At 10:38 AM 5/18/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Howard, you wrote,
If one thinks this way, then every physical event is a measurement.
That won't work for an empiricist.
[End quote]
I've held off on replying because I didn't understand that remark
and I've blamed myself. Could you elaborate a
At 12:09 PM 5/10/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
I don't think Frederik wants to
get into an dispute over words any more than I do.
HP: Word choice is not the issue. Frederik has explained why Peirce
avoided the words subject-object.
GF: Howard, to the extent that
you've clarified what you mean by
on At 10:20 AM 5/7/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
From my point of view, you avoid
facing the obvious chicken-and-egg problem intrinsic to your hypothesis
of self-replication as the first self. (Which is no more
testable as a hypothesis than Peirce's matter as effete
mind.)
HP: Your point of view is
At 11:26 AM 5/6/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
Did I not already answer
this? (below)
I do not think Peircean semiotics avoids that question.
I think it avoids the subject-object terminology in order not to
import anthropocentric conceptions from German
idealism.
HP: Yes, Frederik, that was
At 05:46 PM 5/5/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
It's quite a stretch to read
[the Peirce quote] as an assertion that the subject-object
relation is obscure and mysterious, and it has nothing
to do with the mind-matter problem which is the legacy of
Cartesian dualism.
What is the stretch? Your
they must first teach them a new language, and no one can learn a new
language unless he first trusts that it means something.â
Michael Polanyi (1962, 151))
Gary f.
From: Howard Pattee
[
mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com]
Sent: May 4, 2015 9:46 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce-L
At 09:49 AM 5/2/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Frederik, you wrote,
[So here I agree with Howard (and I guess P would do so as well) that the
right direction is to generalize the observer-phenomenon distinction so
as to cover all biological organisms.]
GF: I agree about the right direction, but I
At 11:32 AM 5/1/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:
Howard, I don't see why a rock's
hitting the ground on a lifeless planet shouldn't be taken as occasioning
a measurement.
HP: If one thinks this way, then every physical event is a measurement.
That won't work for an empiricist.
BU: That's the sense
At 09:21 AM 5/1/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
I've got my own book to finish,
so I for one need to get off this detour. My apologies for taking it in
the first place.
I accept your apology. It may be a detour from your book, but I don't
think that my discussion of the subject-object distinction is a
At 10:06 AM 4/30/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary
F.wrote:
Howard, interesting definition!
[A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's
detection of a physical interaction.]
HP: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition
to subhuman
At 09:20 AM 4/28/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
HP: Or are [logic and math] conditions for describing laws?
Indeed they are, but more than that. Parts of mathematics which are
not (yet?) applied in any science are unproblematically developed.
So I would not subscribe to Quine's idea that
At 09:47 AM 4/28/2015, Gary F wrote:
As
its normally used in physics, I think a
phenomenon is an observable
occurrence. The implication is that it occurs (or perhaps recurs) at a
time. Wouldnt the Big Bang be a better candidate for first phenomenon
than the first self-replication?[snip]
It
At 05:18 AM 4/28/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[snip]
- Dicisigns - applies to
biosemiotics as well. To me, this forms part of a naturalization of
semiotics. But, simultaneously, a naturalization which takes generalities
such as empirical universals as well as mathematics/logic as parts of
At 10:59 AM 4/28/2015,Gary F.wrote:
Howard, interesting
definition!
[A phenomenon is information resulting from an individual subject's
detection of a physical interaction.]
HP: This definition is just an extension of the classic definition to
subhuman organisms.As a broad academic discipline
At 08:00 AM 4/23/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[snip]
In general, it is the universal, formal aspects of reasoning
processes which Peirce refers to as logical - while the way they
are implemented in the human mind is taken to be a different (not
less important) issue.
Agreed. But there is
At 11:55 AM 4/23/2015, Bob Logan wrote:
Could not a process of induction
not lead to abduction.
That's very likely what happens. A current rough picture of the
brain is the associative
small-world
network model.
See also
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn5012#.VTl9-SFViko
Howard
At 12:57 AM 4/23/2015, Joseph Brenner wrote:
Peirce's 'lumping'
of the alleged opposites of induction and abduction is, rather the
recognition that the opposition between them is not so absolute, and
indeed they have 'a common feature'. Further, if the criterion for
judgement is only the
At 07:13 PM 4/23/2015, John Collier wrote:
Abduction comes first because it gives the conditions for belonging
to a class (one that is to be hoped to be scientifically useful).
Of course John is right. An associative network only works if you
know what an association means.
Howard
At 04:38 PM 4/21/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
But I'd be really curious to
hear more about your take on the corollarial/theorematic distinction
!
Since you ask, here are a few thoughts.
In my opinion, the corollarial-theorematic distinction is a case of the
more general induction-abduction
At 10:20 AM 4/21/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
Howard said: There are no a priori foods as illustrated by the many
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremotrophextremotrophs.
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the
categories food and poison are a priori, not which
At 04:16 AM 4/21/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
The distinction between food and poison belongs, I would say, to the a
priori concepts of biology - not of logic.
HP: What is food for a cell is decided by the evolutionary history of the
cell as recorded by its heritable information.
There are
Ben and list,
Thank you for the links to Peirce. I follow his logic and diagrams,
and I have no problem with any of it. Formal logic is clear. It's the
natural language expressions that cause confusion. It seems to me
that it is also natural language that has produced most of the
well-known
Ben and list,
I don't see that any of your examples correspond to Peirce's first
clause: there is some one individual of which one or other of two
predicates is true. My point was that this statement does not imply
a second individual. Even if you assume that this one individual is
a member
Ben and list,
I agree that Poincaré's complaints about logic
were excessive, probably because he was irritated
more by Russell's attitude than by logic itself;
but I'm still missing something about that strange theorem.
Peirce says: The logical Principle is that to
say that there is some
At 02:10 PM 2/3/2015, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
So, to restate the point, relations involving representation don't
determine the things that are represented in the way that the laws
of fact determine the relations between existing facts, and neither
kind of determination is a matter of
At 09:44 AM 1/31/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
What you [John] are saying is essentially that we may not use this
[Peirce's] language, nor may we use the term determine to signify
the relation between objects in the real world (including generals)
and the propositions about them, the signs which
, which is the issue. Abduction is just
constrained (informed) guessing. That is not determinism. We can make
different models of the same reality.
Howard
gary f.
From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 31-Jan-15 11:06 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce List; biosemiot
At 14:48:09 -0500, 31 Jan 2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Evidently you, like John, move mainly in
professional circles where the normal use of
determine implies determinism. But if you
want to understand what Peirce is saying or any
writer who was extremely scupulous in his use of
words
At 08:24 PM 1/31/2015, Howard Pattee wrote:
My point is that we cannot equate the determinism of Nature with the
conceptual determinism of how the symbolic laws come about. That
would be confusing the map from the territory. As many physicists
have pointed out, without respecting
At 08:50 PM 1/28/2015, Jon Awbrey wrote:
This is common misconception of life as semiotics.
HP: Without some evidence here, I would consider this misconception
only one opinion. Many others say life and semiotics are coextensive.
JA: A more pragmatic understanding of the process would
At 04:42 PM 1/26/2015, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Applications of a Propositional Calculator : Constraint Satisfaction Problems
https://www.academia.edu/4727842/Applications_of_a_Propositional_Calculator_Constraint_Satisfaction_Problems
This problem illustrates a case where drawing a graph beats linear
, and it requires
symbolic description.
Howard
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Howard Pattee [hpat...@roadrunner.com]
Sent: Sunday, January 25, 2015 7:54 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Sungchul Ji; PEIRCE
At 09:02 PM 1/25/2015, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
While he [Peirce] does explore this idea in places, he suggests
elsewhere that can't find any clear examples of genuine sign
relations outside of living or intelligent systems.
I believe Frederik says this, but where does Peirce say this?
At 08:02 PM 1/18/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
FS: I know of no-one being a realist about any possible claim or
any possible universal!
All realists know it is only some universals which are real
(phologiston, ether, unicorn and a host of others are not).
HP: In my mind this is a truism.
At 01:29 PM 1/19/2015, Stanley N Salthe wrote:
S: Anything that occurs will have had all four Aristotelian causes,
including material cause.
HP: I want to make a point of this observation. Few people dispute
the value of Aristotle's complementarity view of casual
models. Each one has
Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say,
then, that in thinking about formal mathematics
Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of
course leaves him free to be realistic about
diagrams and physics. The basis for considering
logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me.
Of
At 03:32 PM 1/17/2015, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of
'realism' rather than the one many of us use; we've been through
this difference before.
HP: As I said, I agree with the
At 12:44 AM 1/17/2015, Gary Richmond wrote:
Howard wrote: I agree with
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/SEP
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/Realism:
Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed
that Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even
At 11:07 AM 1/16/2015, Frederik wrote:
It is generally assumed that Peirce only introduced real
possibilities around 1896-97 - Max Fisch famously charted this as
yet another step in the development of Peirce's realism and even
calls it the most decisive single step in that development.
At 04:44 AM 1/11/2015, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Helmut, Howard,
Do you have any questions about logical graphs in general or this
species of logical graphs in particular?
I have no problem with Peirce's logic graphs. I recommend Sowa's
elaboration of http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/egtut.pdfPeirce's
At 02:42 PM 1/10/2015, Helmut Raulien wrote:
We need examples. Same with the ten classes of signs. I am still
wondering, do these ten classes only apply to reflection, or also to
action- but that would be another topic. But the discussions in this
lists to me seem to show that there is some
At 12:58 PM 12/29/2014, Frederik wrote:
But still you seem to presuppose a genes first approach to early evolution.
HP: I was not addressing the origin of life, but how it works. Of
course I agree there was a chemical substrate at the origin. You say,
But the structure of the metabolic
At 02:57 PM 12/17/2014, Gary Richmond wrote:
From the operational criterion comes the basic notion, expressed in
the Syllabus (1903) that iconic signs are the only kind of sign
which gives information . . .
But Peirce also said: the idea embodied by an icon . . . cannot of
itself convey any
At 12:12 AM 12/17/2014, Jon Awbrey wrote:
What do I see in a picture like this?
```s``
``/```
o---R
``\```
```i``
The R brings to mind a triadic relation R, which collateral
knowledge tells me is a set of 3-tuples. What sort of
3-tuples? The picture sets a place for
At 02:07 PM 12/16/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
The reason that people keep saying you [Edwina] support dyads is
that your three relations have only two members each, to use
Peirce's term. A triadic relation has three members, not two; and a
complexus of three dyadic (two-member) relations is
At 10:04 PM 12/16/2014, Jon Awbrey wrote:
In the best mathematical terms, a triadic relation is a cartesian
product of three sets together with a specified subset of that
cartesian product.
I know that. My question was: Is there a graph theory representation
of a triadic relation that does
Frederik and list,
I agree that symbol systems are necessary from the beginning of
biological evolution, as Frederik has discussed, but I still have
trouble picturing the icons, indices, Dicisigns, and propositions at
the level of the cell.
Evolution requires stable storage and reliable
Getting back to Frederik's Chapter 6
at 07:14 AM 11/26/2014, John Collier wrote:
We will now look at examples of innate signalling between animals.
Unlike the previous examples, which involved only innate
perception-action cycles, these involve signalling between different
animals,
At 11:04 PM 11/8/2014, Jon Awbrey wrote:
It is necessary to distinguish the mathematical concepts of
continuity and infinity from the question of their physical
realization. The mathematical concepts retain their practical
utility for modeling empirical phenomena quite independently of the
At 03:51 PM 11/6/2014, Frederik wrote:
Dear Howard, list
This is where our ways part.
HP: I'm not sure why. My 25 words was just trying
to sound like a nominalist. It is not my view, as
the other 700 words tried to explain.
Suppose I agree to be a realist about iron,
baking pies, round
At 02:40 PM 11/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
It seems to me that you're in danger here of falling into the trap
that Howard sometimes falls into, of thinking that the existence of
discontinuities or punctuations refutes the reality of continuity.
HP: I have never said or implied anything like
Debate, Docent Press, 2008.
Zalamea, Peirce's Logic of Continuity. Docent Press 2012.
Howard
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 4-Nov-14 4:45 PM
HP: I have never said or implied anything like the existence of
discontinuities
At 02:45 PM 11/2/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
Dear Howard, Gary, lists,
I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if
not in all details.
I think Howard's generalization of language goes too far because
that seems to require an elaborated system to exist as a
At 09:40 AM 10/20/2014, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Howard wrote: That is only a narrow human view of nominalism. I
think Peirce's view of Tychasm and Agapism is more radical. He
generalizes signs, interpreters, mind, habits, and love to the
entire natural world.
Edwina: What do tychasm and
At 07:37 AM 10/17/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Howard said: To keep the discussion on the subject of Frederik's
book let me explain where I see modern physics differing from Peirce's views.
GF: What does that have to do with the subject of NP? Until you can
explain that, I'm changing the subject
At 04:07 PM 10/14/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:
On one hand you argue that such questions as those of realism and
nominalism can't ever be settled and that mentioning them adds
nothing; and on the other hand you argue against realism and call
nominalism the best bet.
HP: I said no such thing.
At 07:45 AM 10/6/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Information in Peircean logic is defined as the logical product of
the breadth and depth of a sign; these are logical quantities and
cannot be measured in bits.
HP: I do not understand a quantity that has no measure of some
kind. If not information,
At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word symbol
is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the
language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.
HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most
Gary F,
I was responding to your statement: Bits (as the name implies!) can
only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word
symbol; they are not symbols.
Of course, a bit is not a symbol or a piece of symbol. It is a
measure of information. I was trying to indicate that
At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote:
The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here
[Pattee-Fuhrman disagreement].
HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type
of information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1.
Howard
At 01:39 PM 10/4/2014, Gary Fuhrman quotes Peirce:
Peirce: When an assertion is made, there really
is some speaker, writer, or other signmaker who
delivers it; and he supposes there is, or will
be, some hearer, reader, or other interpreter
who will receive it. It may be a stranger upon a
On Oct 1, 2014, at 4:00 AM, John Collier wrote:
I think that it is a given that for any realist position there is a
nominalist position in the contemporary sense that can fit the same
assent structure. Typically one is realist about some things, but
not others (for example one can be a
At 08:58 PM 9/29/2014, Clark Goble wrote:
HP: To get a fairer picture of how physicists think, please peruse
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1301.1069v1.pdfthis survey.
CG: I'd seen that before. While it's a great guide to
interpretations of quantum mechanics it really doesn't address the
nominalism
To: Peirce List peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6834] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 2
At 12:24 PM 9/30/2014, Clark wrote:
To me nominalism is whether there are just particular things and not
real generals. I don't quite see how whether there's really
On Sep 29, 2014, at 10:38 AM, Benjamin wrote:
By the way, I think that we should remind or
inform readers that many physicists, when they
speak of 'realism', mean ideas such as that a
particle has an objective, determinate state, even when unmeasured.
Goble: I think the ultimately problem
At 11:09 AM 9/25/2014, Frederik wrote:
So, like Peirce, I hesitate to make consciousness part of the
definition of thought, also because we have as yet no means to
ascertain which animal thoughts are accompanied by consciousness.
HP: The distinction between unconscious and conscious thought
At 02:11 PM 9/24/2014, Benjamin wrote:
[snip]
I'm just saying that if one regards mathematics mainly as a neural
activity, then mathematics would seem absurdly effective in physics
and other special sciences, as if an average child by doodling had
invented a rocket ship.
HP: I do not see
At 12:45 PM 9/22/2014, Benjamin Udell wrote:
The laws seem for all the world like mathematical rules nontrivially
operative as laws of physical quantities such as force, mass,
velocity, etc. That's why the laws can be formulated as mathematical
rules, in conventional mathematical symbols and
At 01:44 AM 9/19/2014, Jon wrote:
Howard, Ben, All,
Peirce, unlike Hertz, did not stop at a correspondence theory of
truth. And that has made all the difference.
HP: Hertz also did not stop thinking about the correspondence, or
what physics now calls the epistemic cut.
Outside
At 12:07 PM 9/17/2014, Frederik wrote:
I think it follows from these observations [that MRI scans require
mathematics] that it is a preposterous claim to say that mathematics
is the study of neurological structures - or that mathematics could,
in any way, be reduced to neuropsychology.
HP:
At 10:39 AM 9/18/2014, Benjamin wrote:
Only humans (at least here on Earth) do sociology, psychology,
biology, chemistry, or physics. I have no evidence that elementary
nature does even simple physics, or even wears a lab coat.
HP: I agree. These are all fields in which humans make models of
At 06:51 PM 9/16/2014, Dennis Leri wrote:
And, not only do we do that to a degree of accuracy greater than
chance but that a methodology predicated upon the Method of Least
Squares says it must be the case. Differences that make a difference
need not be conscious.
HP: Meditate, don't reason.
At 09:42 AM 9/11/2014, Jon wrote:
Stephen,
Back in the early 90s I used to consult on statistics and computing
for nurse researchers at a medical school (http://nursing.utmb.edu/)
and mother-infant communication was one of their major research areas.
HP: Joanna has been educating me on how
At 04:39 PM 9/8/2014, Frederik wrote:
So the chain of reasoning, on a Peircean view, involves all sorts
of abductions -
HP: I'm sure this apparently unlimited view if reasoning is one
source of my misunderstanding of Peirce. I don't think of any
unconscious processes of abduction as
Pattees comments on NP Chapters 1 and 2.
At 04:36 PM 9/3/2014, Frederik wrote:
FS: Charting how brains or psyches implement
aspects of that chain [of reasoning], however
important this is, does not change the importance
of P's insistence that logic in the broad sense
should be studied
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