Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, List, One point I ways trying to make is that the various diagrams Peirce uses to characterize a branching line (e.g., branching trees, branch in a roadway) have a number of different sources--and Peirce explored the use of these different diagrams for more than a decade before he developed the EG. As such, I was agreeing with Gary F. that the particular use of the branching line in CP 1.343-9 should be interpreted in light of the rules for the beta system of the EG as Peirce was formulating them at the time of the Lowell Lectures of 1903. As the same time, I was point out that we have a considerable range of diagrams to consider as we try to understand what Peirce was doing (e.g., between 1886 and 1896) when he was developing the conception of a triadic relation prior to the formulation of the alpha and beta systems of the EG. In fact, we should consider a wide range of different sort of diagrams that involve branching lines as we try to understand what is involved in the notion of a triadic relation and what might be evolved from such a formal element of thought. These diagrams involving branching relations should be interpreted in light of his notes and responses to the works of Euler, Sylvester, Kempe, Listing, etc. For my part, I'm particularly interested in some of the objections he raises to Kempe's thesis in the Memoir that all mathematical relations can be "reduced" to dyadic relations between spots and lines. I'd like to interpret his response in light of his discussion of the categories and the topological notion of a furcation in a continuous line in MS 717. In response to your remark that loving is a dyadic relation, I'll start by saying that--in general--I agree. Having said that, your earlier rejoinder to Gary F. that genuine dyadic relations are, on Peirce's account, always reactions between two actual, discrete objects misses the mark. In "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within," Peirce develops a rich classification of different sorts of dyadic relations. The dyadic relation A loves B is a materially and formally ordered dynamical dyad of diversity. A single actual, discrete object is also classified as a genuine dyad by Peirce (e.g., in comparison to a essential dyad or a inherential dyad). For instance, an individual object that has changed in some characteristic (e.g., the aspen leaf turned from green to yellow) can be classified as a qualitative dyad of diversity. With that much said, the reason I'm engaging with these questions about Peirce's account of triadic relations is that I'm particularly interested in exploring the differences between the classes of monadically degenerate triads, dyadically degenerate triads, genuine triadic relations and thoroughly genuine triadic relations. A number of the points made recently in various discussions on the Peirce-List seem to ignore the differences between the latter two classes. In saying that, I'm getting ahead of myself, so let me return to the example of "Every mother loves some child of hers." In focusing on the dyadic character of A loves B, you set to the side "Every", "some", and "of hers." The relations involved in putting those together in this proposition are not simple. We have two different quantifiers, and a fact with two parts. In my remarks, I was trying to draw attention to the fact that Peirce is focusing on the "possible space time continuity with several such phenomena to which it is related in the same way" (see Roberts, 20-6). Without yet worrying about how the space-time continuity might be represented in different sorts of diagrams, let me just ask how we might represent the references to "several such phenomena to which it is related in the same way." How does Peirce represent the reference to the range of phenomena that might be observed in this diagram in chapter 7 of the Grand Logic. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________ From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 8:09 AM To: 'Peirce-L'; Jeffrey Brian Downard Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my view of the 'umbrella image' of the semiosic process. An 'existential graph with three tails' is a mere 'kinetic' description of a 2D diagram. It doesn't mean anything. The phrase: 'Mother loves child' - I'm removing the 'All' and 'Some' , or 'X loves Y' ..which seems to be, as noted a dyadic relation doesn't seem, to me, to fit the triad. It's a rhema with two blanks; a dyad. Roberts p 115. So- I'm confused about your po
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my view of the 'umbrella image' of the semiosic process. An 'existential graph with three tails' is a mere 'kinetic' description of a 2D diagram. It doesn't mean anything. The phrase: 'Mother loves child' - I'm removing the 'All' and 'Some' , or 'X loves Y' ..which seems to be, as noted a dyadic relation doesn't seem, to me, to fit the triad. It's a rhema with two blanks; a dyad. Roberts p 115. So- I'm confused about your point. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Fri 14/04/17 10:41 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent: Gary, F, Gary R. Edwina, John S., List, Gary F. has made a clear and interesting set of interpretative points about the “ 'umbrella image' of the triad. While I agree with much of what he says, let me insert some questions and offer some qualifications. I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms — especially what he means by a triadic relation — we need to read them in the context where Peirce uses them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into a scheme of our own invention. Or, to put the point in different terms, let's make our aims clear. If our goal is to interpret Peirce's texts, then we need to pay particular attention to the context of any given passage in a given essay, and the context of a given essay as part of a larger projected work or series of essays. What is more, we need to be clear about the aims that are guiding Peirce's inquiries and the methods he is using to answer the questions at hand. For these scholarly purposes, for instance, it probably makes sense to focus on the diagrams that Peirce actually used in his writings and refrain from developing our own. Having said that, if we are drawing on Peirce's ideas for our own purposes for the sake of using them to engage in our own lines of inquiry, then it may be productive to insert some of his ideas into different frameworks (some of our own making) or to draw on different diagrammatic systems or even to develop our own diagrams. If we don't really understand what Peirce was doing with those ideas, then we run the risk of misunderstanding them and using them poorly. As such, many of us who want to put the ideas to work in our own inquiries also want to ensure that we're doing a responsible job of trying to understand what Peirce is doing with those ideas. Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is something like a three spoked umbrella: - Links: -- [1] http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon, list - yes, makes sense. Yes - I meant the internal Sign triadAnd yes, the three correlates are in 'other Sign relations'enables diversity Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Thu 13/04/17 6:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: ET: In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being filled by some subject. So far, so good. The triadic Sign relation has three loose ends, which are filled by three subjects--the Sign itself, the Dynamic Object, and the Dynamic Interpretant. ET: So, the representamen as a predicate connects to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. We have agreed that the Representamen is part of the (internal) triad that constitutes the Sign, so I am guessing that you meant Sign here, since you went on to mention the (external) Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant. The predicate is not the Sign itself, but the triadic Sign relation. Again, the Sign itself is one of the three subjects that are the correlates of that relation, the others being the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant. ET: That, to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than dyadic closure or monadic/medad closure. Remember, the triad is internal to the Sign (Oi-R-Ii), rather than external (Od-S-Id). The interaction that you are rightly concerned to maintain comes about because the three correlates are in other triadic Sign relations, not just the specific one that we are discussing in any particular case. To show this, we would need to incorporate these additional relations into the diagram; but it would not take long for the resulting complexity to overwhelm our ability to comprehend any visual representation of what is happening. Put another way, every relation has a specific valency--e.g., three for a triadic relation--but each correlate is effectively unlimited in the number of relations that it can have. I assume that is why Peirce held that there are no absolute singulars in the sense of being completely determinate in every conceivable respect; every subject has infinitely many potential predicates. Hence the openness and diversity that your are seeking is not a property of the triadic Sign relation; instead, it reflects the capacity of subjects to occupy any of the three spots (Sign, Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant)--or rather, all of the three spots with respect to various other subjects. Does that make sense? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a few questions: 1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in chemistry and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in Robert's, p.115, he shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents triadic spots'. And he explains that the definition of the rhema or spot, which is the proposition [subject and predicate] - can be shown by a line/tail and heavy dot, so to speak. A monad has one dot and an open/loose end or tail. If you join two monads/spots you get closure, i.e., no open ends. A dyad has two open ends/tails but if you add another, you'll get another dyad [which is the problem with linearity]. But the triad - and the image is the same as that given in 1.347- obviously, since Roberts is working from that section. [See also Peirce 3.470]. I hope I've understood you correctly. 2) I still don't see why this isn't an image of the semiosic triad. The rhema is the proposition, i.e., a semiosic relation made up of a subject and predicate. In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being filled by some subject. So, the representamen as a predicate connects to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. That, to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than dyadic closure or monadic/medad closure. Now- what am I missing in this view? Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [4] Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/j
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Supplement: I have made a mistake with my explaining a relation with itself: If there is a set that has a relation with itself, this relation is not a subset of all tupels possibly formed by any two elements of this set, but of the set that would be formed by all tupels of the set and a copy of this set, meaning: A tupel may contain same elements, like in the relation "same size as": ((mouse,mouse), (dog,dog), (elephant, elephant)). I am afraid, by this attempt to be correct, I only have confused you, so if so, ignore. Jon, List, You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller than", then the relation is ((mouse,dog), (mouse, elephant), (dog, elephant)). The dyadic relation is a subset of all couples (tupels) that can be formed out of the elements of the set. If you have two sets, then the dyadic relation is a subset of tupels, each containing one element from one set, and one from the other. In the case of representamen relation, mathematics transferred, the one set is the representamen (or sign), and there are three possible relation reasons/relations: Qualisign, sinsign, legisign. I think, that the "proper" kind of projectional reduction is applied by Ogden/Richards, but Peirce did it differently, for some reason, and he also, for some reason, used the term "sign" for both representamen and triad. I guess, because projectionally (in his way) reduced, there is no difference: In eg. "Rhematic indexical legisign" the first two words are adjectives, traits, of the legisign, the representamen. About the dynamical object, the dynamical and final interpretant: They are, spatially and/or temporally, outside of the sign as irreducible triad. But not outside of the projectionally-reduced-to-dyads-sign. Because indication towards something located outside, and anticipation into the future may both be called projections, I guess. But I am just guessing all the time.. Best, Helmut 13. April 2017 um 22:26 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in the past. He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a triadic relation that is "projectively reducible." I still wonder, though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications? By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S). The reason why Peirce never discusses the (O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation. The first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulienwrote: Jon, List, You wrote: "To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations. Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that." I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following: A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for some triadic relations. Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S). My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I). It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate. Best, Helmut - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?
Edwina, List: ET: In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being filled by some subject. So far, so good. The triadic Sign relation has three loose ends, which are filled by three subjects--the Sign itself, the Dynamic Object, and the Dynamic Interpretant. ET: So, the representamen as a predicate connects to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. We have agreed that the Representamen is part of the (internal) triad that *constitutes *the Sign, so I am guessing that you meant Sign here, since you went on to mention the (external) Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant. The predicate is not the Sign *itself*, but the triadic Sign *relation*. Again, the Sign itself is one of the three *subjects* that are the *correlates *of that relation, the others being the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant. ET: That, to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than dyadic closure or monadic/medad closure. Remember, the triad is *internal *to the Sign (Oi-R-Ii), rather than *external *(Od-S-Id). The interaction that you are rightly concerned to maintain comes about because the three correlates are in *other *triadic Sign relations, not just the specific one that we are discussing in any particular case. To show this, we would need to incorporate these *additional *relations into the diagram; but it would not take long for the resulting complexity to overwhelm our ability to comprehend any *visual *representation of what is happening. Put another way, every *relation *has a specific valency--e.g., three for a triadic relation--but each *correlate *is effectively *unlimited *in the number of relations that it can have. I assume that is why Peirce held that there are no absolute singulars in the sense of being completely determinate in every conceivable respect; every subject has *infinitely many* potential predicates. Hence the openness and diversity that your are seeking is not a property of the triadic Sign *relation*; instead, it reflects the capacity of *subjects *to occupy *any *of the three spots (Sign, Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant)--or rather, *all *of the three spots with respect to various *other *subjects. Does that make sense? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a few > questions: > > 1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in chemistry > and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in Robert's, p.115, he > shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents triadic spots'. And he > explains that the definition of the rhema or spot, which is the proposition > [subject and predicate] - can be shown by a line/tail and heavy dot, so to > speak. A monad has one dot and an open/loose end or tail. If you join two > monads/spots you get closure, i.e., no open ends. A dyad has two open > ends/tails but if you add another, you'll get another dyad [which is the > problem with linearity]. But the triad - and the image is the same as that > given in 1.347- obviously, since Roberts is working from that section. [See > also Peirce 3.470]. I hope I've understood you correctly. > > 2) I still don't see why this isn't an image of the semiosic triad. The > rhema is the proposition, i.e., a semiosic relation made up of a subject > and predicate. In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose > ends' or blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to > being filled by some subject. So, the representamen as a predicate connects > to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic > Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. That, to me - shows > the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose ends or blank forms > which enable interactions rather than dyadic closure or monadic/medad > closure. > > Now- what am I missing in this view? > > Edwina > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?
Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a few questions: 1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in chemistry and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in Robert's, p.115, he shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents triadic spots'. And he explains that the definition of the rhema or spot, which is the proposition [subject and predicate] - can be shown by a line/tail and heavy dot, so to speak. A monad has one dot and an open/loose end or tail. If you join two monads/spots you get closure, i.e., no open ends. A dyad has two open ends/tails but if you add another, you'll get another dyad [which is the problem with linearity]. But the triad - and the image is the same as that given in 1.347- obviously, since Roberts is working from that section. [See also Peirce 3.470]. I hope I've understood you correctly. 2) I still don't see why this isn't an image of the semiosic triad. The rhema is the proposition, i.e., a semiosic relation made up of a subject and predicate. In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being filled by some subject. So, the representamen as a predicate connects to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. That, to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than dyadic closure or monadic/medad closure. Now- what am I missing in this view? Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Thu 13/04/17 3:59 PM , Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent: List: (This post is rather technical and the contents may be intractably perplex for many readers of this list. One purpose of this post is to crisply separate the fundamental philosophical concept of identity from the mathematical concept of identity. To differentiate CSP view of lines of identity from classical views, see McGinn’s, Logical Properties, 2000, OUP Chapter 1, p.1-14, Identity, for an overview of one philosopher’s notion of “Identity" ) On Apr 13, 2017, at 8:14 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote: But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean some of Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight acquaintance with existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at 1.347, the lines (Peirce calls them “tails” here) are lines of identity each representing that something exists. The relation is represented in the graph by the labelled spot to which they are all attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In propositional terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three subjects, (i.e. with a “valency” of three). To read the lines in the graph as relations is to misread the graph. The graph is itself a diagrammatic sign, but there is no attempt to represent its object(s) or its interpretant on the sheet of assertion. In fact, I have never seen, anywhere in Peirce’s writings, an attempt to represent the basic triadic sign relation in a single diagram. I think the reason is simple: thatkind of triadic relation cannot be represented that way. But if someone can show me a text where Peirce has done that, I’ll happily retract that claim.This would explain, by the way, why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize' what 'one triadic Relation' would look like or how it would function.” If you represent relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent dyadic relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of (dyadic) relations. I think Gary’s conclusion is problematic because of the the way CSP uses the concept of identity in chemistry as a basis for his concept of identity in logic and / or mathematics. First, a bit of historical context for the emergence of CSP’s view of lines of identity in relation to concrete signs and symbols in applied mathematics and graph theory. CSP's early writings (1860’s, 1870’s) were very accurate representations of the facts of chemistry as they stood in his day. But, following the Karlsruhe Conference of 1861(?), the relationships between chemical symbols and chemical signs underwent rapid development during the remainder of the 19 th Century with three major changes. With the development the electrical structure of atom (1913) and Quantum Chemistry (Schodinger, 1926), and Pauling’s notion of the mechanics of the chemical bond, further profound changes in the logic of chemistry emerged in the 20 th Century. The three major changes following the 1860’s were: 1. Acceptance of the concept of atom identities as separate units conjoined by a chemical bond, forming the relations WITHIN molecules with clear and distinct IDENTITIES different from atoms. 2. Acceptance of the notion of Kekule’s
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon, List, You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller than", then the relation is ((mouse,dog), (mouse, elephant), (dog, elephant)). The dyadic relation is a subset of all couples (tupels) that can be formed out of the elements of the set. If you have two sets, then the dyadic relation is a subset of tupels, each containing one element from one set, and one from the other. In the case of representamen relation, mathematics transferred, the one set is the representamen (or sign), and there are three possible relation reasons/relations: Qualisign, sinsign, legisign. I think, that the "proper" kind of projectional reduction is applied by Ogden/Richards, but Peirce did it differently, for some reason, and he also, for some reason, used the term "sign" for both representamen and triad. I guess, because projectionally (in his way) reduced, there is no difference: In eg. "Rhematic indexical legisign" the first two words are adjectives, traits, of the legisign, the representamen. About the dynamical object, the dynamical and final interpretant: They are, spatially and/or temporally, outside of the sign as irreducible triad. But not outside of the projectionally-reduced-to-dyads-sign. Because indication towards something located outside, and anticipation into the future may both be called projections, I guess. But I am just guessing all the time.. Best, Helmut 13. April 2017 um 22:26 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Helmut, List: That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in the past. He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a triadic relation that is "projectively reducible." I still wonder, though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications? By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S). The reason why Peirce never discusses the (O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation. The first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulienwrote: Jon, List, You wrote: "To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations. Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that." I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following: A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for some triadic relations. Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S). My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I). It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate. Best, Helmut - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Helmut, List: That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in the past. He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a triadic relation that is "projectively reducible." I still wonder, though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications? By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S). The reason why Peirce never discusses the (O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation. The first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply *identity*. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Jon, List, > You wrote: > "To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely *triadic*, I > have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the > basis of one correlate and two *dyadic *relations. Perhaps others on the > List can shed some light on that." > > I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about > relation reduction something like the following: > A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot > compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional > reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of > reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind > of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for > some triadic relations. > Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to > (S,O), (O,I), (I,S). > My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: > (S,S), (S,O), (S,I). > It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would > say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the > representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate. > Best, > Helmut > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
to read them in the context where > Peirce uses them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into a > scheme of our own invention. > > > > Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is > something like a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from > this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image.” But in its > context, that image is NOT a diagram of the S-O-I relation, the essential > “sign relation.” That image is in fact an existential graph with three > “tails.” > > The context, CP 1.343-9, is “From the “Lowell Lectures of 1903,” III, vol. > 1, 3d Draught.” The larger context is the Lowell lectures (pieces of which > are unfortunately scattered here and there in the CP) and the Syllabus > which Peirce wrote to accompany them. The Syllabus of course includes the > “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”, which ought to be the > go-to text for Peirce’s explanation of the triadic relations involved in > semiosis. > > > > But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean some of > Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight acquaintance with > existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at 1.347, the lines (Peirce > calls them “tails” here) are lines of identity each representing that > something > exists. The relation is represented in the graph by the labelled spot to > which they are all attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In > propositional terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three > subjects, (i.e. with a “valency” of three). To read the lines in the > graph as relations is to misread the graph. The graph is itself a > diagrammatic sign, but there is no attempt to represent its object(s) or > its interpretant on the sheet of assertion. In fact, I have never seen, > anywhere in Peirce’s writings, an attempt to represent the basic triadic > sign relation in a single diagram. I think the reason is simple: that > kind of triadic relation cannot be represented that way. But if someone can > show me a text where Peirce has done that, I’ll happily retract that claim. > > > > This would explain, by the way, why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize' > what 'one triadic Relation' would look like or how it would function.” If > you represent relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent > dyadic relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of > (dyadic) relations. > > > > Gary’s point about the time dimension is crucial here: existential graphs > are “moving pictures of thought” in which semiosis is represented by > transformations of the graphs. I think an attentive reading of CP 1.343-9 > should clarify why it is that the essential sign relation, and the > Thirdness of semiosis, cannot be adequately represented in a single image. > In that passage, Peirce is trying to give an experiential account of > Thirdness and triadic relations to his audience. CP 1.345: > > “I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of > quality and reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that > every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a > triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by > means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to > convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic > relation involves meaning.” > > > > If anyone wants to study this passage from the Lowell lectures but doesn’t > have access to the Collected Papers, let me know and I’ll provide you with > a copy. Or post it here, if there’s enough interest. But I hope that at > least those who do have access to CP will take a closer look at it. > > > > Gary f. > > > > From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] > Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45 > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs > > > > Edwina, Jon S, List, > > > > First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I > think the three pronged spoke does exactly represent a triadic relation, > not three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node > from which the three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three. > > > > But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've > discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and > duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis. > > > > For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present > anticipating the future. Andre d
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon - I see your point about what we have discussed is an INTERNAL semiosis of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant. I agree with this - since they are all in the same mode, then, I can understand its being ONE Relation split into three sectors. BUT, the point is, that this Internal Triad is not all there is to semiosis. If there were - then frankly, semiosis wouldn't exist...nor would anything else [i.e., matter/concepts]. The point is that this strictly internal complexity is necessarily linked to the external world, in the basic case: with a Dynamic Object. And possibly generating a Dynamic Interpretant. It is this image that I am considering is the three-spokes. The trichotomies are not relevant to this; they are simply sets-of-three modes. I'd agree with your suggestion that the rheme/dicent/argument might work with the Dynamic Interpretant - considering that the Final Interpretant has a more powerful function 'in the future', so to speak. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Thu 13/04/17 9:40 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one triadic relation. As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), which divides the Sign "As to the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" (EP 2:490) into Instinct/Experience/Form. Hence the spokes themselves are all in the same mode, even though the correlates at their ends and the dyadic relations between those correlates can be in different modes. By contrast, the three trichotomies of 1903 are for "the sign in itself" as Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, "the relation of the sign to its Object" as Icon/Index/Symbol, and how "its Interpretant represents it" as Rheme/Dicent/Argument (EP 2:291-292). Peirce subsequently characterized the latter as "the Relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), but I have been suggesting recently that it should be associated instead with the relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant. To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations. Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that. Regards, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response: 1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's 8.335,8.337 comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object, Relations to the Interpretant..but the reason is that each of the three 'spikes' so to speak, can be in a different modal category. So, in a rhematic indexical legisign, the Representamen spoke can be in Thirdness; the relation to the Dynamic Object in a mode of Secondness; the relation to the Dy. Interpretant in a mode of Firstness. That's why I refer to relations in the plural. These interactions most certainly are NOT independent - and my use of the plural of RelationS doesn't imply their independence. Instead, it implies their modal differentiation within this singular semiosic interaction. 2) The problem I have with the linear image of the movement from DO to DI...and Peirce often uses it, which is one relation with three correlates, is that I also am interested in the morphological result of the semiosis. Not simply in the passing of X via Y to Z. But the physiological FORM. That is - referring to my oft-quoted 4.551 'Mind ..in crystal, in the work of bees'...etc... I am considering that the Sign, that triad, takes on a FORM. This FORM is the full Sign. So, a cell - let's say a single cell - is the semiosic Form, a Sign. This is the result of the interaction of the Representamen HABITS interacting with many Dynamic Objects [water, nutrients, chemicals, etc etc]...which are then transformed via the HABITS held within the Representamen into the Dynamic Interpretant - that CELL. BUT - all three parts of this whole FORM/SIGN must be operative in this semiosic process: The input from the various multiple Dynamic Interpretants.transformed via the general rules held by the Representamenresulting in the Dynamic Interpretant FORM of the whole system...that particular cell. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [2] On Wed 12/04/17 6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [3] sent: Edwina, List: ET: A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? Or is it th
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F- thanks for your comments, but I disagree with your explanation. A dyad is between TWO existential entities. A Relation, such as between the Representamen and the Interpretant is not between two existential entities, but is an interaction that actually enables both to function. Neither exists per se on their own - and therefore - this is NOT a dyad. A dyadic interaction would be a rock hitting the water. Two existential 'things'; rock and water. That is NOT a RELATION. I have said repeatedly that I do NOT consider these interactions to be dyads. So - why keep bringing it up? The Peircean 'spoke' is not a triad of dyadic interactions. But, to me, a model showing how ONE semiosic process, the Sign [capital S] functions as a whole within three - not one- but three Relations. The Relation between the Representamen-Object; that between the R-Interpretant; and the R in itself. Each of them can be in a different categorical mode. "Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic relationships and three monadic characters" 6.331 BUT - "every triad is either monadically degenerate, dyadically degenerate or geuine. A monadically degenerate triad is one which results from the essence of three monads, its subjects" 1.473. NOTE - this is what you, Gary F, seem to be suggesting - with your comments on 'subjects'... Peirce continues: "A dyadically degenerate triad is one which results from dyads" 1.473. NOTE: This - is what you, Gary, seem to be suggesting is my view. Peirce continues: "A genuine triad is one which cannot be resolved in any such way..." 1.473. NOTE: And the genuine triad introduces the mediation of generalization among its interactors - and THIS is what makes the triadic interaction 'genuine'.."the genuine triad must involve generality" 1.477 Then, Peirce goes on to explain the nature of 'it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought" 1.480. And I referenced Peirce's writing on Relations - 8.335-7. I won't repeat them. My point is that the triad is a complex process of transformation of information. That is why I cannot see it as ONE Relation but as a complex one; of three Relations bonded irreducibly together. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Thu 13/04/17 9:14 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Gary R, Edwina, Jon S, list, I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms — especially what he means by a triadic relation — we need to read them in the context where Peirce uses them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into a scheme of our own invention. Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is something like a three spoked umbrella: - Links: -- [1] http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html [2] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, List: ET: A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object? I believe that our recent joint resolution to use "Sign" only for the internal Oi-R-Ii triad could go a long way toward clearing up this particular terminological difficulty. The external Dynamic Object is not part of the Sign itself, it is something distinct that is in a single triadic relation with both the Sign and the external Dynamic Interpretant. ET: My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation means. I can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is something like a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image. Lake Gary R., my understanding of that particular diagram is that its spokes do not correspond to *three *distinct relations; instead, it represents *one *triadic relation with three distinct *subjects *(correlates). The three-pronged shape is intended to convey that none of the correlates is in an *independent *relation with either of the other correlates; the *triadic *relation is *not *reducible to multiple *dyadic *relations. The basic idea is the same as when the triadic Sign relation is represented as a single proposition, _ stands for _ to _; rather than three relations, there is one relation with three correlates, which correspond to the three blanks. Another well-known example is _ gives _ to _; giving is not a combination of *three *relations, it is *one *triadic relation. ET: I can even imagine ONE Sign SET - made up of that image as outlined by JAS, made up of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant - and this triadic Sign would interact with the Dynamic Object - which is itself made up of a triad of an Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant...and forms a Dynamic Interpretant, which is itself made up of an Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant. This is a good example of how restricting the term "Sign" to the *internal *Oi-R-Ii triad might help clarify things. There is one such Sign at each "node" of the *external *Sign relation--the Sign itself, the Dynamic Object that determines it, and the Dynamic Interpretant that it (possibly) determines. Again, the latter is not one triad that consists of three relations, it is one triadic relation with three correlates. Is that helpful at all? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 3:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think that > there are three relations rather than one triadic relation. > > A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? > Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate > Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object? > > My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation means. I > can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is > something like a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from > this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image. They may > certainly interact and affect each other, but - this doesn't reduce them to > ONE triadic Relation. I simply can't 'imagize' what 'one triadic Relation' > would look like or how it would function. > > I can imagine ONE Sign SET [not a Relation], as an irreducible set, made > up of three Relations. > > I can even imagine ONE Sign SET - made up of that image as outlined by > JAS, made up of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant - > and this triadic Sign would interact with the Dynamic Object - which is > itself made up of a triad of an Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate > Interpretant...and forms a Dynamic Interpretant, which is itself made up of > an Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant. > > But- that's making me dizzy and I'll stop. > > Edwina > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon S, List, First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think the three pronged spoke *does *exactly represent a triadic relation, not three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from which the three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three. But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis. For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in "Peirce's Logic of Information" http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html (a paper, btw, which I find both intriguing, but have some reservations about--but not regarding the present point). De Tienne comments and then quotes Nadin, who here concentrates on 'anticipation' and Peirce's notion of 'final cause' (and teleology). In a remarkable programmatic paper titled "Anticipation: A Spooky Computation" Mihai Nadin has written that "every sign is in anticipation of its interpretation". He explains (NADIN 2000: §5.1.1): Signs are not constituted at the object level, but in an open-ended infinite sign process (semiosis). In sign processes, the arrow of time can run in both directions: from the past through the present to the future, or the other way around, from the future to the present. Signs carry the future (intentions, desires, needs, ideals, etc., all of a nature different from what is given, i.e., all in the range of a final cause) into the present and thus allow us to derive a coherent image of the universe. Actually […], a semiosis is constituted in both directions: from the past into the future, and from the future into the present, and forward into the past. […] The two directions of semiosis are in co-relation. In the first case, we constitute understandings based on previous semiotic processes. In the second, we actually make up the world as we constitute ourselves as part of it. This means that the notion of sign has to reflect the two arrows. De Tienne's comments just following this quotation relate directly to a consideration of the nature of the growth of symbols (" as having the nature of a law, symbols are partly general, partly vague enunciations of what *could* happen in the future given certain antecedent conditions that they spell out to some degree"), as I remarked in an earlier post. Thus they have this living quality--"symbols grow" Peirce says. Anticipation is a process through which the representation of a future state determines a present semiotic event, and this implies a teleological dimension, not of an Aristotelian, but of a Peircean kind. Put briefly, one simply needs to remember that for Peirce every symbol is teleological in the sense that, being preoccupied with its own development into new interpretants, some of which are dynamic and thus anchored in an experience they modify, it adopts a conditional (would-be) form that orients it toward the future. As legisigns, thus as having the nature of a law, symbols are partly general, partly vague enunciations of what *could* happen in the future given certain antecedent conditions that they spell out to some degree. Such an evolving, self-correcting outlook toward the likely future is structurally embedded within symbols and distinguishes them from other types of signs. In addition, all symbols are signs that seek to "replicate" themselves, since there is no law that governs no event. Replicated symbols are a special kind of sinsigns: they are rule-bound semiotic events whose instantiation occurs under the rule’s guidance. Each instantiation thus anticipates the rule that it replicates, and in doing so it anticipates the future: the instantiation takes it into account, and thus is determined by it, although that determination is, as Nadin says, in the range of a final cause rather than of an efficient cause. Semiotic events are vectorized, they happen not at random but within an inferential continuum that ensures that propositions that conclude arguments, especially ampliative ones, become themselves premises to new arguments, in the same way as any symbolic sign has first been an interpretant before serving as a sign solicitor of new signs. And recall that while Nadin is especially concerned with the symbol in the passage quoted above, he's written that " "every sign is in anticipation of its interpretation," or, better, its interpretant. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think that > there are three relations rather than one triadic relation. > > A large issue is the defin
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think that there are three relations rather than one triadic relation. A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object? My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation means. I can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is something like a three spoked umbrella: - "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same page here?" EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. I agree with its being the first correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad, as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but not necessarily doing so. So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal bond. 3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [5] On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now. My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same page here? My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation. Every Sign has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external (Od-S-Id). We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation," usually meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign, Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three correlates. What I am asking now is whether there is such a thing as a Sign that is itself a relation. Thanks, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on the terminology. For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen, which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the habits developed within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of Firstness or Secondness]. I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object can be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential. But, it remains a triad. And - what does the term relation mean? So- "can a relation be a Sign'? It depends what you mean by each term. For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I consider that there are three key relations within the triad; th
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon S, List, Edwina wrote: But what about: ."the interpretant of a proposition is its predicate" 5.474. This moves the laws, so to speak, which I have located in the Representamen - to the Interpretant! So- I have no idea...for I tend to see the Interpretant as a result of the actions of the Laws. But as Jay Zeman comments in "Peirce's Theory of Signs," http://users.clas.ufl.edu/jzeman/peirces_theory_of_signs.htm it is important to remember that the interpretant is itself a sign. Zeman quotes Peirce (here considering only human semiosis), then comments: "A sign," Peirce tells us, . . . is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, *creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign*. *That sign which it creates *I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object* (2.228 emphasis added by GR). Peirce here is discussing the sign as it participates in semiosis, the sign relation. There are a number of ways of subdividing the matter of Peirce’s semiotic; one of them is based on the fact that we may identify three *relata* in the semiosical relation as understood by Peirce: these are the sign itself, and the above-mentioned object and interpretant. *The interpretant itself is a sign *(2.228) which Peirce calls the "proper significate effect" of the original sign (5.475, emphasis added GR) And later in the paper he comments: A major thrust of Peirce’s speculative grammar is a detailed and complex classification of signs. In a definite sense, even the most basic part of speculative grammar, the description of the semiosical relation itself, is a classification of signs. *The interpretant is a sign (2. 228), and the object is, at least often, a sign. So the description of semiosis gives us a triple viewpoint from which to observe signs in action: signs functioning as signs properly so called, signs as objects of semiosis, and signs as effects of semiosis (interpretants) *(emphasis added, GR)*.* The above makes me once again question whether there are in semiosis three relations rather than one triadic relation, and that the analysis into three relations is, at best, essentially analytic. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 2:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > see my comments > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Wed 12/04/17 1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > 1) ET: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of > three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal > triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the > bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual > relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. > > > Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate > Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when making > the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and we now agree > that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute the Sign. As such, > I am inclined to think of them as more analytic than actual; specifically, > as constraints on how the Sign can represent its Dynamic Object and > determine a Dynamic Interpretant. > > EDWINA: Agreed - more analytic than actual. And agreed, acting as > constraints on HOW the Sign [that internal triad] represents the DO and > determines the DI. But, as constraints - isn't there an aspect of ACTUAL > force/behaviour - within the constraint? > > 2) ET: As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking > about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. > > > Probably so. Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close synonym of > "predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for what it means to > say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a relation is a Sign. > > EDWINA: A law is a habit; i.e., operative in Thirdness. I can see this as > a predicate, for 'a proposition can have any number of subjects but can > have but one predicate which is invariably general" 5.151..But what about: > ."the interpretant of a proposition is its predicate" 5.474. This moves the > laws, so to speak, which I have located in the Representamen - to the > Interpretant! So- I have no idea...for I tend to see the Interpretant as a > result of the actions of the Laws. > > > > > Thanks, > > Jon S. > > On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> Jon, list >> >> 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are >> these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }see my comments -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Wed 12/04/17 1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: 1) ET: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when making the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and we now agree that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute the Sign. As such, I am inclined to think of them as more analytic than actual; specifically, as constraints on how the Sign can represent its Dynamic Object and determine a Dynamic Interpretant. EDWINA: Agreed - more analytic than actual. And agreed, acting as constraints on HOW the Sign [that internal triad] represents the DO and determines the DI. But, as constraints - isn't there an aspect of ACTUAL force/behaviour - within the constraint? 2) ET: As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. Probably so. Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close synonym of "predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for what it means to say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a relation is a Sign. EDWINA: A law is a habit; i.e., operative in Thirdness. I can see this as a predicate, for 'a proposition can have any number of subjects but can have but one predicate which is invariably general" 5.151..But what about: ."the interpretant of a proposition is its predicate" 5.474. This moves the laws, so to speak, which I have located in the Representamen - to the Interpretant! So- I have no idea...for I tend to see the Interpretant as a result of the actions of the Laws. Thanks, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon, list 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and its interactions with other cells - are, as I understand it, operative within Thirdness and carried within the Representamen. So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it for now. 2) I agree with your second paragraph. - just a few quibbles.. JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same page here?" EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. I agree with its being the first correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad, as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but not necessarily doing so. So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal bond. 3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [2] On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com [3] sent: Edwina, List: I r
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, List: ET: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when making the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and we now agree that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute the Sign. As such, I am inclined to think of them as more analytic than actual; specifically, as constraints on *how *the Sign *can *represent its Dynamic Object and determine a Dynamic Interpretant. ET: As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. Probably so. Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close synonym of "predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for what it means to say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a relation is a Sign. Thanks, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list > > 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are > these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its > habits, which function to mould its material content and its interactions > with other cells - are, as I understand it, operative within Thirdness and > carried within the Representamen. > > So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it for now. > > 2) I agree with your second paragraph. - just a few quibbles.. > > JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that > going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad > of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we > would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a > triadic > relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the > other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined > by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic > Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same > page here?" > > EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of > three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal > triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the > bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual > relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. I agree with its being the first > correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the other two external > correlates in addition to this basic Internal triad. These two external > correlates are not bonded within the triad, as the interactions are within > the Internal Triad. That leaves them open. I agree with the necessary > determination of the DO, and the Sign [that internal triad] being capable > of determining a DI - but not necessarily doing so. > > So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble with > that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and probably > operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able to > differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the three > 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant] can have > any actuality except within that internal bond. > > 3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about - > but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and > associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now. > > My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going > forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of > Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would > always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic > relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the > other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined > by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic > Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same > page here? > > My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign > from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation. Every > Sign has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external > (Od-S-Id). We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation,"
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and its interactions with other cells - are, as I understand it, operative within Thirdness and carried within the Representamen. So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it for now. 2) I agree with your second paragraph. - just a few quibbles.. JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same page here?" EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations. I agree with its being the first correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad, as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but not necessarily doing so. So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal bond. 3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, List: I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now. My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same page here? My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation. Every Sign has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external (Od-S-Id). We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation," usually meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign, Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three correlates. What I am asking now is whether there is such a thing as a Sign that is itself a relation. Thanks, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on the terminology. For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen, which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the habits developed within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of Firstness or Secondness]. I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object can be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential. But, it remains a triad. And - what does the term relation mean? So- "can a relation be a Sign'? It depends what you mean by each term. For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I consider that there are three key relations within the triad; that between the R-O; between the R-I, a
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, List: I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now. My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) *triad *of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a *triadic relation* in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign *must *be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is *capable *of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might never actually do so). Are we still on the same page here? My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign from a logical standpoint as a *subject*, rather than a relation. Every Sign *has *relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external (Od-S-Id). We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation," usually meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign, Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three correlates. What I am asking now is whether there is such a thing as a Sign that *is itself *a relation. Thanks, Jon S. On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on the > terminology. > > For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen, which I > consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the habits developed > within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of Firstness or > Secondness]. > > I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of > Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object can > be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential. But, it > remains a triad. > > And - what does the term relation mean? > > So- "can a relation be a Sign'? It depends what you mean by each term. > > For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the semiosic > process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I consider that there > are three key relations within the triad; that between the R-O; between > the R-I, and the Representamen in itself. The Representamen -in-itself is, > in my view, a Relation, seeking out its habits of organization and linking > them to the object and transforming them into the interpretant. > > So- at first thought, I'd say that A single relation can't be a Sign, > since the Sign requires a networked set of triadic Relations. > > But - is a law of Nature a Relation I'd say, yes, since the Law of Nature > operates as the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Wed 12/04/17 10:14 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > List: > > I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, Peirce's > Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality, via interlibrary loan this > week. Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I > could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading. He points out > in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a relation, which leads me to pose a > new question--can a relation be a Sign? Again, I am referring to the > relation itself, not its representation in verbal, diagrammatic, or other > form. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on the terminology. For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen, which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the habits developed within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of Firstness or Secondness]. I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object can be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential. But, it remains a triad. And - what does the term relation mean? So- "can a relation be a Sign'? It depends what you mean by each term. For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I consider that there are three key relations within the triad; that between the R-O; between the R-I, and the Representamen in itself. The Representamen -in-itself is, in my view, a Relation, seeking out its habits of organization and linking them to the object and transforming them into the interpretant. So- at first thought, I'd say that A single relation can't be a Sign, since the Sign requires a networked set of triadic Relations. But - is a law of Nature a Relation I'd say, yes, since the Law of Nature operates as the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Wed 12/04/17 10:14 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: List: I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, Peirce's Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality, via interlibrary loan this week. Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading. He points out in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a relation, which leads me to pose a new question--can a relation be a Sign? Again, I am referring to the relation itself, not its representation in verbal, diagrammatic, or other form. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness. That is, complexity, which operates via both differentiations and commonalities, is a key factor in the ability of the universe to prevent entropy. Therefore, the development of differentiation of Form, which implies boundaries to that Form, and a severance of This from That, and thus enables Secondness, is a reality in our universe. Just as is the vagueness of Firstness and the commonalities of Thirdness. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sun 09/04/17 9:41 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent: Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined. There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate case. HR > In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water). Even the interior is not well defined. There are many more billions of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body. Some of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health. HR > I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous) > by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily... Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk. The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm. We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground, but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of trunks. ET > The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e., > a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it > a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE > of chemical. Very few molecules exist in isolation. For example, salt (NaCl) rarely consists of Na-CL pairs. In a crystal, the atoms are organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms of both kinds. In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions. ET > in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique > from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, > a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different > in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE > particular Type/Breed of dog... There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and species. Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with coyotes. Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats. The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as gene transfers that occur naturally. Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing throughout life. Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary for maturation. Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral. And many can be inherited. The only reason why DNA remains relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors. ET > in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar. > This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations called laws of physics): conservation of mass-energy, momentum, angular momentum, charge, etc. But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting. Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of years. But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in a camera, they change. Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most other particles are highly unstable. In quantum electrodynamics, the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the borderline of existence. JAS > biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than > most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is > not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon, List, I agree, that a molecule (and an atom, a particle...) is a token. But, when something happens with this molecule due to a natural law, eg. the law of gravitation, is then the spatial section of this law that works upon the molecule a token of the law? I was thinking no, because the law continuously pervades the whole cosmos, and to think, that saying "instantiation of a law" would mean to construct a concept of spatial section of the law, and that this concept would be sort of anthropocentric or organismocentric. But maybe I am too hairsplitting, and anthropocentrism cannot totally be avoided by us humans anyway. I think I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous) by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily- Ok! Best, Helmut 09. April 2017 um 22:09 Uhr "Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote: Helmut, Edwina, List: HR: my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body) ... In this context, "embodied" does not necessarily mean that a Token "has a body," it just means that it is existentially instantiated in some way. The word "Token" is a Type, but it is embodied every time someone actually says, writes, or thinks that word. Water is a Type, but it is embodied in every molecule that consists of two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom. ET: in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. In a sense, this is true even in the physico-chemical realm. Although every molecule of water is "the same" in terms of its composition and structure, each one is a different particular with different constituent parts--two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom with their corresponding protons, neutrons, electrons, etc. This is why I keep saying that the Dynamic Object of a general Type is the continuum of its potential Tokens, not the (discrete) collection of its actual Tokens. Given any two actual Tokens of a given Type, there is an inexhaustible supply of potential Tokens of that same Type that would be intermediate between them. ET: The fact that in the biological realm, each individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more adaptive diversity - and less stability. Agreed, biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 9, 2017 at 8:19 AM, Edwina Taborskywrote: Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical. in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE particular Type/Breed of dog. But - in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. The fact that in the biological realm, each individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more adaptive diversity - and less stability. I agree with your outline of the difference between the two realms - the biological realm moved differentiation INTO each separate Token, removing the constant bonding to all other Tokens, so that changes from the Type could emerge rapidly and in response to local stimuli. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, List, my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate"
Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Helmut, Edwina, List: HR: my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body) ... In this context, "embodied" does not necessarily mean that a Token "has a body," it just means that it is existentially instantiated in some way. The word "Token" is a Type, but it is embodied every time someone actually says, writes, or thinks that word. Water is a Type, but it is embodied in every molecule that consists of two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom. ET: in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. In a sense, this is true even in the physico-chemical realm. Although every molecule of water is "the same" in terms of its composition and structure, each one is a different particular with different constituent parts--two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom with their corresponding protons, neutrons, electrons, etc. This is why I keep saying that the Dynamic Object of a general Type is the *continuum *of its *potential *Tokens, not the (discrete) *collection *of its *actual *Tokens. Given any two actual Tokens of a given Type, there is an inexhaustible supply of potential Tokens of that same Type that would be intermediate between them. ET: The fact that in the biological realm, each individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more adaptive diversity - and less stability. Agreed, biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Apr 9, 2017 at 8:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self with > distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact that its > composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of > electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that > differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical. > > in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet. > Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong > to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of dog will, each one, be > slightly different in temperament and even look, but all will be members of > ONE particular Type/Breed of dog. But - in the physico-chemical realm, > the majority of tokens are similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a > great deal of stability. The fact that in the biological realm, each > individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide > more adaptive diversity - and less stability. > > I agree with your outline of the difference between the two realms - the > biological realm moved differentiation INTO each separate Token, removing > the constant bonding to all other Tokens, so that changes from the Type > could emerge rapidly and in response to local stimuli. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: > > Edwina, List, > my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear > borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are > borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is > borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. > "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have > clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs > of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in > self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? > (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there > obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean, > that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate). > Best, Helmut > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical. in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE particular Type/Breed of dog. But - in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. The fact that in the biological realm, each individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more adaptive diversity - and less stability. I agree with your outline of the difference between the two realms - the biological realm moved differentiation INTO each separate Token, removing the constant bonding to all other Tokens, so that changes from the Type could emerge rapidly and in response to local stimuli. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, List, my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate). Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 22:20 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure of your point. I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the type/law. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [1] On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr "John F Sowa" wrote: Jon and Edwina, Jon > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/ > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat > reality as consisting entirely of Signs. Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types. Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as "A cat on a red mat". All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc. The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction), which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further observations. Edwina > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact > with another external organism, to informationally connect with > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their > own [or both sets of] laws.
RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Helmut, Your idea of “self-defined bodies” is essentially the “autopoiesis” of Maturana and Varela, and the idea of final causation being intrinsic to animate bodymind is shared by Gregory Bateson and, I think, by Peirce. My book Turning Signs joins these concepts with Robert Rosen’s concepts of “anticipatory systems” and the Uexkullian “Innenwelt” as internal model, and identifies all this with semiosis (drawing very heavily on Peirce, of course). The central idea is that living beings are self-guided, relatively autonomous, and incorporate semiosic “guidance systems.” For more on this see especially my Chapter 3, http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm. Gary f. From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] Sent: 9-Apr-17 00:32 Edwina, List, my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate). Best, Helmut - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gene's Lawrence quote is apposite and not at all inconsistent with a decent theology that recognizes what Lawrence says. What theology might add is that part of creation is the existence of word, words. These single us out and call us to account and must be included in any effort to frame a philosophy that is true. The names Spinoza, Einstein and Jesus appears to me as a sort of triad that addresses this. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Sun, Apr 9, 2017 at 7:11 AM, wrote: > Edwina, I think that what you call atheism, some people call “religious > naturalism” — a more positive expression of the “wonder of creation.” > > https://religiousnaturalism.org/ > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > *Sent:* 8-Apr-17 19:37 > *To:* Peirce List ; Eugene Halton < > eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> > *Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs > > > > > Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote > from Peirce, > > "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work > of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551. > > That's a beautiful quote from Lawrence - and says in a broad sense what I > feel and think as well. But - I call that atheism! > > Edwina > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > *On Sat 08/04/17 7:03 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu > sent:* > > Dear Edwina, > > Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be > “reasonableness energizing in the world.” > > Not “universe.” > > I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given > that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious > atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence > gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924 > description of attending an Apache ritual: > > “There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly. > There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation, > the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in > every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes > of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the > yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is > no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the > dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were, > in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal > God” > > Gene > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, I think that what you call atheism, some people call “religious naturalism” — a more positive expression of the “wonder of creation.” https://religiousnaturalism.org/ gary f. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 8-Apr-17 19:37 To: Peirce List ; Eugene Halton Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote from Peirce, "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551. That's a beautiful quote from Lawrence - and says in a broad sense what I feel and think as well. But - I call that atheism! Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sat 08/04/17 7:03 PM , Eugene Halton <mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent: Dear Edwina, Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be “reasonableness energizing in the world.” Not “universe.” I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924 description of attending an Apache ritual: “There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly. There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation, the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were, in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal God” Gene - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, List, my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate). Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 22:20 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure of your point. I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the type/law. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr "John F Sowa" wrote: Jon and Edwina, Jon > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/ > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat > reality as consisting entirely of Signs. Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types. Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as "A cat on a red mat". All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc. The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction), which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further observations. Edwina > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact > with another external organism, to informationally connect with > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their > own [or both sets of] laws. I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction. Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gene, List: Your comments are well-taken. I did not mean to imply that the growth of knowledge is the *only *manifestation of the growth of reasonableness, although I now can see how it came across that way. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 5:30 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: > John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction. > Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An > infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling, > and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.” > > > > The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already > instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of > the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than > inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial, > communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s > upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally > engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the > toddler as a symbolizer. > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt: “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by > "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the > *summum > bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge > about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create > (CP 1.615; 1903).” > > > > Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth > of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation. > Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the > living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal > to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation > through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to > which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements > that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is > the *summum bonum*,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the > universe.” > > > > Gene Halton > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote from Peirce, "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551. That's a beautiful quote from Lawrence - and says in a broad sense what I feel and think as well. But - I call that atheism! Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sat 08/04/17 7:03 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent: Dear Edwina, Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be “reasonableness energizing in the world.” Not “universe.” I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924 description of attending an Apache ritual: “There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly. There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation, the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were, in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal God” Gene On Apr 8, 2017 6:39 PM, "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Gene - thanks. Your last paragraph on knowledge says what I was trying to say and I didn't express it very well - you've said it perfectly. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [2] On Sat 08/04/17 6:30 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu [3] sent: John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction. Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.” The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial, communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the toddler as a symbolizer. Jon Alan Schmidt: “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).” Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation. Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is the summum bonum,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the universe.” Gene Halton Links: -- [1] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [2] http://www.primus.ca [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu\',\'\',\'\',\'\') - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Dear Edwina, Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be “reasonableness energizing in the world.” Not “universe.” I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924 description of attending an Apache ritual: “There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly. There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation, the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were, in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal God” Gene On Apr 8, 2017 6:39 PM, "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Gene - thanks. Your last paragraph on knowledge says what I was trying to say and I didn't express it very well - you've said it perfectly. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sat 08/04/17 6:30 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent: John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction. Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.” The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial, communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the toddler as a symbolizer. Jon Alan Schmidt: “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).” Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation. Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is the summum bonum,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the universe.” Gene Halton - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction. Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.” The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial, communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the toddler as a symbolizer. Jon Alan Schmidt: “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).” Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation. Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is the *summum bonum*,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the universe.” Gene Halton - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F., List: GF: In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.” This is very helpful. My mistake has been thinking of the Sign-Object relation as conventional for a Symbol, rather than more broadly habitual. CSP: Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. So, just as ideas or resolutions in a human mind result in actions by a human body, likewise the laws of nature have existential effects within the universe. GF: But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness” (CP6.489). I think that there is some equivocation on "consciousness" between the two passages. In the earlier one, it seems to me that Peirce may have chosen that word mainly to avoid repeating "mind." In the later one, he clearly associated consciousness with bodily sensation and therefore 2ns or existence, which (as I just mentioned in another post) he did not consider to be applicable to God. GF: I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think it’s possible that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the *Ens necessarium/Creator* God you believe in may not be the same as the *agency *God that Edwina disbelieves in. That is an interesting suggestion, although I have a hard time seeing how God could be the Creator *without *possessing agency. I am reminded of these remarks by Peirce. CSP: "God" is a vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than almost any, is *vague*. No words are so well understood as vernacular words, in one way; yet they are invariably vague; and of many of them it is true that, let the logician do his best to substitute precise equivalents in their places, still the vernacular words alone, for all their vagueness, answer the principal purposes. This is emphatically the case with the very vague word "God," which is not made less vague by saying that it imports "infinity," etc., since those attributes are at least as vague. (CP 6.494; c. 1906) Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 4:17 PM, wrote: > Jon Alan, > > > > The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In > *Baldwin’s > Dictionary,* Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is > constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and > understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and > without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.” > > > > Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here > (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7): > > “That thoughts act on the physical world and *conversely*, is one of the > most familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories > are stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible > for us, in the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very > promising guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be > made which suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of > ultimate solution. > > > > All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature > influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or > symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not > merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The > general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But > it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not > in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the > thing. Here we have that great problem of the *principle of individuation* > which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible > analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. > Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the > mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a > Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and > Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the > advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that > beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific > service.” > > > > But
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
John S., Helmut, List: Of course, Peirce famously argued for the *Reality *of God, not the *existence *of God. He explained why in one of the manuscript drafts of "A Neglected Argument." CSP: Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing subject to brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,) and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely say that He is a Spirit, or Mind. (R 843; 1908) He also addressed this a couple of years earlier. CSP: ... I myself always use *exist *in its strict philosophical sense of "react with the other like things in the environment." Of course, in that sense, it would be fetichism to say that God "exists." (CP 6.495; c. 1906) As for "the *logos *is God," consistent with the possible connection between the beginning as an indeterminate symbol (EP 2:322) and John 1:1, I think that this is 3ns (reality) rather than 2ns (existence)--at least, until "the *logos *became flesh and dwelt among us." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:05 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > John, List, > I think so, after your proof! > Best, Helmut > 08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr > "John F Sowa" > > On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, > > but the law itself at work. > > I agree. > > > So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world > > of efficient causation. Is my guess. > > For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would > be a token. > > For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token. > > But does that mean no token can exist? What would existence mean > for such a thing? Perhaps you could call it logos. As John the > Evangelist said, "The logos is God." Does God exist? > > John > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, List: ET: Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is "God's purpose" as "the development of Reason." CP 1.615 (1903) continues beyond what you quoted. CSP: Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develope knowledge the most speedily. So it seems to me that Peirce *equated *knowledge and reasonableness, such that the growth of one *is *the growth of other. I would also suggest that this is the *summum bonum* precisely because choosing to pursue it aligns *our *purpose with *God's *purpose. In other words, we have the opportunity to participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative activity. I see no conflict between this interpretation and what you quoted from CP 5.433 (1905), especially since Peirce added in that same passage, "In its higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for making the rational purport to be general." We contribute to evolution, the growth of reasonableness, by exercising self-control. In fact, right after stating what you quoted from CP 5.427 (1905), Peirce went on to explain what he meant. CSP: It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning in future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to self-control. Meaning is in the future, but purpose is in the present as the end that *guides *our future self-controlled conduct. And since God (or Mind, as you prefer) "has its being outside of time" (CP 6.490; 1908), its purpose is neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, but simply eternal. ET: I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and therefore, not really debatable. I agree that ultimately this is not a topic to argue about on the List. However, I am not convinced that either theism or atheism is completely devoid of evidentiary support. Many people adopt one or the other for various reasons that they consider well-grounded, but often they differ on what *counts *as evidence, as well as *how *it should be evaluated. ET: I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the 'reasonable nature' and 'reasoning function' of the physic-chemical and biological semiosis within it. I continue to share this interest and appreciate being able to set aside our differences to discuss it. Thanks, Jon On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Jon, list: And here is a key difference. > > Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum > bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge > about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create > (CP 1.615; 1903)." > > I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of knowledge > about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you, Jon, as a > theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a contentious issue. > > Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can never > have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General, of Reason, > is of such a mode that this being consists in the Reason's actually > governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason, consists in > its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such > that its being never can have been completely perfecfed. It always must be > in a state of incipiency, of growth. ...So, then, the development of Reason > requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than can > ever occur. ...This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in > embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which > did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is > going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason". > > Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is > the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES write > that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning universe' by > ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the same thing. > > My own view is
RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Jon Alan, The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.” Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7): “That thoughts act on the physical world and conversely, is one of the most familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories are stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible for us, in the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very promising guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be made which suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of ultimate solution. All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.” But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in His essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness” (CP6.489). Yet he had earlier referred to God as a “vast consciousness.” I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think it’s possible that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the Ens necessarium/Creator God you believe in may not be the same as the agency God that Edwina disbelieves in. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 8-Apr-17 14:21 To: Gary Fuhrman Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F., List: There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902). As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself. Besides the still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903). Hence the laws of nature in some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human reason is analogous." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list: And here is a key difference. Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903)." I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you, Jon, as a theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a contentious issue. Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can never have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General, of Reason, is of such a mode that this being consists in the Reason's actually governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfecfed. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. ...So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than can ever occur. ...This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason". Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES write that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning universe' by ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the same thing. My own view is that the universe was not created 'by God' and God does not continue to create it. My view is that the universe, which is an act of Reason - is a creation of transforming energy to matter - by 'governing individual existentialities/events' which function according to habits, laws and thus, prevent entropic dissipation of that same matter. Certainly, Peirce uses many metaphors to describe this continuous nature of the transformative embodiment of Reason: - that it is a "vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities.The Universe as an argument is necessarily a great work of art, a great poem" 5.119 which can be even compared with a painting.. But WHY is the universe? Since I reject the notion of agency [God], then, I'd prefer the articulation of Mind, that energy-to-matter function, where "the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. 5.433 And since "5.427 "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in the future" - then, this suggests to me, that there is no a priori purpose [i.e., God's purpose]. --- I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and therefore, not really debatable. I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the 'reasonable nature' and 'reasoning function' of the physic-chemical and biological semiosis within it. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sat 08/04/17 2:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Gary F., List: There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902). As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself. Besides the still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903). Hence the laws of nature in some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human reason i
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
John, List, I think so, after your proof! Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr "John F Sowa" On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, > but the law itself at work. I agree. > So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world > of efficient causation. Is my guess. For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would be a token. For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token. But does that mean no token can exist? What would existence mean for such a thing? Perhaps you could call it logos. As John the Evangelist said, "The logos is God." Does God exist? John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F., List: There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902). As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself. Besides the still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903). Hence the laws of nature in some sense *represent *the development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human reason is analogous." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 7:47 AM, wrote: > Edwina, Jon S., > > > > As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I > supplied is “that there is something in nature to which the human reason > is analogous.” If all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge > is in signs. If we ask what kind of sign the laws of nature are analogous > to, those laws are dynamic objects of the signs we are now using to > describe them. If we agree that those objects are themselves signs, that > the real Universe is a vast representamen, “precisely an argument,” any > knowledge we can have of them must be both *in* signs and *of* signs > which are real. It follows that the real signs we are talking about are > analogous to the signs we are using to talk about them, which are > propositions (symbolic dicisigns as well as legisigns). > > > > But one thing we know about the symbols we use is that they cannot supply > acquaintance with their dynamic objects. Only by collateral experience can > we know anything about those objects, the signs we call “the laws of > nature.” If you assert that they are symbols, your assertion is meaningless > unless you call upon your collateral experience of symbols to indicate the > dynamic object of the symbols we are using. Your collateral experience > consists of having done the sort of thing we are doing right now, > participating in an ongoing argument. Our hypothesis that the “laws of > nature” are symbols participating in an argument is empty of content unless > those laws, those signs, are analogous to the signs in which our thought > about them is expressed. Our thought is thus metaphorical insofar as it > deploys that analogy. > > > > In short, my claim was not “that our primary experience of these natural > laws is metaphorical.” My claim was that our primary experience of > *symbols* and of *propositions* is our own use of them to participate in > arguments. Unless your use of the word “symbol” differs from the > conventional use well formulated by Peirce, our acquaintance with its > dynamic object can only be drawn from the *commens*, and only by analogy > with that can we mean something definite by asking whether the laws of > nature are symbols. > > > > Gary f. > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
hese qualities play in an argument that, they of course, > play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the > little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our > perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual > judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are > immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The > premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements > of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian > supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, > but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions. > Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual > facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being > premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the > premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]] > > > > Gary F. > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53 > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca > Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs > > Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: > > "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents > of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to > call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is > anthropomorphic" > > As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or > symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because > WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our > experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form > individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical > but as real. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: > > Jon A.S., John S., > > > > I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below. > > > > Gary F. > > > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] > Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52 > > John S., List: > > > > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor > for aspects of nature that we can only describe. > > > > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs are > they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general > laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs > all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is > not composed exclusively of signs." > > [GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies > what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”: > > “It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign > should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the > explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,— > not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, > embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are > all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth,’— that all this universe is > perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394). > > > > Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of > nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out its > conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols, > though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form > of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our > primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We > ascribe these forms to the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”: > “What we call a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, > but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of > every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to > approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would > be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may > use this language) would be the very Universe” (EP2:304). > > > > To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your question, > although it may not use the language you are looking for. > > > > Gary f. > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list - hmm - that is interesting and I'd agree; the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact with another external organism, to informationally connect with the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their own [or both sets of] laws. -- Edwina This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Sat 08/04/17 12:58 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: Edwina, John S., List: JFS: Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat reality as consisting entirely of Signs. ET: I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law of nature is the continuum of its potential instantiations (3ns), not the (discrete) collection of its actual instantiations (2ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: John, list: I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of chickens, which have an ability to reproduce their type via eggs-to-chickens. It would refer to the continuity of the type of flower - which has the ability to reproduce that type year after year in particular form after form. A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that particular individual and does not continue on after that individual. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [4] On Fri 07/04/17 9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net [5] sent: On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. > > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs > are they? Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time he went out for his daily walk. That is an example of law-like behavior. But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law embodied in Kant's nature. That's just the way he behaved. > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general > laws of nature are real, If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be something real that makes it true. But that something may be as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior. Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that we don't understand in detail. For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and Einstein. Then think of the thousands or millions of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws. Then imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium. An interesting joke: "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks." For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries. John Links: -- [1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\') [4] http://www.primus.ca [5] http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\') - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/p
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, John S., List: JFS: Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/regularity as a Sign *itself*, if in fact it is legitimate to treat reality as consisting *entirely *of Signs. ET: I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law of nature is the *continuum *of its *potential *instantiations (3ns), not the (discrete) *collection *of its *actual *instantiations (2ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > John, list: > > I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among > a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. > > That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of chickens, > which have an ability to reproduce their type via eggs-to-chickens. It > would refer to the continuity of the type of flower - which has the ability > to reproduce that type year after year in particular form after form. > > A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that > particular individual and does not continue on after that individual. > > Edwina > > -- > This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's > largest alternative telecommunications provider. > > http://www.primus.ca > > On Fri 07/04/17 9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent: > > On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is > > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. > > > > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our > > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs > > are they? > > Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes > reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. > That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But > it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. > > For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his > neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time > he went out for his daily walk. That is an example of law-like > behavior. But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law > embodied in Kant's nature. That's just the way he behaved. > > > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general > > laws of nature are real, > > If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be > something real that makes it true. But that something may be > as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior. > Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that > we don't understand in detail. > > For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, > Newton, and Einstein. Then think of the thousands or millions > of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws. Then > imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium. > > An interesting joke: "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks." > > For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is > as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries. > > John > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and those pages weren't included. I do prefer the CP collection. No- I am not assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign isn't real. I am sure that it can be/IS real. That's not my point. - which was to question first, the nature of these natural laws, which are symbolic but not in the human sense of symbolic. And second, to question that our primary experience of these natural laws is metaphorical. I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic constructs - is a secondary step. As Peirce said - "every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon". I'm talking about prior to the scientific explanation which, since it suggests Reason functioning within the natural world - can be 'anthropomorphic' [if we define Reason as particularly human]. But I consider our analysis of these laws irrelevant. My focus is on the natural laws themselves, in themselves, and how they operate. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Fri 07/04/17 10:53 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption. For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here: [[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe. Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions. Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]] Gary F. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic" As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical but as real. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca [1] On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [2] sent: Jon A.S., John S., I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below.
Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
List, I think there are two signs we are talking about: The law formation sign, and a law application (instantiation?) sign. In the law formation sign, it depends on ones belief, which kind of interpretant the law is: Does the law not change anymore, then the interpretant is final, and the immediate and the dynamical interpretants are the same like it. Is the law still changing (tychism), then the interpretant is immediate, I guess, because it is internal to the sign, which is taking the space of the whole universe. To define a law application sign , that is to draw a line around it, is an arbitrary action, if you are eg. talking about two masses in space attracting each other, because they are attracted by all other masses in the universe as well. But, if you do, you have a sign with a blurred border, and for this, I would say, the law is the immediate object, if the law is still changing, and, if the law is not changing anymore, both the immediate and the dynamical object, both being the same then. The representamen is the situation at the beginning of the sign, the interpretant the situation at the end of the sign, becoming the representamen for the next sign, and the duration of each sign is infenitisimally short, I would say. Best, Helmut 07. April 2017 um 16:53 Uhr Von: g...@gnusystems.ca Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption. For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here: [[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe. Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions. Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]] Gary F. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic" As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical but as real. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Jon A.S., John S., I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below. Gary F. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52 John S., List: JFS: In sum
RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption. For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here: [[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe. Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions. Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]] Gary F. From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic" As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical but as real. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Jon A.S., John S., I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below. Gary F. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52 John S., List: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs are they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs." [GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”: “It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,— not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth,’— that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394). Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of nature would
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement: "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic" As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical but as real. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent: Jon A.S., John S., I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below. Gary F. From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52 John S., List: JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs are they? Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs." [GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”: “It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,— not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth,’— that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394). Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We ascribe these forms to the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”: “What we call a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe” (EP2:304). To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your question, although it may not use the language you are looking for. Gary f. Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jon and Edwina, Jon What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/, the real general that governs actual occurrences. Edwina But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a 'shared reality' could be developed. That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange. Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor. To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples: Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional to t squared: x = ½ gt² Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system travel in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each elli
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }John, list: I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation. That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of chickens, which have an ability to reproduce their type via eggs-to-chickens. It would refer to the continuity of the type of flower - which has the ability to reproduce that type year after year in particular form after form. A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that particular individual and does not continue on after that individual. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider. http://www.primus.ca On Fri 07/04/17 9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent: On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. > > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs > are they? Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time he went out for his daily walk. That is an example of law-like behavior. But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law embodied in Kant's nature. That's just the way he behaved. > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general > laws of nature are real, If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be something real that makes it true. But that something may be as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior. Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that we don't understand in detail. For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, Newton, and Einstein. Then think of the thousands or millions of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws. Then imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium. An interesting joke: "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks." For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .