Gary, all,
Gary F. wrote:
But phaneroscopy is looking for the elements of the phaneron, not the
elements of experience, and certainly not the elements of *human* experience
only. I can well believe that the only way to do this scientifically (i.e.
communally) is by way of iconoscopy, or objectify
Gary,
GR: I would maintain that, and apart from analysis, in our phenomenological
experience those several qualities are felt as distinct.
GF: I would agree with that. They are felt as distinct when the analysis is
not under conscious control, as the percept itself is not.
Phaneroscopicall
Gary R, Gary F, list,
>From my cherry-picking readings in the orchard of Peirce, I gathered the
impression that
"Every phenomenon has three aspects he called (081314-1)
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness."
If this impression of mine is true, why can't "phaneron" itself have these
Gary F, list,
I'm not at all convinced of the following.
GF: Speaking both for my own phaneroscopy and for my understanding of
Peirce's, I would say that the redness, the roundness, the coolness and the
solidity of the apple are all constituents of the single feeling which is
the experience of th
Gary, John, list,
GR: Although I agree that "Firstness" (rather, any given First as quality or
character) does not admit of discreteness or plurality," I'm not so certain
that "we can't really speak of 'firsts' in the plural." Doesn't it happen
that within a moment of a single experience that s
Gary, John, list,
Responding John's remark that:
I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because
of this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this
is the point I have been
To the extent that I understand Firsts as originating in feelings (derived
I infer from some effort to sense what is "coming up" in one's
consciousness, having willed to seek to plumb it, it seems to me that a
First begins with that feeling and that it is then named with one or more
terms. For exam
John, you wrote,
I think you would have to agree that experiencing firsts is at least very
difficult and something that we do not usually do. In particular, because of
this, they cannot be the ground of other experiences. If so, then this is
the point I have been trying to make.
I think yo
wd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
To: Gary Richmond
<gary.richm...@gmail.com
>
Mensaje original ----
Asunto: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for
Fecha: Wed, 06 Aug 2014 15:17:22 -0300
De: Claudio Guerri
Forwarded at the request of Claudio Guerri. GR
-- Forwarded message --
From: Claudio Guerri
Date: Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 9:25 AM
Subject: Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
basis for
To: Gary Richmond
Mensaje original Asunto: Re
ness and
>> Secondness - but Firstness is without analytic awareness: a pure
>> feeling...which we don't even yet know what it is a feeling OF. To move
>> into defining that feeling as 'wow, it's hot'...requires a second step of
>> differentiation of the Self from thi
. Secondness is that
> direct physical contact but - we do react to it - i.e., to withdraw from
> the heat.
>
>
>
> No, I don't think a sign always goes through these three stages that you
> outline. ...vagueness to indexical to an expression..Certainly some
> semiosic expreiences ar
: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is
the basis for
On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky
<tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:
I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they
couldn't be general AND material, for materiality is existentially local
and particul
Collier
[
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 3-Aug-14 1:40 PM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is
the basis for
Stephen,
It seems to me if you are aware of something as distinct from something
else, irrespective of if you put a word to it, then it is
t;
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* August 3, 2014 10:00 PM
> *To:* Stephen C. Rose; John Collier
> *Cc:* Peirce List
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
> bas
Message -
From: Stephen C. Rose<mailto:stever...@gmail.com>
To: John Collier<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: Peirce List<mailto:Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Seems to me
rce's logic and semiotic, which
> does
> indeed apply to "dumb animals" as well as to words.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
> Sent: 3-Aug-14 1:40 PM
> To: Peirce List
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics
dumb animals" as well as to words.
gary f.
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 3-Aug-14 1:40 PM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for
Stephen,
It seems to me if you are aware of something as distinct from somet
ce List
Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 4:09 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
The sort of thinking I am talking about is conscious and not in any way an
effort to replicate explicit notions of CSP. When this form of thinking is
engaged in b
nal Message -
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* Peirce List
> *Sent:* Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
> basis for
>
> Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how
> On Aug 3, 2014, at 2:09 PM, John Collier wrote:
>
> At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>> The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a matter
>> of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the penumbra which I
>> infer from direct experience.
>
>
Stephen C. Rose
To: John Collier
Cc: Peirce List
Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:30 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may
seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do
d the self.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "John Collier"
To: "Stephen C. Rose"
Cc: "Peirce List"
Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2014 2:09 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for
At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen
Seems to me that we do have direct experience no matter how vague it may
seem. Certainly something precedes words. Words do not emerge of their own
accord. I associate a triad with three stages and see the sign as what
exists at every stage but which moves from vagueness (penumbra) through
some sor
John wrote:
"I am not arguing that pure firsts are not real;(6231-1)
I am arguing that they are not what we experience
directly."
Let me expose my ignorance. Is this what is known as "constructive realism"?
With all the bet.
Sung
> At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
At 08:00 PM 2014-08-03, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
The notion of how signs get to their editing is clearly ultimately a
matter of theory. But the theory can stipulate that there is the
penumbra which I infer from direct experience.
I don't think you entitled to do this. Do you really think I would
sceptical that uninterpreted icons can be anything more than
> confused experiences or abstractions, and that habit rules the day for
> mental experience.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> From: Gary Fuhrman [ mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca ]
> Sent: July 31, 2014 11:25 PM
> To: 'P
e it must designate something here and now: an
individual, not a general. This is the germ of the idea that Natural
Propositions is about.
gary f.
From: John Collier
[mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 31-Jul-14 4:31 PM
To: Clark Goble; Søren Brier; Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosem
e said
> >> (citing Eugene Gendlin) in Chapter 4 of *Turning Signs* (
> >> http://www.gnusystems.ca/bdy.htm#person). But then this is an
> >> introspective view of mental activity, which according to Peirce is
> >> unreliable unless we can investigate it logicall
ess we can investigate it logically through *public*
>> observations.
>>
>>
>>
>> gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* 31-Jul-14 6:39 PM
>> *To:* John Collier; Peirce List
>> *Subject
unreliable unless we can investigate it logically through *public*
> observations.
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 31-Jul-14 6:39 PM
> *To:* John Collier; Peirce List
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemioti
mental activity, which according to Peirce is unreliable unless we
can investigate it logically through public observations.
gary f.
From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
Sent: 31-Jul-14 6:39 PM
To: John Collier; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: bios
systems.ca]
Sent: July 31, 2014 11:25 PM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for
John, in order to make sense (i.e. to convey any information in the
Peircean sense), it must function both iconically and indexically, as a
dicisign.
(Undistorted Figure 1 is attached.)
Clark wrote :
"There are many problems with this (exactly where to (073114-1)
place the laws of physics for example). . . ."
I wonder if the MPM category theory would be helpful here. According this
theory, the laws of physics can be viewed as the (mat
6.220 is from the Logic of Events, 1898- and that section refers, as John was
talking about, to the nature of potentiality.
- Original Message -
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 7:27 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics
Clark wrote:
"But there can be signs of mind and not matter. (073114-1)
Thats more the issue Im getting at."
Can there be any signs of mind independent of matter or unsupported by
material mechanisms of some sort ?
If so, what would be an example of that ?
With all the best.
Sung
___
> On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:08 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> I agree that the laws are generals and not material; they couldn't be
> general AND material, for materiality is existentially local and particular.
> However, following Aristotle, I consider that the general law (Form) is
> embedded
> On Jul 31, 2014, at 5:06 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
>
> It is rather common to assume some space/time substrate with extension as a
> necessary substrate for any property. So much so that it’s rather common for
> many from the scientific community to even recognize it as an unestablished
> assu
I'll reply to a few comments; thanks for your input.
- Original Message -
From: Clark Goble
To: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 6:48 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
1) CLARK: Lots of comments so I’ll just pick
> On Jul 31, 2014, at 3:32 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> Do you deny that DNA is matter ? Does it not represent an organism?
>
> Do you deny that
>
> “Semiosis is a material process enabled by the action of the(073114-6)
> irreducible triad of object, representamen and interpretant.
> Hence,
Lots of comments so I’ll just pick a few posts and include my comments in a
single post. My sense is that there’s a lot of miscommunication going on
because it’s not clear when people are following Peirce and when they aren’t.
> On Jul 31, 2014, at 1:35 PM, John Collier wrote:
>
> I suppose t
ll in all, I
> am pretty sceptical that uninterpreted icons can be anything more than
> confused experiences or abstractions, and that habit rules the day for
> mental experience.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Gary Fuhrman [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* July
you also don't
understand - as you showed us a few weeks ago).
This isn't about thermodynamics and semiosis. So again, don't try to
divert
the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis, your
complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use
]
Sent: July 31, 2014 11:25 PM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
John, in order to “make sense” (i.e. to convey any information in the Peircean
sense), it must function both iconically and indexically, as a dicisign. A
legisign
eircean semiosis, your
> complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his
> terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the
> world - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into
> diversions and irrelevancies.
>
> Again, read Peir
. This is the germ of the idea that Natural Propositions is about.
gary f.
From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 31-Jul-14 4:31 PM
To: Clark Goble; Søren Brier; Peirce-L
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis
for
Clark, I dont think
age -
> *From:* Stephen C. Rose
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce List
>
> *Sent:* Thursday, July 31, 2014 4:20 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the
> basis for
>
> "Peirce was Aristotelian" in this context? Or entirely? I
nd semiosis. So again, don't try to
>> divert the issue. It's about your failure to understand Peircean semiosis,
>> your complete misuse of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his
>> terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the
>> w
Clark, I don’t think something can be a sign unless it is habitual. How could
it make any sense otherwise?
John
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: July 31, 2014 10:16 PM
To: Søren Brier; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On
nic - where the Forms are
actually existentially real on their own.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Stephen C. Rose
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce List
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2014 4:20 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
of his analysis and his terms, your attempt to use his
> terms, twisting and turning them, to fit into your own analysis of the
> world - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into
> diversions and irrelevancies.
>
> Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't
> On Jul 31, 2014, at 12:19 PM, Søren Brier wrote:
>
> My I add a few thoughts? I agree that sign are reals, but when they manifests
> as tokens their Secondness must enter the world of physics and thermodynamics
> must apply. It is work to make signs emerge in non-verbal communication or as
orld - and, when criticized, your constant reflexive retreat into
diversions and irrelevancies.
Again, read Peirce. And use your own terms and don't misuse his terms.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "Sungchul Ji"
To: "Edwina Taborsky"
Cc: "Sungchul Ji
Edwina wrote (073114-1):
Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's (073114-1)
original works, rather than, as you do, relying on secondary
writings about Peirce and on cherry-quotes of his works.
You have been repeating this admonition whenever you want to criticize my
views
> On Jul 31, 2014, at 2:37 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> Yes. That is what I am saying, and I too distinguish between material
> process of semiotics and semiotics in general. My working hypothesis is
> that
>
> "Physics of words/signs is necessary but (073114-2)
> not suffic
Sung, it would help if you would actually read Peirce's original works,
rather than, as you do, relying on secondary writings about Peirce and on
cherry-quotes of his works. You wrote:
"Written words are representamens and spoken(073114-7)
(and understood) words are signs."
N
The word "sign" (S) can appear on both sides of the equation that defines
its meaning, i.e., it is recursive:
"S = the irreducible triad of S, O, and I" (073114-4)
where O is object and I is interpretant. To avoid possible confusions due
to this recursivity of the word "sign", I
Clark wrote:
" . . . my sense is that you are after semiosis (073114-1)
as a process while thermodynamically at the
appropriate scale and simplification a system
in equilibrium isnt undergoing measurable change
and thus cant be conceived of as a changing process.
If thats all youre
One brief last point. I think Peirce’s distinctions between token, type, and
tone are rather helpful here and should be kept in mind. Of course the
token/type distinction in particular can be blurry but I’m not sure that’s
relevant to the discussion at hand.
My sense is that the metaphysics/epi
> On Jul 30, 2014, at 7:08 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> You and Clark, perhaps representing the views of most Peirceans scholars,
> seem to think that the physics of words is not that significant in discussing
> semiotics, whereas
> I think it is.
I think I’m more of a physicist than a Peircea
John wrote:
"I should have said as well that my student, Scott Muller, (073014-1)
was able to prove that the information content I refer to
is unique. He uses group theory following he argument I made
that information originates in symmetry breaking. His book
is Asymmetry: The Foundation of Inf
At 06:57 PM 2014-07-30, Clark Goble wrote:
On Jul 29, 2014, at 1:44 AM,
John Collier
wrote:
I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990,
Intrinsic
Information (1990)
but I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the
usual thermodynamic ones.
> On Jul 29, 2014, at 1:44 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
> I made the relevant distinctions in a book chapter in 1990,
> Intrinsic Information (1990)
> but I had to introduce some new concepts and definitions to the usual
> thermodynamic ones. The lack of those has caused multiple confusions and
> On Jul 30, 2014, at 10:07 AM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
> I agree that a tape will decay eventually but not while being read with a
> tape reader (to produce sound or visual images that last only very briefly
> relative to tape itself).
Right - so there is always a temporal aspect. Although I’d di
(Undistorted figures are attached.)
Dear Clark,
Thank for your informative comments. My responses to some of them follow:
> On Jul 28, 2014, at 6:24 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
>
>> I don't understand what you mean by "holistically" here. I thought
>> there s only one way to understand/interpret t
John wrote:
"In particular I argued that dissipative and (072914-1)
non-dissipative is a scale dependent distinction."
I would agree. That is, there may be no "absolute" scale at which some
systems are dissipative and some are at equilibrium. Perhaps we can define
a dissipative s
At 11:28 PM 2014-07-28, Clark Goble wrote:
(Sorry for any repeats - I
accidentally sent several emails from the wrong account so they didnt
make it to the list)
On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji
wrote:
Peircean scholars and
philosophers in general seem to find it d
On Jul 28, 2014, at 6:24 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
> I don't understand what you mean by "holistically" here. I thought there
> is only one way to understand/interpret thermodynamics -- scientifically.
Yes but any scientific model is simplified. You exclude other systems that the
system under an
Clark wrote (072814-1), (- 2), (-3), (-4), (-5), (-6), (-12) and (-13):
"The implications of this are quite important and demand (072814-1)
we consider the thermodynamics far more holistically."
I don't understand what you mean by "holistically" here. I thought there
is only one way to under
On Jul 28, 2014, at 3:28 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> Effectively to deny this gap is to claim the legendary transcendental sign
> which is key to certain philosophies - especially many Platonic ones. I think
> a major theme of semiotics in the second half of the 20th century, regardless
> of jar
On Jul 25, 2014, at 8:01 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
> As you know, Prigogine (1917-2003) divided all structures in the Universe
> into two classes equilibrium structures (ES) and dissipative structures
> (DS) [1, 2]. ESs do not but DSs do need to dissipate free energy for them
> to exist. I thin
(Sorry for any repeats - I accidentally sent several emails from the wrong
account so they didn’t make it to the list)
On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote:
> Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult
> (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categori
Dear Clark,
Thanks for your response.
What you say below is correct if we accept the meanings of "dissipative"
and "equilibrium" structures as you define them in your mind, and this
applies to Benjamin's previous response as well.
But the point I was making in my admittedly provocative email was
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