Re: NSS/PSM improvements - short term action plan

On 04/09/2011 10:32 PM, From Adam Barth: Yes. Certificate (or CA) pinning in HSTS is an agreement between a web site and a browser. Excellent! Even though I assume that this still prevents only a particular failure and probably should never be a substitute or shifting of responsibilities

Re: Debian Weak Key Problem

). The premise (and a not unreasonable one) is that such a list can be generated if needed. I expect that Mozilla will not come up with the resources for it. Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog

Re: Debian Weak Key Problem

Gervase Markham: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: Oh, that would technically not be possible I guess. Searching for such keys dynamically could take hours per key, hence previously created keys are used. They would need to be hosted somewhere and compared to. That's why Mozilla would

Re: Debian Weak Key Problem

Gervase Markham: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: Locally stored where exactly? Do you have an idea how big such a list which would cover just the most commonly used key sizes would be? Doesn't sound feasible to me, hence I thought you were talking about some kind of lookup service

Re: Debian Weak Key Problem

the certificate because of somebody detected a weak key. I haven't encountered such a situation yet and doesn't make much sense. Suggestions? Even if it doesn't sound so good, do nothing is the right thing to do I think. Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http

Re: Debian Weak Key Problem

that already. I had no clue what other CAs decided in that respect and I offered our estimates and decisions on this subject. That's not something coordinated. I'm open to suggestions as always. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber

Re: [Fwd: Secure Server e-Cert Developer e-Cert. Comerica TM Connect Web Bank]

the cxv32.com domain already all over the place? Tested with FF3 and FF2... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http://blog.startcom.org Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: [Fwd: Secure Server e-Cert Developer e-Cert. Comerica TM Connect Web Bank]

Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.): I just wonder why the h*** Google anti-phishing tool still allows me to go to http://comerica.connect.tmconnectweb.login.cgi.msg5984.time32491989.webbizcompany.c1b9r62whf314lx53xq.secureserv.onlineupdatemirror66272.comerica.certificateupdate.cxv32.com/logon.htm

Re: How to get a free certificate

, since todays requirements and sites are mostly not static, but dynamically assembled on the server side. In my opinion, the security concept of the Mozilla browser(s) is not really usable... :-( -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber

Re: Extract of CA certificates

Hi Gerv, Gervase Markham wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: Or I could simply push the Backup button of the certificate viewer? Except that in this very specific case, the copyright of the different CA certificates are perhaps that of the CAs themselves. However distribution

Re: Extract of CA certificates

of the certdata.txt file can be loaded at run-time as opposed at compile time, this problem could be solved that way easily. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http

Re: Extract of CA certificates

://www.verisign.com/repository/roots/pca_certificate.html -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http://blog.startcom.org Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: Extract of CA certificates

Hecker wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: So is the assumption correct, that if I or anybody else extracts the CA certificates from certdata.txt and uses the result of it, isn't bound to any licensing constraints, similar as the content of a web page which the browser displays isn't

Reassessment of sub-ordinated CA certificates

situation of loosing control. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http://blog.startcom.org Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev

Re: Extract of CA certificates

Thanks for your answer! Gervase Markham wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: Since sometimes there are some licensing concerns with the certdata.txt file, I wanted to know exactly what one is allowed to do. If for example by merely extracting the CA certificates with a tool like

Extract of CA certificates

know the answer, but try to help another project solve an issue with this, which affects many other applications. Thanks! [1] http://lxr.mozilla.org/seamonkey/source/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/certdata.txt -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber

Re: Mozilla isn't trusting its own certificates

;-) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http://blog.startcom.org Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev

CA policy and EV

of not being compliant with the Mozilla CA policy. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http://blog.startcom.org Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: Updating Mozilla CA certificate policy to address EV certificates

more edits, additions and changes. This would leave the current CA policy mostly as is now and in the future. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http

Re: Firefox 2.0.x: tracking unsuspecting users using TLS client certificates

configure a web server to accept ANY certificate for client auth. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http://blog.startcom.org Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: Firefox 2.0.x: tracking unsuspecting users using TLS client certificates

present in client certs, of the competition and spam them for their services...good thought ;-) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. http://www.startcom.org Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] xmpp:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Blog: Join the Revolution! http://blog.startcom.org Phone

Re: nsinstall: Command not found

Thanks for the tip! I didn't knew that... Nelson B wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: Does anyone know what the issue might be when trying to build from trunk? After checkout and building browser or mail static I'm getting: gmake[6]: ../../../config/./nsinstall: Command not found

Re: EV and mixed content

SSL connections (broken lock) anyway. So perhaps the initial question of this thread is really important and I suggest to require same certificate (or at least same level) per site. It makes sense in my opinion... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: EV and mixed content

, the browser complains. Guess something like that should happen here as well (i.e. downgrade). -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security

Re: EV and mixed content

if something on the same site is served by a different level then claimed originally. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org

Re: EV and mixed content

? Obviously this is only important if a distinctions is made between EV and others... ;-) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 Gervase Markham wrote: As I'm not sure of the way the proposed implementation for EV indication

Re: EV Draft Review Discussion

-- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: CAB Forum meeting report

Gervase Markham wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: Is there a way to have them commit to that in some way or form? And what if they'll just say: Well, we looked at it and it's not possible after you already voted in favor? I think it's rather unlikely that they would say

Re: EV Draft Review Discussion

Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: EV Draft Review Discussion

and trying to open it up is obviously much harder and I congratulate you for every success you achieve. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security

Re: EV Draft Review Discussion

orientated organization refrains from voting in favor of the EV guidelines! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https

Re: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA?

this is what it's all about? Maybe they don't want non-microsoft - non-IE users to participate? ;-) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev

Re: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA?

. It's a service that adds tremendous value for your subscribers and all their users/customers. I wish more CAs did that. Thank you for the flowers :-) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA?

not trust button is chosen. How good that this certificate isn't trusted...which CA issues such a certificatewww.microsoft.ipsos.com? I guess that the signer is a fake Verisign certificate -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone

Re: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA?

have a robot checking for missing ICA certificatesand send an appropriate message to the subscriber... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev

Re: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA?

and should add the intermediate CA certificate to your server...Which server software are you using? -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security

Re: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA?

I'm replying now to my own mail, as I misunderstood the statement from you...Of course this is not the correct answer to what you said Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: I can create a cert which claims to be a VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA and sign my webserver's cert with it. If you

Re: VeriSign Class 3 Secure Server CA?

of the obligation to send their entire server cert chains Correct. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Jabber: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

? -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

:-)) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

for testing and promotional reasons, same as StartCom uses Class 3 and Class 1 for its own web sites. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https

Re: Practical steps question for multi-level proposal

Gervase Markham wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: This is why I asked how to continue from here. But there is a general proposal on the table, which can be taken as the basis to form a new policy etc. So which steps would you propose? Shaping and refining the proposal could be one

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

Gervase Markham wrote: Oh, and I'm sure we're taking patches for DNSSec support in Firefox. Aren't we? This however would be a very good idea! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing

Re: Registerfly

). -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

Gervase Markham wrote: Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: That's right! But the audit confirms exactly that (in your example, no verification). The CA will have to mark its certificates compared to its policy which was audited accordingly. Why will they have to? Because they would like

Re: Mozilla Products Included Certificates

such a table... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

)? Should the UI wait for the framework? Do the proposals (ours, EV) depend on the UI proposal? Or should they be implemented without relation? -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: They are a Geotrust reseller, but also have issued hundreds of ssl from their own FlySSL CA: http://www.registerfly.com/ssl/ It's irrelevant! There is no FlySSL in the Mozilla certificate store. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

-- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

now on the responsibility and liability? -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

have a completely valid certificate for a domain name which doesn't belong to you anymore. How's that?! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

a CA certificate to be embedded in Mozilla software, the CA agrees to adhere to the this policy in full... and confirm to have read, understood etc. of the same paper...Something for the lawyers obviously, but I think it has to be done in some way. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

and liability of the CA, by making sure anything of it? Let the CA decide its promise to Mozilla, the subscriber and relying party and let the CA retain all responsibilities. Mozilla only provides an interface for the promises. Hope this makes sense! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

anything special. Just as example. If the OID detections for the UI would be possible in Javascript I don't know. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

that. However we were thinking about it too and came to the conclusion that this might be the right thing to do. Cheers! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org

Re: Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.) wrote: I'm sorry, but I can't work it out - what does the abbreviation resp. stand for? It stands for respective. Ouuups, it stand for Respectively of course... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Proposal for Mozilla CA policy extension

be build according to this framework however and we suggest its implementation afterwards. The proposal is also available as a PDF document at http://apache-2.startcom.org/moz-pki-proposal.pdf -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: Study questions EV certs effectiveness?

Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Flowchart covering SSL checks, error states, dialogs

called it...There is nothing else to do for you, except what you already provide, period! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing

Re: EV guidelines

promised to shut up and wait for the UI team to put a proposal forward...I shut up now ;-) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing

Re: Study questions EV certs effectiveness?

General in agreement with you, so I'm not sure if the domain name itself is the most important thing, because the domain is in the address bar already and if that's not the correct domain, than the browser already barks... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: Flowchart covering SSL checks, error states, dialogs

Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: EV guidelines

by a participant on this list, is simply rejected by you! So we might never agree with each other in that respect, but please let me explain to others what I think would be the best for the Mozilla browser. I believe that others are actually listening -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd

Re: Study questions EV certs effectiveness?

! And because neither Mozilla nor any other browser vendor would do this - it remains a hollow phrase without meaning and teeth... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature

Re: EV guidelines

? -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Applicability of SSL / use-cases

enabled web site your browser has to download a CRL of a few megabytes and even beyond. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev

Re: EV guidelines

...There is something I'm missing here... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https

Re: EV guidelines

and company estate) and then of sudden there is none...Confusing, isn't it? -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security

Re: Study questions EV certs effectiveness?

]: GlobalSign (http://www.globalsign.com/images/extended-validation-ssl.gif) -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security

Re: Study questions EV certs effectiveness?

. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Study questions EV certs effectiveness?

studies paid by some CA showing how EV helps the user...ala Get the Windows Facts... In the meantime, let the various CA's do a really great job and make some real good verifications based on the EV guidelines - without the greenly incentive! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd

Re: bugzilla.mozilla.org security group reorganisation proposal

-security: Websites webtools-security: Webtools addons-security: addons.mozilla.org updates-security: AUS security: Everything else -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature

Re: Study questions EV certs effectiveness?

this information! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 Michael Lefevre wrote: On 2007-01-29, Gervase Markham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: dolphinling wrote: The study, based on user testing, found that EV certificates don't improve users' ability

Re: Mozilla, Opera and co only tout open standards as it suits them

... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Opera article about EV

smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Why now? (Was: Extended Validation Certificates)

*equivalent *depending interpretation only*! * We hope, that Mozilla has the ability to change that decision taken by the CA/Browser Forum and get rid of the WebTust monopole which Microsoft and perhaps other CA's maintain. -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone

Re: Why now? (Was: Extended Validation Certificates)

, not the rest -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Extended Validation Certificates

-020305.html -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Why now? (Was: Extended Validation Certificates)

: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390 ___ dev-security mailing list dev

Re: Extended Validation Certificates

pishing sites. Certainly NOT the issue here. Is this it, what you are trying to say? [1] http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2006/10/09/september_phishing_site_competition_winners.html -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390

Re: Extended Validation Certificates

smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Why now? (Was: Extended Validation Certificates)

this contribution. This has nothing to do with CA dominance, but perhaps with some knowledge on the subject, being it as a CA, Linux distributer and with lots of contact with user/clients of such certificates. I hope , that this changes your impression! -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd

Re: Extended Validation Certificates

smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ dev-security mailing list dev-security@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security

Re: Extended Validation Certificates

green color (after the user got used to see it for a while when visiting their sites). Other type of confusion could happen however, if the entities are legitimate businesses and validated as such... -- Regards Signer: Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. Phone: +1.213.341.0390