subject:"Observation versus assumption"


> On 28 Aug 2019, at 21:38, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> > How much?
> 
> 42

That is absolutely wrong!

Everyone knows that 42 is fiction. (Douglas Adams, Lewis Carroll, etc.)

The correct answer is 24 (Ramanujan, Hardy, ..)

The real debate is between 3 x 8 or 4 x 6.

Now you know the difference between fiction and reality. 

It is 18.

Lol

Bruno

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Re: Observation versus assumption

> On 28 Aug 2019, at 19:15, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2019, 11:36 AM John Clark  > wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 7:45 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> > You can write a program that outputs the string "2 + 2 = 5", but you'll 
> > never find a program that outputs a proof of 2 + 2 = 5 in any consistent 
> > and sound system of axioms.
> 
> Even if your system is consistent there is no way you can prove its 
> consistent while remaining within the system, and if you go outside the 
> system to prove it then you've just kicked the problem upstairs and you can't 
> prove the meta system is consistent. And soundness means any formula that you 
> can derive from axioms, that is to say prove, is true. So if you've got a 
> error free proof that 2+2=4 how do you know it's true, how do you know 2+2 
> isn't 5?  You're going to need a independent method of determining the truth 
> of that and there is only one way to do it, with physics. You put 2 hydrogen 
> atoms on a scale and note it reads about 2, you put 2 more on and it reads 
> about 4. You never get exact integers but physics tells us that 2+2=4 is a 
> good approximation of the truth, so we make sure our axioms and rules of 
> inference produce that.
> 
> From day one when we started to construct our mathematics we've tried to make 
> it consistent with physics but there have been a few bumps in the road. It 
> turns out that is some places (where spacetime is flat) Euclid's fifth axiom 
> is true but in other places (where spacetime is curved) it's not true. And 
> both the Axiom Of Choice and the Continuum Axiom involve infinity and physics 
> has no use for infinity so physics doesn't care if those axioms are true or 
> not, so there is no way to independently determine their truth, so stuff 
> based on them are the equivalent to mathematical Harry Potter stories.
> 
> Is this to say you agree?  If you disagree with anything I said that missed 
> it.
> 
> It is true we never access truth,

OK. I guess you mean we never access public 3p truth, through theories, 
experiments, etc. We have only theories, and means to refute or improved them.

We do access truth in the 1p sense, as I guess you agree. That plays some 
important role to get that we do address the “consciousness” issue. 

> but the same dilemma haunts us in physics. Physics never tells us our 
> theories are true, only that they haven't been refuted so far.  That's how 
> the bgs work with building axioms.  We can hope they approximate the truth, 
> and we hope to find better axioms in the future.
> 
> Have I changed your mind regarding what Minsky said regarding possible 
> programs?
> 
> Regarding axiom of choice, I believe it's independent of ZFC,

Of ZF I guess. It is a typo error. Obviously ZFC proves C, as ZFC is ZF plus C, 
the Choice axiom (or any of its mathematically equivalent formulations).

> but that doesn't imply it's independent of another more powerful system.

… or that it is a natural way to axiomatise our conception of sets. I am not 
set theoretically realist, but I am not enough non-realist either so as to 
doubt the axiom of choice!

For a long time I took my notion of sets from Gödel constructible notion of 
sets, so my theory was V = L, in which there is few doubt on the consistency of 
Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis. Cohen technic to build models 
contradicting choice and CH seemed to me both wonderful semantical (even modal) 
method in logic, but that the results where leading to ad hoc theories too much 
easily like with 2^(aleph_0) = aleph_122. But the work and book  by Patrick 
Dehornoy and the discovery of self-distributivity, both in braids and in the 
discovery of (possible) *very* large cardinal, has changed my mind on this. 
Now, I have reason to suspect that ZFC + Projective Determinacy might be … 
true, or at least saying something non trivial about some machine/number.

That book by Patrick Dehornoy(*) has revived my interest for set theory. It 
helps a lot to see the relation between the arithmetical hierarchy in 
theoretical computer science, and the analytical hierarchy and the so called 
descriptive set theory (the study of the set N^N, identified with the reals, 
with variate topologies).

Patrick Dehornoy, La théorie des ensembles, Calvage & Mounet, 2017.

> 
> Jason
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Re: Observation versus assumption

> On 28 Aug 2019, at 20:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/28/2019 8:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> How much? If you ask to much on matter for its role in preserving your 
>> consciousness, it will be no more Turing emulable.
>> 
>> If it remains Turing emulable, then it is already emulated in the a tiny 
>> part of the arithmetical reality.
> 
> But in other posts you maintain that consciousness and matter are not 
> computable.  That they are statistical phenomena of infinite threads of the 
> UD.  So which is it.

Simulation, computation, machines, brains (in first approximation relevant with 
the mechanist ’truncation") UD-threads, etc.  are all 3p notions. They admit 
precise definition, understandable by anybody having its diploma of primary 
school. 

Nothing 1p can be identified with anything 3p describable. Consciousness and 
eventually matter are 1p notion (matter beccomes 1p-plural).

We cannot emulate them.But we can enacted them, and indeed, the arithmetical 
reality enacted them.

That point is subtle and fundamental for the understanding of the mechanist 
reformulation of the mind-body problem. It is easy to understand this, I think, 
by using the iterated duplication experience:

You are cut (read and annihilated) in some room R, and  reconstituted, in two 
rooms, which are distinguished by having a big 1 (resp. 0) paint on the front 
wall.I denote those room by 1 and 0. Each copy comes back in R and do the 
experience again, and again. The experience of each copy is a particular 
sequence of 0 and 1.

With mechanism, all those person-copies are conscious, with a sugar 
experience/history, although none of the experience they live could be 
simulated by a computer. The experience is mathematically equivalent with a 
random oracle, which is typically NOT computable. Now, the “real 
consciousness”, when assuming mechanism, if given by that mixture of “all 
relative computations” and the fact that you are distributed in infinitely many 
consistent extensions (in slightly different sense as I allow adding new 
symboles to the machine, according to some conditions).
The arithmetical reality enacted all computations, but what the machines truly 
“live” is the indetermination on all computations, in a non computable reality 
(arithmetic).

QM confirms this by even just suggesting a multiple histories type of physical 
reality (and the perpendicularity and proximity relation are given by the 
quantum logic imposed by incompleteness, which gives rise to the []p & <>t, or 
even already, with p sigma_1 (partial computable) with []p & p.

Consciousness is a semantic fixed point. The tour-de-force permitted by both 
axiomatic and the definition of Theaetetus, and enforced by incompleteness is 
that G* can prove []p <-> ([p] & p), but the *truth* is that such a truth is 
NOT provable by the machine, yet, if “WE” are sound and consistent, living in 
*some* reality; automatically the builded machine inherit *that* reality (if it 
exists, and here, with mechanism, we need eventually only to believe in the 
truth of what we have been taught in High School (1+1=2, etc.).

The tour-de-force is made available by mimicking at the object level the truth 
of p by its assertorical meaning, making truth inflationary into the 1p view, 
but still obtained syntactically by the machine (relative, local) assertion. 

A real definition of consciousness or knowledge of truth would be []t & Vt 
(where Vt means that t is true). But V is not definable for the machine, but 
can mimic it assertorically (as as we limit ourself to correct machine, we know 
that it works, the machine does not know that, but will tend to believe that, 
and she will be lead to confusions on this, like us (that’s why the mind-body 
problem is hard, and hot).

So, we replace Vt by t is []t & t, and more generally we define “to know” by 
“(to believe/assert p) & p”.

If we could emulate the 1p, we would be able to predict the first person 
indeterminacy. Consciousness is a mixed 
“syntactical/mechanical/theoretical/number-theoretical” notion with semantical 
notion, related to Truth, possibilities, consistencies, infinities, 
models/realties. 

Mechanism assumes only that a possible syntactical transformation of some sort 
*preserve* consciousness in but the consciousness in in the truth-part. The 
machines/numbers “borrow” it from the arithmetical reality. The arithmetical 
reality itself is largely beyond the emulable (which is only the sigma_1 
arithmetical).

Most machine attribute are NOT computable. Being a machine/number computing a 
computable function from N to N is itself NOT computable. Consciousness and 
matter surf on the frontier between the computable and the non computable, and 
the self-referential modes generalized this for notion of 
believable/unbelievable, knowable/not-knowable, observable/not-observable, etc.

I think that your intuition to give a role to the environment is correct and 
can be

Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-29 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 10:45 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > *When we prove that there is no biggest prime number, we don’t make the
> prime numbers being infinite. There was no biggest prime number "well
> before” Euclid proved it. *
>

Euclid proved that *IF* numbers have nothing to do with physics then there
are infinitely many primes. But that's a big if.

*> Any way, if you believe that stars are made of primitive matter, then
> you become inconsistent when saying “yes” to a digitalist doctor. *
>

Neither I or the "digitalist" (formerly digital) doctor give a damn if "stars
are made of primitive matter"  because IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH IT.

>> I don't know what it is today but Just a few days ago in the language of
> Brunospeak a belief in Mechanism mente saying "yes" to the digital
>
> *> Not digital. But “digitalist”. Unless you say only yes to a doctor who
> has itself already say yes to a doctor.*
>

Well now, that clears things up beautifully!

> what is the role of your primitive matter in consciousness
>

I don't care. My answer to the digital or digitized or digitalist doctor
has not changed, it's still yes. That means the day before yesterday I
believed in mechanism according to the Brunospeak meaning of the word, but
today I may or may not believe in mechanism, I'm not sure because my
Brunospeak is not up to date.

*> **(and what is your “primitive matter”, incidentally, can you give a
> theory of it,*
>

Nope.

 John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

> On 28 Aug 2019, at 21:38, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 11:46 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> There are 2 attributes that matter has that numbers don't, and I've said 
> >> this over and over, the ability to change, and the ability to interact 
> >> with time in such a way that cause always precedes effect.  And both of 
> >> these attributes are vitally important in the making of a mind.
>  
> > How much?
> 
> 42
>  
> > just invoking a”god” without [...]
> 
> And that is a cue to skip to the next paragraph.
> 
> > Come back to step 3, and [...]
> 
> And that is a cue to skip to the next paragraph.
>  
> > Matter has a role in consciousness, that is correct, but that cannot be 
> > used to assert that matter is not explainable in term of coherent subset of 
> > computations
> 
> All explanations need a language and mathematics is a language,

Mathematicians use a language, but what they study is not a language. I have 
already given counter-example (cf composition and partition of numbers).
“2+2=4” is grammatically correct language, but so  is “2+2=5”, yet the fact is 
that 2 + 2 = 4.

> but explaining how a star can explode into a supernova does not cause a star 
> to explode into a supernova,

Of course.

> stars did it for billions of years when there was nobody around to give an 
> explanation and nobody around to understand one.  

When we prove that there is no biggest prime number, we don’t make the prime 
numbers being infinite. There was no biggest prime number "well before” Euclid 
proved it. 

Any way, if you believe that stars are made of primitive matter, then you 
become inconsistent when saying “yes” to a digitalist doctor. 

>  
> >> as is your habit you've changed your definition of “Mechanism"
> 
> > This is dishonest at the extreme. Mechanism is YD + CT from the start.
> 
> I don't know what it is today but Just a few days ago in the language of 
> Brunospeak a belief in Mechanism mente saying "yes" to the digital

Not digital. But “digitalist”. Unless you say only yes to a doctor who has 
itself already say yes to a doctor.

> doctor.  And you've completely forgotten IHA.

I add CT just to make sure people use “digitalist” in the same sense. So you 
just confirm that you did understand what I meant by Mechanism, and that I did 
not have changed the definition. Of course, I use not just the definition, but 
also its consequences.

You persistently distract us from the question asked: what is the role of your 
primitive matter in consciousness (and what is your “primitive matter”, 
incidentally, can you give a theory of it, physics never assumes such a thing 
in their paper, except in foundational papers, when doing speculation in 
metaphysics).

Bruno

>  
> > You are the one “religious” here.
> 
>  And that is a cue to skip to the next paragraph.
>  
> > Maybe some universal number will play key role in the laws of the machine’s 
> > observable,
> 
> I don't know about that but I can't deny that dentists know about "universal 
> numbers" and they seem to like them.

> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption


> On 28 Aug 2019, at 21:21, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> >> And both the Axiom Of Choice and the Continuum Axiom involve infinity and 
> >> physics has no use for infinity so physics doesn't care if those axioms 
> >> are true or not, so there is no way to independently determine their 
> >> truth, so stuff based on them are the equivalent to mathematical Harry 
> >> Potter stories.
> 
> > Is this to say you agree? 
> 
> You mean you agree with me?
> 
> > If you disagree with anything I said that missed it.
> 
> I disagree if you still think a program doesn't need to be running to *do* 
> something.


It is just obvious that a program needs to be run to do something. But only a 
universal number/machine can run something. And indeed, all the universal 
machine eventually run all programs, already in the arithmetical reality. 
Physics emerges from that.

If your conception of mathematical existence was right, mathematics would be 
founded on physics. Unfortunately, physics, the science, assume the numbers at 
the start.

Bruno




> 
> It is true we never access truth, but the same dilemma haunts us in physics.
> 
> It's not perfect but it's all we've got, Physics is the only way we have of 
> determining even the approximate truth. You hold up 2 physical fingers and 
> then you hold up 2 more physical fingers and you see there are 4 and not 5 or 
> 3. Why else would you be so convinced that 2+2 is 4, and why else would 
> mankind pick only those axioms and rules of operation that make things come 
> out that way?
>  
> > Have I changed your mind regarding what Minsky said regarding possible 
> > programs?
> 
> No but I don't want to argue over what Minsky's words did or did not mean as 
> if it were the talmud and not just a very smart man giving an interview.
> 
> > Regarding axiom of choice, I believe it's independent of ZFC, but that 
> > doesn't imply it's independent of another more powerful system.
> 
> If the axiom of choice is true Banach and Tarski proved you can cut up a 
> solid 3D sphere into as few as 5 pieces and then by just moving the pieces 
> around and rotating them (and not changing the pieces size or shape) you can 
> reassemble those 5 pieces in such a way that you end up with 2 spheres each 
> one identical to the original sphere. And if you had a tiny sphere and a huge 
> sphere you could cut up and reassemble the tiny sphere so it's identical to 
> the huge sphere and cut up and reassemble the huge sphere so it's identical 
> to the tiny sphere. But that's not the way our world works, that's not the 
> way physics works, so any proof that starts with the assumption the axiom of 
> choice is true is like a book that starts with the assumption a boy could be 
> a wizard, such proofs are mathematical Harry Potter stories. The book may 
> have no plot holes and the proof contain no errors but both are fiction 
> nevertheless. 
> 
> I should add that neither Euclid's geometry or Einstein's Non-Euclidean 
> geometry need the axiom of choice, nothing in Physics does.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

> On 28 Aug 2019, at 20:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, August 28, 2019 at 10:46:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Aug 2019, at 13:31, John Clark > 
>> wrote:
>> 
> 
>> yet again to who knows what because I still say "yes" to the digital doctor. 
>> That's why I never bothered to learn Brunospeak,
> 
> 
> That is a trolling technic. 
> 
> Why do you keep using the argument of those who want to show that they have 
> no argument?
> 
> You are the one “religious” here. You are the one talking like if you do have 
> found evidence from primary matter, or for physicalism. But you have not show 
> them, and you get trapped by the fact you says yes to a digitalist doctor.
> 
> I understand your appeal to a mystical notion of computation, but it has to 
> be different from “emulating a universal machine” to provide a role for some 
> primary matter. Maybe some universal number will play key role in the laws of 
> the machine’s observable, but to get the quanta without eliminating the 
> qualia, we have to extract that number, if it exists, by the modal variants I 
> described here and in my papers.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> You realize that if Fictionalism is true
> 
>  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 
>  
> 
> (and there is no demonstrable evidence against it), then
> 
>There are no models of arithmetic consisting of numbers.
> 
> because numbers do not exist in the first place).

With mechanism, fictionalism can be judged true for analysis, real number, the 
existence of limit, and eventually for the whole physics. But it is non 
sensical for elementary arithmetic.

To say that natural numbers do not exist is problematic, because you have to 
believe in numbers to believe in physical laws. If numbers do not exist the 
equation x -2 = 0, has no solution, which does not make sense to me. 

If you define existence by physical existence, then Mechanism explains why some 
things exists, and why some other things do not exist, without assuming a 
primary physical existence notion. 

If natural numbers do not exist, universal machine do not exist, and physics, 
which is apparently Turing universal would not exist either.

Arithmetic is consistent, so there is a model of arithmetic. To show that there 
is no model of arithmetic, you need to prove 0 = 1 in some simple theory of 
arithmetic.

My first point is that you cannot have mechanism and materialism together, then 
my second point, which is much more technical, is that the empirical world 
confirms Mechanism, and is refuted by its inability to handle consciousness, 
when not eliminating it.

Ito be honest, I have no clue what you mean by “natural number do not exist”. I 
can understand that they don’t exist physically, but with Mechanism, we know 
that “physical existence” is not a criterium for being fundamentally real. 
Physical existence is phenomenologically real.

Bruno

> 
> @philipthrift
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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 11:46 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> There are 2 attributes that matter has that numbers don't, and I've said
> this over and over, the ability to change, and the ability to interact with
> time in such a way that cause always precedes effect.  And both of these
> attributes are vitally important in the making of a mind.
>

*> How much?*
>

42

> > just invoking a”god” without [...]
>

And that is a cue to skip to the next paragraph.

*> Come back to step 3, and* [...]
>

And that is a cue to skip to the next paragraph.

> *> Matter has a role in consciousness, that is correct, but that cannot be
> used to assert that matter is not explainable in term of coherent subset of
> computations*
>

All explanations need a language and mathematics is a language, but
explaining how a star can explode into a supernova does not cause a star to
explode into a supernova, stars did it for billions of years when there was
nobody around to give an explanation and nobody around to understand one.

> >> as is your habit you've changed your definition of “Mechanism"
>
> > This is dishonest at the extreme. Mechanism is YD + CT from the start.
>

I don't know what it is today but Just a few days ago in the language of
Brunospeak a belief in Mechanism mente saying "yes" to the digital doctor.  And
you've completely forgotten IHA.

> > *You are the one “religious” here.*
>

 And that is a cue to skip to the next paragraph.

> *> Maybe some universal number will play key role in the laws of the
> machine’s observable,*
>

I don't know about that but I can't deny that dentists know about "universal
numbers" and they seem to like them.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread John Clark

On Wed, Aug 28, 2019 at 1:15 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

>> And both the Axiom Of Choice and the Continuum Axiom involve infinity
> and physics has no use for infinity so physics doesn't care if those axioms
> are true or not, so there is no way to independently determine their truth,
> so stuff based on them are the equivalent to mathematical Harry Potter
> stories.
>
> *> Is this to say you agree?  *
>

You mean you agree with me?

*> If you disagree with anything I said that missed it.*
>

I disagree if you still think a program doesn't need to be running to *do*
something.

*It is true we never access truth, but the same dilemma haunts us in
> physics.*
>

It's not perfect but it's all we've got, Physics is the only way we have of
determining even the approximate truth. You hold up 2 physical fingers and
then you hold up 2 more physical fingers and you see there are 4 and not 5
or 3. Why else would you be so convinced that 2+2 is 4, and why else would
mankind pick only those axioms and rules of operation that make things come
out that way?

> *> Have I changed your mind regarding what Minsky said regarding possible
> programs?*
>

No but I don't want to argue over what Minsky's words did or did not mean
as if it were the talmud and not just a very smart man giving an interview.

*> Regarding axiom of choice, I believe it's independent of ZFC, but that
> doesn't imply it's independent of another more powerful system.*
>

If the axiom of choice is true Banach and Tarski proved you can cut up a
solid 3D sphere into as few as 5 pieces and then by just moving the pieces
around and rotating them (and not changing the pieces size or shape) you
can reassemble those 5 pieces in such a way that you end up with 2 spheres
each one identical to the original sphere. And if you had a tiny sphere and
a huge sphere you could cut up and reassemble the tiny sphere so it's
identical to the huge sphere and cut up and reassemble the huge sphere so
it's identical to the tiny sphere. But that's not the way our world works,
that's not the way physics works, so any proof that starts with the
assumption the axiom of choice is true is like a book that starts with the
assumption a boy could be a wizard, such proofs are mathematical Harry
Potter stories. The book may have no plot holes and the proof contain no
errors but both are fiction nevertheless.

I should add that neither Euclid's geometry or Einstein's Non-Euclidean
geometry need the axiom of choice, nothing in Physics does.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, August 28, 2019 at 10:46:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Aug 2019, at 13:31, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
>
> yet again to who knows what because I still say "yes" to the digital 
> doctor. That's why I never bothered to learn Brunospeak,
>
>
>
> That is a trolling technic. 
>
> Why do you keep using the argument of those who want to show that they 
> have no argument?
>
> You are the one “religious” here. You are the one talking like if you do 
> have found evidence from primary matter, or for physicalism. But you have 
> not show them, and you get trapped by the fact you says yes to a digitalist 
> doctor.
>
> I understand your appeal to a mystical notion of computation, but it has 
> to be different from “emulating a universal machine” to provide a role for 
> some primary matter. Maybe some universal number will play key role in the 
> laws of the machine’s observable, but to get the quanta without eliminating 
> the qualia, we have to extract that number, if it exists, by the modal 
> variants I described here and in my papers.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


You realize that if Fictionalism is true

 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ 

(and there is no demonstrable evidence against it), then

   *There are no models of arithmetic consisting of numbers.*

because numbers do not exist in the first place).

@philipthrift

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 8/28/2019 8:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How much? If you ask to much on matter for its role in preserving your 
consciousness, it will be no more Turing emulable.


If it remains Turing emulable, then it is already emulated in the a 
tiny part of the arithmetical reality.


But in other posts you maintain that consciousness and matter are not 
computable.  That they are statistical phenomena of infinite threads of 
the UD.  So which is it.


Brent


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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Aug 28, 2019, 11:36 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 7:45 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> You can write a program that outputs the string "2 + 2 = 5", but you'll
>> never find a program that outputs a proof of 2 + 2 = 5 in any consistent
>> and sound system of axioms.*
>>
>
> Even if your system is consistent there is no way you can prove its
> consistent while remaining within the system, and if you go outside the
> system to prove it then you've just kicked the problem upstairs and you
> can't prove the meta system is consistent. And soundness means any formula
> that you can derive from axioms, that is to say prove, is true. So if you've
> got a error free proof that 2+2=4 how do you know it's true, how do you
> know 2+2 isn't 5?  You're going to need a independent method of
> determining the truth of that and there is only one way to do it, with 
> physics.
> You put 2 hydrogen atoms on a scale and note it reads about 2, you put 2
> more on and it reads about 4. You never get exact integers but physics
> tells us that 2+2=4 is a good approximation of the truth, so we make sure
> our axioms and rules of inference produce that.
>
> From day one when we started to construct our mathematics we've tried to
> make it consistent with physics but there have been a few bumps in the
> road. It turns out that is some places (where spacetime is flat) Euclid's
> fifth axiom is true but in other places (where spacetime is curved) it's
> not true. And both the Axiom Of Choice and the Continuum Axiom involve
> infinity and physics has no use for infinity so physics doesn't care if
> those axioms are true or not, so there is no way to independently determine
> their truth, so stuff based on them are the equivalent to mathematical
> Harry Potter stories.
>

Is this to say you agree?  If you disagree with anything I said that missed
it.

It is true we never access truth, but the same dilemma haunts us in
physics. Physics never tells us our theories are true, only that they
haven't been refuted so far.  That's how the bgs work with building
axioms.  We can hope they approximate the truth, and we hope to find better
axioms in the future.

Have I changed your mind regarding what Minsky said regarding possible
programs?

Regarding axiom of choice, I believe it's independent of ZFC, but that
doesn't imply it's independent of another more powerful system.

Jason

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread John Clark

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 7:45 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

*> You can write a program that outputs the string "2 + 2 = 5", but you'll
> never find a program that outputs a proof of 2 + 2 = 5 in any consistent
> and sound system of axioms.*
>

Even if your system is consistent there is no way you can prove its
consistent while remaining within the system, and if you go outside the
system to prove it then you've just kicked the problem upstairs and you
can't prove the meta system is consistent. And soundness means any formula
that you can derive from axioms, that is to say prove, is true. So if you've
got a error free proof that 2+2=4 how do you know it's true, how do you
know 2+2 isn't 5?  You're going to need a independent method of determining
the truth of that and there is only one way to do it, with physics. You put
2 hydrogen atoms on a scale and note it reads about 2, you put 2 more on
and it reads about 4. You never get exact integers but physics tells us
that 2+2=4 is a good approximation of the truth, so we make sure our axioms
and rules of inference produce that.

>From day one when we started to construct our mathematics we've tried to
make it consistent with physics but there have been a few bumps in the
road. It turns out that is some places (where spacetime is flat) Euclid's
fifth axiom is true but in other places (where spacetime is curved) it's
not true. And both the Axiom Of Choice and the Continuum Axiom involve
infinity and physics has no use for infinity so physics doesn't care if
those axioms are true or not, so there is no way to independently determine
their truth, so stuff based on them are the equivalent to mathematical
Harry Potter stories.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 27 Aug 2019, at 19:19, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/27/2019 4:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 26 Aug 2019, at 21:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 8/26/2019 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 26 Aug 2019, at 02:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/25/2019 12:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> What's the difference between abstract and concrete?  I think it's only 
>> a matter of relative perspective. Other universes to us seem abstract.  
>> While to people in other universes ours would seem abstract.  Do you 
>> agree?
> 
> No.  The difference is one of completeness.  A abstract something is 
> incomplete. 
 
 It is the finite construction, like a theory, which can be incomplete. The 
 arithmetical reality is complete. The theories are incomplete.
>>> 
>>> That arithmetical reality is complete is a theory.
>> 
>> No, it is true by definition of the arithmetical reality, which here has 
>> been defined by the set of all true sentences in the standard model of PA.  
> 
> Yes, I'm familiar with the fantasy that things can be true by definition.  
> Sadly it only works for fictional things, as "Watson was Holmes 
> companion...by definition.”


Sadly, there are few application of Sherlock Holmes in physics or in any 
science different from the Art of the Detectives. 

But the arithmetical reality, taught in high school, is full of applications in 
physics and actually in most sciences.

You might read the beginning of the book by Torkel Franzen on the use of 
“truth" in mathematical logic. 

Truth, in its mathematical sense, is always relative to a model, but that does 
not eliminate some intuitive standard notion of truth at the metalevel. and in 
first order arithmetical logic, we do  have a notion of standard (intuitive 
classical) model, whose sigma_ restriction gives mathematical precise meaning 
to terms like “computable”, “not computable"  and “computation”.

The string theory of the photon would not work if the prime numbers did not 
have taught us that it makes sense to say that the sum of all natural numbers 
converges to -1/12.

But with digital mechanism, the role of numbers become obvious, even if all 
universal system will compete, somehow.

Also, keep in mind that for the ontology, we need only the sigma_1 arithmetical 
reality, which can be defined by PA.

Bruno






> 
> Brent
> 
> 
>> I “model” it by the set of the Gödel’s number of those true sentences. No 
>> theories can axiomatise that set, but by definition, that set is complete. 
>> The definition of that set can be done informally, and does not ask much 
>> that we we need to understand real number or analysis.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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>>> .
>> 
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>> .
> 
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-28 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 27 Aug 2019, at 13:31, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 8:37 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>  
> >  if you think that there is a difference, what is it? It seems that you 
> > will have to invoke some attribute of your “matter”
> 
> There are 2 attributes that matter has that numbers don't, and I've said this 
> over and over, the ability to change, and the ability to interact with time 
> in such a way that cause always precedes effect.  And both of these 
> attributes are vitally important in the making of a mind.

How much? If you ask to much on matter for its role in preserving your 
consciousness, it will be no more Turing emulable.

If it remains Turing emulable, then it is already emulated in the a tiny part 
of the arithmetical reality.

A number cannot change, obviously, but a number can, in virtue of the laws of 
succession, addition and multiplication, participate in a complex sigma_1 
relation, simulating, for example, our local cluster of galaxies, including us, 
with 10^(10^(10^10)) decimal exactes in the (complex) rationals., at the level 
of strings, say. This might contain many John Clark  knocking on the table, and 
on a pendulum, or sending me mails to convince that time and space exist “out 
there”.

You assume not just a physical universe, you assume that the physical universe 
can make a digital machine conscious, and that an arithmetical reality can’t, 
when objectively both describes number relations, and along physicists some 
aspect block-universe view, even lattice.

Technically you make the physical universe into an oracle, without which the 
machine cannot be conscious, but with mechanism, that Oracle has to be the 
random oracle related to the first person indeterminacy.

As it is well defined mathematically we can do the comparison, and thanks to 
QM, it fits.

>  
> > and that it cannot be Turing emulated
> 
> It's the easiest thing in the world for a Turing machine to emulate matter 
> because a Turing machine is made of matter.
> 
> >> I think information is the fundamental thing that makes me be me,
> 
> >Yes, and it is relative information, and that is given by the relation 
> >between you and universal numbers,
> 
> If you wish to communicate with your fellow human beings you really need to 
> give Brunospeak a rest.

Try to understand instead of showing your prejudice. As long as you don’t 
understand the definition of emulation, you will be just invoking a”god” 
without evidence for it, to prevent people trying to understand the problem, 
and solve it.

Come back to step 3, and got the courage to acknowledge you understand, and 
move on. Your “refutation” has consisted in elimination the 1p and 3p 
distinction, or, when acknowledging that description, to say it is trivial, or 
to replace indeterminacy by ambiguity, and I don’t know which tricks you keep 
inventing to deny something that many said quite easy to understand, once we 
apply the definition given in that context.

If some primary matter has some role in consciousness and you are still 
emulable by a Turing machine, then you are emulable by a combinator, a 
diophantine polynomial, a patter of the game of life, and 
additive/multiplicative relation.

Matter has a role in consciousness, that is correct, but that cannot be used to 
assert that matter is not explainable in term of coherent subset of 
computations with respect to some notion of first person plural, definable in 
arithmetic (or slight extensions).

> 
> >> but information must be about something and in this case it's information 
> >> about how atoms are arranged.
> 
> > How?
> 
> How what?
>  
> > Could a brain in vat knows anything about those atoms.
> 
> A brain in a skull can know stuff about atoms, why would a brain in a vat be 
> more ignorant?
> 
> > It could not even know if it is emulated by a Babbage machine or by human 
> > with paper, or by a quantum computer.
> 
> True, but it could know that it's NOT being emulated by pure numbers, because 
> whatever is doing the emulating it needs to be something that can change and 
> something that can interact with time. And pure numbers can't do either of 
> those things. But matter can.
> 
> >> And atoms are physical things that interact with each other according to 
> >> the laws of physics.  
> 
> > Assuming some physical reality, but that makes no sense when you assume 
> > Mechanism.
> 
> Then as is your habit you've changed your definition of “Mechanism"

This is dishonest at the extreme. Mechanism is YD + CT from the start.

>From Mechanism, I derive that *all* explanation invoke the assumption of 
>physicalism leads to a contradiction, and that physics is given by precise 
>variant of the Solovay logic G*.

You say that I change the definition of mechanism, when I just refer to 
something proved, and peer reviewed. 

If you have heard about any scientist having the slightest doubt on the 
validity of my reasoning, let le know. Until

Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-27 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 8/27/2019 4:45 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


Minsky:  No I'd say to say that this button is real is to say it's
in this universe that we're in *to say that the universe is real
makes no sense at all it's just possible*.


(Emphasis mine)


However trivial the word existence was to Minsky, he believed that 
"this" the reality he found himself in, could be the result of a 
computer programming that was not even running, just because it is a 
set of logical possibilities. To me, this sounds much closer to what 
Bruno describes, our being computations in arithmetical realism, then 
it is to your dictum that only physical computers cab do anything, and 
only if they're turned on and change and use energy.


He says "that's where we have to stop" not because it doesn't make any 
sense, he explicitly says the opposite, saying "that's the only kind 
of existence that makes sense".


Of course whatever happens is possible.  But it doesn't follow that 
whatever is possible happens.


Brent

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-27 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 2:37 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 12:48 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> But he wasn't smart enough to immediately reject the notion of
>> computation without physical execution on a computer.*
>>
>
> Probably because Marvin Minsky didn't think he was talking to somebody
> like Bruno or you and some things in a conversation don't need to be
> spelled out because they are a given. I've heard him say a simulated
> world running on a computer (made of matter that obeys the laws of physics)
> must exist if the word "exist" is to have any meaning, and I've heard him
> say (5 min 50 sec in) that even if the electronic computer is turned off if
> a human looks at the computer's program his physical brain (that is made of
> matter and obeys the laws of physics) can work out what will happen next.
> But if you're talking about a program that is not running on a computer and
> nobody has even thought of it   (6 min 25 sec in) he said "that's where I
> think we have to stop" because if you don't then the word "existence" makes
> no sense and everything is trivial.
>

From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVJwzVD3jEs=4m54s (4:58)

Minsky: It's a serious question we don't know that we exist because *we
might be a program running on a computer* or *maybe we're just what a
program would do if the computer were turned on* and *it's not even running*
because it has the same logical possibilities there's only given that set
of rules there's only one thing that could happen after each other thing
that could happen after each other thing *so maybe this is just a possible
sequence of actions in that computer*.

Kuhn: But how could we not be turned on even if we're a simulation because
I I have a cognitive sense about me as I assume you do.

Minsky: Well imagine a program that's running on a very simple
old-fashioned computer and if you put a number in it adds two to it and
then it adds two to it again and it just runs so if you say five it says
seven nine eleven thirteen fifteen... right okay suppose you don't turn it
on but you just look at the program and you say what if I started that
program with five and the answer is oh well then it would say seven nine
eleven thirteen fifteen okay suppose the program is a complete description
of the processes in a human mind then instead of turning it on you just say
what would it think so first *it could be a program that's running on a
computer* second *it could be a program that some programmer is just
thinking about* third *it could be a program that nobody's even thought of*
just one of the possible programs and *that's where I think we have to stop
that that's the only kind of existence that makes sense* because the others
are trivial it's the process itself that's the real thing and doesn't have
to exist in any ordinary sense it's just possible.

Kuhn: So so you're you're defining real as possible. Anything possible is
real but there's no independent sense of reality.

Minsky: Yes so I wouldn't use the word real at all I think it's obsolete
and unnecessary and, however, it makes sense to talk about what's happening
in this universe *which is the one that we're stuck in*.

Kuhn: So to ask the question what what is what stuff is is real you you
don't you don't even want you you can't even answer that question.

Minsky:  No I'd say to say that this button is real is to say it's in this
universe that we're in *to say that the universe is real makes no sense at
all it's just possible*.

(Emphasis mine)

However trivial the word existence was to Minsky, he believed that "this"
the reality he found himself in, could be the result of a computer
programming that was not even running, just because it is a set of logical
possibilities.  To me, this sounds much closer to what Bruno describes, our
being computations in arithmetical realism, then it is to your dictum that
only physical computers cab do anything, and only if they're turned on and
change and use energy.

He says "that's where we have to stop" not because it doesn't make any
sense, he explicitly says the opposite, saying "that's the only kind of
existence that makes sense".

>
> And If you equate "possible" with "real" then the word becomes "obsolete
> and unnecessary". So if you want to make sense you've got to talk about
> what's happening in this universe. He said (9 min 30 sec in ) you can write
> a small computer program that can write every possible computer program
> (obviously including programs that say 2+2=5),
>

You can write a program that outputs the string "2 + 2 = 5", but you'll
never find a program that outputs a proof of 2 + 2 = 5 in any consistent
and sound system of axioms.

> it's true at that point he didn't specifically say that small program
> would have to be running of a computer or be read by a person to actually
> *do* that, or *do* anything at all, but I think that's clearly implied.
>

No he says the opposite, he said it could be a program no one has

Re: Observation versus assumption

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 12:48 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

*> But he wasn't smart enough to immediately reject the notion of
> computation without physical execution on a computer.*
>

Probably because Marvin Minsky didn't think he was talking to somebody like
Bruno or you and some things in a conversation don't need to be spelled out
because they are a given. I've heard him say a simulated world running on a
computer (made of matter that obeys the laws of physics) must exist if the
word "exist" is to have any meaning, and I've heard him say (5 min 50 sec
in) that even if the electronic computer is turned off if a human looks at
the computer's program his physical brain (that is made of matter and
obeys the laws of physics) can work out what will happen next. But if
you're talking about a program that is not running on a computer and nobody
has even thought of it   (6 min 25 sec in) he said "that's where I think we
have to stop" because if you don't then the word "existence" makes no sense
and everything is trivial.

And If you equate "possible" with "real" then the word becomes "obsolete
and unnecessary". So if you want to make sense you've got to talk about
what's happening in this universe. He said (9 min 30 sec in ) you can write
a small computer program that can write every possible computer program
(obviously including programs that say 2+2=5), it's true at that point he
didn't specifically say that small program would have to be running of a
computer or be read by a person to actually *do* that, or *do* anything at
all, but I think that's clearly implied.  I've certainly never heard him
say you can make a computation without a physical computer or a physical
person somewhere along the line.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-27 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 8/27/2019 4:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Aug 2019, at 21:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 8/26/2019 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Aug 2019, at 02:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 8/25/2019 12:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
What's the difference between abstract and concrete? I think it's
only a matter of relative perspective. Other universes to us seem
abstract. While to people in other universes ours would seem
abstract. Do you agree?

No. The difference is one of completeness. A abstract something
is incomplete.

It is the finite construction, like a theory, which can be
incomplete. The arithmetical reality is complete. The theories are
incomplete.

That arithmetical reality is complete is a theory.

No, it is true by definition of the arithmetical reality, which here
has been defined by the set of all true sentences in the standard
model of PA.

Yes, I'm familiar with the fantasy that things can be true by
definition. Sadly it only works for fictional things, as "Watson was
Holmes companion...by definition."

Brent

I “model” it by the set of the Gödel’s number of those true sentences.
No theories can axiomatise that set, but by definition, that set is
complete. The definition of that set can be done informally, and does
not ask much that we we need to understand real number or analysis.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Tue, Aug 27, 2019 at 7:25 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

*>>> A computer is a universal number.*
>


>> I agree because my personal idiosyncratic definition of "universal
> number" is a chip of Silicon made by the Intel corporation, and that is
> ever bit as valid as your personal idiosyncratic definition of "universal
> number". And since you quoted every word of my long post without comment I
> assume you agree with every word of it. Why else would you repost it?
>

> *> My definition of “universal machine” or “universal number” is the
> standard one.*
>

The standard definition of “universal number” involves teeth and is used
only by dentists. And you can't equate "machine" and "number" because one
can change and one can't, and one can interact with time and one can't.
Consciousness can change and consciousness can interact with time but
numbers can't.


> > *The chip off silicon, when being a general purpose computer, is a
> physical implementation of universal number.*
>

So your personal idiosyncratic definition of a "universal number" is a
tooth.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-27 Thread Jason Resch

On Tuesday, August 27, 2019, John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 9:04 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > *You sound just like Minsky here* ( https://www.youtube.com/
>> watch?v=hVJwzVD3jEs ) *debating possible things vs. real things.*
>>
>
> Marvin Minsky was certainly a very smart fellow, Isaac Asimov once said
> that in his entire life he only met 2 people smarter than he was, Carl
> Sagan and Marvin Minsky. I don't know about that but Minsky was smart
> enough to get frozen by Alcor when he died in 2016.
>

But he wasn't smart enough to immediately reject the notion of computation
without physical execution on a computer.

 Jason

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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 9:04 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> *You sound just like Minsky here* (
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVJwzVD3jEs ) *debating possible things
> vs. real things.*
>

Marvin Minsky was certainly a very smart fellow, Isaac Asimov once said
that in his entire life he only met 2 people smarter than he was, Carl
Sagan and Marvin Minsky. I don't know about that but Minsky was smart
enough to get frozen by Alcor when he died in 2016.

 John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 5:08 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

*> If every possible mathematical structure exists, then "exists" is
> meaningless when applied to mathematical structures.*


Yes! Meaning needs contrast, "everything has the X property" is
equivalent to "nothing has the X property" because there is no way to know
what "the X property" means with the scientific method.

 John K Clark


>

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Re: Observation versus assumption


> On 27 Aug 2019, at 05:15, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/26/2019 7:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 9:33 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 8/26/2019 6:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> What does "distinct" mean in that?  It's a distinction you make because 
>> you can think of a brain and processes of the brain as separate.  Just 
>> like you can think of an automobile plant as distinct from the steps 
>> required to make a car.  But that doesn't mean that a car can be made 
>> without any physical process.
>> 
>> It is distinct in the sense that bits are different from electrical 
>> voltages or scribbles on paper.
> 
> Yes and insurance is different from cash.  So what?  A bit is just a 
> physical thing that you choose to  regard purely in terms of its 
> computational relations...we calll the "abstractions" for a reason.
> 
> Under your own definition of abstraction above, there is a distinction 
> between a mind and a brain.  There's not an identity relation between the 
> two, as one discards unnecessary details. 
 
 "Unnecessary" to what?
 
 The specification of the mind.
>>> 
>>> But you don't know that.  You're merely assuming that a mind can be 
>>> specified without reference to a physical world in which it exists.
>>> 
>>> If functionalism is true, and if it's description is not infinite, then it 
>>> can be.
>>>  
>> 
>> But one of the specifications of the mind may be that it's physically 
>> instantiated.  Otherwise it couldn't perceive or act.
>> 
>> You agreed that the computation would act the same regardless of the source 
>> of the information.  So I don't know why you think it would not act.
> 
> The mind needs a body to act. 

Correct. But it does not a primary real body, as any mind has infinitely many 
virtual body in arithmetic, and it has even an apparent primary body, which 
emerges from the first person indeterminacy on all its relative virtual bodies.

Bruno



> The mind is a process in the brain or computer.  As a process per se it can't 
> act.
> 
> Brent
>> 
>> Also, you agreed "physical" is just a relation between an observer and a 
>> structure which might be mathematical.  So what makes any Turing machine any 
>> more or less capable than any other for processing an observer?
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
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>>  
>> .
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 8:37 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> > * if you think that there is a difference, what is it? It seems that
> you will have to invoke some attribute of your “matter”*
>

There are 2 attributes that matter has that numbers don't, and I've said
this over and over, the ability to change, and the ability to interact with
time in such a way that cause always precedes effect.  And both of these
attributes are vitally important in the making of a mind.

> *> and that it cannot be Turing emulated*
>

It's the easiest thing in the world for a Turing machine to emulate matter
because a Turing machine is made of matter.

>> I think information is the fundamental thing that makes me be me,
>
> >Yes, and it is relative information, and that is given by the relation
> between you and universal numbers,
>

If you wish to communicate with your fellow human beings you really need to
give Brunospeak a rest.

>> but information must be about something and in this case it's
> information about how atoms are arranged.
>
> *> How? *
>

How what?

> *> Could a brain in vat knows anything about those atoms. *
>

A brain in a skull can know stuff about atoms, why would a brain in a vat
be more ignorant?

> *It could not even know if it is emulated by a Babbage machine or by
> human with paper, or by a quantum computer.*
>

True, but it could know that it's NOT being emulated by pure numbers,
because whatever is doing the emulating it needs to be something that can
change and something that can interact with time. And pure numbers can't do
either of those things. But matter can.

>> And atoms are physical things that interact with each other according to
> the laws of physics.
>
> *> Assuming some physical reality, but that makes no sense when you assume
> Mechanism.*
>

Then as is your habit you've changed your definition of "Mechanism" yet
again to who knows what because I still say "yes" to the digital doctor.
That's why I never bothered to learn Brunospeak, even if I was fluent in it
today by tomorrow it would have mutated so much it would be
incomprehensible.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption


> On 26 Aug 2019, at 23:08, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/26/2019 5:51 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> One not necessary,
>> 
>> If every possible mathematical structure exists, then everything (including 
>> what you might call accidents) is necessary. 
> 
> If every possible mathematical structure exists, then "exists" is meaningless 
> when applied to mathematical structures.

It is more the “every” in “every mathematical structure” which is non sensical 
… in most set theories. But the theory NF might provides some sense, but I am 
not sure if that is not a bit ad hoc.

Phycialism has the same problem with the notion of “whole”. But it has even 
bigger problem with the mechanist assumption.

Bruno 




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Re: Observation versus assumption


> On 26 Aug 2019, at 22:37, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 4:27 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> > But if the laws of physics are deterministic,
> 
> They're not.

Are you alluding to the wave collapse? Without wave collapse, physics is purely 
3p-deterministic. The indeterminacy is in the mind of the first person.

Bruno




> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

> On 26 Aug 2019, at 21:08, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > A computer is a universal number.
> 
> I agree because my personal idiosyncratic definition of "universal number" is 
> a chip of Silicon made by the Intel corporation, and that is ever bit as 
> valid as your personal idiosyncratic definition of "universal number". And 
> since you quoted every word of my long post without comment I assume you 
> agree with every word of it. Why else would you repost it?

My definition of “universal machine” or “universal number” is the standard one. 
A number n is universal in the universal machinery phi_i if phi_n(x,y) = 
phi_x(y), for all x and y. It is equivalent of Turing’s original definition of 
a universal Turing machine, which is (the code) of a set of quadruplets which, 
once having n and m coded on its tape, compute phi_n(m), and find the result of 
the nth program when applied on the number m.

The chip off silicon, when being a general purpose computer, is a physical 
implementation of universal number.

That physical implementation requires the assumption of the existence of some 
physical things, but the standard definition of a universal 
number/words/machine requires only elementary arithmetic, or elementary lambda 
calculus, or the game of life, etc.

Bruno

> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption


> On 26 Aug 2019, at 21:04, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/26/2019 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 26 Aug 2019, at 02:28, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 8/25/2019 12:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 What's the difference between abstract and concrete?  I think it's only a 
 matter of relative perspective. Other universes to us seem abstract.  
 While to people in other universes ours would seem abstract.  Do you agree?
>>> 
>>> No.  The difference is one of completeness.  A abstract something is 
>>> incomplete. 
>> 
>> It is the finite construction, like a theory, which can be incomplete. The 
>> arithmetical reality is complete. The theories are incomplete.
> 
> That arithmetical reality is complete is a theory.

No, it is true by definition of the arithmetical reality, which here has been 
defined by the set of all true sentences in the standard model of PA.  I 
“model” it by the set of the Gödel’s number of those true sentences. No 
theories can axiomatise that set, but by definition, that set is complete. The 
definition of that set can be done informally, and does not ask much that we we 
need to understand real number or analysis.

Bruno



> 
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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 8/26/2019 7:44 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 9:33 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 8/26/2019 6:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

What does "distinct" mean in that? It's a
distinction you make because
you can think of a brain and processes of the
brain as separate. Just
like you can think of an automobile plant as
distinct from the steps
required to make a car. But that doesn't mean
that a car can be made
without any physical process.

It is distinct in the sense that bits are
different from electrical voltages or scribbles on
paper.

Yes and insurance is different from cash. So
what? A bit is just a physical thing that you
choose to regard purely in terms of its
computational relations...we calll the
"abstractions" for a reason.

Under your own definition of abstraction above, there
is a distinction between a mind and a brain. There's
not an identity relation between the two, as one
discards unnecessary details.

"Unnecessary" to what?

The specification of the mind.

But you don't know that. You're merely assuming that a mind
can be specified without reference to a physical world in
which it exists.

If functionalism is true, and if it's description is not
infinite, then it can be.

But one of the specifications of the mind may be that it's
physically instantiated. Otherwise it couldn't perceive or act.

You agreed that the computation would act the same regardless of the
source of the information. So I don't know why you think it would not
act.

The mind needs a body to act. The mind is a process in the brain or
computer. As a process per se it can't act.

Brent

Also, you agreed "physical" is just a relation between an observer and
a structure which might be mathematical. So what makes any Turing
machine any more or less capable than any other for processing an
observer?

Jason

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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 9:33 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 8/26/2019 6:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> What does "distinct" mean in that?  It's a distinction you make because
> you can think of a brain and processes of the brain as separate.  Just
> like you can think of an automobile plant as distinct from the steps
> required to make a car.  But that doesn't mean that a car can be made
> without any physical process.
>

 It is distinct in the sense that bits are different from electrical
 voltages or scribbles on paper.

 Yes and insurance is different from cash.  So what?  A bit is just a
 physical thing that you choose to  regard purely in terms of its
 computational relations...we calll the "abstractions" for a reason.

>>>
>>> Under your own definition of abstraction above, there is a distinction
>>> between a mind and a brain.  There's not an identity relation between the
>>> two, as one discards unnecessary details.
>>>
>>>
>>> "Unnecessary" to what?
>>>
>>
>> The specification of the mind.
>>
>>
>> But you don't know that.  You're merely assuming that a mind can be
>> specified without reference to a physical world in which it exists.
>>
>
> If functionalism is true, and if it's description is not infinite, then it
> can be.
>
>
>>
> But one of the specifications of the mind may be that it's physically
> instantiated.  Otherwise it couldn't perceive or act.
>

You agreed that the computation would act the same regardless of the source
of the information.  So I don't know why you think it would not act.

Also, you agreed "physical" is just a relation between an observer and a
structure which might be mathematical.  So what makes any Turing machine
any more or less capable than any other for processing an observer?

Jason

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 8/26/2019 6:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

What does "distinct" mean in that? It's a
distinction you make because
you can think of a brain and processes of the brain
as separate. Just
like you can think of an automobile plant as
distinct from the steps
required to make a car. But that doesn't mean that
a car can be made
without any physical process.

It is distinct in the sense that bits are different
from electrical voltages or scribbles on paper.

Yes and insurance is different from cash. So what? A
bit is just a physical thing that you choose to regard
purely in terms of its computational relations...we
calll the "abstractions" for a reason.

Under your own definition of abstraction above, there is a
distinction between a mind and a brain. There's not an
identity relation between the two, as one discards
unnecessary details.

"Unnecessary" to what?

The specification of the mind.

But you don't know that. You're merely assuming that a mind can
be specified without reference to a physical world in which it exists.

If functionalism is true, and if it's description is not infinite,
then it can be.

But one of the specifications of the mind may be that it's physically
instantiated. Otherwise it couldn't perceive or act.

Brent

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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 4:12 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 8/26/2019 5:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/25/2019 6:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, August 25, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/25/2019 2:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Aug 25, 2019, 12:08 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 8/24/2019 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 >
 > The mind is a pattern distinct from any of it's physical incarnations.

 What does "distinct" mean in that?  It's a distinction you make because
 you can think of a brain and processes of the brain as separate.  Just
 like you can think of an automobile plant as distinct from the steps
 required to make a car.  But that doesn't mean that a car can be made
 without any physical process.

>>>
>>> It is distinct in the sense that bits are different from electrical
>>> voltages or scribbles on paper.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes and insurance is different from cash.  So what?  A bit is just a
>>> physical thing that you choose to  regard purely in terms of its
>>> computational relations...we calll the "abstractions" for a reason.
>>>
>>
>> Under your own definition of abstraction above, there is a distinction
>> between a mind and a brain.  There's not an identity relation between the
>> two, as one discards unnecessary details.
>>
>>
>> "Unnecessary" to what?
>>
>
> The specification of the mind.
>
>
> But you don't know that.  You're merely assuming that a mind can be
> specified without reference to a physical world in which it exists.
>

If functionalism is true, and if it's description is not infinite, then it
can be.


>
>
>
>>
>> As an abstract pattern, there's many physical incarnations that could map
>> to the same mind.
>>
>>
>> No.  Because the mind is relative to the environment...including the
>> brain.
>>
>>
> What is the difference between information in the brain and information
> that came from the environment being in the brain?  From a computer science
> perspective, I can tell you that where the input bits come from won't make
> a difference in the evolution of the program execution.  So whether the
> bits were hard coded, generated by a random number generator, or captured
> from a video camera makes no difference.  From this would you predict that
> one of these three cases would result in a non-conscious zombie?
>
>
> No.  But note that they all assume a physical world.
>

They don't unless you are operating under the assumption that computation
requires a physical world.

1. Do you think a computer operated in a different universe with different
physical laws could run a conscious emulation of your brain?
2. Do you think there are possible mathematical structures that are Turing
machines? (which under your definition, would constitute "physical"
universes, to any beings contained in the computation performed by the
Turing machine)
3. Could the Turing machines in #2 be responsible for your present moment
of awareness? (in the same sense as a Boltzmann brain might be)

Jason

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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 4:08 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 8/26/2019 5:51 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> One not necessary,
>>
>
> If every possible mathematical structure exists, then everything
> (including what you might call accidents) is necessary.
>
>
> If every possible mathematical structure exists, then "exists" is
> meaningless when applied to mathematical structures.
>

You sound just like Minsky here (
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hVJwzVD3jEs ) debating possible things vs.
real things.

Jason

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Re: Observation versus assumption

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 3:38 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 4:27 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> But if the laws of physics are deterministic,*
>>
>
> They're not.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
Which one's aren't?

Jason

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 8/26/2019 5:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 8/25/2019 6:26 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sunday, August 25, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 8/25/2019 2:12 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Aug 25, 2019, 12:08 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 8/24/2019 9:16 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> The mind is a pattern distinct from any of it's
physical incarnations.

What does "distinct" mean in that? It's a distinction
you make because
you can think of a brain and processes of the brain as
separate. Just
like you can think of an automobile plant as distinct
from the steps
required to make a car. But that doesn't mean that a
car can be made
without any physical process.

It is distinct in the sense that bits are different from
electrical voltages or scribbles on paper.

Yes and insurance is different from cash. So what? A bit is
just a physical thing that you choose to regard purely in
terms of its computational relations...we calll the
"abstractions" for a reason.

Under your own definition of abstraction above, there is a
distinction between a mind and a brain. There's not an identity
relation between the two, as one discards unnecessary details.

"Unnecessary" to what?

The specification of the mind.

But you don't know that. You're merely assuming that a mind can be
specified without reference to a physical world in which it exists.

As an abstract pattern, there's many physical incarnations that
could map to the same mind.

No. Because the mind is relative to the environment...including
the brain.

What is the difference between information in the brain and
information that came from the environment being in the brain? From a
computer science perspective, I can tell you that where the input bits
come from won't make a difference in the evolution of the program
execution. So whether the bits were hard coded, generated by a random
number generator, or captured from a video camera makes no
difference. From this would you predict that one of these three cases
would result in a non-conscious zombie?

No. But note that they all assume a physical world.

Brent

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 8/26/2019 5:51 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
It is generally impossible to differentiate a random sequence from one 
produced by an algorithm.  What you may take as evidence of randomness 
could instead be the output of a complex deterministic algorithm.


If QM required collapse, or if the universe had to be envisioned as an 
evolving 3d space, rather than a static 4d spacetime, I would agree 
with you that would be strong evidence against mathematical existence, 
but since both of these ideas have been shown as unnecessary 
complications of the simpler physical view (i.e. spactime, and no 
collapse qm) I consider those successes to be evidence in favor of 
mathematical existence.


You consider it evidence that you can imagine something.  I don't.

Brent

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-26 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 8/26/2019 5:51 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


One not necessary,


If every possible mathematical structure exists, then everything 
(including what you might call accidents) is necessary.


If every possible mathematical structure exists, then "exists" is 
meaningless when applied to mathematical structures.


Brent

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Re: Observation versus assumption

2019-08-26 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Aug 26, 2019 at 4:27 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

*> But if the laws of physics are deterministic,*
>

They're not.

John K Clark

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Re: Observation versus assumption