subject:"what is mechanism\?"


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 09:49, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:12:12 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson > wrote:
>> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>> 
>> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
>> to define it in words? 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
>> "consciousness”.
> 
> Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to 
> not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they 
> will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. 
> Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.
> 
> I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is how 
> it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some 
> chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy it 
> absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm.  Also, more 
> fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. 
> Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, 
> whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I 
> see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical 
> object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the 
> successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical 
> world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as codified in 
> Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, an 
> extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on what 
> Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is relevant to 
> any of this? AG
>> In terms of what?
> With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief 
> and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic 
> (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of 
> truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the 
> arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most 
> non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.
> 
> "conjunction-onjction"? What the heck is that?


A new type of typo error, due to the progress in applied computer science. 
Sorry. Read simply “conjunction”.




> I contend that all the postulates of arithmetic, including x + 0 = x, can be 
> inferred from observations of the external, physical universe. AG 


No problem with this, all universal machine in arithmetic get their ignition of 
number through a physical reality, that they cannot avoid, even if it is not a 
primitive reality in the big picture.

Bruno



>> Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as 
>> the electron.
> You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p notion.
> (Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for 
> later).
> 
> I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties 
> which anyone, with sufficient
> effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with this, 
> other than to obfuscate. AG 
>> Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but 
>> you can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say 
>> about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. 
>> AG
> 
> Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, 
> which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian 
> machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) 
> where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the 
> difference between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher 
> vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate to 
> have it too.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the w

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 23 Sep 2019, at 06:12, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson > 
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>> 
>> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
>> to define it in words? 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
>> "consciousness”.
> 
> Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to 
> not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they 
> will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. 
> Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.
> 
> I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue.

OK.

> What I don't know is how it can exist or the conditions for its existence.

Assuming that the brain works “digitally-mechanically” at some level of 
description will eventually answer this, but the price is that physics will 
have to be reduced to machine theology (which is itself reducible to 
arithmetic).

> I also know that some chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness,

Which is easy to explain in the mechanist theory, as the chemical will perturb 
the *functioning* of the brain.

> and in some cases destroy it absolutely.

This will never happens, but that is highly not obvious, so I will not try to 
explain here. It necessitates to understand that mechanism makes the physical 
universe having no ontological status at all (which contradicts 1500 years of 
enforced materialist theology, so people will take time to swallow this, no 
doubt).

> So its material basis seems pretty firm. 

Yes. But eventually, that material basis emerges from the statistic on all 
computations. Matter exists, and indeed the physical laws describe a reality, 
but it is no more fundamental or ontological.

> Also, more fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious 
> grounds.

I do not assume platonism. I assume only what I have to assume to define what 
is a machine, mathematically.

If you agree with proposition like “2+2=4”, and that we can deduce from it that 
the equation x + 2 = 4 has a solution, that is enough. That is assumed by most 
theory in physics. 

So Platonism and neoplatonism are not assumed, but derived from Mechanism.

> Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world,

That is correct. But that does not imply that the physical world is primary.

What you miss is perhaps, like some other, the fact (and here that *is* a fact) 
that the notion of computation have been shown being purely arithmetical. 
Turing’s original definition is purely mathematical already (set of quadruples 
verifying some conditions) and later it has been shown to be arithmetical 
(although the proof is already in Gödel 1931, but Gödel did not see this as he 
did not believe the Church-Turing thesis at that time, only later).

> whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I 
> see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical 
> object and I conceive "2”.

The idea of defining “real” by what we see IS Aristotle theology. It is what 
Plato warns us to not taken for granted.

To be honest with you, I confess that I have less doubt that 2 divides 24, than 
any extrapolation in some reality or in any laws inferred from it. I doubt less 
“2 divide 24” than F = GmM/r^2. I can conceive waking up in the morning and 
discovering that F = GmM/r^2. Is false, but it is harder to conceive that I can 
wake up in the morning and believe that 2 does not divide 24. In fact, to 
accept F = GmM/r^2, I already needs the believe in elementary arithmetic. 

> And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the successor function or 
> principle is derivable independent of the physical world, which you see as 
> illusional.

I am a logician. I don’t know the truth. I just explain the consequence of 
Mechanism, and show that Nature confirms them up to now, at a place where the 
materialist ignores consciousness or dismiss it entirely.

> The successor principle as codified in Peano's postulates seems a simply 
> inference from observations,

Yes, the successor can be inferred from physical experience and life, like with 
birthday and the idea of death, but most results obtained have been got through 
logical reflection. Euclid might h

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 21 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. 
> From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define 
> what consciousness IS. AG
> 
> Bruno; does "Yes doctor" mean that a patient accepts as fact that removing 
> his/her brain and/or nervous system and replacing it with microcircuits 
> preserving the same functions, yields a surgical result such that the patient 
> upon awakening seems to him or herself, and others, as the same "person" who 
> previously approved the surgery?

The patient cannot accept this as a fact. It is something he can hope only. 
Then, if mechanism is true, by definition he was correct, but even after the 
operation, he cannot claim that as a fact, despite its personal impression. He 
might have lose a faculty and not be aware of it, like people can become blind 
and be unaware of the change, in some special brain disease (anosognosia).

> Is this the essence of mechanism?  If not, please elaborate. TIA, AG

Yes, it is mechanism, but it requires an act of faith.

Now, to be sure, taking a plane, or even a bike, requires some faith too, but 
here, that play an important role in the sequel, and so that nuance has to be 
taken into account.

Rational machine have a surrational corona extending what they can justify. 
That corona has a precise mathematical structure, and is used to derive the 
laws of physics from arithmetic. 

Bruno

>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f2deceff-c0b2-4991-b54b-c8b78a8b46e8%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3E4C8DA2-05C6-4DC3-9385-466FF7789F6F%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 20 Sep 2019, at 05:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/19/2019 4:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 12:52:03 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 9/19/2019 2:45 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, 
>> > acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't 
>> > do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. AG 
>> 
>> Sure. But ultimately they are all grounded in ostensive definitions. 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>> Obstensively, like imagining anything like an elephant exists? But what and 
>> how is this imagining helpful in knowing what consciousness us, as compared 
>> to specific definitions used in physics as previously indicated? AG
> 
> Whether it's helpful or not, it's the basis we have to go on.  Bruno wants to 
> define consciousness as whatever is self-referential,

Not 3p self-referential (that is []p), but very importantly it is 
1p-self-referential. Consciousness is first person knowledge, with not 
definable self, but still existing. My theory of consciousness is basically the 
standard one found by Theaetetus. Incompleteness literally imposed it once we 
bet on mechanism.

> because he can prove arithmetic is self-referential (given the right coding). 
>  But I've seen billboards that are self-referential, so I don't think that's 
> a good definition.

If the billboard is Turing universal, it will work. And the main point is that 
this theory of consciousness implies the laws of physics, and implies already 
the quantum formalism and its many-histories structuration. 

>And even if it's true that consciousness if self-referential (I have my 
> doubts),

Here there is a difficulty. The consciousness of the universal machine lack 
full self-reference power, and is not subjectively self-referential. Only the 
Löbian machine get aware of the self-reference,ntial aspect of consciousness, 
but it makes sense to say that this is already a delusion. The induction axioms 
belongs already in the phenomenology, somehow.

> so what?  It's doesn't see that essential to consciousness, since I very 
> rarely refer to my consciousness.

It is normal. It has to be like that. When the worm is suffering, he is not 
aware of the self-reference, but we, from outside can bet that the worm’s 
suffering is the worms’ one, like you say “my consciousness” (a symptom that 
you are a Löbian machine).

Consciousness can be meta-defined in many ways. It is what we know the best, 
and the only thing we can be sure of, yet it is not definable with any words, 
and not identifiable with anything describable in the third person way. That is 
something that consciousness has in common with god (and that’w why the 
idealist sometimes want to assume consciousness as the primitive thing, but 
with mechanism, consciousness is just a relative property of numbers with 
respect to their infinitely many computational histories.

Unfortunately, most people (especially since the closure of Plato’s academy) 
confuse first person notion and third person notion, like Penrose and Lucas who 
use Gödel against mechanism, but confuse []p and ([]p & p).

Bruno

> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c11dd3d1-97b4-6acb-3bea-3a3ce34cf538%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F3C38C8B-9636-4C7E-AAC2-6AE4F1FDC7EC%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-23 Thread Alan Grayson



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 10:12:12 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
>>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
>>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
>>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
>>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
>>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>>>
>>> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
>>> to define it in words? 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>
>> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
>> "consciousness”.
>>
>>
>> Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim 
>> to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and 
>> they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having 
>> consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, 
>> knowledge, etc.
>>
>
> I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is 
> how it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some 
> chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy 
> it absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm.  Also, more 
> fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. 
> Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, 
> whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I 
> see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical 
> object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the 
> successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical 
> world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as *codified* 
> in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, 
> an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on 
> what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is 
> relevant to any of this? AG
>
>> In terms of what?
>>
>> With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of 
>> belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary 
>> arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study 
>> Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing 
>> that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, 
>> even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.
>>
>
"conjunction-onjction"? What the heck is that? I contend that all the 
postulates of arithmetic, including x + 0 = x, can be inferred from 
observations of the external, physical universe. AG 

> Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such 
>> as the electron.
>>
>> You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p 
>> notion.
>> (Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s 
>> for later).
>>
>
> I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties 
> which anyone, with sufficient
> effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with 
> this, other than to obfuscate. AG 
>
>> Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but 
>> you can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say 
>> about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's 
>> self-referential. AG
>>
>>
>> Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive 
>> consciousness, which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness 
>> of the Löbian machine (which are not just universal, they know that they 
>> are universal) where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It 
>> has about the difference between the consciousness of low animals compared 
>> to higher vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others 
>> invertebrate to have it too.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/fda96173-ec56-4a88-9479-f84d98e67e50%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-22 Thread Alan Grayson



On Sunday, September 22, 2019 at 9:16:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson > 
> wrote:
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>>
>> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
>> to define it in words? 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
> "consciousness”.
>
>
> Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim 
> to not know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and 
> they will have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having 
> consciousness. Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, 
> knowledge, etc.
>

I know I have consciousness. That's not the issue. What I don't know is how 
it can exist or the conditions for its existence. I also know that some 
chemicals can dramatically alter consciousness, and in some cases destroy 
it absolutely. So its material basis seems pretty firm.  Also, more 
fundamentally, I find your Platonic theory of numbers on dubious grounds. 
Numbers can easily be inferred from observations of the physical world, 
whereas the reverse Platonic claim is hugely difficult if not impossible. I 
see a single object, from which I conceive "1". I see another indentical 
object and I conceive "2". And so forth. I also dispute your claim that the 
successor function or principle is derivable independent of the physical 
world, which you see as illusional. The successor principle as *codified* 
in Peano's postulates seems a simply inference from observations, that is, 
an extension of them. It's not sometime inherently mysterious dependent on 
what Godel proved. Can you say exactly, in a few words, why Godel is 
relevant to any of this? AG

> In terms of what?
>
> With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of 
> belief and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary 
> arithmetic (where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study 
> Tarski theory of truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing 
> that the arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, 
> even by most non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.
>
> Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such 
> as the electron.
>
> You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p 
> notion.
> (Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for 
> later).
>

I am merely stating that an electron is defined by its measured properties 
which anyone, with sufficient
effort, can confirm. I don't see that 1p or 3p has anything to do with 
this, other than to obfuscate. AG 

> Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but 
> you can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say 
> about consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's 
> self-referential. AG
>
>
> Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, 
> which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian 
> machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) 
> where the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the 
> difference between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher 
> vertebrate, although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate 
> to have it too.
>
> Bruno
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2fe285a1-8ac7-4d30-9ef4-7f381d1297de%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 19 Sep 2019, at 17:00, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
> 
> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
> to define it in words? 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
> "consciousness”.

Not we don”t have a definition of consciousness, but for those who claim to not 
know, I suggest to ask their dentist to not use anesthetiser, and they will 
have a pretty good idea of what is it to be like having consciousness. 
Consciousness is what gives sense to pain, pleasure, knowledge, etc.

> In terms of what?

With mechanism, we can define knowledge by the conjunction-onjction of belief 
and truth. For belief, we can use Gödel’s definition in elementary arithmetic 
(where you assume x + 0 = x, & Co.), fortieth you can study Tarski theory of 
truth, it quite enough, and yes, tarski is the one showing that the 
arithmetical truth cannot be defined by machines, or actually, even by most 
non-mechanical entities too, with some exception.

> Presumably it's properties, as we define other entities in physics, such as 
> the electron.

You cannot use 3p notions to define consciousness which is a pure 1p notion.
(Eventually the physical will appear as a 1p-plural notion, but that’s for 
later).

> Who was the SC justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but you 
> can't define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say about 
> consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG

Indeed, but it has two main level: the simple non reflexive consciousness, 
which is implicitly self-referential, and the consciousness of the Löbian 
machine (which are not just universal, they know that they are universal) where 
the self-reference is made explicit by the machine. It has about the difference 
between the consciousness of low animals compared to higher vertebrate, 
although I suspect the cuttlefish and some others invertebrate to have it too.

Bruno

> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3442bea9-dddc-4452-be42-72dbf18166a2%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CACC11BA-B30E-4C3E-8558-092DCE1A8A28%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 19 Sep 2019, at 12:12, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 3:56:43 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 5:45 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>  
> > Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, 
> > acceleration, space, time, entropy?
> 
> Sure, and every one of those definitions came from EXAMPLES observed in the 
> physical world. The definitions didn't create the physical world, the 
> physical world created the definitions. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics. All I am 
> saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part of an 
> overall process for knowing reality, that is, for actually doing physics.

Hmm … if you are patient and honest, I can explain that physics does not study 
the fundamental reality, but only one aspect of it.

> Without them we can't speak meaningfully with each other. And most people 
> still use dictionaries, which are now online, and often are implicit in our 
> discussions. As I recall quite clearly, it was YOU who have been vigorously 
> critical of Bruno for his alleged sloppy and varying DEFINITIONS!.

Clark seems to have a personal agenda, and will systematically try to confuse 
people on the issue of the consequence of mechanism. 

Now, in mathematical logic there is a huge chapter of definability theory, and 
we can prove that machine’s introspecting themselves will be confronted to 
“obvious but undeniable truth”, like “I am conscious” will belong. Also, 
“knowledge” by a machine cannot be defined by that machine, but the machine can 
define “knowledge” for a simpler machine than itself, and the, by assuming 
Mechanism, can lift that theory on itself, but she has to be very cautious, as 
the math shows that when done in some manner, the machine will become 
inconsistent. This is related to what I call the theological trap. Some truth 
becomes false when asserted or prove. The logical equation []x -> ~x has many 
non trivial solutions (x = f; x = <>t, x = <><>t, etc. “<> is the dual of [] 
(provable) and can be read consistent. Dual means that <>p is the same as ~[]~p.

> Looks like your achieving troll status with foolish argments. So where is 
> Bruno? AG 

I am here AG. Sorry for being late, but it is the academical “entry” (we say in 
French) and there is a lot of work.

Bruno

> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d5ae645d-40e7-4a75-89a5-3249cdb8717b%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B49E5911-5650-4AA4-BB7D-702FC6210755%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?


> On 19 Sep 2019, at 11:56, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 5:45 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>  
> > Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, 
> > acceleration, space, time, entropy?
> 
> Sure, and every one of those definitions came from EXAMPLES observed in the 
> physical world. The definitions didn't create the physical world, the 
> physical world created the definitions. 

Assuming a physical world, but that assumption is the one incompatible with 
Mechanism.

That results annoy only philosopher who are dogmatic on both Matter and 
Mechanism. Scientist usually are not, thanks god!

Bruno




> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1YoNjnN42VrR-Fq6kh%3DK17Q98chYza%3DKvBxN4wV%2BEPUQ%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7875D969-CBEB-4A0F-A8F9-4CE2FB385C05%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 19 Sep 2019, at 03:45, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. 
> From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define 
> what consciousness IS. AG
> 
> The really interesting thing about this thread, and it's hugely telling, is 
> that Bruno refuses (yes, refuses) to say whether my comment is correct, and 
> if not, what needs to be corrected. AG 

And so your inference was wrong.

Your definition was correct, albeit imprecise.Indexical Digital Mechanism (aka 
computationalism) is the assumption that there is a level of description of my 
brain/body (actually in a very general sense, it could the whole physical 
universe) such that my consciousness is maintained in a digital emulation of my 
brain when digitally correct at that level.

Non mechanism is basically the idea that no magic events occurs in the brain, 
nor that a brain, which can be considered as an analog Mechanism,  needs all 
decimal of some non computable reals. Mechanism is used explicitly by Everett, 
but also arguably by Darwin, molecular genetics, and is a consequence of most 
known physical laws.

The problem is that atheism are used to exploit mechanism to put the mind-body 
problem under the rug. There would be a physical ontological universe, and we 
are just material machine. The problem is that a digital machine cannot feel 
any difference in between being emulated in arithmetic and in a physical 
reality, and eventually physics has to be come a statistics on all (relative) 
computations. When the math is done, we recover the quantum formalism, until 
now, so we can say that the idea that there is a “real” (ontological, 
primitive,irreductibel,  in-ned-to be assumed) physical universe has become 
speculative, if not superstitious or pseudo-religious.

Materialism will be abandonned, probably, just like the “élan vitale” of 18th 
century. It makes just no sense, besides having zero evidence for it.

We must not confuse the physical reality, and the physicalist idea that the 
physical reality is the fundamental reality from which all the others (biology, 
psychology, …) would emerge.

Assuming Mechanism, it is a theorem in metaphysics/theology that the physical 
reality has to be explained by machine’s mathematical psycho-theology, and 
nature confirms this (unless you believe in the magical “physical collapse”).

Bruno

> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15140c33-1992-4ff3-9819-d6c2b4a2f990%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B1F45CF5-676C-4035-AC2F-2BE107B5CDD8%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?


> On 19 Sep 2019, at 00:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'  
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> > Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG 
>> 
>> >> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone else. 
>> >> But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?
>> 
>> >>> You'd ask people who knew you well.
>> 
>> And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth, but 
>> whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises. If your 
>> lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that would 
>> indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional assumption 
>> to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is 
>> an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody makes 
>> that assumption a   thousand times a day because the alternative 
>> is solipsism. 
> 
> They question was whether you could find out you were fundamentally different 
> after an operation.  Not whether or not your friends were conscious.  Saibal 
> said "No." apparently based only on the fact that he couldn't trust 
> introspection.  But in that would equally imply he couldn't tell whether he 
> fundamentally changed from day to day, or minute to minute. Of course nothing 
> can provide certainty, but your friends saying you act differently or you 
> don't would be good evidence.  It's the same level of evidence for thinking 
> one another consciousness, but it's broader since you might be different in 
> some way you were not conscious of.

That’s right, and the definitions of the “first person” used either in the 
thought experiment (content of the diary taken by the candidate with him, in 
the annihilation/copy box) or used in the math (beweisbar(‘p’) & p, []p & p) 
makes the reasoning on consciousness rigorous and transparent, despite not 
being able to define it, as long as we agree that we can survive for more than 
one second in our everyday life. 

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/deaa9ce8-6ad4-094f-f861-5bc1e77e29fd%40verizon.net
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20147F12-1413-4E1D-8A13-F332EB0F89BA%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?


> On 18 Sep 2019, at 23:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 3:27:55 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2019 11:55 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>> 
>> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
>> to define it in words? 
>> 
>> Brent 
>> 
>> Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call 
>> "dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define 
>> "consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG
> 
> Like this.  Imagine an elephant.  
> 
> Ok, that was you being conscious of an elephant.
> 
> Brent
> 
> Actually I first "imaged" Dumbo, the Disney cartoon character. :)

That happen often to fictionalist :)

Bruno


> 
> @philipthrift 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8ba468a6-b03a-470d-9ac2-c23ee628046d%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7D3E59E6-F495-4426-B19E-CAC0354352F8%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?


> On 18 Sep 2019, at 21:30, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 1:14:36 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 2:55 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> > You know, there are things we call "dictionaries" where words are defined.
> 
> And all those dictionary definitions are made of words, and all those words 
> have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have 
> there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have there 
> own definitions also in the dictionary and round and round we go. Another 
> definition is never going to break is out of that meaningless circle, to do 
> that you're going to need an example. After all, where do you think the 
> people who wrote the dictionary got the knowledge to write their book?
> 
> > If we have no way to define "consciousness", we have no chance of 
> > understanding it.
> 
> That's not true for consciousness and its not true for anything else either. 
> Fundamentally our understanding of the world does not come from definitions, 
> it comes from examples.
> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> Where would science be without its definitions? They are decisive in knowing 
> what we are talking about! And there's more, much more to dictionaries, than 
> you claim. AG 

In science, we never know. A scientist who say “we know that …” is either doing 
an abuse of language for being short, or is a con artist.

Bruno




> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/43a058f4-4f16-4e3e-b3a8-9f29312e441f%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15D5AA6C-01DC-4E65-8318-F2D4BEB800B4%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?


> On 18 Sep 2019, at 20:55, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
> 
> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
> to define it in words? 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call 
> "dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define 
> "consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG

Like with truth, which is undefinable, we can use the notion all the time, 
without being able to define it. Enough examples can give the intuition, even 
if we can’t get to the certainty (which in science is just a form of madness).

And the, as I show, we can meta-define such concept, and there is a science 
which provides all the needed tools; it is mathematical logic (alas, very badly 
taught when taught at all).

Bruno


> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7f1b1c9f-4bac-44bb-af9e-6dcb9d30c178%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/335EB49B-4C6C-4883-B123-769F1B0F6476%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 18 Sep 2019, at 13:11, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 6:02 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
> 
> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> > computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> > simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> > thinking he/she's the same person,
> 
> On some days the meaning of "Mechanism" may mean that in Brunospeak but on 
> other days it does not, such as the day Bruno said "it is not relevant to say 
> “yes” or “no” in a practical implementation of Mechanism”.

That does not change the definition of mechanism, that Grayson explained in the 
right way, although he does not mention that mechanism is a believe/assumption 
of the existence of level of substitution. Later I show that no machine can 
find its own level of substitution, but they can still make a bet, or an act of 
faith, if and when the doctor suggest they *migt* survive some disease through 
this, but of course, not in any provable way. That is why Mechanism is a 
theological axiom/hypothesis. It is the belief in some form of technical (then 
arithmetical) (re)-incarnation.

What you say is true for all theories, and is akin to say that the logical 
consequence of a theory does not depend on your or me believing or assuming the 
theory.

Now, in the thought experience, is it easier to fake we believe in the theory 
to get the consequences, but you could use “robots” instead of human, as the 
first person notion is defined in a third person way (the content of the 
1p-personal diary, and “1p-personal diary” 

> The only thing that remains constant is that the Brunospeak meaning never has 
> any relationship to the English meaning of the word. And the same thing is 
> true for words like "God" and "theology”.

No. My use of the term is English. It is even the Christian use in the period 
where the christian were neoplatonist. It is a common use, often precise by 
“the god of the philosopher”, on which the literature is extremely abundant. 

Like many atheists, you talk like if only the christians got the right 
vocabulary, and like them, you do everything to make us forget that theology 
has been a science for a millenium, and a very fertile one, as mathematics and 
physics are born from the neoplatonist doubt that physics was the fundamental 
science.

Bruno

> 
>   John K Clark
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv24N15Ox3-6PD2c285wrHU9ubS5SrqtOU5GsRUAQGO0qg%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/C19E1DC0-AD29-4351-B526-AFC048C65ADF%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 18 Sep 2019, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 5:02:09 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery. 
> From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define 
> what consciousness IS. AG
> 
> 
> I was just taking "Mechanism" as a (computability) term meaning "not able to 
> perform Turing jumps".
> 
>  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump 
> 
> 
> But then there is an "Extended" Mechanism:
> 
>   Turing jumps through provability
>https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05327 
> 

Yes, that is what Turing machine can do. They can compute (and are universal 
with resect to computation), but they can many other things, were they are no 
more ever universal, and so can improved themselves infinitely. And yes there 
are many jumps, and the machine do that all the time, including when you pull 
out he electrical source …

But it is not extended mechanism. It is simple digital mechanism, where we 
distinguish provability and computability, and that distinction is a key in my 
work. Despite provability is not universal, once the machine is “rich enough” 
(I use the term Löbian) then not only the (sound) machine is not universal for 
provability (Gödel’s theorem), but it knows that very well, and get a little 
bit “mystical” for pure logical reason (like Plato and others humans have 
understood).

Bruno

> 
> @philipthrift
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09fcda72-da35-4c6d-a3fb-893188b03f6f%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/4EFBC228-33B3-4CCB-A497-C6ABAE522B52%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

> On 18 Sep 2019, at 12:02, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable surgery.

Yes, that is basically correct. A bit imprecise. To be sure, I do not claim 
that Mechanism is true. It is just my working hypothesis, and my point is that:

1) mechanism is incompatible with physicalism: physics becomes a branch of 
machine’s biology/psychology/theology/computer-science/elementary arithmetic. 

And indeed, I git very early that mechanism entails a physical reality which 
has a many “words/histories/alternate-relative-states, with a weird statistics, 
but it took me 30 years to see that the math confirms quantum mechanics 
(without collapse).

> From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even define 
> what consciousness IS. AG

I guess you meant “”...since we can even define what consciousness IS”.

We cannot even define what is a physical universe. There are very few things 
that we can define about “reality” (not even “reality”), but that does not 
prevent us to know or to have a good idea about those thing. I agree with you 
that consciousness is not definable, nor knowledge, nor truth, but 
consciousness is what we know the best, and is the only indubitable thing we 
are confronted with. 

Actually I define, or “meta-define” consciousness by something

1) true
2) knowable
3) indubitable 

Yet,

4) not provable, and, importantly, as you say

5) not definable in the language available by the entity concerned, unless 
through adherence to a notion of truth (mathematical logic explains how to give 
sense to this).

In that sense, not only the machine is conscious, but do find that theory of 
consciousness, including the fact that physics has to be retrieved from that 
theory of consciousness, making it refutable. I predicted most quantum 
weirdness from this, and was not far from believing I was refuting Mechanism, 
until I realise (thanks to Everett) that the physicists were already there. 
Before that I have used quantum mechanics + collapse just a tool in molecular 
biochemistry.

Bruno

> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c959ae4d-feb0-4568-83f0-04cc981cfdd7%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/F0D2F8E4-A37B-4686-A2ED-C4438C305314%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-21 Thread Alan Grayson

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable 
> surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even 
> define what consciousness IS. AG
>

Bruno; does "Yes doctor" mean that a patient accepts as fact that removing 
his/her brain and/or nervous system and replacing it with microcircuits 
preserving the same functions, yields a surgical result such that the 
patient upon awakening seems to him or herself, and others, as the same 
"person" who previously approved the surgery? Is this the essence of 
mechanism?  If not, please elaborate. TIA, AG

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f2deceff-c0b2-4991-b54b-c8b78a8b46e8%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/19/2019 4:42 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 12:52:03 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/19/2019 2:45 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy,
velocity,
> acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply
couldn't
> do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to
reality. AG

Sure. But ultimately they are all grounded in ostensive definitions.

Brent

Obstensively, like imagining anything like an elephant exists? But 
what and
how is this imagining helpful in knowing what consciousness us, as 
compared

to specific definitions used in physics as previously indicated? AG

Whether it's helpful or not, it's the basis we have to go on.  Bruno 
wants to define consciousness as whatever is self-referential, because 
he can prove arithmetic is self-referential (given the right coding).  
But I've seen billboards that are self-referential, so I don't think 
that's a good definition.   And even if it's true that consciousness if 
self-referential (I have my doubts), so what?  It's doesn't see that 
essential to consciousness, since I very rarely refer to my consciousness.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c11dd3d1-97b4-6acb-3bea-3a3ce34cf538%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/19/2019 11:04 AM, AG wrote:
I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
"consciousness". In terms of what? Presumably it's properties, as we 
define other entities in physics, such as the electron. Who was the SC 
justice who said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't 
define it prior to the observation?  So far, the most we can say about 
consciousness, that is, its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG


Actually, I think this is questionable.  I'm not sure that I can 
directly refer to my own consciousness.  Whenever I think about by 
consciousness I'm thinking of what it just was, a moment ago.  Of course 
I think the phrase "I'm conscious."  But that's the words. I'm not sure 
there's a qualia of consciousness per se.  Conscious is always 
consciousness OF something...but I don't think that thing can be 
consciousness.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/21fc36d1-387d-e904-41ef-dac2d1816f97%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable 
> surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even 
> define what consciousness IS. AG
>

The fact that Bruno, a prolific poster, won't comment if the above is 
correct, is evidence for me, that at his core, he's is a BS artist. AG 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/0e4ddbcd-4857-49fd-9883-fff55f60d064%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 12:52:03 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/19/2019 2:45 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, 
> > acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't 
> > do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. 
> AG 
>
> Sure. But ultimately they are all grounded in ostensive definitions. 
>
> Brent 
>

Obstensively, like imagining anything like an elephant exists? But what and 
how is this imagining helpful in knowing what consciousness us, as compared 
to specific definitions used in physics as previously indicated? AG

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/00213c27-4cb5-4bda-a670-894ab5f7d482%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-19 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/19/2019 2:45 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, 
acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't 
do physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. AG


Sure. But ultimately they are all grounded in ostensive definitions.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/6910ed1c-bcf8-d5bc-fb17-c237c0cf7ee6%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-19 Thread Philip Thrift



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 10:00:13 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>>
>> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
>> to define it in words? 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
> "consciousness". In terms of what? Presumably it's properties, as we define 
> other entities in physics, such as the electron. Who was the SC justice who 
> said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't define it prior to 
> the observation?  So far, the most we can say about consciousness, that is, 
> its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG
>

On defining 'electron', of course some say

https://ui.adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/1984qtg..book...66D/abstract

Particles do not Exist 

   - Davies, P. C. W. 
   

Abstract

The concept of a particle is purely an idealized model of some utility in 
flat space quantum field theory. Away from that limited context, however, 
the concept becomes much less useful and has been the source of much 
confusion. The study of DeWitt-style particle detectors has exposed the 
nebulousness of the particle concept and suggests that it should be 
abandoned completely.

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/97762695-da5f-4d39-866a-87df29853c2e%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>
> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
> to define it in words? 
>
> Brent 
>

I think you've nailed the problem. We don't know how to define 
"consciousness". In terms of what? Presumably it's properties, as we define 
other entities in physics, such as the electron. Who was the SC justice who 
said you know pornography when you see it, but you can't define it prior to 
the observation?  So far, the most we can say about consciousness, that is, 
its properties, is that it's self-referential. AG

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3442bea9-dddc-4452-be42-72dbf18166a2%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:43 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> How would you know what a LT is unless it was well defined?*
>

By seeing it used in relation to something in the physical world, but I
never have so I have no idea what a "LT" is, but I do know IHA.

John K Clark






>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1UZUhfZh_yeBNbUVtzHdm%2Ba90NtM51W4b2s9YbntFSoQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 4:33:41 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:12 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>  
>
>> > *I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics. 
>> All I am saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part 
>> of an overall process for knowing reality,*
>>
>
> Definitions have nothing to do with knowing reality, sometimes they can 
> help in communicating with fellow human beings but even then they are 
> usually not needed, the meaning of the word is obvious from the usage. That 
> is after all how children learn language, by observing its use in the 
> physical world. 
>

How would you know what a LT is unless it was well defined? I think this 
discussion is worthless and I won't reply to any nonsense put forth to 
continue it. AG 

>
>  > *And most people still use dictionaries*
>>
>
> Dictionaries are only a few hundred years old and even today most humans 
> on this planet have never used a dictionary even once in their entire life.
>  
>
>> *> As I recall quite clearly, it was YOU who have been vigorously 
>> critical of Bruno for his alleged sloppy and varying DEFINITIONS!.*
>>
>
> Definitions are arbitrary human conventions not signposts to ultimate 
> reality, but for communication to be effective they need to be consistent, 
> at least from one paragraph to the next in the same post.  
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/f7db4c1c-af0a-422a-840e-140f0e368cb9%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:12 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

> > *I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics.
> All I am saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part
> of an overall process for knowing reality,*
>

Definitions have nothing to do with knowing reality, sometimes they can
help in communicating with fellow human beings but even then they are
usually not needed, the meaning of the word is obvious from the usage. That
is after all how children learn language, by observing its use in the
physical world.

 > *And most people still use dictionaries*
>

Dictionaries are only a few hundred years old and even today most humans on
this planet have never used a dictionary even once in their entire life.

> *> As I recall quite clearly, it was YOU who have been vigorously critical
> of Bruno for his alleged sloppy and varying DEFINITIONS!.*
>

Definitions are arbitrary human conventions not signposts to ultimate
reality, but for communication to be effective they need to be consistent,
at least from one paragraph to the next in the same post.

 John K Clark

>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv22iPzM_ueg1eyWGRs2mCfDbpMmus3LoFgaa5C4%3D0EYZQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 3:56:43 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 5:45 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>  
>
>> > Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, 
>> acceleration, space, time, entropy?
>>
>
> Sure, and every one of those definitions came from EXAMPLES observed in 
> the physical world. The definitions didn't create the physical world, the 
> physical world created the definitions. 
>
> John K Clark
>

I am not saying that examples are not suggestive of laws of physics. All I 
am saying, which you irrationally deny, is that definitions are part of an 
overall process for knowing reality, that is, for actually doing physics. 
Without them we can't speak meaningfully with each other. And most people 
still use dictionaries, which are now online, and often are implicit in our 
discussions. As I recall quite clearly, it was YOU who have been vigorously 
critical of Bruno for his alleged sloppy and varying DEFINITIONS!. Looks 
like your achieving troll status with foolish argments. So where is Bruno? 
AG 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d5ae645d-40e7-4a75-89a5-3249cdb8717b%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 5:45 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

> > Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity,
> acceleration, space, time, entropy?
>

Sure, and every one of those definitions came from EXAMPLES observed in the
physical world. The definitions didn't create the physical world, the
physical world created the definitions.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1YoNjnN42VrR-Fq6kh%3DK17Q98chYza%3DKvBxN4wV%2BEPUQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 2:40:29 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 9:40 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> >> There is more, much more in a dictionary than definitions made of 
>>> words that are also made of words?! Please give me an *EXAMPLE* of that.
>>>
>>
>> *> Do you use a dictionary? AG *
>>
>
> The last time I used a dictionary was when I was trying to decide if I 
> should use the word "effect" or "affect" and concluded that most people 
> don't know the difference either so it just didn't effect (or affect) 
> communication a great deal one way or the other. And I certainly find a 
> dictionary is never of any help in trying to figure out fundamental 
> questions about reality. Most people don't have a dictionary in their house 
> and haven't used one since they were nine when their fourth grade teacher 
> made them, and yet they somehow manage to communicate just fine. 
>
> And you never answered my question, if it wasn't from EXAMPLES of language 
> use where do you think the people who wrote the dictionary got the 
> knowledge to write their book? I suggest you read the book "The Professor 
> and the Madman" by Simon Winchester, it tells the story of how the ultimate 
> dictionary, The Oxford English Dictionary got made:
>
> The Professor and the Madman: A Tale of Murder, Insanity, and the Making 
> of the Oxford English Dictionary 
> 
>
> John K Clark
>

Don't you use definitions in physics, such as mass, energy, velocity, 
acceleration, space, time, entropy? Without them, we simply couldn't do 
physics. Here, as in your MW obsession, you seem opaque to reality. AG

>
>  
>
>>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/50ceadde-4a8e-4e83-89a3-739bd95c8b22%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-19 Thread Philip Thrift



On Thursday, September 19, 2019 at 3:40:29 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 9:40 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> >> There is more, much more in a dictionary than definitions made of 
>>> words that are also made of words?! Please give me an *EXAMPLE* of that.
>>>
>>
>> *> Do you use a dictionary? AG *
>>
>
> The last time I used a dictionary was when I was trying to decide if I 
> should use the word "effect" or "affect" and concluded that most people 
> don't know the difference either so it just didn't effect (or affect) 
> communication a great deal one way or the other. And I certainly find a 
> dictionary is never of any help in trying to figure out fundamental 
> questions about reality. Most people don't have a dictionary in their house 
> and haven't used one since they were nine when their fourth grade teacher 
> made them, and yet they somehow manage to communicate just fine. 
>
> And you never answered my question, if it wasn't from EXAMPLES of language 
> use where do you think the people who wrote the dictionary got the 
> knowledge to write their book? I suggest you read the book "The Professor 
> and the Madman" by Simon Winchester, it tells the story of how the ultimate 
> dictionary, The Oxford English Dictionary got made:
>
> The Professor and the Madman: A Tale of Murder, Insanity, and the Making 
> of the Oxford English Dictionary 
> 
>
> John K Clark
>




This is a nice online dictionary I found recently:

   https://www.lexico.com/en

 (Try our your favorite word.)

@philpthrift

>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2740a87d-4a13-4173-b09e-0b8e3856bf4f%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 9:40 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>> There is more, much more in a dictionary than definitions made of words
>> that are also made of words?! Please give me an *EXAMPLE* of that.
>>
>
> *> Do you use a dictionary? AG *
>

The last time I used a dictionary was when I was trying to decide if I
should use the word "effect" or "affect" and concluded that most people
don't know the difference either so it just didn't effect (or affect)
communication a great deal one way or the other. And I certainly find a
dictionary is never of any help in trying to figure out fundamental
questions about reality. Most people don't have a dictionary in their house
and haven't used one since they were nine when their fourth grade teacher
made them, and yet they somehow manage to communicate just fine.

And you never answered my question, if it wasn't from EXAMPLES of language
use where do you think the people who wrote the dictionary got the
knowledge to write their book? I suggest you read the book "The Professor
and the Madman" by Simon Winchester, it tells the story of how the ultimate
dictionary, The Oxford English Dictionary got made:

The Professor and the Madman: A Tale of Murder, Insanity, and the Making of
the Oxford English Dictionary

John K Clark

>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3_bJ9fshOvd%3DaoDDNd6ad72u9Pc%2Bjh4z%2BJiWYJELZVnQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:02:09 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable 
> surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even 
> define what consciousness IS. AG
>

The really interesting thing about this thread, and it's hugely telling, is 
that Bruno refuses (yes, refuses) to say whether my comment is correct, and 
if not, what needs to be corrected. AG 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/15140c33-1992-4ff3-9819-d6c2b4a2f990%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 1:37:19 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 3:30 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>  
>
>> * > there's more, much more to dictionaries, than you claim.*
>>
>
> There is more, much more in a dictionary than definitions made of words 
> that are also made of words?! Please give me an *EXAMPLE* of that.
>
> John K Clark
>

Do you use a dictionary? AG 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8bbdc5ac-621e-4918-91ac-bd775eac0353%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/18/2019 5:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 10:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:22 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 08:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

/> //Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG /
/
/
/>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and
so does everyone else. But maybe I am fundamentally
different. How would I know?/

>>> You'd ask people who knew you well.

And if you did that you would hear them make noises with
their mouth, but whatever consciousness is it certainly
isn't those mouth noises. If your lucky you may be able to
detect a pattern in those noises that would indicate
intelligence, but you would have to make an additional
assumption to conclude that also indicated consciousness,
namely that consciousness is an inevitable byproduct of
intelligence. In the real world everybody makes that
assumption a thousand times a day because the alternative is
solipsism.

They question was whether you could find out you were
fundamentally different after an operation. Not whether or
not your friends were conscious. Saibal said "No."
apparently based only on the fact that he couldn't trust
introspection. But in that would equally imply he couldn't
tell whether he fundamentally changed from day to day, or
minute to minute. Of course nothing can provide certainty,
but your friends saying you act differently or you don't
would be good evidence. It's the same level of evidence for
thinking one another consciousness, but it's broader since
you might be different in some way you were not conscious of.

And if you were different in some way you were not conscious of,
it wouldn’t matter.

How do you figure that? Suppose you're a murderous psychopath
after the operation. Just because YOU don't remember not being a
murderous psychopath before, it may still matter.

In that case there would be objective evidence of a change and you
would be conscious of this evidence.

You would be conscious of the fact that your friends and other physical
evidence told you that you had changed. You would not need to have any
feeling (gualia) of difference. Which is why we believe that the shared
physical world is more real/stable/fundamental than our qualia.

Brent

But if neither you nor anyone else noticed a change, it wouldn’t
matter. For example, if my colour qualia changed every day, but there
was no objective difference and I didn’t notice any difference, it
wouldn’t matter. It could be argued that such a change is not really a
change at all.

--
Stathis Papaioannou
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXvvoGn%3DYvoChSL9B0s3-_HEYBnVvGw1%2BWDFH4s%2B%3D%2BPsg%40mail.gmail.com
.

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/3aaba841-3c3c-dc41-e999-c4e2bdb6ed83%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

I

On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 10:17, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 9/18/2019 3:22 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 08:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>> *> **Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG *
>>>
>>> *>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone
>>> else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?*
>>>
>>> >>> You'd ask people who knew you well.
>>>
>>
>> And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth, but
>> whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises. If your
>> lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that would
>> indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional assumption
>> to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is
>> an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody makes
>> that assumption a thousand times a day because the alternative is
>> solipsism.
>>
>>
>> They question was whether you could find out you were fundamentally
>> different after an operation.  Not whether or not your friends were
>> conscious.  Saibal said "No." apparently based only on the fact that he
>> couldn't trust introspection.  But in that would equally imply he couldn't
>> tell whether he fundamentally changed from day to day, or minute to minute.
>> Of course nothing can provide certainty, but your friends saying you act
>> differently or you don't would be good evidence.  It's the same level of
>> evidence for thinking one another consciousness, but it's broader since you
>> might be different in some way you were not conscious of.
>>
>
> And if you were different in some way you were  not conscious of, it
> wouldn’t matter.
>
>
> How do you figure that?  Suppose you're a murderous psychopath after the
> operation.   Just because YOU don't remember not being a murderous
> psychopath before, it may still matter.
>

In that case there would be objective evidence of a change and you would be
conscious of this evidence. But if neither you nor anyone else noticed a
change, it wouldn’t matter. For example, if my colour qualia changed every
day, but there was no objective difference and I didn’t notice any
difference, it wouldn’t matter. It could be argued that such a change is
not really a change at all.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXvvoGn%3DYvoChSL9B0s3-_HEYBnVvGw1%2BWDFH4s%2B%3D%2BPsg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/18/2019 3:22 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 08:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

/> //Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG /
/
/
/>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so
does everyone else. But maybe I am fundamentally different.
How would I know?/

>>> You'd ask people who knew you well.

And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their
mouth, but whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those
mouth noises. If your lucky you may be able to detect a pattern
in those noises that would indicate intelligence, but you would
have to make an additional assumption to conclude that also
indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is an
inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody
makes that assumption a thousand times a day because the
alternative is solipsism.

They question was whether you could find out you were
fundamentally different after an operation. Not whether or not
your friends were conscious. Saibal said "No." apparently based
only on the fact that he couldn't trust introspection. But in
that would equally imply he couldn't tell whether he fundamentally
changed from day to day, or minute to minute. Of course nothing
can provide certainty, but your friends saying you act differently
or you don't would be good evidence. It's the same level of
evidence for thinking one another consciousness, but it's broader
since you might be different in some way you were not conscious of.

And if you were different in some way you were not conscious of, it
wouldn’t matter.

How do you figure that? Suppose you're a murderous psychopath after the
operation. Just because YOU don't remember not being a murderous
psychopath before, it may still matter.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/d2f448a1-a225-ea32-bf07-3efe46718551%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Thu, 19 Sep 2019 at 08:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> *> **Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG *
>>
>> *>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone
>> else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?*
>>
>> >>> You'd ask people who knew you well.
>>
>
> And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth, but
> whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises. If your
> lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that would
> indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional assumption
> to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is
> an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody makes
> that assumption a thousand times a day because the alternative is
> solipsism.
>
>
> They question was whether you could find out you were fundamentally
> different after an operation.  Not whether or not your friends were
> conscious.  Saibal said "No." apparently based only on the fact that he
> couldn't trust introspection.  But in that would equally imply he couldn't
> tell whether he fundamentally changed from day to day, or minute to minute.
> Of course nothing can provide certainty, but your friends saying you act
> differently or you don't would be good evidence.  It's the same level of
> evidence for thinking one another consciousness, but it's broader since you
> might be different in some way you were not conscious of.
>

And if you were different in some way you were  not conscious of, it
wouldn’t matter.
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWkEf7U5HAfM%2BgAWpmcp%3DZYs2vk-4vUNwjKHdB5ZK0soQ%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/18/2019 2:58 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'
> wrote:

/> //Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG /
/
/
/>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does
everyone else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I
know?/

>>> You'd ask people who knew you well.

And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth,
but whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises.
If your lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that
would indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional
assumption to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that
consciousness is an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real
world everybody makes that assumption a thousand times a day because
the alternative is solipsism.

They question was whether you could find out you were fundamentally
different after an operation. Not whether or not your friends were
conscious. Saibal said "No." apparently based only on the fact that he
couldn't trust introspection. But in that would equally imply he
couldn't tell whether he fundamentally changed from day to day, or
minute to minute. Of course nothing can provide certainty, but your
friends saying you act differently or you don't would be good evidence.
It's the same level of evidence for thinking one another consciousness,
but it's broader since you might be different in some way you were not
conscious of.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/deaa9ce8-6ad4-094f-f861-5bc1e77e29fd%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 4:25 PM 'Brent Meeker'  <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

*> **Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG *
>
> *>> Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone
> else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?*
>
> >>> You'd ask people who knew you well.
>

And if you did that you would hear them make noises with their mouth, but
whatever consciousness is it certainly isn't those mouth noises. If your
lucky you may be able to detect a pattern in those noises that would
indicate intelligence, but you would have to make an additional assumption
to conclude that also indicated consciousness, namely that consciousness is
an inevitable byproduct of intelligence. In the real world everybody makes
that assumption a thousand times a day because the alternative is
solipsism.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2FhWqjYLbWSHgOQjndw9G4-vPniD08sHq45z8Afknqyg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 3:27:55 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/18/2019 11:55 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
>> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
>> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
>> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
>> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
>> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
>> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>>
>> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
>> to define it in words? 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>
> Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call 
> "dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define 
> "consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG
>
>
> Like this.  Imagine an elephant.  
>
> Ok, that was you being conscious of an elephant.
>
> Brent
>

Actually I first "imaged" Dumbo, the Disney cartoon character. :)

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/8ba468a6-b03a-470d-9ac2-c23ee628046d%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/18/2019 11:55 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:

On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous
system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or
> perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake
> from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening
> from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge
> stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.

Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it
help
to define it in words?

Brent

Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call
"dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define
"consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG

Like this.  Imagine an elephant.

Ok, that was you being conscious of an elephant.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e609b834-4019-afa7-368f-3907a38b99f6%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 9/18/2019 11:14 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 21:58, Alan Grayson > wrote:




On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:50:36 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:



On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 20:02, Alan Grayson
 wrote:

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or
nervous system with computer microchips and consciousness
will be preserved, or perfectly simulated so the person
who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery
thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from
unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge,
huge stretch since we can even define what consciousness
IS. AG


The complaint that we can’t define, explain or test for
consciousness can be used for “awakening from unremarkable
surgery” as well: people who go through it seem to be the
same, but how could you know?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG


Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone 
else. But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?


You'd ask people who knew you well.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/9f50588b-6790-a076-c43e-6f65f931fb64%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 3:30 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:


> * > there's more, much more to dictionaries, than you claim.*
>

There is more, much more in a dictionary than definitions made of words
that are also made of words?! Please give me an *EXAMPLE* of that.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0UAe0_7dX887fUoeY_44NAG9n901cKo9%3DsZk_8wTmhsw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 1:14:36 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 2:55 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> *> You know, there are things we call "dictionaries" where words are 
>> defined.*
>>
>
> And all those dictionary definitions are made of words, and all those 
> words have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those 
> words have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those 
> words have there own definitions also in the dictionary and round and 
> round we go. Another definition is never going to break is out of that 
> meaningless circle, to do that you're going to need an example. After all, 
> where do you think the people who wrote the dictionary got the knowledge to 
> write their book?
>
> *> If we have no way to define "consciousness", we have no chance of 
>> understanding it.*
>>
>
> That's not true for consciousness and its not true for anything else 
> either. Fundamentally our understanding of the world does not come from 
> definitions, it comes from examples.
>
>  John K Clark
>

Where would science be without its definitions? They are decisive in 
knowing what we are talking about! And there's more, much more to 
dictionaries, than you claim. AG 

>
>
>  
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/43a058f4-4f16-4e3e-b3a8-9f29312e441f%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 2:55 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> You know, there are things we call "dictionaries" where words are
> defined.*
>

And all those dictionary definitions are made of words, and all those words
have there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have
there own definitions also in the dictionary, and all those words have
there own definitions also in the dictionary and round and round we go.
Another definition is never going to break is out of that meaningless
circle, to do that you're going to need an example. After all, where do you
think the people who wrote the dictionary got the knowledge to write their
book?

*> If we have no way to define "consciousness", we have no chance of
> understanding it.*
>

That's not true for consciousness and its not true for anything else
either. Fundamentally our understanding of the world does not come from
definitions, it comes from examples.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv1MFqV9fy9FOoWVpYQ_3v0qoddXbdX6Cac4Je1rGBUU1w%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 12:14:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
> > with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
> > perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
> > from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
> > from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
> > stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS. 
>
> Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
> to define it in words? 
>
> Brent 
>

Ostensively? What do you mean? You know, there are things we call 
"dictionaries" where words are defined. If we have no way to define 
"consciousness", we have no chance of understanding it. AG

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/7f1b1c9f-4bac-44bb-af9e-6dcb9d30c178%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 21:58, Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:50:36 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 20:02, Alan Grayson  wrote:
>>
>>> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
>>> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly
>>> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery
>>> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable
>>> surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even
>>> define what consciousness IS. AG
>>>
>>
>> The complaint that we can’t define, explain or test for consciousness can
>> be used for “awakening from unremarkable surgery” as well: people who go
>> through it seem to be the same, but how could you know?
>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG
>

Yes, and I think I was just the same as before and so does everyone else.
But maybe I am fundamentally different. How would I know?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypWCTC10UFMnum%3Dx7HOkNzPKrRh%2BHUHxwq%3Dj7QHOq-PkHg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/18/2019 3:02 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system 
with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or 
perfectly simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake 
from the surgery thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening 
from unremarkable surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge 
stretch since we can even define what consciousness IS.


Define in terms of what?  We define it ostensively.  How would it help 
to define it in words?


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/83ed667e-758f-4da4-12a7-4e720b2737ba%40verizon.net.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 4:50:36 AM UTC-6, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 20:02, Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
>> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
>> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
>> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable 
>> surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even 
>> define what consciousness IS. AG
>>
>
> The complaint that we can’t define, explain or test for consciousness can 
> be used for “awakening from unremarkable surgery” as well: people who go 
> through it seem to be the same, but how could you know?
>
>> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

Haven't you ever awoken from surgery? AG 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/64aa794f-d505-4b4f-8802-07946f137942%40googlegroups.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 6:02 AM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system
> with computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery
> thinking he/she's the same person,*
>

On some days the meaning of "Mechanism" may mean that in Brunospeak but on
other days it does not, such as the day Bruno said "it is not relevant to
say “yes” or “no” in a practical implementation of Mechanism". The only
thing that remains constant is that the Brunospeak meaning never has any
relationship to the English meaning of the word. And the same thing is true
for words like "God" and "theology".

  John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv24N15Ox3-6PD2c285wrHU9ubS5SrqtOU5GsRUAQGO0qg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

On Wed, 18 Sep 2019 at 20:02, Alan Grayson  wrote:

> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable
> surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even
> define what consciousness IS. AG
>

The complaint that we can’t define, explain or test for consciousness can
be used for “awakening from unremarkable surgery” as well: people who go
through it seem to be the same, but how could you know?

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAH%3D2ypXs%3DQLUMqatjH8C8AftMdd4j1p7Cybj5r2pzihmG3F%2BAg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

2019-09-18 Thread Philip Thrift



On Wednesday, September 18, 2019 at 5:02:09 AM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
> I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
> computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
> simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
> thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable 
> surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even 
> define what consciousness IS. AG
>


I was just taking "Mechanism" as a (computability) term meaning "not able 
to perform Turing jumps".

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_jump

But then there is an "Extended" Mechanism:

  *Turing jumps through provability*
   https://arxiv.org/abs/1501.05327


@philipthrift



 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/09fcda72-da35-4c6d-a3fb-893188b03f6f%40googlegroups.com.

What is Mechanism, Bruno style?

I think he means one can replace a human brain and/or nervous system with 
computer microchips and consciousness will be preserved, or perfectly 
simulated so the person who says "Yes doctor", will awake from the surgery 
thinking he/she's the same person, like awakening from unremarkable 
surgery. From my pov, this belief is a huge, huge stretch since we can even 
define what consciousness IS. AG

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/c959ae4d-feb0-4568-83f0-04cc981cfdd7%40googlegroups.com.

Re: what is mechanism?



On 03 Jul 2012, at 16:33, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 02 Jul 2012, at 23:09, Jason Resch wrote:



To summarize our conversation up to this point:

BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs  
and people and numbers,
JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really  
complex ones with a large information content.  This is the  
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are  
mathematical.
BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish  
a description from the thing described.
JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no  
distinction can ever be made (by observers within a mathematical  
universe and observers within a physical universe) then there is no  
distinction.  You are using "physical" as an honorific, but it adds  
no information.

BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair",  
rather than a "mathematical chair"?
BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at  
'mathematical chair' is. Can you point out how it is different from  
a chair?


I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical  
laws, then observers can make no distinction between whether they  
exist in a platonically existing mathematical object, or a physical  
universe.  If you agree with this, then there is no fundamental  
ontological difference between chairs, people, and numbers, that I  
can see.


Comp allows a big flexibility for the initial basic reality. If we  
choose the natural numbers, then people and chair must be explained  
from them, and usually will not be numbers.



I agree that chairs, people != numbers, but I think they exist in  
the same way numbers exist.



In which theory? What is a chair?










Facing the question: is the universe a mathematical object, or a  
physical one, we must evaluate the two candidate theories as we  
would any other.



With comp, the "universe" is neither primitively physical, nor  
primitive mathematical. It is a mental object, or a theological  
object. It exist as an object of thought in the mind of believing  
machines (relative numbers).



I assume the comp hypothesis, all experiences are the results of  
computations.


This is ambiguous, as computation of unction gives results. I guess  
you mean that consciousness can be related to computation. (The nature  
of that relation is different than we usually think when we abandon  
the physical supervenience thesis).




What I mean by a mathematical universe is any mathematical object  
that implements the computations necessary to contain observers.   
Any given observer, of course, may exist in an infinite number of  
such objects (universes) and there is no one universe the observer  
can rightfully be said to belong to.


Yes there is one. In fact many. In fact all universal systems can do.  
I use the tiny universal fragment of arithmetic to fix the thing.










Does one theory explain more, does one make fewer assumptions, etc.

That is the right attitude.




The existence of the physical universe does not explain the  
existence of mathematical objects, but the converse is true.


Yes. And not only with comp, but with most of his natural weakening.




If we have to explain the existence of both: mathematical objects,  
and the physical universe, the simpler theory is that mathematical  
objects exist, as it also explains the appearance of the physical  
world.  If one accepts mathematical realism, then postulate the  
physical world as some other kind of thing, in addition to its  
mathematical incarnation, is pure redundancy.


OK.
I think that the idea of a primitive universe is a dogma. Of course  
it is only a superfluous (redundant with comp) hypothesis.


Now the idea that the physical universe is "only" a mathematical  
object among others is false too. It is a mental phenomenon as lived  
by internal creature and provably made non mathematical from their  
points of view. The relation between mind and matter, but also  
between physics and the mathematical reality are more subtle than a  
simple mathematicalist shift.  The physical reality "needs" the  
consciousness of *all* (universal, Löbian) machines to exist in some  
sense, even if locally, large part of that physical reality will be  
independent of the local conscious creatures embedded in it. Physics  
is really the result of an epitemological process, which exists by  
the nature of the arithmetical relations.



What do you think about the existence of mathematical objects that  
do not contain observers?


They exist like the object of the term of my (first order  
specification) of my initial universal theory.


With arithmetic, it means that they exist like the numbers exist.



Is their type of existence somehow different from those that can/do  
contain observers?


They are not different. Non u

Re: what is mechanism?

2012-07-03 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 02.07.2012 22:01 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 12:45 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.07.2012 21:08 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 11:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:


...


Where to will you place 'description' in the physicalism? Is
this just some excitation of natural neural nets or something
else?


The description is in Platonia.


This is presumably one of the reasons that Popper at the end has
come to World 3 (equivalent of Platonia):

“If I am right that the physical world has been changed by the
world 3 products of the human mind, acting through the intervention
of the human mind then this means that the worlds 1, 2, and 3, can
interact and, therefore, that none of them is causally closed. The
thesis that the physical world is not causally closed but that it
can be acted upon by world 2 and, through its intervention, by
world 3, seems to be particularly hard to swallow for the
materialist monist, or the physicalist.”

Yet, as a consequence this should mean as Popper mentioned that
"the physical world is not causally closed".


In which case there should be observable events in the brain or
elsewhere which are caused unphysically by events in World 3. It is
not clear to me how this would comport with computationalism which
assumes that any mechanism with the same physical functionality will
always compute the same function. Perhaps quantum randomness allows
this, although the evidence seems to point to the brain being
functionally classical.


The observable effects are human languages, mathematics, art, to name a 
few things. Nevertheless I should agree thatthere is no way that I like 
to explain it.


If we take physics, for example as presented in Hawking's Grand Design, 
then 'description' should be just some excitations of natural neural 
nets in the brains of biological machines. However, in Grand Design 
there was no explanation why these excitations in the brain are able to 
comprehend the M-theory that governs all the observable effects.


According to Bruno, this is another way around. Yet, for me it is also 
unclear how the first person view could comprehend mathematical objects 
that compose the framework of the mathematical universe. As far as I 
understand, human language cannot be formalized mathematically, so it is 
a puzzle how it could be created from arithmetics.


It would be nice to have both, a physical world and Platonia but then 
the connection between the both is a puzzle.


Evgenii

--
Three Worlds by Karl Popper
http://blog.rudnyi.ru/2012/06/three-worlds.html






--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

2012-07-03 Thread smitra


Citeren meekerdb :


On 7/2/2012 6:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 5:35 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 7/2/2012 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



To summarize our conversation up to this point:

BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and 
chairs and people

and numbers,
JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just 
really complex ones
with a large information content.  This is the necessary 
conclusion of anyone

who believes physical laws are mathematical.
BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot 
distinguish a

description from the thing described.
JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no 
distinction can ever
be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and 
observers within a
physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are 
using "physical" as an

honorific, but it adds no information.
BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical 
chair", rather than

a "mathematical chair"?
BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at 
'mathematical chair'

is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?

I think we both agree that if the universe follows 
mathematical laws, then
observers can make no distinction between whether they exist 
in a platonically
existing mathematical object, or a physical universe.  If 
you agree with this,
then there is no fundamental ontological difference between 
chairs, people, and

numbers, that I can see.


No.  The mathematical laws of physics (e.g. the standard model) 
leave initial
conditions undetermined, Which is equivalent to saying every 
solution to the Schrodinger equation is true.


It's true that they are solutions.  It doesn't follow that they exist.

they assume inherent randomness (symmetry breaking), No where in 
the math of quantum mechanics is there anything that suggest 
collapse of the wave function.


Except that's the only way to get a definite result.  Otherwise your 
instruments say, "Well it was probably + and probably -."


A strict interpretation of the the math leaves only MWI (or 
alternatively, as Ron Garett points out zero-universes 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc ).


How did you decide the Born rule wasn't math and wasn't part of QM?

The randomness is explained directly by first person indeterminacy 
in a reality containing all possibilities.


Maybe. But it's not clear that it explains the Born rule.

they don't specify why they are the laws of physics instead of 
some others. Many physicists hope that they will one day find a 
reason that our laws of physics are unique, some justification why 
the one they find themselves in is the only one that can be, but 
this seeming to be a pipe dream.  Many physicists dislike anthropic 
reasoning, perhaps because it spoils their dream of finding a TOE, 
but disliking something shouldn't carry any weight in assessing a 
theory's validity.


I could say the same about the Born rule and disliking that some 
things happen and some don't.


So the ontological difference is that some things exist and some 
don't.  This
distinction doesn't exist in Platonia: exist=having a consistent 
description.  In

physics exist=a member of the ontology of the fundamental model.


What's wrong with Platonia being a fundamental model?


No predictive power: everything exists, everything happens.


The way conventional physics avoids that is by making ad-hoc 
assumptions and by imposing ad hoc boundaries that according to the 
physical model itself don't exist. E.g. it is very hard to escape the 
Boltzmann brain problem in most complete models of the universe. So, 
the predictive power of physics is achieved by imposing additional 
unphysical ad hoc rules.


Of course, with these additional ammendments, physics is still very 
successful. To me this suggests that we shouldn't dismiss any attmepts 
to make a "Platonia model" work, just because you would need to impose 
some additional ad-hoc rules for doing computations, that don't fit in 
well within the Plationia philosophy. It could be that such additional 
rules could be explained later.


Saibal

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

2012-07-03 Thread Jason Resch

On Tue, Jul 3, 2012 at 8:39 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 02 Jul 2012, at 23:09, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>>
>> To summarize our conversation up to this point:
>>
>> BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
>> people and numbers,
>> JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex
>> ones with a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of
>> anyone who believes physical laws are mathematical.
>> BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
>> description from the thing described.
>> JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can
>> ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers
>> within a physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using
>> "physical" as an honorific, but it adds no information.
>> BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
>> JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair",
>> rather than a "mathematical chair"?
>> BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at 'mathematical
>> chair' is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?
>>
>> I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical laws,
>> then observers can make no distinction between whether they exist in a
>> platonically existing mathematical object, or a physical universe.  If you
>> agree with this, then there is no fundamental ontological difference
>> between chairs, people, and numbers, that I can see.
>>
>
> Comp allows a big flexibility for the initial basic reality. If we choose
> the natural numbers, then people and chair must be explained from them, and
> usually will not be numbers.
>
>
I agree that chairs, people != numbers, but I think they exist in the same
way numbers exist.



>
>
>
>
>> Facing the question: is the universe a mathematical object, or a physical
>> one, we must evaluate the two candidate theories as we would any other.
>>
>
>
> With comp, the "universe" is neither primitively physical, nor primitive
> mathematical. It is a mental object, or a theological object. It exist as
> an object of thought in the mind of believing machines (relative numbers).
>
>
I assume the comp hypothesis, all experiences are the results of
computations.  What I mean by a mathematical universe is any mathematical
object that implements the computations necessary to contain observers.
Any given observer, of course, may exist in an infinite number of such
objects (universes) and there is no one universe the observer can
rightfully be said to belong to.



>
>
>
>  Does one theory explain more, does one make fewer assumptions, etc.
>>
>
> That is the right attitude.
>
>
>
>
>  The existence of the physical universe does not explain the existence of
>> mathematical objects, but the converse is true.
>>
>
> Yes. And not only with comp, but with most of his natural weakening.
>
>
>
>
>  If we have to explain the existence of both: mathematical objects, and
>> the physical universe, the simpler theory is that mathematical objects
>> exist, as it also explains the appearance of the physical world.  If one
>> accepts mathematical realism, then postulate the physical world as some
>> other kind of thing, in addition to its mathematical incarnation, is pure
>> redundancy.
>>
>
> OK.
> I think that the idea of a primitive universe is a dogma. Of course it is
> only a superfluous (redundant with comp) hypothesis.
>
> Now the idea that the physical universe is "only" a mathematical object
> among others is false too. It is a mental phenomenon as lived by internal
> creature and provably made non mathematical from their points of view. The
> relation between mind and matter, but also between physics and the
> mathematical reality are more subtle than a simple mathematicalist shift.
>  The physical reality "needs" the consciousness of *all* (universal,
> Löbian) machines to exist in some sense, even if locally, large part of
> that physical reality will be independent of the local conscious creatures
> embedded in it. Physics is really the result of an epitemological process,
> which exists by the nature of the arithmetical relations.
>


What do you think about the existence of mathematical objects that do not
contain observers?  Is their type of existence somehow different from those
that can/do contain observers?

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

2012-07-03 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 11:55 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/2/2012 6:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 5:35 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>> On 7/2/2012 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To summarize our conversation up to this point:
>>>
>>> BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
>>> people and numbers,
>>> JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex
>>> ones with a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of
>>> anyone who believes physical laws are mathematical.
>>> BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
>>> description from the thing described.
>>> JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction
>>> can ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers
>>> within a physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using
>>> "physical" as an honorific, but it adds no information.
>>> BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
>>> JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair",
>>> rather than a "mathematical chair"?
>>> BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at 'mathematical
>>> chair' is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?
>>>
>>> I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical laws,
>>> then observers can make no distinction between whether they exist in a
>>> platonically existing mathematical object, or a physical universe.  If you
>>> agree with this, then there is no fundamental ontological difference
>>> between chairs, people, and numbers, that I can see.
>>>
>>
>>  No.  The mathematical laws of physics (e.g. the standard model) leave
>> initial conditions undetermined,
>
>
> Which is equivalent to saying every solution to the Schrodinger equation
> is true.
>
>
> It's true that they are solutions.  It doesn't follow that they exist.
>

We could take the position that they don't exist, but then we wouldn't be
taking our own theories seriously.

Defending collapse is like defending retrograde motion in order to cling to
a stationary Earth hypothesis: we don't feel the earth moving, it is
against our intuition, so why should we take seriously a theory that says
it moves when we can instead take retrograde motion as true and have a
theory that doesn't upset anyone?

>
>
>
>
>> they assume inherent randomness (symmetry breaking),
>
>
> No where in the math of quantum mechanics is there anything that suggest
> collapse of the wave function.
>
>
> Except that's the only way to get a definite result.  Otherwise your
> instruments say, "Well it was probably + and probably -."
>

They all happen, probability, like time is a phenomenon of observation.

Let me ask you an unrelated question: Do you think quantum computers with
thousands of qubits will one day be built, or do you think they are
impossible to build, for one reason or another?

If you think they will be built one day, the world will be forced to
confront the issue of many universes head-on.  How could a few atoms
calculate what a universe-sized computer could not finish in the entire
lifetime of the universe?

>
>
>  A strict interpretation of the the math leaves only MWI (or
> alternatively, as Ron Garett points out zero-universes
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc ).
>
>
> How did you decide the Born rule wasn't math and wasn't part of QM?
>
>
>
What is your opinion of Deutsch et al.'s work in recovering the Born rule?

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-worlds_interpretation#Deutsch_et_al.
Deutsch *et al.*

An information-theoretic
derivation of the
Born rule from Everettarian assumptions, was produced by David
Deutsch 
(1999)[30]and
refined by Wallace (2002–2009)
[31] 
[32] 
[33] 
[34] and
Saunders (2004).
[35] 
[36] 
Deutsch's
derivation is a two-stage proof: first he shows that the number
of orthonormal Everett-worlds
after a branching is proportional to the conventional probability
density . Then he uses
game theory to show that these are all equally likely to be observed. The
last step in particular has been criticised for
circularity
.[37]
[38]

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 23:09, Jason Resch wrote:




To summarize our conversation up to this point:

BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs  
and people and numbers,
JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really  
complex ones with a large information content.  This is the  
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are  
mathematical.
BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish  
a description from the thing described.
JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no  
distinction can ever be made (by observers within a mathematical  
universe and observers within a physical universe) then there is no  
distinction.  You are using "physical" as an honorific, but it adds  
no information.

BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair",  
rather than a "mathematical chair"?
BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at  
'mathematical chair' is. Can you point out how it is different from  
a chair?


I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical  
laws, then observers can make no distinction between whether they  
exist in a platonically existing mathematical object, or a physical  
universe.  If you agree with this, then there is no fundamental  
ontological difference between chairs, people, and numbers, that I  
can see.


Comp allows a big flexibility for the initial basic reality. If we  
choose the natural numbers, then people and chair must be explained  
from them, and usually will not be numbers.






Facing the question: is the universe a mathematical object, or a  
physical one, we must evaluate the two candidate theories as we  
would any other.



With comp, the "universe" is neither primitively physical, nor  
primitive mathematical. It is a mental object, or a theological  
object. It exist as an object of thought in the mind of believing  
machines (relative numbers).





Does one theory explain more, does one make fewer assumptions, etc.


That is the right attitude.



The existence of the physical universe does not explain the  
existence of mathematical objects, but the converse is true.


Yes. And not only with comp, but with most of his natural weakening.



If we have to explain the existence of both: mathematical objects,  
and the physical universe, the simpler theory is that mathematical  
objects exist, as it also explains the appearance of the physical  
world.  If one accepts mathematical realism, then postulate the  
physical world as some other kind of thing, in addition to its  
mathematical incarnation, is pure redundancy.


OK.
I think that the idea of a primitive universe is a dogma. Of course it  
is only a superfluous (redundant with comp) hypothesis.


Now the idea that the physical universe is "only" a mathematical  
object among others is false too. It is a mental phenomenon as lived  
by internal creature and provably made non mathematical from their  
points of view. The relation between mind and matter, but also between  
physics and the mathematical reality are more subtle than a simple  
mathematicalist shift.  The physical reality "needs" the consciousness  
of *all* (universal, Löbian) machines to exist in some sense, even if  
locally, large part of that physical reality will be independent of  
the local conscious creatures embedded in it. Physics is really the  
result of an epitemological process, which exists by the nature of the  
arithmetical relations.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 21:08, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/2/2012 11:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.07.2012 20:12 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
people and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really
complex ones with a large information content. This is the
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are
mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
description from the thing described.


Brent,

Where to will you place 'description' in the physicalism? Is this  
just some excitation of natural neural nets or something else?


The description is in Platonia.


The description exists in the mind of some subject which might exist  
in some "Platonia", but I am not even sure this can make sense in the  
arithmetical Platonia of comp, where the subject comes *only* from the  
internal view of Platonia, and this one does not belong in any sense  
to Platonia, only in the 1pov-consciousness.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 21:01, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/2/2012 11:21 AM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 1:12 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and  
people and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really  
complex ones with a large information content.  This is the  
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are  
mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a  
description from the thing described.



I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction  
can ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and  
observers within a physical universe) then there is no  
distinction.  You are using "physical" as an honorific, but it adds  
no information.


I can point to a chair and say "This!"


This proves that relatively to you some token are selected. This  
happens provably so in arithmetic (in comp) and so cannot be an  
argument to distinguish physical and mathematical.


The fact is that we have no evidence for something primitively  
physical, and we already know that it does not exist (in any genuine  
sense) in the comp theory of mind/matter.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 20:21, Jason Resch wrote:




On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 1:12 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and  
people and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really  
complex ones with a large information content.  This is the  
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are  
mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a  
description from the thing described.



I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction  
can ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and  
observers within a physical universe) then there is no distinction.   
You are using "physical" as an honorific, but it adds no information.


I agree, but Brent's remark was not instrumentalist, but metaphysical.  
For some reason he seems to want physics being fundamental, and even  
if we cannot distinguish physical and mathematical universe, the  
distinction can still make sense in abstracto.
But with comp we have really no choice. We can give a role of matter,  
in the observation of matter, only by making the mind non Turing  
emulable.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 20:12, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and  
people and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really  
complex ones with a large information content.  This is the  
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are  
mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a  
description from the thing described.



I can follow you on this. the fact that the chair obeys mathematical  
laws does not logically entail per se that the chair is a mathematical  
object. But comp does not give any choice in the matter, as I have  
already explain.
A non mathematical chair cannot select a mathematical comp  
consciousness without both the chair and the consciousness being non  
Turing emulable. Your argument might apply on Tegmark, but obviously  
Tegmark does not take the 1-comp indeterminacy into account.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?


On 7/2/2012 6:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 5:35 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 7/2/2012 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



To summarize our conversation up to this point:

BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and 
people
and numbers,
JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really 
complex ones
with a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of 
anyone
who believes physical laws are mathematical.
BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
description from the thing described.
JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction 
can ever
be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers 
within a
physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using 
"physical" as an
honorific, but it adds no information.
BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair", 
rather than
a "mathematical chair"?
BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at 'mathematical 
chair'
is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?

I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical laws, 
then
observers can make no distinction between whether they exist in a 
platonically
existing mathematical object, or a physical universe.  If you agree 
with this,
then there is no fundamental ontological difference between chairs, 
people, and
numbers, that I can see.


No.  The mathematical laws of physics (e.g. the standard model) leave 
initial
conditions undetermined, 



Which is equivalent to saying every solution to the Schrodinger equation is 
true.


It's true that they are solutions.  It doesn't follow that they exist.

they assume inherent randomness (symmetry breaking), 



No where in the math of quantum mechanics is there anything that suggest collapse of the 
wave function.


Except that's the only way to get a definite result.  Otherwise your instruments say, 
"Well it was probably + and probably -."


A strict interpretation of the the math leaves only MWI (or alternatively, as Ron Garett 
points out zero-universes https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc ).


How did you decide the Born rule wasn't math and wasn't part of QM?

The randomness is explained directly by first person indeterminacy in a reality 
containing all possibilities.


Maybe. But it's not clear that it explains the Born rule.

they don't specify why they are the laws of physics instead of some others. 



Many physicists hope that they will one day find a reason that our laws of physics are 
unique, some justification why the one they find themselves in is the only one that can 
be, but this seeming to be a pipe dream.  Many physicists dislike anthropic reasoning, 
perhaps because it spoils their dream of finding a TOE, but disliking something 
shouldn't carry any weight in assessing a theory's validity.


I could say the same about the Born rule and disliking that some things happen 
and some don't.


So the ontological difference is that some things exist and some don't.  
This
distinction doesn't exist in Platonia: exist=having a consistent 
description.  In
physics exist=a member of the ontology of the fundamental model.


What's wrong with Platonia being a fundamental model?


No predictive power: everything exists, everything happens.



That's why Everett, to avoid having some randomness, postulated that we 
exist in
many copies.


I think there are more reasons than that.  Before Everett, QM was extremely ugly, being 
the only non-local, non-time reversible, FTL permitting, theory in all of physics.  It 
is more accurate to say Bohr and Heisenberg inserted collapse into the theory in an 
attempt to rescue the single-universe idea.  There is nothing in the math of QM to 
suggest collapse exists, its addition was entirely artificial, and done to make the 
theory seem to fit in with our experience.


What shameful reason!  :-)

Everett showed there was no need to do this to fit with our experience, as the theory 
itself explains why we don't feel ourselves split.


 Others have postulated multiple copies of the universe beyond the Hubble 
radius or
in separate inflating spacetimes.  Tegmark proposed "all mathematical 
structures".
 Most of this strikes me as a metaphysical stretch to equate the physical 
world with
the Platonic.


Why?

 In Platonia everything not self-contradictory exists.  There is no 
difference
between logical and nomological. Our universe is 'explained' by anthropic 
selection
from everything. 



And yet another mystery: fine tuning, is explained away.

 So do you think there were chairs before there were people?

Re: what is mechanism?

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 5:35 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 7/2/2012 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> To summarize our conversation up to this point:
>>
>> BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
>> people and numbers,
>> JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex
>> ones with a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of
>> anyone who believes physical laws are mathematical.
>> BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
>> description from the thing described.
>> JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can
>> ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers
>> within a physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using
>> "physical" as an honorific, but it adds no information.
>> BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
>> JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair",
>> rather than a "mathematical chair"?
>> BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at 'mathematical
>> chair' is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?
>>
>> I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical laws,
>> then observers can make no distinction between whether they exist in a
>> platonically existing mathematical object, or a physical universe.  If you
>> agree with this, then there is no fundamental ontological difference
>> between chairs, people, and numbers, that I can see.
>>
>
> No.  The mathematical laws of physics (e.g. the standard model) leave
> initial conditions undetermined,

Which is equivalent to saying every solution to the Schrodinger equation is
true.

> they assume inherent randomness (symmetry breaking),

No where in the math of quantum mechanics is there anything that suggest
collapse of the wave function.  A strict interpretation of the the math
leaves only MWI (or alternatively, as Ron Garett points out zero-universes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dEaecUuEqfc ).  The randomness is explained
directly by first person indeterminacy in a reality containing all
possibilities.

> they don't specify why they are the laws of physics instead of some
> others.

Many physicists hope that they will one day find a reason that our laws of
physics are unique, some justification why the one they find themselves in
is the only one that can be, but this seeming to be a pipe dream.  Many
physicists dislike anthropic reasoning, perhaps because it spoils their
dream of finding a TOE, but disliking something shouldn't carry any weight
in assessing a theory's validity.

> So the ontological difference is that some things exist and some don't.
>  This distinction doesn't exist in Platonia: exist=having a consistent
> description.  In physics exist=a member of the ontology of the fundamental
> model.
>

What's wrong with Platonia being a fundamental model?

>
> That's why Everett, to avoid having some randomness, postulated that we
> exist in many copies.

I think there are more reasons than that.  Before Everett, QM was extremely
ugly, being the only non-local, non-time reversible, FTL permitting, theory
in all of physics.  It is more accurate to say Bohr and Heisenberg inserted
collapse into the theory in an attempt to rescue the single-universe idea.
There is nothing in the math of QM to suggest collapse exists, its addition
was entirely artificial, and done to make the theory seem to fit in with
our experience.  Everett showed there was no need to do this to fit with
our experience, as the theory itself explains why we don't feel ourselves
split.

>  Others have postulated multiple copies of the universe beyond the Hubble
> radius or in separate inflating spacetimes.  Tegmark proposed "all
> mathematical structures".  Most of this strikes me as a metaphysical
> stretch to equate the physical world with the Platonic.

Why?

>  In Platonia everything not self-contradictory exists.  There is no
> difference between logical and nomological. Our universe is 'explained' by
> anthropic selection from everything.

And yet another mystery: fine tuning, is explained away.

>  So do you think there were chairs before there were people?  Were there
> numbers before people?
>
>
There is no before or after in Platonia.  Time is only meaningful to
observers inside certain mathematical structures.

>
>
>> Facing the question: is the universe a mathematical object, or a physical
>> one, we must evaluate the two candidate theories as we would any other.
>>
>
> That's not the question.  The question is whether all mathematical objects
> exist while only some physical ones do.

No.  If all mathematical objects exist, then all things which could be
considered physical universes exist too.  What possible difference is there
between a physical universe and a mathematical structure isomorphic to that
universe?  Should these extraneous physical universes not be discarded
according to Occam?

>

Re: what is mechanism?

On 7/2/2012 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

To summarize our conversation up to this point:

BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and people
and numbers,
JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex ones with a
large information content. This is the necessary conclusion of anyone who believes
physical laws are mathematical.
BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a description from
the thing described.
JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can ever be made
(by observers within a mathematical universe and observers within a physical universe)
then there is no distinction. You are using "physical" as an honorific, but it adds no
information.

BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair", rather than a
"mathematical chair"?
BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair. I don't know what at 'mathematical chair' is. Can
you point out how it is different from a chair?

I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical laws, then observers can
make no distinction between whether they exist in a platonically existing mathematical
object, or a physical universe. If you agree with this, then there is no fundamental
ontological difference between chairs, people, and numbers, that I can see.

No. The mathematical laws of physics (e.g. the standard model) leave initial conditions
undetermined, they assume inherent randomness (symmetry breaking), they don't specify why
they are the laws of physics instead of some others. So the ontological difference is that
some things exist and some don't. This distinction doesn't exist in Platonia:
exist=having a consistent description. In physics exist=a member of the ontology of the
fundamental model.

That's why Everett, to avoid having some randomness, postulated that we exist in many
copies. Others have postulated multiple copies of the universe beyond the Hubble radius
or in separate inflating spacetimes. Tegmark proposed "all mathematical structures".
Most of this strikes me as a metaphysical stretch to equate the physical world with the
Platonic. In Platonia everything not self-contradictory exists. There is no difference
between logical and nomological. Our universe is 'explained' by anthropic selection from
everything. So do you think there were chairs before there were people? Were there
numbers before people?

Facing the question: is the universe a mathematical object, or a physical one, we must
evaluate the two candidate theories as we would any other.

That's not the question. The question is whether all mathematical objects exist while
only some physical ones do. In the latter case we need to find which physical ones exist
and what is their mathematical description.

Does one theory explain more, does one make fewer assumptions, etc. The existence of
the physical universe does not explain the existence of mathematical objects

I think it does. See William S. Coopers "The Evolution of Reason".

, but the converse is true.

But only in the cheap sense of 'explain' like "God did it." Bruno at least limits his
fundamental ontology to digital computation, but even this threatens to 'explain' too much.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

To summarize our conversation up to this point:

BM: Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
people and numbers,
JR: Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex
ones with a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of
anyone who believes physical laws are mathematical.
BM: No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
description from the thing described.
JR: I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can
ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers
within a physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using
"physical" as an honorific, but it adds no information.
BM: I can point to a chair and say "This!"
JR: Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair", rather
than a "mathematical chair"?
BM: I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at 'mathematical
chair' is. Can you point out how it is different from a chair?

I think we both agree that if the universe follows mathematical laws, then
observers can make no distinction between whether they exist in a
platonically existing mathematical object, or a physical universe.  If you
agree with this, then there is no fundamental ontological difference
between chairs, people, and numbers, that I can see.

Facing the question: is the universe a mathematical object, or a physical
one, we must evaluate the two candidate theories as we would any other.
 Does one theory explain more, does one make fewer assumptions, etc.  The
existence of the physical universe does not explain the existence of
mathematical objects, but the converse is true.  If we have to explain the
existence of both: mathematical objects, and the physical universe, the
simpler theory is that mathematical objects exist, as it also explains
the appearance of the physical world.  If one accepts mathematical realism,
then postulate the physical world as some other kind of thing, in addition
to its mathematical incarnation, is pure redundancy.

Jason


>
>
>
>  Also, the "point test" fails to work for past or future times, different
> branches of the wave function, etc.
>
>
> But it's fundamental. All the others depend on it through physical links.
>
> Brent
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

On 7/2/2012 12:45 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.07.2012 21:08 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 11:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.07.2012 20:12 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs
and people and numbers,

Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really
complex ones with a large information content. This is the
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are
mathematical.

No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish
a description from the thing described.

Brent,

Where to will you place 'description' in the physicalism? Is this
just some excitation of natural neural nets or something else?

The description is in Platonia.

This is presumably one of the reasons that Popper at the end has come to World 3
(equivalent of Platonia):

“If I am right that the physical world has been changed by the world 3 products of the
human mind, acting through the intervention of the human mind then this means that the
worlds 1, 2, and 3, can interact and, therefore, that none of them is causally closed.
The thesis that the physical world is not causally closed but that it can be acted upon
by world 2 and, through its intervention, by world 3, seems to be particularly hard to
swallow for the materialist monist, or the physicalist.”

Yet, as a consequence this should mean as Popper mentioned that "the physical world is
not causally closed".

In which case there should be observable events in the brain or elsewhere which are caused
unphysically by events in World 3. It is not clear to me how this would comport with
computationalism which assumes that any mechanism with the same physical functionality
will always compute the same function. Perhaps quantum randomness allows this, although
the evidence seems to point to the brain being functionally classical.

Brent

Re: what is mechanism?

2012-07-02 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 02.07.2012 21:08 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 11:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.07.2012 20:12 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs
and people and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really
complex ones with a large information content. This is the
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are
mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish
a description from the thing described.


Brent,

Where to will you place 'description' in the physicalism? Is this
just some excitation of natural neural nets or something else?


The description is in Platonia.


This is presumably one of the reasons that Popper at the end has come to 
World 3 (equivalent of Platonia):


“If I am right that the physical world has been changed by the world 3 
products of the human mind, acting through the intervention of the human 
mind then this means that the worlds 1, 2, and 3, can interact and, 
therefore, that none of them is causally closed. The thesis that the 
physical world is not causally closed but that it can be acted upon by 
world 2 and, through its intervention, by world 3, seems to be 
particularly hard to swallow for the materialist monist, or the 
physicalist.”


Yet, as a consequence this should mean as Popper mentioned that "the 
physical world is not causally closed".


Evgenii


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?


On 7/2/2012 12:08 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 2:01 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 7/2/2012 11:21 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 1:12 PM, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and 
people
and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex 
ones with
a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of 
anyone who
believes physical laws are mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a 
description
from the thing described.


I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can ever 
be made
(by observers within a mathematical universe and observers within a physical
universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using "physical" as an 
honorific,
but it adds no information.


I can point to a chair and say "This!"


Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair", rather than a 
"mathematical chair"?


I know I'm pointing at a chair.  I don't know what at 'mathematical chair' is. Can you 
point out how it is different from a chair?




Also, the "point test" fails to work for past or future times, different branches of the 
wave function, etc.


But it's fundamental. All the others depend on it through physical links.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 2:01 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/2/2012 11:21 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 1:12 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>  Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
>>> people and numbers,
>>>
>>
>>
>> Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex ones
>> with a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of
>> anyone who believes physical laws are mathematical.
>>
>>
>> No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
>> description from the thing described.
>>
>>
>  I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can
> ever be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers
> within a physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using
> "physical" as an honorific, but it adds no information.
>
>
> I can point to a chair and say "This!"
>
>
Yes, but how do you know you are pointing to a "physical chair", rather
than a "mathematical chair"?

Also, the "point test" fails to work for past or future times, different
branches of the wave function, etc.

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?


On 7/2/2012 11:50 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

On 02.07.2012 20:12 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
 people and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really
complex ones with a large information content. This is the
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are
mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
description from the thing described.


Brent,

Where to will you place 'description' in the physicalism? Is this just some excitation 
of natural neural nets or something else?


The description is in Platonia.

Brent



Evgenii



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?


On 7/2/2012 11:21 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 1:12 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and 
people and
numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex ones 
with a
large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of anyone who 
believes
physical laws are mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a 
description from
the thing described.


I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can ever be made (by 
observers within a mathematical universe and observers within a physical universe) then 
there is no distinction.  You are using "physical" as an honorific, but it adds no 
information.


I can point to a chair and say "This!"

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

2012-07-02 Thread Evgenii Rudnyi


On 02.07.2012 20:12 meekerdb said the following:

On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
 people and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really
complex ones with a large information content. This is the
necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical laws are
mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
description from the thing described.


Brent,

Where to will you place 'description' in the physicalism? Is this just 
some excitation of natural neural nets or something else?


Evgenii

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?

On 02 Jul 2012, at 19:39, meekerdb wrote:

On 7/2/2012 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It is no different than abstracting apples and oranges as fruit
so that we can add one apple to one orange and get two fruit. It
doesn't make apples and oranges the same thing.

Sure. But it makes both of them being incarnation of fruit, showing
that fruit can exist even without apple or without orange.

But then your step 8 is analogous to saying that fruit exists in
Platonia, independent of any physical realizations, and then since
we can dispense with an physical realization of a fruit, physics is
not fundamental but fruit is.

No doubt that the fruits are physical, and biological, and have deep
relation with our local constitutions.

I am not saying that physics is not fundamental, in the sense that it
determines indeed our local neighborhoods. I am saying that if comp is
correct we have the problem to relate the inference made by the
machines in those computations coherent with what they experienced,
which has to take the complex 1-indeterminacy domain given by UD*, or
by elementary arithmetic. But this results in having to derive physics
from the comp 1-indeterminacy, the global one, below our substitution
level, on UD*, or equivalently the sigma_1 complete part of
arithmetic. That is huge, from inside.

Bruno

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: what is mechanism?

On Mon, Jul 2, 2012 at 1:12 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>  Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and
>> people and numbers,
>>
>
>
> Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex ones
> with a large information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of
> anyone who believes physical laws are mathematical.
>
>
> No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a
> description from the thing described.
>
>
I think the identity of indiscernibles applies: If no distinction can ever
be made (by observers within a mathematical universe and observers within a
physical universe) then there is no distinction.  You are using "physical"
as an honorific, but it adds no information.

Jason

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?


On 7/2/2012 7:36 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


Do you really not see any difference between tables and chairs and people 
and numbers,



Chairs and people are also mathematical objects, just really complex ones with a large 
information content.  This is the necessary conclusion of anyone who believes physical 
laws are mathematical.


No, it's a necessary conclusion of anyone who cannot distinguish a description from the 
thing described.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?


On 7/2/2012 1:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 It is no different than abstracting apples and oranges as fruit so that we can add one 
apple to one orange and get two fruit.  It doesn't make apples and oranges the same thing.


Sure. But it makes both of them being incarnation of fruit, showing that fruit can exist 
even without apple or without orange. 


But then your step 8 is analogous to saying that fruit exists in Platonia, independent of 
any physical realizations, and then since we can dispense with an physical realization of 
a fruit, physics is not fundamental but fruit is.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 11:54, Bruno Marchal wrote (to Stephen):

It is the believe that the principle of excluded middle can be apply  
on the arithmetical sentence. In particular the proof needs ony the  
belief that phi_i(j) converge or diverge, or that the machine i  
applied on j stops or does not stop, and this for any i and j.


Of course I meant: it is the BELIEF  can be APPLIED ... on the  
arithmetic sentenceS.  In particular ... phi_i(j) convergeS or  
divergeS ...


I feel very sorry for my too quick spelling. Please ask me to rewrite  
any paragraph in case too much spelling mistakes make the statement  
ambiguous. Thanks for your patience.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 10:28, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 7/2/2012 4:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 01 Jul 2012, at 20:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/1/2012 4:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Except neither fortran nor Turing machines exist apart from  
physical realizations.



Of course they do. Turing machine and fortran program are  
mathematical, arithmetical actually, object. They exist in the  
same sense that the number 17 exists.


Exactly, as ideas - patterns in brain processes.


That would contradict the Arithmetical realism, and thus Church  
thesis, comp, etc.


Hi!

A big carve out of the preceding thread... We need an exact  
definition of Realism!


It is the believe that the principle of excluded middle can be apply  
on the arithmetical sentence. In particular the proof needs ony the  
belief that phi_i(j) converge or diverge, or that the machine i  
applied on j stops or does not stop, and this for any i and j.











Brent

We can implement them in physical system, but this does not make  
them physical.





They are abstractions.


If you want. This changes nothing.






There is no need of step 8, here. It is just a mathematical  
fact that arithmetic emulates all programs, in the mathematical  
sense of "emulate".


That's a metaphorical sense.


Not at all.



"Arithmetic" doesn't act or perform anything,



Acting and performing are the metaphor here. Computation is a  
purely mathematical notion discovered before the building of  
physical computer. Some could even argue that the physical  
reality can only approximate them.


Right. They are idealizations.

And with comp we have to define eventually notion like acting and  
performing from the relation between numbers, and this is rather  
easy to do.


That doesn't follow. Comp only says that we could substitute some  
different physical structure for part (or all) of a brain, and so  
long as the input/output functions were always


At some level,


But is this level reachable by finite means?


Yes, in the sense that the UD will, after a finite number of  
computation steps (in the math sense) reach the corresponding genuine  
computational state(s).









the same consciousness would be unchanged.


OK.


But how exactly would we measure this invariance of consciousness?


Like we do each time we go to the hospital, or in any life situation.



How do we deal with the parochial nature of the encodings of the  
diaries that the various observers write such that we have something  
like a 3p account of the experience? What I write in my diary might  
be in a code that only I might understand, so how do we compensate  
for this variability of language?


For the same reason we agree with Gödel's proof despite he wrote it in  
german. Either use a dictionary or ask an interpreter. In this present  
case, we can ask to the candidate to write W, if he self-localizes  
himself  in Washington, after the duplication/differentiation, and M  
if not.









So comp allows that we may still need a physical realization of  
the functionality.


In which case physical inactive object, with respect to a  
particular computation, must be physically active. That is a  
contradiction. Cf step 8.


In the case of a Mach–Zehnder interferometer we see that what  
appears to be physically purely passive and inactive arms can and  
does play a real and causal part such that its removal makes a  
difference.


But if you simulate that with a Turing machine, you see that the arms  
does play a role, you have just a multiverse. Then we do the step 8 on  
that deeper simulation.








That this can be described by relations between numbers does not  
entail that it is replaceable by the abstraction.


Indeed, and that is why there is a step 8.


But Step 8 makes a leap too far. It mistakes the relative  
independence of computations for complete separation from physical  
systems.


That is the result of step 8. To make the reasoning invalid, it is  
enough to tell us that the result is surprising.









What is difficult is to get the right measure on the  
computations, not to define action and performance.
I am explaining what is a computation on the FOAR list, but you  
can find it also in any textbook on theoretical computer science.  
No notion of physics are involved at all in the definition.


But those definitions are concerned with abstracting away the  
physical,


If you want.


We do!



since the physical realization can be different for  
(approximately) the same function.


You are confusing a computation with its implementation in a  
physical reality. Computations have been discovered in the  
mathematical reality, before we implemented them in the physical  
reality. They exist independently of us, once you agree that 17 is  
prime is true independently of us. And "17 is prime independently  
of us" is obligatory to explain what Church thesis is, so we assume  
that implicitly when saying "yes" to the doctor.


There simply

Re: what is mechanism?



On 02 Jul 2012, at 04:45, Jason Resch wrote:

I agree that solving one problem (ontology) has created a new one  
(predicting experiences), but if solutions to old problems didn't  
bring new questions, science would have hit a dead end long ago.   
But just because we are faced with a new problem does not mean we  
haven't gotten anywhere.



Good point. Normally it should be considered as a progress. A problem  
(the mind-body problem) has been reduced into another problem (the  
measure on the relative computational histories).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Re: what is mechanism?