Supplement:
Edwina, List,
Now I have an easier explanation of what I was meaning, based on topology and temporality regarding "internal" and "external".
If sign A is the spatiotemporal supersign, sign B the spatiotemporal subsign, meaning: Sign B is located inside sign A or spatially identi
Edwina,
ok, but a concept which has been formed by the individual who thinks about it, or by the two people who are talking about this concept, is even more a work in progress, or, as you wrote, anticipatory, like an immediate interpretant. But it is a funny thing, self referentiality, a creative
Helmut - a concept can be formed by an individual. It doesn't have
to be formed by a group. The concept that the two people are using
is a dynamic object. Yes, their interaction, if there are two people
discussing a common concept, connects them to the wider community.
Edwina
Edwina,
The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg. two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically makes them parts of the c
Jeffrey- I understand your point, but please understand that I don't
differentiate these terms with such specificity as do you and many
others. That is - it would never occur to me, a non-philosophy
person, to define an axiom as 'a fundamental rule that is beyond
doubt'. I just muddle along wit
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Jon, list
The psychical law i.e., Mind, is primordial and 'matter is effete
mind' - but - this Mind is not human mind, but that basic natural
'primordial mind' which seeks or wills, so to speak, itself into
exis
;
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
> To: John Collier
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic pr
Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1]
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem
M
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John - thanks for the quotation.
>
> I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he
> writes, "Every
]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John - thanks for the quotation.
I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he writes,
"Every sign has an object&qu
lier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John C., List:
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be
confusing.
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where
Peirce use
Jeff, List:
Thanks for once again giving all of us this important reminder. It
probably goes without saying that my focus tends to be on #1; after all,
how can we claim that something we advocate is genuinely Peircean, without
first carefully ascertaining what Peirce's own considered views were?
Jon, List,
Thank you. So this was another semantic problem, this time with the term "would"!
30. März 2017 um 20:04 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be.
ofessor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwin
Helmut, List:
HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is
the object as a final study would show it to be.
I think that the key word here is *would*. The idea is that the real is
that which *would *come to be known by an infinite community after
indefinite inquiry,
en on multiple universes, though I readily admit
>> different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just
>> talk.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
>> *To:*
23-8354
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about
; *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
> *To:* John Collier
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
>
>
>
> John C., List:
>
> *[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.*
&g
_
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this
: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
John C., List:
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.
Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic funct
Clark, list - I think I wasn't clear in my post below. What I meant
to say is that Peirce himself did not use singular terms that meant
'only this' in his work. As John Collier points out - he used 'sign'
and 'representamen'; his use of the three categories were filled
with expansive sy
Edwina, List:
Just one (hopefully last) comment here.
ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is
its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions.
But Peirce wasn't focused on that.
Peirce was certainly not *only *focused on words and defin
ier
>
> Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
>
> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
>
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
> *To:* tabor...@primus
-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1]
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term
Edwina, List:
It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to
name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered
opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly
*`when once it is written, every composition trundles about everywhere in
the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject and
of those who have nothing at all to do with it.. ~ *Phaedrus
*Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be
proficient
Edwina, List:
It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to
name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered
opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from
Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that posit
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Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.
1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to
acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative
function/action in t
Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is
dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation.
This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean
semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from
Object to Representa
Edwina,
I agree. By "the sign" (and farer down "subsign") I didnt mean any sign or the phaneron, but the sign of which the dynamical object is a dynamical object.
Best,
Helmut
29. März 2017 um 01:57 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynami
Helmut - it depends what you mean by 'sign'. The Dynamic Object is
external to another Dynamic Object! But, in my view, since
'everything is in Signs' then, everything functions within a triadic
set of relations: the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
The Dynamic Object is, whe
Jon, Edwina, List,
I think, the dynamical object must be external from the sign, because all other parts, or, less mechanicallly spoken, aspects, of it are internal of it. And, if nothing at all would be external from the sign, the sign would have no connection to other signs and be idiosyncratic
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That's what I mean by your arrogance, Jon. Instead of speaking just
for yourself - you have to insist that you speak for Peirce. Or that
you speak for all and 'anyone else'. I have backed up my views of
Peirce repeatedl
Edwina, List:
I knew that I could count on you! As usual, you offer no evidence to back
up your assertions, so I have no reason to take them seriously--and neither
does anyone else.
Cheers,
Jon S.
On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 1:51 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Jon - I of course reject your views o
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Jon - I of course reject your views of Peirce and your insistence
that yours is the correct interpretation. I find such a claim to be
unscientific and arrogant. You are too literal and you don't, in my
view, absorb the f
Helmut, List:
Actually, your first quote below *does not* corroborate what Edwina wrote.
Rather, in context Peirce was saying there that the Dynamic Object is
not *necessarily
*something that is outside the mind; it might be another thought, or a
fictional character, or a command, as just a few ex
Edwina,
Here are four quotes from the Commens Dictionary. The first corrobates what you wrote, that the d.o. is not outside of the mind and its experience, the second quote says that it is a part of reality, the third says, it is in itself, and the fourth says it is what final study would show it
Helmut - in my view, ALL material and conceptual existences are
Signs. They ALL function within the triadic set of Relations:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
Therefore, there is no such thing as a Dynamic Object 'in itself',
i.e., which exists outside of this interactive proc
List,
Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and c
Dear list:
rather ironic that the ultimate, immutable aim- the one that should accord
with a free development of the agent's own esthetic quality- takes on the
form of a carrot, no?
Best,
Jerry R
On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Claudio Guerri
wrote:
> Mein lieber Helmut, List,
> again answer
Mein lieber Helmut, List,
again answer between the lines with >>>
(this was taught to me by T.A.Sebeok just at the beginning of e-mails)
Helmut Raulien escribió el 27/03/2017 a las 13:14:
Claudio, List,
So it is a bit paradoxical: On one hand we should be aware, that we
are carrot-chasing donk
Claudio, List,
So it is a bit paradoxical: On one hand we should be aware, that we are carrot-chasing donkeys, on the other hand we should not abandon the carrot chasing projects, inquiry. And we must respect other donkeys who are chasing different carrots. And, for not thinking that there are a
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