Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354   From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comm

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.   --Jeff       Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354   From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE Subject: Re:

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

that are beyond doubt. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE Subject: Re: R

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

that might be caused for people who think about axioms as fundamental rules that are beyond doubt.   --Jeff       Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354   From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: Peir

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354   From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment he

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 8:11 AM To: Peirce-L; CLARK GOBLE Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks fo

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark - OK - I'll put in a long comment here on how I see the non-philosophical aspects of Peirce's work. Thanks for your encouragement to do so. Basic axioms: that our universe operates as energy-transforming-to-matter, or ‘things’ [Peirce used the term ‘things’ often] via

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon, list The psychical law i.e., Mind, is primordial and 'matter is effete mind' - but - this Mind is not human mind, but that basic natural 'primordial mind' which seeks or wills, so to speak, itself into

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, Clark, List: One thing that I am curious about is whether it is feasible to follow Peirce's lead in expanding the scope of semeiosis from human cognition to the physico-chemical and biological realms, *without *maintaining Peirce's distinctive metaphysics of objective idealism--"the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark - thanks for your comments - and they are indeed very valid. What I'd like to see, in discussions on the Peirce list, is an expansion of his work from the focus on human cognition - to the physico-chemical and biological realms. Peirce himself used his semiosis in those realms but it

Re: RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

> Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] > Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM > To: John Collier > Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] se

Re: RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

, University of KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier [1] From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM To: John Collier Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term John

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM > *To:* John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > > > John - thanks for the quotation. > > I fully agree. The Peircean framework is

RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

] Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term John - thanks for the quotation. I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly triadic. As he writes, "

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term John C., List: [John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing. Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used "sign" to mean a

Aw: Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Jon, List, Thank you. So this was another semantic problem, this time with the term "would"!    30. März 2017 um 20:04 Uhr Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"   Helmut, List:   HR:  Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final

Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Schmidt Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM To: tabor...@primus.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term Edwina, List: Just one (hopefully last) comment here. ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list

Re: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Helmut, List: HR: Eg. he wrote, that the dynamical object is real, and that it also is the object as a final study would show it to be. I think that the key word here is *would*. The idea is that the real is that which *would *come to be known by an infinite community after indefinite

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

.ac.za> > wrote: > >> I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit >> different metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just >> talk. >> >> >> >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com

Aw: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM To: tabor...@primus.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term   Edwina, List:   Just one (hopefully last) comment here.   ET:  But a thing that bothe

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

anschm...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM > *To:* John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term > > > > John C., List: > > *[John Collier] Peirce uses “s

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

com> Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 6:52 AM To: tabor...@primus.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term Edwina, List: Just one (hopefully last) comment here. ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its iso

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

irce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term John C., List: [John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing. Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used "sign" to mean a "triad&qu

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark, list - I think I wasn't clear in my post below. What I meant to say is that Peirce himself did not use singular terms that meant 'only this' in his work. As John Collier points out - he used 'sign' and 'representamen'; his use of the three categories were filled with expansive

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark- again, thanks for your comments. The fact that Mind and consciousness are often used synonymously is not - as you point out - part of the Peircean analysis. But to inform readers that you are using Peircean terms - and not 'general audience terms - is not the same as the focus

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Clark - thanks for your comments. The biosemiotics people [and I'm part of that group] are indeed focused on pragmatics, which is not, I think, quite the same as 'practical applications'. And there's interest in the Peircean semiosis in the chemico-physical realm and in AI,

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List: Just one (hopefully last) comment here. ET: But a thing that bothers me about some of the focus of this list is its isolation from reality; that is, it's all about words and definitions. But Peirce wasn't focused on that. Peirce was certainly not *only *focused on words and

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term Edwina, List: It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term Edwina, List: It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

*`when once it is written, every composition trundles about everywhere in the same way, in the presence both of those who know about the subject and of those who have nothing at all to do with it.. ~ *Phaedrus *Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List: It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to name-calling as you routinely have. I have simply expressed my considered opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you. 1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen' rather than 'sign' to acknowledge the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Helmut - yes, my apologies, you are quite right about the benefits of using different terms. My problem was that I wasn't sure what YOU meant by the term 'fact'. Edwina -- This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's largest alternative telecommunications provider.

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List: ET: As I've said repeatedly - the key factor of Peircean semiosis is that it is not mechanical or linear but enables an understanding of complex morphological generation which is enabled by constant transformative RELATIONS between TRIADIC PROCESSES. Again, the full triad is the

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List, Most of your post I dont see contradicting what I wrote, except that you are against "mapping the semantic movement of one term to another term". But why not trying to translate, if it helps interdisciplinarity? Philosophers and lay persons talk about "truth", "facts", "things",

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Helmut, list - I'm not exactly sure what you mean by a 'fact'. I think that is introducing another set of semantics into the Peircean framework and I'm not sure that it has any function. Again, the Dynamic Object functions ONLY within the triadic process of semiosis. It doesn't

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Helmut - the point to remember about Peircean semiosis is that it is dynamic; it sets up an active process of informational transformation. This is non-linear, so it is an error, I feel, to view Peircean semiosis as a step-by-step action, i.e., a linear movement from Object to

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

List, Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and

Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are continuously changing 'that with which we interact'. As an example, if I take a

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Dear list: rather ironic that the ultimate, immutable aim- the one that should accord with a free development of the agent's own esthetic quality- takes on the form of a carrot, no? Best, Jerry R On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Claudio Guerri wrote: > Mein lieber

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Mein lieber Helmut, List, again answer between the lines with >>> (this was taught to me by T.A.Sebeok just at the beginning of e-mails) Helmut Raulien escribió el 27/03/2017 a las 13:14: Claudio, List, So it is a bit paradoxical: On one hand we should be aware, that we are carrot-chasing

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Claudio, List,  So it is a bit paradoxical: On one hand we should be aware, that we are carrot-chasing donkeys, on the other hand we should not abandon the carrot chasing projects, inquiry. And we must respect other donkeys who are chasing different carrots. And, for not thinking that there are

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, Helmut, List, I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore. Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.), perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228). But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

    Supplement: Now I guess, that any dynamical object is a fact. But this view brings some problems: First: The dynamical object is said to be independent from the sign. But it may change, even due to the sign. How can that be? I would say, at the time of the sign, the dynamical object does not

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Claudio, Edwina, List, I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Dear all, The *surprising* *fact*, (object) C, is observed (by a human);... Best, Jerry R On Sun, Mar 26, 2017 at 9:48 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are > different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say