Re: [PEIRCE-L] How language began, a Ted talk by Dan Everett

> On Jun 14, 2018, at 6:06 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I came across a Ted talk by Dan E with the title > "How language began". At the halfway mark (9 minutes) > he mentions Peirce and relates his semiotic to the issues: > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qFxg5vkaPgk > > My only comment would b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

It’s worth noting that most evolutionary views of religion see much of it evolving intertwined with the evolution of government. To the point that it’s hard to separate the two. It’s true that particularly in evolutionary psychology religion has some key differences such as focus on the cognitio

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 8:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Hmm- I'm inclined to think that 'religions' - by which I am assuming a belief > in metaphysical powers, begins first at the individual psychological level, > where the individual becomes aware of his own finite nature and lack of power

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 2:38 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > > Christianity was particularly important to the European renaissance. Why? Not quite sure what you’re asking. Could there have been a different movement less tied to Christianity? Probably. If there was a tie I suspect it was primarily

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 20, 2018, at 4:31 AM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote: > > The Pragmaticist Maxim cuts through all these considerations and focuses on > the practical results of thinking, musing, etc Peirce designated aesthetics > and ethics as normative sciences. He was agapaic in his core understanding

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Democracy (was The real environmental problems...

> On Jun 19, 2018, at 10:49 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote: > >> "Not quite sure what you’re asking. Could there have been a different >> movement less tied to Christianity? Probably." > > I say probably not. And certainly not Islam. I guess it depends upon what one sees as important and/or essen

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

> On Jun 20, 2018, at 12:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > GF: It’s important to note that Stjernfelt’s definition of the immediate > object is a functional one--the immediate object plays an indexical role > within the functioning of a Dicisign ... > > According to Peirce, this is only

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances

> On Jan 25, 2019, at 12:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > How should we characterize these various ways of uttering the same > Proposition? For example ... > We are going to the restaurant. > We are going to the restaurant? > We are going to the restaurant! > The only change here is the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 11:17 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > On your suggestions, let's make some smaller steps. You say: "Now, as others > have pointed out, Peirce did not introduce the distinction between immediate > and dynamic object until around 1904, and I think his clearest expla

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > First, thanks for providing those many Peirce snippets on the three > interpretants. May I ask, how did you do that, that is, find so many so > quickly? Or, perhaps, you've been gathering them for some time? Or did you > found them some

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 20, 2016, at 3:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > ET: I don't see that the Immediate Object is internal to that external > Dynamic Object! Not at all. > > Again, no one is arguing otherwise. Clark's comment was that the Dynamic > Object virtually contains the Immediate Object, w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:59 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > >> As for Clark's comment 'that the Dynamic Object virtually contains the >> Immediate Object' - I still don't see this, for how could the Dynamic Object >> determine how I, or the pla

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 1:45 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > While he doesn’t make this distinction clearly until the 19th century I tend > to think it is there in his earlier thought latently. Especially in his > notions of continuity with signs. The connection between synechism a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > If this is the case, then what accounts for Peirce's consistent assignment of > "Dynamic" to the actual Object and Interpretant, rather than the possible > (Immediate) Object and Interpretant? Because the possible objects and inter

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 4:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: Because the possible objects and interpretants are determined by this > original object. So the potential is in this original. > > Since the original object determines the possible objects and interpretants, > would it not be

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 23, 2016, at 10:48 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > What makes something virtual is that it has potential--it possesses the > possibility of realizing certain capacities--but it is not actually or really > a thing of that kind. I’d say one has to be cautious with the “not rea

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:15 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > 'Semiotic realism' is good - could we extend it to 'triadic semiotic process > realism' ? While some see semiotic just as thirdness I think typically those using it consider all three categories are always at work. But I agree that there’

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Agreed - all three categories are fundamental to semiosis; I don't see how > anyone can view 'semiotic just as Thirdness'. But I think that the definition > of realism isn't so much about Thirdness or any 'undue privileging' [??] but >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 24, 2016, at 6:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > Agreed - all three categories are fundamental to semiosis; I don't see how > anyone can view 'semiotic just as Thirdness'. But I think that the definition > of realism isn't so much about Thirdness or any 'u

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 6:45 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > 1) Continuity is an integral component of 'community'. I've never heard of a > 'finite community, at least in the natural world. The artificial world that > includes 'identity politics' and their 'finite communities' is a different > s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:00 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > EDWINA: I understand your point but I'll have a problem with the > identification of 'community' only in the present tense. The very nature of > Thirdness is its focus on the future existentiality of the 'type' - a type > developed wi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:20 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > I don’t think so. What makes a Dynamic Object dynamic — and efficient — (as > in “efficient cause”) — is its genuine Secondness to the sign, and the > Immediate Object has only a degenerate secondness to it. I think the specific > ex

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 9:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > > GF: “Virtual Object” would not serve to replace “Immediate Object” here, > because a virtual object would have the “efficiency” of an object without > being one, while the immediate objects of both question and reply here ARE >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:24 AM, wrote: > > in the case of Peirce’s conversation with his wife about the weather, the > immediate object of his reply (“the notion of the present weather so far as > this is common to her mind and mine”) will partially determine what words he > will choose to r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 10:06 AM, Bev Corwin wrote: > > Hello everyone, I follow the discussions somewhat, however, not consistently. > Many interesting thoughts and wondering how they would apply in situational > case scenarios. So I have a question: How would you apply some of these > Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:23 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: The immediate object would be the environment of speakers relevant to > the use. > > How do we reconcile this with the Immediate Object being internal to the Sign? I don’t see the problem. Don’t confuse the sign with the sign

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My outline of the same situation brings in the categories, where > > 1) The Dynamic Object is the existential nature of the weather - which > interacts with my eyes [both are dynamic objects]; both are interacting in > the Mode of S

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 11:54 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark, list - thanks, I see your point, but my quibble is with the > interpretation of the 'Immediate Object'. > > I see it as a personal rather than common meaning. That is - you define the > immediate object as the average nature'

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 12:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: Don’t confuse the sign with the sign-vehicle. > > I generally avoid the term "sign-vehicle," because Peirce did not use it. > The closest I could find was in CP 1.339 (undated), where he wrote, "A sign > stands for something

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 4:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I'm not referring to the action of communication but to the triadic semiosic > process of developing meaning. > > Let's say that I hear a frog. That frog or rather, the sound of the frog, is > the Dynamic Object. [The frog's croak it

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 12:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: We say the immediate object is internal to the sign because it’s in > understanding in use. > > I do not understand what you mean here. Please clarify, or perhaps provide > citations from Peirce that illustrate what you take

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 25, 2016, at 8:33 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > JS: As for the Final Interpretant, "I confess [with Peirce] that my own > conception of this interpretant is not yet quite free from mist" (CP 4.536, > 1906); but I am starting to think of it as perhaps the habit of feeling, > act

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 27, 2016, at 7:30 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > Clark, > > I don’t think this approach clarifies the matter, because it seems to > overlook a couple of Peirce’s specifications. First, in reference to the sign > “It is a stormy day,” he says that “Its Immediate Object is the noti

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

Sorry. I meant to include this quote of Peirce’s and neglected to. This I think is the textual evidence for what I’m saying. Emphasis mine. …it is easy to see that the object of the sign, that to which it virtually at least professes to be applicable, can itself only be a sign. For example, the

Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> But you’re quite right, there is more than one way to analyze these things, > and different analyses sometimes appear to describe semiosis differently. I > don’t think Peirce was ever satisfied to stick with a single mode of > analysis, and that the immediate/dynamic object distinction was a s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 30, 2016, at 10:37 AM, wrote: > > I agree, and likewise the Dynamic Interpretant determines the Final > Interpretant in the sense that it constrains the possible habits resulting > from its repetition; at least, that is my hypothesis at the moment I think that was Peirce’s view. At

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation

> On Aug 30, 2016, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Just to clarify, I am actually the one who wrote what is quoted below from > Gary F.'s subsequent reply. > > CG: What Peirce wants to argue is that ultimately a kind of convergence at > infinity happens ... it seems to me that Pe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] "Sentient Science," "Spiritual Biology"--what is our "program"?

> On Aug 31, 2016, at 10:20 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I have tried several times to get through on this list with the third point > you have. But I think some of my mails on fundamentalism has been censured > away. We must be aware when we pass from empirically based science to > philosophy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 6, 2016, at 3:18 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this >> compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is >> in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of >> thought i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

My sense is that there’s some equivocation (perhaps even by Peirce) over the term existence. It seems to me that Peirce’s use of “real” is really about predication. Part of the confusion is things like mathematical objects. To follow Quine you can quantify over them but as soon as you start usi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Thank you for your comments. I cited the first part of that quote earlier to > show that Peirce considered "Real" and "Reality" to be the adjective and noun > for the same basic concept. The excerpt from Ben is also relevant and > he

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 4:08 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Clark wrote: The old joke of 90% of any philosophical argument consists of > coming to agreement over the semantics of terms is all too often true. > > And in a logically narrow sense, this is what Peirce suggests is the purpose > and val

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My use of the term 'universal' refers to its use in the analysis of reality. > > i frequently refer to that 4.551 quote about Mind - but, in my view, Mind is > not the same as Thirdness. Thirdness is a semiosic process, one of the thre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 7:57 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Edwina wrote: And I recall a Nobel Laureate in physics, in a conference, > declaring that Peircean semiotics was a vital analytic framework for physics. > > This might very well have been Ilya Prigogine, the Belgian physical chemist > wh

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:03 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > I wonder, though, how many Peirceans even know what Prigogine means by > pluralism in physical laws, never mind physicists. I confess I had to look it up even though it’s right down my alley. Latour and Prigogine have some overlap in many

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 10, 2016, at 8:25 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Thank you for sharing these helpful reflections. As others have pointed out > before, how we talk about the categories depends on what type of analysis we > are performing. I am content to accept your correction of my third bullet

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On 9/13/2016 3:29 AM, John Collier wrote: >> I used Peirce’s ideas fairly prominently in my philosophy of science courses >> in the 1980s and 90s. I also used his work to cast light on Kuhnian issues >> both in my classes and in my doctoral dissertation. Although the last was >> accepted enth

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

While I couldn’t find the Peirce quote I was searching for I did find this from Joe Ransdell: Qualities are not what philosophers sometimes call "the given" to which "interpretation" is somehow to be added to form cognitive units; for qualities are not objects of predication but rather that whi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

(Sorry I thought I sent this before I left my office yesterday only to find it still on my screen. I know the discussion has moved on but I figured I’d post it anyway) > On Sep 13, 2016, at 11:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark- yes, I think that the disagreements in interpretation of Pei

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 16, 2016, at 11:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: > > This to me suggests that at least some of the force of the NA is “extracted” > not from the concept of God as defined by Peirce but from the vernacular > concept. Peirce does distinguish between the two concepts, right at the > begi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 18, 2016, at 4:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I appreciate the suggestion, and Chiasson's article is interesting. However, > I find it rather implausible that a work entitled "A Neglected Argument for > the Reality of God" was somehow intended to be more about "the attitude an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 19, 2016, at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark- thanks for your very nice outline of the NA - I certainly agree with > your view, that as Chiasson says, it's not just about a 'belief in God', > because it's not deductive but is, as noted, abductive. Abduction inserts > freedo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 22, 2016, at 3:09 AM, Ben Novak wrote: > > I went to Craigslist where I found a laptop with a Vista operating system, > called the seller, and drove 50 miles to test it out. It worked like a charm. > For $70, and a hundred miles worth of gasoline, I have my Intelex investment > back.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 23, 2016, at 2:24 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: > > And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of musement > and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language left behind? A > realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could not enter? You have > entere

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we > variously may think for our own parts. I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the social changes in the intervening century

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's > writings. I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was > rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about > whe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:13 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > I'd like to emphasize again that it's a distinction that makes a difference: > methodeutical promise is not the same thing as plausibility or (instinctual) > assurance of truth. Many years ago here at peirce-l, Howard Callaway argued >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic has a > special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific > hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a > justifiable

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 1:09 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > > Yes, methodeutical reasoning can itself be abductive, and if one builds a > house of abductive inferences none of which are quite compelling, then it's > guesswork, it could be a house of cards. > > In the end we base all our reasoning

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do > affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we cannot > begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who self-describes > a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is > why it contributes to security, but not to uberty. I wonder if another way > to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but >

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Another new book, this one with texts by Peirce

> On Oct 5, 2016, at 9:39 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Richard Atkins also has a brand-new book out, Peirce and the Conduct of Life: > Sentiment and Instincts in Ethics and Religion, from Cambridge University > Press > (http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/philosophy/nineteenth-c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 20, 2016, at 10:23 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > I can find no easy way from phenomenology alone - not even from Peirce’s > triadic phaneroscophy - to the reality of an outer world and other embodied > conscious subjects. I do not think Peirce solves this problem. Do you? When you say t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 21, 2016, at 11:55 AM, John F Sowa > wrote: > > But the modern word has become specialized to the single sense of efficient > cause. I’d add that we have to distinguish the idea of efficient causation as determinate from what came to be seen through a more pr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 20, 2016, at 9:18 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Now we have "Modes of Being" or "modes of reality" that are identified as > "three Universes" and correspond to "Actuality, Possibility, Destiny (or > Freedom from Destiny)." We also have "Realms for

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 21, 2016, at 1:30 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > That is true of all the sciences, especially physics. When I used > the word 'modern', I meant the informal use by Hume. But as early > as the 17th century, physicists discovered that the differential > equations by Newton and Leibniz (loca

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 11:47 AM, Søren Brier wrote: > > All conceptual knowledge need language of some sort and -as Wittgenstein > says – there are no private language. Thus you must assume the existence of > other embodied experiential conscious subject in language, - and you must > assume s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 8:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina, List: > > ET: After all, chaos IS something - i.e., it is the absence of order within > a collection of bits of unorganized matter. > > Not according to Peirce--he explicitly held that chaos is nothing. It’s worth noting

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 10:14 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > wrote: > > As far as I can tell, Peirce never stopped talking about the categories in > the context of the phenomenology or phaneroscopy. Furthermore, he never > stopped talking about the categories in the context of the semiotics. I w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Logical Universes and Categories

> On Oct 22, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > The problem is, Gary, that you and Jon are both theists and both of you > reject the 'Big Bang'. I am an atheist and support the 'Big Bang'. Therefore, > both sides in this debate select sections from Peirce to which we feel > compatib

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

I’ve changed the subject line to better reflect the theme. > On Oct 24, 2016, at 12:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > On Mon, Oct 24, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > As for Peirce's Platonism -[ which is not the same as neo-Platonism], I find > Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below. As we have > pre

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 4:28 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Edwina and I have gone back and forth on this on multiple occasions. My > understanding--which she will presumably correct if I am mistaken--is that > she denies that Peirce held Firstness (possibilities, qualities) and > Thirdnes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts? Depends. Are numbers real even when not embedded within matter/concepts? After all there are numbers that have never been formally thought yet it’s pretty com

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Clark, List: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 9:43 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > I’m slowly working through the posts I missed. Allow me to repost the > relevant quote. This is 6.202-209. I think you quoted the paragraph referring > to platonism. (See the other quotes at the bottom of this post too that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CP 6.185-213 is the manuscript text for the eighth and final Cambridge > Conferences lecture and actually dates from 1898, not 1892-1893--thus coming > after Peirce became a full-blown three-category realist, according to Fisch.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism

> On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot > depends upon what we mean by the terms. > > Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality of > possibilities until about 1

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 11:53 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or RLT rather than CP for reasons > like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out the dates - although perhaps > that’s me) > > It is not just you--I have come to despise not only the arbitrar

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 25, 2016, at 2:38 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Then for what reason is CP if it is simply an "arbitrarily jumbled topical > arrangement of the Collected Papers"? > To arrange papers with solely that purpose appears silly to me. > Perhaps something is being missed or ignored. > > For

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 7:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Actually, seven volumes of the Writings have been published (1-6 and 8), now > extending through July 1892. As I understand it, work is currently in > progress on three additional volumes. > W7 will include all of Peirce's contribu

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 10:01 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I am wondering, whether it is helpful at all to ponder about "nothing", > because I doubt that it can be more than a myth. Same with beginning, > creation, tychism, and platonic ideas. I have the hypothesis, that > reverse-engineering

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 11:56 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > Just perhaps with quite the genealogical mythic etymology that besets > Heideggers and others in that particular phenomenological tradition. Sorry autocorrect was not my friend. I should have proof read that before sending.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 26, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: They don’t have 8 up on their web page for purchase yet. > > Which web page? It was published way back in 2009, and may be purchased > directly from IUP at > http://www.iupress.indiana.edu/product_info.php?products_id=207993

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 27, 2016, at 10:29 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I guess that the question whether there is God or not leads to the assumtion > that there is God: Given that there is no God, everything has evolved by > itself, but this self-creation requires a mechanism, which is intelligent, > i.e.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 28, 2016, at 2:17 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Thank you, Clark, for this nutshell summary of God-concepts since the Greek > abstraction. After I wrote it I worried I’d come off as being patronizing as I know many here knew all this. I just put it in that form because I think the u

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Oct 29, 2016, at 5:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Jon wrote: "With that in mind, a unique aspect of Christianity is its > startling affirmation that God Himself entered into Actuality--" > > I don't think that the concept of 'god entering into actuality' is unique to > Christianity.

Re: CSP and Spinoza (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

I don’t have my library handy, but the following link might be useful for seeing that Kabbalistic/Spinoza tie that I think is relevant to Peirce. https://books.google.com/books?id=gZEgOxy_hXoC&lpg=PA186&pg=PA186#v=onepage&q&f=false

Re: CSP and Spinoza (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Oct 30, 2016, at 8:37 AM, jerry_lr_chand...@me.com wrote: > > To what extend did Spinoza’s effort to express meta-physics in terms of > Euclid’s geometrical mathematics, excite CSP to express his meta-physics in > terms of continuous mathematics and graph theory (as a dualism between > ph

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Oct 31, 2016, at 3:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > I also share Clark's interest in learning more, if possible, about what > Peirce thought regarding the divinity Jesus. The only published comment on > it that I could find is CP 6.538 (c.1901). > > CSP: I do not assent to the con

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> On Nov 1, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/evolove/evolove.htm > > > But this link brings us to Joe's edition (really just a formatting) of > Peirce's "Evolutiona

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 1, 2016, at 2:52 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > This is an interesting point indeed. We've discussed in at least one of the > cosmological threads of late the way in which Peirce does ascribe one sort of > being to God, namely, Reality. On the other hand, Peirce held that to refer > to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 2:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Potter writes: > > I would like to add here on my account that when it coms to understanding the > conditions of possibility of special disclosure or revelation in holy persons > or historical events, disclosure of God in the natural orde

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 3:47 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > At first glance, it seems to me that mapping John 1:1 to Peirce's Categories > gives us something like, "In the beginning was the Word [Thirdness], and the > Word was with God [Secondness], and the Word was God [Firstness]." > I’ll ju

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 2, 2016, at 10:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > > Jon and I (and others) have argued that the 3ns which "emerges" following the > creation of this Universe (that is, after the Big Bang, so to loosely speak) > is *not* the same as the 3ns which is the ur-continuity represented by the > b

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 7:04 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I, for one, don't see in Peirce that there is a 'pre-Big Bang universe' of > 'ur-continuity' nor that there is a 'creator' involved in this > 'ur-continuity'. Nor that there is a 'different kind of pre-Big Bang > Thirdness. > > But I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Religious Views (was Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology))

> The first paragraph tells us that Peirce's approach to Scripture was that of > "modern Biblical criticism," and he expected "the liberal parties" to triumph > accordingly. This is not surprising; I also discovered that he wrote in R > 851 (1911) that "the reader will find me a scientific man

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 10:59 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: As I’ve often said we probably should keep as separate issues the > historic ones (what Peirce believed and when) from the more philosophical > ones (whether particular views of Peirce were correct or extending arguments > bey

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > While I personally disagree with process theology itself, I actually agree > with Clark that Peirce's writings can plausibly be interpreted from a process > theology perspective. Peirce clearly rejected determinism--or > necessita

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Nov 3, 2016, at 12:23 PM, Søren Brier wrote: > > Quantum filed theory seems to have arrived at such a foundational > ur-continuity. I’m not sure that’s right. There’s certainly a type of continuity in quantum field theory but it’s unlike Peirce’s ur-continutiy because QFT pretty well a

  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   >