan, List, That is indeed a good quote. It is on precisely that point that Putnam diverges from Peirce in his “brain in a vat” argument. He says “we determine meaning if anything does”. This leads him to his internal realism and rejection of metaphysical realism. I think that we can still keep metaphysical realism by not putting so much emphasis on only language making sense, as I argue in a 1990 article in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, but the argument is much easier if we just reject Putnam’s premise and follow Peirce. To Edwina: there is a lot of empirical evidence for Kirsti’s claims. I’ll take that ahead of your reasoning. No doubt you have pointed to small set of cases that don’t fit the general evidence, which is statistical. John From: sb [mailto:peirc...@semiotikon.de] Sent: November 15, 2014 7:11 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Kirsti Määttänen Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism, etc. Dear Kirsti, a CP-Quote i like very much: Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: ”You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought.“ In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man‘s information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word’s information. CP 5.131 Best Stefan Am 15.11.14 17:30, schrieb Edwina Taborsky: Kirsti- you make a lot of assumptions, most of them without any empirical or objective evidence, and thus, one can only conclude that there are merely and only: your personal opinions. For example: 1) The cut-and-paste method of copying does not enable understanding while the handcopy method does enable understanding. Kirsti- there is no evidence of your assertion. Understanding what is in a document is not dependent on the method of copying that document. After all, the numerous scribes of the monasteries did not, when copying out texts, necessarily also understand them. 2) Mistakes in hand copying a document are due to the dictates of your culture and not merely personal blunders. Again, there is no evidence of such an assertion. First, you'd have to prove that such errors have nothing to do with personal blunders; and second, you'd have to prove that these errors are due to and only to: 'cultural dictates' - and third, you'd have to prove both the cultural mindset and how this 'forces' your hand. 3
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism, etc.
Stefan, List, That is indeed a good quote. It is on precisely that point that Putnam diverges from Peirce in his “brain in a vat” argument. He says “we determine meaning if anything does”. This leads him to his internal realism and rejection of metaphysical realism. I think that we can still keep metaphysical realism by not putting so much emphasis on only language making sense, as I argue in a 1990 article in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, but the argument is much easier if we just reject Putnam’s premise and follow Peirce. To Edwina: there is a lot of empirical evidence for Kirsti’s claims. I’ll take that ahead of your reasoning. No doubt you have pointed to small set of cases that don’t fit the general evidence, which is statistical. John From: sb [mailto:peirc...@semiotikon.de] Sent: November 15, 2014 7:11 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Kirsti Määttänen Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism, etc. Dear Kirsti, a CP-Quote i like very much: Man makes the word, and the word means nothing which the man has not made it mean, and that only to some man. But since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: ”You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought.“ In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man‘s information involves and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word’s information. CP 5.131 Best Stefan Am 15.11.14 17:30, schrieb Edwina Taborsky: Kirsti- you make a lot of assumptions, most of them without any empirical or objective evidence, and thus, one can only conclude that there are merely and only: your personal opinions. For example: 1) The cut-and-paste method of copying does not enable understanding while the handcopy method does enable understanding. Kirsti- there is no evidence of your assertion. Understanding what is in a document is not dependent on the method of copying that document. After all, the numerous scribes of the monasteries did not, when copying out texts, necessarily also understand them. 2) Mistakes in hand copying a document are due to the dictates of your culture and not merely personal blunders. Again, there is no evidence of such an assertion. First, you'd have to prove that such errors have nothing to do with personal blunders; and second, you'd have to prove that these errors are due to and only to: 'cultural dictates' - and third, you'd have to prove both the cultural mindset and how this 'forces' your hand. 3) You write: 'individuality (in the modern sense) he tied up with mistakes. I've no idea what you mean by 'the modern sense', but again, this is a personal assumption. The FACT is, that only the individual particular unit can ACT in time and space - whether that is a molecule, a cell or a human being. Collectives do not exist, per se, as discrete agents, in time and space. They operate in what is known as 'progressive' time or continuous time. 4) And you write 'mistakes we are prone' to make - and you assert that these mistakes are a 'cultural issue'. You provide, yet again, no evidence for your claim that essentially turns human beings into robotic clones of some Agential Culture. As is obvious, I disagree with your assertions. And no, my disagreement is not 'culturally conditioned'. It's my own reasoning. Edwina - Original Message - From: Kirsti Määttänen kirst...@saunalahti.fimailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi To: Mary Libertin mary.liber...@gmail.commailto:mary.liber...@gmail.com; Peirce List' Peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, November 15, 2014 10:36 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Continuity, Generality, Infinity, Law, Synechism, etc. Dear Mary, Thank you for the list of quotations from Collected Papers. -Most of those I have copied by hand, in handwriting, that is. Which is a part of my method in trying to get an exact, as good as possible undertanding of the writings in question. - Now CSP. Nowadays, people just copy and paste. Which is mechanical. - No understading needs to go along. With reading and writing it down, it just so happens that you make mistakes - Well, instead of just taking the mistakes as your personal blunders, uou also can look upon them as smoething dictated by your culture, and the dominant ways of it. CSP did draw attention to mistakes. Individuality (in the modern sense) he tied up with mistakes. - I have added to that mistakes we are prone to make. And need to notice. Which is acultural issue. - CSP had only a very vague undertanding of that. - if he had had, he would have maniged somewhat better, I think. Collected Papers, what a nuisance. - but as long as the chronological edition is laggig and lägging, it is all we have. - Well,we who do not have timelor oppotunitytot deciher Peirce's handewriring,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
of the scientific sort, that is acceptable even to nominalists of the Lockean sort. Question 1, for example, gives positive answers to the irreducibility of randomness and its being a fundamental concept. The second answer is committed to scientific realism about randomness, and seems to be committed to the reality of the concept, which would not be nominalist. The lower rate for claims of the irreducibility of randomness, though, suggests that the concepts for some of the positive responders to (d) think the concept is reducible to something else, which suggests it not fundamental in the sense of being something real in itself. I could go on to others, but I hope you get the idea. The answers make it very hard to detect even scientific realism about the properties, let alone metaphysical realism (belief in the reality of generals). Randomness, for example, though fundamental, could be fundamental in each instance, the instances being similar, which is compatible with the traditional nominalist position. For the modern nominalist, it is just a way in which we choose to talk. I think that Question 9 is special because it asks specifically for ontological commitment. Still, it doesn't decide between scientific and metaphysical realism, and at least some of the responders seem to be metaphysically confused. I hope this is reasonably clear. John John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions,
Jerry, List, The usual reason beauty and truth are taken to be teleological terms is that they are values. They can't be given a purely descriptive definition that doesn't require empirical justification. That means that they can't be given nontrivial definitions. The inability to define truth has been known for some time (it leads to paradoxes). I can provide references if you need. For beauty, suppose that I claim that beauty is harmony, and don't mean this trivially to mean that I will use the words in the same way, and that I claim harmony is a descriptive property. My claim would be open to various possible empirical counterexamples (dissonance used in contemporary music, for example). Peirce, of course, thought that both were values. This isn't quite enough, since someone might be able to recognize truth or beauty, but not value it. Peirce argues, though, that if you want to pursue inquiry, then you must pursue truth, so there is a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical one. In Peirce's article, The Fixation of Belief, he offers the method of stubbornly holding on to what you believe, but you can do this only if you (at least implicitly) don't value truth. I doubt very much that one can legitimately hold that truth and beauty are required by reason alone to be valued (though many have claimed that), but this doesn't mean that they are not values. I may not value hatching eggs, but I can easily recognize that it is in the nature of eggs to be hatched, and that it is a value for eggs. Likewise, it is only in the context that truth an beauty are recognized as values (something to be pursued, and end) that they can be fully understood, hypothetically, as it were. John From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] Sent: September 28, 2014 6:05 AM To: Stephen C. Rose Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6912] Re: Natural Propositions, Stephen: You simply state: Beauty and truth are teleological terms I wonder why. Cheers Jerry On Sep 26, 2014, at 1:05 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote: Beauty and truth are teleological terms and valuable as objectives that continuity heads toward and fallibility clouds. @stephencrosehttps://twitter.com/stephencrose On Fri, Sep 26, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote: Stefan, all, I think that there's much to be said for your suggestion of our jettisoning 'truth' and replacing it with 'knowledge', at least in science. There are, I believe, strong hints of this notion in Peirce as well, for example, here: When our logic shall have paid its devoirs to Esthetics and the Ethics, it will be time for it to settle down to its regular business. That business is of a varied nature; but so far as I intend in this place to speak of it, it consists in ascertaining methods of sound reasoning, and of proving that they are sound, not by any instinctive guarantee, but because it can be shown by the kinds of reasoning already considered, especially the mathematical, of one class of reasonings that they follow methods which, persisted in, must eventually lead to the truth in regard to those problems to which they are applicable, or, if not to the absolute truth, to an indefinite approximation thereto, while in regard to another class of reasonings, although they are so insecure that no reliance can be placed upon them, it will be shown in a similar way that yet they afford the only means of attaining to a satisfactory knowledge of the truth, in case this knowledge is ever to be attained at all, doing so by putting problems into such form that the former class of reasonings become applicable to them. This prospectus of how I am to proceed is sufficient to show that there can be no ground of reasonable complaint that unwarranted assumptions are made in the course of the discussion. Nothing will be assumed beyond what every sincere and intelligent person will and must confess is perfectly evident and which, in point of fact, is not really doubted by any caviller (CP2.200, emphasis added). These hints follow naturally from the principle of fallibility, and from the knowledge that pragmatism is offered by Peirce as but a method of asymptotically approaching the truth of any matter being inquired into, the communities of scientists correcting errors along the way. Still, on the way to scientific knowledge societies may discover laws invaluable for developing tools of at least potential value to humanity and to the earth and its inhabitants, for example, the technologies which led to the development of the internet or, my personal favorite, modern plumbing. That we can misuse these tools and technologies, and do so today as we have throughout human history, is an ethical matter (quite distinct from the ethics of scientific inquiry which Peirce addresses). Best, Gary . Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:6969] Re: Natural Propositions,
Ben, Yes, please do post the paper. I don’t deal with the materialism-idealism issue in that paper. Just in things that aren’t directly Peirce related, though they do use some of his ideas. I hadn’t thought of the legal issue, but Susan Haack is a legal philosopher first of all. I found her book in the law library here, which surprised me at first. Best, John From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com] Sent: September 23, 2014 8:13 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:6969] Re: Natural Propositions, John, lists, I remember years ago here at peirce-l I did another one of those examples of what would happen in courtrooms (but I was a LOT wordier in those days) if some replacement of truth as a value were to prevail, Rorty's in that case, the value of democratic exchange of views. Rorty also didn't think that philosophers had anything to learn from science about inquiry and truth. Later a philosopher as I recall said at his blog that, in personal correspondence, Rorty said to him that the idea of truth remains rightly a value in places like courtrooms. Apparently it's only philosophy that's supposed to be subjected to this weird abnegation. Well, like you say, Rorty walked the walk, and walked (away). Among the reasons that Rorty quit philosophy was what he regarded as philosophers' always trying to achieve a 'god's eye' view. I don't know why it would be beyond philosophers to have the fallibilism of proper statisticians, it's among the main businesses of statisticians to try to infer to a 'god's eye' view of a totality. I noticed that you posted a paper Signs without Minds http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Signs%20without%20minds.pdf so I hope you won't mind if I link to it at Arisbe. I haven't read it thoroughly but I noticed that it contained a quote that I'd been looking for, if, for example, there be a certain fossil fish, certain observations upon which, made by a skilled paleontologist, and taken in connection with chemical analyses of the bones and of the rock in which they were embedded, will one day furnish that paleontologist with the keystone of an argumentative arch upon which he will securely erect a solid proof of a conclusion of great importance, then, in my view, in the true logical sense, that thought has already all the reality it ever will have, although as yet the quarries have not been opened that will enable human minds to perform that reasoning. [] EP 2:455. Does that paper relate to the materialism-idealism question in Peirce? I haven't followed that part of the recent discussion here at peirce-l. I've read Haack's We Pragmatists, highly recommend it. Best, Ben On 9/23/2014 12:54 PM, John Collier wrote: Ben, Lists, Richard Rorty in his appeal to “ironicism” argues that it is best, if you are a postmodernist social constructivist, not to talk about truth at all. He considers it to be irrelevant. I would disagree with him, of course, but at least he puts the crux of the issue out front: truth has no role in his position. I have taught Rorty with Peirce along with a colleague who is a Rorty scholar. Her PhD thesis, which I examined, was a critique of Rorty’s liberalism, and was very good. I have tried to persuade her to publish it. I like to use Susan Haack’s conversation between Peirce and Rorty at the end of the course, when the students have a fairly good grasp of both. It is in Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate, University of Chicago Press, 1998, pp. 31-47, the chapter “We Pragmatists” Peirce and Rorty in conversation. It takes actual quotes from the two and weaves them together into a dialogue. Very clever. Rorty comes off looking rather silly. I asked Susan about this, and she defended her production on the grounds that she used actual and typical quotes from the two. I think she is right, of course. On separate issue recently discussed, I agree that Peirce’s development is pretty much continuous, but I don’t think it is completely inevitable from the content of his early work. I think he gets caught in the materialism or idealism opposition, which I see as a mistake (as I have mentioned here more than once). I do use some of his later work first in my classes, and then go back to his earlier work. This seems to work fairly well, since it gives the students some idea of where this is all going, a map so to speak. John From: Benjamin Udell Sent: September 23, 2014 6:25 PM To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [biosemiotics:6967] Re: Natural Propositions, Stan, lists, You prefer to use 'truth' in quotes and to call 'truth' any opinion that anybody calls a truth. You're saying that, as far as I can tell, that truth is culturally relative, period, end of story. That would imply that your cultural relativism is itself culturally relative and isn't finally true
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6698] Re: Natural Propositions
, which he regards as badly secondary. https://sites.google.com/site/cspmem/terms#simple . Yet even here he includes a normative ought, saying By plausibility, I mean the degree to which a theory ought to recommend itself to our belief independently of any kind of evidence other than our instinct urging us to regard it favorably. (A Letter to Paul Carus 1910, Collected Papers v. 8, see paragraph 223.) Philosophical logic, in Peirce's view, then will be concerned with instinct's role in abductive inference, but not with the specific evolutionary history and kind of instinct possessed by homo sapiens. Anti-psychologism in logic is, or involves, the idea that mathematical and philosophical theories of logic are not chapters in psychology and are not based mathematically or logically on research findings in psychology, any more than calculus and the math of conical refraction are based mathematically or logically on physics or physical optics, even though questions of physical theory inspired the development of calculus etc. and could be called a genealogical basis for the more abstract subjects. Best, Ben On 9/8/2014 10:26 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: [John Collier] He thought that we set aside a certain class of experiences that we take (fallibly in each instance) to be externally caused (an abduction) because they surprise us. However our thought does not get outside of the sequence of signs that are connected in our thought (or experience more generally, if you make a distinction). [FS] He does indeed claim that all thought is in signs - but I do not recall him saying those signs are in our thought. I think he is careful not to make his concept of mind a concept of the psyche, let alone our psyche. [JC] Ok, I find this idea too bizarre to contemplate seriously. We will have to part company here. I think if you read carefully his papers on the faculties you will see why I make the interpretation I do, even if you don't agree with it. [FS] I am sad to hear you offer no better argument against Peirce's p-o-v than that it be bizarre. Same: I think if you read carefully his papers on semiotics you will see why I make the interpretation I do. - Q: Why do you have to re-read your own papers before teaching them in the classroom? [JC] This sucks the world up inside the head, [FS] - if the world is sucked up inside the head - where are the head then, not in the world presumably? - is the head then in still other heads? - and where are those heads? - etc. [JC] (Peirce thought that nothing could be established a priori.) [FS] He vacillated on that, sometimes calling semiotics the a priori theory of signs. [JC] Yeh, I know. Always sounded like wishful thinking to me. I had a friend studying mathematics who, when he did not know or could not find a proof, he started with what he did know led towards the conclusion, and jumped over the missing parts with the justification WT for wishful thinking. Of course the conclusion is connected logically to the premises and steps he did put down, so the connection is there, quite independently of his own thinking. In Peirce's favour, there are two senses of a priori. One, which Peirce describes as problematic, depends on reason alone. The other, which may apply to the theory of signs, does not depend on particular experience, but we can discover that there is no alternative, no matter how the world is. I don't have much problem with the latter kind, but one has to be careful about failures of imagination. This can take unexpected forms, for example many people think they can imagine a universe with exactly two objects of identical properties (Max Black's balls). [FS] Ha! [JC] However I would ask if they never interact what does it mean to say they are in the same universe? I am not at all convinced the supposed example is meaningful. Or for a more mundane case, many people would think we can imagine a centaur. As my mentor David Hull liked to point out, this is dubious -- how many hearts, lungs, or livers, for that matter, does a centaur have? [FS] Right. Imagination leaves blank what is not explicitly presented. As I said in a posting a couple of days ago, I think Peirce's implicit (sometimes explicit) notion of the a priori comes closer to that of the Husserlian tradition than to Kant's: it deals with inescapable structures of reality which you must often consult the foundations of the special sciences in order to learn about. But those sciences are also not only in the head. The signs we exchange in this very List conversation are distributed by servers to computer screens and are not confined to anybody's head. Here, I think common sense supports my p-o-v no less than yours. Best F - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6518] Re: Abduction,
well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277]. In the sense that for a few years Peirce was confused about these categorial associations of the inference patterns, he is at least partially at fault in creating confusion in the minds of many scholars about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he finally sees the error of his ways and corrects himself: At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my original opinion. And yet he adds that he will leave the question undecided. Still, after 1903 he never again associates deduction with anything but 3ns, nor induction with anything but 2ns. As I wrote in 2012: GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468 - 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns. Best, Gary - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:6520] Re: Abduction,
), the reason for it, and his late tendency to more or less settle his opinion again as deduction being 3ns and induction 2ns. He writes: Abduction, or the suggestion of an explanatory theory, is inference through an Icon, and is thus connected with Firstness; Induction, or trying how things will act, is inference through an Index, and is thus connected with Secondness; Deduction, or recognition of the relations of general ideas, is inference through a Symbol, and is thus connected with Thirdness. . . [My] connection of Abduction with Firstness, Induction with Secondness, and Deduction with Thirdness was confirmed by my finding no essential subdivisions of Abduction; that Induction split, at once, into the Sampling of Collections, and the Sampling of Qualities. . . (*Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism*, Turrisi, ed. 276-7). Shortly after this he comments on his brief period of confusion in the matter. [In] the book called *Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University*, while I stated the rationale of induction pretty well, I confused Abduction with the Second kind of Induction, that is the induction of qualities. Subsequently, writing in the seventh volume of the Monist, sensible of the error of that book but not quite understanding in what it consisted I stated the rationale of Induction in a manner more suitable to Abduction, and still later in lectures here in Cambridge I represented Induction to be connected with the third category and Deduction with the Second [op. cit, 277]. In the sense that for a few years Peirce was confused about these categorial associations of the inference patterns, he is at least partially at fault in creating confusion in the minds of many scholars about the categorial associations of the three inference patterns. Still, he finally sees the error of his ways and corrects himself: At present [1903] I am somewhat disposed to revert to my original opinion. And yet he adds that he will leave the question undecided. Still, after 1903 he never again associates deduction with anything but 3ns, nor induction with anything but 2ns. As I wrote in 2012: GR: I myself have never been able to think of deduction as anything but thirdness, nor induction as anything but 2ns, and I think that I mainly have stuck to that way of thinking because when, in methodeutic, Peirce employs the three categories together in consideration of a complete inquiry--as he does, for example, very late in life in *The Neglected Argument for the Reality of God* in the section the CP editors titled The Three Stages of Inquiry [CP 6.468 - 6.473; also, EP 2:440 - 442]--he *explicitly* associates abduction (here, 'retroduction', of the hypothesis) with 1ns, deduction (of the retroduction's implications for the purposes of devising tests of it) with 3ns, and induction (as the inductive testing once devised) with 2ns. Best, Gary - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
to
Gary R.)
The aspects of 1ness, are not
always very ethereal, ineffable, or a mere sensation... it depends of the
sign considered.
I apologize for my English and the length of the writing after so long
absence...
All the best
CL
--
Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri
Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo
Universidad de Buenos Aires
Home address: Gral. Lemos 270 (1427) Buenos Aires Argentina
Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976
Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123
E-mail:
claudiogue...@gmail.com
Gary Richmond said the following on 06/08/2014 11:19 a.m.:
John,
You wrote:
I am aware that
Peirce
can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of firsts as unclassified
feels. This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among other considerations)
to describe uninterpreted experiences as ineffable. I dont see
the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as real from our
experience, but I dont think we ever experience them directly. I
previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to them,
but I
think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I think
that this is required if all thought is via signs (emphasis added).
Your last sentences are, I think, key towards resolving this issue.
My point would be that those direct 'feels' are not thoughts, that
they are unanalyzed experiences of qualities. The analysis--should it
happen at all--happens after the fact.
An example: I remember once being in an apple orchard on one of the
autumn days when the wind briskly moves stratocumulus clouds across the
sky, creating all sorts of rapidly changing shadows on the earth. Upon
reflection I analyzed the colors of the apples as I'd experienced them as
bright red, dark red, cherry red, almost purple, almost black, etc., the
last 'color' experience ('almost black') being the most remarkable for
me.
I had an experience like this after taking some DMT some chemist friends
whipped up for me from a recipe I provided. I experienced a shade of
green unlike any I had experienced before. The shade sort of took over my
experience. A friend claims that he found DMT was good for this sort of
immediate experience.
Indeed, in the totality of my
phaneron I recall that I wasn't even experiencing 'colors' as such so
that my sense of them was just what it was, and that experience could
only be (inadequately and partially) analyzed after the fact as
experience of firsts as qualities, at times changing so very rapidly and
melding into other hues so subtly that I couldn't have analyzed
them--couldn't have found descriptive adjectives to name the colors--had
I tried (the only reason that I had tried at all was that the 'black'-red
apple sensation shocked me into a moment of analysis). At such moments of
pure experience nothing is being represented at all. I wouldn't and
couldn't think of all those hues as having color-names as they were
experienced and, in some cases, even upon reflection I couldn't (that
color between 'almost purple' and 'almost black' doesn't have a name for
me).
So, all thought is via signs, but the experience of a quality is not a
thought. So, I do not see why you say that you don't think we
ever experience them (qualities, firsts) directly. Isn't my example
one of the direct experience of qualities before
analysis?
If thoughts are propositional, I would have to agree, but I have never
thought that (being an avid student of John Locke).
I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
is the point I have been trying to make.
John
Professor John
Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.za
Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
Africa
T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F:
+27 (31) 260 3031
Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Edwina, I am aware that Peirce can be interpreted as thinking we can be aware of firsts as unclassified “feels”. This is what I think led C.I. Lewis (among other considerations) to describe uninterpreted experiences as “ineffable”. I don’t see the sense of this, but I do think we can abstract firsts as real from our experience, but I don’t think we ever experience them directly. I previously suggested some experiences that get us closer to them, but I think some version of representationalism is correct. In fact I think that this is required if all thought is via signs. I agree that Stephen and I have been talking past each other. We had a short exchange privately that I am content with. John From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: August 3, 2014 10:00 PM To: Stephen C. Rose; John Collier Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Stephen- I think John and you are talking about different things and since you don't seem to use the Peircean analytic frame - the result is confusing. Yes - we do have direct experience, as both Firstness and Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of differentiation of the Self from this other source. Secondness is that direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from the heat. No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some semiosic expreiences are just like that but that's not always the case for a sign. Edwina - Original Message - From: Stephen C. Rosemailto:stever...@gmail.com To: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Cc: Peirce Listmailto:Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what exists at every stage but which moves from vagueness (penumbra) through some sort of index to some form of expression or action. I certainly made no assumptions of the sort you note. I find that reaction surprising. Sorry! @stephencrosehttps://twitter.com/stephencrose On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 2:09 PM, John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote: At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248tel:%2B27%20%2831%29%20260%203248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031tel:%2B27%20%2831%29%20260%203031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edumailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote: The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I infer from direct experience. I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would be so stupid as to ignore this possibility? I am arguing that what you experience is already interpreted, and hence not a pure first. Indeed, merely because we use words and theories, of necessity, does not mean that they do not correctly infer things that are real, including things to which we have given names. For example the word tolerance refers to something which I believe is real, along with other values, And by real I mean they are universal and universally applicable. Now that is clearly all theoretical, but it makes all the difference if what you are theorizing is something you take to be fundamental to reality. Yes, but this is rather beside the point. I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real; I am arguing that they are not what we experience directly. John -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: SV: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
I would agree with Søren, except that I find the grammar a bit odd. I suppose that their could be signs that are not manifested, but I would call these possible signs. The possibilities are real, and are most likely thirds. I don't think that a possible x is an x. So I find it a bit odd to talk about signs that manifest[s] as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics. I see the possible becoming actual here, which is a change of category. Any change of category undermines identity, so I wouldn't talk about a sign manifesting itself. Any existing sign has a physical basis (and Peirce did talk about this, but I am sure their are those on the list with a better memory for actual words than I have -- I failed word memorization -- poetry, which is a bunch of words in some finicky form -- in grade school -- who can come up with suitable quotes. I would have to go and look for them, and I leave for a four day drive in eight hours so I don't have time). That is just part of what it is to exist. So I think Søren is right in saying that sign tokens are subject to thermodynamics, and in particular it takes work for them to appear. They also tend to dissipate, and to overcome that requires work as we.. And so does recognizing them for what they are. As Edwina has said over and over, a full fledged sign is a process connecting object and interpretation through a representamen (in a very specific way), all of which on Peirce's view have dynamic counterparts to their abstract consideration. These are not separate things, and they must be considered so they are not opposed to each other (except perhaps in the overactive imagination). John At 08:19 PM 2014-07-31, Søren Brier wrote: Dear Clark and list My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Best Søren Fra: Clark Goble [ mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sendt: 31. juli 2014 20:11 Til: Sungchul Ji; Peirce-L Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for On Jul 31, 2014, at 2:37 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Yes. That is what I am saying, and I too distinguish between material process of semiotics and semiotics in general. My working hypothesis is that Physics of words/signs is necessary but (073114-2) not sufficient for their semiosis. or that No equilibrium structures can carry out semiosis (073114-3) unless and until transformed into dissipative structures by being activated by input of free energy. For example, words on a piece of paper must be lit before they can convey information. Right, but again that is an ontological assumption of the underlying substrate for semiotic process. Those who adopt a more idealist rather than materialist ontology will simply not agree with that. And indeed Peirce, in both his early and mature phases, would disagree with that conception. (Again, noting that one can simply mine Peircean semiotics without taking all his thought) Thus my point about knowledge of a system and whether that system can be conceived of semiotically. Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Gary f, This topic has come up before, partly because of my scepticism about icons. Joe was helpful to me in working out a resolution I could live with. I suppose that you are familiar with Sellars’ “Myth of the given”. He basically denies the independent existence of uninterpreted phenomena. C.I. Lewis accepted them, but believed they were “ineffable”. His reasons for thinking they existed were entirely theoretical, because being ineffable we could not experience them without interpreting them. Presumably this is because it is psychologically impossible – as soon as we have a feeling we group it with others (a shade of red, a particular tone). Given the way our neural system works, it is pretty hard to see how it could be otherwise. Sellers, though, just thinks there is no need to postulate such things as pure uninterpreted feelings. I think he is right, but still I think we can abstract the experiential aspect of our mental signs, but it isn’t easy. I like to look at the corner of a room and gradually make it go in, then out again, then flat, and circle through those more quickly and get confused so I don’t see it any clear way (a third). Normally we can’t do this. Most of our thoughts come fully interpreted, and the neuropsychology of sensory perception, for example, requires that our experiences are sorted by habits inherited from our evolutionary past in order for us to perceive things. There is an exception, called “blindsight”, which is processed when the visual cortex is damaged and lower brain systems are all that can be relied on. People with blindsight don’t have the usual phenomenal experiences we have, but can still discriminate visual properties to some degree as shown by their behaviour. Presumably there are visual signs that guide their behaviour despite the lack of conscious experience of them. All in all, I am pretty sceptical that uninterpreted icons can be anything more than confused experiences or abstractions, and that habit rules the day for mental experience. John From: Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: July 31, 2014 11:25 PM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for John, in order to “make sense” (i.e. to convey any information in the Peircean sense), it must function both iconically and indexically, as a dicisign. A legisign has to be habitual, but an index cannot be habitual, because it must designate something here and now: an individual, not a general. This is the germ of the idea that Natural Propositions is about. gary f. From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sent: 31-Jul-14 4:31 PM To: Clark Goble; Søren Brier; Peirce-L Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for Clark, I don’t think something can be a sign unless it is habitual. How could it make any sense otherwise? John From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] Sent: July 31, 2014 10:16 PM To: Søren Brier; Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier sb@cbs.dkmailto:sb@cbs.dk wrote: My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as language from ones feeling and thoughts. Even to produces thoughts and feeling demands work. That would be a biosemiotic view (but one that we have not discussed much). But I think you are correct in saying that Peirce did not do any work on this aspect of sign production. Again this gets at ontological issues. Remember Peirce’s conception of mind and matter which gets a bit tricky. The world of physics is the world of matter which is mind under habit. But there can be signs of mind and not matter. That’s more the issue I’m getting at. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
At 11:28 PM 2014-07-28, Clark Goble wrote: (Sorry for any repeats - I accidentally sent several emails from the wrong account so they didnt make it to the list) On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. A perhaps pedantic quibble. I think philosophy has been conducted with writing really just since the modern era and even then only on a large scale in more recent centuries. Its just that the major works of philosophy that we have recorded are written. However I think for a large portion of our history (and perhaps arguably even today or at least until the advent of email) philosophy was dialogical in nature. Of course I think theres a continuum between what you call equilibrium and dissipative (Im a bit unsure what you mean by equilibrium - apologies if youve clarified this before. Im behind in reading the list) Writing is frequently lost after all, we reinterpret its meanings as new contexts are introduced, etc. And of course old recordings degrade over time. Even data stored on hard drive loses data and can become corrupt. At the end all we have are traces of the original dialog. To follow Derrida (although he makes his point in an annoyingly petulant way) all we have are traces rather than some pure presence of communication we call speech. I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990, Intrinsic Information (1990) but I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the usual thermodynamic ones. The lack of those has caused multiple confusions and misunderstandings when I have discussed the issues on mailing lists. In particular I argued that dissipative and non-dissipative is a scale dependent distinction. The goal was to ask what the world must be like if we get information from the world, as some philosophers hold. At that time I thought that semiotics was too far from my audience that I didn't mention it, tough I have dome some extensions in later papers. John Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1
Well, Søren, I would agree, as implicitly I did with Edwina, that we are here talking about Nature, nothing non-natural. I stand by my comparison. I think you are very much deluded on this issue. I think you should change your terminology, but not necessarily your beliefs. There is no God as found in any religion that I know about, which requires a care for humans, one way or the other -- some Gods don't like humans, others do. There is nothing supernatural that cares about humans, I think; all of these are imaginary friends or possibly enemies. We are here to make the best of things we can. Without extraordinary help. We have to figure it out. so far we are alone in the universe. John At 03:06 PM 2014-06-17, Søren Brier wrote: Dear John What term other than God would you find better? We are talking about the ultimate reality that holds everything else together and is you most intimate connection to reality and meaning. I find your example of the Higgs boson is very misleading and a bit offending. Makes me wonder if you have really understood me. Best Søren Fra: John Collier [ mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sendt: 17. juni 2014 06:38 Til: Edwina Taborsky; Søren Brier; Catherine Legg; Gary Richmond; g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1 I concur with Edwina; I see no reason to call the real here 'god'. I have taken a similar line in my classes for decades when looking at what Aquinas' Five Ways would imply (Aquinas, of course, does not make Peirce's distinction between existence and reality, so his use of 'existence' is misleading at best). In fact I find this sort of 'god' talk misleading, in much the same way as calling the Higgs boson 'the God particle' is misleading. John At 07:49 AM 2014-06-16, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Thanks, Soren, for this outline - very nice. In particular, the brief and succinct account: God is real but does not exists and therefore is not conscious and cannot have a will based on a personhood as it is understood by most Theists. Therefore the whole creationist concept of a conscious plan in the creation of the world would collapses and only Peirces synechist and thycistic semiotic Agapism remains. As in evolutionary epistemology there is a deep connection between the process of human cognition , ecology and evolution in the form of semiosis combination of chance, love and logic. The differentiation between 'reality' and 'the existence' is important, as is the location of 'will' within existentiality rather than within reality. Even though I'm an atheist and don't accept the notion of 'god', I do accept the notion of reality - a reality that is rational, evolving, logical and that acknowledges chance and love. Edwina - Original Message - From: Søren Brier To: Catherine Legg ; Gary Richmond ; g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, June 16, 2014 9:34 AM Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1 Dear Cathy Thank you for your appreciation of my work. It is heartwarming coming from such a good philosopher ! The references came from the fact that a lot of my writing was based on those two article that was not accepted by the referees of the Centennial conference, probably because this is a dangerous area in Peirces philosophy for many analytically trained philosophers. There is no doubt that Peirces evolutionary process view combined with his fallibilism adds something to both Buddhism and Christianity as also Hartshorne see it in his development of a process theology. Thus evolution is Gods way of creating the world. The problem with this understanding for most ordinary Christians is that it would demand a change in their concept of God to Peirces: God is real but does not exists and therefore is not conscious and cannot have a will based on a personhood as it is understood by most Theists. Therefore the whole creationist concept of a conscious plan in the creation of the world would collapses and only Peirces synechist and thycistic semiotic Agapism remains. As in evolutionary epistemology there is a deep connection between the process of human cognition , ecology and evolution in the form of semiosis combination of chance, love and logic. John Archibald Wheelers it from bit participatory universe is the closest a modern philosophical physicist has come to Peirces vision. But as most physicist Wheeler is basing his view on an information theoretical view and fails on establishing the reflective phenomenological basis, which that is so foundational to Peirces pragmaticist semiotics and view of the natural light of reasoning. J.A. Wheeler (1990). Information, physics, Quantum: The search for links, pp. 3-29 in W.H. Zurek (Ed.). Complexity, entropy and the physics of information. Vol. VIII in Santa Fe Institute, Studies in the Sciences of complexity. Addison Wesley
Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1
Quite. The term 'god' has been used traditionally to refer to something that wills from no place in existence. There is no such being. It is impossible. John At 03:41 PM 2014-06-17, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Soren - I don't use the term or even the concept of god to explain the difference between 'reality' and 'existential'. I reject the concept (of god) IF it includes any notion of Will or Intentionality attached to it. To me, reality is a natural process, which functions as a rational (not human reasoning) but a logical, ordered force developing complex adaptive networks of matter. It is the force of Thirdness and I don't refer to it as 'god'. The distinction, as John points out, between existence and reality is vital. Therefore, I can see the point of John's reference to the Higgs boson (or field), which also refers to the transformation of massless energy (potential) to actual particles with mass: or reality-to-existence. And, equally, his rejection of the metaphor of the 'god particle' is valid, I think, since the same analysis of 'what is going on in nature' can be examined either theologically, as you do with the use of the term of 'god', or within physics with the use of the examination of massless to mass transformation, or philosophically, with the use of the transformation of the potential to the actual. Edwina - Original Message - From: Søren Brier To: 'John Collier' ; Edwina Taborsky ; Catherine Legg ; Gary Richmond ; g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2014 9:06 AM Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1 Dear John What term other than God would you find better? We are talking about the ultimate reality that holds everything else together and is you most intimate connection to reality and meaning. I find your example of the Higgs boson is very misleading and a bit offending. Makes me wonder if you have really understood me. Best Søren Fra: John Collier [ mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] Sendt: 17. juni 2014 06:38 Til: Edwina Taborsky; Søren Brier; Catherine Legg; Gary Richmond; g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1 I concur with Edwina; I see no reason to call the real here 'god'. I have taken a similar line in my classes for decades when looking at what Aquinas' Five Ways would imply (Aquinas, of course, does not make Peirce's distinction between existence and reality, so his use of 'existence' is misleading at best). In fact I find this sort of 'god' talk misleading, in much the same way as calling the Higgs boson 'the God particle' is misleading. John At 07:49 AM 2014-06-16, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Thanks, Soren, for this outline - very nice. In particular, the brief and succinct account: God is real but does not exists and therefore is not conscious and cannot have a will based on a personhood as it is understood by most Theists. Therefore the whole creationist concept of a conscious plan in the creation of the world would collapses and only Peirces synechist and thycistic semiotic Agapism remains. As in evolutionary epistemology there is a deep connection between the process of human cognition , ecology and evolution in the form of semiosis combination of chance, love and logic. The differentiation between 'reality' and 'the existence' is important, as is the location of 'will' within existentiality rather than within reality. Even though I'm an atheist and don't accept the notion of 'god', I do accept the notion of reality - a reality that is rational, evolving, logical and that acknowledges chance and love. Edwina - Original Message - From: Søren Brier To: Catherine Legg ; Gary Richmond ; g...@gnusystems.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, June 16, 2014 9:34 AM Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on God, science and religion: text 1 Dear Cathy Thank you for your appreciation of my work. It is heartwarming coming from such a good philosopher ! The references came from the fact that a lot of my writing was based on those two article that was not accepted by the referees of the Centennial conference, probably because this is a dangerous area in Peirces philosophy for many analytically trained philosophers. There is no doubt that Peirces evolutionary process view combined with his fallibilism adds something to both Buddhism and Christianity as also Hartshorne see it in his development of a process theology. Thus evolution is Gods way of creating the world. The problem with this understanding for most ordinary Christians is that it would demand a change in their concept of God to Peirces: God is real but does not exists and therefore is not conscious and cannot have a will based on a personhood as it is understood by most Theists. Therefore the whole creationist concept
Re: [PEIRCE-L] THIRD? REPLY TO HELMUT RAULIEN
At 08:12 AM 2014-06-05, Stephen C. Rose wrote: Lynching was a habit that was broken by social intervention and we would only go back to it in he event of an unprecedented regression. We do inch along ethicaly extendingi the reach of tolerance, helpfulness, democracy and non-idolatry. Progress is breaking bad habits. Maybe we would go back to it more easily than with unprecedented regression: http://abcnews.go.com/US/supervisor-caught-recordings-discussing-hangings-whites-water-fountains/story?id=23986223 Cotton Gin Employees Record Supervisors Racist Remarks The two men, Untonia Harris and Marrio Mangrum, said the intolerance at Atkinson Cotton Warehouse went on for months. Eventually, Harris had enough and recorded the supervisor's statements with his cell phone. In one of the conversations, the supervisor told Harris he couldn't drink from certain water fountains. What they do when they catch me drinking your water? Harris asked the supervisor in one of the recordings. Thats when we hang you, the supervisor responded. Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: SV: SV: [PEIRCE-L] De Waal seminar chapter 9, section on Mind, self, and person
At 03:08 PM 2014-06-01, Benjamin Udell wrote: Søren, Gary R., list, Søren, you wrote, But logic is semiotics? And semiosis is a process of relations and therefore quite a lot self-organizing through an evolution of meaning? I'd say that it's with semiotics and semioses, as with statistics and stochastic processes. There are material statistics, biostatistics, etc., and the study of stochastic processes at those levels; e.g., chemical dynamics is stochastic. Then there is the general statistical study of stochastic processes more or less in the abstract - involving particular examples and applications, but not dedicated to any special class or 'domain' (as people sometimes like to say) of phenomena. I've also seen stochastic processes listed among the things considered in probability theory, which is a pretty high level of generality. Peirce placed his discussion of statistical reasoning in the section on induction in critical logic in the 1902 Carnegie application. (In his time, reference to a subject simply as 'statistics' could be taken as a reference to accounts of human matters, like biography and history). As part of cenoscopic http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/cenoscopy.html philosophy, general statistics is a study of positive phenomena in general, not this or that special class of phenomena. Questions OF general statistics are not resolved by special experiments; rather such statistics may point out when special experiments need to be done, how to design them, etc. As part of his philosophical logic, general statistics is part of logic as formal semiotic. He generally pursues the study of semiosis at the cenoscopic level, though he uses examples often from human life, and sometimes from a broader pool of phenomena. He considers evolution of meaning at various levels of abstract generality within philosophy. The closest to an idioscopic sense of 'evolution' is in his metaphysics, wherein evolution has three modes, tychasm, anancasm, and agapasm. One could argue that, from a Peircean standpoint, decision processes and information processes (communication and control) would have the same variety of levels of study in terms of abstract generality as stochastic processes have. I know little about the study of self-organization, but I don't know why there shouldn't be a cenoscopic study of self-organization, as long as it is a study that rests mathematics and some philosophy, concerns observations within the range of everybody's normal range of experience during most of their waking time, and does not, of itself, treat of the kinds of questions that require special experiences or special experiments to resolve, even if it ought to be applied in treating of such questions. I feel pretty confident in saying that self-organization (in the sense the produces and maintains cohesive properties and/or systems that have organized complexity) is not observable, but requires a fairly sophisticated set of abductions concerning underlying dynamics and their results. If so, I don't think there could be a cenoscopic study of self-organization. Signs, as incorporating thirds, are irreducible. The only case of irreducible systems based in dynamics that I know of are self-organizing ones. So I abduce that all signs are grounded in self-organizing processes. John Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
methods tempting those trying for a theoretical or hypothetical understanding that goes beyond the familiar - but on the other hand, those seriously trying for a theoretical or hypothetical understanding of unfamiliar things are likelier to be smart and to rate themselves as even smarter (as most people overrate themselves in intelligence, if Dunning's samples are fairly representative). Best, Ben On 4/10/2014 4:05 PM, John Collier wrote: Dear Ben, List, Ben, I agree with most of what you say, but the last part on self-authority goes somewhat against current research. For those interested more, I include a link to a short news item. Apparently the smartest among us are better at both self-evaluation and self-criticism, but the less bright don't have this capacity. At 09:11 PM 2014-04-09, Benjamin Udell wrote: Among the methods of authority, perhaps the biggest temptation in discovery research is the method of status, especially when it is a method of _self _-deception, such that one grants oneself a status of greater knowledgeability, etc., than one fairly has; it's a temptation of the intelligent; magicians find it easier to bewilder or beguile 'smart' people than to do so with 'stupid' people, by whom magicians mean, the people who are unimpressed and chuckle, well, you did it somehow (but those people are obviously smart enough in another way). As Feynman said, the person whom it is easiest for one to fool is oneself. Peirce focuses, near the end of Fixation, on the closing of one's eyes or ears to the information or evidence that might bring one the truth particularly when one should know better. This closing of one's perception, in sometimes less guilty ways, plays a particularly vulnerable role in the method of tenacity because it is there unprotected by folds of authority or of aprioristic emulation of some fermented paradigm; instead there is to keep practicing and repeating one's initial opinion, it seems a bit like the gambler's fallacy, boosted sometimes by some initial luck. Well, practice and repetition of something that has shown _some _ success is the core practical-learning method, not inevitably infallibilistic, of artisans and more generally practitioners productive and otherwise; to which method they add the appreciational method of devotees (including the religious) - identification (appreciation) and imitation (emulation) and, these days, the methods of reflective disciplines as well (sciences, fine arts, etc.). What I'm getting at is that some infallibilistic methods of inquiry can be seen as misapplications, or at least as echoes, of methods that have some validity outside of inquiry as the struggle to settle opinion, and thus have validity in applications in inquiry (e.g., one needs to keep _in practice _ in doing math, etc.), as long as those applications are not confused with inquiry itself. Anyway, one's barring of one's own way to truth inhabits the core of all infallibilistic inquiry. Perhaps one can reduce all logical sins to this, as long as one remembers the difference between logical sin and other logical errors, errors sometimes imposed on one. Some excerpts http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/pure-genius/qa-why-40-of-us-think-were-in-the-top-5/?tag=nl.e660s_cid=e660ttag=e660ftag=TRE4eb29b5 Psychologist David Dunning explains that not only are we terrible at seeing how stupid we are, but we're also too dumb to recognize genius right in front of us. One of my favorite examples is a study of the engineering departments of software firms in the Bay Area in California. Researchers asked individual engineers how good they were. In Company A 32% of the engineers said they were in the top 5% of skill and quality of work in the company. That seemed outrageous until you go to Company B, where 42% said they were in the top 5%. So much for being lonely at the top. Everybody tends to think that they are at the top much more than they really are. People do what they can conceive of, but sometimes there are better solutions, or considerations and risks they never knew were out there. They dont take a solution they dont know about. If there is a risk they do not know about, they dont prepare for it. There are any number of unknown unknowns that we are dealing with whenever we face a challenge in life. Your recent work surrounds genius. Specifically the fact that we cannot recognize a genius even when they are right in front of us? Our past research was about poor performers and how they did not have the skills to recognize their shortcomings. Well, ultimately, we found out that that is true for everybody. Its a problem we all have. We might recognize poor performers because we outperform them. The problem is we do not see mistakes we are making. But people who are more competent than us, they can certainly see our mistakes. Here is the twist: For really top performers we cannot recognize just how superior their responses, or their strategy is, or their thinking is. We cannot recognize
RE: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] RE: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science
boldness (or at least due confident behavior) despite pressure to do otherwise; prudence is due caution despite contrary pressure; and so on. In the above-quoted passage, Peirce sees issues of struggle, costs, and trade-offs reaching into issues of one's most general values, i.e., the esthetic level. The Fixation of Belief starts with the idea of inquiry as struggle, and this struggle is also a case of ethical right and wrong and of esthetic good and bad, in Peirce's view at that time, even though he didn't yet see the studies of esthetics and ethics as preceding that of logic. As regards your last paragraph, the scientific method's fallibilism about opinion seems quite thoroughgoing enough to apply to premisses, conclusions, methods, etc., since all premisses, conclusions, and methods that are actually adopted are adopted on the basis of actual opinions. The infallibilism of the other three methods seems likewise. Best, Ben On 4/7/2014 3:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: List, In addition to joining Jeff K. in looking forward to the prospect of bouncing ideas off each other as we explore this chapter of the Guide for the Perplexed, Id like t0o start by saying that I found his introductory remarks about The Fixation of Belief clear and to the point. For the sake of getting the discussion started, Id like raise a question about a claim Peirce makes in part V of the essay. He says: This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way. (EP, vol. 1, 121) What is Peirce saying here? Let us try to clarify the bases of this claim. In a number of places, including the lectures in Reasoning and the Logic of Things, he stresses and develops the idea that the scientific method is self-correcting. Id like to ask a question about the relationship between these two claims. Peirce seems to suggest that the self-correcting character of the scientific method is quite remarkable because it is able to correct for three kinds of errors: 1) in the premises (i.e., the observations) weve used as starting points, 2) in the conclusions weve drawn (i.e., the beliefs weve formed) in our scientific reasoning, 3) and in the method itself. I want ask a question about these three different kinds of error. Call them, if you will, observational errors, errors in our conclusions, and methodological errors. How might the claim that the scientific method is the only one that admits of any distinction of a right and wrong way be used in arguments to support each of these three claims about the self-correcting character of scientific inquiry? My hunch is that the other three methods he is consideringtenacity, authority and the a priori methods--fail on each of these three fronts. Yours, Jeffrey D. Jeff Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy NAU (o) 523-8354 From: Kasser,Jeff [jeff.kas...@colostate.edumailto:jeff.kas...@colostate.edu mailto:jeff.kas...@colostate.edu ] Sent: Monday, April 07, 2014 10:55 AM To: Jeffrey Brian Downard Cc: Peirce List Subject: de Waal Seminar: Chapter 6, Philosophy of Science -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 Http://web.ncf.ca/collier - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
