Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 05:57, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 11:18 PM, acw wrote: On 2/14/2012 02:55, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 5:27 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] There is a problem with this though b/c it assumes that the field is pre-existing; it is the same as the block universe idea that Andrew Soltau and others are wrestling with. Why is a pre-existing field so troublesome? Seems like a similar problem as the one you have with Platonia. For any system featuring time or change, you can find a meta-system in which you can describe that system timelessly (and you have to, if one is to talk about time and change at all). Dear Kermit, OK, I will try to explain this in detail and check my math. I am good with pictures, even N-dimensional ones, but not symbols, equations and words... Think of a collection of different objects. Now think of how many ways that they can be arranged or partitioned up. For N objects, I believe that there are at least N! numbers of ways that they can be arranged. Now think of an Electromagnetic Field as we do in classical physics. At each point in space, it has a vector and a scalar value representing its magnetic and electric potentials. How many ways can this field be configured in terms of the possible values of the potentials at each point? At least 1x2x3x...xM ways, where M is the number of points of space. Let's add a dimension of time so that we have a 3,1 dimensional field configuration. How many different ways can this be configured? Well, that depends. We known that in Nature there is something called the Least Action Principle that basically states that what ever happens in a situation it is the one that minimizes the action. Water flows down hill for this reason, among other things... But it is still at least M! number of possible configurations. How do we compute what the minimum action configuration of the electromagnetic fields distributed across space-time? It is an optimization problem of figuring out which is the least action configured field given a choice of all possible field configurations. This computational problem is known to be NP-Complete and as such requires a quantity of resources to run the computation that increases as a non-polynomial power of the number of possible choices, so the number is, I think, 2^M! . The easiest to understand example of this kind of problem is the Traveling Salesman problem http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Travelling_salesman_problem: Given a list of cities and their pairwise distances, the task is to find the shortest possible route that visits each city exactly once. The number of possible routes that the salesman can take increases exponentially with the number of cities, there for the number of possible distances that have to be compared to each other to find the shortest route increases at least exponentially. So for a computer running a program to find the solution it takes exponentially more resources of memory and time (in computational steps) or some combination of the two. Yet the problem is decidable in finite amount of steps, even if that amount may be very large indeed. It would be unfeasible for someone with bounded resources, but not a problem for any abstract TM or a physical system (are they one and the same, at least locally?). Hi ACW, WARNING WARNING WARNING DANGER DANGER! Overload is Eminent! OK, please help me understand how we can speak of computations for situations where I have just laid out how computations can't exist. Computations can be encoded in Peano Arithmetic and many others timeless theories just as well. I'm not entirely sure I see what your proof is. Although if you deny any form of Platonia or Plentitude and any form of *primitive* physical reality, I'm not entirely sure what you're left with to represent computations. You'll have to present an understandable theory which is not primitively physical, nor platonic. Currently I only consider the timeless platonic versions as primitive physics: 1) doesn't make too much sense, especially since we're always talking about it only through math, thus it can just be 'math' 2) UDA+MGA show that it's superfluous if we do happen to admit a digital substitution. Adding 3p time does not fix the issue (as shown in my earlier thought experiment), and 1p time is too subjective to grant it continuity over too large intervals (we cannot guarantee continuity each time short term memory is cleared). If we take CTT at face value, then it requires some form of implementation. Implementation in arithmetic seems sufficient to me. Some kind of machine must be run. It's run by some sentences being either true or false. Are you sure that you are not substituting your ability to imagine the solution of a computation as an intuitive proof that computations exist as purely abstract entities, independent from all things physical? If COMP, they have to. Without COMP, but assuming a 3p, it's not hard to again get a similar result if one
Re: Non-Standard Arithmetic
On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:54, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Bruno, What limits are there on what can constitute the constant that defines a particular model of a non-standard Arithmetic? Infinity. Non standard integers are infinite objects. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Free Floating entities
On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:26, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 9:44 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 9:16 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: RDR: Not sure if this is helpful, but a possible hypothetical communications model is the 3D 10^90 per cc set Calabi-Yau Compact Manifolds of string theory that are purported to control all physical interactions as they each contain the laws of physics; and collectively they may manifest consciousness as well as perhaps Platonia and cyclic gossiping as their variable properties across the universe may manifest a Peano arithmetic. Regarding communication each spherical element/manifold instantly maps all the other manifolds and all physical phenomena to its interior. http://vixra.org/abs/1101.0044 -- Hi Richard, I am highly skeptical of string theory because of its Landscape problem, the lack of observational evidence of super-partner particles, the fact that it is not back-ground independent and its underlying philosophical assumptions. All that aside, I will take a look at the referenced paper. Onward! Stephen Hi Richard, I like your paper! I would like to point out something. You quoted [Chalmers(1995)]: (1) Assume my reasoning powers are captured by some formal system F (to put this more briefly, I am F). Consider the class of statements I can know to be true, given this assumption. (2) Given that I know that I am F, No machine can know which machine she is. I know that F is sound (as I know that I am sound). No sound machine can know that she is sound. Indeed, I know that the larger system F' is sound, where F' is F supplemented by the further assumption I am F. (Supplementing a sound system with a true statement yields a sound system.) PA is sound and consistent. But PA + I am sound, with I = PA + I am sound (the circularity apparent here can be removded with the DD trick or the recursion theorem of Kleene) is unsound. (3) So I know that G(F') is true, where this is the Gödel sentence of the system F'. (4) But F' could not see that G(F') is true (by Gödel's theorem). (5) By assumption, however, I am now effectively equivalent to F'. After all, I am F supplemented by the knowledge that I am F. (6) This is a contradiction, so the initial assumption must be false, and F must not have captured my powers of reasoning after all. (7) The conclusion generalizes: my reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system. This is basically the Lucas-Penrose error. It confuses Bp p with Bp. Bp - p is true for sound machine (obviously) but is not provable by any sound machine. Bruno This reminds me of problematic sentences in logic such as Stephen cannot know the truth value of this sentence. While I can only inconsistently speculated on the truth value of that sentence, you, not being Stephen, can consistently determine its truth value. I see this as arguing that truth values are quantities that are strictly local and not global. Since I am a HUGE fan of Leibniz, I like the Monad-like quality that you are considering with the concept of a CYCM, but wonder if the particular geometric properties are being arbitrarily selected. It seems to me that any monadic construction will do so long as it can support a self-referential logic, such as Peano Arithmetic. Additionally, how do we deal with the apparently bosonic property of minds given the very fermionic property of matter. Could supersymmetry really be a theory of the mind-body problem? Some people, like Matti Pitkanen, think so and I sympathize with this view. But it still seems to assume too much. Maybe this is just the price of a theory. ;-) Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote: On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.com wrote: Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming COMP, consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. Not even a little. Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of physics-mechanism is actually accepted. Clearly, we now have to regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is currently related. OK. But what are we now to make of the original proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an actual conscious state? After all, we don't regard them as primitively physical objects any longer, so we can't now apply the reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we? I don't see why. We did bet on a comp substitution level. The material aspect of the device will have to be retrieved from the infinitely many computations going through our current state, but such a current state does still exist by the initial assumption. They're part of the general computational state of affairs, like everything else. Is it that they instantiate the wrong sort of computation for consciousness, Not all. Such matter is just very stable, and is supposed to implement the right computation (at the right level), if not, then we would not accept the digital brain. Comp is neutral on the nature of matter. because their physical behaviour is the result of accidentally contrived relations? I am not sure I see your problem. The physical behavior becomes very well founded by a statistics on infinitely many computations, a priori. The math might one day refute comp, by showing that there are too much white rabbit, but this is not yet the case. IOW, they're not really UM's in any relevant sense. ? There is UMs in two (related) sense. The UMs which are proved to exist (in arithmetic), and then the observable local UMs, who bodies emerge from the competition between all UMs (in the preview sense) below their substitution level. But then wouldn't the same argument for contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio? Only in the case it appears that the comp matter is not stable enough to provide stable computations, but the whole point has been to make that very possibility testable. I'm puzzled. David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. Bruno David On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP
Re: COMP, MGA and Time
On 13 Feb 2012, at 14:21, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Folks, I have been mulling over my conversations with Bruno, Joseph and ACW in the EVERYTHING list and have a question. In SANE04 we read the following: For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no inputs and no outputs. Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running computation, the machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for that precise computation, with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will make the machine running computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed that counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active devices which will be triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the environment. Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the conjunction of both comp and materialism. Setting aside the problem of concurrency for now, how is it that we are jumping over the difference between infinitely slow or even adiabatic physical process and null physical process? I may be not even wrong here, but in math isn't it true that there is a big difference between a quantity being arbitrarily small and a quantity being zero? Yes, that's true. But it is not relevant for the MGA reductio ad absurdum, which needs just to show that the physical activity of the locally implemented computation is not relevant. If the amount of physical activity can be made arbitrarily small, it cannot be related to the physical *computation*, whose complexity remains unchanged for some fixed amount of conscious experience. At that stage we just show the falsity of the physical supervenience thesis. (Note also that some version of MGA makes that primary physical activity null). Bruno I suspect that the folks in FOAR List that have been discussing information and entropy might have a thought on this. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:14, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: [JK] Yet COMP is true AND COMP is false is necessarily false. Hi Joseph, I agree, they are false as a proposition iff they are given in a single proposition or evaluated as such, as your usage of bracketing shows. This is one of the problems that I see in the COMP based theory and why one has to have something else in addition to propositions. ? Of course. The proposition heve to bear on something. But that's the case with arithmetic. We have numbers, universal numbers, their discourses, their experiences (defined with the intensional variants of G and G*), etc. On the contrary: UDA shows that you cannot add anything to it, without loosing the ability to distinguish the quanta and the qualia. Adding something might be useful in practice, but is conceptually a red herring. This 'something else', I propose, is physical matter or a quantum logic as underlying structure. You can't even compare physical matter (a metaphysical unclear controversial notion) and quantum logic (a formal system). Then you dismiss that comp already provides a couple of quantum logics exactly where UDA predicts it should be (on the measure 1 on consistent continuations). But now, it seems that you are assuming physical matter, contradicting your neutral monism. This latter possibility works because of the non-distributive nature of its logic but it requires additional structure to derive the Born postulate. And arithmetic gives exactly that, a quantum logic enriched by non trivial arithmetical constraints. If we consider that they only can have this side by side equivalence in the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is dependent on the choice, [JK] How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct bet. Just because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal credence, doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is coming from. [SPK] One must have at least two different (orthogonal?) alternatives and a selection mechanism that can operate on all of them for a betting scheme to be possible. You talk like if comp did not provide this, but it does. [JK] The UDA only shows that they cannot be ontologically primitive, or fundamental. [SPK] I agree, but that restriction is not eliminative. What you need to understand is that what ever the UDA is defined to be, for it to be more than just a theoretical construct, it has to be able to be generated or implemented somehow, otherwise it is much like a concept that cannot be communicated or known. Would it even be a concept? UDA is an informal (but rigorous) argument. I guess you mean UD. The UD is already implemented, infinitely often in arithmetic. Implementation is an arithmetical notions, as I have explain to you already. Consider an (unrealistically long) dream wherein the dreamer observes several violations of the real-life laws of physics (wrong proton mass, broken glasses reassembling themselves, whatever.). He then reasonably concludes that he is dreaming. In other words he reduces his experience in the dream to a more fundamental physical reality wherein he is asleep, his brain is in state X, and so on. He is therefore denying the primitiveness of his dream -- it is, in your terminology, an illusion. [SPK] This situation assumes that the content of the dream can be known to contain violations, e.g. that there is some other set of experiences which are a standard of correctness against which the content of the dream can deviate. If the Dreamer never experiences another world except for that physics violating version it would never know and would accept it as real, in fact it would have no reason to consider that it might be unreal. That is incorrect. The dreamer can develop a belief in comp, extract the physics from it and then compare with the content of dream. this is actually what happen with QM. We know from the observation of nature that nature conforms (up to now) to the startling consequences of comp, like indeterminacy, MW, non locality, non cloning, core physical symmetries, etc. [JK] It seems to me that by your reasoning, the idea that the dreamer is dreaming undermines the result itself, so that no one can ever legitimately say I am dreaming. If I see a cup of coffee getting hotter on a cold day, or have conversations with long-dead relatives, I cannot say that I am dreaming, because if I am dreaming then there is no reason to take my reasoning seriously. (A lot of lucid dreamers would beg to differ!) Is this a misrepresentation of your view? It is
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the interpretations. So you assume QM? I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. Why not? Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want, I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I know it follows from comp. No amount of whats and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy', and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.) ? The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense. This makes brain mysterious. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We are saying, in effect, first we must care about logical ideas before we can explain anything. This is not how we organically make sense of the world. Sure, but those things are not as the same level. You are saying that we cannot life science, because we have to alive for doing that. This is incorrect. Logic is always an a posteriori analysis No doubt on this. But arithmetical truth does not depend on logic. Logic is used in *theories*, or by *machines or beings* attempting to get a tiny bit of the arithmetical truth. and never precedes or causes a sense experience (outside of more verbal-symbolic sense experiences). Logic and arithmetic is a late afterthought in the history of the development of the psyche and is always rooted in emotion and sensation first, both individually and evolutionarily. What must we assume to become ourselves? What must we assume to feel the wind? Nothing. What if, to feel the wind, the brain has to make many unconscious assumptions? Just to show that your argument is not an argument, but a begging question move. I try to reason about reality, avoiding theory when I can. Reality is what we search. You can only reason on a theory. That's why I don't deal in philosophical zombies. The point is that your theory entails either zombie, or that bodies have an infinitely complexity relevant for the consciousness of the person having that body. That's a loaded question fallacy. If we use puppet instead of zombie, there is no confusion and it all
Re: The free will function
On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 11, 8:04 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program mean. That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning? A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then. Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it, I can agree, although then even human might have a limited intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an already very long and fuzzy list. which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the diagonalization routine. If it weren't that way we would not be having this discussion. Machines would exhibit creativity and versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and human life. You confuse the conceptually possibility that some machine can think, the possibility that actual machine can thing. You might have said that the DNA will never reach the moon by looking at bacteria or insects. That is not reasoning. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP, MGA and Time
On 13 Feb 2012, at 18:47, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 12:11 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: I think you should probably read Maudlin's paper for specifics. I don't think thermodynamics will have much to do with the conclusions, whatever they may be (and I don't think it's obvious what exactly Maudlin showed). Hi Joseph, Thank you for the new link to Maudlin''s paper. I was having a hard time finding my copy... As to your comment: Would you consider exactly what a computational structure means in a universe that allows for perpetual motion? (We are going to run a reductio argument...) One thing that I see is that in such a universe we would have a huge White Rabbit problem because all brains in it would only be those of the Boltzmann type. There could not be any invariant form of sequencing that we could run a UD on. How so? Becasue in a universe without thermodynamics there is no such a thing as a sequence of events thatis invariant with respect to transitions from one observer to another, i.e. there would be no such thing as time definable in a 'dimensional' sense. All sequences would be at best Markov. With such a restriction to Markov processes, how to you define a UD? Without a UD, how do we get COMP to work? The UD can be emulated by a Markov process (all programs can). The UD, and its many implementations works by virtue of the the laws of addition and multiplication. You seem to forget that the notion of implementation can be defined precisely in arithmetic. To define a notion of primary physical implementation, you need to postulate primitive matter, and explains why it is Turing universal, and use the already defined notion of arithmetical implementation to justify that the physical activity is indeed a (local) implementation of a universal number. But then you will run into the UDA/MGA difficulties. Bruno Onward! Stephen On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 at 7:21 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Folks, I have been mulling over my conversations with Bruno, Joseph and ACW in the EVERYTHING list and have a question. In SANE04 we read the following: For any given precise running computation associated to some inner experience, you can modify the device in such a way that the amount of physical activity involved is arbitrarily low, and even null for dreaming experience which has no inputs and no outputs. Now, having suppressed that physical activity present in the running computation, the machine will only be accidentally correct. It will be correct only for that precise computation, with unchanged environment. If it is changed a little bit, it will make the machine running computation no more relatively correct. But then, Maudlin ingenuously showed that counterfactual correctness can be recovered, by adding non active devices which will be triggered only if some (counterfactual) change would appear in the environment. Now this shows that any inner experience can be associated with an arbitrary low (even null) physical activity, and this in keeping counterfactual correctness. And that is absurd with the conjunction of both comp and materialism. Setting aside the problem of concurrency for now, how is it that we are jumping over the difference between infinitely slow or even adiabatic physical process and null physical process? I may be not even wrong here, but in math isn't it true that there is a big difference between a quantity being arbitrarily small and a quantity being zero? I suspect that the folks in FOAR List that have been discussing information and entropy might have a thought on this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to find it. Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a real primary physical universe exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe from my 1p view. Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp (without always saying it). I do not blame him as this problem has been glossed over for hundred of years in math and thus we have to play with nonsense like the Axiom of Choice (or Zorn's Lemma) to prove that a solution exists, never-mind trying to actually find the solution. This so called 'proof come at a very steep price, it allows for all kinds of paradox. This is unclear. Comp is axiom-of-choice independent. Even arithmetical truth is entirely axiom of choice independent. ZF and ZF + AC proves exactly the same arithmetical truth. A possible solution to this problem, proposed by many even back as far as Heraclitus, is to avoid the requirement of a solution at the beginning. Just let the universe compute its least action configuration as it evolves in time, This does not work, unless you define the physical reality by arithmetic, but this would be confusing. It seems clearer and cleare that your existence axiom is the postulate that there is a physical primary reality. But then comp is wrong. At least Craig is coherent on this. he want some primitive matter, and he abandons comp. His theory is still unclear, but the overall shape make sense, despite it explains nothing (given that he assume also a primitive sense, and a primitive symmetry). Bruno but to accept this possibility we have to overturn many preciously held, but wrong, ideas and replace them with better ideas. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 5:13 AM, acw wrote: How does the existence on an entity determine its properties? Please answer this question. What do soundness and consistency even mean when there does not exist an unassailable way of defining what they are? Look carefully at what is required for a proof, don't ignore the need to be able to communicate the proof. Soundness and consistency have precise definitions. If you want an absolute definition of consistency, it could be seen as a particular machine never halting. Due to circularity of any such definitions, one has to take some notion of abstract computation fundamental (for example through arithmetic or combinators or ...) Dear ACW, I do like this definition of consistency as an (abstract) machine that never halts (its computation of itself). I like it a lot! We can use the language of hypersets http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-well-founded_set_theory to get consistent definitions in spite of the circularity. Ben Goertzel wrote a very nice paper that outlines the idea: goertzel.org/consciousness/consciousness_paper.pdf Ben Goertzel is one smart dude! Getting back to my basic question: How is it that the mere existence of an entity gives it a definition? The usual notion of a definition of a word is what is found to the right of a word listed in a dictionary, but are we going beyond that notion? How come that one definition and not some other or even a class of definitions? Am I incorrect in thinking that definitions are a set of relations that are built up by observers though the process of observation of the world and communicating with each other about the possible content of their individual observations? This is, after all, how dictionaries are formed (modulo the printing process, etc.)... When I am thinking of the existence of an entity, I am not considering that it is observed or that observation or measurement by an automated system occurred or anything else that might yield a definite count of what the properties of an entity are; I am just considering its existence per se. So I guess that I am not being clear... How does the mere existence of an entity act in any way as an observation of itself? Why that question? B/c it seems to me that that is what is required to have a consistent notion of an entity having properties merely by existing. So maybe you are thinking of what a hyperset is without realizing it! Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Non-Standard Arithmetic
On 2/14/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:54, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Bruno, What limits are there on what can constitute the constant that defines a particular model of a non-standard Arithmetic? Infinity. Non standard integers are infinite objects. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hi Bruno, OK, I am studying this idea. But your answer is confusing. AFAIK, standard integers are infinite objects also, given that they can be defined as equivalence classes where the equivalence relation is has the same value as X, where X is the integer in question. So how are non-standard integers different? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Anthropic Trilemma - Less Wrong
On 14 Feb 2012, at 04:00, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/13/2012 5:54 PM, acw wrote: On 2/12/2012 17:29, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Folks, I would like to bring the following to your attention. I think that we do need to revisit this problem. http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/ The Anthropic Trilemma http://lesswrong.com/lw/19d/the_anthropic_trilemma/ snip I gave a tentative (and likely wrong) possible solution to it in another thread. The trillema is much lessened if one considers a relative measure on histories (chains of OMs) and their length. That is, if a branch has more OMs, it should be more likely. The first horn doesn't apply because you'd have to keep the copies running indefinitely (merging won't work). The second horn, I'm not so sure if it's avoided: COMP-immortality implies potentially infinite histories (although mergers may make them finite), which makes formalizing my idea not trivial. The third horn only applies to ASSA, not RSSA (implicit in COMP). The fourth horn is acceptable to me, we can't really deny Boltzmann brains, but they shouldn't be that important as the experience isn't spatially located anyway(MGA). The white rabbit problem is more of a worry in COMP than this horn. The fifth horn is interesting, but also the most difficult to solve: it would require deriving local physics from COMP. My solution doesn't really solve the first horn though, it just makes it more difficult: if you do happen to make 3^^^3 copies of yourself in the future and they live very different and long lives, that might make it more likely that you end up with a continuation in such a future, however making copies and merging them shortly afterwards won't work. Hi ACW, This solution only will work for finite and very special versions of infinite sets. For the infinities like that of the Integers, it will not work because any proper subset of the infinite set is identical to the complete set as we can demonstrated with a one-to- one map between the odd integers and the integers. You should not confuse bijection (set isomorphism) and equality. Also, measure exists on infinite discrete sets, by weakening the sigma- additivity constraints. And then, finally, the measure problem bears on infinite extension of computations, and they are 2^aleph_0. Remember the one line UD program: For all i, j,k compute the kth first steps of phi_i(j). We can describe a computation a sequence phi_i(j)^0, phi_i(j)^1, , phi_i(j)^k. That set is enumerable, but the set of all sequences going through equivalent 1p-steps is not enumerable, and you can define a measure by just using the normal distribution in a manner similar to the dovetailing on the reals. This has just to be corrected to take into account the constraints of self-reference, which seems to be the origin of an arithmetical quantization, negative amplitude of probability, etc. Given that the number of computations that a universal TM can run is at least the countable infinity of the integers, we cannot use a comparison procedure to define the measure. You confuse the computations made by the UD, and observed by an outsider, and the infinite computations going through your actual 1p- state. Those includes all the dummies dovetailing on the reals, and cannot be enumerable. Think about the iterated self-duplication. It leads to the usual Gaussian. (Maybe this is one of the reasons many very smart people have tried, unsuccessfully, to ban infinite sets...) Not al all. The infinite set have been introduced to make the measure problem more easy, even for problem handling finite objects when they are very numerous. Mathematical logic explains that finite and enumerable is more complex than the continuum, which existence is basically motivated by searching to simplify the problem. For example, Fermat on the reals is trivial. Not so on non negative integers. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 14 Feb 2012, at 06:57, Stephen P. King wrote: acw: Yet the problem is decidable in finite amount of steps, even if that amount may be very large indeed. It would be unfeasible for someone with bounded resources, but not a problem for any abstract TM or a physical system (are they one and the same, at least locally?). Hi ACW, WARNING WARNING WARNING DANGER DANGER! Overload is Eminent! OK, please help me understand how we can speak of computations for situations where I have just laid out how computations can't exist. In which theory? The concept of existence is theory dependent. If we take CTT at face value, then it requires some form of implementation. Some kind of machine must be run. Are you sure that you are not substituting your ability to imagine the solution of a computation as an intuitive proof that computations exist as purely abstract entities, independent from all things physical? My difficulty may just be a simple failure of imagination but how can it make any sense to believe in something in whose very definition is the requirement that it cannot be known or imagined? If we assume this: Ax ~(0 = s(x)) (For all number x the successor of x is different from zero). AxAy ~(x = y) - ~(s(x) = s(y))(different numbers have different successors) Ax x + 0 = x (0 adds nothing) AxAy x + s(y) = s(x + y) ( meaning x + (y +1) = (x + y) +1) Ax x *0 = 0 AxAy x*s(y) = x*y + x Then we can define computations and we can prove them to exist. It is not more difficult that to prove the existence of an even number, or of a prime number. It is just much more longer, but conceptually without any new difficulty. Knowing and imagining are, at least, computations running in our brain hardware. If your brained stopped, the knowing, imagining and even dreaming that is you continues? Not relatively to those sharing the reality where your brain stop. But from your own point of view, it will continue. So you do believe in disembodies spirits, No. If your brain stop here and now, from your point of view, it continue in the most normal near computational histories. In those histories you will still feel as locally and relatively embodied. Globally you are not, even in this local reality, given that there a re no bodies at all. Bodies are appearances. you are just not calling them that. I apologize, but this is a bit hard to take. The inconsistency that runs rampant here is making me a bit depressed. You have to find the inconsistency. Now, given all of that, in the concept of Platonia we have the idea of ideal forms, be they the Good, or some particular infinite string of numbers. How exactly are they determined to be the best possible by some standard. Whatever the standard, all that matters is that there are multiple possible options of The Forms with the stipulation that it is the best or most consistent or whatever. It is still an optimization problem with N variables that are required to be compared to each other according to some standard. Therefore, in most cases there is an Np-complete problem to be solved. How can it be computed if it has to exist as perfect from the beginning? The problem is that you're considering a from the beginning at all, as in, you're imagining math as existing in time. Instead of thinking it along the lines of specific Forms, try thinking of a limited version along the lines of: is this problem decidable in a finite amount of steps, no matter how large, as in: if a true solution exists, it's there. And what exactly partitions it away from all the other true solutions? This idea seems to only work if there is One True Theory of Mathematics Not at all. Comp needs only one true conception of arithmetic. The evidence is that it exists, even if we cannot define it in arithmetic. We need the intuition to understand the difference between finite and non finite. But we know that that is not the case, there are many different Arithmetics. How exactly do you know that yours is the true standard one? It does not matter as long as we reason in first order logic, or if we are enough cautious with higher logic. The consequence are the same in all models, standard or non standard. IF PA proves S, S is true in all models of arithmetic, and we don't need more than that. I'm not entirely sure if we can include uncomputable values there, such as if a specific program halts or not, but I'm leaning towards that it might be possible. OK, there is no beginning. Recursively enumerable functions exist eternally. OK. Why not Little Ponies? My daughters tells me all about How Princess Celestia rules the sky... This entire theory reminds me of the elaborated Pascal's Gamble... How do we know that our god is the true god? OK. So we Bet on Bpp. OK... Then what? How do I know what Bpp means? Because for all
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to find it. Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a real primary physical universe exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe from my 1p view. Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp (without always saying it). Hi Bruno, The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. Why is that a problem? Because without a physical world, it is impossible for that theory to have any properties. You want to get around this problem by postulating that the entities of UDA+MGA can and does have a particular set of properties merely because they exist. OK, but how does the existence of an entity define its properties? I do not blame him as this problem has been glossed over for hundred of years in math and thus we have to play with nonsense like the Axiom of Choice (or Zorn's Lemma) to prove that a solution exists, never-mind trying to actually find the solution. This so called 'proof come at a very steep price, it allows for all kinds of paradox http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach-Tarski_paradox. This is unclear. Comp is axiom-of-choice independent. Even arithmetical truth is entirely axiom of choice independent. ZF and ZF + AC proves exactly the same arithmetical truth. COMP is Axiom of Choice independent ... Does this means that COMP is independent of any particular version of AC or does it means that the truth of a statement is just the existence of the statement as an abstract entity in an isolated way? I am just trying to be consistent with what I understand of UDA+MGA. UDA+MGA, as far as I can tell, proposes that the physical world does not have an existence independent of our experiences and since our experiences can be represented exactly as relations between numbers, that all that exists is numbers. Correct? If this is correct, then my questions turn on what exactly are numbers and how do they acquire properties. 1 is a 1, a 2 is a 2, and 3 is a 3. But what is it that defines what a 1 or a 2 or a 3 is? We could think of this as a set of different patterns of pixels on our computer monitors, of marks on paper, or a chalkboard, or apples, bananas, or trees. But this avoids the question of what is it that ultimately gives 1 its one-ness?. Alternatively, we can think of these symbols as physical representations of sets or classes of objects, but then we have to define what that means. The easiest way to do that is to point at objects in the world and make noises with our mouth or, if we are mute, to make signs with our hands and/or grimaces with our faces. Obviously, all of this is taking a 3p or objective point of view of objects, symbols, etc. but as we know, this is a conceit as we can only guess and bet that what we observe is real in that it is not just a figment of our imagination that vanishes when we stop thinking of it. I am being intentionally absurd to illustrate a problem that I see. If we are going to claim that the physical world does not exist then we have to be consistent with that claim and cannot use any concepts that assumes the properties of a physical world. My claim is that UDA+MGA violates this requirement by using concepts that only have a meaning because of their relation to physical processes and yet claiming that those very processes do not exist. A possible solution to this problem, proposed by many even back as far as Heraclitus, is to avoid the requirement of a solution at the beginning. Just let the universe compute its least action configuration as it evolves in time, This does not work, unless you define the physical reality by arithmetic, but this would be confusing. It seems clearer and cleare that your existence axiom is the postulate that there is a physical primary reality. But then comp is wrong. What I see as wrong about COMP is how you are interpreting it. You are taking its implied meaning too far. I claim that there is a limit on its soundness as a theory or explanation of ontological nature, a soundness that vanishes when it is taken to imply that its communicability becomes impossible - a situation which inevitably occurs when one
Re: The free will function
On Feb 9, 2:45 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 8, 10:14 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer of interest. That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously. Why would your subjective concerns matter to me? I take *my* subjectivity as seriously as anything! If I am very cold and I walk into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature works. My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness, that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way. Hopelessly vague. Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague? may not bemay not be... If I don't qualify it, then I get crap because I 'speak as if I know' and if I do qualify it then I get crap because I'm hopelessly vague. Philosophy is difficult. This supports my suspicion that when people disagree with what you are saying but can't find any reason they can support, they tend to criticize how you write instead. It's conceivable. I just conceived it. I just conceived it = I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of it No. The two are not synonymous. Why not? Semantics and grammar. Obviously they aren't literally the same words, otherwise there would be no reason to point out that they figuratively mean the same thing. You are not pointing out a fact to the effect that they mean ther same thing figurativelty. They seem to mean the same thing to you because of baggage you are brigning to the issue that other people are not bringing. Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it? Are you saying causation is coercion? If someone is caused to do something against their will, then yes, of course. If no other agents, humans, individuals is overrding their will, they are not being coerced. Coercion is a deliberate act. Gravity does not coerce objects into falling. I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed, there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to determinism. You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic forces. No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything else. I can't see why. Can you see why a universe without light would have no concept of darkness? No. We can conceive of the existence of the non-existent and vice versa. Mistakes are possbile under determinism. It isn't possible to do the impossible by mistake. If you posit a universe that is deterministic, then by definition, no shade of free will can exist. Not voluntary action, not will, not intention, accident, nothing at all would exist to define determinism in any way. Except determinism itself. Everything would be purely automatic and unconscious and have no way to conceive of any other possibility. Non-sequitur. You would be determined to conceive whatever you were determined to conceive, rightly or wrongly. Let's say they brain state of someone who believes in free will is state S. Does it really make a difference whether S is arrived at by a history involving indeterminism and free will, or by a history involving involving strict determinism? It's the same state either way. so, under determinsim, one could be mistaken about determinism. You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine that there could be any other theoretical possibility. That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't exist. They do exist, they just exist within your experience. Existing only in ones experience is for all practical purposes exactly equivalent to not existing. That is the most common way to look at it, but it's backwards. Nothing exists unless it exists in something's experience (directly or indirectly). Unsupported assertion. That is what existence is. Detection and participation. One cannot deny the existence of that which one has never imagined or conceived. There is nothing to deny if you haven't experienced its existence in some way. We experience molecules indirectly through description and inference, therefore they seem like they exist to us. We imagine what they are based on models and experiments which have allowed us to feel like we have closed the gap between our indirect experience of mathematics and physics and our direct experience of microscopy and materials science. All of these things are contingent solely on detection and interpretation. We could
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 8:53 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to find it. Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a real primary physical universe exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe from my 1p view. Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp (without always saying it). Hi Bruno, The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? Why is that a problem? Because without a physical world, it is impossible for that theory to have any properties. You want to get around this problem by postulating that the entities of UDA+MGA can and does have a particular set of properties merely because they exist. OK, but how does the existence of an entity define its properties? I do not blame him as this problem has been glossed over for hundred of years in math and thus we have to play with nonsense like the Axiom of Choice (or Zorn's Lemma) to prove that a solution exists, never-mind trying to actually find the solution. This so called 'proof come at a very steep price, it allows for all kinds of paradoxhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach-Tarski_paradox . This is unclear. Comp is axiom-of-choice independent. Even arithmetical truth is entirely axiom of choice independent. ZF and ZF + AC proves exactly the same arithmetical truth. COMP is Axiom of Choice independent ... Does this means that COMP is independent of any particular version of AC or does it means that the truth of a statement is just the existence of the statement as an abstract entity in an isolated way? I am just trying to be consistent with what I understand of UDA+MGA. UDA+MGA, as far as I can tell, proposes that the physical world does not have an existence independent of our experiences and since our experiences can be represented exactly as relations between numbers, that all that exists is numbers. Correct? If this is correct, then my questions turn on what exactly are numbers and how do they acquire properties. 1 is a 1, a 2 is a 2, and 3 is a 3. But what is it that defines what a 1 or a 2 or a 3 is? We could think of this as a set of different patterns of pixels on our computer monitors, of marks on paper, or a chalkboard, or apples, bananas, or trees. But this avoids the question of what is it that ultimately gives 1 its one-ness?. Alternatively, we can think of these symbols as physical representations of sets or classes of objects, but then we have to define what that means. The easiest way to do that is to point at objects in the world and make noises with our mouth or, if we are mute, to make signs with our hands and/or grimaces with our faces. Obviously, all of this is taking a 3p or objective point of view of objects, symbols, etc. but as we know, this is a conceit as we can only guess and bet that what we observe is real in that it is not just a figment of our imagination that vanishes when we stop thinking of it. I am being intentionally absurd to illustrate a problem that I see. If we are going to claim that the physical world does not exist then we have to be consistent with that claim and cannot use any concepts that assumes the properties of a physical world. My claim is that UDA+MGA violates this requirement by using concepts that only have a meaning because of their relation to physical processes and yet claiming that those very processes do not exist. A possible solution to this problem, proposed by many even back as far as Heraclitus, is to avoid the requirement of a solution at the beginning. Just let the universe compute its least action configuration as it evolves in time, This does not work, unless you define the physical reality by arithmetic, but this would be confusing. It seems clearer and cleare that your existence axiom is the postulate that there is a physical primary reality. But then comp is wrong. What I see as wrong about COMP is how you are interpreting it. You are taking its implied meaning too far. I claim that there is a limit on its soundness as a theory or explanation of ontological
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to find it. Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a real primary physical universe exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe from my 1p view. Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp (without always saying it). Hi Bruno, The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. It does not prove that the physical world does not exist... it proves that a *primitive* material world is irrelevant to predict your next moment, the current physics of the world. Whether there is a primitive material world or not cannot change your expectation of your next moment, rendering this primitive material world devoid of explanatory power. Why is that a problem? Because without a physical world, it is impossible for that theory to have any properties. You want to get around this problem by postulating that the entities of UDA+MGA can and does have a particular set of properties merely because they exist. OK, but how does the existence of an entity define its properties? I do not blame him as this problem has been glossed over for hundred of years in math and thus we have to play with nonsense like the Axiom of Choice (or Zorn's Lemma) to prove that a solution exists, never-mind trying to actually find the solution. This so called 'proof come at a very steep price, it allows for all kinds of paradoxhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banach-Tarski_paradox . This is unclear. Comp is axiom-of-choice independent. Even arithmetical truth is entirely axiom of choice independent. ZF and ZF + AC proves exactly the same arithmetical truth. COMP is Axiom of Choice independent ... Does this means that COMP is independent of any particular version of AC or does it means that the truth of a statement is just the existence of the statement as an abstract entity in an isolated way? I am just trying to be consistent with what I understand of UDA+MGA. UDA+MGA, as far as I can tell, proposes that the physical world does not have an existence independent of our experiences and since our experiences can be represented exactly as relations between numbers, that all that exists is numbers. Correct? If this is correct, then my questions turn on what exactly are numbers and how do they acquire properties. 1 is a 1, a 2 is a 2, and 3 is a 3. But what is it that defines what a 1 or a 2 or a 3 is? We could think of this as a set of different patterns of pixels on our computer monitors, of marks on paper, or a chalkboard, or apples, bananas, or trees. But this avoids the question of what is it that ultimately gives 1 its one-ness?. Alternatively, we can think of these symbols as physical representations of sets or classes of objects, but then we have to define what that means. The easiest way to do that is to point at objects in the world and make noises with our mouth or, if we are mute, to make signs with our hands and/or grimaces with our faces. Obviously, all of this is taking a 3p or objective point of view of objects, symbols, etc. but as we know, this is a conceit as we can only guess and bet that what we observe is real in that it is not just a figment of our imagination that vanishes when we stop thinking of it. I am being intentionally absurd to illustrate a problem that I see. If we are going to claim that the physical world does not exist then we have to be consistent with that claim and cannot use any concepts that assumes the properties of a physical world. My claim is that UDA+MGA violates this requirement by using concepts that only have a meaning because of their relation to physical processes and yet claiming that those very processes do not exist. A possible solution to this problem, proposed by many even back as far as Heraclitus, is to avoid the requirement of a solution at the beginning. Just let the universe compute its least action configuration as it evolves in time, This does not work, unless you define the physical reality by arithmetic, but this would be confusing. It seems clearer and cleare that your existence axiom is the postulate that
Re: The free will function
On Feb 12, 2:22 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 11, 8:04 pm, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/2/11 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program mean. That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. Then no AI is fully dumb, since all are adaptive to some extent. Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context Any? Then no human is fully intelligent. and to potentially transcend it, which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not be having this discussion. That we are having this discussion does not prove we are infinitely adaptable, as your definition intelligent requires. Machines would exhibit creativity and versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and human life. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 10:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: 2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to find it. Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a real primary physical universe exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe from my 1p view. Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp (without always saying it). Hi Bruno, The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. It does not prove that the physical world does not exist... it proves that a *primitive* material world is irrelevant to predict your next moment, the current physics of the world. Whether there is a primitive material world or not cannot change your expectation of your next moment, rendering this primitive material world devoid of explanatory power. Quentin, This reminds me of the GHZM quantum experiment which seems to suggest that a pre-existing reality does not exist at least according to Lubos Motl. Is that anything like what you mean? Richard You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
Hi Stephen, On 14 Feb 2012, at 15:53, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to find it. Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a real primary physical universe exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe from my 1p view. Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp (without always saying it). Hi Bruno, The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. Why is that a problem? Because without a physical world, it is impossible for that theory to have any properties. You want to get around this problem by postulating that the entities of UDA+MGA can and does have a particular set of properties merely because they exist. OK, but how does the existence of an entity define its properties? See Quentin's answer. To insist on this: comp does not say that the physical reality does not exist. It says that the physical reality is not a primary notion. You could as well say that Darwin has shown that higher mammals don't exist, because he provided an explanation of their appearance from simpler objects. I do not blame him as this problem has been glossed over for hundred of years in math and thus we have to play with nonsense like the Axiom of Choice (or Zorn's Lemma) to prove that a solution exists, never-mind trying to actually find the solution. This so called 'proof come at a very steep price, it allows for all kinds of paradox. This is unclear. Comp is axiom-of-choice independent. Even arithmetical truth is entirely axiom of choice independent. ZF and ZF + AC proves exactly the same arithmetical truth. COMP is Axiom of Choice independent ... Does this means that COMP is independent of any particular version of AC or does it means that the truth of a statement is just the existence of the statement as an abstract entity in an isolated way? It means that the first order arithmetical proposition are the same in the model of set theories with AC than with set theories without AC, or with ~AC. I am just trying to be consistent with what I understand of UDA+MGA. UDA+MGA, as far as I can tell, proposes that the physical world does not have an existence independent of our experiences and since our experiences can be represented exactly as relations between numbers, that all that exists is numbers. Correct? Not entirely. The physical reality is explained by numbers' dream coherence, and that is independent of our *experience* of it. So, in a sense, physical reality is independent of us. But it is still dependent on all universal numbers and the entire arithmetical truth. Also, our experience cannot be represented by number relations, by number relations. I mean, for numbers, their experience are not number relations. Only at the meta)level, having bet on comp, we can say that the number experiences are partially axiomatized by relation between computations and truth, but keep in mind that arithmetical truth itself cannot be represented by a number relation. (Cf Tarski, Kaplan Montague, etc.). If this is correct, then my questions turn on what exactly are numbers and how do they acquire properties. 1 is a 1, a 2 is a 2, and 3 is a 3. But what is it that defines what a 1 or a 2 or a 3 is? To reason, we don't have to know what we are talking about. We just need to agree on axioms. I gave you the axioms. We could think of this as a set of different patterns of pixels on our computer monitors, of marks on paper, or a chalkboard, or apples, bananas, or trees. But this avoids the question of what is it that ultimately gives 1 its one-ness?. With the axiom given, it can be proved that Ex((x = s(0) Ay((y = s(0)) - y = x)). Alternatively, we can think of these symbols as physical representations of sets or classes of objects, but then we have to define what that means. The easiest way to do that is to point at objects in the world and make noises with our mouth or, if we are mute, to make signs with our hands and/or grimaces with our faces. I think we can use first order logic. It evacuates the metaphysical baggage, to use Brian Tenneson expression.
Re: COMP theology
On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. The initial postulate is that the either MG set-up, or Maudlin's machine, instantiates an episode of consciousness in virtue of its computational states. The reductio demolishes the possibility of this being true qua materia, because the relevant physical components have, in effect, been rendered impotent. So are you saying that, if one then accepts the additional postulate of matter-mechanism reversal, either of these two devices can indeed be considered to instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but qua computatio rather than qua materia? Or not? David On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote: On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.com wrote: Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming COMP, consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. Not even a little. Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie-graph setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of physics-mechanism is actually accepted. Clearly, we now have to regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is currently related. OK. But what are we now to make of the original proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an actual conscious state? After all, we don't regard them as primitively physical objects any longer, so we can't now apply the reductio arguments in quite the same way, can we? I don't see why. We did bet on a comp substitution level. The material aspect of the device will have to be retrieved from the infinitely many computations going through our current state, but such a current state does still exist by the initial assumption. They're part of the general computational state of affairs, like everything else. Is it that they instantiate the wrong sort of computation for consciousness, Not all. Such matter is just very stable, and is supposed to implement the right computation (at the right level), if not, then we would not accept the digital brain. Comp is neutral on the nature of matter. because their physical behaviour is the result of accidentally contrived relations? I am not sure I see your problem. The physical behavior becomes very well founded by a statistics on infinitely many computations, a priori. The math might one day refute comp, by showing that there are too much white rabbit, but this is not yet the case. IOW, they're not really UM's in any relevant sense. ? There is UMs in two (related) sense. The UMs which are proved to exist (in arithmetic), and then the observable local UMs, who bodies emerge from the competition between all UMs (in the preview sense) below their substitution level. But then wouldn't the same argument for contrivance hold in the original case, and undermine the reductio? Only in the case it appears that the comp matter is not stable enough to provide stable computations, but the whole point has been to make that very possibility testable. I'm puzzled. David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. Bruno David On Sun, Feb 12, 2012 at 11:14 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/11/2012 5:09 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of
Re: The free will function
On Feb 13, 5:17 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Digital substitution is not a local symmetry. hence flight simulators do not fly. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 9, 4:43 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: It [being free] means your actions are not determined by external forces So a external force like light that has reflected off a wall does not effect your actions and you crash into the wall. If that's what being free means then I don't want to be free. You substituted effect for determine. What is my defintion, IYO? You're asking me??! You want me to tell you what you're talking about? You wrote as if you knew. I don't believe I've offered one in the current discussion. As you've been arguing passionately that free will exist and even claim to have proven No and no. it I think its odd that now you refuse to even say what the hell it is. Are you asking? I thought you knew. Before you can prove something you must know what the hell you're trying to prove. First tell me what free will means and only then we can debate if human beings have this property or not. Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. Meaning it was caused or uncased. Meaning it was deterministic or random. an uncaused aim or goal still counts as a reason, Yes certainly, in that case you did X because of goal Y and so X was deterministic. But what caused goal Y? Nothing caused goal Y, it was random. And you did X to achieve goal Y, so X had a reason, even if Y didn't have a cause. because it is an answer to the question what did you do that for. However, only a very select group of entities can answer such questions. But human beings don't seem to be members of that very select group because very soon after you start firing off a chain of what did you do that for questions at them all they can do is come up with a standard rubber stamp reply of I don't know, I just wanted to. FW only requires people to be as rational as people generally are , so that doens't matter. and if the name is appropriate and it really is final That's not what final means in context. Bullshit. Bullshit yourself, I intorduced the term and I know what I meant by it Read yer Aristotle. Actually I have read Aristotle when I was young and foolish and it was a complete waste of time. Unlike Plato his literary style was really bad, and even by the standards of the day Aristotle was a dreadful physicist, just awful, a good high school physics student today knows far more philosophy than Aristotle did. Progress has been made in the last 2500 years. And I've got to tell you that just dropping the name of a ancient Greek philosopher doesn't impress me very much, especially when there is no evidence you know a damn thing about him. I was establishing a meaning, not a claim. But there;s no reasoining with the unreasonable. Nope. You have misunderstood final cause. I'm curious, does anybody think that the above is a satisfactory rebuttal to my argument, or to any argument for that matter? Yes, it is a satisfactory rebuttal to say that you did not understand the claim in the first place, and therefore did not relevantly refute it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: To actually implement digital substitution, we would have to not only match the functionally of the module internally but also match the interactions of that module with the environment. No, you'd only have to match he interactions with the environment, what happens internally is inaccessible to us by direct observation. And before you start yelling objections to that reflect on the fact that other human beings are black boxes to us, we can hypothesize that they have a internal life and we can hypothesize what it feels like to be that other person, but we have no direct access to such things and we can never know for sure if our hypothesis is right. Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as carbon Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as the element germanium either (although they are in the same column in the periodic table as is carbon) and yet you can make transistors out of both and in fact the first transistors were germanium. So is arithmetic performed on a germanium computer different from arithmetic performed on a silicon computer? Or can the atoms be treated as black boxes and the important thing being the logic in the way the atoms are arranged and thus the 4 a silicon computer produces to the question how much is 2+2 is the same 4 that a germanium computer produces? The thing I don't understand is that everybody agrees that our conscious experience is not at the level of carbon or silicon or germanium atoms, or atoms of any sort for that matter, we are not conscious of them and until a few centuries ago no conscious being even knew they existed, and yet one and only one of those 3 atoms is supposed to produce consciousness even though we are no more conscious of that atom than the other two atoms. Quite frankly I think the idea that 6 protons 6 electrons and 6 neutrons (carbon) is conscious but 14 protons 14 electrons and 14 neutrons (silicon) is not and can never be no matter how you put such objects together is nuts. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 7:49 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 10:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com mailto:allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 2/14/2012 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 03:55, Stephen P. King wrote: The idea of a measure that Bruno talks about is just another way of talking about this same kind of optimization problem without tipping his hand that it implicitly requires a computation to be performed to find it. Because UDA+MGA shows that even if a real primary physical universe exists, it cannot explain anything related to what I can feel to observe from my 1p view. Obviously, the appearance of a universe makes it natural to believe that a simple explanation is that such a universe exists, but this has been shown to not work at all, once we assume we are Turing emulable. So f you are right, then there must be flaw in UDA+MGA, but each time we ask you to point where it is, you come up with philosophical reason to discard comp (without always saying it). Hi Bruno, The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. It does not prove that the physical world does not exist... it proves that a *primitive* material world is irrelevant to predict your next moment, the current physics of the world. Whether there is a primitive material world or not cannot change your expectation of your next moment, rendering this primitive material world devoid of explanatory power. Quentin, This reminds me of the GHZM quantum experiment which seems to suggest that a pre-existing reality does not exist at least according to Lubos Motl. Is that anything like what you mean? Richard It's not really that a primitive physical world would be devoid of explanatory power. After all it is the implicit working assumption of almost all scientists. What it primitively explains is that some things exist (are primitive and physical) and other things don't. On this list, the working hypothesis is that 'everything' (in some sense) exists and so there is no explantory function for primitive physics. The fact that it seems impossible to explain qualia in terms of physics also argues against taking physics as primitive. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose If its rational then there is a reason for it and thus it's deterministic. and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. So a hand calculator hooked up to a roulette wheel so that one time in 37 it gives the wrong answer has free will. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2012, at 18:54, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm assuming the observations of quantum mechanics, but not the interpretations. So you assume QM? I assume the observations, but not the interpretations. For example: I assume that the double slit experiment produces a particular pattern of illumination under the given conditions, but I think that pattern is really interfering waves of sensitivity spread across the target, rather than a literal wave of photons in space. I assume that bubble and cloud chambers produce trails under the given conditions, but I don't assume that means that a physical particle has penetrated the chamber - it could be an event within the chamber that has an external cause. I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. With comp, matter is not an embodiment of logic, if that means something. Why not? Because matter are first person (plural) experiences emerging from truth (not formalizable) and infinities of computations. It's not clear to me what the difference would really be between emerging from truth and embodying logic. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. This is a don't ask assumption. No, it is a positive assertion of irreducibility. Ask all you want, I'm explaining why you will never get an answer. I already got an answer. I don't know if it is the true one, but I know it follows from comp. How does it really answer what blue is though? Comp can only point to a function that would match the function of qualia in general, but no specific characteristics. To comp, blue is no different from sour. It might specify *that* two qualia would have different values, but it has no way to describe in what way the experience differs. No amount of whats and hows add up to a who or a why. They are anomalously symmetric. Not dualistic, because they are only opposite views of the same sense (making it an involuted monism, since 1p exists within 3p as 'energy', and 3p exists within 1p as body/matter.) ? What and how are questions that can be asked about literal machines. Who and why are questions that can be asked about figurative stories. They don't mix, but they are symmetrical aspects of the same underlying when where root sense. Actors (who and why) + Stage (what and how) = Show (when and where). The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, We have access only to 1p, but this does not mean that there are no 1p-3p relation. The cat lives the 1p experience of the mouse, but sometimes the cat catch a mouse, also. Sure, yes. Every 3p is the back door of some other 1p. They are the same thing in one sense, and opposite things in the opposite sense. This makes brain mysterious. No more than the back side of a tapestry. therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. This is too fuzzy. Comp can agree or disagree with this. I am still waiting for a list of what you assume and derive. I assume that you don't need to assume in order to derive, and I derive that there are many overlapping channels of sense which themselves make sense relative to each other. By reaching for a list of a priori assumptions, we subscribe to a logos-centric cosmology. We are saying, in effect,
Re: The free will function
On 14 Feb 2012, at 18:53, 1Z wrote: On Feb 13, 5:17 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Digital substitution is not a local symmetry. hence flight simulators do not fly. That's very funny, Peter. That reminds us of a quite good typical comp exercise: can a virtual typhoon makes you wet? Related here to Can you flight with a computer?. Let me ask a question to Stephen. I think I know the answer of all participants on this, I think, except for Stephen, where I am less sure. The question is: do you agree with the, now common and rather obvious comp answer to that exercise. The comp answer is yes you can be made wet by a virtual typhoon, but you have to virtualize yourself, or more precisely you need only to virtualize your skin-interfaces with the virtual typhoon. Stephen, do you agree with this? Do you agree that with comp, we can in principle, make you feel like being under a tempest, by virtue of running a computer in room. Craig would clearly answer that this is not possible, given that for him, comp is not possible in the first place. But you acknowledge that you believe in comp, or that you can assume it, or at least that you do not assume that comp is false. But my question does not bear on the truth or falsity of comp, but on the experience of feeling wet by Stephen King in case his brain has been digitalized and interfaces in a virtual environment of the kind tempest. Do you agree that if comp is correct then Stephen King has experienced the quite physical-material experience of being quite wet due to violent raining winds in a tempest. OK? If you agree with this we can proceed step by step, and perhaps, jump quickly to step 8, the MGA-Maudlin stuff, which is at the heart of the difficulty of linking consciousness to the physical objects, unless, like Craig, you abandon comp and you make both consciousness and the physical infinitely complex. That prevents indeed the unavoidable metaphysical dissociation brought by betting on a substitution level. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: [SPK] The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? Hi Joseph, Please be specific. What is not true about the sentence I wrote above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read: 8) Yes, but what if we don't grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up to this stage, w_e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning steps, by postulating that a ''physical universe'' really ''exists'' and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so that our usual physical predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated ''little'' computational histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and disgraceful. _It can also be quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of Ockham's Razor, and obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept comp+ (in which case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology, and the general shape of physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically, there is still a place for both physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose._This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power._ _It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham's razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ''matter'' has been ontologically reduced to ''mind'' where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. _All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is that comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the physical processing related to the computations corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical ''supervenience thesis'' of the materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner experiences can only be associated with type of computation. Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). If this is not a statement that the physical world does not exist and, instead, that all that exists is abstract machine, I will eat my hat. I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the existence of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On 2/14/2012 10:48 AM, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose If its rational then there is a reason for it and thus it's deterministic. Except that game theory shows that the rational strategy may be to make random choices. and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. So a hand calculator hooked up to a roulette wheel so that one time in 37 it gives the wrong answer has free will. I don't see that would count as an ability to rationally choose unless the calculator was smart enough to understand game theory. Brent John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2112/4809 - Release Date: 02/14/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 10:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. It does not prove that the physical world does not exist... it proves that a *primitive* material world is irrelevant to predict your next moment, the current physics of the world. Whether there is a primitive material world or not cannot change your expectation of your next moment, rendering this primitive material world devoid of explanatory power. HI Quentin, What is the difference? Please see my last post to ACW with the subject header Re: On Pre-existing Fields Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: [SPK] The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? Hi Joseph, Please be specific. What is not true about the sentence I wrote above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read: 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up to this stage, w*e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning steps, by postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ * He talks about a primary physical universe... an ontological physical universe, just below he uses the word concrete showing that really was what he meant... hence your statement is false, because he does not say the physical universe does not exist... and just using your eyes shows that such a statement is absurd. *and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so that our usual physical predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated ‘‘little’’ computational histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and disgraceful. *It can also be quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of Ockham’s Razor, and obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept comp+ (in which case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology, and the general shape of physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically, there is still a place for both physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose.* This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.* * It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. *All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is that comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the physical processing related to the computations corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical ‘‘supervenience thesis’’ of the materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner experiences can only be associated with type of computation. Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). If this is not a statement that the physical world does not exist and, instead, that all that exists is abstract machine, I will eat my hat. I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the existence of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net On 2/14/2012 10:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. It does not prove that the physical world does not exist... it proves that a *primitive* material world is irrelevant to predict your next moment, the current physics of the world. Whether there is a primitive material world or not cannot change your expectation of your next moment, rendering this primitive material world devoid of explanatory power. HI Quentin, What is the difference? Please see my last post to ACW with the subject header Re: On Pre-existing Fields The difference is that it is not primary... the physical universe emerge from computations. It should be an invariant in relative deep computation giving rise to consciousness. Numbers-Computations-consciousness universe Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program mean. That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning? My goal is not to be intelligent or to be interested in every idea, it is to explore the implications of this particular set of ideas. A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then. I'm saying that comp does the same thing, as does every religion and philosophy. They are all different ways of making sense of the universe and the self. All I'm doing is looking at what they all have in common - sense. Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it, I can agree, although then even human might have a limited intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an already very long and fuzzy list. I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others. which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the diagonalization routine. Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the only way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels us to accept it's evidence. Faith does the same thing in reverse. It says you have to see through logic and embrace a deeper truth. If it weren't that way we would not be having this discussion. Machines would exhibit creativity and versatility and would be widely considered identical to animal and human life. You confuse the conceptually possibility that some machine can think, the possibility that actual machine can thing. You might have said that the DNA will never reach the moon by looking at bacteria or insects. That is not reasoning. But I still would have said that DNA has a better chance to reach the moon by looking at bacteria or insects then silicon dioxide has of reaching the moon. The problem is that machines show no signs of being anything other than emotionally inert. If it weren't for that fact, and the nature of that fact as a defining feature of AI thus far, I would not have a problem with it. I agree that in theory it shouldn't be a problem, but in theory, DNA shouldn't need to make consciousness either. Once we allow the common sense notion of inanimate objects being unconscious to be possibly true, then we can look to understand why that might be the case, rather than adopting a 'don't ask' attitude ;) Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 11:31 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: [SPK] The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? Hi Joseph, Please be specific. What is not true about the sentence I wrote above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read: 8) Yes, but what if we don't grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up to this stage, w_e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning steps, by postulating that a ''physical universe'' really ''exists'' and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so that our usual physical predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated ''little'' computational histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and disgraceful. _It can also be quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of Ockham's Razor, and obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept comp+ (in which case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology, and the general shape of physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically, there is still a place for both physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose._This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power._ _It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham's razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ''matter'' has been ontologically reduced to ''mind'' where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. _All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is that comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the physical processing related to the computations corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical ''supervenience thesis'' of the materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner experiences can only be associated with type of computation. Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). If this is not a statement that the physical world does not exist and, instead, that all that exists is abstract machine, I will eat my hat. I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the existence of the physical world. My understanding is that the properties of the physical world are inferred from our subjective experiences that have a consistency (which Vic Stenger calls point-of-view-invariance) which allows us to model them as being out there, i.e. objective. Bruno's theory is that this subset of subjective experiences is generated by all possible computations. Hence the material world model is derivative from computation and is not primitive or fundamental. This however may suffer from a white-rabbit problem since it seems likely that many sets of subjective experiences will correspond to models of Alice-in-wonderland worlds. Incidentally, I think that human-like consciousness can only exist within the context of a physical world model. So the physical world is not optional, even if it isn't fundamental. Brent My claim is that we can recover appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand. Onward! Stephen No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2012.0.1913 / Virus Database: 2112/4809 - Release Date: 02/14/12 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 at 1:31 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 2/14/2012 10:25 AM, Joseph Knight wrote: [SPK] The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. How many times do we have to tell you that's not true? Hi Joseph, Please be specific. What is not true about the sentence I wrote above? In SANE04, pg. 10-11, I read: 8) Yes, but what if we don’t grant a concrete robust physical universe? Up to this stage, w*e can still escape the conclusion of the seven preceding reasoning steps, by postulating that a ‘‘physical universe’’ really ‘‘exists’’ and is too little in the sense of not being able to generate the entire UD*, nor any reasonable portions of it, so that our usual physical predictions would be safe from any interference with its UD-generated ‘‘little’’ computational histories. Such a move can be considered as being ad hoc and disgraceful. *It can also be quite weakened by some acceptation of some conceptual version of Ockham’s Razor, and obviously that move is without purpose for those who are willing to accept comp+ (in which case the UDA just show the necessity of the detour in psychology, and the general shape of physics as averages on consistent 1-histories). But logically, there is still a place for both physicalism and comp, once we made that move. Actually the 8th present step will explain that such a move is nevertheless without purpose.* This will make the notion of concrete and existing universe completely devoid of any explicative power.* * It will follow that a much weaker and usual form of Ockham’s razor can be used to conclude that not only physics has been epistemologically reduced to machine psychology, but that ‘‘matter’’ has been ontologically reduced to ‘‘mind’’ where mind is defined as the object study of fundamental machine psychology. *All that by assuming comp, I insist. The reason is that comp forbids to associate inner experiences with the physical processing related to the computations corresponding (with comp) to those experiences. The physical ‘‘supervenience thesis’’ of the materialist philosophers of mind cannot be maintained, and inner experiences can only be associated with type of computation. Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism). If this is not a statement that the physical world does not exist and, instead, that all that exists is abstract machine, I will eat my hat. I have repeatedly tried to see if the reasoning of Bruno et al allows for us to decouple the existence of an entity from its properties but I have been repeatedly rebuffed for such a thought, therefore the elimination of the properties of the physical world demands the elimination of the existence of the physical world. My claim is that we can recover appearances by decoupling existence from property definiteness, but that idea is either not being understood or is being rejected out of hand. What Quentin said. If* *anyone actually denied the existence of a physical reality in any sense, that would indeed be grounds not just for correcting them, but for ignoring them entirely. Is your post some kind of meta-level commentary on the need for precise language?? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 14 Feb 2012, at 17:52, David Nyman wrote: On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. The initial postulate is that the either MG set-up, or Maudlin's machine, instantiates an episode of consciousness in virtue of its computational states. Yes. More precisely, in virtue of a bet we make on some local UM (the computer, the boolean laser graph) to relate those states relatively to us. The reductio demolishes the possibility of this being true qua materia, because the relevant physical components have, in effect, been rendered impotent. Gosh? Why? It means just that we are at the place where we understand that we will have to justify the persistent appearances of those physical components from the computational structure (arithmetic). We abandon physical supervenience, but we keep comp, so it is the place where we associate our actual current mind no more to one phi_i(j)^k, say, but to the infinity of one (1p-indiscernible) belonging to the trace of the UD (say). Then the fact that we can survive with an physical artificial brain, means only that above the substitution level, there is a intelligible reality with stable universal beings (billiard, ball, computer, brain, chemical laws, etc.). Nevertheless, stable can only mean that for the majority of phi_i(j)^k coding us, the local universal beings belongs like us to those computation too. Our computations are contagious, if you want, so that we share a deep level of substitution with our environment (in some sense). The quantum tensor confirms this aspect of comp, in Everett QM. And normally the arithmetical quantization (BDp in S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*) should justify this too (but this is complex technically). So are you saying that, if one then accepts the additional postulate of matter-mechanism reversal, What do you mean by this? I am not sure it is the place to add a postulate. Could you elaborate on this? either of these two devices can indeed be considered to instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but qua computatio rather than qua materia? Or not? The consciousness is in Platonia, or in arithmetic. you are a local universal history (the running of a computer) but intricated to a finite number of computers (universal machines, other beings) themselves sharing with you infinities of more lower grained computations, below the substitution level. So you are a very complex double clouds of numbers, if you want a picture, with both a big important set of finite numbers (changing all the time), and infinities of big and bigger invariant numbers competing in the building of your continuations. It is a whole complex process from which emerges at infinity (but instantaneously from the 1p view) the coupling consciousness/realities. So, does the device instantiate consciousness? No. Does a brain instantiate consciousness? No. All what a device, a brain, or a well adapted machine (to probable environment/computation) can do, is make higher the probability of a person to get a continuation in a similar environment. The big picture has to conflict with the internal intuition, because, when alive, it looks like we (first person plural) are singularize in some spatio- temporal unique history. This appearance has to be justified, and that' why I interview the UMs on the question, which can already partially justify it (at the propositional level). Comp does not solve the mind-body problem, but it reduces the mind- body problem into a body problem in arithmetic, or a body problem appearance, in arithmetic. It shows the realm where the laws of physics come from (basically nulber theory). It shows also that the solution is in the head of all universal machines, and that by interviewing them and their true extension (provided by the double self-reference logics) we can get both the provable and the unprovable but true part (at the propositional modal level, to begin with). Bruno On 13 Feb 2012, at 16:24, David Nyman wrote: On 13 February 2012 01:18, Joseph Knight joseph.9...@gmail.com wrote: Yes it is, with the Movie Graph Argument. The MGA shows that assuming COMP, consciousness cannot be explained by appealing to any physical system. Not even a little. Whereas I would concur with this conclusion, I realise on reflection that I'm not sure exactly where it leaves us vis-a-vis the Movie- graph setup itself, or Maudlin's contraption, once the reversal of physics-mechanism is actually accepted. Clearly, we now have to regard these devices in their physical manifestation as aspects of a deeper computational reality with which our conscious state is currently related. OK. But what are we now to make of the original proposal that they instantiate some computation that encapsulates an actual conscious state? After all, we don't regard
Re: The free will function
On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program mean. That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning? My goal is not to be intelligent or to be interested in every idea, it is to explore the implications of this particular set of ideas. You write well, but I'm afraid that you have to develop your learning ability, and it is only by exploring the implications of different set of ideas that you will learn the difference between arguing and advertizing an opinion. A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then. I'm saying that comp does the same thing, as does every religion and philosophy. They are all different ways of making sense of the universe and the self. All I'm doing is looking at what they all have in common - sense. That is not what I am doing. On the contrary I wish the philosophy and religion adopt the standard of science, which is modest hypothetical communication, without *ever* claiming the truth, but trying valid reasoning in hypothetical frames. It is the only way to progress. Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it, I can agree, although then even human might have a limited intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an already very long and fuzzy list. I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others. which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the diagonalization routine. Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the only way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels us to accept it's evidence. On the contrary. Comp leads to a counter-intuitive view of reality, doubly so for Aristotelians, and it does not ask to accept its evidence, but only for its refutation. You get it all wrong, Craig. Faith does the same thing in reverse. It says you have to see through logic and embrace a deeper truth. It suggests a theory, and derive propositions, accepted in the frame of that theory. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 9:58 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer of interest. That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously. Why would your subjective concerns matter to me? I take *my* subjectivity as seriously as anything! You don't have to care about my subjectivity to care about subjectivity in general. I feel like Pulp Fiction: Jules: You know the shows on TV? Vincent: I don't watch TV. Jules: Yeah, but, you are aware that there's an invention called television, and on this invention they show shows, right? If I am very cold and I walk into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature works. My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness, that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way. Hopelessly vague. Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague? may not bemay not be... If I don't qualify it, then I get crap because I 'speak as if I know' and if I do qualify it then I get crap because I'm hopelessly vague. Philosophy is difficult. and accusations are easy. This supports my suspicion that when people disagree with what you are saying but can't find any reason they can support, they tend to criticize how you write instead. It's conceivable. I just conceived it. I just conceived it = I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of it No. The two are not synonymous. Why not? Semantics and grammar. Obviously they aren't literally the same words, otherwise there would be no reason to point out that they figuratively mean the same thing. You are not pointing out a fact to the effect that they mean ther same thing figurativelty. They seem to mean the same thing to you because of baggage you are brigning to the issue that other people are not bringing. If by baggage you mean understanding, then yes, that could be true. Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it? Are you saying causation is coercion? If someone is caused to do something against their will, then yes, of course. If no other agents, humans, individuals is overrding their will, they are not being coerced. Coercion is a deliberate act. Gravity does not coerce objects into falling. You're right from a 3p perspective. From a 1p perspective anything that winds up changing your mind can be said to convince you or coerce your decision. We can project intention on unconscious agents. You can say, I was coerced into joining a gym by my expanding gut. I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed, there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to determinism. You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic forces. No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything else. I can't see why. Can you see why a universe without light would have no concept of darkness? No. We can conceive of the existence of the non-existent and vice versa. We can conceive of non-existence because things can cease to exist. If there were no light, then nothing could be imagined to be lacking light. It would be no more possible than it is for us to conceive of Non-Gromwalschedness in our universe. Mistakes are possbile under determinism. It isn't possible to do the impossible by mistake. If you posit a universe that is deterministic, then by definition, no shade of free will can exist. Not voluntary action, not will, not intention, accident, nothing at all would exist to define determinism in any way. Except determinism itself. Not even determinism. It could not be defined, it would simply be the way that the universe is. We can talk about determinism only because we extend beyond it. Everything would be purely automatic and unconscious and have no way to conceive of any other possibility. Non-sequitur. You would be determined to conceive whatever you were determined to conceive, rightly or wrongly. Why would anything be determined to conceive of anything? Let's say they brain state of someone who believes in free will is state S. Does it really make a difference whether S is arrived at by a history involving indeterminism and free will, or by a history involving involving strict determinism? It's the same state either way. There is no state S. Each person's 'belief' isn't arrived at at all. That is not how it works. Opinions are dynamic impressions driven by motive.
Re: The free will function
On 2/14/2012 1:47 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: We can conceive of non-existence because things can cease to exist. If there were no light, then nothing could be imagined to be lacking light. It would be no more possible than it is for us to conceive of Non-Gromwalschedness in our universe. So you can't conceive of the non-existence of Russell's teapot that's orbiting Jupiter because it never existed and so cannot have ceased to exist? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 10:37 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 12, 2:22 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. Then no AI is fully dumb, since all are adaptive to some extent. It doesn't adapt intentionally, it is programmed to imitate adaptation. In a sense it's not fully dumb, but it's the trivial sense of dumb. In the deeper sense, it literally devoid of understanding or awareness. Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context Any? Then no human is fully intelligent. Right. We have no intelligence in contexts which we can't make sense of. We could be as dumb as computers are relative to some higher sentience. and to potentially transcend it, which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not be having this discussion. That we are having this discussion does not prove we are infinitely adaptable, as your definition intelligent requires. We're not infinitely adaptable nor even is intelligence infinitely adaptable, but sense is. Even non-sense is a kind of sense. That we are having this discussion proves only that we have the potential to transcend our own programming. Machines don't gather together while we aren't watching and try to improve their programming. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 2:21 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The comp answer is yes you can be made wet by a virtual typhoon, but you have to virtualize yourself, or more precisely you need only to virtualize your skin-interfaces with the virtual typhoon. Stephen, do you agree with this? Do you agree that with comp, we can in principle, make you feel like being under a tempest, by virtue of running a computer in room. Craig would clearly answer that this is not possible, given that for him, comp is not possible in the first place. To be clear, I think it may very well be possible to imitate the experience of a typhoon virtually*, but only through a physical interface to the sense organs or the brain directly. This does not mean though that it is possible to imitate the experience of experience itself. Full sensory virtual typhoon animation? Absolutely. Virtual consciousness, understanding, feeling? Possibly in a living tissue bank or something, but not in a glass brain. *true virtual reality is one of best things that I can imagine. I have nothing against astonishingly realistic virtual experiences, if anything, I think one of my reasons for wanting to point out the problems with strong AI is to get on with the business of making sensory prosthetics and not worry so much about simulating intelligence. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 3:41 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 20:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 14, 7:56 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2012, at 15:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. It's not because you can program's them to being slavingly dumb to do a thing *that's the only thing they can do*, that's a program mean. That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. But is that not what you do, and vindicate, by telling us that you don't want to study the work of other people, or that you cannot assume comp if only just for the sake of reasoning? My goal is not to be intelligent or to be interested in every idea, it is to explore the implications of this particular set of ideas. You write well, but I'm afraid that you have to develop your learning ability, and it is only by exploring the implications of different set of ideas that you will learn the difference between arguing and advertizing an opinion. A superficial survey of the total set of ideas is what I'm after. I was an anthropology major. I'm not trying to understand the customs and truths of any particular culture, I'm trying to see through all cultures to the underlying universals. A lot of your comment are preventing the meaning of trying to discuss further because you beg the question systematically. In a sense you are saying that comp cannot be true, because your know that your opinion is the correct one. We can't argue then. I'm saying that comp does the same thing, as does every religion and philosophy. They are all different ways of making sense of the universe and the self. All I'm doing is looking at what they all have in common - sense. That is not what I am doing. On the contrary I wish the philosophy and religion adopt the standard of science, which is modest hypothetical communication, without *ever* claiming the truth, but trying valid reasoning in hypothetical frames. It is the only way to progress. But science doesn't put itself in the hypothetical frame - which is fine for specific inquiries, but inquiries into consciousness in general or the cosmos as a whole have to include science itself, it's assumptions, it's origins and motives. There was progress before science, so it is not true that it is the only way to progress. Science itself may be just the beginning. Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context and to potentially transcend it, I can agree, although then even human might have a limited intelligence, as humans cannot a priori transcend all context, or you are making a gros assumption on humans. Again a new assumption in an already very long and fuzzy list. I'm not assuming humans have unlimited intelligence. We are smart monkeys in some ways and really dumb in others. which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). And now a big assumption on machine, which is already refuted by the diagonalization routine. Comp automatically refutes challenges to comp. It does so in the only way that makes sense in comp terms - by showing that logic compels us to accept it's evidence. On the contrary. Comp leads to a counter-intuitive view of reality, doubly so for Aristotelians, and it does not ask to accept its evidence, but only for its refutation. You get it all wrong, Craig. That's what I'm saying is that it is reverse psychology. Comp seduces with humility. It is the ultimate anthropomorphism to see the entire cosmos as completely real except for our own experience which is somehow completely illusory yet has ability to precisely understand its own illusory reasoning. Instead of the special child of God, we become the insignificant consequence of an immense non-god. Faith does the same thing in reverse. It says you have to see through logic and embrace a deeper truth. It suggests a theory, and derive propositions, accepted in the frame of that theory. The theory and propositions can be arbitrary and contradictory. It is more about charismatic identification and ritual participation. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 6:35 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as the element germanium either (although they are in the same column in the periodic table as is carbon) and yet you can make transistors out of both and in fact the first transistors were germanium. So is arithmetic performed on a germanium computer different from arithmetic performed on a silicon computer? Or can the atoms be treated as black boxes and the important thing being the logic in the way the atoms are arranged and thus the 4 a silicon computer produces to the question how much is 2+2 is the same 4 that a germanium computer produces? No one knows. It is quite coherent to suppose that consc. critically depends on unique features of human hardware. The universality of computation is rather exceptional. The thing I don't understand is that everybody agrees that our conscious experience is not at the level of carbon or silicon or germanium atoms, or atoms of any sort for that matter, we are not conscious of them and until a few centuries ago no conscious being even knew they existed, and yet one and only one of those 3 atoms is supposed to produce consciousness even though we are no more conscious of that atom than the other two atoms. I cannot imagine why the conscious of which atom would be relevant. It takes certain very specific atoms to have magnetic properties, and it takes them in bulk. No indiividual atom is ferromagnetic in itself. To say that substance N is a necessary precursor of consc. is not to say atoms of substance N are mini-consciousnesses. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 6:48 pm, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 14, 2012 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose If its rational then there is a reason for it and thus it's deterministic. False, because causes need not be reasons, and reasons need not be causes. and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. So a hand calculator hooked up to a roulette wheel so that one time in 37 it gives the wrong answer has free will. There's nothing particularly rational about giving the wrong answer one in 37 times. However, naturalistic libertarianism holds that more complex combinations of chance and determinism can do the trick. Your objection is a like Craig's claims that, since a toaster is dumb and unconscious, so is Big Blue and all its successors. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 9:47 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 14, 9:58 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: Whatever. If you subjectivise it completely. it is no longer of interest. That's because you aren't taking subjectivity seriously. Why would your subjective concerns matter to me? I take *my* subjectivity as seriously as anything! You don't have to care about my subjectivity to care about subjectivity in general. You mean subjectivity is objectively important? I feel like Pulp Fiction: Jules: You know the shows on TV? Vincent: I don't watch TV. Jules: Yeah, but, you are aware that there's an invention called television, and on this invention they show shows, right? If I am very cold and I walk into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature works. My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness, that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way. Hopelessly vague. Hopelessly unhelpful personal opinion. How is it vague? may not bemay not be... If I don't qualify it, then I get crap because I 'speak as if I know' and if I do qualify it then I get crap because I'm hopelessly vague. Philosophy is difficult. and accusations are easy. It was an observation, not an accusation. This supports my suspicion that when people disagree with what you are saying but can't find any reason they can support, they tend to criticize how you write instead. It's conceivable. I just conceived it. I just conceived it = I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of it No. The two are not synonymous. Why not? Semantics and grammar. Obviously they aren't literally the same words, otherwise there would be no reason to point out that they figuratively mean the same thing. You are not pointing out a fact to the effect that they mean ther same thing figurativelty. They seem to mean the same thing to you because of baggage you are brigning to the issue that other people are not bringing. If by baggage you mean understanding, then yes, that could be true. Or everyone else could understand better. That's subjectivity for you. Are you saying that you were coerced into conceiving it? Are you saying causation is coercion? If someone is caused to do something against their will, then yes, of course. If no other agents, humans, individuals is overrding their will, they are not being coerced. Coercion is a deliberate act. Gravity does not coerce objects into falling. You're right from a 3p perspective. From a 1p perspective anything that winds up changing your mind can be said to convince you or coerce your decision. We can project intention on unconscious agents. You can say, I was coerced into joining a gym by my expanding gut. You can say your gut tells you things. But it doens;t. That is just figurative language. I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed, there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to determinism. You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic forces. No, just like you can't conceive of a square circle. It would not be in the realm of possibility to differentiate determinism from anything else. I can't see why. Can you see why a universe without light would have no concept of darkness? No. We can conceive of the existence of the non-existent and vice versa. We can conceive of non-existence because things can cease to exist. If there were no light, then nothing could be imagined to be lacking light. if there were no light, everything we imagined would be lacking light. It would be no more possible than it is for us to conceive of Non-Gromwalschedness in our universe. Mistakes are possbile under determinism. It isn't possible to do the impossible by mistake. If you posit a universe that is deterministic, then by definition, no shade of free will can exist. Not voluntary action, not will, not intention, accident, nothing at all would exist to define determinism in any way. Except determinism itself. Not even determinism. It could not be defined, it would simply be the way that the universe is. And we can't get a handle on the way the universe is? You seem to think you can. We can talk about determinism only because we extend beyond it. Gee, I guess you extend beyond everything then. Or your initial premise is wrong. Everything would be purely automatic and
Re: COMP theology
On 14 February 2012 20:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The reductio demolishes the possibility of this being true qua materia, because the relevant physical components have, in effect, been rendered impotent. Gosh? Why? Bruno, I think we must be at cross-purposes. I thought that the gist of both your and Maudlin's reductio arguments is the absurdity of associating conscious states with arbitrarily low or null physical activity, if one assumes that matter is primitive. Maudlin's conclusion (retaining the primitiveness assumption): CTM is false. Your conclusion: save CTM by reversing the relation of matter-mechanism. Isn't this how it goes? So now let's assume computational supervenience as you propose and reconsider Maudlin's arguments. Presumably we aren't now in a position to deploy the same reductio argument with respect to primitively physical activity, because surely the alternative of computational supervenience was deployed precisely to save CTM by rescuing us from that horn of the dilemma. So my question was, in effect, what implication would this have for saying yes to a doctor who proposed a partial brain substitution by some such contrivance as that described by Maudlin? In short ;-) David On 14 Feb 2012, at 17:52, David Nyman wrote: On 14 February 2012 12:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: David, Tell me is I have succeed to clarify this. The initial postulate is that the either MG set-up, or Maudlin's machine, instantiates an episode of consciousness in virtue of its computational states. Yes. More precisely, in virtue of a bet we make on some local UM (the computer, the boolean laser graph) to relate those states relatively to us. The reductio demolishes the possibility of this being true qua materia, because the relevant physical components have, in effect, been rendered impotent. Gosh? Why? It means just that we are at the place where we understand that we will have to justify the persistent appearances of those physical components from the computational structure (arithmetic). We abandon physical supervenience, but we keep comp, so it is the place where we associate our actual current mind no more to one phi_i(j)^k, say, but to the infinity of one (1p-indiscernible) belonging to the trace of the UD (say). Then the fact that we can survive with an physical artificial brain, means only that above the substitution level, there is a intelligible reality with stable universal beings (billiard, ball, computer, brain, chemical laws, etc.). Nevertheless, stable can only mean that for the majority of phi_i(j)^k coding us, the local universal beings belongs like us to those computation too. Our computations are contagious, if you want, so that we share a deep level of substitution with our environment (in some sense). The quantum tensor confirms this aspect of comp, in Everett QM. And normally the arithmetical quantization (BDp in S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*) should justify this too (but this is complex technically). So are you saying that, if one then accepts the additional postulate of matter-mechanism reversal, What do you mean by this? I am not sure it is the place to add a postulate. Could you elaborate on this? either of these two devices can indeed be considered to instantiate such an episode as originally postulated, but qua computatio rather than qua materia? Or not? The consciousness is in Platonia, or in arithmetic. you are a local universal history (the running of a computer) but intricated to a finite number of computers (universal machines, other beings) themselves sharing with you infinities of more lower grained computations, below the substitution level. So you are a very complex double clouds of numbers, if you want a picture, with both a big important set of finite numbers (changing all the time), and infinities of big and bigger invariant numbers competing in the building of your continuations. It is a whole complex process from which emerges at infinity (but instantaneously from the 1p view) the coupling consciousness/realities. So, does the device instantiate consciousness? No. Does a brain instantiate consciousness? No. All what a device, a brain, or a well adapted machine (to probable environment/computation) can do, is make higher the probability of a person to get a continuation in a similar environment. The big picture has to conflict with the internal intuition, because, when alive, it looks like we (first person plural) are singularize in some spatio-temporal unique history. This appearance has to be justified, and that' why I interview the UMs on the question, which can already partially justify it (at the propositional level). Comp does not solve the mind-body problem, but it reduces the mind-body problem into a body problem in arithmetic, or a body problem appearance, in arithmetic. It shows the realm where the laws of physics come from
Re: The free will function
On 2/14/2012 1:47 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: How could any belief be possible under determinism? Belief implies a voluntary epistemological investment. To be a believer is to choose to believe. Is it? Can you choose believe you are floating in the air? Can you believe you're not reading this? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 10:01 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 14, 10:37 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 12, 2:22 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: That's what being dumb is - not being able to figure out how to do anything else than what you already do. Then no AI is fully dumb, since all are adaptive to some extent. It doesn't adapt intentionally, You know it doens't? You know we do? it is programmed to imitate adaptation. In a sense it's not fully dumb, but it's the trivial sense of dumb. In the deeper sense, it literally devoid of understanding or awareness. You know that? Intelligence is the ability to make sense of any given context Any? Then no human is fully intelligent. Right. We have no intelligence in contexts which we can't make sense of. We could be as dumb as computers are relative to some higher sentience. and to potentially transcend it, which is why it can't be programmed or simulated (but it can be imitated trivially for specific functions). If it weren't that way we would not be having this discussion. That we are having this discussion does not prove we are infinitely adaptable, as your definition intelligent requires. We're not infinitely adaptable nor even is intelligence infinitely adaptable, So you didn;t mean any? but sense is. Even non-sense is a kind of sense. Ermm... That we are having this discussion proves only that we have the potential to transcend our own programming. AIs can transcend their programming by following their programming-transcending programming. Machines don't gather together while we aren't watching and try to improve their programming. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On Feb 14, 9:47 pm, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Feb 14, 9:58 am, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: You seem to be runnign off a theory of concept-formation whereby concepts are only ever recongnitions of percerived realities. Not perceived realities, but ontological possibilities. We can't imagine a square circle, not because we haven't seen one, but because the two figures are mutually exclusive. The most basic requirement of any pattern we can recognize or conceive is to discern the difference between it's presence and it's absence. We cannot know finite without there being the possibility of in-finite. We cannot know determinism without there being the possibility of in-determinism. Light without dark, sanity without insanity, etc. Without a foreground, there can be no background (and vice versa). But what you *were* saying was that our ability to conceive was dependent on what *actually* existed. That does not remotely do justice to human thought and language. Language is combinatorial, it allows you to stick a pair of wings on a horse. Of course. Provided that wings and horses are conceivable in that combination in the first place. It does not allow you to stick wings on irony. You can put them together in the trivial sense, syntactically, but there's no semantic referent. How does that help your other claims? Whenever someone resorts to saying 'Nope' or 'No, it isn't' I know that they have nothing to support their opinion or they haven;t got the energy to explain the bleedin' obvious. Then why bother saying anything? Why let a denial of the bleedin' obvious pass? Ok, so what is an intelligent machine's word for a non-machine? Non machine, if it speaks English. What does it think it means by that though? What we mean if it speaks English. Since the thread is named 'The free will function', I was thinking we were talking about that. I would say that indeterminism is a pseudo- position because it simultaneously assumes an omniscient voyeur and an arbitrary subject for orientation. I can't imagine why you would think that. Because it makes sense? To whom? Does putting a billion gears and levers together in an arrangement make them less dumb? Why not? Because then intelligence becomes a magical power that appears inexplicably. I don't see why. If you can have teeny opinions as a zygote, then levers can have a teeny bit of intelligence. I am physically determined to fall under the influence of gravity, but no one mandated it. It's mandated by the laws of physics, if you want to get that technical on the meaning of mandatory. The main thing is that it's not within your power to refuse, Unlike things that are compulsory. i can refuse them, but I have to bear the consequences. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On 2/14/2012 1:35 PM, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Feb 13, 2012 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: To actually implement digital substitution, we would have to not only match the functionally of the module internally but also match the interactions of that module with the environment. No, you'd only have to match he interactions with the environment, what happens internally is inaccessible to us by direct observation. And before you start yelling objections to that reflect on the fact that other human beings are black boxes to us, we can hypothesize that they have a internal life and we can hypothesize what it feels like to be that other person, but we have no direct access to such things and we can never know for sure if our hypothesis is right. Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as carbon Silicon does not have the same chemical properties as the element germanium either (although they are in the same column in the periodic table as is carbon) and yet you can make transistors out of both and in fact the first transistors were germanium. So is arithmetic performed on a germanium computer different from arithmetic performed on a silicon computer? Or can the atoms be treated as black boxes and the important thing being the logic in the way the atoms are arranged and thus the 4 a silicon computer produces to the question how much is 2+2 is the same 4 that a germanium computer produces? The thing I don't understand is that everybody agrees that our conscious experience is not at the level of carbon or silicon or germanium atoms, or atoms of any sort for that matter, we are not conscious of them and until a few centuries ago no conscious being even knew they existed, and yet one and only one of those 3 atoms is supposed to produce consciousness even though we are no more conscious of that atom than the other two atoms. Quite frankly I think the idea that 6 protons 6 electrons and 6 neutrons (carbon) is conscious but 14 protons 14 electrons and 14 neutrons (silicon) is not and can never be no matter how you put such objects together is nuts. John K Clark Hi John, You are completely missing the point. I don't have time to discuss this any further with you. My apologies. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The free will function
On 2/14/2012 2:21 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2012, at 18:53, 1Z wrote: On Feb 13, 5:17 pm, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Digital substitution is not a local symmetry. hence flight simulators do not fly. That's very funny, Peter. That reminds us of a quite good typical comp exercise: can a virtual typhoon makes you wet? Related here to Can you flight with a computer?. Let me ask a question to Stephen. I think I know the answer of all participants on this, I think, except for Stephen, where I am less sure. The question is: do you agree with the, now common and rather obvious comp answer to that exercise. The comp answer is yes you can be made wet by a virtual typhoon, but you have to virtualize yourself, or more precisely you need only to virtualize your skin-interfaces with the virtual typhoon. Stephen, do you agree with this? Yes, I agree. Virtual typhoons cause virtual skin to get wet. Do you agree that with comp, we can in principle, make you feel like being under a tempest, by virtue of running a computer in room. Craig would clearly answer that this is not possible, given that for him, comp is not possible in the first place. But you acknowledge that you believe in comp, or that you can assume it, or at least that you do not assume that comp is false. But my question does not bear on the truth or falsity of comp, but on the experience of feeling wet by Stephen King in case his brain has been digitalized and interfaces in a virtual environment of the kind tempest. Do you agree that if comp is correct then Stephen King has experienced the quite physical-material experience of being quite wet due to violent raining winds in a tempest. OK? Surely, but I do not speak for Craig and neither do you, for you do not understand the idea that he is trying to communicate to you. If you agree with this we can proceed step by step, and perhaps, jump quickly to step 8, the MGA-Maudlin stuff, which is at the heart of the difficulty of linking consciousness to the physical objects, unless, like Craig, you abandon comp and you make both consciousness and the physical infinitely complex. That prevents indeed the unavoidable metaphysical dissociation brought by betting on a substitution level. I reject UDA 8 as fatally flawed. It claims the non-causal efficaciousness of the very process that allows it to be communicated. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 2:38 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2012/2/14 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net On 2/14/2012 10:36 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The flaw is the entire structure of UDA+MGA, it assumes the existence of the very thing that is claims cannot exist. It is a theory that predicts that it cannot exist. How? By supposedly proving that the physical world does not exist. It does not prove that the physical world does not exist... it proves that a *primitive* material world is irrelevant to predict your next moment, the current physics of the world. Whether there is a primitive material world or not cannot change your expectation of your next moment, rendering this primitive material world devoid of explanatory power. HI Quentin, What is the difference? Please see my last post to ACW with the subject header Re: On Pre-existing Fields The difference is that it is not primary... the physical universe emerge from computations. It should be an invariant in relative deep computation giving rise to consciousness. Numbers-Computations-consciousness universe Hi Quentin, No, numbers cannot have definite properties absent consciousness, therefore one cannot derive consciousness from mere numbers. A more correct diagram would be: Numbers - Computations ^ | | v Consciousness - universes Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On Pre-existing Fields
On 2/14/2012 2:47 PM, meekerdb wrote: My understanding is that the properties of the physical world are inferred from our subjective experiences that have a consistency (which Vic Stenger calls point-of-view-invariance) which allows us to model them as being out there, i.e. objective. Bruno's theory is that this subset of subjective experiences is generated by all possible computations. Hence the material world model is derivative from computation and is not primitive or fundamental. This however may suffer from a white-rabbit problem since it seems likely that many sets of subjective experiences will correspond to models of Alice-in-wonderland worlds. Incidentally, I think that human-like consciousness can only exist within the context of a physical world model. _So the physical world is not optional, even if it isn't fundamental._ Hi Brent, I think that we agree 100% here! Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
