Jon Alen,
I do not see from your quote of Edwina that she states that the logical and the
final interpretant are the same.
And just repeating quotes does not solve interprative difficulties.
best,
Auke
> Op 16 juni 2020 om 19:32 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
>
> Auke, List:
>
>
>
Terry,
That's a good way to explain the issues -- especially
because you and Peirce illustrate your interpretations with concrete
examples. A definition or discussion of any new term must have one or
more examples to show (1) that the term is not vacuous, and (2) the kinds
of features or
Robert, List:
RM: Such an "unreal" sign cannot determine anything real since it is not
determined. How could he determine a final interpreter as a change of habit
if anyone's habits are not affected by his incarnation in the real world,
and therefore by the prior perception of an updated sign?
Auke, List:
JAS: As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider
the emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.
AvB: I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not notice
somebody else doing so in
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}Robert, John, list
I very much like the concept of the representamen referring to the
'universe of possibilities' [which I refer to in my own work as
non-local semiosic processes] - while the 'sign' refers to the
Robert,
That's an excellent summary of the issues. For my comments,
I divided it in three parts:
> The representamen should
therefore be rehabilitated in order to confine it to the universe of
possibilities andthe term sign should be reserved to the incarnate form.
This is the reason why in
Jon Alen,
Just to avoid misunderstanding.
JAS: As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider the
emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants.
I never suggested that I do consider them the same and did not notice
Edwina, Auke, List:
As I have made clear in multiple previous posts, I do not consider the
emotional/energetic/logical interpretants to be the same as the
immediate/dynamical/final interpretants. On the contrary, in my view these
two trichotomies are orthogonal to each
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}With regard to this particular sentence of JAS:
"Every sign has a conditionally necessary (final) interpretant, and
thus a possible (immediate) interpretant, even if it never has an
actual (dynamical)
Jon Alen,
I don't fight your: Moreover, my point continues to be that it is not necessary
for something to be actually perceived in order to qualify as a sign.
I saw those quotes, but I know the scope of the pragmatism article which is the
meaning of intellectual concepts and a quasi mind is
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }I
think there's a confusion here between an Interpretant and an
Interpreter.
The Interpretant is a basic component of the Sign triad which is, as
we know, irreducible. [O-R-I]. There is no additional need for an
Auke, List:
That is my concise summary of my understanding of Peirce's opinion as
expressed in his writings. I provided some supporting quotes in this same
thread a few days ago, as follows (Robert, please forgive the repetition).
RM: A sign is always a real thing that represents because to be
Robert, List:
I agree with that famous quote from Peirce, and it does not refute what I
said before.
For one thing, only certain signs are "elements of concepts" that "enter
into logical thought" by being perceived and thereby determining dynamical
interpretants that are *logical *interpretants
Dear Jon Alan,
JAS > "Something need not be perceived in order to qualify as a sign, as
long as it is *capable *of determining a dynamical interpretant by virtue
of having an immediate interpretant ... and a final interpretant ..."
RM > If I were a literalist, I would say this:
"But
Jon Alen,
> That is an opinion, and even if valid, it does not change the fact that
> Peirce invented and defined "the commens." I find it misleading to use his
> peculiar term to mean something else.
>
>
Isn't our duscussion about the meaning of a particular term, i.e. commens?
Hi Auke, JAS, list,
Could you help me work this out?
AvB: If Peirce did have a thought A, and later had a thought not-A , we
may say that he indeed erred the first time with A, but as well that he did
err when he discarded A.
*‘man is a sign’ (1868)*
*‘the general answer to the question
Bernard, List:
BM: I was not trying to illustrate the project JAS is pursuing.
Thanks for clarifying this, I did not think that was your intent.
BM: Nevertheless the Magritte painting is a Sign, a complex one. But it
needs to be perceived in order to act as such, I agree strongly with Robert
Auke, List:
AvB: Here we have in my opinion a typical example of the risks one runs if
only the words of the master count. The main risk is not a. an incorrect
understanding of Peirce, but b. of reality. Which of the two would count
heavier for Peirce?
Reality, of course; but this misses my
Dear Bernard, list,
I’m surprised you do not have answers to your own questions, since this is,
after all, a Peirce list, and of course, a Peirce list is about ‘*what
Peirce actually wrote’* regards *‘Peirce’s way of thinking’*.
And Peirce said this:
‘This is man,’
I mean, *everybody*
Supplement: The relation between the DO and the sign is, that the sign denotes the DO, and the DO dertermines the sign. Apart from a true index, the DO determines the sign indirectly, by a bypass, via the shared memory of the commens. You are debating, whether this commens is a fusion
Robert, List,
yes, your post answers a lot of questions I had in the post I wrote that appeared after yours, but I had written before I had read yours. Thank you! I had felt, that representation is something quite different from event, two different ways of looking at a sign, but it is a
Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,
RM: We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and therefore
it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of minds. We
discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our lives.
JAS: Again, there may
Jon Alen, Robert, Edwina, John, List,
> RM: We need the commens here to "contain" all these conventions and
> therefore it cannot depend on the only minds that communicate; it is out of
> minds. We discover it when we are born and then internalize it throughout our
> lives.
>
JAS: Again,
Jon Alan, List
I sent a specific message to Helmut. I sincerely thought he was answering
his questions. He has not yet reacted that already you have set off your
usual firework of quotations against my arguments, distorting them
somewhat. I'm not denying you that right, but maybe we should let
Helmut, Robert, List:
Returning to substantive matters ...
HR: Isn't it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write
so much, but other writers did?
Yes, of course; but this is a *Peirce *list, so in general our discussions
tend to focus on topics about which he *did *write.
John,
I find your last two posts informative and in keeping with how I try to
understand Peirce. I agree strongly about the intimate link with action
(actually, in my view it translates into the wellspring of Peirce's
thoughts about belief). The importance of quantification as a basis for
Jon AS, Gary F, and Edwina,
No two people think alike, and
anybody as complex and insightful as Peirce has a wide range of different
ways of thinking. I agree that discussions about methodologies outside of
any particular context are of minor interest to this list. But the most
important
Helmut, you wrote,
“Peirce did not write much about interpreters.”
A quick search of Peirce texts gives over 100 hits for “interpreter”.
Of course it is not a waste of time to read writers other than Peirce. What I
said was that it’s a waste of time to debate about “Peirce’s way of
Edwina, List,
you wrote:
"Think of semiosis not as a mechanical action but as a process of the actual generation of information". But information is a mechanical process. There is no habit without a memory, and a memory is a solid state apparatus, or a quasi-solid equilibrial attractor like
Helmut, List
If I can tell Helmut there are no two concepts. A sign is always a real
thing that represents because to be sign it must be perceived ... Why
wouldn't a sign as a representation" be a real thing? Let's look at the
statue that is at the entrance to New York Harbor ... Isn't that an
Helmut - Personally I think that a lot of the confusion to which you
allude.
"two concepts of sign-as-representation, which is "not a real thing"
versus sign-as-event, which would be a real thing and include the real
things utterer and interpreter. "
...is due to
Gary F., Edwina, List,
Isn´t it so, that there are topics, about which Peirce did not write so much, but other writers did? For example, the online "Commens Dictionary" is named after the commens, which was a major topic of the last discussions, but if you look it up in the dictionary, there
Gary F,
I'll disagree with you. I think that debates about method are
important. The only 'method' I've seen that JAS outlines, is to
provide quotations from Peirce texts. But does interpretation of
these texts consist only of repeating them and declaring that 'it
means this'?
Jon A.S., list,
I can’t speak for Gary the moderator or anyone else on the list, but I think
the principles you’ve outlined here are pretty much self-evident for any
serious Peirce scholarship, and I would certainly prefer not to be subjected to
further debates about them. If a list member
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