Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 09 Jun 2014, at 00:41, David Nyman wrote: On 8 June 2014 22:47, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Ready? Have you bought the Mendelson? OK, I give in. Wonderful. I just found a reasonably-priced second-hand copy of the Mendelson on Abebooks - should be here in a few days. Perfect. That will be an opportunity for me to summarize the key points. Oh, and by the way, I'm presently reading and enjoying Hines's Return to the One. Thanks for the recommendation. I am glad you appreciate it. He gives justice to Plotinus rationalism, but he expands more the mystical issue though, but I find it still to be a quite nice modern rendering on Plotinus. I might reread it now that you are reading it, to make some comments. Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 7 June 2014 20:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: *At step 7, it is not in principle. Like in the preceding protocol, we just assume the existence of an infinite running of the UD in our infinite (then) space-time structure.* *The proposition is that if that is the case, and don't see white rabbits, it means some computations are multiplied, and exploit (perhaps) the random oracle inherent in that multiplication. * OK, so the pedagogic purpose of step 7 is to persuade us that our experiences *could* be the consequence of the above, but it doesn't yet force that conclusion (because it could still be avoided in the way I have suggested). *The step 8 does not, and cannot, refute your point above, but it can explain how far it goes near a god-of-the-gap move, or a magic move. It is close to be proved, as to counteract to step 8 you are forced (in the transfinite) to provide a matter which is non Turing emulable, and non FPI recoverable. It looks like reifying a mystery to prevent a possible partial solution to a mystery. Someone might add that matter needs a Gods blessing, also. * Step 8, if I've understood it, shows that one can evacuate all traces of computation from a primordial physical instantiation (either by substituting a filmed record, under the particular contingencies of the movie graph, or by systematically substituting each of the computational relations by fortuitous physical events). This renders the ascription of computation to the physical events as entirely gratuitous. Hence what follows is either the abandonment of CTM, or alternatively the reversal consequence. The reversal could only then be avoided by an appeal, as you say, to some (presumably presently unknown) aspect of primordial matter that is not Turing emulable in principle (e.g. that required actual computational infinities). Even after such a move, any naturally motivated appeal to computation and its putative relation with consciousness is hardly any clearer than before. My own intuition, for what its worth, has always been that any appeal to computation on the assumption of primordial matter is somewhat suspect and ad hoc. ISTM that what is supposed to be primordial about a specific set of entities and their relations is precisely that they *exclusively* underlie (or more correctly, comprise) everything that is really real. So the hierarchical structure of everything we observe thereafter - be it physical, chemical, biological, physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be underpinned, exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial substratum. The higher-order levels in the hierarchy could always, at least in principle, be reduced without loss to the primordial entities and their relations. They are, IOW, *re-descriptions* of primordial reality, not independent realities in themselves. If so, the problem in trying to add computation to such a hierarchy is that it must suffer the same fate - i.e. that of being reduced and eliminated as an ultimately supernumerary re-description of what is really just the primordial substratum. And consequently, if we attempt to attach consciousness to such a supernumerary re-description, it must inevitably be exposed to similar reduction and elimination. This is, I think, what the demonstrations in step 8 lay bare. By contrast, after the reversal, the primordial entities and relations are restricted to the natural numbers (or their equivalents) and their additive and multiplicative relations. It used to trouble me that the same arguments I have deployed above could seemingly equally be directed at this alternative primordial substratum. That is, that whatever was deemed to emerge from arithmetic could in the final analysis always be reduced to it again without loss and hence ultimately eliminated as being independently real. But the critical difference here, compared with the starting point of primordial matter, seems to be the natural emulation of computation and the universal machine in arithmetic. Their consequences in logic seem, at least in principle, to offer a route out of the reduction/elimination impasse by connecting an outer structure of basic arithmetical entities and relations with a much larger and more complex internal reality consisting of the modes of arithmetical truth. This latter reality is then no longer vulnerable in the same way to either reduction or elimination, though the task (substantially) remains, after a promising beginning, to connect it systematically and robustly with observed reality. It occurred to me that the relation between such a substratum and its truth domain might be suggested, albeit rather imperfectly, by an analogy with something like an LCD screen. The idea is that an enormously large (infinite?) set of possible dramatic storylines can potentially be realised by a finite set (in this case) of fundamental entities and their relations (i.e. the pixels). Of course, the analogy immediately breaks down because, in the case of the
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 08 Jun 2014, at 14:28, David Nyman wrote: On 7 June 2014 20:05, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: At step 7, it is not in principle. Like in the preceding protocol, we just assume the existence of an infinite running of the UD in our infinite (then) space-time structure. The proposition is that if that is the case, and don't see white rabbits, it means some computations are multiplied, and exploit (perhaps) the random oracle inherent in that multiplication. OK, so the pedagogic purpose of step 7 is to persuade us that our experiences *could* be the consequence of the above, but it doesn't yet force that conclusion (because it could still be avoided in the way I have suggested). The step 8 does not, and cannot, refute your point above, but it can explain how far it goes near a god-of-the-gap move, or a magic move. It is close to be proved, as to counteract to step 8 you are forced (in the transfinite) to provide a matter which is non Turing emulable, and non FPI recoverable. It looks like reifying a mystery to prevent a possible partial solution to a mystery. Someone might add that matter needs a Gods blessing, also. Step 8, if I've understood it, shows that one can evacuate all traces of computation from a primordial physical instantiation (either by substituting a filmed record, under the particular contingencies of the movie graph, or by systematically substituting each of the computational relations by fortuitous physical events). This renders the ascription of computation to the physical events as entirely gratuitous. Hence what follows is either the abandonment of CTM, or alternatively the reversal consequence. The reversal could only then be avoided by an appeal, as you say, to some (presumably presently unknown) aspect of primordial matter that is not Turing emulable in principle (e.g. that required actual computational infinities). Even after such a move, any naturally motivated appeal to computation and its putative relation with consciousness is hardly any clearer than before. My own intuition, for what its worth, has always been that any appeal to computation on the assumption of primordial matter is somewhat suspect and ad hoc. ISTM that what is supposed to be primordial about a specific set of entities and their relations is precisely that they *exclusively* underlie (or more correctly, comprise) everything that is really real. So the hierarchical structure of everything we observe thereafter - be it physical, chemical, biological, physiological, etc. - would be deemed to be underpinned, exclusively and exhaustively, by such a primordial substratum. The higher-order levels in the hierarchy could always, at least in principle, be reduced without loss to the primordial entities and their relations. They are, IOW, *re-descriptions* of primordial reality, not independent realities in themselves. If so, the problem in trying to add computation to such a hierarchy is that it must suffer the same fate - i.e. that of being reduced and eliminated as an ultimately supernumerary re-description of what is really just the primordial substratum. And consequently, if we attempt to attach consciousness to such a supernumerary re-description, it must inevitably be exposed to similar reduction and elimination. This is, I think, what the demonstrations in step 8 lay bare. By contrast, after the reversal, the primordial entities and relations are restricted to the natural numbers (or their equivalents) and their additive and multiplicative relations. It used to trouble me that the same arguments I have deployed above could seemingly equally be directed at this alternative primordial substratum. That is, that whatever was deemed to emerge from arithmetic could in the final analysis always be reduced to it again without loss and hence ultimately eliminated as being independently real. But the critical difference here, compared with the starting point of primordial matter, seems to be the natural emulation of computation and the universal machine in arithmetic. Their consequences in logic seem, at least in principle, to offer a route out of the reduction/elimination impasse by connecting an outer structure of basic arithmetical entities and relations with a much larger and more complex internal reality consisting of the modes of arithmetical truth. This latter reality is then no longer vulnerable in the same way to either reduction or elimination, though the task (substantially) remains, after a promising beginning, to connect it systematically and robustly with observed reality. It occurred to me that the relation between such a substratum and its truth domain might be suggested, albeit rather imperfectly, by an analogy with something like an LCD screen. The idea is that an enormously large (infinite?) set of possible dramatic storylines can
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 8 June 2014 22:47, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Ready? Have you bought the Mendelson? OK, I give in. I just found a reasonably-priced second-hand copy of the Mendelson on Abebooks - should be here in a few days. Oh, and by the way, I'm presently reading and enjoying Hines's Return to the One. Thanks for the recommendation. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 12:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-12 12:17 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the ineffable=unprovable identification is gratuitous. There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?) are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world. Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8! I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate. I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument. I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I still don't feel I fully understand what that says yet. At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and arithmetic (or number theology). Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they mean by primitive matter, It could be as Peter Jones said the thing that renders it real... only computations implemented in matter are real... AR as such would be false, a mathematical statement not implemented in matter is indeterminate, the truth value only come from implementation. Computationalism + realness ingredient could still be possible and evade UDA conclusion... at the costs of some magical property. I am OK with this, and it is related on the falsification issue. It is an important thread on which we will have to come back. Bruno Quentin and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties. But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be a refutation of comp-reversal, but of comp itself. To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 February 2014 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and arithmetic (or number theology). If I've grasped this, it's that one could attempt to avoid the reversal by claiming that the physical universe isn't (or mightn't be) sufficiently robust (i.e. physically extended?) to instantiate a physical UD that would run forever. If so, this would presumably side-step the need to take the consequent infinities of computations into account. However, I've never felt fully in command of this step, actually. For example, why couldn't one argue that the physical universe is indeed sufficiently robust, in the sense intended, to support the infinite running of a UD, but it simply be the case that - in fact - *there is no such UD in existence*? I seem to have missed the force of the implication (at step 7) that a physically instantiated, infinitely-running UD *must* be taken into account, given the simple fact of a physical universe sufficiently robust, *in principle*, to support its existence. IOW, even given the comp assumption, why couldn't one still argue that all relevant computations - *absent actual physical evidence* of an infinitely-running UD - in fact supervene on physical brains and/or other non-biological physical digital machines? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 07 Jun 2014, at 17:23, David Nyman wrote: On 12 February 2014 11:17, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and arithmetic (or number theology). If I've grasped this, it's that one could attempt to avoid the reversal by claiming that the physical universe isn't (or mightn't be) sufficiently robust (i.e. physically extended?) to instantiate a physical UD that would run forever. If so, this would presumably side-step the need to take the consequent infinities of computations into account. Yees, that the whole point. However, I've never felt fully in command of this step, actually. For example, why couldn't one argue that the physical universe is indeed sufficiently robust, in the sense intended, to support the infinite running of a UD, but it simply be the case that - in fact - *there is no such UD in existence*? Yes, that certainly exists too. But it is not an interesting protocol to get the partial reversal of step seven: if there is a concrete UD* then the laws of physics = the hunting of the arithmetical rabbits. Then in step eight we quasi-eliminate moves like small universe, or your robust but without UD, etc. I seem to have missed the force of the implication (at step 7) that a physically instantiated, infinitely-running UD *must* be taken into account, given the simple fact of a physical universe sufficiently robust, *in principle*, to support its existence. At step 7, it is not in principle. Like in the preceding protocol, we just assume the existence of an infinite running of the UD in our infinite (then) space-time structure. The proposition is that if that is the case, and don't see white rabbits, it means some computations are multiplied, and exploit (perhaps) the random oracle inherent in that multiplication. IOW, even given the comp assumption, why couldn't one still argue that all relevant computations - *absent actual physical evidence* of an infinitely-running UD - in fact supervene on physical brains and/or other non-biological physical digital machines? By step 8. That moves above is shown introducing a god-of-the-gap to select a reality. It entails a sort of magic distinguishing a computation from all the others. You can do this, as step 8 talk about reality and thus can only suggest the implausibility of such a move. It is almost like using an ideology (the belief in a primary physical universe) to divert from a testable explanation of where the physical laws come from, and why the physical can hurt. It is the same than Omnes, who invoke literally the abandon of rationalism to select one universe in his otherwise clear description of a (QM) multiverse. The step 8 does not, and cannot, refute your point above, but it can explain how far it goes near a god-of-the-gap move, or a magic move. It is close to be proved, as to counteract to step 8 you are forced (in the transfinite) to provide a matter which is non Turing emulable, and non FPI recoverable. It looks like reifying a mystery to prevent a possible partial solution to a mystery. Someone might add that matter needs a Gods blessing, also. Bruno David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 18:20, meekerdb wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? I would recommend the book by Matiyasevich(*). It is very good. You don't need a background (except 17 is prime, of course). But you will need to do some work, of course. It took 70 years to Davis, Putnam, Robinson and Matiyasevich to prove this. The so called DPRM theorem. Many logicians thought they would not succeed. Bruno (*) You will find many accounts when googling on matiyasevich hilbert's tenth problem. + amazon.com for the references. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 18:34, Richard Ruquist wrote: Isn't quantum mechanics based on the reals? Yes. Like classical physics. And like, most plausibly the comp- physics, by the dovetailing on the reals inputs, which might play a role in the measure stabilization problem. But this has to be extracted from the semantics of the comp propositional physics (the two, or three, material hypostases). Bruno On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 12:20 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 11 Feb 2014, at 2:15 pm, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: The point is that if we take the assumptions of comp, then quantum duplication, hypothetical matter transmitter duplication, and living from day to day ALL involve the same amount of (or lack of) continuity. Yes. The way I now understand it, with Comp, sleeping in your bed at night is Death Lite. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 20:43, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 1:38 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: both the W *and* the M guy are the H guy Yes. the question bear on probability of expectation for the H guy when he press the button... If that is the question then the answer will be of zero help in understanding the nature of personal identity But as Quentin just said, that is not the object of the inquiry. because neither probability nor expectations have anything to do with consciousness or of a continuous feeling of self. OK, but expectations is the object of the inquiry. Bruno You feel like Quentin Anciaux today for one reason only, because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday; it's true that if Everett was correct then there are other things that remember that too, but how something feels or what they do can have no effect on you because neither you nor I will ever interact with them nor they with us. And for that reason pronouns like I and you and them and us cause Everett no trouble, but in Bruno's thought experiment they produce endless problems. Everett wanted to explain why the predictions made by Quantum Mechanics were so weird and so accurate, and he wanted to explain it without introducing the very nebulous concept of the observer, and I think he was pretty successful in accomplishing his goal. Bruno wanted to do something different, he wanted to explain how personal identity and a continuous feeling of self worked, and in that he failed. please state where you disagree. Please? You're saying please now? What happened, did you lose you're copy of The Giant Book Of Insults? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 17:03, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-14 16:49 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 21:12, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 21:05 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. I guess you mean any measurement I made is geographical. I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants. Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all geographies, and that is what I call physical laws, as the rest will be sort of contingencies. You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? Ok... but it is no more comp. The we are at the base level of physics is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be tested, except trivially by being conscious, as all virtual being not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This makes Peter Jones realness neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). But in our case, that realness (defined by the satisfiability of comp + theaetetus + non-dream) is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so that I stay correct) then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that... I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation. That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would be able to falsify comp, please be precise. But we cannot measure a physical laws. We can only postulate it, and see if our measurement confirms it or not. Or we can derive laws, from a theory which is postulated. So from QM, we can derive that the observable obeys a quantum logic. From comp, we can derive that the observable obeys to some non boolean logic. Then we can compare the two logics. Let me give you a specific example. let us take Bell's inequality. A simple form is (A B) / (A C) V (B ~C) (/ = we can deduce, I use / because it is simpler, you can verify that with - in place of /, we get a tautology, and so that rule is valid in classical logic, by modus ponens). See my appendices on QM where it is shown how to build Stern Gerlach or polarizers setting showing that this is booean tautology is statistically violated by QM (and nature, even when A and B are quite apart and should be independent). That tautology is not a tautology for quantum logic. QL does not prove, and nature provides counter-example. Now QL proves a logical formula if and only if the modal logic B proves the quantization of that formula. The quantization is a recursive transformation, where you translate p (in QL) into []p in B, and ~p is translated into []~p. So what I say above can be expressed by the quantization of (A B) - (A C) V (B ~C) is not a theorem of the modal
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 17:11, David Nyman wrote: On 14 February 2014 15:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. Do you mean fooled? I guess you are right. I thought failed was english. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that much. Anyway, as we get a quantum logic, and many-worlds, what we observe today can count as much in favor of comp than of QM. Then you have the empirical reason in favor of comp, like the intuition provided by molecular biology. The real point is that what we observe might refute comp, like it might refute QM. Bruno Brent Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know we are awake. This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this. (Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively *any* theory about reality). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:12, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? Because you work in first-order analysis, where you can add and multiply real numbers, but still cannot differentiate 1, 00100100111... and 1. Another way to see that slides rules are not universal is in trying to define a compiler FORTRAN-- slides rules. In that case, ... well I don't know, if you have the sin, you might be able to find the natural numbers, by solving sin(2pi*x) = 0, but you will get analogical natural numbers, and not clear digital 0, 1, 2, ... May be slide rule + your moves + infinitely good eye sight might be Turing universal. May be slides rules can be Turing Universal in a ring, in the sense of Blum, Shub and Smale. I am not sure. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 21:32, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? Yes, you can sum up in that way. Formally you can relate that to the fact that the first order theory of the real is not Turing complete (indeed it is decidable). In analysis, if you get a sequence like 0.9, 0.99, 0.999, ..., and you know that it converge, but you don't know that it converge toward 1 (it might converge toward 0, ...9998), you still know that your problem admits a solution (and indeed Newton or Sturm Liouville provided algorithm to find those solutions when they exist). But the digital world is more demanding, as it needs, not just better and better approximations, but it needs exact solutions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 00:15, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 2:17 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 10:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers because it only has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the cursor. But since a Turing machine is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed to expand the number of distinct positions arbitrarily? So you don't think the analogue/digital thing matters? I suppose a person using a slide rule could be trusted to correct for small errorsor could they? I think it matters because the power of arithmetic to encode proofs depends on it having arbitrarily long strings of digits. But just as Turing idealized infinite tapes, I can idealize arbitrarily large slide rules to get arbitrarily high precision. Not sure this works (despite my allusion to infinitely good eyesight). You might need actual-infinite eye sight, because arbitrary good eye sight might still ask you for an infinite analogical task. You zoom and zoom and zoom ... and after each finite of time, you still don't know if you get 1, or 1+ 0.001, for example, where digital program could, for some reason, find the exact result. You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 22:35, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 04:19, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. ... Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). ... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it will looks dreamy to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It is how we define (and operationally measure) force. No problem with that, and that is why a answered with F = KmM/r^2, but that was not much relevant. If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's Comprehensible Cosmos, he discusses this from page 48. No problem. I appreciate the argument. I read it online, and it was taught by some physicists. Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3 momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity approximation. Sure. Even F = dp/dt is a classical approximation deducible from Feynman integral. So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law - it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently. F= ma is like H phi = E phi. All is in F, or H. Those equality should be laws indeed, and deducible from deeper laws. It might be more doubtful for F or H, except that the Turing universality of the vacuum suggest some H = 0, à-la Dewitt-Wheeler. But we are not yet there .. But this seems to point to a deeper problem. If we elaborate H and E as operators and psi as a ray in a Hilbert space and if we further define the Hilbert space, we will still have a symbolic expression which we can related ostensively to some apparatus. But we will never get down to an arithmetical computation. That would not make sense. In the (comp) physical reality, we can only get down physically, on something physical. Comp does not make matter into something made of number or computations. it is only a point of view, or an internal angle of arithmetic seen from inside. If we get H psi = E psi, we will have the same ostensive relation with apparatus in comp. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 14 Feb 2014, at 23:27, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But it has some semantics in term of infinite sequence of G-multiverse. By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the machine. Not just what is provable by the machine. G* minus G is not empty (it contains t, t, t, ... for example), and it axiomatizes the true but non provable modal (provability) sentences. It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the accesibility relation: For example if the accessibility relation is T (for teleportation) then TM and TW may be false in Helsinki Why. Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know). ? Comp implies the possibility in principle of classical teleportation, (UDA step 1). We don't need more. I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that possible is a relative concept depending on the accessiblity relation. OK. But with comp we define the box through computer science, and isolate the accessibility relation from the math of the boxes, as UDA shows it is the only way to do, given that we cannot look at nature in that approach (cf the treachery). That is an original and subtle points that perhaps some people are still missing. What does possible in principle mean? But this was in UDA. It means that if the brain is some machine, we can survive by substituting an equivalent one, at some level. I assume teleportation being practical, in step 1-6, but this assumption is eliminated in steps 7 and 8. Does it only mean not self contradictory? No, it means that to make this absolutely impossible in theory, you need non-comp type of assumption. Does it mean consistent with our best understanding of physics? No, it means consistent with our best understanding of cognition, life, brains and the notion of computation. Lawrence Krauss discusses the possibility in his book The Physics of Star Trek. He estimates that it would take more energy than available in the Milky Way just to obtain the information to teleport a human being. Classically or quantum mechanically? Of course putting that much mass/energy in the vicinity of the human being would create a black hole. So what does possible really mean? The possibility of classical teleportation It is a way to explain what is meant by saying that the brain is a machine. Nothing else. Then in AUDA, there come 8 notion of possibility, defined in arithmetical terms, all based on the math of self-reference. Like Jean-Paul Delahaye wrote, you can compare such thought experience with Einstein or Maxwell thought experiences to justify relativity or electro-magnetism, before doing the math. To move along with a photon is also hard to do in practice. Bruno Brent Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as an operator necessary, and as possible as just symbols with a defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean. What is necessary and what is possible are dependent on context; just as above you casually assume that teleportation is possible - even though you well know it isn't - just because you can write T. This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a sort of logical realism. I use [] and usually when I explain modal logic, through many examples of different modal systems. In the translation of UDA in arithmetic, all modalities are defined in term of the provability predicate, that is the Gödel's Beweisbar. What is necessary or possible depends on the worlds, yes, that is what Kripke is all about. All I explain is based on the fact that teleportation is possible *theoretically*. Yes. That it is hard to do in practice is not relevant. You could stop at step 0, because the artificial brain is also impossible in practice today. But it is not relevant. We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if teleportation is the accessibility relation. while using F (for flying) would make FM and FW true. OK, but it is the same with T. No it's not. I can fly to Moscow. By definition of the protocol in step three. If not you should have made such remark at step 0, and just say no to the doctor. You just say non-comp (even in theory). The practicality of teleportation is not relevant for the theoretical proof. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single alternative: comp) 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread) finally a three alternative multiverse appears: 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana or 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas. or 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level. 2014-02-14 21:39 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. ? So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. ? -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI - Why they believe in God? God is the universal machine. the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the inner God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God. I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it? - Yes but why people distinguish between god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. That is akin to a comp blaspheme! -Yes, but why people... . that is FPI as i said before - Yes but... I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very nice ideas and so on You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first. Bruno 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-) (Sorry!) I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. I said apparently because I have no idea how he does it. I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of saying yes to the doctor. With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover. With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more a product of the infinity of computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a single
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 15 Feb 2014, at 12:14, Alberto G. Corona wrote: ;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single alternative: comp) If there is no flaws, the real alternative is more between Aristotle's theology (like materialism, naturalism) and Plato's theology (where the physical reality is a product of something non physical). 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread) finally a three alternative multiverse appears: 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana or 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas. or 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level. Well, that is very bad philosophy, but at least it is funny. Bruno 2014-02-14 21:39 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. ? So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. ? -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI - Why they believe in God? God is the universal machine. the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the inner God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God. I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it? - Yes but why people distinguish between god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. That is akin to a comp blaspheme! -Yes, but why people... . that is FPI as i said before - Yes but... I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very nice ideas and so on You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first. Bruno 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-) (Sorry!) I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. I said apparently because I have no idea how he does it. I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of saying yes to the doctor. With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover. With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven,
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point proving our own reality could not be a dream in that sense... The only thing that should render our own reality more real, is that it certainly requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false... Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the self-multiplication factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity, and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person plural) protecting comp from solipsism. All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient being. That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus, assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies the normal histories again the aberrant one. Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it, I do. That's what Z1* Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open problem in math. you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure battle. I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge, observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine needed to extract the correct physics). Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate computationalism... Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM makes both physics into a statistics. I don't think MWI is falsifiable either... computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can be inferred from that. I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that the p and p-[]p seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse. That is important as it makes comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible geographies. What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an open problem because calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you can't use falsifiability argument if such falsification is intractable. And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws from deeper laws. This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can understand by introspection (self-reference) and so the physics is derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation. Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist, with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe. The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not) from the sum on UD*. That one is determined by computer science. The case of the probability one logic is given by the arithmetical quantization. so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, How would it proves that ? By showing that Z1* gives the good type of quantum logic, enough to assure Gleason theorem, and derive the measure from some canonical (Hilbertian) semantics. Z1* is already able to decide if the Hilbert space is finitely dimension, or infinitely dimensional. Then dimension is related to the probability calculus (by works by many quantum logicians), and normally, arithmetic add infinitely many constraints at the first order modal logic level. It might be hard, but I do thing that qZ1* is able to decide if F=ma is valid or not in the worlds of the comp multiverses. Nobody said it was simple, especially that such
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: LizR: but WHO is the observer? The one great advantage that Many Worlds has over other quantum interpretations is that Everett doesn't need to answer that question. That's the reason I like it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/15/2014 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that much. What most adds credence is a surprising prediction that is empirically confirmed. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Isn't quantum mechanics based on the reals? On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 12:20 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 14:10, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-15 10:01 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I don't beg the question, I don't see a problem generating a virtual world where F=ma does not hold true... that world exists in an infinity of versions in the UD deployment as our own reality... You have no point proving our own reality could not be a dream in that sense... The only thing that should render our own reality more real, is that it certainly requires less rules than a reality where F=ma is false... Not at all. By the invariance of the first person, the number of rules and the complexity of the explanations/programs is not relevant. If not I would have solve the measure problem by an appeal to Kolmogorov or Chaitin complexity. But this cannot work. It is only in the self-multiplication factors that the laws of physics can become stable. nature use linearity, and the discovery of arithmetical quantum logic confirms up to now that fact. It makes the Everett multiplication of populations (the first person plural) protecting comp from solipsism. All pieces of dreams are consistent with the actual state of a sentient being. That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. UDA made the laws of physics in a probability calculus, assuming the measure exist: that is: a law of physics is what multiplies the normal histories again the aberrant one. Yes but you don't have that measure nor a way to calculate it, I do. That's what Z1* Co. are supposed to provide. It is technically complex to do, but everything is explained here. the rest are pure open problem in math. you don't know it and you can't know that our reality does win the measure battle. I make this testable, of course I need definitions (of belief, knowledge, observation, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine needed to extract the correct physics). Anyway the fact that almost anything is possible (with different proportion as a measure is assumed), means that *no* measure can invalidate computationalism... Then no measure can invalidate Everett QM for the same reason. Comp and QM makes both physics into a statistics. I don't think MWI is falsifiable either... Of course. We can only falsifies the statistics. computationalism is a metaphysical stands and up to now in your argumentation I see nothing that could falsify comp... You always say to compare physics to comp physics, but it's a dead end, no contradiction can be inferred from that. I cannot make sense of that. That opinion was widely hold before 1991, as X1* and Z1* was believed to collapse the modal logic, due to the fact that the p and p-[]p seemed to impose simultaneously antisymmetry and symmetry, but the nuances brought eventually by incompleteness eventually refuted, amazingly enough, that collapse. That is important as it makes comp distinguishing clearly comp physical laws from comp possible geographies. What are comp physical laws then ? if it is an open problem because calculus is intractable... then comp is not falsifiable, you can't use falsifiability argument if such falsification is intractable. The comp + theatetus comp theory of observable is Z1*. A quantum logic has already been derived. A theorem prover has been implemented. And I still don't understand how comp can sort geographical laws from deeper laws. The FPI makes consciousness differentiating on the infinite computations existing in arithmetic. Geography is the not materialist necessity, or the materialist contingency. In arithmetic this correspond to the diamond of some of the material hypostases defined by the intensional variant []p p, or []p t. This can be translated in computer science/arithmetic, and the case of probability one can be studied by its logic. This, all Löbian machine can understand by introspection (self-reference) and so the physics is derivable from self-reference only, and then tested with the observation. Then the result is that a physical (lawful) physical reality does exist, with a fundamental logic which is already enough quantum-like to let us hope to have an equivalent of Gleason theorem, and in that case the white rabbit problem is solved *only* by the quantum logic we observe. The infinity of computational consistent relative state obeys the same logic in an artificial simulation and in the physics, emerging (or not) from the sum on UD*. That one is determined by computer science. The case of the probability one logic is given by the arithmetical quantization. so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, How would it proves that ? By
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 17:55, John Clark wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: LizR: but WHO is the observer? The one great advantage that Many Worlds has over other quantum interpretations is that Everett doesn't need to answer that question. That's the reason I like it. Everett needs a machine able to memorize succession of measurement results. He needs comp or some weakening of it. Yes, that is what I like in Everett too. But then comp forces us to push Everett's logic farer, on the arithmetical spectrum. You miss this because you confuse the unique 1p with the 3-1p. If I explain with the equivalent unique 1-1-p, you throw back the non unique 3-1-1 p, endlessly. You might not listen to yourself, nor to your many selves (after duplications experiences). The 3 1 p distinction makes all uses of the pronouns unambiguous as far as they need for the reasoning to proceed. You seem to add the noise to make obscure something which is actually very simple and clear, in 3p sharable notions. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 Feb 2014, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 18:06, meekerdb wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. According to Deustch, nothing can count in favor of any theory. We could only refute a theory, but positive confirmation does not lake sense, according to him. I am not sanguine about this, and I can make sense that a non-refutation can add credence to a theory, but not that much. What most adds credence is a surprising prediction that is empirically confirmed. That is not my task. I translate a problem that anyone assuming comp has to solve. In a sense, I refute physicalism, in the comp theory. I search the truth, not to impress colleague. In passing I show a rationalist conception of reality which is Plotinian and Non Aristotelician. All what I described could have been found before QM, and the quantum aspect of nature could have been seen as a surprising prediction. Well, actually, the comparison is not yet finished. Z1* is somehow a generator of surprising predictions, as it might depart from the quantum prediction. Don't ask to much, the machine/number theological science is in its infacy, to say the least. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 16 February 2014 00:14, Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com wrote: ;) From what I observed here, people in this list pass trough the following phases: 1- enter with an apparently bright idea 2- is exposed to comp bombardment 3- comp seduction 4- comp dislike (really comp explains everything and nothing. That means nothing) 5- comp aversion (too much comp, every discussion ends in a single alternative: comp) 6- comp resignation (maybe there is something more that I do not manage to catch from comp. Occasionally there is some room for what he really like. Normally the first five or ten comments of a thread) finally a three alternative multiverse appears: 7 comp nirvana : He enter in the mysticism of machine dreams, comp soteriology and comp theogony while he look at modal logic expressions and smoke a pipe of marihuana or 7' - comp Hell: the Yang of the comp: He is lost in the fifteen line of a modal logic formula for an Eternity. Later on, he discover that it was something trivial, but it was obfuscated and intimidated by the formulas. or 7''- teleportation to another list with a certain substitution level. Teehee. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:40, Russell Standish wrote: thesis. This doesn't bother me - if you ever bothered to read my thesis (not that I'm recommending you do so), you would find it consists of two faily different topics, with only the most tenuous connection between them. Oopsa-daisy! All for the lack of an r. For the record, I didn't fail my PhD :). -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 09:30:52PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:42, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 8:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you saying something a bit like the above on page 11 Now DU [sic - should be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable. That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to say that all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper originally, only got it in context of your statements above. How can that be? Many programs executed by the UD are non-halting, just loops. Can they be considered to correspond to a proof? Yes, like a failed proof. Like searching the first even prime number bigger than 2. The search for ExP(x) when Ax~P(x), but you don't know that. But for the probability calculus, you can limit yourself on the finite pieces of computations, as the first person will glue the infinities of them to experience their consistent infinite union. Bruno I suspect its a little more subtle. Solomonoff's original formulation of the universal prior failed the axioms of probability theory, because it included all computation, even non-halting ones. This was fixed by Levin, who restricted the sum to range over halting computations only. I think this point needs further thought, as presumably the consistent computations passing through my state will be dominated by non-halting ones. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Sat, Feb 15, 2014 at 09:20:43AM -0800, meekerdb wrote: On 2/15/2014 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You might keep in mind that astonishing truth (deducible from Matiyasevitch): - The polynomial on the reals are not Turing universal (you cannot simulate an exponential with such polynomials) - the polynomial on the integers are Turing universal, you can simulate exponential, and indeed all Turing machine with them. You can simulate the function sending the integers x on x^(x^(x^(x^...))) x times with a integers polynomial of dgree four!, but you cannot with any polynomials on the reals. That is astonishing. Where can I read a proof (without having to learn too much background)? You could try your luck with Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diophantine_equations http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matiyasevich's_theorem#Matiyasevich.27s_theorem Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But it has some semantics in term of infinite sequence of G-multiverse. By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the machine. Not just what is provable by the machine. G* minus G is not empty (it contains t, t, t, ... for example), and it axiomatizes the true but non provable modal (provability) sentences. It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the accesibility relation: For example if the accessibility relation is T (for teleportation) then TM and TW may be false in Helsinki Why. Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know). ? Comp implies the possibility in principle of classical teleportation, (UDA step 1). We don't need more. Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as an operator necessary, and as possible as just symbols with a defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean. What is necessary and what is possible are dependent on context; just as above you casually assume that teleportation is possible - even though you well know it isn't - just because you can write T. This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a sort of logical realism. I use [] and usually when I explain modal logic, through many examples of different modal systems. In the translation of UDA in arithmetic, all modalities are defined in term of the provability predicate, that is the Gödel's Beweisbar. What is necessary or possible depends on the worlds, yes, that is what Kripke is all about. All I explain is based on the fact that teleportation is possible *theoretically*. Yes. That it is hard to do in practice is not relevant. You could stop at step 0, because the artificial brain is also impossible in practice today. But it is not relevant. We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if teleportation is the accessibility relation. while using F (for flying) would make FM and FW true. OK, but it is the same with T. No it's not. I can fly to Moscow. By definition of the protocol in step three. If not you should have made such remark at step 0, and just say no to the doctor. You just say non-comp (even in theory). The practicality of teleportation is not relevant for the theoretical proof. Bruno so in the eye of God, nothing changes. But G, which represents the machine ability, does not prove that equivalence, and this entails that []p and []p t will obeys different logics. OK? I'm not sure what you mean by obey different logics? I meant different modal logics. It just means that they have different theorems. They are different theories. For example G proves []([]p -p) - []p, but Z and X does not prove that. Z proves A for all A, but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []p - p, but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []([]p -p), but G does not prove that, etc. OK. Brent By incompleteness, despite G* proves the equivalence of []p, []p p, []p t, are equivalent, as G cannot prove that equivalence, they obeys different logic. They have different theorems. They are different theories, and that's why we have 8 different hypostases. That's how we got a theory of knowledge, a theory of observation, etc, all based on the same arithmetyical truth. That corresponds to the different person points of view. You get the 1p view by the p constraints, and the matter by the p or t constraints, and the non communicable parts, by the passage x to x* for each logic x. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:51, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, What's CPL? Classical Predicate Logic? Classical Propositionnal Logic. then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But that can be explained from Noether's theorem + our insistence that whatever we call a law should be translation invariant. In other words we pick out what is translation invariant - and the rest is geography. OK. But Noether theorem assume space, real numbers, etc. But you can see Z1* as a sort of generalization, and the interest relies in the fact that
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know we are awake. This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this. (Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively *any* theory about reality). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI - Why they believe in God? God is the universal machine. - Yes but why people distinguish between god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. -Yes, but why people... . that is FPI as i said before - Yes but... I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very nice ideas and so on 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.auwrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-) (Sorry!) I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. I said apparently because I have no idea how he does it. I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of saying yes to the doctor. With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover. With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more a product of the infinity of computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a single machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, we can indeed bet that little Mars Rover share some history with us. it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This explains why aspects of consciousness are ineffable. It's because conscious processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that some truths are unprovable. Bruno takes qualia are ineffable and some arithmetical truths are unprovable and postulates ineffable=unprovable. Not really. I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but some logician did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are related to non communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1), Don't understand that. Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency modal logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true statements, it also makes the logic of the differents modalities: p []p []p p []p t []p t p obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent extensionnally (they proves the same true arithmetical propositions, but they see them differently. Among them, three logics splits into provable and non provable parts: []p (gives G and G*, by Solovay theorem) []p p (gives Z and Z*- []p t p (gives X and X*) That remains true when we restrict p on the sigma_1 arithmetical reality (the arithmetical UD, which is a UD, provably). That changes G into a modal
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 February 2014 15:49, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: That is the origin of the white rabbits. if our brain is a universal machine, we can can be failed, and are actually failed in infinities of computations. Do you mean fooled? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 21:39, LizR wrote: On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. Correct. But this is not true. this is already refuted in comp + theaetetus. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of comp). Correct again. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. Brent Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know we are awake. This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this. (Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively *any* theory about reality). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 6:06 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 1:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 20:56, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: snip It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on the real physics. hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? (I think se have discussed this before, but it is OK to come back, as this is not so easy). So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. I guess you mean cannot prove, or confirm in some definitive way, comp. No, I meant something stronger than that. I meant that what we observe cannot count in favor of comp. Not strongly, I suppose. But I still find it perplexing that we can send electricity through a CPU with memory, given foundations of some interpretation of QM, and that certain properties of arithmetic can be realized and exploited on a higher level to yield the working languages and GUIs that most people use today, not to speak of informing and underpinning so many scientific models, even if Bruno notes correctly that we don't employ self-reference above some use of recursion in a very confined sense. All these attacks for metaphysics, soft philosophy bullshit ignore the thing you are typing on and viewing at this very moment, and the arithmetic properties at work in so many scientific models. That these models, the wealth of technologies we derive with arithmetic in hand... or that PCs for instance, work at all, given some interpretation of QM as a base, is just plain weird/amazing. Definitive proof for comp? Of course not. But just metaphysics will force you into being metaphysical, when you push the button and boot your system. As if some metaphysical connotation bars an idea/person of being fruitful to science or our immediate practical lives a priori: where's the proof of this btw? It seems more to confirm a physicalist bias, when we just don't know. As a musician, my bias is supported by the fact that I count all day; meeting the felicity conditions of getting my ratios right on all levels I can parse, say while improvising or teaching, gives me paychecks. So much for comp not working- its just a vain metaphysical tool for retro-explanations. Sure, if you want. Currently I just don't swing that way. I need a beat and some groove. PGC Brent Correct. I have already explain this with some detail. It is the same as the fact that we can know that we dream (lucidity), but that we cannot know we are awake. This is also a consequence of the classical theory of knowledge, or of Theaetetus. Not just comp. But comp confirms this. (Actually, we know something more general: we cannot confirm definitively *any* theory about reality). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they will never meet. That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet... If that happened then it's true the W guy could not interact with the M guy, but the M guy could still interact with the W guy; just as you can make no changes in Plato but Plato can make changes in you, and it happens every time you pick up one of Plato's books. But I can have absolutely no effect on the John Clark in one of Everett's Many Worlds nor can that other fellow have any effect on me; so in Everett pronouns cause no trouble and the question which one is you? never comes up, but it certainly does with Bruno's stuff. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 23:38, chris peck wrote: Hi Bruno Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced only him That's a good way of spinning the fact that for two years it is in reality you who has failed to convince him. That's a good way of spinning the difference between convincing only oneself and convincing his peers, notably academical (even if some philosophers resist, and some scientists react by solidarity, but not by argument nor even dialog). Then on this list I think most people grasp easily steps 0-6, if not 7, and some have no problem with 8. New difficulties can arise as we dig deeper in the arithmetical version of the UDA. I agree, perhaps too much, that the work is not perfect, and that some clarification can be added to the step 8, and to the relation between UDA and AUDA, and that is why I like to discuss this with people sharing some interest. Now if you can make sense of Clark's post, please, say something. If it just rhetorical tricks to confuse people, then refrain, please. Bruno All the best Chris From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 22:23:08 + Hi Quentin I do not, valid critics are valid, By definition mate. but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make Bruno evil??? In a later post you try to rebut Clark : In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they will never meet. That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet... But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly. In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics. all the best Chris. Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of comp). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-14 19:29 GMT+01:00 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 1:58 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.comwrote: In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they will never meet. That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet... If that happened then it's true the W guy could not interact with the M guy, but the M guy could still interact with the W guy; just as you can make no changes in Plato but Plato can make changes in you, and it happens every time you pick up one of Plato's books. But I can have absolutely no effect on the John Clark in one of Everett's Many Worlds nor can that other fellow have any effect on me; so in Everett pronouns cause no trouble and the question which one is you? But that's not the question both the W *and* the M guy are the H guy... the question bear on probability of expectation for the H guy when he press the button... MWI scenario: You stand in a white room with two doors, one on the left, one on the right, there is a column with a button in the middle of the room, when you press it, the spin of an electron is measured, if it is up the left door open, if it is down the right door open... probability for you to see the left door opening after having pressed the button is 0.5. Duplication scenario: You stand in a white room with two doors, one on the left, one on the right, there is a column with a button in the middle of the room, when you press it, you are duplicated, one version of you is reconstructed in a totally similar room where the left door open, one version of you is reconstructed in a totally similar room where the right door open (the original is destroyed), suppose for the sake of the argument, that the copying/annihilation process is instantaneous and not detectable/feelable by the reconstructed guys. Probability for you to see the left door opening after having pressed the button is 0.5 like in MWI *assuming comp and that the copy are still you which is trivially true if computationalism is true. No difference between MWI and comp duplication here... please state where you disagree. Quentin never comes up, but it certainly does with Bruno's stuff. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 00:50, LizR wrote: On 14 February 2014 12:46, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Liz Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy in a universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't concern technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected on that score have they? Some people have objected on the basis that we can't duplicate people, for example. I think the expectation value objection is a valid one (and Bruno agrees that it is an open problem in comp) - we have no way to work out what we should expect to see on the basis of an infinite number of computations (I think the MWI has a similar problem?) In a nutshell, MWI has not that problem, intuitively already with Feynman formulation of QM (see his book on light), or formally (algebraically) by Gleason Theorem. In comp it is *the* problem. AUDA consists in some steps toward formulating the problem and the beginning of a solution, (with a nice and simple global semantics through the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, but that can make some people nervous). Bruno All the best Chris. Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above the quantum level has accepted Yes Doctor.) If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than oh but we can't do that (yet) ! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: John, You need to read about the latest developments in string theory. The sad fact is that there are no recent developments in string theory , and in fact in its entire history it only made one prediction that could be tested even theoretically and it turned out to be wrong, it predicted that there were 9 (or maybe 10 they're not sure) spacial dimensions; they had to invent all sorts of fudge factors and said that for no particular reason 6 (or maybe 7) of those extra dimensions are far too small to ever see. Here is a link the the original Maldacena-Susskind 48 page paper http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.0533. If they're right then the universe is non-local and I stand by what I said, both Einstein and Rosen would be appalled about how their bridge was used. And it still can't explain, as Everett could, how quantum particles seem to know when they are being observed. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 04:19, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. ... Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). ... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it will looks dreamy to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It is how we define (and operationally measure) force. No problem with that, and that is why a answered with F = KmM/r^2, but that was not much relevant. If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's Comprehensible Cosmos, he discusses this from page 48. No problem. I appreciate the argument. I read it online, and it was taught by some physicists. Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3 momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity approximation. Sure. Even F = dp/dt is a classical approximation deducible from Feynman integral. So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law - it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently. F= ma is like H phi = E phi. All is in F, or H. Those equality should be laws indeed, and deducible from deeper laws. It might be more doubtful for F or H, except that the Turing universality of the vacuum suggest some H = 0, à-la Dewitt-Wheeler. But we are not yet there .. Best, Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Fri, Feb 14, 2014 at 1:38 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: both the W *and* the M guy are the H guy Yes. the question bear on probability of expectation for the H guy when he press the button... If that is the question then the answer will be of zero help in understanding the nature of personal identity because neither probability nor expectations have anything to do with consciousness or of a continuous feeling of self. You feel like Quentin Anciaux today for one reason only, because you remember being Quentin Anciaux yesterday; it's true that if Everett was correct then there are other things that remember that too, but how something feels or what they do can have no effect on you because neither you nor I will ever interact with them nor they with us. And for that reason pronouns like I and you and them and us cause Everett no trouble, but in Bruno's thought experiment they produce endless problems. Everett wanted to explain why the predictions made by Quantum Mechanics were so weird and so accurate, and he wanted to explain it without introducing the very nebulous concept of the observer, and I think he was pretty successful in accomplishing his goal. Bruno wanted to do something different, he wanted to explain how personal identity and a continuous feeling of self worked, and in that he failed. please state where you disagree. Please? You're saying please now? What happened, did you lose you're copy of The Giant Book Of Insults? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
LizR: but WHO is the observer? In my vocabulary observer is anyrhing/body acknowledging input on anything/body. (from a charged ion to G.B.Shaw upon an electric charge up to a drama-input.Observation is part of consciousness (again in my terms: as response to relations). (Now Brent, please, do not accuse me, the agnostic, of knowing too much). In such case there is no problem with the 'early' universe, no matter how we imagine the explanations of 'observed' data any time by our science. JM. On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 3:47 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:40, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 10:42:21AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 05:38, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:24:18PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are right, the qualia are in X1* \ X1, like we get quanta in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*. The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the axioms of X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations, which I think is debatable), By UDA, p to refer to a physical certainty needs to 1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true). 2) provable (true in all consistent extensions) 3) and non trivially provable (= there must be at least one consistent extension) This give the []p t, with p sigma_1. So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1* logic. This is certainly an interesting understanding that I hadn't met in your writings before. You worry me a bit, as I think this is explained in all papers and the thesis. I know that I am concise. Normally, if everything get clear, you should see that this is what I am explaining everywhere. Indeed this doesn't come out with your Lille thesis. There is almost no connection between Chapter 5 and the previous 4 chapters of the thesis. This doesn't bother me - if you ever bothered to read my thesis (not that I'm recommending you do so), you would find it consists of two faily different topics, with only the most tenuous connection between them. This was because it actually was two different topics with two different supervisors. I was actually lightly chided by one of the thesis reviewers for attempting to draw out the connection between the topics :). In conscience and mécanisme I make the link UDA and AUDA, more explicit, but this was judged too much easy material, and, in the Lille thesis I refer to conscience mécanisme. (Of course I have realized since that this is not so much easy. It ask some familiarity with mathematical logic). I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe your work that you published since your thesis. There has been more. I gave the references. SANE remains the simplest and the most accessible. There has been the Plotinus paper too, from the Sienna conferences. I should update my webpage ... I can sort of see you saying something a bit like the above on page 11 Now DU [sic - should be UD in English] OK. is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable. Yes, but for the typo. It is of course it exists n such that That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs of all true Sigma 1 sentences, All right. but I think what you are trying to say that all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true Sigma 1 sentence. The reverse. Yes. Is that obvious? It is obvious for a recursion theorists. It is well known, among theoretical computer scientists. Sigma_1 completeness, that is the ability to prove all true sentences with the shape ExP(x, y) and P decidable, leads to Turing universality, and so, by the compiling theorem, you can translate, in both direction from computation, in whatever universal systems, and some proof of the sigma_1 sentence. We have the intensional Church thesis (consequence of the usual CT). Not only all universal machines can compute the same class of computable functions, but they can imitate also the other machines, and compute functions in all possible digital manners. I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper originally, only got it in context of your statements above. Thanks for making me realize this. In associating provable with true in all consistent extensions, In case of provable, this is Gödel COMPLEteness result (not incompleteness!). In case of an abstract box, in a modal logic having a Kripke semantics, this is just the semantics of Kripke. are you meaning that so long as something (ie proposition) is computed by all programs instantiating your current state, no matter how far in the future that calculation might require, then that something is (sigma_1) provable. I am not sure. true in all consistent extensions is a very general notion. It is your term. I take it to mean all programs compatible with your current state, your current here-and-now. OK. What happens is that, in arithmetic, the sigma_1 sentences, when true, are provable (already by RA). So they verify the formula A - []A. (called TRIV for trivial, as that sentence makes many modal logic collapsing, but not so in the provability logic, not even in the 1p S4Grz). Yes - thanks for reminding me. In fact a machine is Turing universal
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 February 2014 09:03, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: LizR: but WHO is the observer? In my vocabulary observer is anyrhing/body acknowledging input on anything/body. (from a charged ion to G.B.Shaw upon an electric charge up to a drama-input.Observation is part of consciousness (again in my terms: as response to relations). (Now Brent, please, do not accuse me, the agnostic, of knowing too much). In such case there is no problem with the 'early' universe, no matter how we imagine the explanations of 'observed' data any time by our science. But we weren't talking about your vocabulary, we were talking specifically about comp. And in comp, as far as I know, an observer has to be a conscious being (see exchange quoted below). JM. On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 3:47 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 Feb 2014, at 05:42, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 8:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you saying something a bit like the above on page 11 Now DU [sic - should be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable. That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to say that all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper originally, only got it in context of your statements above. How can that be? Many programs executed by the UD are non-halting, just loops. Can they be considered to correspond to a proof? Yes, like a failed proof. Like searching the first even prime number bigger than 2. The search for ExP(x) when Ax~P(x), but you don't know that. But for the probability calculus, you can limit yourself on the finite pieces of computations, as the first person will glue the infinities of them to experience their consistent infinite union. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 14 Feb 2014, at 12:17, Alberto G. Corona wrote: To summarize: there are all possible combinations of 1 and 0's therefore everithing can be made isomorphic or emergent from 0 and 1's. ? So stop thinking and praise 0s and 1s hypothesis. ? -Why people make apparently weird distincitions? it does not matter: comp says nothing about it. it depends on FPI - Why they believe in God? God is the universal machine. the Man is the universal machine. God is not a machine, not even the inner God, except perhaps only in the eyes of God. I think you are writing anything going through your mind, is it? - Yes but why people distinguish between god is the universal machine and blah blah blah. That is akin to a comp blaspheme! -Yes, but why people... . that is FPI as i said before - Yes but... I dont´t really care about what you question. but comp UDA and FPI are very nice ideas and so on You can dislike a theory, but you must grasp it correctly first. Bruno 2014-02-12 20:37 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 1:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-) (Sorry!) I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. I said apparently because I have no idea how he does it. I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of saying yes to the doctor. With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. So you're saying that we cannot simulate matter or consciousness. But I think we can still produce consciousness by manipulating matter - we can still build a conscious Mars rover. With comp we can say that, but only as a matter of speaking. Mars Rover is in Heaven, and the hard task of computer we send on Mars is to distracted it enough so that it can manifest its consciousness to us, notably by sending us interesting data on mars. The consciousness of Mars Rover is a 1-view, and it is more a product of the infinity of computations going through its state in the arithmetical reality) than with a single machine. Thanks to Everett, and our own entanglement with mars, we can indeed bet that little Mars Rover share some history with us. it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This explains why aspects of consciousness are ineffable. It's because conscious processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that some truths are unprovable. Bruno takes qualia are ineffable and some arithmetical truths are unprovable and postulates ineffable=unprovable. Not really. I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but some logician did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are related to non communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1), Don't understand that. Incompleteness does not just separate the provability/consistency modal logic G into two parts: the provable statements, and the true statements, it also makes the logic of the differents modalities: p []p []p p []p t []p t p obeying different modal logics, despite G* proves them all equivalent extensionnally
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/14/2014 11:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Feb 2014, at 04:19, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. ... Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). ... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it will looks dreamy to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It is how we define (and operationally measure) force. No problem with that, and that is why a answered with F = KmM/r^2, but that was not much relevant. If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's Comprehensible Cosmos, he discusses this from page 48. No problem. I appreciate the argument. I read it online, and it was taught by some physicists. Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3 momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity approximation. Sure. Even F = dp/dt is a classical approximation deducible from Feynman integral. So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law - it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently. F= ma is like H phi = E phi. All is in F, or H. Those equality should be laws indeed, and deducible from deeper laws. It might be more doubtful for F or H, except that the Turing universality of the vacuum suggest some H = 0, à-la Dewitt-Wheeler. But we are not yet there .. But this seems to point to a deeper problem. If we elaborate H and E as operators and psi as a ray in a Hilbert space and if we further define the Hilbert space, we will still have a symbolic expression which we can related ostensively to some apparatus. But we will never get down to an arithmetical computation. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers because it only has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the cursor. But since a Turing machine is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed to expand the number of distinct positions arbitrarily? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 15 February 2014 10:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers because it only has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the cursor. But since a Turing machine is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed to expand the number of distinct positions arbitrarily? So you don't think the analogue/digital thing matters? I suppose a person using a slide rule could be trusted to correct for small errorsor could they? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 2/14/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 19:34, meekerdb wrote: On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But it has some semantics in term of infinite sequence of G-multiverse. By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the machine. Not just what is provable by the machine. G* minus G is not empty (it contains t, t, t, ... for example), and it axiomatizes the true but non provable modal (provability) sentences. It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the accesibility relation: For example if the accessibility relation is T (for teleportation) then TM and TW may be false in Helsinki Why. Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know). ? Comp implies the possibility in principle of classical teleportation, (UDA step 1). We don't need more. I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that possible is a relative concept depending on the accessiblity relation. What does possible in principle mean? Does it only mean not self contradictory? Does it mean consistent with our best understanding of physics? Lawrence Krauss discusses the possibility in his book The Physics of Star Trek. He estimates that it would take more energy than available in the Milky Way just to obtain the information to teleport a human being. Of course putting that much mass/energy in the vicinity of the human being would create a black hole. So what does possible really mean? Brent Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as an operator necessary, and as possible as just symbols with a defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean. What is necessary and what is possible are dependent on context; just as above you casually assume that teleportation is possible - even though you well know it isn't - just because you can write T. This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a sort of logical realism. I use [] and usually when I explain modal logic, through many examples of different modal systems. In the translation of UDA in arithmetic, all modalities are defined in term of the provability predicate, that is the Gödel's Beweisbar. What is necessary or possible depends on the worlds, yes, that is what Kripke is all about. All I explain is based on the fact that teleportation is possible *theoretically*. Yes. That it is hard to do in practice is not relevant. You could stop at step 0, because the artificial brain is also impossible in practice today. But it is not relevant. We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if teleportation is the accessibility relation. while using F (for flying) would make FM and FW true. OK, but it is the same with T. No it's not. I can fly to Moscow. By definition of the protocol in step three. If not you should have made such remark at step 0, and just say no to the doctor. You just say non-comp (even in theory). The practicality of teleportation is not relevant for the theoretical proof. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 15 February 2014 11:27, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I was merely using teleportation as an example to illustrate that possible is a relative concept depending on the accessiblity relation. What does possible in principle mean? Does it only mean not self contradictory? Does it mean consistent with our best understanding of physics? Lawrence Krauss discusses the possibility in his book The Physics of Star Trek. He estimates that it would take more energy than available in the Milky Way just to obtain the information to teleport a human being. Of course putting that much mass/energy in the vicinity of the human being would create a black hole. ...and that's WITH Heisenberg compensators! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/14/2014 2:17 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 10:57, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 12:32 PM, LizR wrote: On 15 February 2014 09:12, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/14/2014 8:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: With some definition of the abacus, it is Turing universal. With others it is not. The slide rules is not Turing universal. You can add and multiply approximation of natural numbers only, or, if you want, you can analogically add and multiply the real numbers, and that is not Turing universal. (That is not entirely obvious). That's an interesting point to me (I own a collection of circular slide rules). Of course you can add and subtract on a slide rule as well as multiply, divide, exponentiate, and compute the value of other functions encoded on the rule (sin, tan), but the rule doesn't do it by itself; you provide the sequence of operations consisting of reading a cursor and moving the rule. So why would that not be Turing universal? I would guess because it isn't digital, but analogue? 'cause Turing machines use discrete symbols, while slide rules use a continuous scale? Yes, of course a real slide rule can't encode arbitrarily large integers because it only has finitely many distinguisable locations for the the cursor. But since a Turing machine is allowed an infinite tape, suppose my slide rule (Sliding Machine?) is allowed to expand the number of distinct positions arbitrarily? So you don't think the analogue/digital thing matters? I suppose a person using a slide rule could be trusted to correct for small errorsor could they? I think it matters because the power of arithmetic to encode proofs depends on it having arbitrarily long strings of digits. But just as Turing idealized infinite tapes, I can idealize arbitrarily large slide rules to get arbitrarily high precision. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main line on this. Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? Regards, Quentin However I see that isn't so, so I will be interested to know how it's testable - if I ever make it to understanding AUDA. I hope to be able to explain enough so that you understand the main line on this. Meanwhile, more explanation, notably in my answer to Brent. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 13 Feb 2014, at 04:03, meekerdb wrote: On 2/12/2014 11:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Liz, if Brent don't mind, my answer to Brent here contains a bit on modal logic, directly related to the machine discourse (and this will be justified later, as it is not obvious at all). snip which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the UD measure, due to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p p, or []p Dt, or []p Dt p. Brent, do you see this? Are you OK that in a cul-de-sac world we have []A for all A? I understand that W is a cul-de-sac world means there is no world accessible from W (including W itself), so A is true in all worlds accessible from W is vacuously satisfied. OK. But then we also have []~A in W. OK. So []A in W doesn't say anything about the truth value of A in W. That seems like a peculiar formulation. ? This means only that modal logic is not truth-functional. We already know that. If alpha R beta (and only beta), and if p is true in beta and false in alpha, you have []p in alpha, and ~p in alpha. But you could have p in alpha. []A truth value does not depend on the truth value of A. We say that modal logic is not truth functional. I repeat two arguments. I recall first Kripke semantics: All the worlds obeys CPL. And there is some fixed binary relation R on that set of worlds (called accessibility). Then, []p is true in a world alpha if p is true in all worlds beta such that alpha R beta Or equivalently, (and dually): p is true in a world alpha if it exists a world beta with p true in beta and alpha R beta. (re-verify that this entails well p = ~[]~p []p = ~~p ~[]p = ~p (jump law 1) ~p = []~p (jump law 2) OK?) Now consider some multiverse with zeta being a cul-de-sac world, like {alpha, beta, gamma, zeta} with alpha R beta, beta R gamma, gamma R zeta. And nothing else. In that multiverse zeta is a cul-de-sac world. OK? Proposition. For any proposition A, []A is true in zeta. Proof. Imagine that []A is not true in Zeta. Zeta obeys CPL, so if []A is not true, []A is false. OK? And if []A is false, then ~[]A is true, by classical logic. OK? But if ~[]A is true, then ~A is true, by the jump law 1 above. OK? Then by Kripke semantics above, if ~A is true in Zeta, it means that there is a world accessible from Zeta, and in which ~A is true. But that is impossible, given that Zeta is a culd-de-sac world. Conclusion: []A cannot be false in Zeta. But since A is any proposition it is also the case that []~A cannot be false in Zeta. So while either A or ~A but not both are true in Zeta, []A and []~A are both true. Exact. That is why cul-de-sac world shoild be avoided: everything is necessary, and nothing is possible (when reading the box and diamond with the alethic sense, which is some abuse, but can be useful pedagogically). Summary: []A is true, for any A, in any cul-de-sac world, of any Kripke multiverse. This is a direct consequence of the jump law: as []A can only be false if ~A is true, and all proposition beginning by a diamond are false in a cul-de-sac world. In particular []f is true in the cul-de-sac worlds. And in fact []f is false in any non cul-de-sac world. So []f characterizes the cul- de-sac worlds in Kripke semantics. OK? definition: I will say that a world is transitory iff it is not cul-de-sac world. Now, the G modal logic has curious Kripke multiverse. What's the definition of the G modal logic? It is the logic obeyed by Gödel's beweisbar, when provable by the machine. By Solovay first theorem it is axiomatized by the axiom: []([]A - A) - []A) With CPL (and thus the modus ponens rule), the K axioms [](A - B) - ([]A - []B), and the necessitation rules A / []A. []A - [][]A can be proved in that theory, like t - ~[]t (Gödel's incompleteness theorem). On Kripke semantics is given by finite irreflexive and transitive multiverse. Another one is transitive multiverse without infinite path (a R b, b R c, c R d, ...). In particular this implies irreflexivity, as a R a entails a R a, a R a, a R a, etc. No worlds can ever access to itself, but worse, all worlds access to some cul-de-sac world. (cf the image you die at each instant in comp or in the little buddhist theory). G proves t - []f. This says, in Kripke semantics, that if I am in a transitory world, then I can access to a cul-de-sac world. OK? So let us come back in reality, and let us consider our common very small multiverse {Helsinki, Washington, Moscou}, or {H, W, M} to be shorter. We are in the protocol of step 3. And suppose we are told that in M and W, we will have a cup of coffee. Then we would like to say that [](we-will have a cup-of-coffee) is true in Helsinki. Ou guardian angel G* told us that W and M is true in Helsinki, so it looks like the probability one is well captured by the
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 05:38, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:24:18PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are right, the qualia are in X1* \ X1, like we get quanta in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*. The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the axioms of X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations, which I think is debatable), By UDA, p to refer to a physical certainty needs to 1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true). 2) provable (true in all consistent extensions) 3) and non trivially provable (= there must be at least one consistent extension) This give the []p t, with p sigma_1. So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1* logic. This is certainly an interesting understanding that I hadn't met in your writings before. You worry me a bit, as I think this is explained in all papers and the thesis. I know that I am concise. Normally, if everything get clear, you should see that this is what I am explaining everywhere. In associating provable with true in all consistent extensions, In case of provable, this is Gödel COMPLEteness result (not incompleteness!). In case of an abstract box, in a modal logic having a Kripke semantics, this is just the semantics of Kripke. are you meaning that so long as something (ie proposition) is computed by all programs instantiating your current state, no matter how far in the future that calculation might require, then that something is (sigma_1) provable. I am not sure. true in all consistent extensions is a very general notion. What happens is that, in arithmetic, the sigma_1 sentences, when true, are provable (already by RA). So they verify the formula A - []A. (called TRIV for trivial, as that sentence makes many modal logic collapsing, but not so in the provability logic, not even in the 1p S4Grz). In fact a machine is Turing universal iff for all sigma_1 sentences A we have A - []A. So A - []A is the Turing universality axiom, when A is put for any sigma_1 sentence. G1 is G + A-[]A. Visser proved an equivalent of Solovay theorem for G1 and G1*. You can find it in Boolos 1993. It is a way to restrict the logic of the different points of view on the UD*. To be a finite piece of computation is itself given by a sigma_1 formula, and the sigma-1 sentences model computations. Then 12 gives your hypostase for knowledge, ie S4Grz1. Only G1 at that stage. To get knowledge, you need to do 1 and 2, but on []p p, like to get observation/probability/expectation, you need to do 1 and 2, but on (3) []p t. And to get sensible observation, you can mix knowledge ( p), and consistency t. Incompleteness makes all those views obeying to different logic. It is, of course the sigma_1 restriction of Theatetus's definition of knowledge, which both Brent I share quibbles with, but accept for the sake of the argument. Since Plato, many philosophers quibble on Theaetetus' definition. The fist quibbler being Socrate, who refuted it. The magic things happening with comp, is that Socrate's refutation does no more apply, and the only argument against it which remains, is the argument put forward by people who believe that they can distinguish, immediately in the 1p view, simulations or dreams from reality. But this we have already abandoned when we accept an artificial brain (like in step 6). But assuming 3) above is equivalent to assuming the no cul-de-sac conjecture by fiat. The beauty is that incompleteness makes sense of that move. In most modal logic []p - t. I don't feel comfortable in assuming that axiomatically - I was hoping for a proof, or even just a better justification for that. I am not sure what that would mean. Here the proofs is that the move need to get a probability notion from a provability notion makes genuine new sense thanks to incompleteness. When we predict P(head) = 1/2, we also, but *implicitly*, assume t by fiat. Incompleteness gives the opportunity to see that making it explicit does change the logic, and that is why observation will obeys to a different logic than knowledge, and that is exactly what we need to get physics and knowledge, and belief, ... from the same arithmetical reality accessible by a machine. A rumor, alluded in the book by Franzen (on the abuse of Gödel!), is that I define probability by provability, but of course, that is not the case. Knowledge and probability are intensional nuance of provability, not provability itself. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp- physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws or physical truth. Among those already predicted by comp, is the Many- worlds aspect of reality, which appears under the substitution level, and the existence of indeterminacy and non-cloning. In particular, without QM, I would probably tend to believe that comp is not plausible. But comp gives the whole mathematics of observability, which leads to infinitely many testable propositions. For example, a form of Bell's
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But it can't be true everywhere with comp, because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality) hence, that virtual world is as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)... hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. Quentin But comp justifies this: the modalities of provability and observation does not collapse, and so there are universal (in a strong sense) laws or physical truth. Among those already
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But it can't be true everywhere with comp, It must be true at the physical level, about the real (by comp) physical reality. because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality) hence, that virtual world is as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)... It is like a dream, or a simulation implemented on
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But it can't be true everywhere with comp, It must be true at the physical level, about the real (by comp) physical reality. because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality) hence, that virtual world is as real as ours by UDA (and not so virtual)... It is like a dream, or a
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But it can't be true everywhere with comp, It must be true at the physical level, about the real (by comp) physical reality. because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our reality) hence, that
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 12:29 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But it can't be true everywhere with comp, It must be true at the physical level, about the real (by comp) physical reality. because, I can write a virtual world where this does not hold, and as it is a virtual world, an infinity of computations approximate it at any level in the UD deployement (like our
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. I guess you mean any measurement I made is geographical. I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants. Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all geographies, and that is what I call physical laws, as the rest will be sort of contingencies. You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? Ok... but it is no more comp. The we are at the base level of physics is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be tested, except trivially by being conscious, as all virtual being not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This makes Peter Jones realness neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). But in our case, that realness (defined by the satisfiability of comp + theaetetus + non-dream) is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so that I stay correct) then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that... I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation. Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it will looks dreamy to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. so by the same point as our real world, a conscious being in my virtual world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists), then at the next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the consistent extension of it where F=m*a still does not hold true... hence F=m*a cannot be universal in this context and cannot be use to invalidate comp... so as long as you can't say precisely what kind of measurement would invalidate comp or what exactly comp physics encompass (IMO not much except multiplicity of worlds), I can't see a way to falsify it, and certainly not by a measurement. If you think otherwise, please state what kind of measurement you think would qualify. *All* physical measurement can refute comp V simulation in principle, as anything physical can be both derived in comp, and then tested. Of course, if there were no physical laws, and that all number relations measured by physicists are contingent, then that would be a pity for the notion of physical laws. But then comp would predict that those geographical laws have to be accessible and we should be able to
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. I guess you mean any measurement I made is geographical. I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants. Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all geographies, and that is what I call physical laws, as the rest will be sort of contingencies. You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? Ok... but it is no more comp. The we are at the base level of physics is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be tested, except trivially by being conscious, as all virtual being not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This makes Peter Jones realness neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). But in our case, that realness (defined by the satisfiability of comp + theaetetus + non-dream) is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so that I stay correct) then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that... I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation. That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would be able to falsify comp, please be precise. Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. It must be below the substitution level as such world(s) also results from an infinity of computations... so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, How would it proves that ? It can't, the proof is that there *can be* environments where F!=ma which also results from an infinity of computations. it will looks dreamy to me, No argument there proving that. I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. You still haven't show of what consist comp physical reality beside vague manyworld like prediction... so by the same point as our real world, a conscious being in my virtual world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists), then at the next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not the consistent extension of it where F=m*a still does not hold true... hence F=m*a cannot be universal in this context and cannot be use to invalidate comp... so as long as you can't say precisely what kind of
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
The duplication of human beings, such a significant prediction of comp, should then be amenable to test- using mice of course. On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 1:10 PM, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2014-02-13 18:07 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. So if you extract F= KmM/r^2 from comp, and you refute it ostensibly (by flying) then you can infer that either comp is false, or you are dreaming (or you are in a simulation, done, not by the UD, but implemented on the real physics which is not done by the UD but supervenes on the whole UD in a non computable). I think you can't conclude anything, because as I point out, any measure you made is geographical under comp hence no measure can invalidate it. I guess you mean any measurement I made is geographical. I agree that the making of the measurement is geographical, but what I measure might be physically universal, unless physics is only geography, but that is already refuted by comp, thanks to the non collapse of the modal logic brought by the intensional variants. Comp here already predicts that *there* is a physical part common to all geographies, and that is what I call physical laws, as the rest will be sort of contingencies. You are right that we don't test just comp, but comp + theaetetus + we are at the base level of physics (not dreaming or simulated at a higher level). OK? Ok... but it is no more comp. The we are at the base level of physics is the same thing as primitive matter, Peter Jones realness ingredient. Not at all. By definition of that realness ingredient, it cannot be tested, except trivially by being conscious, as all virtual being not implemented in physics are non-conscious in that Peter Jones theory. This makes Peter Jones realness neither confirmable nor refutable (and thus pseudo-religious somehow, or just a reification philosophical mistake). But in our case, that realness (defined by the satisfiability of comp + theaetetus + non-dream) is *refutable*. That is why I explained (to Brett Hall, notably) that a computationalist can test if he belongs to an (higher order, physical (in the comp sense)) simulation. If you program that simulation, and I am the simulated observer, I can derive the physical laws from comp (without doing any observation) and compare it to what I observe. If that fits, I can't conclude anything (and my 1p will overlap on reality and the simulation. I still derived the correct laws of physics), but if I find a discrepancy (and if you don't mess with my virtual brain so that I stay correct) then I can conclude that (~comp V ~Theaetetus V ~simulation). As long as you don't specify anything measurable that can be use to claim a discrepancy... you can't do that... I give an infinity of such specification. If my environment obeys to the physics Z1*, qZ1*, I can't conclude anything, but I will still derive the correct laws, either by introspection, or by observation. If my environment does not obey to Z1*, I am in an artificial simulation. That's not something you can measure, please be specific, what do you see as experiment we could do to prove or disprove comp, what measurement would be able to falsify comp, please be precise. Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). the fact that I could write a virtual world where it does not hold, imply that this virtual world exists in the UD deployement in an infinity of computations which interfere like our reality, no difference here... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. It must be below the substitution level as such world(s) also results from an infinity of computations... so it is below the substitution level, because the level is finite or comp is false. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, How would it proves that ? It can't, the proof is that there *can be* environments where F!=ma which also results from an infinity of computations. it will looks dreamy to me, No argument there proving that. I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. You still haven't show of what consist comp physical reality beside vague manyworld like prediction... so by the same point as our real world, a conscious being in my virtual world (if a UD exists, and in platonia of course it exists), then at the next step he will be out *my* virtual world but not
Re: Modal logic 4 (was Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas).
On 2/13/2014 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What's the definition of G*? G* is a quite peculiar modal logic. It has as axioms all the theorem of G, + the axiom: []A - A But is NOT close for the necessitation rule (can you see why that is impossible). This entails that G* has no Kripke semantics. But it has some semantics in term of infinite sequence of G-multiverse. By Solovay second theorem, G* axiomatizes what is true on the machine. Not just what is provable by the machine. G* minus G is not empty (it contains t, t, t, ... for example), and it axiomatizes the true but non provable modal (provability) sentences. It seems that the notation is inadequate since it depends on the accesibility relation: For example if the accessibility relation is T (for teleportation) then TM and TW may be false in Helsinki Why. Because teleportation isn't possible (so far as we know). Which brings up another point that bothers me: We are using [] as an operator necessary, and as possible as just symbols with a defined syntax, but in application we must say what they mean. What is necessary and what is possible are dependent on context; just as above you casually assume that teleportation is possible - even though you well know it isn't - just because you can write T. This is similar to my complaint about arithmetical realism; it is a sort of logical realism. We assume comp. They are both true, as H T M and H T W, if teleportation is the accessibility relation. while using F (for flying) would make FM and FW true. OK, but it is the same with T. No it's not. I can fly to Moscow. so in the eye of God, nothing changes. But G, which represents the machine ability, does not prove that equivalence, and this entails that []p and []p t will obeys different logics. OK? I'm not sure what you mean by obey different logics? I meant different modal logics. It just means that they have different theorems. They are different theories. For example G proves []([]p -p) - []p, but Z and X does not prove that. Z proves A for all A, but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []p - p, but G does not prove that. S4Grz proves []([]p -p), but G does not prove that, etc. OK. Brent By incompleteness, despite G* proves the equivalence of []p, []p p, []p t, are equivalent, as G cannot prove that equivalence, they obeys different logic. They have different theorems. They are different theories, and that's why we have 8 different hypostases. That's how we got a theory of knowledge, a theory of observation, etc, all based on the same arithmetyical truth. That corresponds to the different person points of view. You get the 1p view by the p constraints, and the matter by the p or t constraints, and the non communicable parts, by the passage x to x* for each logic x. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/13/2014 2:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, What's CPL? Classical Predicate Logic? then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F= KmM/r^2 are laws, that is are true, not only everywhere, but even in all branch of the universal wave. But that can be explained from Noether's theorem + our insistence that whatever we call a law should be translation invariant. In other words we pick out what is translation invariant - and the rest is geography. But comp justifies this: the modalities of
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/13/2014 3:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:07, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 11:52 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 09:44, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 9:32 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 21:47, LizR wrote: On 13 February 2014 09:18, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 18:58, meekerdb wrote: That doesn't follow. If there are disjoint worlds, as contemplated in some versions of cosmology, they may have different physics. Nice, comp predicts that this is impossible, although I can agree this is a matter of semantics, as I define a physical laws to be true for all universal machines, so disjoint worlds will have only different geographies. So you're saying that only those worlds with observers in exist, according to comp? Not completely, as you will still have all the computations approximating all possible geographical reality, including those without observers, and in that sense, those realities exist, but they might not be first person plural sharable, and if you could explore one, they can violate our physics below our substitution level (which witnesses the infinitely many computations, something that one computation can only approximate). Your question can depend if a quantum universal dovetailer win the a measure battle, so that the computations going through you states are asspciated to some precise subdovetailing, for example. So the physics they observe will necessarily be such that it allows them to exist? (In other words, the Strong Anthropic Principle ?) Is that not tautological? If so, how do you account for us being able to observe an early universe in which there were apparently no observers? Or do we as obsverers create it (somehow) ? We select them. See above. You seem to be making your claim a tautology by saying whatever your theory produces is physics, even if it's not any physics we know of. That makes it impossible to test. Why, the physics we get is non trivial. It is as much testable than evolution. It explains where the laws of physics come from, and much more. It is extremely testable, given that it gives the laws, and it is enough to find one natural phenomenon contradicting Z1* or X1* to refute comp (+ Theaetetus). But this needs more on AUDA, so let us not anticipate everything too much quickly. You jump from step 3 to step 8, and then to AUDA. Well, it is interesting, but like Liz said, we have to do the dinner and that kind of things of life, if we want to continue the discussion in decent condition. I must admit I got that impression - thath the answer was something like comp predicts whatever physics we've got! This is false. A priori comp predicts white noise and white rabbits. But thanks to Gödel, we know that self-reference put constraints on what we can observe ([]p t), so comp(+Theaetetus) is not refuted yet, and is the only theory explaining where matter and consciousness comes from. Comp predicts one precise physics, in a way which indeed does not depend at all from what we observe in nature (we assume *only* comp!), and so we can compare the comp-physics with nature physics, and test comp. I don't understand how you would disprove comp like that... because whatever you could measure about reality could just be geographical and so comp is always in accordance with whatever measure... if not, could you precisely point on a specific thing that would invalidate comp ? If all the hypostases (points of view) modalities were collapsing into CPL, then comp would predict that, indeed, there are no physical laws, and everything would be geographical. This would predict that we can travel in the universe/multiverse, and observe anything logically consistent. This would made Smullyan correct when he says, in Forever Undecided (page 47): The physical sciences are interested in the state of affairs that holds for the actual world, whereas pure mathematics and logic study all possible state of affairs. Now, we could criticize this already from observation. Indeed it is those observations which led us to believe that there are physical laws, and laws means that something is true everywhere in our universe (or should means that, if that set is not empty). Indeed we believe that F=ma, or F=
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 February 2014 07:26, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: The duplication of human beings, such a significant prediction of comp, should then be amenable to test- using mice of course. I don't think comp predicts this. Bruno only uses it as a thought experiment. However if this is a prediction of comp, we might be able to test it if we can find a way to test the MWI, which also predicts this. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of comp). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Hi Quentin I do not, valid critics are valid, By definition mate. but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make Bruno evil??? In a later post you try to rebut Clark : In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they will never meet. That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet... But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly. In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics. all the best Chris. Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of comp). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Hi Bruno Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced only him That's a good way of spinning the fact that for two years it is in reality you who has failed to convince him. All the best Chris From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 22:23:08 + Hi Quentin I do not, valid critics are valid, By definition mate. but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make Bruno evil??? In a later post you try to rebut Clark : In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they will never meet. That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet... But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly. In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics. all the best Chris. Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of comp). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Can the MWI copies ever communicate, e.g. via quantum interference? On 14 February 2014 11:38, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Bruno Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced only him That's a good way of spinning the fact that for two years it is in reality you who has failed to convince him. All the best Chris -- From: chris_peck...@hotmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2014 22:23:08 + Hi Quentin I do not, valid critics are valid, By definition mate. but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make Bruno evil??? In a later post you try to rebut Clark : In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they will never meet. That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet... But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy skipping through time too. So they could potentially meet. In MWI 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly. In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics. all the best Chris. -- Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of comp). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-13 23:23 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com: Hi Quentin I do not, valid critics are valid, By definition mate. but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. This is what I mean by emotional arm waving. I can honestly think of things that are more evil and I suppose, from Clark's point of view, hes been pointing out the inconsistencies in Bruno's argument for two years too. Does that make Bruno evil??? In a later post you try to rebut Clark : In the MWI John Clark doesn't have to worry about who I or you is because however many copies of I or you there may or may not be they will never meet. That changes absolutely nothing... just put the reconstruction of the W guy 200 years later than the M guy, they will never meet... But if you can send the W guy skipping through time, you can send the M guy skipping through time too. Not if you follow the protocol, if you reconstruct the W guy 200 years later and the protocol is strictly followed, they'll never meet and that's all what's needed to proceed to this objection... that's all, and the fact that they could meet or not change absolutely nothing. So they could potentially meet. The potential meeting changes nothing... the feeling to be yourself does not depend on the possibility to meet a doppelganger... it's utterly absurd to claim otherwise. Quentin In MWI 'copies' can not potentially meet. If this is your attempt to point out an inconsistency its dismissively lazy and fails triumphantly. In my opinion your beef is impotent anyhow. The most you'd ever show was that Clark applied his argument inconsistently, you certainly wouldn't show that he was wrong about Bruno's metaphysics. all the best Chris. -- Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 09:39:21 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 14 February 2014 08:56, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: So no matter what is refuted we can save comp by saying that it is true but at a lower level and what we have observed that appears to refute comp is a dream or simulation at a higher level. If this is true, comp isn't a scientific theory. Of course the converse of this is that no matter what we observe then it cannot confirm comp. This is true of any scientific theory (if comp is one, therefore, also true of comp). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above the quantum level has accepted Yes Doctor.) If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than oh but we can't do that (yet) ! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
RE: Suicide Words God and Ideas
Hi Liz Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy in a universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't concern technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected on that score have they? All the best Chris. Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above the quantum level has accepted Yes Doctor.) If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than oh but we can't do that (yet) ! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 14 February 2014 12:46, chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com wrote: Hi Liz Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. my objections were to do with the correct way to predict expectancy in a universe in which every possible outcome occurs. They didn't concern technological limitations. I don't think anyone has objected on that score have they? Some people have objected on the basis that we can't duplicate people, for example. I think the expectation value objection is a valid one (and Bruno agrees that it is an open problem in comp) - we have no way to work out what we should expect to see on the basis of an infinite number of computations (I think the MWI has a similar problem?) All the best Chris. -- Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2014 12:31:28 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Personally, I feel that objections to comp on the basis of what we can and can't do with our present technology are a bit hair splitting, or perhaps simply evading the issue. Anyone who has accepted the MWI has accepted that duplication is possible. (And anyone who thinks consciousness is digital above the quantum level has accepted Yes Doctor.) If there's a valid objection, I think it should be a bit more robust than oh but we can't do that (yet) ! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 06:07:00PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 16:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-02-13 16:31 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 13 Feb 2014, at 12:36, Quentin Anciaux wrote: hence F=ma cannot be universaly true if comp is true. ... Even F=m*a cannot be universal as I've shown, It might be. I think it is (I mean the Feynman generalisation, which is already close to comp-physics, but that's out of the topic). ... The computation interfere below the substitution level, but the artificial simulation with F≠ma, bring an artificial physics, which does not result from the interference below the subst. level. If qZ1* proves F=ma, and if my environment does not obeys F=ma, it will looks dreamy to me, I will see that I am not in a real (comp) physical reality, I will see the discrepancy. F=ma is more of a definition actually, than a logical constraint. It is how we define (and operationally measure) force. If you have a copy of Vic Stenger's Comprehensible Cosmos, he discusses this from page 48. Actually, the correct relativistic form is F=dp/dt, where p is the 3 momentum of the object under consideration. F=ma is its low velocity approximation. So I would be surprised if COMP fails to prove Newton's second law - it would mean someone was using terminology inconsistently. Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Thu, Feb 13, 2014 at 10:42:21AM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Feb 2014, at 05:38, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:24:18PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are right, the qualia are in X1* \ X1, like we get quanta in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*. The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the axioms of X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations, which I think is debatable), By UDA, p to refer to a physical certainty needs to 1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true). 2) provable (true in all consistent extensions) 3) and non trivially provable (= there must be at least one consistent extension) This give the []p t, with p sigma_1. So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1* logic. This is certainly an interesting understanding that I hadn't met in your writings before. You worry me a bit, as I think this is explained in all papers and the thesis. I know that I am concise. Normally, if everything get clear, you should see that this is what I am explaining everywhere. Indeed this doesn't come out with your Lille thesis. There is almost no connection between Chapter 5 and the previous 4 chapters of the thesis. This doesn't bother me - if you ever bothered to read my thesis (not that I'm recommending you do so), you would find it consists of two faily different topics, with only the most tenuous connection between them. This was because it actually was two different topics with two different supervisors. I was actually lightly chided by one of the thesis reviewers for attempting to draw out the connection between the topics :). I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you saying something a bit like the above on page 11 Now DU [sic - should be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable. That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to say that all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper originally, only got it in context of your statements above. In associating provable with true in all consistent extensions, In case of provable, this is Gödel COMPLEteness result (not incompleteness!). In case of an abstract box, in a modal logic having a Kripke semantics, this is just the semantics of Kripke. are you meaning that so long as something (ie proposition) is computed by all programs instantiating your current state, no matter how far in the future that calculation might require, then that something is (sigma_1) provable. I am not sure. true in all consistent extensions is a very general notion. It is your term. I take it to mean all programs compatible with your current state, your current here-and-now. What happens is that, in arithmetic, the sigma_1 sentences, when true, are provable (already by RA). So they verify the formula A - []A. (called TRIV for trivial, as that sentence makes many modal logic collapsing, but not so in the provability logic, not even in the 1p S4Grz). Yes - thanks for reminding me. In fact a machine is Turing universal iff for all sigma_1 sentences A we have A - []A. So A - []A is the Turing universality axiom, when A is put for any sigma_1 sentence. Where []A means provable by the machine in question, I take it. G1 is G + A-[]A. Visser proved an equivalent of Solovay theorem for G1 and G1*. You can find it in Boolos 1993. It is a way to restrict the logic of the different points of view on the UD*. To be a finite piece of computation is itself given by a sigma_1 formula, and the sigma-1 sentences model computations. Then 12 gives your hypostase for knowledge, ie S4Grz1. Only G1 at that stage. To get knowledge, you need to do 1 and 2, but on []p p, But p statisfying 12 = p[]p, so why is this G1 and not S4Grz1? Perhaps you mean p satisfying p-[]p (-p v p[]p), which can be added to G (Visser's move). like to get observation/probability/expectation, you need to do 1 and 2, but on (3) []p t. And to get sensible observation, you can mix knowledge ( p), and consistency t. Yes - I still don't get that - either in the full or Sigma_1 restricted sense. Where the penny dropped, if only slightly, was that the existence of a universal dovetailer entails comp immortality, which entails the no cul-de-sac conjecture, which can be written as []pt restricted to sigma_1. But is this the approach you are taking? I always felt that the AUDA stood apart
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 2/13/2014 8:40 PM, Russell Standish wrote: I had a look at your SANE paper, which is the main paper where you describe your work that you published since your thesis. I can sort of see you saying something a bit like the above on page 11 Now DU [sic - should be UD in English] is emulated platonistically by the verifiable propositions of arithmetic. They are equivalent to sentences of the form ``if exists n such that P(n)'' with P(n) decidable. That is actually rather confusing. Obviously a UD executes all proofs of all true Sigma 1 sentences, but I think what you are trying to say that all programs executed by the UD correspond to a proof of some true Sigma 1 sentence. Is that obvious? I didn't get that when I read the SANE paper originally, only got it in context of your statements above. How can that be? Many programs executed by the UD are non-halting, just loops. Can they be considered to correspond to a proof? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 12:12 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2014 17:16, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:45 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2014 16:33, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 10:29 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2014 16:23, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Bell's Inequality in my opinion does not explain the mechanism of EPR. The Einstein-Rosen bridge does. It explains how entangled particles maintain their connection. I don't understand what you mean. Bell's inequality isn't an explanation, it's a number which is violated in the measured results of EPR experiments. You seem to have forgotten my original claim for string theory, that using Maldacena's duality it explains the mechanism of EPR. *Bell's Inequality does not explain the mechanism. *Seems you trust math more than physics or even data as in the other thread. Shorn of the ad hominem nonsense, that's what I just said. What you said was: String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction. So you are, or appear to be, saying that string theory predicts the viscosity of the quark-gluon plasma based on Maldacena's conjecture, and that it also explains the EPR mechanism using ERBs. Or at least that is the most reasonable way to parse of your sentence. You brought up Bell's Inequality, not me. Happy to see that you now get it. You mentioned EPR. The point of EPR is that the results violate Bell's inequality. You are beginning to sound like Edgar. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-12 1:17 GMT+01:00 chris peck chris_peck...@hotmail.com: Hi Chris dM and Bruno etc Once, Chris Peck said that he was convinced by Clark's argument) and I invited him to elaborate, as that might give possible lightening. He did not comply, and I was beginning that UDA was problematical for people named Chris. I think Clark should elaborate on his arguments rather than me, firstly because he'll do it better than I ever could and secondly it will save me the embarrassment if I have him wrong. I've elaborated at length on my own criticisms of step 3 and stand by them. I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their way through Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then maintain that Clark's erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in some way obtuse or difficult to follow. That the person who actually devised the steps themselves remains confused about Clark's comments almost beggars belief. There;s something very odd about that. There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to MWI. Like some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when (if?) he defends the notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI context. I can see though that in Comp people are duplicated within worlds whereas in MWI they are duplicated between worlds, and there possibly are some repercussions vis a vis the proper use of pro-nouns because of that. Im not sure it matters much, because Clark could be right about Comp and just inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, loudly pursued by Quentin, has always seemed impotent to me and not worth bothering about. It is worth pursuing, because the argument against is valid for both, you can't use a claim invalidating MWI and computationalism with a duplication experiment, and then claiming MWI is ok and computationalism with duplication is BS... I do not defend that computationalism is true, I only defend using correct argumentation for or against... I would not have said anything if John Clarck would have rejected MWI on the same ground, he does not and use insults against Bruno, that's not a correct way to argue. Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because, mentioning no names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional and arm wavey about people criticizing Bruno's metaphysics. I do not, valid critics are valid, but when you point to someone the inconsistency in his argument and that he maintains for years the same invalid argument that means that person does not want to argue, he wants to defend a position at all costs, that's evil. Bruno may well be incorrect, his argument invalid... also note that it is only an argument about the *consequence* of the computationalist hypothesis, it says nothing about if computationalism is true or not... It's not an argument *in favor* of computationalism, it's an argument about what it means if computationalism is true and that argument is valid even if computationalism is false, assuming computationalism true, that's were it leads. Quentin So for now at least, I'll limit myself to recommending the odd sci-fi movie on the film thread. The Quiet Earth (1985) is a little known gem, btw. All the best Chris. -- Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured Correctly, I assume. and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction. That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials have a nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have ERBs - that presumably have to be kept open by some exotic mechanicsm - to explain EPR when you can do it very simply anyway? And how can it be done very simply? By dropping Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric (for the particles used in an EPR experiment, which are generally photons). Please explain how dropping asymmetric time explains EPR. It makes it logically possible. I will have to ask a physicist for the details, but it is a mechanism whereby the state of the measuring apparatus can influence the state of the entire system. If we assume the emitter creates a pair of entangled photons and their polarisation is measured at two spacelike-separated
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 11 Feb 2014, at 14:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 12:42 AM, LizR wrote: On 11 February 2014 17:21, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 04:57:50PM +1300, LizR wrote: You wouldn't need to say that if you could show what's wrong with it! :-) (Sorry!) I think the chances are a TOE will have to go a looong way before it's likely to make predictions rather than retrodictions. Didn't string theory retrodict the graviton or something, and everyone said that was a positive result? Well, Bruno's got qualia, apparently... I don't see how he does. He does have the existence of incommunicable facts (the G*\G thing), but that's not the same as qualia ISTM. I said apparently because I have no idea how he does it. I think a simpler form of the argument is that it must be possible to simulate consciousness because (we think) any physical process can be simulated and consciousness necessarily accompanies the physical processes of one's brain. This is the bet of saying yes to the doctor. With comp, I don't think we can simulate matter, nor consciousness. We can only simulate the relevant part of the brain so that consciousness is preserved. The price to pay is that matter becomes something emergent in the 1p views (1p plural) and cannot be simulated or emulated. But there's a catch. When we simulate an aircraft flying or a weather system those have a reference in the 'real' world and that's why they are simulations. But if we simulate a conscious brain the consciousness will be 'real' consciousness. So simulating conscious is in a sense impossible; we may be able to produce it but we can't simulate it. Consciousness must be consciousness of something, but it need not be anything physical; It needs to be physical, at least in the FPI sense of physical. it could just be consciousness of arithmetical truths. This explains why aspects of consciousness are ineffable. It's because conscious processes can prove Goedel's theorem and so know that some truths are unprovable. Bruno takes qualia are ineffable and some arithmetical truths are unprovable and postulates ineffable=unprovable. Not really. I guess people progress, as this is the new common error in fashion, but some logician did it too, and is a confusion between hypostases. Qualia are related to non communicable, but only *indirectly* through G*. It happens through Z1* and X1* (and S4Grz1), which translates the UDA. the Gödel provability cannot be used for the UD measure, due to the cul-de-sac worlds. That is why we need []p p, or []p Dt, or []p Dt p. This allows him to identify specifically what makes some computer program conscious: it's the ability to do induction and diagnoalization and prove Goedel's theorems. OK. But it is not a computable identification. We cannot recognize, neither from code, nor from computational activity, is an entity is Löbian or not. We can just prove non constructively that such programs and computations exists in a non computable distribution. My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense required for this argument. Then you have to find me two numbers a and b contradicting the axioms of RA. I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the ineffable=unprovable identification is gratuitous. This lowers the level only, unless you add something non computable in the local environment. There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?) Once you accept comp, it is standard computer science to show that *all* dreams are emulated in Arithmetic. are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world. I guess we will need to come back on step 8, soon or later. Not sure what you mean by inert computation? re you alluding to the inert device in Maudlin and MGA, or to the static computations which exist in arithmetic. In that case it is the usual argument against block- time or block-universe, and this has been debunked repeatedly. Time and activity are indexicals (indeed translated into *variants* of G*). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 6:01 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:17, chris peck wrote: Hi Chris dM and Bruno etc Once, Chris Peck said that he was convinced by Clark's argument) and I invited him to elaborate, as that might give possible lightening. He did not comply, and I was beginning that UDA was problematical for people named Chris. I think Clark should elaborate on his arguments rather than me, firstly because he'll do it better than I ever could and secondly it will save me the embarrassment if I have him wrong. Come on, the poor guy tried hard since two years, and has convinced only him. But you said you do understood him, so it would be interesting you try to explain (except that it is rather easy to see that he is incoherent, as all replies to him have shown. He just stop the reasoning in the middle, or change the definitions). I've elaborated at length on my own criticisms of step 3 and stand by them. It was not a refutation, as I have explained. I will say though that I find it astonishing if people work their way through Bruno's steps and claim to understand them and then maintain that Clark's erudite and ofttimes witty criticisms are in some way obtuse or difficult to follow. Really? What do you understand in Clark's argument? That the person who actually devised the steps themselves remains confused about Clark's comments almost beggars belief. There;s something very odd about that. The argument just shows that you cannot program a robot so that it can predicts a specific happening, which must exist if we assume comp. Can you show us that algorithm? Or explain how it could exist? There is some fuss about Clark's reluctance to apply his argument to MWI. Like some others I think Clark possibly makes a misstep when (if?) he defends the notion of 1p in-determinism within an MWI context. I can see though that in Comp people are duplicated within worlds whereas in MWI they are duplicated between worlds, and there possibly are some repercussions vis a vis the proper use of pro-nouns because of that. The 1p and 3p definitions shows this to be irrelevant. or use that to refute step 3. Clark has not succeeded in this task, and his argument confuse 3-1 view with 1-views, systematically. Im not sure it matters much, because Clark could be right about Comp and just inconsistent about MWI. So this complaint, loudly pursued by Quentin, has always seemed impotent to me and not worth bothering about. Im reluctant to get involved in the step 3 discussions because, mentioning no names Quentin and PGC, people can get very emotional and arm wavey about people criticizing Bruno's metaphysics. Which metaphysics? It is a reasoning, simply. the assumption is that you can survive with a digital brain. Are you, like Clark, OK with step 0, 1, and 2? And, if you are not OK with step 3 for a genuine reason, just tell it to us. of course, if it is just literary philosophical hand waving, which I suspect (to be franc, due to you absence of doubt on the question), then some people can get emotional, as we are used and sometimes tired with that kind of pseudo-philosophical non-arguments. If step 3 is false, just provide the needed algorithm to prove this. Bruno So for now at least, I'll limit myself to recommending the odd sci-fi movie on the film thread. The Quiet Earth (1985) is a little known gem, btw. All the best Chris. -- Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 12:00:42 +1300 Subject: Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas From: lizj...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On 12 February 2014 10:55, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 4:10 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2014 08:50, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 1:42 PM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 12 February 2014 00:41, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 3:45 AM, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 11 February 2014 18:40, Richard Ruquistyann...@gmail.com wrote: String theory based on Maldacena's conjecture predicted the viscosity of the quark-gluon plasma before it was measured Correctly, I assume. and more recently explained the mechanism behind EPR based on Einstein-Rosen bridges, which is more like a retrodiction. That seems like a sledgehammer to crack a nut, although the initials have a nice near-symmetry. Why would one need to have ERBs - that presumably have to be kept open by some exotic mechanicsm - to explain EPR when you can do it very simply anyway? And how can it be done very simply? By dropping Bell's assumption that time is fundamentally asymmetric (for the particles used in an EPR experiment, which are generally photons). Please explain how dropping asymmetric time explains EPR. It makes it logically possible. I will have to ask
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the ineffable=unprovable identification is gratuitous. There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?) are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world. Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8! I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate. I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument. I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I still don't feel I fully understand what that says yet. At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and arithmetic (or number theology). Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they mean by primitive matter, and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties. But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be a refutation of comp-reversal, but of comp itself. To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:02, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Feb 11, 2014 at 07:31:24PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: You are right, the qualia are in X1* \ X1, like we get quanta in S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*. The only thing you can say is that qualia ought to obey the axioms of X1*\X1, (and even that supposes that Z captures all observations, which I think is debatable), By UDA, p to refer to a physical certainty needs to 1) UD generated (= sigma_1 arithmetical and true). 2) provable (true in all consistent extensions) 3) and non trivially provable (= there must be at least one consistent extension) This give the []p t, with p sigma_1. So the logic of observable certainty should be given by the Z1* logic. not that your model generates qualia, as Liz was suggesting. There may well be other things in X1*\X1 that are not qualia. This is not a critique of you - I don't recall you ever claiming your model got qualia, I was mainly responding to Liz's comment of 11/2/14. I think you might have taken Liz a bit too much literally. Perhaps. Bruno Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
2014-02-12 12:17 GMT+01:00 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: On 12 Feb 2014, at 01:50, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the ineffable=unprovable identification is gratuitous. There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?) are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world. Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8! I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate. I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument. I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I still don't feel I fully understand what that says yet. At step seven, the primitive materialist can still invoke a physicalist form of ultrafinitism, to prevent the comp reversal between physics and arithmetic (or number theology). Step 8, shows that if that move is done, then we have to attribute some non Turing emulable, but also non FPI recoverable properties in that primitive matter to instantiate consciousness. It gives to the primitive materialist a hint to refute comp: 1) to define what they mean by primitive matter, It could be as Peter Jones said the thing that renders it real... only computations implemented in matter are real... AR as such would be false, a mathematical statement not implemented in matter is indeterminate, the truth value only come from implementation. Computationalism + realness ingredient could still be possible and evade UDA conclusion... at the costs of some magical property. Quentin and 2) to show that such matter relies on non FPI recoverable properties. But that is equivalent with the test that comp offers, so it cannot be a refutation of comp-reversal, but of comp itself. To be short. We will have opportunities to come back on this. But only if most are OK, with the steps 0-7. Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:22, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What Everett did for the quantum universal wave, we can do that on any universal system, and comp predicts that this will always give the same physics. How does it predict that? All universal systems produce the same collection of all computations, with exactly the same redundancy. Physics emerged from that set of all computations. So physics must be the same whatever pho_i are chosen for the ontological base. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:28, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But I think what is shown is that there can be a world including conscious beings which does not require physical events in our world, i.e. they can be merely arithmetical or Turing machince events. In other words it is possible to simulate a world with conscious beings. OK, but their consciousness is not simulated, as the consciousness of the being is in all arithmetical simulations. The machine you build makes only that consciousness manifestable relatively to you. But that assumes what you are trying to argue, that consciousness is a purely arithmetical phenomenon. I was slightly making your point more precise, using the UDA's consequence. I was not in the course of arguing on UDA. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:40, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 4:50 PM, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the ineffable=unprovable identification is gratuitous. There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?) are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world. Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8! I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate. Exactly. One may still say yes to the doctor who give you an artificial brain that functions within this world (and cannot be the 'inert' brain of step 8). ? I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument. If you accept AR *and* the identification of unprovable arithmetical truth=qualia I have never identify qualia and unprovable arithmetical truth. Qualia are defined by possible semantics bearing on the logic of certain unprovable arithmetical truth. That is very different. technically, you confuse G* and Z*; Z1*, etc. then it is relevant because a computer can, with the right program, recognize unprovable truths and therefore have ineffabel qualia. But I see no reason to accept this identification. It follows from UDA. Then AUDA isolated the logic, by studying the logic of the probability one. Bruno The only thing they have in common is that they are inexpressible in their respective domains. Brent I'm not yet convinced it is a genuine problem for step 8, or not, as I still don't feel I fully understand what that says yet. Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Suicide Words God and Ideas
On 12 Feb 2014, at 02:43, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2014 4:56 PM, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2014 13:50, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Feb 12, 2014 at 07:46:48AM +1300, LizR wrote: On 12 February 2014 02:55, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: My problem with this is that I don't believe in arithmetical realism in the sense required for this argument. I think consciousness depends of consciousness *of* an external world and thoughts just about Peano's arithmetic is not enough to realize consciousness and the ineffable=unprovable identification is gratuitous. There are obvious physical and evolutionary reasons that qualia would be ineffable. That's why I think step 8 is invalid because it assumes dreams (of arithmetic?) are possible independent of any external world - or looked at another way, I think to make it work would require that the 'inert' computation simulate a whole world in which the consciousness would then exist *relative* to that world. Well, you have already rejected step 0 - (at least one of) the initial assumptions - so I wouldn't worry about step 8! I don't see how it rejects step 0. Provided that the artificial computational brain offered by the doctor is connected to the actual senses, and not just placed in a vat connected to some simulated reality, it certainly satisfies the Yes Doctor postulate. I don't see the relevance of AR or CT to Brent's argument. Well, Brent seems to think it does (it was the AR bit he was rejecting, or the Peano subset thereof I think?). However, I agree that I think consciousness depends of (sic) consciousness *of* an external world is simply an opinion, Is it? Can you be conscious without being conscious of something? Actually yes, but that is not relevant, as arithmetic simulate all digital approximation of all physical universe, (and the real physical universe is a non Turing emulable sum on all those computations), so arithmetic provides the worlds you need to be conscious of. and the other related objections seem to be arguing from incredulity. Yes, I am incredulous that arithmetical provability = knowledge Arithmetic provability CANNOT model knowledge at all. Gödel saw this in 1933(*) (*) GÖDEL K., 1933, Eine Interpretation des Intuitionistischen Aussagenkalküls, Ergebnisse eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums, Vol 4, pp. 39-40, also in FEFERMAN Al. 1986. That is the starting point of AUDA. and unprovable arithmetical truth = qualia. Are you credulous on those two points? It does not make sense, and I insist on this. G* is not a logic of qualia. You need the intensional nuances. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.