RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7923] Re: Natural Propositions: Chapter 8

[Gary Fuhrman]

Gary R, Mary, Frederik, Jon et al.

 

I’m pressed for time myself this week but would like to interject a few points …

 

First, I can’t agree with Jon that Peirce’s late emphasis on the reality of 
possibilities makes no difference to the pragmatic maxim. That maxim was never 
intended to apply only to the rarefied realm of mathematics, and its original 
1878 form defined the meaning of a symbol in terms of conceivable consequences. 
But just as actions have unintended consequences, the use of a symbol can have 
real consequences that are inconceivable, or at least unconceived, in the state 
of information prevailing at the time of use, and yet are really possible; so 
conceivability is not an ultimate criterion of meaning. I’m not sure if this is 
what Peirce had in mind, but it’s an important implication of real possibles in 
my view.

 

I too would like to explore the iconicity of Existential Graphs further, but 
haven’t found time this past week. One point that had occurred to me before has 
to do with the grapheus, which is a term Peirce introduced in CP 4.431 (c. 
1903). In that paragraph there are clearly three ‘minds’ involved in the 
graphing: “grapheus”, “graphist” and “interpreter”. Discussions that I’ve seen, 
including Pietarinen’s, seem to conflate the grapheus with the interpreter, 
which makes no sense to me if the grapheus is the creator of the universe which 
the graphist designates for the interpreter, which is how Peirce defines their 
roles. Maybe it doesn’t matter in the long run, as Peirce seems to drop the 
idea of the grapheus in subsequent work on EGs, but for me it’s important for 
understanding what the sheet of assertion is.

 

I’m afraid that’s all I have time for now!

 

gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 17-Jan-15 12:51 AM
To: Peirce-L; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7923] Re: Natural Propositions:

 

Mary, lists, 

 

Thank for encouraging the further discussion of Chapter 9 since I agree with 
you that it is very rich, especially when considered in relation to the 
chapters preceding it, something which you nicely outlined in your post.

 

I'm afraid I don't have time to respond to your several interesting points and 
intriguing questions (except for one: see below). But I sincerely hope that you 
and Jeff and others (hopefully, Frederik, too) will plunge into such 
considerations of EGs as you've pointed to.

 

I would also like to encourage anyone, who may be wondering at Frederik's 
seemingly narrow concentration on lines of identity and selectives in 
considering iconicity in relation to EGs, to read a long footnote he writes 
beginning on p. 215. Here he both gives reasons for his particular emphasis 
(which, he shows, is also Peirce's), as well as noting other iconicity issues 
in graphs. Halfway through the note he summarizes Pietarinen's response to Shin 
who had argued against Peirce's outside-in reading of graphs, reversing the 
directionality of graph reading (I must admit that I was unable to fully grasp 
Shin's argument in her first book, and laid it aside, unfinished).

 

Frederik concludes this footnote by highlighting one of Pietarinen's strongest 
arguments in defense of Peirce's endoporeutic (out-side in) position against 
Shin's reverse approach. Pietarinen offers several other reasons to prefer 
Peirce's approach to Shin's, for example that her rewriting of Peirce's 
inference rules adds "many more rules and connectors than does Peirce's own 
system" (even if Shin's approach offers greater readability on some 
points--something Gary Fuhrman noted earlier: that greater iconicity doesn't 
necessarily facilitate readability). 

 

But the principal reason he highlights, involving the Graphist and Grapheus, 
may be of particular interest to you, Mary, in the sense in which you brought 
it up in your post (as I recall, Bernard Morand was also keenly interested in 
this aspect of EGs). Frederik writes:

 

Pietarinen highlights a further and very basic feature in [EGs]: the dialogic 
structure , rhythmically changing between a Graphist and a Grapheus, 
responsible for existentially and universally quantified propositions, 
respectively, and thus responsible for taking turns in a dialogue where each of 
them manipulates the graph according to Peirce's rules. [. . .] Here, we may 
emphasize the basic iconicity inherent in this conversational structure of the 
graphs, motivated in the supposed dialogical structure of thought, be it 
between persons or between positions in one person's thought or mind. (NP 215)

 

So, yes, there's a wealth of possibilities for discussion relating to Chapter 8 
and EGs, and I hope that you, Jeff, of course Frederik, and others plunge into 
it. I'll "pop in" when feasible. 

 

Best,

 

Gary R




 Gary Richmond 

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinkin

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405

But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Jan 16, 2015, at 9:16 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Howard,
> 
> There has historically been a lot of confusion about this issue. The lion's 
> share of it comes I think from two different ways of viewing logic in general 
> and conditionals in particular. For lack of better names I'll refer to them 
> as the Mathematical and the Linguistic views.
> 
> Mathematics is about possible existence. What exists in mathematics is what 
> is possible, what is not inconsistent in the properties predicated of it. 
> Real possibles are simply part of the territory.
> 
> As a mathematician Peirce was a realist of this stripe from beginning to end.
> 
> Hope that clears a few things up.
> 
> Jon
> 
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
> 
>> On Jan 16, 2015, at 8:26 PM, Howard Pattee  wrote:
>> 
>> At 11:07 AM 1/16/2015, Frederik wrote:
>> 
>> It is generally assumed that Peirce only introduced "real possibilities" 
>> around 1896-97 - Max Fisch famously charted this as yet another step in the 
>> development of Peirce's realism and even calls it the  "most decisive single 
>> step" in that development. "Would-bes" is another term for "real 
>> possibilities".  
>> 
>> At 12:37 PM 1/16/2015, Gary R wrote:
>> 
>>> I also believe that Peirce's moving more and more to an extreme realism has 
>>> a decided impact on all aspects of his work in the final decades of his 
>>> life, including his semiotics and especially his pragmatism.
>> 
>> HP: "Extreme realism" is a mystery to me without a clear description of what 
>> it entails and excludes. As I have asked before, what reason or pragmatic 
>> justification can you give for believing in just one of many irrefutable and 
>> undemonstrable ideological metaphysics?
>> 
>> From SEP Realism: "Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) 
>> realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be 
>> selectively realist or non-realist about various topics: thus it would be 
>> perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic 
>> objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral 
>> value. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a 
>> straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a 
>> non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that 
>> one can be more-or-less realist about a particular subject matter. Also, 
>> there are many different forms that realism and non-realism can take." 
>> 
>> HP: Can someone briefly state Peirce's limits on "would bes" and "real 
>> possibilities"? Or at least can you give some explicit examples?
>> 
>> Howard
>> 

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[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7921] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Frederik, Lists,

On the second question that Gary R. has raised, the main point I was trying to 
make is that we should not lose sight of how Peirce's approach to these kinds 
of questions is supposed to work.  As such, let me start by setting to the side 
the interesting question of what, precisely, was Peirce's early explanation 
(say in the 1865-6 lectures) of the nature of possibilities, and how his 
position compares to that of Kant, Mill, Whewell, and others who are considered 
in his discussion.  What is more, let us set to the side the question of how 
his view changed in the 1870's, 80's and 90's.  As a way of restating the point 
I was trying to make, let me cite the following passage:

In the days of which I am speaking, the age of Robert of Lincoln, Roger Bacon, 
St. Thomas Aquinas, and Duns Scotus, the question of nominalism and realism was 
regarded as definitively and conclusively settled in favor of realism. You know 
what the question was. It was whether laws and general types are figments of 
the mind or are real. If this be understood to mean whether there really are 
any laws and types, it is strictly speaking a question of metaphysics and not 
of logic. But as a first step toward its solution, it is proper to ask whether, 
granting that our common-sense beliefs are true, the analysis of the meaning of 
those beliefs shows that, according to those beliefs, laws and types are 
objective or subjective. This is a question of logic rather than of metaphysics 
-- and as soon as this is answered the reply to the other question immediately 
follows after. (CP 1.16)

So, I think Peirce was driven to revise his interpretation of would-be's 
because he saw problems in his theory of logic.  In particular, he saw that his 
semiotic theory was leading him to treat some inferences as good that are 
really bad--and vice versa.  After he made the revisions in the logical theory, 
he then drew out the consequences of those revisions in his theory of 
metaphysics.  

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Frederik Stjernfelt [stj...@hum.ku.dk]
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2015 9:07 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; Peirce Discussion Forum (PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu)
Subject: [biosemiotics:7921] Re: Natural Propositions:

Dear Jeff, lists

>
> You've asked a series of questions.
>
> 1.  Do list members find Frederik's notion of two kinds of iconicity of 
> interest and value? If so, what is that value?  It isn't clear to me what the 
> value is of suggesting that Peirce is working with two notions of 
> iconicity--despite Peirce's own efforts to develop a unified conception.  
> I'll agree that there are a number of aspects that are involved in Peirce's 
> conception of iconicity, and that we can draw on the EGs as a tool for 
> clarifying some of the aspects that might be hard to articulate using other 
> means.  What is more, I accept that Peirce was motivated by the aim of 
> developing an optimally iconic graphical logic.  Frederik is clear that he 
> takes himself to be refining Peirce's conception of the icon because he 
> believes there are lingering confusions and vagueness in his conception.  
> Having said that, I don't think that the separation between the two notions 
> clarifies matters in the way I was hoping it might.

Which clarification did you hope for?
I do not speak about lingering confusions and vagueness. I think there are two 
pretty precise, different conceptions. But no-one needs despair, as they need 
not contradict one another. Peirce just does not make explicit the difference 
between them - which I think it would be a service to Peirce scholarship to do.
One conception is what i call operational. It compares iconic representations 
after which inferences may be made from them/ theorems may be proved from them. 
Measured on this criterion, Peirce's Beta Graphs are equivalent to his Algebra 
of Logic system of predicate logic ("logic of relations") of 1885. Optimality 
comes into the question when Peirce compares the two representations and judge 
Beta Graphs superior, not because they can prove more theorems, but because of 
their higher degree of iconic representation of logic relations.
These are obviously two different conceptions. Operational iconicity seems 
basic; optimality is an extra criterion introduced in order to distinguish 
competing representations of the same content.


> 2.  Also, what  does one make of Frederik's notion that the introduction of 
> would-bes greatly modifies Peirce's conception of Thirdness and that it 
> enriches the pragmatic maxim in now involving real possibilities?  I don't 
> think that Peirce introduced a new concept of would-be's.

> This seems to imply that he didn't have a conception, and that he later saw 
> there was something he had missed.  Rather, he had an account of how we might 
> interpret conditionals, and he later sees that his logical the

[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy - Good and Evil

[Stephen C. Rose]

Because I finally see the major stream of this list moving in the direction
of good and evil I want to share the following chapter from


Changing Your Heart and Mind: Triadic Philosophy in A Nut Shell
http://buff.ly/1B22XBV


I assume no one has read this book which is available for about one third
of a reasonably priced work and written to appeal to an educated but not
academic audience. But to my reckoning this is an original indication of a
seismic shift now underway - why because it is true and truth and beauty
lead continuity toward agapeic completion. All we do is seek fallibly to
limn stuff.




Know what good

and evil are



There is a huge "tell" in the story of Adam and Eve. It comes when God says
that if Adam and Eve know what good and evil are, they will become like
him! The writer is clearly telling us that we *do* know what good and evil
is. And that we are not without the qualities that would - and could - make
us at least somewhat better than we are. What the writer does not mention
is that we would ignore this knowledge for centuries in deference to forces
that have in fact been evil.



Good and evil are simple enough. But it makes sense to clear up one huge
misconception. Good is values not virtues. The word virtue crops up 253
times in Aristotle's Ethics. Values are barely mentioned.



The highest goods and the most egregious evils are related to the
achievement of freedom, truth and beauty at the top and the avoidance of
the ascending levels of harm at the bottom. We human beings are a spectrum
of good and evil. Just look at the following hierarchies to become aware of
the incredible mix of good and evil we are.



Hierarchy of Good



1. Being loving and free



2. Acting and expressing for truth and beauty



3. Valuing Non-idolatry



4. Valuing Democracy



5. Valuing Helpfulness



6. Valuing Tolerance



7. Contributing to the community



8. Being responsible



9. Critical thinking



10. Self-respect





Hierarchy of Evil



10. Thoughtlessness



9. Selfishness



8. Judging others



7. Ganging Up



6. Excluding



5. Intolerance



4. Opposing democracy


3. Unhelpfulness



2. Causing injury



1. Killing



Whatever adjustments you might make in these hierarchies, I trust you would
agree that they evoke the actual values that lead to the actual behavior
indicated. Some gang up and exclude, some oppose democracy. Some kill. Some
pay taxes whose effects cause harm.  Some support businesses that do the
same.  Some accept practices that are proved to be harmful. That's merely a
fraction of the downside. On the upside, positive values have been
instrumental in generating historical progress over the centuries.
Particularly those which form the ethical index of triadic philosophy:
tolerance, helpfulness, democracy and non-idolatry.



How much more progress there would be if these positive values were
accepted universally. They are a true and apt measure of what does good.

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Philosophy * Back to The Drawing Board

[Jon Awbrey]

Stephen, List,

I can relate to puzzles.  Reality presents us with puzzles,
some of which we have to solve or die — others of which are
more fun and we have more leisure to solve them before we die.

Some puzzles we solve by finding a good description or explanation,
others we solve by finding a good plan of action to carry out.

I call those "surprising phenomena" and "problematic situations",
respectively.  I've always thought there should be a third class,
but nothing comes to mind right at the moment.

Regards,

Jon

On 1/16/2015 9:42 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

The quote "I puzzle, therefore I am." has a serious subtext. Signs are
primordial and puzzling. If all thought is in signs then the idea of
fallibility is built into the structure of our relationship with what we
call the semiotic. All our statements are efforts to respond to what
essentially remains a puzzle. This should plunge us into something a bit
removed from the certainties that pervade binary culture.

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 9:24 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:


When it come to paradigms, you know what they say ...

"Shift Happens"

On 1/16/2015 6:11 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:


My little thread on Meta and Index had the supreme irony of being
diverted into exactly the sort of thing I was
trying to suggest was not what Triadic Philosophy is about.

It can be summed up with a few words - the quote that I give to my
hero(ine) in my novella The Last Drop.

I puzzle, therefore I am. - Dusty Harkness



--

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Gary Fuhrman]

Jon,

 

We have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely there is a real 
possibility that  a scientific intelligence can come to know facts in the 
future which are inconceivable in the present. Semiosis takes time, and 
conceivability grows; if it didn’t, there would be no difference between 
corollarial and theorematic deduction. Eternal conceivability is not a 
pragmatic or pragmaticistically meaningful concept.

 

gary f.

 

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] 
Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM
To: Howard Pattee
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

 

Re: Gary Fuhrman

At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405

 

But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.

 

Jon






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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Jon Awbrey]

Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15409

Gary,

You can try to split rhetorical hairs between cognizable and conceivable,
but I don't think those frizzies will wash.  I never said anything about
"eternal conceivability".  What you are saying here smacks of a regress
to the very brand of absolutism that Peirce's relational reform of logic
was designed to escape.

Relativity to a "state of information" (SOI_1) is one of Peirce's best ideas,
but it's the same thing as relativity to a "system of interpretation" (SOI_0),
in other words, a triadic sign relation, that was always a part of Peirce's
triadic relational theory of "logic as formal semiotics" from the get-go.

Regards,

Jon

On 1/17/2015 9:56 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

Jon,

We have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely there is a real 
possibility that  a scientific
intelligence can come to know facts in the future which are inconceivable in 
the present. Semiosis takes time, and
conceivability grows; if it didn’t, there would be no difference between 
corollarial and theorematic deduction.
Eternal conceivability is not a pragmatic or pragmaticistically meaningful 
concept.

gary f.

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM To: Howard 
Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

Re: Gary Fuhrman

At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405

But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.

Jon



--

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic Philosophy * Back to The Drawing Board

[Stephen C. Rose]

I see puzzling as a middle term between thinking (Descartes, nominalism,
psychologism) and action or expression which I take to be the real things
that we actually do (in my understanding pragmaticism. Puzzling is what we
do in the index phase. It is where we acknowledge the tentativity of what
we do. But it is also WHAT we do so it has merit. The actions or
expressions are the third and they are carried out in Triadic Philosophy by
including as a coda to the index the Keats nostrum truth is beauty, beauty
truth. Cheers, S

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 9:48 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Stephen, List,
>
> I can relate to puzzles.  Reality presents us with puzzles,
> some of which we have to solve or die -- others of which are
> more fun and we have more leisure to solve them before we die.
>
> Some puzzles we solve by finding a good description or explanation,
> others we solve by finding a good plan of action to carry out.
>
> I call those "surprising phenomena" and "problematic situations",
> respectively.  I've always thought there should be a third class,
> but nothing comes to mind right at the moment.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 1/16/2015 9:42 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>
>> The quote "I puzzle, therefore I am." has a serious subtext. Signs are
>> primordial and puzzling. If all thought is in signs then the idea of
>> fallibility is built into the structure of our relationship with what we
>> call the semiotic. All our statements are efforts to respond to what
>> essentially remains a puzzle. This should plunge us into something a bit
>> removed from the certainties that pervade binary culture.
>>
>> Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
>> Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 9:24 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>>
>>  When it come to paradigms, you know what they say ...
>>>
>>> "Shift Happens"
>>>
>>> On 1/16/2015 6:11 AM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:
>>>
>>>  My little thread on Meta and Index had the supreme irony of being
 diverted into exactly the sort of thing I was
 trying to suggest was not what Triadic Philosophy is about.

 It can be summed up with a few words - the quote that I give to my
 hero(ine) in my novella The Last Drop.

 I puzzle, therefore I am. - Dusty Harkness


> --
>
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Benjamin Udell]

Jon, Gary F.,

I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of 
'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be /insuspectability/. 
That something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't 
doubt it, even if eventually one may come to doubt it. This is related 
to Peirce's critical common-sensism, in which he holds that there is a 
set of propositions which people can't seriously doubt at the time, a 
set which changes only slowly over time if at all. Thus, any proposition 
inconsistent with those indubitable propositions would be insuspectable 
at that time. However, the indubitable propositions also tend to be 
vague, so inconsistencies with other propositions will tend to be vague too.


Now, the pragmatic maxim is a maxim about definitions, not the conduct 
of research, and Peirce in that context eventually calls a conception's 
meaning its 'purport'.  At the end of 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' 
Peirce says that he has discussed how to make our ideas clear, and that 
that is not the same thing as making them true, i.e., verifying them, 
which will be the subject of his next paper.


I think that what one can do in a conception in order to accommodate 
future learning and surprises is incorporate Peirce's contrite 
confession pf fallibility, plus a claim of 'successibility' (denial of 
radical skepticism).


I do think that the reality of possibility makes a difference to the 
pragmatic maxim in the sense that pragmatism leads to accepting such 
reality and its denial tends to weaken the pragmatic maxim, since it 
makes a conception's purport depend on whether certain conceived 
conditions will ever be fulfilled, not on whether we think their 
fulfillment is conceivable. I think Peirce's realism was little stronger 
in the early 1870s than when he wrote 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', for 
example see CP 7.340-1 (1873, "Reality" in "The Logic of 1873").


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 10:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:


Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15409

Gary,

You can try to split rhetorical hairs between cognizable and conceivable,
but I don't think those frizzies will wash.  I never said anything about
"eternal conceivability".  What you are saying here smacks of a regress
to the very brand of absolutism that Peirce's relational reform of logic
was designed to escape.

Relativity to a "state of information" (SOI_1) is one of Peirce's best 
ideas,
but it's the same thing as relativity to a "system of interpretation" 
(SOI_0),
in other words, a triadic sign relation, that was always a part of 
Peirce's

triadic relational theory of "logic as formal semiotics" from the get-go.

Regards,

Jon

On 1/17/2015 9:56 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:

Jon,

We have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely there 
is a real possibility that  a scientific
intelligence can come to know facts in the future which are 
inconceivable in the present. Semiosis takes time, and
conceivability grows; if it didn’t, there would be no difference 
between corollarial and theorematic deduction.
Eternal conceivability is not a pragmatic or pragmaticistically 
meaningful concept.


gary f.

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] Sent: 17-Jan-15 7:35 AM To: 
Howard Pattee Cc: Peirce List Subject:

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

Re: Gary Fuhrman

At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15405

But we have no conception of inconceivable consequences.

Jon






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Re: [biosemiotics:7928] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Howard Pattee]

At 12:44 AM 1/17/2015, Gary Richmond wrote:
Howard wrote:  I agree with 
SEP 
Realism:


Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed 
that Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even mentioned in it.


HP: Which is why I keep asking for specific cases that Peirce did not 
consider real. If you say that a peer refereed and recently updated 
review of realism doesn't include Peirce's concept of realism, then I 
think that is a reasonable question.


For example, it is not clear to me if Peirce considered as real his 
intuitive concept of infinity as a "supermultitudinous" collection of 
sets of infinitesimals. In any case he concluded that this concept 
was too unwieldy to be useful in scientific models. What about 
complex numbers? What about n-dimensional spaces, etc. that are 
necessary for scientific models?


Howard


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7869] Re: Natural Propositions: Chapter 8

[Benjamin Udell]

Gary, list,

I am curious about this. It's a subject where I've tripped up before. It 
apparently has to do with Peirce's removing the rule whereby 'there is 
something blue or round' is equivalent to 'there is something blue or 
there is something round'. That's also to remove the rule where by 'all 
is blue and round' is equivalent to 'all is blue and all is round'. 
Those are among the rules 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rules_of_passage_%28logic%29 now known in 
logic as 'rules of passage' (so dubbed by Herbrand). To remove one of 
them seems to be to remove all of them. My questions, for you or 
Frederik or whomever, are:
(1) How is one to think of 'all is blue and round' as differing in 
meaning from 'all is blue and all is round' ? Does one of them imply, 
without being implied by, the other?
(2) Doesn't this change make the Beta graphs non-equivalent to 
first-order logic? Or is this really a change for the purpose of Gamma 
graphs? I'm no logician, so I may be confused here.


Best, Ben

On 1/14/2015 4:32 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Perhaps this is a good place to stop for now since at this point in 
the chapter Frederik quotes the important long passage I mentioned in 
my first post in this thread and analyzes it in terms of how Peirce 
"relativized" material implication to go beyond it in revising parts 
of his Beta and Gamma graphs. However, that is a somewhat technical 
discussion and I'm am not sure that there is enough interest here in 
EGs to continue it.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Ben, Jon:

On Jan 17, 2015, at 10:36 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of 
> 'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be insuspectability. That 
> something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't doubt it, 
> even if eventually one may come to doubt it.
> 

A highly unusual sentence, at least to this reader.

Peirce's definition seems clear enough to be categorized as a set of 
predictions about a concept and hence refers to an INDIVIDUAL's capability to 
speculate about the future.  Time is intrinsic to this notion.  The 
capabilities of any individual to project into the future is rather dependent 
on the personal history of the individual which in turn, vary greatly from 
person to person.

1. Jon interprets CSP in a very pragmatic way.

2. Gary F. interprets Jon's pragmatism as not being sufficiently pragmatic.

3. Ben interprets Gary's interpretation of Jon's interpretation of CSP 
assertion.

Concomitantly, Ben introduces new terminology  ( 'indubitability', 
insuspectability)  and a restriction on the Aristotelian logical notion of 
"contrary" by introducing a phrase, "for the diametrical contrary".   ( An 
Aristotelian logical contrary may be stated as the relationship between two 
sentences: "S is P."  "S is not P." )

While it seems clear that these interpretations of one-another's philosophical 
perspectives are individual narratives. Yet, I ask, do the step-wise 
regressions of meanings of these sentences points to a general phenomena within 
semiotics - that of individualization of intent/entelechy?

More generally, is any reader of this list serve capable of generating a 
metaphysical interpretation of Ben's interpretation of Gary F's interpretation 
of Jon's interpretation of CSP critical assertion about the nature of his 
philosophy?

Cheers

Jerry 




> Jon, Gary F.,
> 
> I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of 
> 'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be insuspectability. That 
> something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't doubt it, 
> even if eventually one may come to doubt it. This is related to Peirce's 
> critical common-sensism, in which he holds that there is a set of 
> propositions which people can't seriously doubt at the time, a set which 
> changes only slowly over time if at all. Thus, any proposition inconsistent 
> with those indubitable propositions would be insuspectable at that time. 
> However, the indubitable propositions also tend to be vague, so 
> inconsistencies with other propositions will tend to be vague too.
> 
> Now, the pragmatic maxim is a maxim about definitions, not the conduct of 
> research, and Peirce in that context eventually calls a conception's meaning 
> its 'purport'.  At the end of 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' Peirce says that 
> he has discussed how to make our ideas clear, and that that is not the same 
> thing as making them true, i.e., verifying them, which will be the subject of 
> his next paper.
> I think that what one can do in a conception in order to accommodate future 
> learning and surprises is incorporate Peirce's contrite confession pf 
> fallibility, plus a claim of 'successibility' (denial of radical skepticism). 
> I do think that the reality of possibility makes a difference to the 
> pragmatic maxim in the sense that pragmatism leads to accepting such 
> reality and its denial tends to weaken the pragmatic maxim, since it makes a 
> conception's purport depend on whether certain conceived conditions will ever 
> be fulfilled, not on whether we think their fulfillment is conceivable. I 
> think Peirce's realism was little stronger in the early 1870s than when he 
> wrote 'How to Make Our Ideas Clear', for example see CP 7.340-1 (1873, 
> "Reality" in "The Logic of 1873").
> 
> Best, Ben
> 
> On 1/17/2015 10:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> 
>> Re: Gary Fuhrman 
>> At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15409 
>> 
>> Gary, 
>> 
>> You can try to split rhetorical hairs between cognizable and conceivable, 
>> but I don't think those frizzies will wash.  I never said anything about 
>> "eternal conceivability".  What you are saying here smacks of a regress 
>> to the very brand of absolutism that Peirce's relational reform of logic 
>> was designed to escape. 
>> 
>> Relativity to a "state of information" (SOI_1) is one of Peirce's best 
>> ideas, 
>> but it's the same thing as relativity to a "system of interpretation" 
>> (SOI_0), 
>> in other words, a triadic sign relation, that was always a part of Peirce's 
>> triadic relational theory of "logic as formal semiotics" from the get-go. 
>> 
>> Regards, 
>> 
>> Jon 
>> 
>> On 1/17/2015 9:56 AM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: 
>>> Jon, 
>>> 
>>> We have no conception of incognizable consequences. But surely there is a 
>>> real possibility that  a scientific 
>>> intelligence can come to know facts in the future which are inconceiva

Re: [biosemiotics:7928] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Benjamin Udell]

Howard, lists,

My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals 
are real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a 
variation of sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, 
the existent, etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course was 
one) don't care about the real and that their ideal forms are the truly 
real to them a la Plato. I do recall Peirce somewhere saying that the 
question of whether mathematicals are real is a question for the 
metaphysician, not the mathematician, and I recall him not answering the 
question at that point. Peirce always says that mathematical objects are 
purely hypothetical.


Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255:

   The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the
   least depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as
   those which he supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for
   the real world. He lives in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates
   to the saying of his brother Plato that actuality is the roof of a
   dark and sordid cave which shuts out from our direct view the
   splendors and beauties of the vast and more truly real world,—the
   world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of our day said with
   gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of the theory
   of numbers is that it never has been, and never can be, prostituted
   to any practical application whatever."
   [End quote]

Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false 
propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., /bat that evolved from 
bird/.


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 12:24 PM, Howard Pattee wrote:


At 12:44 AM 1/17/2015, Gary Richmond wrote:
Howard wrote:  I agree with SEP 
 Realism 
:


Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed 
that Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even mentioned in it.


HP: Which is why I keep asking for specific cases that Peirce did 
/not/ consider real. If you say that a peer refereed and recently 
updated review of /realism/ doesn't include Peirce's concept of 
realism, then I think that is a reasonable question.


For example, it is not clear to me if Peirce considered as /real/ his 
intuitive concept of infinity as a "supermultitudinous" collection of 
sets of infinitesimals. In any case he concluded that this concept was 
too unwieldy to be useful in scientific models. What about complex 
numbers? What about n-dimensional spaces, etc. that /are/ necessary 
for scientific models?


Howard


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Benjamin Udell]

Jerry,

I guess I should have said 'diametrical opposite' instead of 
'diametrical contrary' which is an atypical phrase.


But your 'S is P' & 'S is not P' are contradictories, not contraries; 
they can't both be true and can't both be false.


'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: they can't 
both be true but can both be false.


I'm willing to introduce a word occasionally, when I think it fills a 
need. Jon pointed out that to call something inconceivable is to call it 
incognizable. I pointed out that there is a word 'indubitable' in 
Peircean terminology for when something is undoubtable not because it's 
infallible but because find ourselves unable to doubt it because it's 
part of our common sense. So a corresponding word for something that is 
not absolutely inconceivable but which we are unable to conceive or 
cognize because it is contrary to our common sense, could be called 
'insuspectable', a kind of reverse mirror image of 'indubitable'.


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 12:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:


List, Ben, Jon:

On Jan 17, 2015, at 10:36 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of 
'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be /insuspectability/. 
That something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't 
doubt it, even if eventually one may come to doubt it.




A highly unusual sentence, at least to this reader.

Peirce's definition seems clear enough to be categorized as a set of 
predictions about a concept and hence refers to an INDIVIDUAL's 
capability to speculate about the future.  Time is intrinsic to this 
notion.  The capabilities of any individual to project into the future 
is rather dependent on the personal history of the individual which in 
turn, vary greatly from person to person.


1. Jon interprets CSP in a very pragmatic way.

2. Gary F. interprets Jon's pragmatism as not being sufficiently 
pragmatic.


3. Ben interprets Gary's interpretation of Jon's interpretation of CSP 
assertion.


Concomitantly, Ben introduces new terminology  ( 'indubitability', 
/insuspectability)/  and a restriction on the Aristotelian logical 
notion of "contrary" by introducing a phrase, "for the diametrical 
contrary".   ( An Aristotelian logical contrary may be stated as the 
relationship between two sentences: "S is P."  "S is not P." )


While it seems clear that these interpretations of one-another's 
philosophical perspectives are individual narratives. Yet, I ask, do 
the step-wise regressions of meanings of these sentences points to a 
general phenomena within semiotics - that of individualization of 
intent/entelechy?


More generally, is any reader of this list serve capable of generating 
a metaphysical interpretation of Ben's interpretation of Gary F's 
interpretation of Jon's interpretation of CSP critical assertion about 
the nature of his philosophy?


Cheers

Jerry





Jon, Gary F.,

I think that Gary F. is looking for the diametrical contrary of 
'indubitability' in Peirce's sense. Such would be /insuspectability/. 
That something is indubitable in Peirce's sense means that one can't 
doubt it, even if eventually one may come to doubt it. This is 
related to Peirce's critical common-sensism, in which he holds that 
there is a set of propositions which people can't seriously doubt at 
the time, a set which changes only slowly over time if at all. Thus, 
any proposition inconsistent with those indubitable propositions 
would be insuspectable at that time. However, the indubitable 
propositions also tend to be vague, so inconsistencies with other 
propositions will tend to be vague too.


Now, the pragmatic maxim is a maxim about definitions, not the 
conduct of research, and Peirce in that context eventually calls a 
conception's meaning its 'purport'.  At the end of 'How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear,' Peirce says that he has discussed how to make our ideas 
clear, and that that is not the same thing as making them true, i.e., 
verifying them, which will be the subject of his next paper.


I think that what one can do in a conception in order to accommodate 
future learning and surprises is incorporate Peirce's contrite 
confession pf fallibility, plus a claim of 'successibility' (denial 
of radical skepticism).


I do think that the reality of possibility makes a difference to the 
pragmatic maxim in the sense that pragmatism leads to accepting such 
reality and its denial tends to weaken the pragmatic maxim, since it 
makes a conception's purport depend on whether certain conceived 
conditions will ever be fulfilled, not on whether we think their 
fulfillment is conceivable. I think Peirce's realism was little 
stronger in the early 1870s than when he wrote 'How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear', for example see CP 7.340-1 (1873, "Reality" in "The Logic of 
1873").


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 10:12 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:


Re: Gary Fuhrman
At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7869] Re: Natural Propositions: Chapter 8

[Gary Richmond]

Ben, lists,

Yours are good questions and I'll try to take them up as, hopefully
sometime next week,  I summarize and reflect on Frederik's analysis of the
"long quotation" in Chapter 8 when he argues, as I put it in an earlier
post, that "Peirce "relativized" material implication to go beyond it in
revising parts of his Beta and Gamma graphs."

Meanwhile, I hope Frederik, or Gary F, or Jim, or Jeffrey or anyone
familiar with this issue will sound in on it as I've no time to myself this
weekend

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

>  Gary, list,
>
> I am curious about this. It's a subject where I've tripped up before. It
> apparently has to do with Peirce's removing the rule whereby 'there is
> something blue or round' is equivalent to 'there is something blue or there
> is something round'. That's also to remove the rule where by 'all is blue
> and round' is equivalent to 'all is blue and all is round'. Those are among
> the rules http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rules_of_passage_%28logic%29 now
> known in logic as 'rules of passage' (so dubbed by Herbrand). To remove one
> of them seems to be to remove all of them. My questions, for you or
> Frederik or whomever, are:
> (1) How is one to think of 'all is blue and round' as differing in meaning
> from 'all is blue and all is round' ? Does one of them imply, without being
> implied by, the other?
> (2) Doesn't this change make the Beta graphs non-equivalent to first-order
> logic? Or is this really a change for the purpose of Gamma graphs? I'm no
> logician, so I may be confused here.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 1/14/2015 4:32 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Perhaps this is a good place to stop for now since at this point in the
> chapter Frederik quotes the important long passage I mentioned in my first
> post in this thread and analyzes it in terms of how Peirce "relativized"
> material implication to go beyond it in revising parts of his Beta and
> Gamma graphs. However, that is a somewhat technical discussion and I'm am
> not sure that there is enough interest here in EGs to continue it.
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy - What Mathematics Is and What It is Not

[Stephen C. Rose]

I have committed to remaining within this thread so as not to muddy
anything up with tangent statements. What I say here is aimed at
stimulating talk about what I intend as Triadic Philosophy. But it seems to
me that when I find lines that express what I believe, they should be
placed here from time to time. The following from Ben squares with my
understanding.

QUOTE

My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals are
real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a variation of
sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, the existent,
etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course was one) don't care
about the real and that their ideal forms are the truly real to them a la
Plato. I do recall Peirce somewhere saying that the question of whether
mathematicals are real is a question for the metaphysician, not the
mathematician, and I recall him not answering the question at that point.
Peirce always says that mathematical objects are purely hypothetical.

END QUOTE

I have suggested that math is finite as all reality is save that part of it
which seems impossible to understand and that it like reason and logic are
utilities accessible to consciousness. I do not attribute this sense to
anyone else but I find it consistent with, or at least relates to, what I
have quoted above.

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Re: [biosemiotics:7928] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Benjamin Udell]

Howard, lists,

The following is Peirce's nearest approach that I've found him making to 
an affirmation of the reality of mathematicals. Peirce does not identify 
himself as the 'metaphysician' whom he mentions, but that metaphysician 
makes a specifically Peircean kind of argument for the reality of 
mathematical being (I've enlarged that sentence's font). Then Peirce 
seems to leave the question open. This is from the article "Truth and 
Falsity and Error" http://www.gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Truth in 
Baldwin's _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_, vol 2 (1901), 
reprinted in CP 5.565-73, the paragraph below in 5.567:


   These characters equally apply to pure mathematics. Projective
   geometry is not pure mathematics, unless it be recognized that
   whatever is said of rays holds good of every family of curves of
   which there is one and one only through any two points, and any two
   of which have a point in common. But even then it is not pure
   mathematics until for points we put any complete determinations of
   any two-dimensional continuum. Nor will that be enough. A
   proposition is not a statement of perfectly pure mathematics until
   it is devoid of all definite meaning, and comes to this — that a
   property of a certain icon is pointed out and is declared to belong
   to anything like it, of which instances are given. The perfect truth
   cannot be stated, except in the sense that it confesses its
   imperfection. The pure mathematician deals exclusively with
   hypotheses. Whether or not there is any corresponding real thing, he
   does not care. His hypotheses are creatures of his own imagination;
   but he discovers in them relations which surprise him sometimes. A
   metaphysician may hold that this very forcing upon the
   mathematician's acceptance of propositions for which he was not
   prepared, proves, or even constitutes, a mode of being independent
   of the mathematician's thought, and so a _/reality/_. But whether
   there is any reality or not, the truth of the pure mathematical
   proposition is constituted by the impossibility of ever finding a
   case in which it fails. This, however, is only possible if we
   confess the impossibility of precisely defining it.
   [Font enlargement added]

Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 12:59 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Howard, lists,

My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that 
mathematicals are real. His discussions of math and reality tend to 
involve a variation of sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, 
the actual, the existent, etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he 
of course was one) don't care about the real and that their ideal 
forms are the truly real to them a la Plato. I do recall Peirce 
somewhere saying that the question of whether mathematicals are real 
is a question for the metaphysician, not the mathematician, and I 
recall him not answering the question at that point. Peirce always 
says that mathematical objects are purely hypothetical.


Here's an example, from _Writings _ 6:255:

The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the
least depend upon there being in the real world any such objects
as those which he supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little
for the real world. He lives in a world of ideas; and his heart
vibrates to the saying of his brother Plato that actuality is the
roof of a dark and sordid cave which shuts out from our direct
view the splendors and beauties of the vast and more truly real
world,—the world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of our day
said with gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of
the theory of numbers is that it never has been, and never can be,
prostituted to any practical application whatever."
[End quote]

Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false 
propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., /bat that evolved from 
bird/ .


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 12:24 PM, Howard Pattee wrote:


At 12:44 AM 1/17/2015, Gary Richmond wrote:
Howard wrote:  I agree with SEP 
 Realism 
 :


Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed 
that Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even mentioned in it.


HP: Which is why I keep asking for specific cases that Peirce did 
/not/ consider real. If you say that a peer refereed and recently 
updated review of /realism/ doesn't include Peirce's concept of 
realism, then I think that is a reasonable question.


For example, it is not clear to me if Peirce considered as /real/ his 
intuitive concept of infinity as a "supermultitudinous" collection of 
sets of infinitesimals. In any case he concluded that this concept 
was too unwieldy to be useful in scientific models. What about 
complex numbers? What about n-dimensional spaces, etc. that /are/ 
necessary for scientific models?


Howard




-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Two sets of 10 triadic signs of Peirce -- Old (1867-8 ?) & New sets (1908)

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi,

The following table is reproduced from my 1/8/2015 post  (attached)
slightly modified based on Ben's input.

___
Table 1.  The two sets of 10 classes of signs -- "old" and "new"
   proposed by Peirce in 1903 and 1908, respectively.
___
Class  Old  (1903) New  (1908)
___
I  111 (rhematic iconic qualisign)  111
II 112 (rhematic iconic sinsign)   (121)
III122 (rhematic indexical sinsign) 122
V  222 (dicent indexical sinsign)   222
V  113 (rhematic iconic legisign)  (131)
VI 123 (rhematic indexical legisign)   (132)
VII223 (dicent indexical legisign) (232)
VIII   133 (rhematic symbolic legisign) 133
IX 233 (dicent symbolic legisign)   233
X  333 (argument symbolic legisign) 333
_


In his post dated 1/12/2015, Ben pointed out that these two lists are not
different as I originally thought (please
see the triad of numbers in parentheses), but there were some
inconsistencies that can be readily removed by
simply switching the numbers in the "object" position with those in the
"sign" position (see (01715-2) ).  To understand
what Ben means, it is necessary for me to explain the meaning of the three
numbers that are used in Table 1 to
represent Peirce's triadic signs.

(1)  All of the 10 classes of signs listed in the third column of Table 1
can be viewed as tokens of the type consisting
of three blanks (see Figure 1 below).

(2)  Each blank can be occupied (or saturated) by one of three numbers, 1,
2 or 3.

(3)  The meaning of these numbers differ depending on the position of the
blank a number occupies.
Thus,  1 can be qualisign, icon, or rheme when occupying the I blank;  2
can be sinsign, index, or dicisign
when occupying the O blank; and 3 can be legisign, symbol or argument when
occupying the S blank.

(4)  Out of all possible triads, i.e., 3^3 = 27, that can be generated
using the template in Figure 1 and the
constraints (2) and (3) listed above, only 10 of these constitute the 10
classes of signs of Peirce.

(5)  The selection of the 10 classes of Peircesn signs from the 27 possible
triads is based on applying what I called
the "Peirce's rule of embodied signs"  [1, p. 69] which can be stated as


"Reading the numerical representation of the 10 classes of Peircean signs
from left to right,  (011715-10)
no number can be preceded by a smaller number."





22
 3
______


  Interpretant (I)   Object (O)
Sign (S)



Figure 1.  The template of the triadic sign of Peirce.  For example, the
triad, 223, represent iconic indexical legisign.
The two lists of the 10 classes of signs each given in the second and the
last columns in Table 1 are constructed
on the basis of this template.


Finally, I now come to the main point of this post:

"Since the 1903 list of 10 classes of signs can be converted to the 1908
list and vice versa by(011715-11)
implementing simple rule indicated in Figure 2 below, how can we judge with
list is the correct
 one and which the corrupted one ?"


"Switch the second
number with the third number"

   1903 list
 <-->
1908 list



Figure 2.  The interconvertibility of the two lists of the 10 classes of
Peircean signs published in 1903 and 1908.
  Rule A = "Switch the




My suggested answer to Question (011715-11) would be that

"The 1903 list must be correct one because only it , and not the 1909 list,
obeys(011715-12)
the Peirce's rule of embodied signs (PRES)."


So, I am tempted to conclude that PRES must reflect some fundamental
principles in
semiotics because

(1) it can be used to select the correct list of 10 classes of signs
between two possible lists. (011715-13)

(2) It can rationalize the selection of the 10 classes of signs out of the
27 possible triads   (011715-14)
of elementary signs."


Finally finally, I would like to suggest that

"The fundamental principle underlying the Peirce's rule of embodied signs
may be (011715-15)
that a sign must be preceded by an object,  an interpretant must be
preceded by a
sign, and an object must be preceded by an interpretant, thereby

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Ben:


On Jan 17, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

> Jerry,
> 
> But your 'S is P' & 'S is not P' are contradictories, not contraries; they 
> can't both be true and can't both be false.
> 
> 'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: they can't both 
> be true but can both be false.
> 
No idea about what your meaning is intended to confer, either to pragmatism or 
logic.


First, let me make clear for I was using the term "contrary".

The distinction between contraries and contradictories are clearly and 
distinctly presented in the Sanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/

from which one reads:

A   Every S is PUniversal Affirmative
E   No S is P   Universal Negative
I   Some S is P Particular Affirmative
O   Some S is not P Particular Negative
and :

‘Every S is P’ and ‘Some S is not P’ are contradictories.
‘No S is P’ and ‘Some S is P’ are contradictories.
‘Every S is P’ and ‘No S is P’ are contraries.
‘Some S is P’ and ‘Some S is not P’ are subcontraries.
‘Some S is P’ is a subaltern of ‘Every S is P’.
‘Some S is not P’ is a subaltern of ‘No S is P’.

and which shows a clear diagram illustrating the difference between contraries 
and contradictories.


> 'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: they can't both 
> be true but can both be false.
> 
This sentence, from either a logical or mathematical sense, does not mean to me.

Are you certain you intended to use the word "the" in this context?
The two phrases as in quotation marks which suggests that you may intend to 
independent concepts.

Your two phrases are contrary if and only if the phrases refer to the same sign 
for the set of dogs you have in mind.

Your response illustrates very nicely the point of my original post.   :-)  


Cheers

Jerry





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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Howard Pattee]

Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, 
then, that in thinking about formal mathematics 
Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of 
course leaves him free to be realistic about 
diagrams and physics. The basis for considering 
logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me.


Of course there is still a great epistemic 
variety among today's mathematicians and 
physicists, largely because of great mysteries. 
Natural selection has made sure we begin life as 
naive realists which is necessary for immediate 
survival. However, as physics has had to rely 
more and more on creative imagination for models 
of events, which are way beyond natural senses 
and common sense, it is only reasonable that the 
models become more nominalistic.


Howard

At 12:59 PM 1/17/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Howard, lists,

My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the 
idea that mathematicals are real. His 
discussions of math and reality tend to involve 
a variation of sense of word 'real' into the 
concretely real, the actual, the existent, etc. 
He says that mathematicians (of whom he of 
course was one) don't care about the real and 
that their ideal forms are the truly real to 
them a la Plato. I do recall Peirce somewhere 
saying that the question of whether 
mathematicals are real is a question for the 
metaphysician, not the mathematician, and I 
recall him not answering the question at that 
point. Peirce always says that mathematical objects are purely hypothetical.


Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255:
The reasonings and conclusions of the 
mathematician do not in the least depend upon 
there being in the real world any such objects 
as those which he supposes. The devoted 
mathematician cares little for the real world. 
He lives in a world of ideas; and his heart 
vibrates to the saying of his brother Plato that 
actuality is the roof of a dark and sordid cave 
which shuts out from our direct view the 
splendors and beauties of the vast and more 
truly real world,—the world of forms beyond. A 
great mathematician of our day said with gustful 
emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of 
the theory of numbers is that it never has been, 
and never can be, prostituted to any practical application whatever."

[End quote]

Peirce positively rejects the reality of 
generals proposed by false propositions. Such 
generals are figments, e.g., bat that evolved from bird.


Best, Ben



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Edwina Taborsky]

Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of 'realism' 
rather than the one many of us use; we've been through this difference before. 
The one many of us use is that 'realism' refers to universals or generals or 
'common rules'  being objectively real. Not existent as particular instances 
but objectively real. I've forgotten what you mean by this term 'realism' but 
it's quite different.

Could you remind us of your meaning? Thanks.

Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Howard Pattee 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:28 PM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:


  Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that in thinking about 
formal mathematics Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of course 
leaves him free to be realistic about diagrams and physics. The basis for 
considering logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me. 

  Of course there is still a great epistemic variety among today's 
mathematicians and physicists, largely because of great mysteries. Natural 
selection has made sure we begin life as naive realists which is necessary for 
immediate survival. However, as physics has had to rely more and more on 
creative imagination for models of events, which are way beyond natural senses 
and common sense, it is only reasonable that the models become more 
nominalistic.

  Howard

  At 12:59 PM 1/17/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Howard, lists,

My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals are 
real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a variation of sense 
of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, the existent, etc. He says 
that mathematicians (of whom he of course was one) don't care about the real 
and that their ideal forms are the truly real to them a la Plato. I do recall 
Peirce somewhere saying that the question of whether mathematicals are real is 
a question for the metaphysician, not the mathematician, and I recall him not 
answering the question at that point. Peirce always says that mathematical 
objects are purely hypothetical. 

Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255: 
  The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the least 
depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as those which he 
supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for the real world. He lives 
in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates to the saying of his brother Plato 
that actuality is the roof of a dark and sordid cave which shuts out from our 
direct view the splendors and beauties of the vast and more truly real 
world,-the world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of our day said with 
gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of the theory of numbers 
is that it never has been, and never can be, prostituted to any practical 
application whatever." 
  [End quote]


Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false 
propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., bat that evolved from bird.

Best, Ben




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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [PEIRe: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Jon Awbrey]

Edwina,

For instance, “Real men don't eat quiche” and “Real mathematicians don't each 
Bourbaquiche”.

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of 'realism' 
> rather than the one many of us use; we've been through this difference 
> before. The one many of us use is that 'realism' refers to universals or 
> generals or 'common rules'  being objectively real. Not existent as 
> particular instances but objectively real. I've forgotten what you mean by 
> this term 'realism' but it's quite different.
>  
> Could you remind us of your meaning? Thanks.
>  
> Edwina
>  
> - Original Message -
> From: Howard Pattee
> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
> Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:28 PM
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:
> 
> Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that in thinking about 
> formal mathematics Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of course 
> leaves him free to be realistic about diagrams and physics. The basis for 
> considering logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me. 
> 
> Of course there is still a great epistemic variety among today's 
> mathematicians and physicists, largely because of great mysteries. Natural 
> selection has made sure we begin life as naive realists which is necessary 
> for immediate survival. However, as physics has had to rely more and more on 
> creative imagination for models of events, which are way beyond natural 
> senses and common sense, it is only reasonable that the models become more 
> nominalistic.
> 
> Howard
> 
> At 12:59 PM 1/17/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> 
>> Howard, lists,
>> 
>> My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals are 
>> real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a variation of 
>> sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, the existent, 
>> etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course was one) don't care 
>> about the real and that their ideal forms are the truly real to them a la 
>> Plato. I do recall Peirce somewhere saying that the question of whether 
>> mathematicals are real is a question for the metaphysician, not the 
>> mathematician, and I recall him not answering the question at that point. 
>> Peirce always says that mathematical objects are purely hypothetical. 
>> 
>> Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255:
>> The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the least 
>> depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as those which he 
>> supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for the real world. He 
>> lives in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates to the saying of his 
>> brother Plato that actuality is the roof of a dark and sordid cave which 
>> shuts out from our direct view the splendors and beauties of the vast and 
>> more truly real world,—the world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of 
>> our day said with gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of 
>> the theory of numbers is that it never has been, and never can be, 
>> prostituted to any practical application whatever."
>> [End quote]
>> 
>> Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false 
>> propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., bat that evolved from bird.
>> 
>> Best, Ben
> 
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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> 
> 
> 
> 

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [PEIRe: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Edwina Taborsky]

Very funny. No, that's not it. It's not Alice in Wonderland. I think it's 
objective vs subjective but I simply can't remember how Howard uses the terms. 
I just remember that at one time, it dawned on me that he uses them in a 
particular way and I then understood what he was talking about. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Awbrey 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Howard Pattee ;  ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:54 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRe: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8


  Edwina,


  For instance, “Real men don't eat quiche” and “Real mathematicians don't each 
Bourbaquiche”.


  Jon

  http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

  On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of 
'realism' rather than the one many of us use; we've been through this 
difference before. The one many of us use is that 'realism' refers to 
universals or generals or 'common rules'  being objectively real. Not existent 
as particular instances but objectively real. I've forgotten what you mean by 
this term 'realism' but it's quite different.

Could you remind us of your meaning? Thanks.

Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Howard Pattee 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:28 PM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:


  Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that in thinking 
about formal mathematics Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of 
course leaves him free to be realistic about diagrams and physics. The basis 
for considering logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me. 

  Of course there is still a great epistemic variety among today's 
mathematicians and physicists, largely because of great mysteries. Natural 
selection has made sure we begin life as naive realists which is necessary for 
immediate survival. However, as physics has had to rely more and more on 
creative imagination for models of events, which are way beyond natural senses 
and common sense, it is only reasonable that the models become more 
nominalistic.

  Howard

  At 12:59 PM 1/17/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Howard, lists,

My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals 
are real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a variation of 
sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, the existent, etc. 
He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course was one) don't care about the 
real and that their ideal forms are the truly real to them a la Plato. I do 
recall Peirce somewhere saying that the question of whether mathematicals are 
real is a question for the metaphysician, not the mathematician, and I recall 
him not answering the question at that point. Peirce always says that 
mathematical objects are purely hypothetical. 

Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255: 
  The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the 
least depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as those which 
he supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for the real world. He 
lives in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates to the saying of his brother 
Plato that actuality is the roof of a dark and sordid cave which shuts out from 
our direct view the splendors and beauties of the vast and more truly real 
world,—the world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of our day said with 
gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of the theory of numbers 
is that it never has been, and never can be, prostituted to any practical 
application whatever." 
  [End quote]


Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false 
propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., bat that evolved from bird.

Best, Ben




--



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Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Benjamin Udell]

Jerry,

The examples that you use from the Aristotelian Square of Opposition are 
standard examples of contradictories, contraries, subcontraries, and 
subalterns. The examples are not definitive of them, however. Every pair 
of propositions (aside from self-referring propositions and that sort of 
thing) is one of the following:


A pair of *contradictories* consists of two propositions such as 'John 
is blue' and 'John is not blue', such that /each proposition is 
equivalent to the other's negation/. That's to say, that they can't be 
both of them true and they can't be both of them false.


A pair of *contraries* consists of two propositions such as 'John is 
blue' and 'John is quiet and not blue', such that /each proposition 
implies, without being implied by, the other's negation/. That's to say, 
that they can't be both of them true, but they can be both of them 
false. Another example is 'We have exactly five dogs' and 'We have 
exactly four dogs'.


A pair of *subcontraries* consists of two propositions such as 'John is 
not blue' and 'John is blue or not quiet', such that /each proposition 
is implied by, without implying, the other's negation/. That's to say, 
that they can both of them true, but they can't be both of them false.


A pair of *subalterns* consists of two propositions such as 'John is 
blue' and 'John is blue or quiet', such that /each proposition neither 
implies, nor is implied, by the other's negation/. That's to say, that 
they can both of them be true, and they can both of them be false. Any 
contingent proposition is subaltern with itself, that is, 'John is blue' 
and 'John is blue' are equivalents and subalterns of each other. 
Formally true propositions are equivalent and subcontrary to each other. 
Formally false propositions are equivalent and contrary to each other. 
No propositions are each the other's equivalent and contradictory.


In the Boolean Square of Opposition, A & E are each other's subalterns. 
Likewise I & O.


Subalterns used to be distinguished from superalterns but that's in the 
old terminology.


I won't provide references, look at 20th-Century logic text books.

Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 3:10 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:


List, Ben:

On Jan 17, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Jerry,

But your 'S is P' & 'S is not P' are contradictories, not contraries; 
they can't both be true and can't both be false.


'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: they 
can't both be true but can both be false.


No idea about what your meaning is intended to confer, either to 
pragmatism or logic.



First, let me make clear for I was using the term "contrary".

The distinction between contraries and contradictories are clearly and 
distinctly presented in the Sanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/

from which one reads:

*A* Every /S/ is /P/Universal Affirmative
*E* No /S/ is /P/   Universal Negative
*I* Some /S/ is /P/ Particular Affirmative
*O* Some /S/ is not /P/ Particular Negative

and :

  * ‘Every /S/ is /P/’ and ‘Some /S/ is not /P/’ are contradictories.

  * ‘No /S/ is /P/’ and ‘Some /S/ is /P/’ are contradictories.

  * ‘Every /S/ is /P/’ and ‘No /S/ is /P/’ are contraries.

  * ‘Some /S/ is /P/’ and ‘Some /S/ is not /P/’ are subcontraries.

  * ‘Some /S/ is /P/’ is a subaltern of ‘Every /S/ is /P/’.

  * ‘Some /S/ is not /P/’ is a subaltern of ‘No /S/ is /P/’.


and which shows a clear diagram illustrating the difference between 
contraries and contradictories.



'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are contraries: they 
can't both be true but can both be false.


This sentence, from either a logical or mathematical sense, does not 
mean to me.


Are you certain you intended to use the word "the" in this context?
The two phrases as in quotation marks which suggests that you may 
intend to independent concepts.


Your two phrases are contrary if and only if the phrases refer to the 
same sign for the set of dogs you have in mind.


Your response illustrates very nicely the point of my original post.   
:-)


Cheers

Jerry







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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Howard Pattee]

At 03:32 PM 1/17/2015, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of 
'realism' rather than the one many of us use; we've been through 
this difference before.


HP: As I said, I agree with the 
SEP 
Realism discussion.


My main point, however, is that an ideological or exclusive 
commitment to one or another epistemology is a case of "blocking the 
path of inquiry." Reality is complex and requires complementarity in 
its multiple models.


Howard

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Re: [biosemiotics:7928] [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Ben:

On Jan 17, 2015, at 11:59 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals are 
> real.
> 
Thanks, Ben. This is a critical thought, at least to me.  It is of substantial 
importance for interpreting the relations between CSP's notion of a sign and 
many modern notions of mathematical signs.

If one seeks to analysis the trichotomistic components of a sign, (QS - SS - 
LS, Icon - index - symbol, R - D - A),
one notes that the selected trichotomies do NOT use mathematic terminology.

But, the concept of an index necessitates the separation of the whole (sinsign) 
into parts and the concept of the medad (in his iconic graphs of logical 
sentences) infers the counting of the terms composing the sinsign.  (As noted 
previously, an index is necessary for enumerating the parts of the whole, such 
as CSP usage of the common notions of molecular weight and molecular formula.)  
These in term are necessary to specify CSP's specification of a component of a 
sign which he names "Rheme".

Thus, these CSP's trichotomies refer to the index/medad/count properties of the 
components of a sign but NOT to calculations of arithmetic or calculus of the 
real numbers.  

One conjectures that CSP constructed these trichotomistic views of signs in 
such a manner as to clearly separate and distinguish his notion of logic from 
his notion of mathematics.  I suppose that mathematical terms were excluded 
from these trichotomies purposefully, potentially as an expression of his 
understanding of the external nature of signs (QS-SS) and the trichotomy of 
objects, signs and interpretations.


> Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255:
> The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the least 
> depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as those which he 
> supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for the real world. He lives 
> in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates to the saying of his brother 
> Plato that actuality is the roof of a dark and sordid cave which shuts out 
> from our direct view the splendors and beauties of the vast and more truly 
> real world,—the world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of our day said 
> with gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of the theory of 
> numbers is that it never has been, and never can be, prostituted to any 
> practical application whatever." 
> [End quote]
Many modern physicists and computer scientists often presuppose the CONTRARY to 
the last sentence of this quote and presuppose that the meaning of signs can be 
encoded into numbers. Indeed, the success of computer science and Shannon 
information theory is directly dependent on encoding signs into numbers and 
hence numbers into electrical signals and hence into transmissible forms that 
can then be decoded from numbers into signs, signs into symbols and symbols 
into icons.  This is a powerful and useful set of concepts, but it has severe 
limitations.

Cheers

Jerry


> Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false 
> propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., bat that evolved from bird.
> Best, Ben
> On 1/17/2015 12:24 PM, Howard Pattee wrote:
> 
>> At 12:44 AM 1/17/2015, Gary Richmond wrote:
>>> Howard wrote:  I agree with SEP Realism:
>>> 
>>> Those who have looked at this article may or may not, have noticed that 
>>> Peirce's understanding of realism isn't even mentioned in it.
>> 
>> HP: Which is why I keep asking for specific cases that Peirce did not 
>> consider real. If you say that a peer refereed and   recently updated 
>> review of realism doesn't include Peirce's concept of realism, then I think 
>> that is a reasonable question.
>> 
>> For example, it is not clear to me if Peirce considered as real his 
>> intuitive concept of infinity as a "supermultitudinous" collection of sets 
>> of infinitesimals. In any case he concluded that this concept was too 
>> unwieldy to be useful in scientific models. What about complex numbers? What 
>> about n-dimensional spaces, etc. that are necessary for scientific models?
>> 
>> Howard
>> 
> 
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> 
> 
> 
> 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:

[Edwina Taborsky]

Thanks. I didn't mean to imply your 'own' to mean idiosyncratic, just that the 
definition was different from that of many others here. I think you mean 
objective vs subjective (realist vs nominalism) whereas my understanding is 
that realism refers to generals/universals/laws that are real but not 
individually existential (while your real objects are individually 
existent)...and nominalism refers to a denial of such universals and considers 
universals merely linguistic/conceptual constructs.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Howard Pattee 
  To: Edwina Taborsky ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 4:12 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:


  At 03:32 PM 1/17/2015, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of 
'realism' rather than the one many of us use; we've been through this 
difference before. 

  HP: As I said, I agree with the SEP Realism discussion.

  My main point, however, is that an ideological or exclusive commitment to one 
or another epistemology is a case of "blocking the path of inquiry." Reality is 
complex and requires complementarity in its multiple models.  

  Howard 

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Jon Awbrey]

But seriously, Folks, I think it's fairly clear that Howard is using “real” in 
the sense of physical reality, as Peirce did when he wrote “real world”, and as 
all of us do when that's what we mean. But I can assure you that mathematicians 
as a rule, including Peirce, regard mathematical objects as “having 
properties”, which makes them “real” according to the technical Scholastic 
definition of “real” that Peirce always uses and often mentions when he's being 
precise. 

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

> On Jan 17, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Very funny. No, that's not it. It's not Alice in Wonderland. I think it's 
> objective vs subjective but I simply can't remember how Howard uses the 
> terms. I just remember that at one time, it dawned on me that he uses them in 
> a particular way and I then understood what he was talking about.
>  
> Edwina
> - Original Message -
> From: Jon Awbrey
> To: Edwina Taborsky
> Cc: Howard Pattee ;  ; Peirce-L
> Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:54 PM
> Subject: Re: [PEIRe: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8
> 
> Edwina,
> 
> For instance, “Real men don't eat quiche” and “Real mathematicians don't each 
> Bourbaquiche”.
> 
> Jon
> 
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
> 
>> On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>> 
>> Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your own definition of 
>> 'realism' rather than the one many of us use; we've been through this 
>> difference before. The one many of us use is that 'realism' refers to 
>> universals or generals or 'common rules'  being objectively real. Not 
>> existent as particular instances but objectively real. I've forgotten what 
>> you mean by this term 'realism' but it's quite different.
>>  
>> Could you remind us of your meaning? Thanks.
>>  
>> Edwina
>>  
>> - Original Message -
>> From: Howard Pattee
>> To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L
>> Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:28 PM
>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:
>> 
>> Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that in thinking about 
>> formal mathematics Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of course 
>> leaves him free to be realistic about diagrams and physics. The basis for 
>> considering logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me. 
>> 
>> Of course there is still a great epistemic variety among today's 
>> mathematicians and physicists, largely because of great mysteries. Natural 
>> selection has made sure we begin life as naive realists which is necessary 
>> for immediate survival. However, as physics has had to rely more and more on 
>> creative imagination for models of events, which are way beyond natural 
>> senses and common sense, it is only reasonable that the models become more 
>> nominalistic.
>> 
>> Howard
>> 
>> At 12:59 PM 1/17/2015, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>> 
>>> Howard, lists,
>>> 
>>> My sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals are 
>>> real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a variation of 
>>> sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, the existent, 
>>> etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course was one) don't care 
>>> about the real and that their ideal forms are the truly real to them a la 
>>> Plato. I do recall Peirce somewhere saying that the question of whether 
>>> mathematicals are real is a question for the metaphysician, not the 
>>> mathematician, and I recall him not answering the question at that point. 
>>> Peirce always says that mathematical objects are purely hypothetical. 
>>> 
>>> Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255:
>>> The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the least 
>>> depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as those which 
>>> he supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for the real world. He 
>>> lives in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates to the saying of his 
>>> brother Plato that actuality is the roof of a dark and sordid cave which 
>>> shuts out from our direct view the splendors and beauties of the vast and 
>>> more truly real world,—the world of forms beyond. A great mathematician of 
>>> our day said with gustful emphasis: "A great satisfaction in the study of 
>>> the theory of numbers is that it never has been, and never can be, 
>>> prostituted to any practical application whatever."
>>> [End quote]
>>> 
>>> Peirce positively rejects the reality of generals proposed by false 
>>> propositions. Such generals are figments, e.g., bat that evolved from bird.
>>> 
>>> Best, Ben
>> 
>> 
>> -
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>> the message. Mor

[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy

[Stephen C. Rose]

We've batted this around and I have been roundly criticized for this
position but I still maintain that reality is all known and not known. We
live within it. It is from our POV a state of finitude. It renders
everything within it subject to finite means of dealing with it. I do not
see how we can speak of good and evil without being able to see the values
of both as operating within all reality. The seismic implication of
accepting this is that we can then move to a genuine and real pragmaticism
that replaces Aristotelian ethics with a values based one built on a triad
that has as its first basic element reality.

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RE: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Jim Willgoose]

Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do not seem to carry enough 
information to decide the question.
 
On the other hand, if  "John" lacks reference, the statements "John is blue " 
and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial empty) Further, one may tempted 
to treat these as Universals; (or singleton classes).  But then, the existent 
singleton class inclusive of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of 
contrary, namely, "may both be false," unless there are two Johns.  Aristotle's 
definition of a contradiction seems to me to exclude this. The square of 
opposition is always fun to play with. I sometimes like to consider that 
"everything exists" so it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the 
"rules of passage" in terms of graphs.
 
Jim W 
 
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 16:07:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural  
Propositions : Chapter 8 -  On the philosophical nature of semiosis?


  

  
  

  Jerry,

  The examples that you use from the Aristotelian Square of
Opposition are standard examples of contradictories, contraries,
subcontraries, and subalterns. The examples are not definitive
of them, however. Every pair of propositions (aside from
self-referring propositions and that sort of thing) is one of
the following: 

  A pair of contradictories consists of two propositions
such as 'John is blue' and 'John is not blue', such that each
  proposition is equivalent to the other's negation. That's
to say, that they can't be both of them true and they can't be
both of them false. 

  A pair of contraries consists of two propositions such
as 'John is blue' and 'John is quiet and not blue', such that each
  proposition implies, without being implied by, the other's
  negation. That's to say, that they can't be both of them
true, but they can be both of them false. Another example is 'We
have exactly five dogs' and 'We have exactly four dogs'.

  A pair of subcontraries consists of two propositions
such as 'John is not blue' and 'John is blue or not quiet', such
that each proposition is implied by, without implying, the
  other's negation. That's to say, that they can both of
them true, but they can't be both of them false.

  A pair of subalterns consists of two propositions such
as 'John is blue' and 'John is blue or quiet', such that each
  proposition neither implies, nor is implied, by the other's
  negation. That's to say, that they can both of them be
true, and they can both of them be false. Any contingent
proposition is subaltern with itself, that is, 'John is blue'
and 'John is blue' are equivalents and subalterns of each other.
Formally true propositions are equivalent and subcontrary to
each other. Formally false propositions are equivalent and
contrary to each other. No propositions are each the other's
equivalent and contradictory.

  In the Boolean Square of Opposition, A & E are each other's
subalterns. Likewise I & O.

  Subalterns used to be distinguished from superalterns but
that's in the old terminology.

  I won't provide references, look at 20th-Century logic text
books.

  Best, Ben

  On 1/17/2015 3:10 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:


List, Ben:
  


  On Jan 17, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
  


  
Jerry,

But your 'S is P' & 'S is not P' are
  contradictories, not contraries; they can't both be
  true and can't both be false.

'The dogs are four' and 'the dogs are five' are
  contraries: they can't both be true but can both be
  false.

  

  
  No idea about what your meaning is intended to confer, either
  to pragmatism or logic.






First, let me make clear for I was using the term
  "contrary".



The distinction between contraries and contradictories are
  clearly and distinctly presented in the Sanford Encyclopedia
  of Philosophy:



http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/square/
  
  

  
  from which one reads:
  

  
  

  

  A
  Every S is P
  Universal
Affirmative


  E
  No S is P
  Universal
Negative


  I
  Some S is P
  Particular
Affirmative

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Jim Willgoose]

I agree. The "Next prime number after three" is a real object with real 
properties.  But it doesn't exist in the sense of physical and causal 
interaction between properties and object the way my lamp appears yellow when I 
turn it on.  BUT, Peirce says somewhere, paraphrasing, "you can say that it 
exists." or "there is an X  such that." if you need the formal logical 
machinery to carry on. 
 
Jim W 
 
From: jawb...@att.net
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 16:32:24 -0500
CC: hpat...@roadrunner.com; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural  Propositions : Chapter 8

But seriously, Folks, I think it's fairly clear that Howard is using “real” in 
the sense of physical reality, as Peirce did when he wrote “real world”, and as 
all of us do when that's what we mean. But I can assure you that mathematicians 
as a rule, including Peirce, regard mathematical objects as “having 
properties”, which makes them “real” according to the technical Scholastic 
definition of “real” that Peirce always uses and often mentions when he's being 
precise. 
Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Jan 17, 2015, at 4:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:






Very funny. No, that's not it. It's not Alice in 
Wonderland. I think it's objective vs subjective but I simply can't remember 
how 
Howard uses the terms. I just remember that at one time, it dawned on me that 
he 
uses them in a particular way and I then understood what he was talking about. 

 
Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Jon Awbrey 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Howard Pattee ;  ; 
  Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:54 
  PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRe: Natural Propositions 
  : Chapter 8
  

  Edwina,
  

  For instance, “Real men don't eat quiche” and “Real mathematicians don't 
  each Bourbaquiche”.
  

  Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
  
On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
  wrote:


  




Howard, I think that possibly, you are using your 
own definition of 'realism' rather than the one many of us use; we've been 
through this difference before. The one many of us use is that 'realism' 
refers to universals or generals or 'common rules'  being objectively 
real. Not existent as particular instances but objectively real. I've 
forgotten what you mean by this term 'realism' but it's quite 
different.
 
Could you remind us of your meaning? 
Thanks.
 
Edwina
 

  - Original Message - 
  From: 
  Howard Pattee 
  To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Saturday, January 17, 2015 3:28 
  PM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 
  [biosemiotics:7934] Re: Natural Propositions:
  
Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that 
  in thinking about formal mathematics Peirce was to some extent 
  nominalistic, which of course leaves him free to be realistic about 
  diagrams and physics. The basis for considering logic to be realistic is 
  still mysterious to me. 

Of course there is still a great epistemic 
  variety among today's mathematicians and physicists, largely because of 
  great mysteries. Natural selection has made sure we begin life as naive 
  realists which is necessary for immediate survival. However, as physics 
  has had to rely more and more on creative imagination for models of 
  events, which are way beyond natural senses and common sense, it is only 
  reasonable that the models become more 
  nominalistic.

Howard

At 12:59 PM 1/17/2015, Benjamin Udell 
  wrote:


  Howard, lists,

My 
sense of it is that Peirce does not push the idea that mathematicals 
are 
real. His discussions of math and reality tend to involve a variation 
of 
sense of word 'real' into the concretely real, the actual, the 
existent, 
etc. He says that mathematicians (of whom he of course was one) don't 
care about the real and that their ideal forms are the truly real to 
them a la Plato. I do recall Peirce somewhere saying that the question 
of whether mathematicals are real is a question for the metaphysician, 
not the mathematician, and I recall him not answering the question at 
that point. Peirce always says that mathematical objects are purely 
hypothetical. 

Here's an example, from _Writings_ 6:255: 

  The reasonings and conclusions of the mathematician do not in the 
  least depend upon there being in the real world any such objects as 
  those which he supposes. The devoted mathematician cares little for 
  the real world. He lives in a world of ideas; and his heart vibrates 
  to the saying of his brother Plato that actuality is the roof of a 
  dark and sordid cave which shuts out from our direct view the 
  splendors and beauties 

Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Benjamin Udell]

Jim, list,

Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to logical 
criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then Peirce's examples of 
inference modes don't work any more than my examples with 'John'.


As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some examples. 
Note that '/Z/' plays the same role as 'bankrupt'.


See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580, see 580 
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm 
. There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce.


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do not seem to carry 
enough information to decide the question.


On the other hand, if  "John" lacks reference, the statements "John is 
blue " and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial empty) 
Further, one may tempted to treat these as Universals; (or singleton 
classes).  But then, the existent singleton class inclusive of "every 
John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of contrary, namely, "may both be 
false," unless there are two Johns.  Aristotle's definition of a 
contradiction seems to me to exclude this. The square of opposition is 
always fun to play with. I sometimes like to consider that "everything 
exists" so it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the 
"rules of passage" in terms of graphs.


Jim W


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions : Chapter 8

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon:

On Jan 17, 2015, at 3:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

>  But I can assure you that mathematicians as a rule, including Peirce, regard 
> mathematical objects as “having properties”, which makes them “real” 
> according to the technical Scholastic definition of “real” that Peirce always 
> uses and often mentions when he's being precise. 

I concur, the manner of usage of symbols by mathematicians is often confounding.

Your assertion, however, obscures a far deeper philosophical problem.  It is 
the sort of problem that philosophers love to ignore as it removes some from 
their "comfort zone" and hence jeopardizes their academic reputations.

Namely, that the usage of mathematical symbols obscures the more important 
pragmatic differentiations between  philosophical talk and mathematical talk 
and physical talk and chemical talk and ...many other disciplines.

As I understand it, the mathematical talk of "having properties" is a critical 
association of logical concepts that associate mathematical concepts as 
structure (sets, semi-groups, groups, rings, vector spaces, topologies, 
matroids, categories and a large number of other mathematical forms.)   For 
example, a group has the property of a set and a logical operation (as well as 
other properties.)  A ring has the properties of a set and two logical 
operations, both addition and multiplication.

 Is this usage an example of philosophical realism? 

A similar situation occurs in the context of the chemistry. A chemical term, a 
concrete "real" name, as a chemical element, is considered real because it has 
measurable properties that are independent of time and place.  A chemical 
element is conceived as an entity with an identity, not as a mathematical 
variable representing a single physical quale.
The set of the table of elements is a set of concrete "real" names with the 
addition property of creating a set of natural relatives. 

Chemical talk of "having properties" refers to those measured properties from 
the empirical methods used in a laboratory.  Pragmatically, differentiation of 
chemical properties lies at the heart of the practical logic of chemistry. 

The difference between chemical talk and mathematical talk is with respect to 
the conceptualization of the nature of  qualia.  The qualia of mathematical 
talk are "objective" by virtue of the meaning of mathematical symbols and 
mathematical traditions.  At least that is how I interpret CSP's writings, such 
as those cited by Ben.

The qualia of chemical talk are the consequences of the consistency of physical 
measures, independent of the time and place of measurements. By consistency, I 
mean the empirical reproducibility of empirical observations.  But, these 
chemical qualia are under extremely severe constraints such that the 
methodology must be consistent. Here, by consistency, I mean that the coherence 
of the logical arithmetic on the molecular numbers, the molecular weight, the 
molecular formula, and the molecular icon are logically extendible.  

The nature of the "reality of properties" (qualia and quanta) of mathematics 
and chemistry rarely overlap.  Indeed, 
Mathematical properties (qualia) are aligned with the regularity of the 
geometry of a line or lines  such that they become merely carriers of 
measurements of chemical qualia.  

Chemical properties may be aligned with mathematical regularity (such as the 
graphs of methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane...) and a corresponding set 
of icons (structures). 

 Or, as is more commonly the case, chemical qualia are aligned with awesome 
IRREGULARITY.  The combinations of valences of a set of related atoms  generate 
a graph with millions of distinctive irregularities, as in the handedness of 
proteins.  A central principle of molecular biology and bio-semiotics rests on 
the irregularities of the qualia of handedness.

Is this chemical usage of the concept of realism an example of philosophical 
realism?

Is there a distinction between mathematical realism and chemical realism?

Are the three trichotomies of terms of a sign selected purposely by CSP to 
simply avoid the confrontation between qualia  and objects (sinsigns)?

Are the three trichotomies of a sign selected purposely by CSP to distinguish 
between mathematical realism and chemical realism?  

>From a century of hindsight, it is a curious game we are playing by asking 
>such speculative questions.  Speculating about CSP's motivations is almost as 
>curious as speculating about current national and international political 
>games. 

As a footnote (based on my personal perceptions of my individual experiences 
with conceptualization of laws), it appears to me that philosophical realism is 
too narrowly defined to clearly and distinctly separate the pragmatic usages of 
the term realism in both mathematical physics and chemistry.  Not to mention 
the far more difficult task of understanding "realism" in the sense of 
economics, or biology, or medicine or

Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Benjamin Udell]

Jim, list,

Here's a plainer case of a rule of passage.



Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 6:20 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Jim, list,


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RE: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Jim Willgoose]

Thanks very much Ben for the link. (As well as all your wiki stuff) I'll spend 
some time with #580 to try and understand the problem.
 
Jim W
 
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural 
Propositions : Chapter 8 -  On the philosophical nature of semiosis?


  

  
  

  Jim, list,

  Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to
logical criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then
Peirce's examples of inference modes don't work any more than my
examples with 'John'.

  

  As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some
examples. Note that 'Z' plays the same role as
'bankrupt'.



  

  See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580,
see 580 
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm
. There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce.


  

  Best, Ben

  

  On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:



  
  Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do
not seem to carry enough information to decide the question.

 

On the other hand, if  "John" lacks reference, the statements
"John is blue " and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial
empty) Further, one may tempted to treat these as Universals;
(or singleton classes).  But then, the existent singleton class
inclusive of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of
contrary, namely, "may both be false," unless there are two
Johns.  Aristotle's definition of a contradiction seems to me to
exclude this. The square of opposition is always fun to play
with. I sometimes like to consider that "everything exists" so
it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the "rules of
passage" in terms of graphs.

 

Jim W 

 

  
  
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7943] Natural Propositions:

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

but Howard, saying this, you assume natural selection to be a real process - 
and not just a linguistic convention …

F

Den 17/01/2015 kl. 21.28 skrev Howard Pattee 
mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com>>:

Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that in thinking about 
formal mathematics Peirce was to some extent nominalistic, which of course 
leaves him free to be realistic about diagrams and physics. The basis for 
considering logic to be realistic is still mysterious to me.

Of course there is still a great epistemic variety among today's mathematicians 
and physicists, largely because of great mysteries. Natural selection has made 
sure we begin life as naive realists which is necessary for immediate survival. 
However, as physics has had to rely more and more on creative imagination for 
models of events, which are way beyond natural senses and common sense, it is 
only reasonable that the models become more nominalistic.

Howard


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Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Ben, lists -

Thank you for good illustrations of the issue.
I discuss the example with suicide and banrkuptcy from "An Improvement of the 
Gamma graphs" towards the end of ch. 8. Here Peirce denies the rule of passage 
- the "strange rule" as he has it - granting the equivalence between your graph 
1 and your graphs 2 and 3. Thereby, P insists that "There is a man, and if he 
goes bankrupt, a man commits suicide" is different from "There is a man, and if 
he goes bankrupt, he commits suicide". There are at least two difficulties here 
- one that we tend to read these claims as causal, temporal claims while they 
must be read as purely logical - the other is that a claim about (at least) one 
person having two properties (2,3) is identified with (1) a claim about two 
persons having one property each (but the two may be identical, we do not 
know). It is the second of these difficulties which P addresses, and the reason 
for his doubts, leading him to deny the "strange rule" seems to be that he 
wants to be able to read the implication in 2) and 3) as saying that having one 
property entails having the other.

Best
F

Den 18/01/2015 kl. 00.20 skrev Benjamin Udell 
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>>:


Jim, list,

Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to logical criticism. 
If 'these beans' lack reference, then Peirce's examples of inference modes 
don't work any more than my examples with 'John'.

As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some examples. Note 
that 'Z' plays the same role as 'bankrupt'.


See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580, see 580 
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm 
. There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce.

Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do not seem to carry enough 
information to decide the question.

On the other hand, if  "John" lacks reference, the statements "John is blue " 
and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial empty) Further, one may tempted 
to treat these as Universals; (or singleton classes).  But then, the existent 
singleton class inclusive of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of 
contrary, namely, "may both be false," unless there are two Johns.  Aristotle's 
definition of a contradiction seems to me to exclude this. The square of 
opposition is always fun to play with. I sometimes like to consider that 
"everything exists" so it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the 
"rules of passage" in terms of graphs.

Jim W




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Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Benjamin Udell]

Dear Frederik, lists,

Thank you. My questions are: does Peirce revise the Beta graph system to 
remove the "strange rule", and wouldn't that render the Beta graph 
system non-equivalent to first-order logic? Or is it only the Gamma 
graph system that's affected? If he did revise the Beta system 
accordingly, then how is one to think of 'all is blue and round' as 
differing in meaning from 'all is blue and all is round' ?


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 10:26 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:

Dear Ben, lists -

Thank you for good illustrations of the issue.
I discuss the example with suicide and banrkuptcy from "An Improvement 
of the Gamma graphs" towards the end of ch. 8. Here Peirce denies the 
rule of passage - the "strange rule" as he has it - granting the 
equivalence between your graph 1 and your graphs 2 and 3. Thereby, P 
insists that "There is a man, and if he goes bankrupt, a man commits 
suicide" is different from "There is a man, and if he goes bankrupt, 
he commits suicide". There are at least two difficulties here - one 
that we tend to read these claims as causal, temporal claims while 
they must be read as purely logical - the other is that a claim about 
(at least) one person having two properties (2,3) is identified with 
(1) a claim about two persons having one property each (but the two 
may be identical, we do not know). It is the second of these 
difficulties which P addresses, and the reason for his doubts, leading 
him to deny the "strange rule" seems to be that he wants to be able to 
read the implication in 2) and 3) as saying that having one property 
entails having the other.


Best
F

Den 18/01/2015 kl. 00.20 skrev Benjamin Udell >:



Jim, list,

Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to logical 
criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then Peirce's examples of 
inference modes don't work any more than my examples with 'John'.


As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some 
examples. Note that '/Z/' plays the same role as 'bankrupt'.



See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580, see 
580http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm. 
There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce.


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:

Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do not seem to carry 
enough information to decide the question.


On the other hand, if  "John" lacks reference, the statements "John 
is blue " and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial empty) 
Further, one may tempted to treat these as Universals; (or singleton 
classes).  But then, the existent singleton class inclusive 
of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of contrary, 
namely, "may both be false," unless there are two Johns.  
Aristotle's definition of a contradiction seems to me to exclude 
this. The square of opposition is always fun to play with. I 
sometimes like to consider that "everything exists" so it works 
alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the "rules of passage" in 
terms of graphs.


Jim W








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Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Frederik Stjernfelt]

Dear Ben -
The Gamma graph paper where P discusses these things is pretty late (1908) - I 
do not think he ever finalizes this revision. But of course, giving up the 
"strange rule" is equivalent with Beta becoming different from FOL with rules 
of passage (as the strange rule is such a rule).
Ahti Pietarinen has argued that Peirce here anticipates Hintikka's IF-logic 
with independent quantifiers.
The question becomes more evident with existential quantification, is it not? - 
the non-equivalence of "X is blue and Y is round" and "X is blue and round".
Best
F


Den 18/01/2015 kl. 04.38 skrev Benjamin Udell 
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com>>
:

Dear Frederik, lists,

Thank you. My questions are: does Peirce revise the Beta graph system to remove 
the "strange rule", and wouldn't that render the Beta graph system 
non-equivalent to first-order logic? Or is it only the Gamma graph system 
that's affected? If he did revise the Beta system accordingly, then how is one 
to think of 'all is blue and round' as differing in meaning from 'all is blue 
and all is round' ?

Best, Ben


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7943] Natural Propositions:

[Howard Pattee]

At 10:02 PM 1/17/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:

but Howard, saying this [selection produces 
realists], you assume natural selection to be a 
real process - and not just a linguistic convention …


HP: Not quite. Of course, what is actually going 
on with population changes are real processes 
acting on individuals.  However, natural 
selection is a good example of what Miller warns about in the SEP review:


Miller: "In addition, it is misleading to think 
that there is a straightforward and clear-cut 
choice between being a realist and a non-realist 
about a particular subject matter. It is rather 
the case that one can be more-or-less realist 
about a particular subject matter."


HP: I would add that one can be both a realist 
and nominalist about the same theory or model. 
Namely, while there are real individual events of 
birth and death going on, the word "selection" 
refers to statistical consequences that are not 
real selections in any recognizable sense. 
Selection is just a name (Darwin called it, "a 
bad term") that we use to indicate only "a 
statistical bias in the relative rates of 
survival" of a population distribution (Geo. 
Williams' def.). So "natural selection" can be viewed as both real and nominal.


Furthermore, there are many 
levels 
of 
selection, 
and because selection processes are never-ending, 
one can never be sure of the ultimately result. 
Consequently there is much controversy (see link) 
which amounts to whether each level is real or 
nominal (although biologists usually don't use these terms).


Howard


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Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Benjamin Udell]

Dear Frederik, lists,

In your example, (A) 'Something is blue AND round' and (B) 'Something is 
blue AND something is round' are indeed non-equivalent in standard 
logic. (A) implies but is not implied by (B), so that does not seem to 
be what raises the question for Peirce. What troubles him is the 
equivalence between (C) 'Something is blue OR round' and (D) 'Something 
is blue OR something is round' in standard logic, and that's where the 
question becomes more evident. It's a situation where there seem two 
things regarding which it doesn't matter whether they are connected by a 
line of identity or not.


That irrelevance of connection certainly threw me for a loop when I 
first saw it (and I'm generally rusty anyway). One can explain it away: 
language is inexact; alternatives among cases, although spatially 
diagrammed, are not really spatial; and shouldn't deduction in logic, 
typically from whole to parts, be prized for results that give the 
premisses a new and even counter-intuitive aspect? and so on. It seems 
Peirce's way not to let matters rest there, but to set out in search of 
something that one was maybe not so wrong-headed to expect after all; 
looking at rearrangements of Barbara, he saw not only induction but 
abduction.


I just looked up Hintikka's IF (independence-friendly) logic that you 
mentioned, and branching quantifiers do seem like something that would 
have interested Peirce in the above context.


Best, Ben

On 1/17/2015 11:43 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:


Dear Ben -
The Gamma graph paper where P discusses these things is pretty late 
(1908) - I do not think he ever finalizes this revision. But of 
course, giving up the "strange rule" is equivalent with Beta becoming 
different from FOL with rules of passage (as the strange rule is such 
a rule).
Ahti Pietarinen has argued that Peirce here anticipates Hintikka's 
IF-logic with independent quantifiers.
The question becomes more evident with existential quantification, is 
it not? - the non-equivalence of "X is blue and Y is round" and "X is 
blue and round".

Best
F

Den 18/01/2015 kl. 04.38 skrev Benjamin Udell  >

:


Dear Frederik, lists,

Thank you. My questions are: does Peirce revise the Beta graph system 
to remove the "strange rule", and wouldn't that render the Beta graph 
system non-equivalent to first-order logic? Or is it only the Gamma 
graph system that's affected? If he did revise the Beta system 
accordingly, then how is one to think of 'all is blue and round' as 
differing in meaning from 'all is blue and all is round' ?


Best, Ben

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RE: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions : Chapter 8 - On the philosophical nature of semiosis?

[Jim Willgoose]

Hello Ben.
 
Not all of these examples seem to fit the #580 case. The first problem is that 
if 222 is an open variable ("a man commits suicide")
is identical to the other man, which Peirce leaves as an option, then the rule 
of passage itself is questionable. Secondly, the rule of passage for a 
conditional statement from an existentially quantified formula to an open 
formula is a universal quantifier binding both.  Thus, "any man either doesn't 
go bankrupt or he commits suicide."  But I cannot tell why the outer line of 
identity is "null and void." It appears that you cannot connect the line 
through "suicide" if the two men are identical. Thus, back to the first 
problem. Importantly, I am changing quantifiers and not simply adding or 
subtracting the same one. Secondly, I am curious about the previous role of "a 
man." Jim W
 
Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2015 18:20:03 -0500
From: bud...@nyc.rr.com
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Contradictories, contraries, etc. WAS Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural 
Propositions : Chapter 8 -  On the philosophical nature of semiosis?


  

  
  

  Jim, list,

  Expository examples in everyday language are usually open to
logical criticism. If 'these beans' lack reference, then
Peirce's examples of inference modes don't work any more than my
examples with 'John'.

  

  As to the rules of passage in terms of graphs, here are some
examples. Note that 'Z' plays the same role as
'bankrupt'.



  

  See "An Improvement on the Gamma graphs" (1906), CP 4.573-580,
see 580 
http://www.existentialgraphs.com/peirceoneg/improvement_on_the_gamma_Graphs.htm
. There you'll see the graph equivalences that bothered Peirce.


  

  Best, Ben

  

  On 1/17/2015 5:41 PM, Jim Willgoose wrote:



  
  Curious. The formula "S is P" or "S is not P" do
not seem to carry enough information to decide the question.

 

On the other hand, if  "John" lacks reference, the statements
"John is blue " and John is not blue" are consistent. (trivial
empty) Further, one may tempted to treat these as Universals;
(or singleton classes).  But then, the existent singleton class
inclusive of "every John" doesn't seem to obey the rule of
contrary, namely, "may both be false," unless there are two
Johns.  Aristotle's definition of a contradiction seems to me to
exclude this. The square of opposition is always fun to play
with. I sometimes like to consider that "everything exists" so
it works alright. BTW, waiting to see how you use the "rules of
passage" in terms of graphs.

 

Jim W 

 

  

  
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