Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

I am afraid that your response was not very helpful to me.

JLRC:  In the triple, Qualisign, Icon, Rheme, the rheme of the Icon(s), is
consistent with the measurements of the qualisigns.


Every Qualisign is also an Icon and a Rheme, so I do not know what you mean
by "the rheme of the Icon(s)" or "the measurements of the qualisigns" in
this context.

JLRC:  Qualisigns are measurements of the identity of material components
of matter, that is, the chemical elements.


My understanding of Peirce is that Qualisigns are qualities that are Signs
(CP 2.244), not measurements of anything.

JLRC:  Do you consider the three trichotomies to be sources of logical
propositions that can be confirmed or denied in the laboratory?


I consider the three trichotomies to be divisions of Signs.  What kinds of
logical propositions do you have in mind?  How would we confirm or deny
them in the laboratory?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 27, 2017 at 11:08 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon, List
>
> On Apr 20, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> What do you mean by "metrological potentials" or "metrological
> considerations"?  How do they relate to the thread topic?  Would you mind
> providing some examples?
>
> Metrology is the study of measurement.
>
> Every sin-sign is a material object.  That is realism.
>
> In the triple, Qualisign, Icon, Rheme, the rheme of the Icon(s), is
> consistent with the measurements of the qualisigns.
>
> Do you think CSP understood scientific inferences of this nature?  See
> 3.421.
>
> NB, the necessity to interrelate measurements on objects with scientific
> calculations in order to construct arguments to relate the signs of nature
> symbolically has not changed.  Indeed, these conscious human activities
> were essential to scientific activities for CSP and for scientists and
> engineers today.
>
> Example: consider 3.421.
> Qualisigns are measurements of the identity of material components of
> matter, that is, the chemical elements.
> These and related signs are represented as blanks in CSP’s propositions.
> “Playing with diagrams”, one of CSP’s favorite phrases, creates possible
> organizations of the terms in the sentences of the rheme.
>
> Do you consider the three trichotomies to be sources of logical
> propositions that can be confirmed or denied in the laboratory?
>
> Or, was CSP being a jokester and seeking to use his sense of humor to
> construct the three trichotomies simply in order to puzzle philosophers for
> the next Century?
>
> With each passing month, the posters to this list are adding to a simple
> proposition:
>
> Inquiry into the meanings of CSP’s writings depends on the meanings of
> symbols.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, List
.
> On Apr 20, 2017, at 2:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> 
> What do you mean by "metrological potentials" or "metrological 
> considerations"?  How do they relate to the thread topic?  Would you mind 
> providing some examples?
> 

Metrology is the study of measurement.

Every sin-sign is a material object.  That is realism.  

In the triple, Qualisign, Icon, Rheme, the rheme of the Icon(s), is consistent 
with the measurements of the qualisigns.

Do you think CSP understood scientific inferences of this nature?  See 3.421.  

NB, the necessity to interrelate measurements on objects with scientific 
calculations in order to construct arguments to relate the signs of nature 
symbolically has not changed.  Indeed, these conscious human activities were 
essential to scientific activities for CSP and for scientists and engineers 
today.

Example: consider 3.421.
Qualisigns are measurements of the identity of material components of matter, 
that is, the chemical elements.
These and related signs are represented as blanks in CSP’s propositions.
“Playing with diagrams”, one of CSP’s favorite phrases, creates possible 
organizations of the terms in the sentences of the rheme. 

Do you consider the three trichotomies to be sources of logical propositions 
that can be confirmed or denied in the laboratory?  

Or, was CSP being a jokester and seeking to use his sense of humor to construct 
the three trichotomies simply in order to puzzle philosophers for the next 
Century?

With each passing month, the posters to this list are adding to a simple 
proposition:

Inquiry into the meanings of CSP’s writings depends on the meanings of symbols.

Cheers

Jerry





> Thanks,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 12:42 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> Jon, List:
>> On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > > wrote:
>> 
>> Jerry C., List:
>> 
>> To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring? 
> I was referring to this conjecture / statement / assertion / hypothesis/ 
> antecedent /…
>>> Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object determines 
>>> the Sign, 
> 
> The question of whether or not a sign determines an object or the object 
> determines the sign is open.  The meaning is context dependent in normal 
> linguistic usage.
> 
> In the chemical sciences, the apperception of Object and the Signs of the 
> Object (physical predicates) and the appellations of the object are used to 
> determine the logic of the proof of structure (the copulatives of the 
> argument.)  
> 
> N.B., this is one of the factual aspects of the chemical and biological 
> sciences that separated these disciplines from the vastly simpler physical 
> and mathematical disciplines.
>> What exactly do you mean by "reference terms" in those hypotheses?
> My view is that a symbol system is grounded in root symbols (reference terms) 
> that have meaning such that a message can be composed.  
> 
> In scientific / engineering discourse, the scientific and engineering symbols 
> infer metrological potentials.
> 
> In the “CSP-speak” of frequent posters to this list, such metrological 
> considerations are often excluded.
> 
> IMHO, of course.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 
>> Thanks,
>> 
>> Jon S.
>> 
>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>> > wrote:
>> Jon:
>>> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>>> 
>>>   Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object 
>>> determines the Sign, 
>> Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically.
>>> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
>>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>>> 
>>> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary 
>>> hypothesis”; 
>> Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis.
>> 
>> Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical or 
>> scientific reasoning?
>> 
>> In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the 
>> propositions you are proposing?  
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>> > wrote:
>>> List, Jon:
 On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote:
 
 If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

In the long quote that I included in my last post, Peirce acknowledged that
the Sign sometimes *creates *its Object; but nevertheless, it remains the
case that the Object *determines *the Sign, which shows that Peirce's usage
of "determination" is not at all equivalent to *causation*.

CSP:  It may be asked, for example, how a lying or erroneous Sign is
determined by its Object, or how if, as not infrequently happens, the
Object is brought into existence by the Sign ... The Object of a Sign may
be something to be created by the sign ... The Object of the sentence
"Hamlet was insane" is the Universe of Shakespeare's Creation so far as it
is determined by Hamlet being a part of it. The Object of the Command
"Ground arms!" is the immediately subsequent action of the soldiers so far
as it is affected by the molition expressed in the command. It cannot be
understood unless collateral observation shows the speaker's relation to
the rank of soldiers. You may say, if you like, that the Object is in the
Universe of things desired by the Commanding Captain at that moment. Or
since the obedience is fully expected, it is in the Universe of his
expectation. At any rate, it [the Object] determines the Sign although it
is to be created by the Sign by the circumstance that its Universe is
relative to the momentary state of mind of the officer. (CP 8.178; 1909)


What do you mean by "metrological potentials" or "metrological
considerations"?  How do they relate to the thread topic?  Would you mind
providing some examples?

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 12:42 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon, List:
>
> On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring?
>
> I was referring to this conjecture / statement / assertion / hypothesis/
> antecedent /…
>
> Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object
>> determines the Sign,
>>
>> The question of whether or not a sign determines an object or the object
> determines the sign is open.  The meaning is context dependent in normal
> linguistic usage.
>
> *In the chemical sciences, the apperception of Object and the Signs of the
> Object (physical predicates) and the appellations of the object are used to
> determine the logic of the proof of structure (the copulatives of the
> argument.)  *
>
> N.B., this is one of the factual aspects of the chemical and biological
> sciences that separated these disciplines from the vastly simpler physical
> and mathematical disciplines.
>
> What exactly do you mean by "reference terms" in those hypotheses?
>
> My view is that a symbol system is grounded in root symbols (reference
> terms) that have meaning such that a message can be composed.
>
> In scientific / engineering discourse, the scientific and engineering
> symbols infer metrological potentials.
>
> In the “CSP-speak” of frequent posters to this list, such metrological
> considerations are often excluded.
>
> IMHO, of course.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> Jon:
>>
>> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>>
>>
>>   Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object
>> determines the Sign,
>>
>> Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically.
>>
>> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of
>> the interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>>
>>
>> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary
>> hypothesis”;
>>
>> Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis.
>>
>> Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical
>> or scientific reasoning?
>>
>> In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the
>> propositions you are proposing?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
>> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List, Jon:
>>>
>>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object
>>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>>>
>>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>>>
>>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
>>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>>>
>>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
>>>
>>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, List:

> On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:42 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring? 

I was referring to this conjecture / statement / assertion / hypothesis/ 
antecedent /…

>> Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object determines 
>> the Sign, 


The question of whether or not a sign determines an object or the object 
determines the sign is open.  The meaning is context dependent in normal 
linguistic usage.

In the chemical sciences, the apperception of Object and the Signs of the 
Object (physical predicates) and the appellations of the object are used to 
determine the logic of the proof of structure (the copulatives of the 
argument.)  

N.B., this is one of the factual aspects of the chemical and biological 
sciences that separated these disciplines from the vastly simpler physical and 
mathematical disciplines.


> What exactly do you mean by "reference terms" in those hypotheses?
> 
My view is that a symbol system is grounded in root symbols (reference terms) 
that have meaning such that a message can be composed.  

In scientific / engineering discourse, the scientific and engineering symbols 
infer metrological potentials.

In the “CSP-speak” of frequent posters to this list, such metrological 
considerations are often excluded.

IMHO, of course.

Cheers

Jerry 





> Thanks,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> Jon:
>> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>> 
>>   Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object 
>> determines the Sign, 
> Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically.
>> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>> 
>> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary hypothesis”; 
> Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis.
> 
> Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical or 
> scientific reasoning?
> 
> In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the 
> propositions you are proposing?  
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
>> Regards,
>> 
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
>> 
>> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>> > wrote:
>> List, Jon:
>>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object 
>>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>> 
>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>> 
>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>> 
>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
>> 
>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” by a 
>> range of metrologies.
>> 
>> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of 
>> interpretant while other measurements are essential to determining the 
>> identity of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Kirsti: 
> On Apr 19, 2017, at 11:51 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
> Why would any pragmatic sign (even limited to science & techology 
> perspectives) be of natural kind? - Scientists and engineers do read and 
> write, do they not?

Perhaps we mis-understand one another. 

I wrote: 

It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:

1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” by a 
range of metrologies.

So, I think I agree with your perspective.

My intent was to avoid the multiplicity of philosophical / linguistic meanings 
associated with the concept of “object” / “objective".  So, by implication, a 
pragmatic object has actual existence / beingness. The assignment of 
purposefulness is arbitrary.

Equally important, the I sought to stress the dependency of the interpretant on 
the interpreter. That is, the mental object generated by the communication 
between the natural kind and the interpretive capacities of the interpreter 
such that a written symbol can be generated by voluntary action.

The interpretant can be symbolically expressed only in the symbol system that 
the interpreter has a competency. 

Cheers

jerry


> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Kirsti
> 
> Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 19.4.2017 17:33:
>> List, Jon:
>>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
>>>  wrote:
>>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the
>>> Object determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering
>> perspective:
>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of
>> signs” by a range of metrologies.
>> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of
>> interpretant while other measurements are _ESSENTIAL TO DETERMINING
>> THE IDENTITY_ of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
>> Cheers
>> Jerry
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

To which specific hypotheses of mine are you referring?  What exactly do
you mean by "reference terms" in those hypotheses?

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Jon:
>
> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>
>
>   Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object
> determines the Sign,
>
> Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically.
>
> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of
> the interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>
>
> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary
> hypothesis”;
>
> Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis.
>
> Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical
> or scientific reasoning?
>
> In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the
> propositions you are proposing?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List, Jon:
>>
>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object
>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>>
>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>>
>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>>
>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
>>
>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs”
>> by a range of metrologies.
>>
>> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of
>> interpretant while other measurements are *essential to determining the
>> identity* of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:


> 
> 
> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
> 
>   Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees that instead the Object determines 
> the Sign, 

Again, I suggest you examine your hypotheses more critically.
> 
> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
> 
> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary hypothesis”; 

Again, I suggest you examine your hypothesis.

Why do you think these hypotheses are are consistent with either logical or 
scientific reasoning?

In logical terms, what role are you assigning to reference terms in the 
propositions you are proposing?  

Cheers

Jerry

> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler 
> > wrote:
> List, Jon:
>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > > wrote:
>> 
>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object 
>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
> 
> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
> 
> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
> 
> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
> 
> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” by a 
> range of metrologies.
> 
> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of 
> interpretant while other measurements are essential to determining the 
> identity of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Stephen C. Rose]

I thought signs were first simply because they are there before we begin
any process. How then can anything be required of them? If they have a life
it is the life we give them by virtue of faculties we might call utilities
of thought. I am not sure if signs determine anything other than what we
determine by making them part ad parcel of whatever processes we
undertake.That they are the foundation of everything is because they are
there.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 10:56 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Jerry C., List:
>
> JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>
>
> As we have been discussing in this thread, CP 2.235-238 seems to require
> that the Intepretant determines the Object, which determines the Sign, on
> the basis of relative complexity.  Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees
> that instead the Object determines the Sign, which determines the
> Interpretant, I am simply looking for the justification of this order.
>
> JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of
> the interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>
>
> My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary
> hypothesis"; by definition, a hypothesis is merely plausible, at best.  In
> any case, I do not know what you mean by "the normativity of the
> interpretant" in this context.  The established habits of interpretation of
> an individual quasi-mind certainly influence what particular Dynamic
> Interpretants a given Sign actually produces in a particular situation, but
> we are talking about how Objects determine Signs in general, and how Signs
> determine Interpretants in general, where "determine" means "constrain with
> respect to Category or Universe."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
> jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:
>
>> List, Jon:
>>
>> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object
>> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>>
>> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>>
>> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
>> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>>
>> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
>>
>> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
>> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs”
>> by a range of metrologies.
>>
>> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of
>> interpretant while other measurements are *essential to determining the
>> identity* of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

JC:  I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.


As we have been discussing in this thread, CP 2.235-238 seems to require
that the Intepretant determines the Object, which determines the Sign, on
the basis of relative complexity.  Since everyone (including Peirce) agrees
that instead the Object determines the Sign, which determines the
Interpretant, I am simply looking for the justification of this order.

JC:  Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?


My understanding is that there is no such thing as a "necessary
hypothesis"; by definition, a hypothesis is merely plausible, at best.  In
any case, I do not know what you mean by "the normativity of the
interpretant" in this context.  The established habits of interpretation of
an individual quasi-mind certainly influence what particular Dynamic
Interpretants a given Sign actually produces in a particular situation, but
we are talking about how Objects determine Signs in general, and how Signs
determine Interpretants in general, where "determine" means "constrain with
respect to Category or Universe."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Jon:
>
> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object
> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?
>
> I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.
>
> Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the
> interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?
>
> It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:
>
> 1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
> 2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” by
> a range of metrologies.
>
> Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of
> interpretant while other measurements are *essential to determining the
> identity* of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon:
> On Apr 18, 2017, at 8:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> If not, how else can we explain why it must be the case that the Object 
> determines the Sign, which determines the Intepretant?

I am puzzled about why this question is of import to you.

Are you rejecting the necessary hypothesis that the normativity of the 
interpretant is a function of the norms of the interpreter?

It seems to me that from either a scientific or engineering perspective:

1. Any pragmatic object is a natural sort or kind.
2. Any pragmatic object can induce dynamics as an “originator of signs” by a 
range of metrologies.

Of course, some signs carry very little meaning about the nature of 
interpretant while other measurements are essential to determining the identity 
of the interpretant. (Not all signs are created equal!)

Cheers

Jerry 







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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Gary R, list,

 

Actually, Gary, you compounded your mistake here, by typing “qualisign” where 
you meant “legisign.” (Well, I had a bad day yesterday too!)

 

I do understand the basis of your nomenclature choice and acknowledge your 
right to make it. But I feel compelled to make a different choice because I 
consider it more consistent with Peirce’s usage. Peirce says explicitly that 
“Signs are divisible by three trichotomies,” after defining “Sign” as first 
correlate of a triadic relation. The parameters for all three trichotomies are 
prescinded from a complete description of that triadic relation. The parameter 
for the first trichotomy is the nature of the Sign in itself without regard for 
its relations with the other two correlates. You think this is a reason for 
privileging the first trichotomy as nominal and relegating the other two 
trichotomies, which take some other aspects of the triadic relation as 
parameters, to adjectival status. I can see no warrant for this in any text of 
Peirce’s, and certainly not in NDTR, where those trichotomies are defined. So, 
although I see the reasoning behind your nomenclature, I don’t intend to follow 
it. I’ll just keep it in mind when I read your posts (and Jon’s, I guess.)

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 17-Apr-17 20:42



 

Gary F, List,

 

Correction: off-list Gary F suggested that where I'd written

 

But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) most certainly signs, 
i.e., Representamen. 

 

that I probably meant, not Dicisign, but Qualisign. Yes, that is what I meant. 
Maybe I ought to start speaking of Signs (as such) as Marks, Tokens, and Types 
(as John Sowa suggested) in the interest of not making that sort of mistake in 
the future!

 

Gary F also wrote off-list, and I responded:

GF: I just don’t buy your ontological argument[. . .] I prefer to take Peirce 
as speaking with his usual exactitude when he says “An Icon is a sign”, “An 
Index is a sign”, “A Symbol is a sign” and so on. He doesn’t need to add “i.e. 
a representamen” because he has already defined a sign as a representamen.

Well, we will have to continue to disagree on this. There are several signs 
which are iconic, and in this sense, an icon is a sign. There are several signs 
which are indexical; 3 are symbolic. 

If you say, for example, "An Icon is a sign," then what you are saying is that 
there are exactly three sign classes where in relation to the object the sign 
is iconic. If you say "An Index is a sign," well that refers to 4 sign classes. 
I think that sort of talk (an Index is a Sign) out of context leads to some 
very loose thinking, and there is a LOT of loose thinking to this day 
surrounding icons/indices/symbols. Too many commentators stop at the 
consideration of these relations to the Object, ignoring the 2 additional 
trichotomies.

So, the "exactitude" with which Peirce speaks, as you put it, is in a specific 
context in which he is emphasizing that relationship to the Object, prescinding 
it from other discussions. I personally think that more prescision is needed in 
discussing Peirce's classification of signs.

Best,

Gary R

 

 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, List,

Correction: off-list Gary F suggested that where I'd written

But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) *most
certainly* signs,
i.e., Representamen.


that I probably meant, not Dicisign, but Qualisign. Yes, that* is* what I
meant. Maybe I ought to start speaking of Signs (as such) as Marks, Tokens,
and Types (as John Sowa suggested) in the interest of not making that sort
of mistake in the future!

Gary F also wrote off-list, and I responded:


GF: I just don’t buy your ontological argument[. . .] I prefer to take
Peirce as speaking with his usual exactitude when he says “An Icon is a
sign”, “An Index is a sign”, “A Symbol is a sign” and so on. He doesn’t
need to add “i.e. a representamen” because he has already *defined* a sign
as a representamen.


Well, we will have to continue to disagree on this. There are several signs
which are iconic, and *in this sense*, an icon is a sign. There are several
signs which are indexical; 3 are symbolic.


If you say, for example, "An Icon is a sign," then what you are saying is
that there are exactly three sign classes where *in relation to the object* the
sign is icon*ic*. If you say "An Index is a sign," well that refers to 4
sign classes. I think that sort of talk (an Index is a Sign) out of context
leads to some very loose thinking, and there is a LOT of loose thinking to
this day surrounding icons/indices/symbols. Too many commentators stop at
the consideration of these relations to the Object, ignoring the 2
additional trichotomies.


So, the "exactitude" with which Peirce speaks, as you put it, is in a
specific context in which he is emphasizing that relationship to the
Object, prescinding it from other discussions. I personally think that more
prescision is needed in discussing Peirce's classification of signs.


Best,


Gary R




[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 7:06 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F,
>
> I guess I'll have to continue to at least partially disagree with you on
> one of the points you singled out. You quoted me then wrote:
>
> GR: “It is my understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of
> Signs," rather, they are *parametric* [and]together (given certain
> constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs into 10 classes.”
>
>
>
> GF: Of course the three trichotomies into which Peirce divides signs are
> parametric, but so are the resulting ten classes.
>
>
> If the 10 sign classes are parametric then they are certainly not so in
> anything like the same sense that the three trichotomies are parametric.
> One can, for example, give examples of exactly the kind of sign each of the
> 10 classes represents, and Peirce does exactly that. On the other hand, the
> 9 elements of the three trichotomies are given precisely to establish the
> 10 classes as Peirce clearly says ("These three trichotomies, taken
> together. etc.")_
>
>
> It seems to me that to distinguish the two (the elements of the
> trichotomies as logically substantially different from those of the
> classification) we should call the 9 "parameters" (since *3 trichotomies*
> doesn't get at the specific parametric character of each of the 9) and the
> 10 members of the Classification of Signs,  "classes." What good could
> possibly come from using the same term, "parameter," to describe them both?
>
>
> GF: I can’t bring myself to use a terminology in which Qualisigns and
> Sinsigns are signs but Dicisigns, Symbols and Arguments are *not *signs.
> Translating Peirce’s text into that terminology is just too much work.
>
>
> But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) *most certainly*
> signs, i.e., Representamen.
>
>
> I have pointed to the way in which, for example, it is more correct to
> speak of the *symbolic* character of a sign (for it is  a symbol in
> consideration of its Object only), but that when one considers that there
> are *three* classes of signs which are symbolic in relation to their
> objects, to speak of a symbol can only be a kind of shorthand, useful
> enough in a context in which it is clear exactly what one is talking about.
>
>
> This is a fortiori the case with Argument, which one surely need never
> "spell out" as, say, *argumentative symbolic legisign. *The three
> symbolic classes may safely be shortened to, respectively, Rheme, Dicisign
> (or Proposition), and Argument (Jon S has suggested the possibility of
> providing all three terms for the 10 classes, and while this may be helpful
> with some of the sign classes, I agree with GF that it is
> unnecessary--"just too much work"-- in the case of all 3 classes of signs
> that are symbolic in relaiton to their objects; this is also so for the
> first class, the Qualisign).
>
>
>
> GF: Peirce actually uses the “mode” language quite often, for instance in
> MS 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F,

I guess I'll have to continue to at least partially disagree with you on
one of the points you singled out. You quoted me then wrote:

GR: “It is my understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of
Signs," rather, they are *parametric* [and]together (given certain
constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs into 10 classes.”



GF: Of course the three trichotomies into which Peirce divides signs are
parametric, but so are the resulting ten classes.


If the 10 sign classes are parametric then they are certainly not so in
anything like the same sense that the three trichotomies are parametric.
One can, for example, give examples of exactly the kind of sign each of the
10 classes represents, and Peirce does exactly that. On the other hand, the
9 elements of the three trichotomies are given precisely to establish the
10 classes as Peirce clearly says ("These three trichotomies, taken
together. etc.")_


It seems to me that to distinguish the two (the elements of the
trichotomies as logically substantially different from those of the
classification) we should call the 9 "parameters" (since *3 trichotomies*
doesn't get at the specific parametric character of each of the 9) and the
10 members of the Classification of Signs,  "classes." What good could
possibly come from using the same term, "parameter," to describe them both?


GF: I can’t bring myself to use a terminology in which Qualisigns and
Sinsigns are signs but Dicisigns, Symbols and Arguments are *not *signs.
Translating Peirce’s text into that terminology is just too much work.


But dicisigns *are* (along with Qualisigns and Sinsigns) *most certainly*
signs, i.e., Representamen.


I have pointed to the way in which, for example, it is more correct to
speak of the *symbolic* character of a sign (for it is  a symbol in
consideration of its Object only), but that when one considers that there
are *three* classes of signs which are symbolic in relation to their
objects, to speak of a symbol can only be a kind of shorthand, useful
enough in a context in which it is clear exactly what one is talking about.


This is a fortiori the case with Argument, which one surely need never
"spell out" as, say, *argumentative symbolic legisign. *The three symbolic
classes may safely be shortened to, respectively, Rheme, Dicisign (or
Proposition), and Argument (Jon S has suggested the possibility of
providing all three terms for the 10 classes, and while this may be helpful
with some of the sign classes, I agree with GF that it is
unnecessary--"just too much work"-- in the case of all 3 classes of signs
that are symbolic in relaiton to their objects; this is also so for the
first class, the Qualisign).



GF: Peirce actually uses the “mode” language quite often, for instance in
MS 318 (EP2:410):

[[ I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined
by the object*relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the
interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this
“sign.” ]]

This quote should also clarify the order of determination as it applies to
signs. But if you search Peirce’s texts for “mode of being,” you’ll find
dozens more.



And yes, I goofed in my remark about legisigns


OK. If you goofed in your remark about legisigns, I goofed on mine
regarding "mode."


Best,


Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*


>
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

I do mean as you say by “formally”. I am pretty well trained in traditional 
formal logic (Boolos, Kaplan, Church, Kalish). I don’t know if Peirce made a 
diagram or algebraic form that I can understand. I find natural language words 
comparatively slippery, and I often don’t understand what they mean in, say, 
physics or biology, until I can construct a diagram or something of the sort. 
But I have not read nearly as much Peirce as other people on this list.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Monday, 17 April 2017 5:01 AM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

By “represent it formally,” do you mean translate the verbal expression into an 
algebraic notation? Or perhaps an entirely nonverbal diagram?
Since you say you have no idea how to represent it formally, and you’ve read 
some Peirce, are you also saying that Peirce never represented it formally, or 
tried to?

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 21:11
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice.

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

242)


Let me highlight what he seems to suggesting when he asserts that "the possible 
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic 
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant." In order to 
keep things simple, consider just one step in the iterative process. It appears 
that the interpretant in the first triadic relation (i.e., the third correlate) 
itself functions as a sign with respect to some further interpretant in a 
second triadic relation (i.e., as the first correlate)--where the object that 
determines the interpretant in the first triadic relation does so mediately 
through the sign (i.e., via particular a sort of triadic relation) and does so 
in a way that ensures the same object is also the object that mediately 
determines the interpretant in the second triadic relation.


In order to sort this out, consider the three strata in the diagram above. Note 
that the interpretant in each level also functions as a sign for some further 
interpretant--but for the same some object. As such, we might imagine putting 
that interpretant into the sign position in each place where it occurs in the 
diagram--and then to have the same object standing in the place of each place 
with the object occurs in the diagram, and then we would have two diagrams--one 
for the relations of determination in the first triadic relation and another 
for the relations of determination in the second triadic relation. What we 
would be missing in the two diagrams are the relations of determination between 
the two triadic relations. As such, try to picture how those might be 
diagrammed (i.e., in my experience, that is not a simple matter). The identity 
of the object standing in iterated patterns of signs and interpretants seems to 
be crucial to understanding how the semiotic process is continuous.


The object, we should recall, does not need to be the kind of thing that we 
normally think of as an existing individual thing distinct from the mind. 
Rather, consider the point that Peirce makes about objects in relation to 
indices in the case of mathematical inquiry:


The above considerations might lead the reader to suppose that indices have 
exclusive reference to objects of experience, and that there would be no use 
for them in pure mathematics, dealing, as it does, with ideal properties of a 
small bar are, as far as we can perceive, the same as those of a large 
creations, without regard to whether they are anywhere realized or not. But the 
imaginary constructions of the mathematician, and even dreams, so far 
approximate to reality as to have a certain degree of fixity, in consequence of 
which they can be recognized and identified as individuals. In short, there is 
a degenerate form of observation which is directed to the creations of our own 
minds--using the word observation in its full sense as implying some degree of 
fixity and quasi-reality in the object to which it endeavours to conform. 
Accordingly, we find that indices are absolutely indispensable in mathematics; 
and until this truth was comprehended, all efforts to reduce to rule the logic 
of triadic and higher relations failed; while as soon as it was once grasped 
the problem was solved. The ordinary letters of algebra that present no 
peculiarities are indices. So also are the letters A, B, C, etc., attached to a 
geometrical figure. (CP 2.305)


The point he is making here holds for any object that is an object in a 
diagram. As we know, diagrams are essential in all processes of semiosis. As 
such, it might help to consider the role of such objects and the manner in 
which they stand in relations of correspondence to indices in the relations of 
determination sketched in the diagram above.


I'm wondering if these points might help us to interpret what Peirce is 
suggesting in CP 2.235-6--and if they might help to resolve some of the 
apparent tensions.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: g...@gnusystems.ca <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Sent: Monday, April 17, 2017 8:28 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic


Jon S, Gary R, Jeff,



Hold the phone ... perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but I 
now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it's applied to signs: the order of 
complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of determination 
object > sign > interpretant. My point 3 below, following the order of 
determination, says that if the sign is a law, then the Interpretant could be 
possibility, fact or law. But 235 says that the First Correlate is "not a law 
unless all three are of that nature." (Why did I think those two statements 
were compatible?!)



CP 2.236-6 now does appear to me as a red herring with respect to the 
classification of signs. So I guess I'd better shut up now.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Right, Peirce's tenfold classification of Signs in NDTR is *not *based in
any way on CP 2.235-238.  The three trichotomies that he used in CP 2.243ff
were not Sign, Object, and Interpretant *as correlates*; this was precisely
the mistake that Hartshorne and Weiss made when they wrongly suggested in a
footnote to CP 2.238 that he reversed "First" and "Third" in CP 2.235-236.
Rather, the three trichotomies were Sign as correlate (per CP 2.238),
Sign-Object as relation (per CP 2.239), and how Sign determines
Interpretant in respect to Object (per CP 2.241).  Peirce never applied CP
2.238 to *all three* correlates--Sign, Object, and Interpretant--in NDTR.
Had he done so, perhaps he would have detected and corrected what I have
come to believe was an error on his part, especially since I now see that
CP 2.241 specifically states that the First Correlate *determines *the
Third Correlate.

Maybe Peirce had not yet fully worked out in his own mind that X
determining Y means that if X is a mere possibility, then Y must also be a
mere possibility; and that if Y is a law, then X must also be a law.  In
other words, contrary to CP 2.235-236, the correlate that is more complex *in
itself* (Interpretant) does not necessarily determine the correlate that is
simpler *in itself* (Sign); rather, complexity vs. simplicity applies to
how the *Category *of one correlate constrains the *Category *of another
(3ns>2ns>1ns).  When I talk about "the order of determination" as applied
to trichotomies, I am referring to which correlate does the constraining
and which one is constrained--which is evidently based on something *other
than* complexity.

Thanks,

Jon

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 10:28 AM,  wrote:

> Jon S, Gary R, Jeff,
>
>
>
> Hold the phone … perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but
> I now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it’s applied to signs: the order
> of complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of
> determination object > sign > interpretant. My point 3 below, following the
> order of determination, says that if the sign is a law, then the
> Interpretant could be possibility, fact or law. But 235 says that the First
> Correlate is “not a law unless all three are of that nature.” (Why did I
> think those two statements were compatible?!)
>
>
>
> CP 2.236-6 now does appear to me as a red herring with respect to the
> classification of signs. So I guess I’d better shut up now. Apologies for
> the queasiness I’ve caused.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 15, 2017, at 12:14 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Clark, yes, that’s why I was careful to qualify my comments by saying “In 
> NDTR.” But when you say that “what happens actually affects what is 
> possible,” what you mean is that what happens now affects what can possibly 
> happen in the future. Possibility as Firstness is timeless, in Peirce’s 
> usage, so your usage of the term in your statement diverges from Peirce’s 
> usage in a categorial context.

That’s an interesting question. My assumption is simply that possibles are 
abstract. So what we’re really saying is that there is some possibility given a 
particular state where the state can be of varying levels of generality or 
vagueness. That is when we talk about how an event changes the possibilities 
we’re talking about what possibilities as first apply. The reasoning of 
possibilities is always this applying abstractions.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S, Gary R, Jeff,

 

Hold the phone . perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but I
now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it's applied to signs: the order of
complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of determination
object > sign > interpretant. My point 3 below, following the order of
determination, says that if the sign is a law, then the Interpretant could
be possibility, fact or law. But 235 says that the First Correlate is "not a
law unless all three are of that nature." (Why did I think those two
statements were compatible?!)

 

CP 2.236-6 now does appear to me as a red herring with respect to the
classification of signs. So I guess I'd better shut up now. Apologies for
the queasiness I've caused.

 

Gary f.

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 

Sent: 17-Apr-17 09:36

 

Jon S.,

 

OK, what I'll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the
assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant
which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether
your "entailment" is among them. 

 

1. Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the Interpretant is
a mere possibility.

2. Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either
an actual fact or a possibility.

3. Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility, fact
or law.

4. Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been
determined by any of the three kinds of sign.

5. Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been
determined by a fact or a law.

6. Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been determined by
a law.

 

Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is "a mere
possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law unless
all three are of that nature." And the Third Correlate is "a law if any one
of the three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three are of
that nature." That's what 2.235-6 says.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S,

Hold the phone … perhaps the scales have suddenly fallen from my eyes, but I
now see the problem with CP 2.235-6 if it’s applied to signs: the order of
complexity as stated there is NOT consistent with the order of determination
object > sign > interpretant.

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: 17-Apr-17 09:36
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon S.,

OK, what I’ll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the
assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant
which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether
your “entailment” is among them.

1.        Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the  
Interpretant is a mere

possibility.
2.        Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either an
actual fact or a possibility.
3.        Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility,  
fact or law.
4.        Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been  
determined by

any of the three kinds of sign.
5.        Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been  
determined by a

fact or a law.
6.        Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been  
determined by a law.


Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is “a mere
possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law unless
all three are of that nature.” And the Third Correlate is “a law if any one
of the three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three are of
that nature.” That’s what 2.235-6 says.

I still don’t see how you get this passage to “entail that the Third
Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which determines the First
Correlate.” Hence my bafflement.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [ <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com][1]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 20:17
To: Gary Fuhrman < <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: Peirce-L < <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

Consider these two passages.

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236;
1903)

CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it
is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the
Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)

If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with
"Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second
passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines
the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.  This is the
only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate
trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies such
that the First Correlate is a law only if all three are laws, and the Third
Correlate is a mere possibility only if all three are mere possibilities.
Please note, I am well aware that these are not the ten Sign classes that
Peirce spells out later in NDTR.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


Links:
--
[1] mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com%5D

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F.:

Your #3 directly contradicts CP 2.235--the First Correlate (Sign) is a law,
but the Third Correlate (Interpretant) need not be.
Your #4 directly contradicts CP 2.236--the Third Correlate (Interpretant)
is a mere possibility, but the First Correlate (Sign) need not be.

Now, if we reverse the order--such that the Interpretant determines the
Sign--then we get these combinations instead.

   1. Interpretant is a mere possibility.  Then the Sign is a mere
   possibility.
   2. Interpretant is an actual fact.  Then the Sign is an actual fact or a
   possibility.
   3. Interpretant is a law.  Then the Sign could be possibility, fact or
   law.
   4. Sign is a mere possibility.  Then it could have been determined by
   any of the three kinds of Interpretant.
   5. Sign is an actual fact.  Then it could have been determined by a fact
   or a law.
   6. Sign is a law.  Then it could only have been determined by a law.

These are all perfectly consistent with CP 2.235-236; in particular, the
First Correlate (Sign) is "not a law unless all three are of that nature"
(my #6), and the Third Correlate (Interpretant) is "not a mere possibility
unless all three are of that nature" (my #1).

CP 2.235-238 is based on the assumption that in a genuine triadic relation,
the more complex correlate always determines the simpler one.  If--as we
all agree--the Object (Second Correlate) determines the Sign (First
Correlate), which determines the Interpretant (Third Correlate), then
Peirce was simply wrong about this in NDTR.  He obviously corrected himself
in later writings, including EP 2:481.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Mon, Apr 17, 2017 at 8:36 AM,  wrote:

> Jon S.,
>
>
>
> OK, what I’ll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the
> assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant
> which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether
> your “entailment” is among them.
>
>
>
>1. Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the Interpretant is a
>mere possibility.
>2. Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either
>an actual fact or a possibility.
>3. Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility, fact or
>law.
>4. Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been
>determined by any of the three kinds of sign.
>5. Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been determined
>by a fact or a law.
>6. Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been determined by a
>law.
>
> Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is “a
> mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law
> unless all three are of that nature.” And the Third Correlate is “a law if
> any one of the three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three
> are of that nature.” That’s what 2.235-6 says.
>
>
>
> I still don’t see how you get this passage to “entail that the Third
> Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which determines the First
> Correlate.” Hence my bafflement.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S.,

 

OK, what I’ll do here is take CP 2.235-6 and apply it to signs on the 
assumption that the Sign is First Correlate and determines the Interpretant 
which is Third Correlate, and list ALL the possibilities, and see whether your 
“entailment” is among them.

 

1.  Sign is a mere possibility (qualisign). Then the Interpretant is a mere 
possibility.
2.  Sign is an actual fact (sinsign). Then the Interpretant is either an 
actual fact or a possibility.
3.  Sign is a law. Then the Interpretant could be possibility, fact or law.
4.  Interpretant is a mere possibility. Then it could have been determined 
by any of the three kinds of sign.
5.  Interpretant is an actual fact. Then it could have been determined by a 
fact or a law.
6.  Interpretant is a law. Then it could only have been determined by a law.

 

Or, as Peirce put it in terms of correlates: the First Correlate is “a mere 
possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not a law unless all 
three are of that nature.” And the Third Correlate is “a law if any one of the 
three is a law, and not a mere possibility unless all three are of that 
nature.” That’s what 2.235-6 says.

 

I still don’t see how you get this passage to “entail that the Third Correlate 
determines the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.” Hence 
my bafflement.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 20:17
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F., List:

 

Consider these two passages.

 

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third 
Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236; 1903)

 

CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is 
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. 
Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object 
determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which 
determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the Effective 
Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, 
instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were 
independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)

 

If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with "Necessitant," 
and define "determines" in accordance with the second passage, then the first 
passage entails that the Third Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which 
determines the First Correlate.  This is the only way that the same procedure 
that yields 28 classes from six correlate trichotomies will yield ten classes 
from three correlate trichotomies such that the First Correlate is a law only 
if all three are laws, and the Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if 
all three are mere possibilities.  Please note, I am well aware that these are 
not the ten Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR. 

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Gary R,

 

I don’t have time today to respond to all of your points, so I’ll start with 
this one:

Gr: “It is my understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of 
Signs," rather, they are parametric in the sense that Ben Udell and I 
introduced in my first paper on the topic over a decade ago and, as Peirce 
said, together (given certain constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs 
into 10 classes.”

 

Gf: Of course the three trichotomies into which Peirce divides signs are 
parametric, but so are the resulting ten classes. I’m afraid I can’t bring 
myself to use a terminology in which Qualisigns and Sinsigns are signs but 
Dicisigns, Symbols and Arguments are not signs. Translating Peirce’s text into 
that terminology is just too much work.

 

Peirce actually uses the “mode” language quite often, for instance in MS 318 
(EP2:410): 

[[ I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which 
mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by 
the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in 
reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be 
determined by the object through the mediation of this “sign.” ]]

This quote should also clarify the order of determination as it applies to 
signs. But if you search Peirce’s texts for “mode of being,” you’ll find dozens 
more.

 

And yes, I goofed in my remark about legisigns.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 20:12
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F, Jon S, List,

 

I'm afraid your post did *not* make me feel any less queasy. My comments are 
interleaved below preceeded by GR:

 

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I 
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first 
constrains the mode of the second.

[GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness?)

 

GR: Where is the language of 'mode' coming from? I don't find it helpful. Why 
call 1ns/2ns/3ns modes? Did Peirce?

 

Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the Sign-Object 
relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow from this that 
the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a symbolic Dicisign 
(proposition) or a Rheme (term).

 

GR: Huh? Dicisigns and Rhemes are both Legisigns.

 

The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the 
Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.

[GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …

 

GR: But doesn't the Interpretant stand in the same (or similar, that is, 
slightly more developed) relation to the Object to which the Representamen 
stands?

 

That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.  
That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument 
must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

[GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination that 
accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine simpler, but 
not the reverse).

 

GR: Queasiness again. . .

 

GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.

 

Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying that 
whether the Sign is an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the 
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my 
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign in 
respect to the Object determines whether the Sign is classified as an Argument, 
Dicent, or Rheme.

[GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way 
because it really is that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s definition of that Sign 
type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other words, I’m 
speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. g\

 

GR: Signs are qualisigns/sinsigns/or legisigns (marks/tokens/or types). They 
are argumentative, dicentic, rhematic iconic, indexical, symbolic, etc.

 

The Sign in itself is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.  No 
Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument in itself; it is only classified as 
such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the Object.  
Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol in itself; it is only 
classified as such by virtue of its relation to its Object.

[GF: ] OK, that’s true. As long as we agree that all nine of these Sign types 
are classifications of Signs, i.e. of First Correlates in the various triadic 
relations that make up this universe of semiotic discourse. Sometimes I think 
that the ki

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

John C,

 

By “represent it formally,” do you mean translate the verbal expression into an 
algebraic notation? Or perhaps an entirely nonverbal diagram?

Since you say you have no idea how to represent it formally, and you’ve read 
some Peirce, are you also saying that Peirce never represented it formally, or 
tried to?

 

Gary f.

 

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 21:11
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

 

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

 

John

 

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  
[mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

John C,

 

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice. 

 

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

 

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

 

Gary f.

 

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> ; 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally. 

 

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

 

Cheers,

John

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

s an error on
> his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as
> representation. Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely
> accepts at about the time  he wrote NDTR. So, if we reinterpret what he says
> in these early works in light of the modifications he later made--such that
> the first category is monadic quality, the second category is dyadic brute
> reaction, and the third category is triadic thought, then we can draw on
> what he says there to understand a number of points on those first three
> pages.
>
>
> Let's start with this question:  why is the sign (or representamen), which
> is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the
> simplest of the three?
>
>
> Looking at Lecture IX of the Lowell Lectures and what he later says in the
> "On a New List", we see the following kind of answer to the question emerge
> in three parts:
>
>
> i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a
> representamen, the qualisign stands for *single* reference to a ground,
> where this reference is to the possession of an internal quality.
>
>
> ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute
> reaction), stands as *double* reference to the correlate and ground.
>
>
> iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of
> interpreting thought, stands as *triple* reference to ground, correlate
> and interpretant.
>
>
> If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single,
> double and triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his
> understanding of how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants,
> then I think it is quite apparent that the order of complexity goes
> from the sign, as the simplest to the object and interpretant as the more
> complex correlates.
>
>
> Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has
> largely dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and
> triple reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his
> more mature writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face
> value when he says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that
> he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this earlier works.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Sunday, April 16, 2017 5:16 PM
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> Consider these two passages.
>
> CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
> the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
> that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
> Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
> complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
> a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236;
> 1903)
>
>
> CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible;
> it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
> Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the
> Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
> itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the
> Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
> trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
> they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)
>
>
> If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with
> "Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second
> passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines
> the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.  This is the
> only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate
> trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies *such
> that* the First Correlate is a law only if all three are laws, and the
> Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if all three are mere
> possibilities.  Please note, I am well aware that these are not the ten
> Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Luthera

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

I wish to point out just how ridiculously clear this statement is:

"...Peirce says that it was an error on his part to treat the second
category as relation and the third category as representation."

Best,
J

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 9:12 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,
>
>
> Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of
> NDTR, I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of
> filling in some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the
> Lowell Lectures of 1866 and "On a New List of the Categories." Looking back
> on this published essay later in life, Peirce says that it was an error on
> his part to treat the second category as relation and the third category as
> representation. Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely
> accepts at about the time  he wrote NDTR. So, if we reinterpret what he says
> in these early works in light of the modifications he later made--such that
> the first category is monadic quality, the second category is dyadic brute
> reaction, and the third category is triadic thought, then we can draw on
> what he says there to understand a number of points on those first three
> pages.
>
>
> Let's start with this question:  why is the sign (or representamen), which
> is the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the
> simplest of the three?
>
>
> Looking at Lecture IX of the Lowell Lectures and what he later says in the
> "On a New List", we see the following kind of answer to the question emerge
> in three parts:
>
>
> i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a
> representamen, the qualisign stands for *single* reference to a ground,
> where this reference is to the possession of an internal quality.
>
>
> ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute
> reaction), stands as *double* reference to the correlate and ground.
>
>
> iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of
> interpreting thought, stands as *triple* reference to ground, correlate
> and interpretant.
>
>
> If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single,
> double and triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his
> understanding of how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants,
> then I think it is quite apparent that the order of complexity goes
> from the sign, as the simplest to the object and interpretant as the more
> complex correlates.
>
>
> Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has
> largely dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and
> triple reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his
> more mature writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face
> value when he says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that
> he hasn't rejected any of he major points made in this earlier works.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Sunday, April 16, 2017 5:16 PM
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> Consider these two passages.
>
> CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
> the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
> that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
> Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
> complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
> a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236;
> 1903)
>
>
> CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible;
> it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
> Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the
> Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
> itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the
> Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
> trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
> they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)
>
>
> If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with
> "Necessitant," and define &quo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,


Given how much Peirce seems to be presupposing in the first few pages of NDTR, 
I want to suggest that try to draw from prior essays for the sake of filling in 
some of the picture. Consider what he says, for example, in the Lowell Lectures 
of 1866 and "On a New List of the Categories." Looking back on this published 
essay later in life, Peirce says that it was an error on his part to treat the 
second category as relation and the third category as representation. 
Otherwise, the argument is one that he still largely accepts at about the time  
he wrote NDTR. So, if we reinterpret what he says in these early works in light 
of the modifications he later made--such that the first category is monadic 
quality, the second category is dyadic brute reaction, and the third category 
is triadic thought, then we can draw on what he says there to understand a 
number of points on those first three pages.


Let's start with this question:  why is the sign (or representamen), which is 
the first correlate of a thoroughly genuine triadic relation, the simplest of 
the three?


Looking at Lecture IX of the Lowell Lectures and what he later says in the "On 
a New List", we see the following kind of answer to the question emerge in 
three parts:


i) This is easiest to see in the case of the qualisign. As a representamen, the 
qualisign stands for single reference to a ground, where this reference is to 
the possession of an internal quality.


ii) The second correlate, which is the relation of two things (i.e., brute 
reaction), stands as double reference to the correlate and ground.


iii) The third correlate, which is has the character of interpreting thought, 
stands as triple reference to ground, correlate and interpretant.


If this suitably modified version of the distinction between single, double and 
triple reference--or something similar--is still part of his understanding of 
how signs stand in relations to objects and interpretants, then I think it is 
quite apparent that the order of complexity goes from the sign, as the simplest 
to the object and interpretant as the more complex correlates.


Some (i.e., Cathy Legg and Bill McCurdy) have suggested that Peirce has largely 
dropped this early and immature understanding of single, double and triple 
reference by the time he is developing the semiotic theory in his more mature 
writings such as NDTR. I, on the other hand, take him at face value when he 
says that the essay was remarkably prescient, and that he hasn't rejected any 
of he major points made in this earlier works.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 16, 2017 5:16 PM
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

Consider these two passages.

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third 
Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236; 1903)

CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is 
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant. 
Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the Dynamoid Object 
determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which 
determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the Effective 
Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six trichotomies, 
instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if they were 
independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)

If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with "Necessitant," 
and define "determines" in accordance with the second passage, then the first 
passage entails that the Third Correlate determines the Second Correlate, which 
determines the First Correlate.  This is the only way that the same procedure 
that yields 28 classes from six correlate trichotomies will yield ten classes 
from three correlate trichotomies such that the First Correlate is a law only 
if all three are laws, and the Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if 
all three are mere possibilities.  Please note, I am well aware that these are 
not the ten Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice.

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Consider these two passages.

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature ...  (CP 2.235-236;
1903)


CSP:  It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible;
it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
Necessitant. Hence it follows from the definition of a Sign that since the
Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which determines the Sign
itself, which determines the Destinate Interpretant, which determins the
Effective Interpretant, which determines the Explicit Interpretant, the six
trichotomies, instead of determining 729 classes of signs, as they would if
they were independent, only yield 28 classes ... (EP 2:481; 1908)


If we equate "mere possibility" with "Possible" and "law" with
"Necessitant," and define "determines" in accordance with the second
passage, then the first passage entails that the Third Correlate determines
the Second Correlate, which determines the First Correlate.  This is the
only way that the same procedure that yields 28 classes from six correlate
trichotomies will yield ten classes from three correlate trichotomies *such
that* the First Correlate is a law only if all three are laws, and the
Third Correlate is a mere possibility only if all three are mere
possibilities.  Please note, I am well aware that these are not the ten
Sign classes that Peirce spells out later in NDTR.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 6:49 PM,  wrote:

> Jon S, see insert below …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 17:40
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that
> Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant
> ...
>
>  Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me.  That
> passage requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second
> Correlate (Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the
> First Correlate (Sign).
>
> [GF: ] That “requirement” is something you have read into it, I think by
> mistaking Peirce’s order of presentation for the order of determination.
> Try fixing your understanding of the order of determination in your mind,
> and then read the passage again carefully and test whether it is consistent
> with your understanding. I think you’ll see that it is. It certainly is
> consistent with the understanding I’ve expressed, which you’ve said you
> agree with.
>
>
>
> It’s also possible that you’ve been distracted by Peirce’s statement that
> “These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations
> into ten classes.” They would indeed, but since they are not the three
> trichotomies *of sign types*, they would not divide *signs* into the same
> ten classes that Peirce gives us later in NDTR.
>
>
>
> I wonder if part of the problem here is that there are differences in what
> each of us means by "determine"; again, I am using it as synonymous with
> "constrain the mode of."
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon S, List,

I'm afraid your post did *not* make me feel any less queasy. My comments
are interleaved below preceeded by GR:

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the
first *constrains *the mode of the second.

[GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness,
Secondness, Thirdness?)


GR: Where is the language of 'mode' coming from? I don't find it helpful.
Why call 1ns/2ns/3ns modes? Did Peirce?



Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the
Sign-Object relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow
from this that the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a
symbolic Dicisign (proposition) or a Rheme (term).


GR: Huh? Dicisigns and Rhemes are both Legisigns.



The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the
Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.

[GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …


GR: But doesn't the Interpretant stand in the same (or similar, that is,
slightly more developed) relation to the Object to which the Representamen
stands?



That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.
That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an
Argument must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

[GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination
that accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine
simpler, but not the reverse).


GR: Queasiness again. . .



GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.



Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying
that whether the Sign *is *an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign
in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign *is classified *as an
Argument, Dicent, or Rheme.

[GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way
because it *really is* that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s *definition* of
that Sign type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other
words, I’m speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. g\


GR: Signs are qualisigns/sinsigns/or legisigns (marks/tokens/or types).
They are argumenta*tive*, dicent*ic*, rhema*tic* icon*ic*, indexi*cal*,
symbol*ic*, etc.



The Sign *in itself* is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.
No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument *in itself*; it is only
*classified *as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in
respect to the Object.  Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol *in
itself*; it is only *classified *as such by virtue of its relation to its
Object.

[GF: ] OK, that’s true. As long as we agree that all nine of these Sign
types are classifications of *Signs*, i.e. of First Correlates in the
various triadic relations that make up this universe of semiotic discourse.
Sometimes I think that the kind of confusion we’ve been experiencing is
sown by the habit of referring to the Sign as the “whole triad” rather than
the First Correlate of a triadic relation, which is how Peirce defines the
term “Sign” in the Syllabus. That’s why I consider it a bad habit, at least
for any reader trying to understand*Peircean* semiotic.


GR: I agree with JS here. See what I just wrote just above. It is my
understanding the 9 are NOT as GF wrote "classifications of Signs," rather,
they are *parametric* in the sense that Ben Udell and I introduced in my
first paper on the topic over a decade ago and, as Peirce said, together
(given certain constraints) lead to the Classification of Signs into 10
classes. I think that the whole notion of 'Corrlate' has not been clarified
in this discussion, and may be the source of much of what I see as some
considerable confusion in what I though was fairly well settled grammatical
theory. Now for some gingerale.


Best,


Gary R






[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S, see insert below …

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 17:40



Gary R., List:

 

GR:  But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce 
always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant ...

 

Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me.  That passage 
requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second Correlate 
(Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the First Correlate 
(Sign). 

[GF: ] That “requirement” is something you have read into it, I think by 
mistaking Peirce’s order of presentation for the order of determination. Try 
fixing your understanding of the order of determination in your mind, and then 
read the passage again carefully and test whether it is consistent with your 
understanding. I think you’ll see that it is. It certainly is consistent with 
the understanding I’ve expressed, which you’ve said you agree with.

 

It’s also possible that you’ve been distracted by Peirce’s statement that 
“These three trichotomies, taken together, divide all triadic relations into 
ten classes.” They would indeed, but since they are not the three trichotomies 
of sign types, they would not divide signs into the same ten classes that 
Peirce gives us later in NDTR.

 

I wonder if part of the problem here is that there are differences in what each 
of us means by "determine"; again, I am using it as synonymous with "constrain 
the mode of."

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F.:

Responses to your responses below.

Jon S.

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 5:47 PM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll
> insert my responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary
> R, as I have no desire to evoke that kind of feeling!
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 17:31
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I
> mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the
> first *constrains *the mode of the second.
>
> [GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness,
> Secondness, Thirdness?)
>
JAS:  Yes.

>
>
> The Sign determines the Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in
> itself is a possibility, then the Sign-Object relation must be a
> possibility; and if the Sign-Object relation is a law, then the Sign in
> itself must be a law.
>
> [GF: ] Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the
> Sign-Object relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow
> from this that the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a
> symbolic Dicisign (proposition) or a Rheme (term).
>
JAS:  It follows from the order of determination (in my sense) that only a
Legisign can be a Symbol, because the mode of the Sign in itself constrains
the possible modes of its relation to its Object.  A Legisign can also be
an Index or an Icon, and a Sinsign must be either an Index or an Icon,
while a Qualisign can only be an Icon.  Likewise, a Symbol can be a Rheme
(term), Dicent (proposition), or Argument; an Index must be either a Rheme
or a Dicent; and an Icon can only be a Rheme.

>
>
> The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.
>
> [GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …
>
JAS:  It was easier to talk about all this when I thought that the third
trichotomy was the dyadic Sign-Interpretant relation.  There is no obvious
shorthand for "how the Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the
Object."

>
>
> That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than
> 27.  That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an
> Argument must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.
>
> [GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination
> that accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine
> simpler, but not the reverse).
>
JAS:  Right, but when I say "order of determination," I mean (in this case)
Sign first, Sign-Object relation second, and how Interpretant represents
Sign in respect to Object third.  What I think you mean by "order of
determination" also comes into play, but only once we put the three
trichotomies in the proper sequence to apply that constraint as I outlined
above.

> GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation
> determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is
> determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.
>
> Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying
> that whether the Sign *is *an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how
> the Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast,
> my understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the
> Sign in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign *is classified *as
> an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme.
>
> [GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way
> because it *really is* that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s *definition* of
> that Sign type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other
> words, I’m speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. All of
> Peirce’s definitions of the nine sign types in the three trichotomies are
> consistent with the order of determination as stated above, as far as I can
> see, but they *are* definitions, so they do determine what *names* are
> applied to the signs which fit them.
>
JAS:  I seem to recall that there have been List debates in the past about
what to call the nine names that come from the three trichotomies.  I am
not a fan of "sign types" personally, but I am not sure what else would be
better; Jappy uses "subdivisions," which makes some sense.  In any case, I
still suspect that we are coming at this from opposite directions.  Is a
Sign classified as a Rheme because its Interpretant represents it as a sign
of possibility, or does a Sign represent its Interpretant as a sign of
possibility because it is a Rheme?

>
>
> The Sign *in itself* is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or
> Legisign.  No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument *in itself*; it
> is only *classified *as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents
> it in respect to the Object.  Likewise, no Sign is 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

John C,

 

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice. 

 

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

 

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

 

Gary f.

 

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally. 

 

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

 

Cheers,

John

 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon,

 

I think i’m beginning to catch on to what you’re driving at, so I’ll insert my 
responses below. I hope this doesn’t make you any queasier, Gary R, as I have 
no desire to evoke that kind of feeling!

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 17:31



Gary F., List:

 

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I 
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the first 
constrains the mode of the second.

[GF: ] By “mode,” are you referring to the ‘mode of being’ (Firstness, 
Secondness, Thirdness?)

 

The Sign determines the Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in itself is 
a possibility, then the Sign-Object relation must be a possibility; and if the 
Sign-Object relation is a law, then the Sign in itself must be a law.

[GF: ] Translating the second part of that into the terms of NDTR, if the 
Sign-Object relation is a law, the Sign is a Symbol. But it does not follow 
from this that the Sign in itself must be a Legisign. It could also be a 
symbolic Dicisign (proposition) or a Rheme (term).

 

The same is true for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the 
Interpretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.

[GF: ] Hmmm, now I’m getting queasy …

 

That is why three trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.  
That is why a Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument 
must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

[GF: ] I thought we already agreed that it’s the order of determination that 
accounts for that (more phenomenologically complex can determine simpler, but 
not the reverse).

 

GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.

 

Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying that 
whether the Sign is an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the 
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my 
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign in 
respect to the Object determines whether the Sign is classified as an Argument, 
Dicent, or Rheme.

[GF: ] Ah. Well, I have been speaking as if a Sign is classified that way 
because it really is that kind of Sign, i.e. Peirce’s definition of that Sign 
type in NDTR really does apply to that particular Sign. In other words, I’m 
speaking from a pragmatistically realist point of view. All of Peirce’s 
definitions of the nine sign types in the three trichotomies are consistent 
with the order of determination as stated above, as far as I can see, but they 
are definitions, so they do determine what names are applied to the signs which 
fit them.  

 

The Sign in itself is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.  No 
Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument in itself; it is only classified as 
such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the Object.  
Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol in itself; it is only 
classified as such by virtue of its relation to its Object.

[GF: ] OK, that’s true. As long as we agree that all nine of these Sign types 
are classifications of Signs, i.e. of First Correlates in the various triadic 
relations that make up this universe of semiotic discourse. Sometimes I think 
that the kind of confusion we’ve been experiencing is sown by the habit of 
referring to the Sign as the “whole triad” rather than the First Correlate of a 
triadic relation, which is how Peirce defines the term “Sign” in the Syllabus. 
That’s why I consider it a bad habit, at least for any reader trying to 
understand Peircean semiotic.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

By purely iconic, I meant iconic sign. Both the object and the representamen 
and the interpretant are the same thing as each other, at least as I understand 
it. Hence a trivial case.

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 3:17 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C, List,

Would you explain this remark: "The only time [the] sign (I am assuming you 
mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I 
take it that this is a trivial case."?

Even in the case of the three classes of iconic signs in the classification 
into 10 classes it would seem to me that the Object determines the 
Representamen for the Interpretant. I don't see any exceptions.

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 4:37 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
[mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAl

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR:  But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that
Peirce always says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant
...


Yes, and this is what makes CP 2.235-238 so incongruous to me.  That
passage requires the Third Correlate (Interpretant) to determine the Second
Correlate (Object), and the Second Correlate (Object) to determine the
First Correlate (Sign).  I wonder if part of the problem here is that there
are differences in what each of us means by "determine"; again, I am using
it as synonymous with "constrain the mode of."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon S, List,
>
> Maybe I should stay out of this discussion at this point, this suggested
> by the fact that I'm getting confused by the dialague Gary F and Jon S are
> currently having. I hope it's just some terminological confusion, since
> these issues under discussion once seemed fairly simple and, even, obvious
> to me.
>
> But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce
> *always* says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant
> and, as I see it, this is so even when Peirce notes that the Object stands
> in the same relation to the Interpretant as the Sign does.
>
> Indeed, I don't at all think that this changes even when Peirce introduces
> the IO/DO dichotomy, for the DO, he notes (in a diagram I can't quickly
> locate), determines the IO, which determines the R, which determins the I.
>
> I found that I couldn't contradict any of the several points Gary F
> enumerated. So, I am hoping that this gets cleared up quickly as the
> present confusion is making me feel queasy.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

When I say that one aspect of semeiosis "determines" another, what I
mean--because it is what I take Peirce to mean--is that the mode of the
first *constrains *the mode of the second.  The Sign determines the
Sign-Object relation such that if the Sign in itself is a possibility, then
the Sign-Object relation must be a possibility; and if the Sign-Object
relation is a law, then the Sign in itself must be a law.  The same is true
for the Sign-Object relation with respect to how the Interpretant
represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  That is why three
trichotomies result in ten Sign classes, rather than 27.  That is why a
Qualisign must also be an Icon and a Rheme, and why an Argument must also
be a Symbol and a Legisign.

GF:  And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme.


Maybe this is where the disconnect is happening.  You seem to be saying
that whether the Sign *is *an Argument, Dicent, or Rheme determines how the
Intepretant represents the Sign in respect to the Object.  By contrast, my
understanding has always been that how the Interpretant represents the Sign
in respect to the Object determines whether the Sign *is classified *as an
Argument, Dicent, or Rheme.

The Sign *in itself* is always and only a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign.
No Sign is a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument *in itself*; it is only
*classified
*as such by virtue of how its Interpretant represents it in respect to the
Object.  Likewise, no Sign is an Icon, an Index, or a Symbol *in itself*;
it is only *classified *as such by virtue of its relation to its Object.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 3:06 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object
> relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce
> usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to
> determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he
> introduces the dichotomy between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is
> not mentioned in NDTR.)
>
>
>
> There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar”
> (EP2:272), where he says that “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First
> which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its
> *Object,* as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
> *Interpretant,* to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in
> which it stands itself to the same Object.” But I have yet to see anyplace
> where Peirce says or implies that the Sign *determines the Sign-Object
> relation*. If you can cite such a place, please do so. And that goes
> double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by
> whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But again, I’m
> happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a Peirce
> text.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

John C, List,

Would you explain this remark: "The only time [the] sign (I am assuming you
mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely
iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case."?

Even in the case of the three classes of iconic signs in the classification
into 10 classes it would seem to me that the Object determines the
Representamen for the Interpretant. I don't see any exceptions.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 4:37 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:

> This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you
> quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.
>
>
>
> The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might
> determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a
> trivial case.
>
>
>
> Cheers,
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
> *Sent:* Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
> *To:* 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object
> relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce
> usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to
> determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he
> introduces the dichotomy between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is
> not mentioned in NDTR.)
>
>
>
> There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar”
> (EP2:272), where he says that “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First
> which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its
> *Object,* as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
> *Interpretant,* to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in
> which it stands itself to the same Object.” But I have yet to see anyplace
> where Peirce says or implies that the Sign *determines the Sign-Object
> relation*. If you can cite such a place, please do so. And that goes
> double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by
> whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But again, I’m
> happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a Peirce
> text.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 15:34
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...
>
>
>
> GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed
> has nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to
> correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this
> would make absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.
>
>
>
> ... because to me, it contradicts #7.
>
>
>
> GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination,
> so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an
> argument.
>
>
>
> The order of determination does not apply *only *to correlates, it
> applies to *all *of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular,
> the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation, which determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the
> order of the three trichotomies in CP 2.243 is *not *random or
> inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to your order, an
> Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an Icon; but
> these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce went on
> to identify.
>
>
>
> As for #12 ...
>
>
>
> GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant
> trichotomy” in NDTR.
>
>
>
> This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have
> been Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908,
> the order of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three)
> Interpretants.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon S, List,

Maybe I should stay out of this discussion at this point, this suggested by
the fact that I'm getting confused by the dialague Gary F and Jon S are
currently having. I hope it's just some terminological confusion, since
these issues under discussion once seemed fairly simple and, even, obvious
to me.

But surely, the most obvious thing, as Gary F reminds us, is that Peirce
*always* says that the Object determines the Sign for the Interpretant and,
as I see it, this is so even when Peirce notes that the Object stands in
the same relation to the Interpretant as the Sign does.

Indeed, I don't at all think that this changes even when Peirce introduces
the IO/DO dichotomy, for the DO, he notes (in a diagram I can't quickly
locate), determines the IO, which determines the R, which determins the I.

I found that I couldn't contradict any of the several points Gary F
enumerated. So, I am hoping that this gets cleared up quickly as the
present confusion is making me feel queasy.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 4:06 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object
> relation,” and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce
> usually says in his definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to
> determine the Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he
> introduces the dichotomy between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is
> not mentioned in NDTR.)
>
>
>
> There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar”
> (EP2:272), where he says that “A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First
> which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its
> *Object,* as to be capable of determining a Third, called its
> *Interpretant,* to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in
> which it stands itself to the same Object.” But I have yet to see anyplace
> where Peirce says or implies that the Sign *determines the Sign-Object
> relation*. If you can cite such a place, please do so. And that goes
> double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is determined by
> whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But again, I’m
> happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a Peirce
> text.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 16-Apr-17 15:34
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...
>
>
>
> GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed
> has nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to
> correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this
> would make absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.
>
>
>
> ... because to me, it contradicts #7.
>
>
>
> GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination,
> so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an
> argument.
>
>
>
> The order of determination does not apply *only *to correlates, it
> applies to *all *of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular,
> the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation, which determines how the
> Interpretant represents the Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the
> order of the three trichotomies in CP 2.243 is *not *random or
> inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to your order, an
> Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an Icon; but
> these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce went on
> to identify.
>
>
>
> As for #12 ...
>
>
>
> GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant
> trichotomy” in NDTR.
>
>
>
> This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have
> been Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908,
> the order of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three)
> Interpretants.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

 

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F., List:

 

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

 

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

 

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

 

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

 

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

 

As for #12 ...

 

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

 

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed
has nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to
correlates, and if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this
would make absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.


... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination,
so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an
argument.


The order of determination does not apply *only *to correlates, it applies
to *all *of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign
determines the Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant
represents the Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the
three trichotomies in CP 2.243 is *not *random or inconsequential.  For
example, if it were switched to your order, an Argument could be a
Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an Icon; but these conclusions are
inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant
trichotomy” in NDTR.


This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have
been Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908,
the order of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three)
Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 1:26 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, Gary, list,
>
>
>
> I just noticed that a point got somehow dropped out between those numbered
> 9 and 10 below. That point was about the *rheme/dicisign/argument
> trichotomy*, which of course is Peirce’s third division of signs, “according
> as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or as a sign of
> fact or a sign of reason.” If we need to refer to this point, let’s call it
> “point X.” Anyway, it’s absence does not not affect the main argument of
> the post.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
> _
>
> Jon S, Gary R,
>
>
>
> Evidently you are both making some inference that to me appears
> unwarranted and unmotivated. The issue may be terminological, or it may be
> grounded in a much deeper conceptual difference regarding the nature of
> signs. Perhaps if I break the whole matter into smaller steps as I see
> them, and lay them out one at a time, you will be able to identify the step
> where my thinking diverges from yours. Since the crux of the matter appears
> to be CP 2.238 in NDTR, all of my direct references will be to NDTR. Maybe
> after that I can comment on Jon’s remarks about Peirce’s 1908
> classification.
>
>
>
> The question for you is: Which of the following assertions would you deny?
>
>
>
>1. A *trichotomy* is a *division* of something into three, such that
>each of the three resulting terms denotes a subtype of the original
>something.
>2. NDTR as a whole — and CP 2.238 in particular — is about division of 
> *triadic
>relations* into types.
>3. All triadic relations have three *correlates*, generically labelled
>First, Second and Third correlates.
>4. Any of the three correlates of a given triadic relation may be
>regarded as simpler or more complex than the others. If they are not all of
>the same complexity, then the simplest is called First and the most complex
>is called Third correlate.
>5. All of NDTR from CP 2.243 on (pp. 291-299 in EP2) is about one type
>of triadic relation, of which a Sign is First Correlate, an Object is
>Second Correlate, and a (possible) Interpretant is Third Correlate.
>6. In NDTR there are three trichotomies in which the three divisions
>have specific names. These are *icon/index/symbol*,
>*rheme/dicisign/argument*, and *qualisign/sinsign/legisign*. Each of
>these nine terms names a type of *Sign* (not a type of triadic
>relation, but the type of First Correlate which characterizes such a
>triadic relation).
>7. The extensions of these names are obviously overlapping, as the
>same sign can be (for instance) a symbol *and* an argument *and* a
>legisign. However the overlapping is constrained by the order of
>determination, so that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a
>sinsign and an argument. [We have already agreed on this.]
>8. In each of these three trichotomies in NDTR, the three sign types
>are distinguished according to different criteria, which criteria are
>logically independent of one another.
>9. The icon/index/symbol trichotomy, introduced by Peirce in 1867
>(though with slightly different names), is made according to the (dyadic)
>relation between Sign and Object, i.e. between the first and second
>

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

 by a trichotomy, so the order of determination is the 
order of the trichotomies.” I don’t see how you relate this to 2.238, given 
that it is not true of 2.238, or of NDTR as a whole, that “each of the 
correlates is divided by a trichotomy.” As I said above, there is no “Object 
trichotomy” or “Interpretant trichotomy” in NDTR. More important, the order of 
determination (or complexity) applies the order of correlates but has nothing 
to do with the order of trichotomies.

 

Point 12 seems a good place to stop, for now at least. Perhaps this is enough 
to locate the point of divergence in our respective accounts of Peirce’s 
classifications of signs.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 15-Apr-17 18:54
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF:  The reason for the 1908 ordering you quote seems clear enough because it 
is an order of successive determination, but it has no relation to any ordering 
of trichotomies.

 

Now you lost me.  Each of the correlates in that 1908 passage is divided by a 
trichotomy, so the order of determination is the order of the trichotomies.  
For example, as Peirce goes on to explain (EP 2:484-488), a Potisign can be 
Copulative, Denominative, or Descriptive; an Actisign can be Copulative or 
Denominative; and a Famisign must be Copulative.  This is because the Immediate 
Object determines the Sign; in other words, the Immediate Object trichotomy 
comes (logically) before the Sign trichotomy.

 

GF:  Nor is there any logical order among the three trichotomies that Peirce 
actually applies to signs in NDTR.

 

Yes, there is.

 

CSP:  Signs are divisible by three trichotomies:  first, according as the sign 
in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; 
secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in the 
sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that 
Object, or in its relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according as its 
Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of fact, or a 
sign of reason. (EP 2:291, emphases added)

 

The three 1903 trichotomies must be in this order to generate the ten specific 
classes of Signs that Peirce subsequently identified, in accordance with the 
rule that a possibility can only determine a possibility and a law can only be 
determined by a law.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 5:11 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca 
<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

Jeff, Gary R, Jon S, List,

Jeff, I’ve always assumed — and NDTR explicitly says, right at the beginning — 
that this principle is based on phenomenology. Of course, the hardest part of 
Peircean phenomenology is developing clear enough notions of what is denoted by 
the terms Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; but based on the notions I have 
of them, it’s easy to see why a First cannot determine a Third, and so on. 
Those notions are, for me, based on observation of everyday phenomena (in this 
context, semiosic phenomena.

Jon, I’m afraid I still don’t get it. I simply haven’t a clue what it means, or 
could mean, to say that one trichotomy logically “follows” or “precedes” 
another. The reason for the 1908 ordering you quote seems clear enough because 
it is an order of successive determination, but it has no relation to any 
ordering of trichotomies. Nor is there any logical order among the three 
trichotomies that Peirce actually applies to signs in NDTR. (Or the ten 
trichotomies he made later in the Welby letters.)

Gary f.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Jeff, Gary F, Jon S, List,

Jeff wrote:

"Given the centrality of the claim for understanding the account of
the relations between objects, signs and interpretants, I'd like to have a
better understanding of what the basis of the assertion really is.


"I've been looking for an argument (in the context of the normative
theory) to support the point, but I've not had much luck. As such, I'm
starting to think that it might be derived from a phenomenological analysis
of common experience--or something like that."


I would tend to agree that the assertion under consideration "might be
derived from a phenomenological analysis of common experience--or something
like that" while I would also tend to agree with Jon S that it is, from
another, mathematical, standpoint a matter of complexity, that 3ns involves
2ns and 1ns and 2ns involves 1ns,  while 1ns involves nothing but itself.


As for the first approach (following a phenomenology of common experience),
it seems to me so much common sense that a 1ns (be it a mere possibility or
some evanescent quality) has no power to determine a 2ns  (be it an
actuality, some action-reaction) or a 3ns, and 2ns cannot determine 3ns (be
it a law, habit, or thought-sign tending towards the future).


Jon S has already given the mathematical/involutional rationale.


I would also tend to agree with him--and contra Gary F--that


"The three 1903 trichotomies *must *be in this order to generate the ten
specific classes of Signs that Peirce subsequently identified, in
accordance with the rule that a possibility can only determine a
possibility and a law can only be determined by a law."


Best,


Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary F, Gary R, Jon S, List,
>
>
> All agree that "the upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness
> (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law),
> and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness."
>
>
> Ok, that appears to be a really basic point about what kinds of things can
> *determine* other kinds of things, and what kinds can't determine other
> things. Given the fact that the point is made in the context of a semiotic
> theory (which part of the normative theory), and that the point is not made
> in the context of a theory of metaphysics, what is the basis of the
> assertion? Is it drawn from common experience or our common sense
> understanding? Or, does the assertion rest on some kind of
> philosophical argument?
>
>
> Given the centrality of the claim for understanding the account of
> the relations between objects, signs and interpretants, I'd like to have a
> better understanding of what the basis of the assertion really is.
>
>
> I've been looking for an argument (in the context of the normative
> theory) to support the point, but I've not had much luck. As such, I'm
> starting to think that it might be derived from a phenomenological analysis
> of common experience--or something like that.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> ----------
> *From:* Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 15, 2017 9:38 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L
>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
> Gary F, Jon S, List,
>
> Gary F wrote:
>
> The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility)
> cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness
> cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other
> direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the
> definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.
>
>
> I agree. I don't see what the problem is here.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 12:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>
>> Jon,
>>
>>
>>
>> Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three *correlate *
>> trichotomies.”
>>
>>
>>
>> In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic
>> relation in which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is
>> Third Correlate.
>>
>> So when

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: Just googled "metaphysics". Seems to have some ugly, pretentious, megalomanic connotations. I did not mean it in that way, rather like abstraction of nature, or like looking for conditions for knowledge and experience: What else are categories? Not a contradiction to phenomenology and experience. If they suit, they are in accord with both.




Jeff, List,

Are these two contexts (semiotic theory, metaphysic theory) separatable? In the semiotical context, the categories rather are "possibility, actuality, law", and in the metaphysical context perhaps rather "quality, relation, representation", maybe. I think, that a lower categorical thing cannot determine a higher one is a matter of how "determination" is defined, and I guess, it is defined (by Peirce) as a matter of inclusion, meronomy, composition, like secondness already includes firstness and secondness of secondness, or like a relation includes the quality and a thing that has this quality.

In common experience though, determination also might be understood like classification (taxonomy), like a possibility may anticipate a class of actualities, or a quality may anticipate or separate a class of things that may have this quality out of all things that are there or might be there.

But in the Peircean sense, "determination" is a meronomic, not a taxonomic concept, I guess, and what can determine what is a consequence of a calculus based on this definition, so rather a kind of metaphysics, I would say, than experience or phenomenology.

Best,

Helmut

 

 15. April 2017 um 23:01 Uhr
"Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
 




Gary F, Gary R, Jon S, List,

 

All agree that "the upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness."

 

Ok, that appears to be a really basic point about what kinds of things can determine other kinds of things, and what kinds can't determine other things. Given the fact that the point is made in the context of a semiotic theory (which part of the normative theory), and that the point is not made in the context of a theory of metaphysics, what is the basis of the assertion? Is it drawn from common experience or our common sense understanding? Or, does the assertion rest on some kind of philosophical argument?

 

Given the centrality of the claim for understanding the account of the relations between objects, signs and interpretants, I'd like to have a better understanding of what the basis of the assertion really is.

 

I've been looking for an argument (in the context of the normative theory) to support the point, but I've not had much luck. As such, I'm starting to think that it might be derived from a phenomenological analysis of common experience--or something like that.

 

--Jeff 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 15, 2017 9:38 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 



Gary F, Jon S, List,
 

Gary F wrote: 

 


The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.


 

I agree. I don't see what the problem is here.

 

Best,

 

Gary R


 







 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690





 

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 12:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:




Jon,

 

Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three correlate trichotomies.”

 

In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic relation in which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is Third Correlate. 

So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign relation, we get:

[ The Sign is that one of the three correlates which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Interpretant is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. ]

Also in NDTR, the First Correlate determines the Third, i.e. the Sign determines the Interpretant.

 

All of the above is fully borne out in the NDTR classification of signs. To paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the Object or the Interpretant is a mere possibility. So a Qualisign is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF:  The reason for the 1908 ordering you quote seems clear enough because
it is an order of successive determination, but it has no relation to any
ordering of trichotomies.


Now you lost me.  Each of the correlates in that 1908 passage is divided by
a trichotomy, so the order of determination *is *the order of the
trichotomies.  For example, as Peirce goes on to explain (EP 2:484-488), a
Potisign can be Copulative, Denominative, or Descriptive; an Actisign can
be Copulative or Denominative; and a Famisign must be Copulative.  This is
because the Immediate Object *determines *the Sign; in other words, the
Immediate Object trichotomy comes (logically) *before *the Sign trichotomy.

GF:  Nor is there any logical order among the three trichotomies that
Peirce actually applies to signs in NDTR.


Yes, there is.

CSP:  Signs are divisible by three trichotomies:  *first*, according as the
sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general
law; *secondly*, according as the relation of the sign to its Object
consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some
existential relation to that Object, or in its relation to an Interpretant;
*thirdly*, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of
possibility, or as a sign of fact, or a sign of reason. (EP 2:291, emphases
added)


The three 1903 trichotomies *must *be in this order to generate the ten
specific classes of Signs that Peirce subsequently identified, in
accordance with the rule that a possibility can only determine a
possibility and a law can only be determined by a law.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 5:11 PM,  wrote:

> Jeff, Gary R, Jon S, List,
>
>
>
> Jeff, I’ve always assumed — and NDTR explicitly says, right at the
> beginning — that this principle is based on phenomenology. Of course, the
> hardest part of Peircean phenomenology is developing clear enough notions
> of what is denoted by the terms Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; but
> based on the notions I have of them, it’s easy to see why a First cannot
> determine a Third, and so on. Those notions are, for me, based on
> observation of everyday phenomena (in this context, semiosic phenomena.
>
>
>
> Jon, I’m afraid I still don’t get it. I simply haven’t a clue what it
> means, or could mean, to say that one *trichotomy* logically “follows” or
> “precedes” another. The reason for the 1908 ordering you quote seems clear
> enough because it is an order of successive *determination*, but it has
> no relation to any ordering of *trichotomies*. Nor is there any logical
> order among the three trichotomies that Peirce actually applies to signs in
> NDTR. (Or the ten trichotomies he made later in the Welby letters.)
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Helmut Raulien]

Jeff, List,

Are these two contexts (semiotic theory, metaphysic theory) separatable? In the semiotical context, the categories rather are "possibility, actuality, law", and in the metaphysical context perhaps rather "quality, relation, representation", maybe. I think, that a lower categorical thing cannot determine a higher one is a matter of how "determination" is defined, and I guess, it is defined (by Peirce) as a matter of inclusion, meronomy, composition, like secondness already includes firstness and secondness of secondness, or like a relation includes the quality and a thing that has this quality.

In common experience though, determination also might be understood like classification (taxonomy), like a possibility may anticipate a class of actualities, or a quality may anticipate or separate a class of things that may have this quality out of all things that are there or might be there.

But in the Peircean sense, "determination" is a meronomic, not a taxonomic concept, I guess, and what can determine what is a consequence of a calculus based on this definition, so rather a kind of metaphysics, I would say, than experience or phenomenology.

Best,

Helmut

 

 15. April 2017 um 23:01 Uhr
"Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
 




Gary F, Gary R, Jon S, List,

 

All agree that "the upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness."

 

Ok, that appears to be a really basic point about what kinds of things can determine other kinds of things, and what kinds can't determine other things. Given the fact that the point is made in the context of a semiotic theory (which part of the normative theory), and that the point is not made in the context of a theory of metaphysics, what is the basis of the assertion? Is it drawn from common experience or our common sense understanding? Or, does the assertion rest on some kind of philosophical argument?

 

Given the centrality of the claim for understanding the account of the relations between objects, signs and interpretants, I'd like to have a better understanding of what the basis of the assertion really is.

 

I've been looking for an argument (in the context of the normative theory) to support the point, but I've not had much luck. As such, I'm starting to think that it might be derived from a phenomenological analysis of common experience--or something like that.

 

--Jeff 

 



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


 



From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 15, 2017 9:38 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 



Gary F, Jon S, List,
 

Gary F wrote: 

 


The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.


 

I agree. I don't see what the problem is here.

 

Best,

 

Gary R


 







 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690





 

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 12:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:




Jon,

 

Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three correlate trichotomies.”

 

In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic relation in which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is Third Correlate. 

So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign relation, we get:

[ The Sign is that one of the three correlates which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Interpretant is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. ]

Also in NDTR, the First Correlate determines the Third, i.e. the Sign determines the Interpretant.

 

All of the above is fully borne out in the NDTR classification of signs. To paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the Object or the Interpretant is a mere possibility. So a Qualisign is too simple to determine its Interpretant to be either an actuality or a law, and a sign is not complex enough to be a Legisign unless it determines its Object and Interpretant to also be laws.

 

To paraphrase 236, the Interpretant is a law if either the Sign or its Object is a law, and is not a mere possibility unless the Sign and its Object are mere possibilities.

 

T

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jeff, Gary R, Jon S, List,

 

Jeff, I've always assumed - and NDTR explicitly says, right at the beginning
- that this principle is based on phenomenology. Of course, the hardest part
of Peircean phenomenology is developing clear enough notions of what is
denoted by the terms Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness; but based on the
notions I have of them, it's easy to see why a First cannot determine a
Third, and so on. Those notions are, for me, based on observation of
everyday phenomena (in this context, semiosic phenomena.

 

Jon, I'm afraid I still don't get it. I simply haven't a clue what it means,
or could mean, to say that one trichotomy logically "follows" or "precedes"
another. The reason for the 1908 ordering you quote seems clear enough
because it is an order of successive determination, but it has no relation
to any ordering of trichotomies. Nor is there any logical order among the
three trichotomies that Peirce actually applies to signs in NDTR. (Or the
ten trichotomies he made later in the Welby letters.)

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 15-Apr-17 17:01
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F, Gary R, Jon S, List,

 

All agree that "the upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness
(possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law),
and Secondness cannot determine Thirdness."

 

Ok, that appears to be a really basic point about what kinds of things can
determine other kinds of things, and what kinds can't determine other
things. Given the fact that the point is made in the context of a semiotic
theory (which part of the normative theory), and that the point is not made
in the context of a theory of metaphysics, what is the basis of the
assertion? Is it drawn from common experience or our common sense
understanding? Or, does the assertion rest on some kind of philosophical
argument?

 

Given the centrality of the claim for understanding the account of the
relations between objects, signs and interpretants, I'd like to have a
better understanding of what the basis of the assertion really is.

 

I've been looking for an argument (in the context of the normative theory)
to support the point, but I've not had much luck. As such, I'm starting to
think that it might be derived from a phenomenological analysis of common
experience--or something like that.

 

--Jeff 

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F, Gary R, Jon S, List,


All agree that "the upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness 
(possibility) cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and 
Secondness cannot determine Thirdness."


Ok, that appears to be a really basic point about what kinds of things can 
determine other kinds of things, and what kinds can't determine other things. 
Given the fact that the point is made in the context of a semiotic theory 
(which part of the normative theory), and that the point is not made in the 
context of a theory of metaphysics, what is the basis of the assertion? Is it 
drawn from common experience or our common sense understanding? Or, does the 
assertion rest on some kind of philosophical argument?


Given the centrality of the claim for understanding the account of the 
relations between objects, signs and interpretants, I'd like to have a better 
understanding of what the basis of the assertion really is.


I've been looking for an argument (in the context of the normative theory) to 
support the point, but I've not had much luck. As such, I'm starting to think 
that it might be derived from a phenomenological analysis of common 
experience--or something like that.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 15, 2017 9:38 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F, Jon S, List,

Gary F wrote:

The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot 
determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot 
determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And 
again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three 
trichotomies and the tenfold classification.

I agree. I don't see what the problem is here.

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 12:28 PM, 
<g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Jon,

Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three correlate 
trichotomies.”

In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic relation in 
which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is Third Correlate.
So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign relation, we get:
[ The Sign is that one of the three correlates which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The 
Interpretant is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature. ]
Also in NDTR, the First Correlate determines the Third, i.e. the Sign 
determines the Interpretant.

All of the above is fully borne out in the NDTR classification of signs. To 
paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the Object or the 
Interpretant is a mere possibility. So a Qualisign is too simple to determine 
its Interpretant to be either an actuality or a law, and a sign is not complex 
enough to be a Legisign unless it determines its Object and Interpretant to 
also be laws.

To paraphrase 236, the Interpretant is a law if either the Sign or its Object 
is a law, and is not a mere possibility unless the Sign and its Object are mere 
possibilities.

The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot 
determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot 
determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And 
again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three 
trichotomies and the tenfold classification.

Either I’m missing something, or you are confusing Firstness with being First 
Correlate in a triadic relation, and the same with the other categories. Or 
something like that.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: 15-Apr-17 10:46
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third 
Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2:235-236; 1903)

The usual rule for reducing the 27 possible combinations of three trichotomies 
to only ten is that the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I am sorry that my explanations have been inadequate so far.  I will give
it another try.

It is a logical order, not a temporal order.  Why do three trichotomies of
correlates "divide all triadic relations into ten classes," rather than
27?  Because a possibility can only determine a possibility, and a law can
only be determined by a law.

If either the Object or Interpretant being a possibility *entails *that the
Sign is a possibility, then the Sign trichotomy must *follow *the other
two.  If the Interpretant being a possibility *entails *that both the Sign
and Object are possibilities, then the Interpretant trichotomy must *precede
*the other two.

As you said, these are *not *the three trichotomies of Peirce's Sign
classification; they are the trichotomies of the correlates themselves, in
accordance with CP 2.238.  Peirce evidently followed a *different *ordering
principle when he later wrote that "the Dynamoid Object determines the
Immediate Object, which determines the Sign itself, which determines the
Destinate Interpretant, which determines the Effective Interpretant, which
determines the Explicit Interpretant" (EP 2:481; 1908).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 1:51 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Jon S, Gary R,
>
>
>
> Jon, I’m afraid this doesn’t help at all — doesn’t help *me*, anyway,
> because I don’t see in what sense any of the three trichotomies sketched in
> 2.238 could “come before” either of the other two. Are you assigning some
> *temporal* order to them? Or some *logical* order? On what basis? And
> what does that have to do with the three trichotomies of signs that Peirce
> spells out later in NDTR?
>
>
>
> CP 2.238 says that “Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by
> trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate,
> respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law.” So,
> what I guess you are calling the “Object trichotomy” is a division
> according to whether the Object is a mere possibility, an actual existent,
> or a law. And I guess your “Interpretant trichotomy” would be a division
> according to whether the Interpretant is a mere possibility, an actual
> existent, or a law. (These of course do not correspond to any of the three
> trichotomies *of Signs* which generate the tenfold classification of
> signs which Peirce develops later in NDTR.) What I can’t guess is how or
> why you are assigning an *order* to those trichotomies (or saying that
> Peirce implies some such order in 235-6).
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 15-Apr-17 14:06
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Garys, List:
>
>
>
> I agree with that much, as well.  The issue arises when we apply this
> principle to establish the proper order of the three correlate trichotomies
> when employing Peirce's first method for dividing a triadic relation (CP
> 2.238).
>
> GF:  To paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the
> Object or the Interpretant is a mere possibility.
>
> This entails that the Object and Interpretant trichotomies both come *before
> *the Sign trichotomy.  If the Sign came first, then it could still be an
> actuality or a law if the Object and/or Interpretant were mere
> possibilities.
>
> GS:  To paraphrase 236, the Interpretant is a law if either the Sign or
> its Object is a law, and is not a mere possibility unless the Sign and its
> Object are mere possibilities.
>
> This entails that the Interpretant trichotomy comes *before *both the
> Sign and Object trichotomies.  If the Interpretant came last, then it could
> be a possibility no matter what the Sign and Object were, and it could only
> be a law if *both *the Sign and Object were laws.
>
>
>
> Hence the necessary order of the correlate trichotomies per CP 2.235-238
> (1903) is from the most complex to the most simple--Third, Second, First;
> i.e., Interpretant, Object, Sign.  But five years later, Peirce clearly
> indicates (EP 2:481) that the correct order is instead (two) Objects, Sign,
> (three) Interpretants.  I suspect that Jappy's book is an attempt to
> explain this apparent change of mind by Peirce, and then explore its
> implications.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 11:38 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> Gary F, Jon S, List,
>
>
>
> Gary F wrote:
>
> The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibi

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S, Gary R,

 

Jon, I’m afraid this doesn’t help at all — doesn’t help me, anyway, because I 
don’t see in what sense any of the three trichotomies sketched in 2.238 could 
“come before” either of the other two. Are you assigning some temporal order to 
them? Or some logical order? On what basis? And what does that have to do with 
the three trichotomies of signs that Peirce spells out later in NDTR?

 

CP 2.238 says that “Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by 
trichotomy, according as the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, 
respectively, is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law.” So, what I 
guess you are calling the “Object trichotomy” is a division according to 
whether the Object is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. And I 
guess your “Interpretant trichotomy” would be a division according to whether 
the Interpretant is a mere possibility, an actual existent, or a law. (These of 
course do not correspond to any of the three trichotomies of Signs which 
generate the tenfold classification of signs which Peirce develops later in 
NDTR.) What I can’t guess is how or why you are assigning an order to those 
trichotomies (or saying that Peirce implies some such order in 235-6).

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 15-Apr-17 14:06
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Garys, List:

 

I agree with that much, as well.  The issue arises when we apply this principle 
to establish the proper order of the three correlate trichotomies when 
employing Peirce's first method for dividing a triadic relation (CP 2.238).

 

GF:  To paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the Object or 
the Interpretant is a mere possibility.

 

This entails that the Object and Interpretant trichotomies both come before the 
Sign trichotomy.  If the Sign came first, then it could still be an actuality 
or a law if the Object and/or Interpretant were mere possibilities.

 

GS:  To paraphrase 236, the Interpretant is a law if either the Sign or its 
Object is a law, and is not a mere possibility unless the Sign and its Object 
are mere possibilities.

 

This entails that the Interpretant trichotomy comes before both the Sign and 
Object trichotomies.  If the Interpretant came last, then it could be a 
possibility no matter what the Sign and Object were, and it could only be a law 
if both the Sign and Object were laws.

 

Hence the necessary order of the correlate trichotomies per CP 2.235-238 (1903) 
is from the most complex to the most simple--Third, Second, First; i.e., 
Interpretant, Object, Sign.  But five years later, Peirce clearly indicates (EP 
2:481) that the correct order is instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) 
Interpretants.  I suspect that Jappy's book is an attempt to explain this 
apparent change of mind by Peirce, and then explore its implications.

 

Thanks,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 11:38 AM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com 
<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com> > wrote:

Gary F, Jon S, List,

 

Gary F wrote: 

 

The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot 
determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot 
determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And 
again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three 
trichotomies and the tenfold classification.

 

I agree. I don't see what the problem is here.

 

Best,

 

Gary R




  
<https://d22r54gnmuhwmk.cloudfront.net/photos/0/ia/il/nnIAIlpwAddaFAz-44x44-cropped.jpg>
 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690 <tel:(718)%20482-5690> 

 

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 12:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca 
<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

Jon,

 

Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three correlate 
trichotomies.”

 

In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic relation in 
which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is Third Correlate. 

So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign relation, we get:

[ The Sign is that one of the three correlates which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The 
Interpretant is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature. ]

Also in NDTR, the First Correlate

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Clark, yes, that’s why I was careful to qualify my comments by saying “In 
NDTR.” But when you say that “what happens actually affects what is possible,” 
what you mean is that what happens now affects what can possibly happen in the 
future. Possibility as Firstness is timeless, in Peirce’s usage, so your usage 
of the term in your statement diverges from Peirce’s usage in a categorial 
context.

 

Gary f.

 

From: CLARK GOBLE [mailto:cl...@lextek.com] 
Sent: 15-Apr-17 13:49
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

 

On Apr 15, 2017, at 10:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  
wrote:

 

The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot 
determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot 
determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And 
again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three 
trichotomies and the tenfold classification.

 

 

We should note that this is for a particular type of analysis and meaning of 
determines. Since in his cosmology he’s not so limited. Further we can see how 
what happens actually affects what is possible. (If a bridge collapses it’s no 
longer possible to cross) So we should be careful not to assume NDTR applies to 
any type of analysis.

 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Apr 15, 2017, at 10:28 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) 
> cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness 
> cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other 
> direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the 
> definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.
> 

We should note that this is for a particular type of analysis and meaning of 
determines. Since in his cosmology he’s not so limited. Further we can see how 
what happens actually affects what is possible. (If a bridge collapses it’s no 
longer possible to cross) So we should be careful not to assume NDTR applies to 
any type of analysis.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon S, List,

Gary F wrote:

The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility)
cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness
cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other
direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the
definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.


I agree. I don't see what the problem is here.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 12:28 PM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three *correlate *
> trichotomies.”
>
>
>
> In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic
> relation in which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is
> Third Correlate.
>
> So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign relation, we get:
>
> [ The Sign is that one of the three correlates which is regarded as of
> the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
> that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
> Interpretant is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
> complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
> a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. ]
>
> Also in NDTR, the First Correlate determines the Third, i.e. the Sign
> determines the Interpretant.
>
>
>
> All of the above is fully borne out in the NDTR classification of signs.
> To paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the Object or
> the Interpretant is a mere possibility. So a Qualisign is too simple to
> determine its Interpretant to be either an actuality or a law, and a sign
> is not complex enough to be a Legisign unless it determines its Object and
> Interpretant to also be laws.
>
>
>
> To paraphrase 236, the Interpretant is a law if either the Sign or its
> Object is a law, and is not a mere possibility unless the Sign and its
> Object are mere possibilities.
>
>
>
> The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility)
> cannot determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness
> cannot determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other
> direction. And again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the
> definitions of the three trichotomies and the tenfold classification.
>
>
>
> Either I’m missing something, or you are confusing Firstness with being
> First Correlate in a triadic relation, and the same with the other
> categories. Or something like that.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 15-Apr-17 10:46
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
> the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
> that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
> Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
> complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
> a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2:235-236; 1903)
>
>
>
> The usual rule for reducing the 27 possible combinations of three
> trichotomies to only ten is that the category of each can only be equal to
> or lower than the previous one, where "possibility" is the lowest (1ns) and
> "law" is the highest (3ns).  Peirce said above that if the Third Correlate
> is a possibility, then the Second and Third Correlates must also be
> possibilities; just like if the Sign is a Qualisign, then it must also be
> an Icon and a Rheme.  Peirce said above that if the First Correlate is a
> law, then the Second and Third Correlates must also be laws; just like if
> the Sign is an Argument, then it must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.
>
>
>
> So in 1903, the order of the three *correlate *trichotomies for any
> triadic relation is Third, Second, First.  For the triadic Sign relation,
> it becomes Interpretant, Object, Sign.  However, in his 1903 classification
> of Signs, Peirce only included the last of these; the other two are not for
> the Object *itself *and the Interpretant *itself*, but for the dyadic
> Sign-Object *relation *and the Sign's *determination *of the Interpretant
> in respect to the Object.  And Peirce evidently changed his mind about the
> order of the correlate trichotomies by 1908, when he 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon,

 

Sorry, I don’t know what you mean by “the order of the three correlate 
trichotomies.”

 

In NDTR, Peirce defines a Sign as the First Correlate of a triadic relation in 
which the Object is Second Correlate and the Interpretant is Third Correlate. 

So when we apply CP2.235-6 to the sign relation, we get:

[ The Sign is that one of the three correlates which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The 
Interpretant is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature. ]

Also in NDTR, the First Correlate determines the Third, i.e. the Sign 
determines the Interpretant.

 

All of the above is fully borne out in the NDTR classification of signs. To 
paraphrase 235, the Sign is a mere possibility if either the Object or the 
Interpretant is a mere possibility. So a Qualisign is too simple to determine 
its Interpretant to be either an actuality or a law, and a sign is not complex 
enough to be a Legisign unless it determines its Object and Interpretant to 
also be laws.

 

To paraphrase 236, the Interpretant is a law if either the Sign or its Object 
is a law, and is not a mere possibility unless the Sign and its Object are mere 
possibilities.

 

The upshot of this, as far as I can see, is that Firstness (possibility) cannot 
determine Secondness (actuality) or Thirdness (law), and Secondness cannot 
determine Thirdness: determination can only run in the other direction. And 
again, this seems to me entirely consistent with the definitions of the three 
trichotomies and the tenfold classification.

 

Either I’m missing something, or you are confusing Firstness with being First 
Correlate in a triadic relation, and the same with the other categories. Or 
something like that.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 15-Apr-17 10:46
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F., List:

 

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the 
simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that 
nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The Third 
Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex 
nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere 
possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2:235-236; 1903)

 

The usual rule for reducing the 27 possible combinations of three trichotomies 
to only ten is that the category of each can only be equal to or lower than the 
previous one, where "possibility" is the lowest (1ns) and "law" is the highest 
(3ns).  Peirce said above that if the Third Correlate is a possibility, then 
the Second and Third Correlates must also be possibilities; just like if the 
Sign is a Qualisign, then it must also be an Icon and a Rheme.  Peirce said 
above that if the First Correlate is a law, then the Second and Third 
Correlates must also be laws; just like if the Sign is an Argument, then it 
must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

 

So in 1903, the order of the three correlate trichotomies for any triadic 
relation is Third, Second, First.  For the triadic Sign relation, it becomes 
Interpretant, Object, Sign.  However, in his 1903 classification of Signs, 
Peirce only included the last of these; the other two are not for the Object 
itself and the Interpretant itself, but for the dyadic Sign-Object relation and 
the Sign's determination of the Interpretant in respect to the Object.  And 
Peirce evidently changed his mind about the order of the correlate trichotomies 
by 1908, when he wrote that the two Objects come first, followed by the Sign, 
and then the three Interpretants.

 

Regards,

 

Jon S.

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

CSP:  The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of
the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of
that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. The
Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most
complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being
a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. (CP 2:235-236; 1903)


The usual rule for reducing the 27 possible combinations of three
trichotomies to only ten is that the category of each can only be equal to
or lower than the previous one, where "possibility" is the lowest (1ns) and
"law" is the highest (3ns).  Peirce said above that if the Third Correlate
is a possibility, then the Second and Third Correlates must also be
possibilities; just like if the Sign is a Qualisign, then it must also be
an Icon and a Rheme.  Peirce said above that if the First Correlate is a
law, then the Second and Third Correlates must also be laws; just like if
the Sign is an Argument, then it must also be a Symbol and a Legisign.

So in 1903, the order of the three *correlate *trichotomies for any triadic
relation is Third, Second, First.  For the triadic Sign relation, it
becomes Interpretant, Object, Sign.  However, in his 1903 classification of
Signs, Peirce only included the last of these; the other two are not for
the Object *itself *and the Interpretant *itself*, but for the dyadic
Sign-Object *relation *and the Sign's *determination *of the Interpretant
in respect to the Object.  And Peirce evidently changed his mind about the
order of the correlate trichotomies by 1908, when he wrote that the two
Objects come first, followed by the Sign, and then the three Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Apr 15, 2017 at 7:53 AM,  wrote:

> Jon S, you wrote:
>
> “in subsequently rereading CP 2.235-236, I noticed that it implied the
> order of determination of the three correlates to be Third, Second, First;
> i.e., Interpretant, Object, Sign.”
>
> But I don’t see how these two paragraphs imply anything at all about order
> of determination. Can you explain?
>
>
>
> Regarding Olsen’s point about the three later paragraphs, I agree, and in
> fact I made the same observation myself in a peirce-l post some time ago,
> as part of a close reading of NDTR. But I think that was before you joined
> the list.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 15-Apr-17 00:53
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> Jappy's first chapter purports to spell out Peirce's 1903 theory of signs
> without any reference to his later writings, and it straightforwardly
> labels the three trichotomies as S, S-O, and S-I.  From thumbing through
> the whole book, it looks like it does not say anything about Marty's
> category-theoretic approach that apparently took them to be S, S-O, and
> (S-O)-I.
>
>
>
> However, in subsequently rereading CP 2.235-236, I noticed that it implied
> the order of determination of the three correlates to be Third, Second,
> First; i.e., Interpretant, Object, Sign.  This is why Hartshorne and Weiss
> suggested in a footnote that Peirce must have mistakenly switched "First
> Correlate" and "Third Correlate" in these two paragraphs.  While
> investigating this further, I renewed my acquaintance with a 2000
> *Transactions* article by Len Olsen, "On Peirce's Systematic Division of
> Signs," that defends Peirce's text.
>
>
>
> Olsen points out that Peirce actually defines *three *different ways of
> categorically dividing genuine triadic relations--by each of the three
> correlates (CP 2.238), by each of the three dyadic relations (CP 2.239),
> and by how the First Correlate determines the Third in respect to the
> Second (CP 2.241).  Olsen then suggests--persuasively, I think--that the
> three 1903 trichotomies are obtained by following these distinct methods to
> divide respectively the Sign itself, the Sign-Object relation, and how the
> Sign determines the Interpretant in respect to the Object.
>
>
>
> Jappy's overall thesis, which I brought up on the List several months ago
> after reading a couple of his online papers, is that Peirce's entire
> theoretical framework for Sign classification changed significantly after
> 1903.  I will be interested to see whether and how Jappy maintains,
> modifies, or discards the approach in NDTR based on Peirce's later writings.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 4:39 PM,  wrote:
>
> Interesting, Jon. I noticed Jappy’s new book (about the 28 signs) but
> passed on it as too expensive, even the Kindle is over $100, and I don’t
> have access to a library that could get it for me. But that’s life in the
> backwoods. I look forward to 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S, you wrote:

“in subsequently rereading CP 2.235-236, I noticed that it implied the order of 
determination of the three correlates to be Third, Second, First; i.e., 
Interpretant, Object, Sign.”

But I don’t see how these two paragraphs imply anything at all about order of 
determination. Can you explain?

 

Regarding Olsen’s point about the three later paragraphs, I agree, and in fact 
I made the same observation myself in a peirce-l post some time ago, as part of 
a close reading of NDTR. But I think that was before you joined the list.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 15-Apr-17 00:53



Gary F., List:

 

Jappy's first chapter purports to spell out Peirce's 1903 theory of signs 
without any reference to his later writings, and it straightforwardly labels 
the three trichotomies as S, S-O, and S-I.  From thumbing through the whole 
book, it looks like it does not say anything about Marty's category-theoretic 
approach that apparently took them to be S, S-O, and (S-O)-I.

 

However, in subsequently rereading CP 2.235-236, I noticed that it implied the 
order of determination of the three correlates to be Third, Second, First; 
i.e., Interpretant, Object, Sign.  This is why Hartshorne and Weiss suggested 
in a footnote that Peirce must have mistakenly switched "First Correlate" and 
"Third Correlate" in these two paragraphs.  While investigating this further, I 
renewed my acquaintance with a 2000 Transactions article by Len Olsen, "On 
Peirce's Systematic Division of Signs," that defends Peirce's text.

 

Olsen points out that Peirce actually defines three different ways of 
categorically dividing genuine triadic relations--by each of the three 
correlates (CP 2.238), by each of the three dyadic relations (CP 2.239), and by 
how the First Correlate determines the Third in respect to the Second (CP 
2.241).  Olsen then suggests--persuasively, I think--that the three 1903 
trichotomies are obtained by following these distinct methods to divide 
respectively the Sign itself, the Sign-Object relation, and how the Sign 
determines the Interpretant in respect to the Object.

 

Jappy's overall thesis, which I brought up on the List several months ago after 
reading a couple of his online papers, is that Peirce's entire theoretical 
framework for Sign classification changed significantly after 1903.  I will be 
interested to see whether and how Jappy maintains, modifies, or discards the 
approach in NDTR based on Peirce's later writings.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 4:39 PM,  > wrote:

Interesting, Jon. I noticed Jappy’s new book (about the 28 signs) but passed on 
it as too expensive, even the Kindle is over $100, and I don’t have access to a 
library that could get it for me. But that’s life in the backwoods. I look 
forward to hearing what you can glean from it.

 

Gary f.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Jappy's first chapter purports to spell out Peirce's 1903 theory of signs
without any reference to his later writings, and it straightforwardly
labels the three trichotomies as S, S-O, and S-I.  From thumbing through
the whole book, it looks like it does not say anything about Marty's
category-theoretic approach that apparently took them to be S, S-O, and
(S-O)-I.

However, in subsequently rereading CP 2.235-236, I noticed that it implied
the order of determination of the three correlates to be Third, Second,
First; i.e., Interpretant, Object, Sign.  This is why Hartshorne and Weiss
suggested in a footnote that Peirce must have mistakenly switched "First
Correlate" and "Third Correlate" in these two paragraphs.  While
investigating this further, I renewed my acquaintance with a 2000
*Transactions* article by Len Olsen, "On Peirce's Systematic Division of
Signs," that defends Peirce's text.

Olsen points out that Peirce actually defines *three *different ways of
categorically dividing genuine triadic relations--by each of the three
correlates (CP 2.238), by each of the three dyadic relations (CP 2.239),
and by how the First Correlate determines the Third in respect to the
Second (CP 2.241).  Olsen then suggests--persuasively, I think--that the
three 1903 trichotomies are obtained by following these distinct methods to
divide respectively the Sign itself, the Sign-Object relation, and how the
Sign determines the Interpretant in respect to the Object.

Jappy's overall thesis, which I brought up on the List several months ago
after reading a couple of his online papers, is that Peirce's entire
theoretical framework for Sign classification changed significantly after
1903.  I will be interested to see whether and how Jappy maintains,
modifies, or discards the approach in NDTR based on Peirce's later writings.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 4:39 PM,  wrote:

> Interesting, Jon. I noticed Jappy’s new book (about the 28 signs) but
> passed on it as too expensive, even the Kindle is over $100, and I don’t
> have access to a library that could get it for me. But that’s life in the
> backwoods. I look forward to hearing what you can glean from it.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Earlier in NDTR, Peirce stated that the third division of a Sign is
"according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, or
as a sign of fact, or a sign of reason" (CP 2.243, EP 2:291).  This
initially sounds to me like the (dyadic) relation between the Sign and its
Interpretant; i.e., how the Interpretant represents the Sign.

A few paragraphs later, he stated, "A *Rheme *is a sign which, for its
Interpretant, is a sign of qualitative possibility, that is, is understood
as representing such and such a kind of possible Object ... A *Dicent Sign*
is a sign which, for its Interpretant, is a sign of actual existence
... An *Argument
*is a sign which, for its Interpretant, is a sign of law" (CP 2.250-252, EP
2:292).  This initially sounds to me like the Immediate Object; i.e., how
the Sign represents the Object to the Interpretant.

The summary that you quoted comes right after this, and sounds to me like
the alternative that you mentioned--the relation between the Sign-Object
relation and the Interpretant; i.e., how the Interpretant represents the
Sign's representation of the Object.  Interestingly, in the 1989 paper that
I mentioned previously, Tony Jappy cited Robert Marty as having used
category theory to represent the ten Sign classes of 1903 as a lattice
where the three criteria are S, (S-O), and ((S-O)-I).  Jappy's brand-new
book is waiting for me at the library, and maybe it will shed further light
on all of this.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 1:47 PM,  wrote:

> Jon S,
>
>
>
> Thanks for noticing and fixing my typo (NDDR for NDTR) (I can’t blame that
> on the youngster). The question you raise is an interesting one. When I
> wrote that “the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy cannot be defined in
> terms of dyadic relations,” I was reflecting on the fact that in NDTR at
> least, Peirce’s definitions of those terms explicitly refer to the Object,
> and thus seem to require mention of all three correlates, while the
> definitions of icon and index, and perhaps symbol, require no mention of
> the third correlate. I say “perhaps” in the case of the symbol because it
> “denotes by virtue of a law” which “operates to cause the Symbol to be
> interpreted as referring to that Object,” which does refer obliquely to the
> interpretant.” But the three definitions of the third trichotomy refer
> directly to the object; “we may say that a Rheme is a sign which is
> understood to represent its object in its characters merely; that a
> Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its object in respect
> to actual existence; and that an Argument is a Sign which is understood to
> represent its Object in its character as Sign” (CP2:252).
>
>
>
> Nevertheless, I wouldn’t say that it’s dead wrong to consider that third
> trichotomy as being according to the dyadic Sign-Interpretant relation.
> Another possibility is to consider it as being divided according to the
> dyadic relation between the Interpretant and *the Sign-Object relation*.
> But I wouldn’t want to be forced to choose among those options. As long as
> we know what we’re talking about … (more or less) …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Gary R,

 

A quick response to the point you asked for clarification on: what I had in 
mind was a part of NDTR that I didn’t bother to quote in my original post, 
where Peirce says that “The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is 
regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is 
a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature” 
(EP2:290, CP2.236). In NDTR, of course, the Third Correlate in a sign relation 
is the Interpretant, so I was thinking that the complexity of the Interpretant 
would (partially) explain why it can only be described in terms of triadic 
relations. (It would also explain why there have to be three Interpretants 
while there are only two Objects, and why the Argument can only be a Symbol and 
a Legisign.) I’m not sure about any of this, but that’s what I meant.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 14-Apr-17 14:50
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Jon S, Gary F, List,

 

Jon, this is most interesting and brings up several topics, some of which, for 
example, those relating to Jappy's diagram, I'll hold off discussing at least 
for now (although I have a number of questions regarding his approach and, 
indeed, with much of the literature surrounding the possible classification 
into 66 sign classes). 

 

For now I'd like to take up just one facet of one of your points (there are 
others, which you allude to at the close of your post and which do not appear 
in this truncated excerpt), that of whether the signs of the third trichotomy 
can or cannot be analyzed dyadically. Your wrote:

 

JS:  However, you seem to be saying that the third trichotomy 
(Rheme/Dicent/Argument) is not for the dyadic Sign-Interpretant relation that 
we can likewise prescind.  That would be contrary to not only most (maybe all) 
of the secondary literature that I have read on this topic, but also what 
Peirce himself wrote later in the same 1904 letter to Lady Welby that you 
quoted.

 

CSP:  In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is either 
a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. (CP 8.337)

 

Are you claiming that the Sign-Interpretant relation in this context is somehow 
not dyadic like the Sign-Object relation?  I am still inclined to think that it 
is dyadic in much the same way-

 

I think there are several ways of looking at this. First, from the standpoint 
of prescission, I see no reason why for the purposes of prescissive abstraction 
the Sign-Interpretant relation "in this context" cannot be dealt with 
dyadically. Indeed, I am of the opinion that even the first 1903 trichotomy 
(Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) can be so analyzed as well, at least for the 
purposes of an abstract analysis (this, albeit, "in a manner of speaking"). We 
are, after all, working at a rather high level of abstraction in consideration 
of the diagram of the 10 classes.

 

But--and I hope I'm not beating this horse of 'involution' to death--from the 
standpoint of involution it is the case that the argument will involve, and 
necessarily, it's dicents (propositions) and rhemes (terms). Now this is not 
shown in the 10-class diagram, but at another level of analysis it can be 
presupposed, and this relates to the complexity and mental quality of symbols. 

 

Further, in Peirce's gloss on each of the classes (including the examples he 
gives) we see that several of the classes may take into consideration (involve 
in another sense) classes 'lower' in the classification.

 

And, at this level of analysis each of the10 signs of the 1903 classification 
can be seen as involving all-at-once-together a relation to the interpretant 
which involves a relation to the object which, in turn, involves a relation to 
the sign itself. One can, as I see it, prescind each of the 3 kinds of the 3 
correlates from the each of the 10 classes of signs. But, again, only for the 
purposes of a rather abstract analysis.

 

I'm not sure that I  see exactly what Gary F is aiming at in writing that 
"Since the other correlate, the Interpretant, is “mental” and is the most 
complex of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy cannot be defined 
in terms of dyadic relations," but it may be related to the mental character 
and complexity of the genuine sign, the Symbol. Perhaps Gary F can clarify his 
meaning in this matter.

 

Best,

 

Gary R




  
<https://d22r54gnmuhwmk.cloudfront.net/photos/0/ia/il/nnIAIlpwAddaFAz-44x44-cropped.jpg>
 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690

 

On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 1:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:

Gary F., List:

 

This is very helpful, thank you for posting it.  It is inter

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Jon S, Gary F, List,

Jon, this is most interesting and brings up several topics, some of which,
for example, those relating to Jappy's diagram, I'll hold off discussing at
least for now (although I have a number of questions regarding his approach
and, indeed, with much of the literature surrounding the possible
classification into 66 sign classes).

For now I'd like to take up just one facet of one of your points (there are
others, which you allude to at the close of your post and which do not
appear in this truncated excerpt), that of whether the signs of the third
trichotomy can or cannot be analyzed dyadically. Your wrote:


JS:  However, you seem to be saying that the third trichotomy
(Rheme/Dicent/Argument) is *not *for the dyadic Sign-Interpretant relation
that we can likewise prescind.  That would be contrary to not only most
(maybe all) of the secondary literature that I have read on this topic, but
also what Peirce himself wrote later in the same 1904 letter to Lady Welby
that you quoted.

CSP:  In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is
either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. (CP 8.337)


Are you claiming that the Sign-Interpretant relation in this context is
somehow *not *dyadic like the Sign-Object relation?  I am still inclined to
think that it *is *dyadic in much the same way-


I think there are several ways of looking at this. First, from the
standpoint of prescission, I see no reason why for the purposes of
prescissive abstraction the Sign-Interpretant relation "in this context"
cannot be dealt with dyadically. Indeed, I am of the opinion that even
the first
1903 trichotomy (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) can be so analyzed as well, at
least for the purposes of an abstract analysis (this, albeit, "in a manner
of speaking"). We are, after all, working at a rather high level of
abstraction in consideration of the diagram of the 10 classes.

But--and I hope I'm not beating this horse of 'involution' to death--from
the standpoint of involution it is the case that the argument will *involve*,
and *necessarily*, it's dicents (propositions) and rhemes (terms). Now this
is not shown in the 10-class diagram, but at another level of analysis it
can be presupposed, and this relates to the complexity and mental quality
of symbols.

Further, in Peirce's gloss on each of the classes (including the examples
he gives) we see that several of the classes may take into consideration
(involve in another sense) classes 'lower' in the classification.

And, at this level of analysis each of the10 signs of the 1903
classification can be seen as involving all-at-once-together a relation to
the interpretant which involves a relation to the object which, in turn,
involves a relation to the sign itself. One can, as I see it, prescind each
of the 3 kinds of the 3 correlates from the each of the 10 classes of
signs. But, again, only for the purposes of a rather abstract analysis.

I'm not sure that I  see exactly what Gary F is aiming at in writing
that "Since
the other correlate, the Interpretant, is “mental” and is the most complex
of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy cannot be defined in
terms of dyadic relations," but it may be related to the mental character
and complexity of the genuine sign, the Symbol. Perhaps Gary F can clarify
his meaning in this matter.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 1:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> This is very helpful, thank you for posting it.  It is interesting that in
> NDTR, Peirce treated the three monadic correlate divisions and three dyadic
> relation divisions as each generating a different set of ten Sign classes.
> Tony Jappy has suggested that we should perhaps maintain these two separate
> approaches when expanding to two Objects and three Interpretants, rather
> than trying to integrate them into a single series of ten trichotomies to
> produce 66 Sign classes.  This figure is from his 1989 paper, "Peirce's
> Sixty-Six Signs Revisited," in Gerard Deledalle, Ed., *Semiotics and
> Pragmatics:  Proceedings of the Perpignan Symposium*.
>
> [image: Inline image 1]
>
>
> GF:  Peirce devotes the rest of [NDTR] to the division of sign relations,
> i.e. the classification of signs. For this purpose he applies the three
> trichotomies introduced above, one of which is according to the dyadic
> relation between the first and second correlates, the Sign and its Object.
> These are “constituted” by the triadic relation of which sign and object
> are two correlates. Since the other correlate, the Interpretant, is
> “mental” and is the most complex of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument
> trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic relations.
>
>
> So the first 1903 trichotomy (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) is for 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[gnox]

Jon S,

 

Thanks for noticing and fixing my typo (NDDR for NDTR) (I can’t blame that on 
the youngster). The question you raise is an interesting one. When I wrote that 
“the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic 
relations,” I was reflecting on the fact that in NDTR at least, Peirce’s 
definitions of those terms explicitly refer to the Object, and thus seem to 
require mention of all three correlates, while the definitions of icon and 
index, and perhaps symbol, require no mention of the third correlate. I say 
“perhaps” in the case of the symbol because it “denotes by virtue of a law” 
which “operates to cause the Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that 
Object,” which does refer obliquely to the interpretant.” But the three 
definitions of the third trichotomy refer directly to the object; “we may say 
that a Rheme is a sign which is understood to represent its object in its 
characters merely; that a Dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent 
its object in respect to actual existence; and that an Argument is a Sign which 
is understood to represent its Object in its character as Sign” (CP2:252).

 

Nevertheless, I wouldn’t say that it’s dead wrong to consider that third 
trichotomy as being according to the dyadic Sign-Interpretant relation. Another 
possibility is to consider it as being divided according to the dyadic relation 
between the Interpretant and the Sign-Object relation. But I wouldn’t want to 
be forced to choose among those options. As long as we know what we’re talking 
about … (more or less) …

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 14-Apr-17 13:12
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

 

Gary F., List:

 

This is very helpful, thank you for posting it.  It is interesting that in 
NDTR, Peirce treated the three monadic correlate divisions and three dyadic 
relation divisions as each generating a different set of ten Sign classes.  
Tony Jappy has suggested that we should perhaps maintain these two separate 
approaches when expanding to two Objects and three Interpretants, rather than 
trying to integrate them into a single series of ten trichotomies to produce 66 
Sign classes.  This figure is from his 1989 paper, "Peirce's Sixty-Six Signs 
Revisited," in Gerard Deledalle, Ed., Semiotics and Pragmatics:  Proceedings of 
the Perpignan Symposium.

 



 

GF:  Peirce devotes the rest of [NDTR] to the division of sign relations, i.e. 
the classification of signs. For this purpose he applies the three trichotomies 
introduced above, one of which is according to the dyadic relation between the 
first and second correlates, the Sign and its Object. These are “constituted” 
by the triadic relation of which sign and object are two correlates. Since the 
other correlate, the Interpretant, is “mental” and is the most complex of the 
three, the rheme/dicisign/argument trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of 
dyadic relations.

 

So the first 1903 trichotomy (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) is for the Sign 
considered monadically, and the second (Icon/Index/Symbol) is for the dyadic 
Sign-Object relation that we can prescind from the triadic 
Sign-Object-Interpretant relation.  However, you seem to be saying that the 
third trichotomy (Rheme/Dicent/Argument) is not for the dyadic 
Sign-Interpretant relation that we can likewise prescind.  That would be 
contrary to not only most (maybe all) of the secondary literature that I have 
read on this topic, but also what Peirce himself wrote later in the same 1904 
letter to Lady Welby that you quoted.

 

CSP:  In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is either 
a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. (CP 8.337)

 

Are you claiming that the Sign-Interpretant relation in this context is somehow 
not dyadic like the Sign-Object relation?  I am still inclined to think that it 
is dyadic in much the same way--which, by the way, strikes me as another reason 
to associate this particular trichotomy with the relation of the Sign to the 
Dynamic Interpretant, rather than the Final Interpretant; again, I recognize 
that this is a departure from Peirce.  Otherwise, what alternative relation is 
this trichotomy dividing?

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

This is very helpful, thank you for posting it.  It is interesting that in
NDTR, Peirce treated the three monadic correlate divisions and three dyadic
relation divisions as each generating a different set of ten Sign classes.
Tony Jappy has suggested that we should perhaps maintain these two separate
approaches when expanding to two Objects and three Interpretants, rather
than trying to integrate them into a single series of ten trichotomies to
produce 66 Sign classes.  This figure is from his 1989 paper, "Peirce's
Sixty-Six Signs Revisited," in Gerard Deledalle, Ed., *Semiotics and
Pragmatics:  Proceedings of the Perpignan Symposium*.

[image: Inline image 1]


GF:  Peirce devotes the rest of [NDTR] to the division of sign relations,
i.e. the classification of signs. For this purpose he applies the three
trichotomies introduced above, one of which is according to the dyadic
relation between the first and second correlates, the Sign and its Object.
These are “constituted” by the triadic relation of which sign and object
are two correlates. Since the other correlate, the Interpretant, is
“mental” and is the most complex of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument
trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic relations.


So the first 1903 trichotomy (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) is for the Sign
considered monadically, and the second (Icon/Index/Symbol) is for the
dyadic Sign-Object relation that we can prescind from the triadic
Sign-Object-Interpretant relation.  However, you seem to be saying that the
third trichotomy (Rheme/Dicent/Argument) is *not *for the dyadic
Sign-Interpretant relation that we can likewise prescind.  That would be
contrary to not only most (maybe all) of the secondary literature that I
have read on this topic, but also what Peirce himself wrote later in the
same 1904 letter to Lady Welby that you quoted.

CSP:  In regard to its relation to its signified interpretant, a sign is
either a Rheme, a Dicent, or an Argument. (CP 8.337)


Are you claiming that the Sign-Interpretant relation in this context is
somehow *not *dyadic like the Sign-Object relation?  I am still inclined to
think that it *is *dyadic in much the same way--which, by the way, strikes
me as another reason to associate this particular trichotomy with the
relation of the Sign to the *Dynamic *Interpretant, rather than the
*Final *Interpretant;
again, I recognize that this is a departure from Peirce.  Otherwise, what
alternative relation is this trichotomy dividing?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 11:04 AM,  wrote:

> Jon S, Gary R, list,
>
>
>
> Much as I admire the efforts of Jon S. to reconcile the Taborskian
> framework with the Peircean, and Jon A’s efforts to express it all
> algebraically, I would rather go straight to Peirce’s own text on the
> question Jon raised about the tenfold classification of signs. Since the
> topic of “Laws of nature as signs” has been left behind, I’ve devised a new
> subject line for this one. However, it is also a follow-up to Gary R's post
> which included some of our offlist discussion.
>
>
>
> In “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (EP2:290, CP
> 2.235-40), Peirce launches his systematic classification of triadic
> relations by distinguishing among the three correlates. Then he introduces
> a first tenfold classification according to the nature of each correlate
> considered monadically. Then we get a second tenfold classification based
> on the dyadic relations between any two of those correlates:
>
>
>
> [[ *There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations
> into ten classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute
> between either the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or
> the Second and Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws;
> and these ten classes will be subdivided in different ways.* ]]
>
>
>
> The syntax of this sentence implies that triadic relations “constitute”
> various dyadic relations; and these relations can themselves be “of the
> nature of possibilities, facts, or laws,” just as the correlates can. But
> when Peirce turns to the “*genuine Triadic Relation*,” where “*the First
> Correlate may be regarded as determining the Third Correlate in some
> respect,*” this “determination” is evidently not a dyadic relation,
> because the “respect” in which the Third Correlate gets determined is
> defined with reference to the Second Correlate. These “*triadic relations
> may be divided according as that determination of the Third Correlate is to
> having some quality, or to being in some existential relation to the Second
> Correlate, or to being in some relation of thought to the Second for
> something.*”
>
>
>
> Up to this point Peirce has been referring to triadic relations generally.
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, List,

Gary, this post is very helpful especially in the context of the new
Subject heading you've given it. It appears to me that a great deal of
effort went into your writing it including your finding the textual support
you've offered. I will be studying it this weekend.

For now suffice it to say, and really, again, that I concur with your
conclusion:

GF: "Since logic is semiotic, dyadic relations do have to be taken into
account for the analysis of sign relations; and in the tenfold
classification of NDDR, Peirce does this by prescinding the dyadic
sign-object relation from the triadic sign relation."

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 14, 2017 at 12:04 PM,  wrote:

> Jon S, Gary R, list,
>
>
>
> Much as I admire the efforts of Jon S. to reconcile the Taborskian
> framework with the Peircean, and Jon A’s efforts to express it all
> algebraically, I would rather go straight to Peirce’s own text on the
> question Jon raised about the tenfold classification of signs. Since the
> topic of “Laws of nature as signs” has been left behind, I’ve devised a new
> subject line for this one. However, it is also a follow-up to Gary R's post
> which included some of our offlist discussion.
>
>
>
> In “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (EP2:290, CP
> 2.235-40), Peirce launches his systematic classification of triadic
> relations by distinguishing among the three correlates. Then he introduces
> a first tenfold classification according to the nature of each correlate
> considered monadically. Then we get a second tenfold classification based
> on the dyadic relations between any two of those correlates:
>
>
>
> [[ *There will be besides a second similar division of triadic relations
> into ten classes, according as the dyadic relations which they constitute
> between either the First and Second Correlates, or the First and Third, or
> the Second and Third are of the nature of possibilities, facts, or laws;
> and these ten classes will be subdivided in different ways.* ]]
>
>
>
> The syntax of this sentence implies that triadic relations “constitute”
> various dyadic relations; and these relations can themselves be “of the
> nature of possibilities, facts, or laws,” just as the correlates can. But
> when Peirce turns to the “*genuine Triadic Relation*,” where “*the First
> Correlate may be regarded as determining the Third Correlate in some
> respect,*” this “determination” is evidently not a dyadic relation,
> because the “respect” in which the Third Correlate gets determined is
> defined with reference to the Second Correlate. These “*triadic relations
> may be divided according as that determination of the Third Correlate is to
> having some quality, or to being in some existential relation to the Second
> Correlate, or to being in some relation of thought to the Second for
> something.*”
>
>
>
> Up to this point Peirce has been referring to triadic relations generally.
> Next he introduces the specific kind of triadic relation which has a “
> *Representamen*” as the First Correlate, “*the Second Correlate being
> termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being termed its
> Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible Interpretant is
> determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic relation to the
> same Object, and for some possible Interpretant*.” So the special
> characteristic of this triadic relation is that it reproduces itself by
> means of its determination of its Third Correlate. This is the “*power of
> reproduction*” which Peirce attributes to the Representamen in his
> “Speculative Grammar” (EP2:273).
>
>
>
> The sign relation is a special case of this kind of triadic relation: “*A
> Sign is a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a
> mind.*” This essentially repeats what Peirce had said earlier in the
> Syllabus, that “*A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant*”
> (EP2:273). Since “*Signs are the only representamens that have been much
> studied*,” Peirce devotes the rest of NDDR to the division of sign
> relations, i.e. the classification of signs. For this purpose he applies
> the three trichotomies introduced above, one of which is according to the
> dyadic relation between the first and second correlates, the Sign and its
> Object. These are “constituted” by the triadic relation of which sign and
> object are two correlates. Since the other correlate, the Interpretant, is
> “mental” and is the most complex of the three, the rheme/dicisign/argument
> trichotomy cannot be defined in terms of dyadic relations.
>
>
>
> For a somewhat less systematic account of these triadic relations, and how
> they differ from dyadic relations, we can turn to Peirce's 1904 letter to
> Lady Welby (CP 8.330-31):
>
>
>
> [[ *I consider the idea of