Re: [PEIRCE-L] The failure of Intelligent Design

[John Collier]

/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, May 11, 2018 at 7:15 AM, Stephen Jarosek
<sjaro...@iinet.net.au> wrote:

Hi Colin,

I don’t understand what insights a
creator/designer provides as to the nature of
existence. What phenomenology explains His
motivation to be? Why should He care to create
life? Where is His workshop? What tools does He
use? Does He have hands with which to wield a
hammer or use a soldering iron? Does he have eyes
with which to read a blueprint?

Many of us might be receptive to a God as a unity,
as Kashyap suggests, in the laws of nature around
us. It would make more sense for God’s emergence
to be bootstrapped with the emergence of the
universe as a unity, not as a meddler in a
workshop working to a blueprint. God and the
universe as one. Or maybe a systems-theory view of
nested hierarchies, where autopoiesis
(self-organisation) can be considered a form of
creation/design. But not god as a visitor in some
kind of workspace.

I’m not big fan of Richard Dawkins, but he does
have a point when he asks, sarcastically, who
created god? A god-god? Then who created god-god?
A god-god-god? God as a creator makes no sense and
explains nothing.

Isaac Newton provided the axiomatic framework for
a physics that did not make sense at the time. Now
it makes perfect sense, and we bear witness to its
relevance in our engineering and technological
achievements. We need a similar awakening with the
life sciences. What axiomatic framework does God
the Creator/Designer relate to? Here’s my
prediction… whatever the right theory is, it MUST
make sense… and we will know it when we see it. A
godly designer does not make sense. There is no
phenomenology that explains his motivations or
existence.

And you raise the topic of mutations again.
Natural selection based on mutations violates the
principles of entropy, as the tendency to
disorder. Nobody’s proven the relevance of
mutations to evolution. Pure, unsubstantiated
conjecture. Calvin Beisner, with reference to the
work of RH Byles, dispenses tidily with the
mutation mumbo jumbo:

https://www.icr.org/article/270
<https://www.icr.org/article/270>


Regards




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--
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Collier web page <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[John Collier]

20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,

Edwina

> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more
complex

> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro

> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.

Yes. I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her
career to studying bacteria:  “The growth, reproduction, and
communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”

lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our
sensitivities and stimulations.”

https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html
<https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html>

Gary R

> Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing
the

> thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on

> this.

Following is the article I presented at a conference on "Pragmatic
process philosophy" in 1999: http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf
<http://jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf>

Stephen

> Here's

> somethinghttp://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei 
<http://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-pei>

> rce/

Thanks for that reference.  I googled "peirce whitehead" and found
many other references.  Among them was a paper by Jaime Nubiola
from 2008: http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html
<http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html>

Jaime also spoke at the 1999 conference.  But the 2008 paper is
more detailed.  In it, he quoted Whitehead's biographer, Victor Lowe:

> Convictions common to Peirce and Whitehead have been deservedly

> noticed by commentators, somewhat to the neglect of the first
question

> of

> metaphysics: How shall metaphysics be pursued? — As a science among

> the sciences, says Peirce. Not so, says Whitehead; it seeks
truth, but

> a more general truth than sciences seek (Lowe 1964, 440).

But I'm not sure that they disagreed on that point.  In his 1903
classification of the sciences, Peirce said that the "special
sciences"

depend on mathematics and metaphysics. Therefore, metaphysics
would be more general than the special sciences.

Gary F

> Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign”

> which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures

> may represent his first clear move in that direction.

This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and
transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for
changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't
explain why.

John

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--
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Collier web page <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[John Collier]

he passing
reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely
believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it
anywhere stated something like that?

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or
semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear, though
suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little
more to the point, but still vague. I do like the fact this comes
up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, pretty
thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.

Thanks!

Mike

On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca
<javascript:top.opencompose('g...@gnusystems.ca','','','')> wrote:

Mike,

There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually
identify semiosis with Representation and thus with Thirdness,
and the laws of nature being /general/ laws, Thirdness is
predominant in them. For instance there is CP 5.105, EP 2:184):

[[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for
Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term
because its suggestions are not so narrow and special as those
of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say that a
general principle that is operative in the real world is of
the essential nature of a Representation and of a Symbol
because its /modus operandi/ is the same as that by which
/words/ produce physical effects. ]]

Gary f.

*From:*Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com
<javascript:top.opencompose('m...@mkbergman.com','','','')>]
*Sent:* 9-Dec-17 17:25
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
<javascript:top.opencompose('peirce-l@list.iupui.edu','','','')>
*Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

Hi List,

I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology,
and Semiotics" in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across
this quote:

"One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis
(semeiosis), is human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever
there is life and there is some reason to believe that even
the *laws of nature* are semiotic products." (emphasis added)

I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551),
but do not recall seeing Peirce references to signs in
inanimate nature other than crystals. Does anyone on the list
know of others?

Thanks!

Mike

[1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The
Routledge Companion to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New
York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 89–100.



--
John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban
Collier web page <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'

[John Collier]

In the technical sense (algorithmic information theory, Shannon, various 
others), information is understood syntactically only, so there is no content 
involved. Content is required for truth or falsity. So the technical notion of 
information has nothing to say about truth or falsity of the information. 
Information is either transferred, or it is not.

On the nature of information flow (transfer), I recommend the book by that name 
by Barwise and Seligman. It is far superior to anything written by or about 
Shannon, but it is based on pre-Shannon work on networks by electrical 
engineers in the 1930s. It is a difficult book, but you can find the basics 
summarised in several of my articles on my web page.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Charles Pyle [mailto:charlesp...@comcast.net]
Sent: Thursday, 29 June 2017 4:35 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's own definition of 'information'


I have always been concerned about the implications of false information for 
the definition of information. Is false information information? Is false 
knowledge knowledge? I should think the answer must certainly be "No" for 
knowledge, because to know is a factive verb, meaning that it presupposes the 
truth of its object. I believe in common usage of 'information' in the 
technical sense, as in information theory, false information would be 
information even if it was false,  but information in the ordinary sense of the 
word would not be information if it is false.



If, as I have argued, all signs are of a duplicitous nature, then this would be 
a moot question, or at least a very different question.

On June 29, 2017 at 7:59 AM John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:

Jon A, Jeff D, and Gary F,

JA

Why don't we put this on hold for later discussion?

I was about to send the following when your note appeared in
my inbox. It should be sufficient for the word 'information',
but we can discuss other issues later.

JD

I take the following passage to indicate that Peirce changed his use of
"depth" and "breadth" in some respects some time between 1867 and 1896.
The change was a broadening of the use of both terms.

GF

What Peirce wrote in 1893 is that he had broadened the application
of the terms, i.e. the breadth of the propositions involving them.
That does not mean that their depth, or “signification” as Peirce
often called it, changed in any way;

I agree. One example I use is the broadening of the word 'number'
from integers to rational numbers to irrational numbers to complex
numbers to quaternions... That broadens the application of the word,
but it does not make the definitions for its earlier uses obsolete.

For any particular application, the definition can be narrowed
by adding an adjective, such as real, complex, hypercomplex...

JA

BTW, is it really necessary to point out once again that the job
of a lexicographer presenting a survey of significant usages in
common or technical is very different from the role of a philosopher
expounding his or her own conception?

Many of Peirce's definitions for the Century Dictionary or Baldwin's
dictionary include short philosophical essays. They are as significant
for his Opera Omnia as any other publications.

And note his Ethics of Terminology. From EP 2.265:

The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose
meanings will not be misunderstood

Implication: For a common word such as 'information', a dictionary
that cites dates for the word senses, such as the OED, would be
sufficient to determine what Peirce had intended. But when he wrote
the definition himself, that's even better: I'm sure he would not
use a word in a sense that was inconsistent with his own definition.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

[John Collier]

I am not sure that these “dogmas” are not merely working hypotheses that have 
served well.

But there is some reason to think scientists (if not science) can be dogmatic. 
A colleague and occasional co-author of mine is one of the world’s experts on 
Douglas fir. He submitted a grant application noting that he had found 
variation that could be explained neither by genetics nor by environment, and 
he wanted to explore self-organization during development. This is a 
commonplace now, but thirty years ago he failed to get the grant because his 
referees (not Douglas fir experts) said that he just hadn’t looked hard enough 
for a selectionist explanation.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 01 June 2017 11:19 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk

John S, list,

John S wrote: "As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree, nothing is 
a dogma of science." Well, I would certainly agree that nothing ought to be a 
dogma.

And yet Peirce railed against "the mechanical philosophy," materialism, 
necessitarianism (recall his response to Camus in "Reply to the 
Necessitarians"), reducing cosmology to  the nothing-but-ism of 
actions/reactions of 2ns, etc.

Certainly not holding dogmatic views is an ideal of scientific, but I do not 
agree you in that it seems to me that any number of scientists in Peirce's day 
and in ours as well yet hold them, whether they would say they do, or think 
they do, or not.

Late in life, Peirce concluded the N.A. (not including the Additaments) by 
writing that even "approximate acceptance of the Pragmaticist principle" has 
helped those who do accept it:

". . . to a mightily clear discernment of some fundamental truths that other 
philosophers have seen but through a mist, and most of them not at all. Among 
such truths -- all of them old, of course, yet acknowledged by few -- I reckon 
their denial of necessitarianism; their rejection of any "consciousness" 
different from a visceral or other external sensation; their acknowledgment 
that there are, in a Pragmatistical sense, Real habits (which Really would 
produce effects, under circumstances that may not happen to get actualized, and 
are thus Real generals); and their insistence upon interpreting all hypostatic 
abstractions in terms of what they would or might (not actually will) come to 
in the concrete. . . . "
(CP 6.485).

It seems to me that Peirce is clear--and while here he seems to be addressing 
philosophers in particular, elsewhere and frequently he argues this for science 
more generally--that many thinkers (philosophers and scientists alike) do 
indeed hold such dogmas as "necessitarianism" and "mechanism" (==Sheldrake's 
slide for dogma #1 "Everything is essentially mechanical). That Peirce's views 
were far from dogmatic follows for me from his theory of inquiry including his 
pragmaticism.

Again, I don't necessarily agree with Sheldrake's list of putatie dogmas, and I 
would certainly fully agree with you if by "nothing is a dogma of science" you 
mean that this should be an essential maxim of the ethics of science. But just 
as Peirce argued that every scientist has a metaphysics--even as certain 
scientists argue against metaphysics altogether, that everyone of them ought 
take pains at discovering what are her perhaps hidden metaphysical 
presuppositions--I think that even those who claim that "nothing is a dogma of 
science" (but, I must quickly add, certainly not you, John) still many yet hold 
certain dogmatic views, and that these can enter into even whole 'schools' in 
certain fields of scientific endeavor.

Best,

Gary R




[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690<tel:(718)%20482-5690>

On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 2:34 AM, John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
On 5/31/2017 10:48 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
I agree that #3 is not a dogma of science.

As Peirce emphasized and nearly all scientists agree,
nothing is a dogma of science.

John



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and interaction

[John Collier]

I suspect you are right, Jon. I think this means that you would disagree with 
Terry Deacon’s approach, which starts with icons and has the rest evolve. 
Perhaps the origin of the first third is the beginning. Nothing is outside of 
that. That would be a bit like some gnostic views.

Best,
John

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, 19 April 2017 7:00 PM
To: Gary Richmond 
Cc: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Triadic forms of constraint, determination, and 
interaction

Gary, all ...

I have every reason to suppose triadic relations are the very fabric of the 
universe, and for all I know every triadic relation has the potential to serve 
as a sign relation in one measure or another.


In this view triadic relations do not evolve from lower species but are present 
from the beginning.  So I do not believe symbols emerge from icons and indices 
so much as icons and indices devolve from their generic precursors in the 
triadic matrix.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Apr 19, 2017, at 6:22 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
Jon, List,

Nice post, and rereading it, quite hlepfull. However, I don't think that a 
consideration of sets and subsets fully does the trick. Or rather, it may for 
mathematics, but it does not do so sufficiently for semiotics, at least in my 
opinion.

So the notion of 'constraints' has got to be fleshed out much further for 
semiotics. I earlier commented on the richness and originality of Terrence 
Deacon's Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter. For Deacon 
constraints are seen in relation to what is absent, much like the hub of a 
wheel is a hole which yet allows for its functioning (as a student of the Tao, 
I know that this is no news to you!).

More importantly for one of the key ideas of his book is that those constraints 
which bring about emergent processes are in their nature more complex than the 
constituents of a process because the complexity of such absential constraints 
is tied to their not being physical things: take away the spokes and the tire 
and the hub just disappears.

Gary Furhman has done some interesting work as well in consideration of the 
organizing power of constraints in his book, Turning Signs 
http://gnusystems.ca/TS/TWindex.htm, a work which I've highly recommended in 
the past and have been recently re-reading parts of, esp. it's penultimate 
Chapter 18, which Gary referred to recently in another thread. (I should note 
that for both authors discussions of constraint include but go beyond semeiotic 
science, although perhaps not beyond semiosis itself.)

In the light of thinking about constraints, I especially liked this comment in 
your message as to the complexity added in consideration of what you termed 
"mutual constraints":

JA: There are by the way such things as mutual constraints, indeed,
they are very common, and not just in matters of human bondage.
So, for instance, the fact that objects constrain or determine
signs in a given sign relation does not exclude the possibility
that signs constrain or determine objects in that sign relation.

I think that this is quite true, and that much more could be said regardomg it. 
Fuhrman, referring to an earlier book by Deacon, The Symbolic Species: The 
Co-evolution of Language and the Brain, gives an example of such mutual 
constraints in this sniippet.

As Deacon (1997) points out, languages have adapted to human use. ‘The brain 
has co-evolved with respect to language, but languages have done most of the 
adapting’ (122) in  Fuhrman, Turning Signs, Chapter 13.

Best,

Gary R



[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Wed, Apr 19, 2017 at 5:12 PM, Jon Awbrey 
> wrote:
Gary,

Here's one way of stating what I call a constraint:

• The set L is constrained to a subset of the set M.

Here's one way of stating a triadic constraint:

• The set L is a subset of the cartesian product X × Y × Z.

So any way we choose to define a triadic relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint.

In particular, any way we choose to define a sign relation
we are stating or imposing a triadic constraint of the form:

• L ⊆ O × S × I

where:
O is the set of all objects under discussion,
S is the set of all signs under discussion, and
I is the set of all interpretant signs under discussion.

The concepts of constraint, definition, determination,
lawfulness, ruliness, and so on all have their basis
in the idea that one set is a subset of another set.

Among the next questions that will occur to us, we might ask:

• What bearings do these types of global constraints
  have on various local settings we might select?

And conversely:

• To what extent do various types of local constraints combine
  to constrain 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

I do mean as you say by “formally”. I am pretty well trained in traditional 
formal logic (Boolos, Kaplan, Church, Kalish). I don’t know if Peirce made a 
diagram or algebraic form that I can understand. I find natural language words 
comparatively slippery, and I often don’t understand what they mean in, say, 
physics or biology, until I can construct a diagram or something of the sort. 
But I have not read nearly as much Peirce as other people on this list.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Monday, 17 April 2017 5:01 AM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

By “represent it formally,” do you mean translate the verbal expression into an 
algebraic notation? Or perhaps an entirely nonverbal diagram?
Since you say you have no idea how to represent it formally, and you’ve read 
some Peirce, are you also saying that Peirce never represented it formally, or 
tried to?

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 21:11
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice.

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

What you say may well be true, Gary, but I have no idea how to represent it 
formally (or iconically, for that matter), so it doesn’t do much more for me 
than gibberish, except to indicate there is probably something I don’t 
understand.

I’ve already expressed my problems with formalizing how interpretants can be 
signs in a cascade of interpretation if signs are limited to representamens. 
This seems to me to be a similar problem.

John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 5:22 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C,

You say that you are assuming that by “sign” I mean “representamen.” I am 
consistently using the word “sign” as Peirce defined it in 1903, as “a 
Representamen with a mental Interpretant.” But since Peirce never says anything 
specific about representamens which are not signs (though he admits the 
possibility, EP2:273), the two terms are pretty much interchangeable in 
Peircean semiotic practice.

But I think your assumption about my usage is not based on that practice, but 
on the habit of using “representamen” as one correlate of the triadic sign 
relation as opposed to the “sign” which supposedly refers to all three 
correlates taken together. As I explained at the end of my previous post, I 
regard this as a bad habit because it causes endless confusion for those trying 
to understand what Peirce actually said about signs.

I also don’t think it’s consistent with Peircean terminology to say that “the 
object and the representamen and the interpretant are the same thing as each 
other,” for the icon or any other kind of sign. You could say that all three 
share the same quality, or perhaps “form,” in the case of the icon, but they 
cannot be identical, as the correlates of a triadic relation must be distinct.

Gary f.

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 16:37
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 'Peirce-L' 
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

By purely iconic, I meant iconic sign. Both the object and the representamen 
and the interpretant are the same thing as each other, at least as I understand 
it. Hence a trivial case.

John

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 3:17 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

John C, List,

Would you explain this remark: "The only time [the] sign (I am assuming you 
mean representamen) might determine the objects is when it is purely iconic. I 
take it that this is a trivial case."?

Even in the case of the three classes of iconic signs in the classification 
into 10 classes it would seem to me that the Object determines the 
Representamen for the Interpretant. I don't see any exceptions.

Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Apr 16, 2017 at 4:37 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
[mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAl

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

[John Collier]

This is my understanding too, Gary F., though I have found the passage you 
quoted from Peirce especially hard to parse formally.

The only time thee sign (I am assuming you mean representamen) might determine 
the objects is when it is purely iconic. I take it that this is a trivial case.

Cheers,
John

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 16 April 2017 2:07 PM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Jon, briefly, I don’t see that “the Sign determines the Sign-Object relation,” 
and I don’t see where Peirce says that it does. What Peirce usually says in his 
definitions is that the Object determines the Sign to determine the 
Interpretant. (This does get more complicated when he introduces the dichotomy 
between Immediate and Dynamic Objects, but this is not mentioned in NDTR.)

There are many variations, such as the beginning of “Speculative Grammar” 
(EP2:272), where he says that “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same 
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.” 
But I have yet to see anyplace where Peirce says or implies that the Sign 
determines the Sign-Object relation. If you can cite such a place, please do 
so. And that goes double for your claim that “the Sign-Object relation 
determines how the Interpretant represents the Sign.” In my view, that is 
determined by whether the Sign is an Argument, a Dicisign or a Rheme. But 
again, I’m happy to be corrected if you can show that I’m wrong by citing a 
Peirce text.

Gary f.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 16-Apr-17 15:34
To: Gary Fuhrman >
Cc: Peirce-L >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Dyadic relations within the triadic

Gary F., List:

As I see it, #11 is the main sticking point ...

GF:  My contrary claim is that the order in which trichotomies are listed has 
nothing to do with the order of determination that applies to correlates, and 
if Peirce had chosen to list them in the order I did, this would make 
absolutely no difference to the tenfold classification of signs.

... because to me, it contradicts #7.

GF:  However the overlapping is constrained by the order of determination, so 
that (for instance) the same sign cannot be both a sinsign and an argument.

The order of determination does not apply only to correlates, it applies to all 
of the divisions for classifying Signs.  In particular, the Sign determines the 
Sign-Object relation, which determines how the Interpretant represents the 
Sign.  As I emphasized when I quoted it, the order of the three trichotomies in 
CP 2.243 is not random or inconsequential.  For example, if it were switched to 
your order, an Argument could be a Qualisign, and a Legisign could not be an 
Icon; but these conclusions are inconsistent with the ten classes that Peirce 
went on to identify.

As for #12 ...

GF:  As I said above, there is no “Object trichotomy” or “Interpretant 
trichotomy” in NDTR.

This is true--but if there had been, the order of determination would have been 
Interpretant, Object, Sign in accordance with CP 2.235-238.  By 1908, the order 
of determination was instead (two) Objects, Sign, (three) Interpretants.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John Collier]

Three body problem is computable for any finite amount of time (like all 
conservative systems). To get problems the end state must be reached in a 
finite time. This can happen in dissipative systems.

There are many cases where you can’t even get approximate solutions, though you 
can get probabilities of various solutions. For example, Mercury is in a 3/2 
rotation to revolution rate around the Sun. It was expected to be 1:1 like the 
Moon around the Earth. A bit of a surprise, since the 1-1 ratio is the lowest 
energy one. However, everything near the 3/2 state is higher energy, so it is 
stable. Now the interesting thig is that the boundaries between the attractors 
are such that there are regions in which any two points in one attractor has a 
point in the other attractor between them. So no degree of accuracy of 
measurement can allow predicting which attractor the system is in. So Frances 
Darwin’s explanation of why the Moon always faces the Earth is incomplete, and 
can never be fully completed. There is about 50% likelihood of 1-1 capture, 33% 
for 3-2 capture, and the rest take up the remaining chances. Note that the end 
states aren’t just a little bit different, but a lot different. Things get much 
more complicated in evolution and development, where more factors are involved. 
I argue that information dissipation (e.g., through death eliminating genetic 
information) works the same way. I first published on this as the first paper 
in the journal Biology and Philosophy n 1986.

The main point is the problem is not one of our limited calculation capacity. 
It holds in principle. Even Laplace’s demon, if they are like a regular 
computer, but arbitrarily large, could not do the calculations. Basically, 
there are far more functions that are not Turing computable than are, and many 
of these give widely different possible solutions. It’s really just another 
case of the number of theorems being aleph 1, but the number of possible proofs 
is only aleph 0.

I call systems like the Mercury –Sun system reductively explainable, but not 
reductive. Physicalism is not violated, but reduction is not possible. But we 
can get a good idea of what is going on, after the fact (though our first guess 
in the Mercury-Sun case was wrong).

Personally, I think all thirds are of this nature, which is why they can’t be 
reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments convincing about the 
irreducibility.

John

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs


On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even 
in Newtonian mechanics.

Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the 
three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking of rather I was more 
thinking that any solution is approximate and the errors can propagate in weird 
ways.

But that’s true of almost any real phenomena which is more complex than we can 
calculate. It’s not just an issue of reduction although it clearly manifests in 
the problem of reduction and emergence.





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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John Collier]

Thanks for the references.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 07 April 2017 6:30 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

[John Collier] Snip
Well my problem ultimately is over statistical mechanics and the eventual death 
of the universe which Peirce pretty well denies seeing it merely as an issue of 
heat inefficiencies which he thinks chance avoids.


[John Collier] I don’t think there is a heat death, either. I think that 
certain structures get frozen out, and it is also possible (in a very large 
universe that still has a reasonable density) that new ones could form. If the 
expansion is so fast that any remaining structures are pretty much isolated 
this would not happen. It would depend on things that Peirce was not aware of, 
and that we still don’t know.
John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John Collier]

SM is statistical mechanics. I don’t recall Peirce ever discussing it, though 
it was well known at his time, and proven beyond a doubt with Einstein’s ex 
planation of Brownian motion in 1906. Before that many French theorists 
rejected it because atoms and molecules were not observables.

I think that for some time now most physicists have agreed that order emerges 
from disorder, along the lines outlined by Prigogine (he won the Nobel prize, 
after all). David Layzer’s 1990Cosmogenesis makes the idea pretty clear on a 
cosmic scale. I applied the idea to biological information systems in the first 
paper in the journal Biology and Philosophy in 1986. At the time it was a bit 
adventurous, but not especially so. Entropy production is behind the formation 
of order; order doesn’t just happen on its own. The chance aspects of entropy 
production are crucial to the emergence of order, but the overall trend is 
always to increasing disorder. Personally, I think that all thirdness 
originates this way, through symmetry breaking, and I wrote an article on that 
Information Originates in Symmetry Breaking (1996). I did not see it as 
confirming Peirce’s ideas about habit formation, and I am still very doubtful 
that he didn’t just goof on this whole issue because of a lack of understanding 
of SM.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Thursday, 06 April 2017 7:39 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was 
semantic problem with the term)


> On Apr 6, 2017, at 12:03 AM, John Collier 
> <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
>
> There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the 
> fact that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say 
> that QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their arguments sound.

I’d tend to agree that reconciling QM to TD hasn’t been well thought through. 
I’m not sure that entails TD doesn’t apply (not that you are making that claim 
- just emphasizing the distinction)

What do you mean by SM?

> I don’t think I agree with Edwina that firstness is entropic, though in some 
> cases it can be.

I took her to just be making that claim in a narrow area of inquiry.

> I think it is important to distinguish between chance and randomness. Peirce 
> focuses on chance. Chance events can be deterministic on the larger scale, 
> such as when we have a chance meeting with a friend in the store. Nothing in 
> either of our determining that we will be in the store at that time is 
> coordinated with our friend’s determinants except that these determinants 
> become coordinated when we meet. Without both stories together, the meeting 
> is chance, but not random in the technical sense, since the stories together 
> can be compressed to mark our meeting. I call situations like this relative 
> randomness: two histories are not sufficient individually to predict a common 
> event – they don’t contain enough information to compute this event, but the 
> stories together do, assuming determinism.

This is more or less what I was getting at. The combination of 
chance/determinism can lead to unique situations, such as Peirce argues happens 
with mind. I want to address Jon’s point about distinguishing between chance 
and what we might call variants of agency. I think a fair bit of work has been 
done on that in the free will literature. I’m not sure though that Peirce draws 
the distinctions that we’ve seen in the last 20-30 years of that literature. 
(Not that we should expect him to)

I’ll probably not get to Jon’s answer until later though.

> In any case, I don’t see the divergence Clark apparently sees in the use of 
> the concept of entropy.
>

Not quite sure what you mean by that. I was just speaking of how the universe 
crystalizes into a system of higher information than was there at the beginning 
for Peirce. Peirce’s solution is just to say that TD only applies to the 
determinate part of a system. That is he doesn’t see entropy as an universal 
law, but a much more limited law. Is that more or less what you’re agreeing 
with or are you agreeing with me that such a claim is problematic for most 
physicists? Could you clarify a bit here?


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--

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John Collier]

A few points. Thermodynamics is a specialty of mine since I was an 
undergraduate, especially the statistical version. I don’t think I agree with 
Edwina that firstness is entropic, though in some cases it can be. In other 
cases it is just something like form considered in isolation. I take it that 
the senses (qualia on some  accounts) start with this, but there is typically a 
good deal more going on outside of this firstness that would lead me not to 
call it entropic. However I would also say that there are events that we 
perceive that are not coordinated with previous experience, and that these can 
lead to habits to accommodate future similar events. See my Dealing with the 
Unexpected<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/CASYS2000final.pdf> (CASYS 2000) 
for an account of how this can happen in a complex system like the mind, though 
I see no reason why this need be a mental process, and could apply to 
interacting complex processes in general, leading to habits in the broad sense. 
In my paper I use the idea to explain Piaget’s asdsimi9lation and 
accommodation, which is, of course, a generalization process, but a novel one, 
not preprogramed.


There is still an understanding gap between QM and SM, largely due to the fact 
that the theory of QM is deterministic. I have heard good scientists say that 
QM is the basis of entropy, but I don’t find their arguments sound. I think it 
is important to distinguish between chance and randomness. Peirce focuses on 
chance. Chance events can be deterministic on the larger scale, such as when we 
have a chance meeting with a friend in the store. Nothing in either of our 
determining that we will be in the store at that time is coordinated with our 
friend’s determinants except that these determinants become coordinated when we 
meet. Without both stories together, the meeting is chance, but not random in 
the technical sense, since the stories together can be compressed to mark our 
meeting. I call situations like this relative randomness: two histories are not 
sufficient individually to predict a common event – they don’t contain enough 
information to compute this event, but the stories together do, assuming 
determinism.

In any case, I don’t see the divergence Clark apparently sees in the use of the 
concept of entropy.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 05 April 2017 8:43 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was 
semantic problem with the term)


On Apr 5, 2017, at 12:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

Since Mind refers to the 'habit-taking capacity' then, what appears to be the 
ultimate limit, in my view, is not matter but habit. Habits don't move toward 
more differentiation but towards more generality.
What is Firstness? It is the introduction of non-habits and thus, entropic 
dissipation of the force of habits on the formation of matter. Peirce
Hopefully you saw that subsequent post where I noted not everyone agreed with 
the article I was using. Although I think in terms of Peirce’s conception of 
why thermodynamics doesn’t apply it’s pretty on the ball. My sense (perhaps 
wrong) is that the differences tend to be tied to terminology.

To the above, I agree habits are introducing more and more generality. However 
as they become more and more habitual they come more and more to take the 
character of substance. That is substance/matter is simply a reflection of a 
lack of variation from the habit. Peirce saw in the long run that these habits 
would crystalize in some sense.

Now from the perspective of a habit, any variation is a swerve. Peirce in 
various places appears to have since qualia or feeling as firstness as the 
inner view of swerve that he picks up (in a somewhat distorted fashion) from 
the Epircureans. So to that degree that swerve or chance is a break from habit 
I fully agree with you. That’s entropy, formally considered. The problem is 
that Peirce’s conception of the in the long run means habits become more set 
which is anti-entropic.

The question though is what happens when habits form. Peirce sees that 
formation as also occurring out of chance. That’s why I think we can’t only say 
that chance/feeling is entropy. What Peirce sees as entropy proper is purely in 
terms of deterministic mechanics and the Boltzmann statistical view of entropy. 
So here we’re distinguishing between the law of entropy and the measure of 
entropy. That’s an important distinction to keep in mind. Chance as a break 
from habit increases the measure of entropy. But it does not affect the law of 
entropy which is purely a law of physical necessary motion.

The reason this is difficult to wrap our mind around is because we’re all used 
to quantum me

RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[John Collier]

That is the way I understood the quote, Edwina, though there are certainly many 
places where Peirce uses “sign” as a synonym for representamen. One of the 
problems I have with sign used this way in all cases is that the interpretant 
can be a sign with the original sign its object. The only way I have been able 
to diagram this is with the triad as the object. But maybe that is just my lack 
of imagination.

John

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 9:23 PM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term


John - thanks for the quotation.

I fully agree. The Peircean framework is irreducibly  triadic. As he writes, 
"Every sign has an object" and it is "essential to the function of a sign that 
it should determine an Interpretant".  Therefore - the sign is, even to exist 
as such, triadic. It must have that object. And, to function as a sign [gosh - 
does a sign FUNCTION?]...it must have an Interpretant. Otherwise - it isn't a 
sign, even all by itself.



That's why I acknowledge the triad as a distinct entity [Sign] - because none 
of these 'parts' exist 'per se' on their own, but only within the FUNCTION of 
the triad.





Edwina






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On Thu 30/03/17 11:59 AM , John Collier 
colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za> sent:
I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different 
metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

John C., List:

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used 
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of the 
representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I would 
be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.  Would you at 
least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am 
advocating?

[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce refers to 
the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to understand if 
the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is essential to being a sign 
that it have an object and interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part 
of their nature to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean 
the iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list some time ago.

Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS 
[R] 914:5-6
The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown 
that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, 
which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be 
[or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a 
sign that it should determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to 
the object of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this 
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its 
pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own firstness. Upon these 
considerations are founded six trichotomic divisions of signs…


John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier


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RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[John Collier]

I am not very keen on multiple universes, though I readily admit different 
metaphysical categories. But I think any deep difference is just talk.

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 30 March 2017 3:33 PM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

John C., List:

[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

Perhaps I missed them, but I am not aware of any passages where Peirce used 
"sign" to mean a "triad" or a "triadic function" that consists of the 
representamen, object, and interpretant.  If there are such passages, I would 
be grateful for the citations so that I can take a look at them.  Would you at 
least agree that Peirce predominantly used "sign" in the way that I am 
advocating?

[John Collier] I think the following undated passage in which Peirce refers to 
the sign as the most characteristic form of thirdness is hard to understand if 
the sign meant here is the representamen alone. It is essential to being a sign 
that it have an object and interpretant. I take this as meaning that it is part 
of their nature to be triadic. I agree that Peirce mostly used “sign” to mean 
the iconic representamen. This issue was discussed on the list some time ago.

Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness, and the Reducibility of Fourthness [R] | MS 
[R] 914:5-6
The most characteristic form of thirdness is that of a sign; and it is shown 
that every cognition is of the nature of a sign. Every sign has an object, 
which may be regarded either as it is immediately represented in the sign to be 
[or] as it is in it own firstness. It is equally essential to the function of a 
sign that it should determine an Interpretant, or second correlate related to 
the object of the sign as the sign is itself related to that object; and this 
interpretant may be regarded as the sign represents it to be, as it is in its 
pure secondness to the object, and as it is in its own firstness. Upon these 
considerations are founded six trichotomic divisions of signs…


John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

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RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[John Collier]

Some points interspersed.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 29 March 2017 11:37 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

Edwina, List:

It has never been my intention to insult you, and I have never resorted to 
name-calling as you routinely have.  I have simply expressed my considered 
opinion that your model of sign-action is significantly different from 
Peirce's, and I have provided the reasons why I take that position.  I wish 
that we could have a friendly discussion about this, rather than a debate--and 
that others would join us in doing so--but unfortunately, we cannot seem to get 
past our directly opposing convictions.

ET:  I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to acknowledge 
the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in the triadic set 
- and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad.

Again, Peirce does not define the Sign as a triad (or a triadic function) that 
includes the Representamen; rather, he defines it as the Representamen, the 
first correlate of a triadic relation.  The Object and Interpretant are not 
additional parts of the Sign, they are the other two correlates in that triadic 
relation.  To me, this is absolutely fundamental to Peircean semeiosis, so any 
model that denies it is by definition non-Peircean.
[John Collier] Peirce uses “sign” in both ways, which can be confusing.

ET:  As I've often said, none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on 
their own. They are not each 'subjects' in their own right and I disagree that 
each is 'a constituent in their own universe'. I don't consider that the three 
modal categories are 'universes'.

Of course they "exist," albeit only when they are in the mode of 2ns.  Peirce 
explicitly referred to the Sign/Representamen, Object, and Interpretant as 
"subjects" (EP 2:411); and he explicitly called the three modal categories 
"Universes" (EP 2:478-479); and he explicitly stated that the Sign, both 
Objects, all three Interpretants, and their relations are all constituents of 
one or another Universe (EP 2:480-490).  Hence your disagreement on these 
matters is with him, not just with me.
[John Collier] I suspect that Peirce meant universe of discourse, which is 
quite a different thing from a universe (as in, say, Popper). Peirce uses 
“subject” in a rather strange way in which predicates can be subjects. 
Stjernfelt, Natural Propositions, 6.10 Hypostatic abstraction.

I have no objections to raise to your further points.

John

ET:  There is nothing wrong with using different terms.

I agree!  My issue is with (a) using the same terms that Peirce did, but then 
assigning different definitions to them; and (b) using different terms, but 
then claiming that your model is the same as Peirce's.

ET:  With regard to 'habits of formation' - what the heck do you think those 
'habits' are doing?

What I am questioning is your definition of the Representamen as "a set of 
habits of formation."  I do not see where Peirce ever associates the 
Representamen with habits.  Rather, he identifies a habit as a final logical 
Interpretant, precisely because it does not act as a Representamen to determine 
any further logical Interpretants (EP 2:418).

ET:  As Peirce notes, 1.414, a 'bundle of habits' is a 'thing' or a substance. 
That seems pretty clear to me that this 'bundle of habits FORMS the thing.

Saying that bundles of habits are substances (as Peirce did) is not the same as 
saying that bundles of habits form substances (as you do).  When they are 
Existents (mode of 2ns), Representamina, Objects, and Interpretants are all 
bundles of habits in this sense.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 3:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

Jon - I will say this only once; I won't get into a debate with you.

1) I use Peirce's term of 'representamen'  rather than 'sign' to acknowledge 
the unique role in the triad; that mediative function/action in the triadic set 
- and to differentiate it from the WHOLE Sign, the triad. As I've often said, 
none of the parts of this triad exist 'per se' on their own. They are not each 
'subjects' in their own right  and I disagree that each is 'a constituent in 
their own universe'. I don't consider that the three modal categories are 
'universes'.

You do not differentiate this mediative process; indeed, you rarely refer to it 
as a vital action. Indeed, all you seem to focus on is NAMING the different 
parts of the Sign. But do you examine the dynamic PROCESS that is going on?

I consider that the Sign as a whole is a triadic FUNCTION. Actions are going on 
in that triad! It's not a static or mechanical process!

[PEIRCE-L] Non-arbitrary connections between the sounds of words and there objects

[John Collier]

The usual view is that except for some onomatopoetic words, the connection 
between words and there objects is arbitrary. Apparently this is not true in 
general, at least across many unrelated languages for a set of basic words. See:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/16/universal-language-sound-associations-meaning-linguistics

This means that many words have a non-obvious iconic character that goes beyond 
their mere sound-feeling.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

[John Collier]

. Whence it follows that in so far as a particle is not acted 
upon by another, that which it retains is a relation between space and time. 
Now it is not logically accurate to say that the law of motion prescribes that 
a particle, so far as it is not acted upon by forces, continues to move in a 
straight line, describing equal intervals in equal times. On the contrary the 
true statement is that straight lines are that family of lines which particles, 
so far as they are unacted upon, describe, and that equal spaces are such 
spaces as such a particle describes in equal times. (CP 6.82)


“Atoms also violate the doctrine of continuity insofar as they are thought to 
be indestructible material beings. If they do not come into being and do not 
decay then they are not subject to transitional states. If they are 
instantaneously created or annihilated then their emergence or disappearance is 
discontinuous in space and time. (Belief in the annihilation of matter Peirce 
considered a gratuitous hypothesis. CP 5.587) A more coherent model is that of 
a system of forces. The being of elementary particles—atoms, singularities, 
atomicules, atomicities—was to interact: “We observe no life in chemical atoms. 
They appear to have no organs by which they could act. Nor can any action 
proper gain actuality, that is, a place in the world of actions, for any 
subject. Yet the individual atom exists, not at all in obedience to any 
physical law which would be violated if it never had existed, nor by virtue of 
any qualities whatsoever, but simply by virtue of its arbitrarily interfering 
with other atoms, whether in the way of attraction or repulsion. We can hardly 
help saying that it blindly forces a place for itself in the universe, or 
willfully crowds its way in.” (CP 1.459)

“As a result of his synechistic perspective Peirce at times sounds more like a 
twentieth-century physicist than a nineteenth-century one. Developments in 
elementary particle physics in this century have shown that the atom of John 
Dalton and Niels Bohr was a profound simplicity.”



I might add, that it is also a return to Boscovich.

With respect to biology, Peirce is b=very sceptical that understanding the 
combinations of atoms is sufficient:
“The molecule-to-molecule mechanism may be described in terms of lesser or 
greater bonding capacity; for example, molecules may attach to a cellular 
membrane consisting of molecular-matrixes and disrupt the covalent bonds that 
stabilize the membrane molecule thereby changing its linking capacity within 
the cell and making it a target cell. Hormones and other signaling molecules 
circulate throughout the body to highly specific targets in order to activate 
through various transduction pathways other messengers that turn on or inhibit 
cascades of enzymes. However, such descriptions do not reach a level of 
relational generality that explains what is being described, and we are left to 
marvel at what we do not understand even while the picture may be clearly 
before us. What is the required level of generality—the subatomic, the 
cellular, the intercellular, that of functioning organs, the organism, the 
ecological? Peirce suggests that there may be a relatively few general 
algorithms that are capable of explaining the dizzying complexity of mushy 
biological systems. He would contend that the capacity to represent would be a 
part of this synechistic algorithm. Representation is a process of creating a 
virtual reality, a Hegelian ‘reflection’, the emergence of a Thou to an I. It 
is part of every physical process, according to Peirce:

Whatever is real is the law of something less real. Stuart Mill defined matter 
as a permanent possibility of sensation. What is a permanent possibility but a 
law? Atom acts on atom, causing stress in the intervening matter. Thus force is 
the general fact of the states of atoms on the line. This is true of force in 
its widest sense, dyadism. That which corresponds to a general class of dyads 
is a representation of it, and the dyad is nothing but a conflux of 
representations. A general class of representations collected into one object 
is an organized thing, and the representation is that which many such things 
have in common. And so forth. (CP 1.487)

“Atomism collapses because it does not include a way of integrating itself into 
a theory, for example, of how biological sub-systems may ‘signal’ other 
sub-systems and generally of how representations could co-exist with atoms.

So Peirce rejected atomism as an explanatory principle.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
Sent: Thursday, 09 March 2017 7:00 AM
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com>; John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; 
Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk>; Jeffrey Bria

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich points.

[John Collier]

Interesting discussion, but one that bothers me a bit due to my reading of 
Boscovic as an undergrad and my familiarity with the Scottish “Common Sense” 
philosophers.

My understanding of Boscovician atoms is that they are centres od force fields 
that very in sign and intensity, being effective over varying distances. The 
overall effect is a sinusoidal liker wave centred on the atom. In this sense 
Boscovician atoms are not points, but have an extended scope, which varies with 
distance. The point aspect stems from this filed being zero at the centre, all 
the effects stemming from more distant fields centred on the atom.

The Scottish Common Sense Philosophers, Like Thomas Young (usually classed as 
an empiricist) took the view that we should treat a phenomena as it appears, 
irrespective of its real nature, until we know more. In the Boscovician case 
this would mean treating atoms as very small, but with the Boscovician field 
properties, without reference to their smaller nature or their real structure. 
Young, the wave theorist, was a follower of this school, and so was, to some 
extent Maxwell.

So I think it is historically misleading to compare Boscovician atomism with 
continuous views – I see no contradiction – much as the problem might be 
interest in itself. I am more than a little reluctant to set up metaphysical 
problems that aren’t supported by the science itself, and I think it requires 
careful and unbiased historical study to ensure this is enforced.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 08 March 2017 6:51 PM
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com>; Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk>; 
Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>; Jeffrey Goldstein 
<goldst...@adelphi.edu>; Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>; 
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen <ahti-veikko.pietari...@helsinki.fi>; John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Truth as Regulative or Real; Continuity and Boscovich 
points.

List, John:

I’m rather  pressed for time so only brief responses to your highly provocative 
post.
Clearly, your philosophy of mathematics is pretty main stream relative to mine. 
 But this is neither the time nor the place to develop these critical 
differences.

My post was aimed directly at the problem of the logical composition of 
Boscovich points.  This is inferred from CSP’s graphs and writings.
I would ask that you describe your views on how to compose Boscovich points 
into the chemical table of elements. Please keep in mind that each chemical 
element represents logically a set of functors in the Carnapian sense. see: p. 
14, The Logical Syntax of Language.

> On Mar 7, 2017, at 8:56 AM, John F Sowa 
> <s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
>
> Jerry,
>
> We already have a universal foundation for logic.  It's called
> "Peirce's semiotic”.

Semiotics is not, in my view, a foundation for logic which is grounded on 
antecedent and consequences.
Neither antecedents nor conclusions are intrinsic to the experience of signs 
yet both are necessary for logic.
Logic is grounded in artificial symbols.  Applications of logic to the natural 
world requires symbolic competencies appropriate to the application(s).
>
> JLRC
>> the mathematics of the continuous can not be the same as the
>> mathematics of the discrete. Nor can the mathematics of the
>> discrete become the mathematics of the continuous.
>
> They are all subsets of what mathematicians say in natural languages.

I reject this view of ‘subsets’ because of the mathematical physics of 
electricity.
Many mathematics reject set theory as a foundations for mathematics, including 
such notables as S. Mac Lane (I discussed this personally with him some decades 
ago.)  My belief is that numbers are the linguistic foundations of mathematics 
and the physics of atomic numbers are the logical origin of (macroscopic) 
matter and of the natural sciences. (Philosophical cosmology is a different 
discourse.)

>
> For that matter, chess, go, and bridge are just as mathematical as
> any other branch of mathematics.  They have different language games,
> but nobody worries about unifying them with algebra or topology.
>
Board games are super-duper simple relative to the mathematics of either 
chemistry and even more so wrt life itself.

> I believe that Richard Montague was half right:
>
> RM, Universal Grammar (1970).
>> There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between
>> natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians; indeed,
>> I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and semantics of
>> both kinds of languages withi

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[John Collier]

From talking with colleagues, some say they think only in words and others, 
like me, say they think mostly in diagrams or in physical feelings that I 
attach no words to (and probably couldn’t in many cases). Although I am 
surprised when I find someone who believes they think in words only, I have 
little reason to doubt them, as it seems these people also think quite 
differently from me. One of the hardest things for me in learning analytic 
philosophy (after original training and work in physics) was to think in words. 
Dick Cartwright helped me immensely with this.

Surely it is a psychological issue, if people differ so much in this respect.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:baud...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 15 February 2017 8:16 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -


Eric, none of the statements that you quoted in your 2/14/2017 message 
originate with Peirce.

Peirce held that logic generally involves icons (including diagrams and not 
only graphic-looking ones), indices, and symbols, and he saw all three kinds of 
signs as needed. Remember also that Peirce so defined 'symbol' that plenty of 
symbols are not words and some words are not symbols.

You wrote in your subsequent message:

One can also find people with limited brain damage who (by all evidence) have 
lost their ability to coherently verbalize (i.e., they cannot do language), and 
yet those people otherwise seem to think perfectly well.

I remember a course on Merleau-Ponty decades ago in which the professor 
discussed patients who could no longer think about absent things. He said that 
they had lost their "symbolic function" - taking "symbol" in an old traditional 
sense as sign of something not perceived, especially something not perceivable, 
picturable, etc. I can't say off-hand whether those patients had completely 
lost their ability to think in symbols in Peirce's sense.

I don't know whether Peirce held that actual people usually think in words or 
in any particular kind of signs, and what basis he would have offered for the 
claim; anyway it wouldn't be a philosophical statement, but a psychological 
statement, and Peirce was as adverse to basing cenoscopic philosophy (including 
philosophical logic) on psychology as he was to to basing pure mathematics on 
psychology. When he discusses semiotics and logic, he is discussing how one 
ought to think, not how people actually do think.

Peirce said of himself:

I do not think that I ever _reflect_ in words. I employ visual diagrams, 
firstly because this way of thinking is my natural language of 
self-communication, and secondly, because I am convinced that it is the best 
system for the purpose
[MS 629, p. 8, quoted in _The Existential Graphs of Charles S. Peirce_, p. 126, 
by Don D. Roberts]

Google preview: 
https://books.google.com/books?id=Q4K30wCAf-gC=PA126=PA126=%22I+do+not+think+I+ever+reflect+in+words:+I+employ+visual+diagrams%22

Peirce described corollarial deduction as verbal and philosophical, and 
theorematic deduction as diagrammatic and mathematical. He seemed to have a 
higher opinion of the latter, which is not unusual for a mathematician.

Peirce left innumerable drawings among his papers. I somewhere read that a 
considerable percentage of his papers consisted in drawings, I seem to remember 
"60%" but I'm not sure. A project involving those drawings (and accumulating an 
archive of reproductions ofthem) resulted in the publication of a book:

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/newbooks.htm#engel_queisner_viola<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/newbooks.htm#engel_queisner_viola>

Das bildnerische Denken: Charles S. Peirce.  [Visual Thinking: Charles S. 
Peirce].Actus et Imago Volume 5. Editors: Franz Engel, Moritz Queisner, Tullio 
Viola. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, March 21, 2012. Hardcover 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/product/224194
346 pages., 82 illustrations in black & white, 31 illustrations in color.

Peirce, as you say, often focuses on clear thought, but he sometimes discusses 
vague thought, and says that vagueness is often needed for thought. For example 
in his critical common-sensism.

Peirce thought that there are logical conceptions of mind based not on 
empirical science of psychology nor even on metaphysics. See for example Memoir 
11 "On the Logical Conception of Mind" in the 1902 Carnegie Application:

http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm<http://www.iupui.edu/%7Earisbe/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm>

As to how linguistic people actually are or how linguistic one needs or ought 
to be, that will depend at least partly on the definition of language. In the 
quote of him above, Peirce uses the word "language" more loosely than some 
would.

Best, Ben

On 2/15/2017 11:16 AM

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[John Collier]

The reference is to the method, not the word. There is an historical continuity 
between the Medieval empiricists like Roger Bacon, and Galen’s followers (he 
died about 299 AD (who go back to Arabic predecessors, perhaps influenced by 
Galen – medical usage, of course, but he seemed to extend it in his views of 
the natural world)  and the later ones who came to called The British 
Empiricists, though not by that name at that time. On source puts the general 
use of the modern accepted sense at 1796, well after the British Empiricists.



Typical definition:

empiricist

ɛmˈpɪrɪsɪst/

PHILOSOPHY

noun

1.

a person who supports the theory that all knowledge is based on experience 
derived from the senses.

"most scientists are empiricists by nature"

adjective

1.

relating to or characteristic of the theory that all knowledge is based on 
experience derived from the senses.

"his radically empiricist view of science as a direct engagement with the world"

The term in its present form originated in 1660-70; some say about 1700. If you 
think that words determine thoughts, than there was no empiricism except in 
medicine before these dates.



Aristotle had some things I common with empiricists, but his requirement for a 
rationalist/ essentialist middle term undermined that because it required the 
active nour. The Medieval ones gave that up. But so did many of the stoics, who 
were therefore empiricists.



The term goes back to the Greeks, not that I think that some magic connects 
terms to ideas:

Etymology

The English term empirical derives from the Greek word ἐμπειρία, empeiria, 
which is cognate with and translates to the Latin experientia, from which are 
derived the word experience and the related experiment. The term was used by 
the Empiric school of ancient Greek medical practitioners, who rejected the 
three doctrines of the Dogmatic school, preferring to rely on the observation 
of "phenomena".[5]



NB the restriction to medicine here, similar to the early restriction of 
semiotics to medicine.



Peirce relevance: Peirce is usually included among those who tried to combine 
elements of empiricism and rationalism, though for my money he doesn’t fit 
either camp very well



In any case, the recent attempts on this list to try to tie empiricism to the 
use of the word are pretty poor examples of scholarship.



John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate Philosophy, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal http://web.ncf.ca/collier



> -Original Message-

> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]

> Sent: Saturday, 11 February 2017 5:58 PM

> To: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>

> Cc: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>; John Collier

> <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>

> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

>

> I share your surprise, Jerry.

>

> Kirsti

>

> Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 5.2.2017 19:26:

> > John, Edwina, List:

> >

> > I am more than a bit surprised by the assertions that the Middle

> > Ages gave birth to "Empirism".

> >

> > Does anyone have a convenient reference to the historical emergence

> > of this term in philosophy?

> >

> > Cheers

> > Jerry

> >

> > Sent from my iPhone

> >

> > On Feb 5, 2017, at 10:24 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>

> > wrote:

> >

> >> John:

> >>

> >> Agreed, empiricism started in the 'middle ages' - and my point is

> >> that no 'thought-ideology' exists in a vacuum. Empiricism became an

> >> observable if peripheral force in the 13th century, as did the

> >> shift towards empowering individuals.

> >>

> >> I consider that philosophical ideologies do not exist in a vacuum

> >> but co-exist with political ideologies. My point is which ones are

> >> dominant?

> >>

> >> No- I am not confusing societal 'logic' [??]with scientific

> >> logic. [I hate the term _sociological_ for the abuses of thought

> >> found within so many sociology treatises]... Philosophic ideology

> >> is not the same as scientific logic. I am suggesting that a

> >> philosophical ideology is correlated with a societal ideology - and

> >> that empiricism, which began at least to emerge in open discourse

> >> in the 13th c, is correlated with the political ideology that

> >> affirmed support for individual interaction with the world.

> >>

> >> I certainly agree: Peirce wasn't political at all. My point is only

> >> that HIS analysis, with its three categories, works very well to

> >> disempower the extremes of both empiricism and ide

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI perspective

[John Collier]

Stephen, if you change the definitions (I specifically used the Catholic case), 
then you can say whatever you want. I have no idea what you are talking about 
with square circles. I had a sculpturist student once who thought he could 
square the circle. Under the usual assumptions of what this means it is 
logically impossible.

My point was exactly that the interpretants matter. You have actually confirmed 
my point here that real and unreal are not binaries in their essence.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 11 February 2017 5:11 AM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; Peirce List <Peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI 
perspective

A square circle is real in many possible ways. Evil is not absence it is 
tangible harm mental or physical and its ethical status depends on whether it 
is consciously intended. Evil does ultimately vanish as we conscious sorts over 
time leech it out of ourselves either here or beyond if there is a beyond which 
makes sense mainly in terms of the  possibility that a review of our lives here 
might induce some repentance and reformation.Nothing I have said is in 
disagreement I think with either Peirce or Wittgenstein who seem to me together 
to be the sentinels at the gare of the natural sconce's primacy in validating 
anything that is not presupposition. In Wittgenstein's terms I talk nonsense. 
Though I do not think calling a circle square is supposition.  Cheers, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose<http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose>

On Fri, Feb 10, 2017 at 9:57 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Square circles aren’t real, and there are some much more subtle cases involving 
failure of reference. I am sure you know that evil is regarded by the Catholic 
Church as an absence, I suppose this could be real, but considered as a 
positive force it would not be real.

I don’t think the logic is binary. The interpretant matters in such cases. 
Where there is none, there is no reality, so thirdness is essential to reality 
and for distinguishing it.

Regards,
John

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com<mailto:stever...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Friday, 10 February 2017 1:04 PM
To: Mike Bergman <m...@mkbergman.com<mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>; Jon 
Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Possible Article of Interest - CSP's "Mindset" from AI 
perspective

A distinction between real and anything is to me a binary notion which may be 
useful but is ultimately confusing. To say that everything is real is to say 
that reality is the whole kahuna of everything within which there is good and 
evil, falsity and truth, and so forth. I know that Peirce makes distinctions 
but I think the entire tendency of his thinking tends toward the result of 
thinking when it deems reality as being all. S  Best. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose<http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose>

On Thu, Feb 9, 2017 at 11:59 PM, Mike Bergman 
<m...@mkbergman.com<mailto:m...@mkbergman.com>> wrote:

Hi Jon,

Thanks for commenting. Please see below:
On 2/9/2017 8:28 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Mike, List:

I read your linked article and the earlier one that it referenced, and found 
them very interesting, especially the whole notion of "mindset."  My first 
introduction to Peirce's thought was a doctoral dissertation that used it to 
identify and explicate a distinctively Lutheran way of thinking, which appealed 
to me not only because I am a Lutheran myself, but also because I have long 
desired to identify and explicate the distinctive way of thinking that we 
engineers employ in doing our jobs.  My series of articles on "The Logic of 
Ingenuity" was the outcome, and the final installment (Part 4, "Beyond 
Engineering") is now scheduled to appear next month.

However, I disagree with a couple of things that you mentioned in your last 
message.

MB:  I take ideas and all generals to be real, including the idea of concepts 
to represent ideas. I think this is supported by Peirce. I also take the 
fictional to be real, but not actual.

While Peirce certainly held Ideas to be real--"the fact that their Being 
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually 
thinking them, saves their Reality" (CP 6.455; 1908)--his position was not that 
all generals are real, only that some of them are.

CSP:  Consequently, some ge

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

[John Collier]

I don’t agree. Edwina. Empiricism started in the Middle ages and went through 
periods of profound social transformation since while being changed relatively 
little.

I don’t think it is a political ideology.

I think that confusing sociological and scientific logic with each together 
leads to confusion, with which your post is rife. Much of what you say about 
empiricism just strikes me as irrelevant, with multitude counterexamples I 
won’t go into here except to note that empiricism co-existed with m any 
political ideologies.

I don’t think that Peirce was particularly political in his logic or 
methodology, though I understand his politics tended to towards the 
conservative. He didn’t write much about real political issues of his time, and 
I doubt it was a major influence in his overall though.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, 05 February 2017 5:58 PM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

I think that even a philosophical ideology , eg, the 'classic form of 
empiricism', has to be grounded in the societal infrastructure.

Political ideologies certainly must be grounded; I think it's an error to say, 
for example, the 'democracy is the best political system', for any political 
system must give political power to that section of the population that 
produces wealth and so enables continuity of that society. If the majority of 
the population are producing wealth, then, democracy is the most functional 
political system. If only a minority are producing wealth [and this was the 
case for most of mankind's economic history], then, democracy would be 
dysfunctional.

What about philosophical ideologies? Are they isolated from grounding in the 
societal infrastructure? I've outlined my view of the enormous societal impact 
of the rise of empiricism, which empowered ordinary individuals to interact, as 
they saw fit, with the world. The slippery slope downside is that it easily 
moves into the randomness of postmodern relativism and chaos.

What about realism? How does it societally function? It removes the individual 
from sole access to 'truth' and inserts a 'community of scholars'. This removes 
randomness from the analysis. It posits a truth system based around general 
rules, where individual articulations of these rules are just that: individual 
and transient versions but almost minor in their real-life power except as 
versions of those rules. This has its own slippery slope of fundamental 
determinism and we've seen the results in many eras in our world history, 
including modern times.

 Peirce dealt with this with his focus on the freedom of Firstness and his view 
that the rules [Thirdness] evolve and adapt. This would enable a society to 
have a rule of law, with local variations - something required in a 'growth 
society' - i.e., a modern society as differentiated from a no-growth or 
pre-industrial society.

Edwina


- Original Message -
From: John Collier<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
To: Jerry LR Chandler<mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com>
Cc: Peirce List<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; Eric 
Charles<mailto:eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> ; Helmut 
Raulien<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>
Sent: Sunday, February 05, 2017 3:18 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - “The union of units unifies 
the unity”

Jerry, I think we are using ‘empiricism’ differently. I was using it in the 
classic form, not just to refer to anyone who uses the natural world as a 
touchstone for clarifying meaning and discovering the truth. I am an empiricist 
in this latter sense, but not the former.



-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - “The union of units unifies the unity”

[John Collier]

Jerry, I think we are using ‘empiricism’ differently. I was using it in the 
classic form, not just to refer to anyone who uses the natural world as a 
touchstone for clarifying meaning and discovering the truth. I am an empiricist 
in this latter sense, but not the former.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, 03 February 2017 3:20 AM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Eric Charles 
<eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>; Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - “The union of units unifies 
the unity”

John, List:

On Jan 31, 2017, at 1:05 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

5. The assertion "Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything more 
to do science.” appears rather problematic to me.

I don’t see this, Jerry. A typical example of a contemporary empiricist who 
argues specifically this is Bas van Fraassen, who specifically takes this view 
in his work, such as The Scientific Image. Classic empiricists like Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume also take this view. I would hasten to add that I distinguish 
between empiricism as a reductive sceptical constructivist movement and 
empiricism as the view that our interactions with the world are our only 
reliable touchstone for clarifying meaning and discovering the truth. I agree 
with the latter, and I don’t think it implies nominalism. But it also goes 
beyond classic empiricism, being more open to methods than reliance on 
observation and combining and projecting observations inductively. I would 
agree with Edwina and John Sowa that classic empiricism has been tied together 
with certain sociological views, but I don’t think that these are implied by 
the logic of empiricism. Stan Salthe is one who, it seems to me, ties the 
sociological aspects into a common “discourse” that he takes to define 
empiricism (but I think his alternative discourse makes the same errors). I am 
not keen on discourses as unanalysable wholes. I think they can be examined 
both internally and externally in a critical way. I think the external 
criticism is often opened up by internal criticism (e.g., Feyerabend’ s 
“Problems with empiricism” and Hanson’s work, as well as Kuhn’s, of course, and 
Quine’s “Two dogmas of empiricism”).

John

You touch many bases in this paragraph, often rather adroitly.  I agree with 
several points. But, more importantly, it is what I find missing from this 
paragraph is the essential need to expand the scope of view from the science of 
physics to the science of biology and medicine.  Belief in raw empiricism does 
not negate the need for deep abstractions. Internality and externality are 
essential to systems as well. This requires a grammar of speciation that is 
remote from predicate logic and your oft-cited set theoretical deductions.

It (empiricism) requires new symbolic competencies to integrate the meanings of 
the  symbol systems in the perplex or organic sciences.

It also requires elaboration on the roles of electrical symbols as parts of 
wholes and as attractors and repellers that contribute to the spontaneity of 
life.

Quine?  H…  From my perspective, I long ago discarded any role for Quine’s 
scientific illiteracy in the perplex number system or organic mathematics.

Why? Because his well known quote, ‘To be is to be a variable’ contradicts the 
logic of the table of elements and the derivation of the genetic code from it.

Let me suggest an alternative that can be derived from the table of physical 
elements:
"To be alive is to be a species.”

The logic of “The union of units unifies the unity”  under natural physical 
constraints (Newton’s and Coulomb’s laws) can be used to derive the graphic 
pathways.

Or, have I missed your point completely?

Cheers

Jerry





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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

[John Collier]

Jerry,

I haven't found it necessary to go beyond the logic that I was taught in 
University as an undergrad and graduate student, especially from Boolos, 
Church, Kalish and David Kaplan. From the former I learned set theory (which I 
later taught at Rice) in which arithmetic can be grounded (granted the 
incompleteness of both. From Kaplan I learned many-valued logic including three 
valued logic used by intuitionists and others who deny the excluded middle.

Incompleteness, undecidability and noncomputablity plays a major role in my 
dealings with nonreducible phenomena, and the application of information theory 
thereto, as well as to my work on causation and dynamical systems un general. 
To the best of my knowledge, the application (but not the logic) is novel.

I do not see any way in which CSP's logic is at odds with contemporary logic, 
though contemporary logic has included much that he never thought of or just 
had primordial thoughts about.

I agree that statistical methods are limited and are often misused, but I 
think, and have taught, that a proper understanding of the underlying logic can 
help to avoid this and help to put statistics in its proper place.

My work on natural kinds makes use of intensional logic, but argues that once 
we understand the isssues we can dispense with mere possibilities in the 
science of the natual world. Since 1994 I have been on an effort to minimize my 
metaphysics, best represented in Every Thing Must Go, though I prefer what I 
call dynamical realism to structural realism.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com]
Sent: Friday, 03 February 2017 2:35 AM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>; Helmut Raulien 
<h.raul...@gmx.de>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

John, List:
On Jan 31, 2017, at 1:05 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

2.  Now, for the most important comment.  It is almost certain that CSP's 
notion of abduction as a method to generate a possibility space came directly 
from the concept of proof of structure.  It follows from his notions of medads 
and graphic relations and relatives and the concept of variable valences of 
elements.  The notion of abduction was a critical part of hybrid logic 
necessary to develop the simple algebra of labelled bipartite graph theory of 
the perplex number system.

I would have to put this terminology into terms of contemporary logic to see if 
I agree with this. I suspect I do, but right now I reserve judgement.

I think you are missing my point.
The mathematical nature of chemical logic does not fit into the terms of 
contemporary logic, yet chemist make calculations involving millions of atoms.

Why is that?

Neither does the nature of CSP's logic fit into contemporary logic.
Why?  Your personal research contributes to understanding some aspects of this 
problem.

The logic of natural sorts and kinds require numerical propositions that bridge 
the gap between the logics of physics and the logics of biology/medicine.  
Chemists developed methods to do calculations based on the atomic numbers. How 
does one formalize it?

Given the nature of species and reproduction, it is fairly obvious that 
statistical methods are of limited utility for such perplex problems.

That is one of my points.

Cheers

jerry



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

[John Collier]

Jerry, List,

Thanks for your response, Jerry. We are in agreement on a number of points that 
I will mark below. Others, not so much. My PhD thesis was an argument for 
realism that was basically Peircean, starting out with separating Peirce’s 
criterion for cognitive significance from even weak verificationism. Together 
they imply relativism (and nominalism), which sets up my search later for an 
alternative to verificationism to get at truth. It wasn’t entirely successful, 
but I was able to argue that incommensurability about meaning (from Quine and 
Kuhn) was a pragmatic issue, and show how this could be used to tease out 
differing but hidden background assumptions ( Polanyi’s tacit knowledge) to 
establish commensurability in at least some cases, and allow for a realist view 
of scientific progress. My remarks about nominalism and realism were largely 
based in this analysis. I should have published it, but I got involved with an 
information theoretic approach to self-organization in biology that quickly 
took up all my available time. Apparently there is still some confusion about 
these issues, especially concerning sociological and logical issues. As you 
probably know, the relativists focussed on and largely tried to reduce the 
logical issues to sociological ones. Now that this project has largely failed, 
perhaps there is room for my thesis again.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@mac.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 31 January 2017 6:09 AM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>; Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>; Helmut Raulien 
<h.raul...@gmx.de>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

John:

Thanks for your interesting and provocative insights.

By way of background, I have compared the various theories of nominalism and 
realism for more than 20 years.  I find your values deeply embedded in the 
assertion that one is a weaker hypothesis than the other.  Often, nominalists 
appeal to the role of authority, historical precedence.  (Think of the role of 
precedence in our legal and political systems.)


Some points of your post deserves to be highlighted.

Peirce thought we could get out of this by abduction, but empiricists don't 
allow this as part of logic. Nominalism says nothing else about the real 
essence of things. Realists have to add something in order to make their 
claims. Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything more to do 
science.

1.  Scientific empiricism, as I understand it, is virtually independent of 
any concern about abduction.  In physics, chemistry and politics, empiricism 
seeks ways to justify past, present or future events.  (Often, with the aid of 
statistics.)

Agreed.

2. “Names”, as I pointed out, are critical to the logic of chemistry.  Each 
chemical identity is an individual polynomial.  It is not historically or 
grammatically possible to completely separate the concept of  nominalism from 
the concept of names, is it?  The thread connecting the concept of nominalism 
to names may be weak, but it cannot be completely ignored.

Nominalism is grounded in a view of naming that it is arbitrary. Putnam and 
Kripke argue against this by arguing that the name should follow what Locke 
called the real essence. I don’t think that this was enough, since both retain 
some sort of verificationism and thus leave themselves open to my arguments 
from my thesis. Putnam explicitly calls his view internal realism, in contrast 
to metaphysical realism. Putnam’s view is a sort of nominalism. To reject it we 
need some sort of argument to the effect that naming is not arbitrary. Causal 
descriptivism is often invoked for this purpose (David Lewis, for example), but 
I don’t think this is enough; as Putnam argues, causation is “just more theory”.


2.  Now, for the most important comment.  It is almost certain that CSP’s 
notion of abduction as a method to generate a possibility space came directly 
from the concept of proof of structure.  It follows from his notions of medads 
and graphic relations and relatives and the concept of variable valences of 
elements.  The notion of abduction was a critical part of hybrid logic 
necessary to develop the simple algebra of labelled bipartite graph theory of 
the perplex number system.



I would have to put this terminology into terms of contemporary logic to see if 
I agree with this. I suspect I do, but right now I reserve judgement.


3.  Secondly, realists MUST add something to signs to make their claims. 
What must be added is the physical evidence that relates the parts (indices) to 
the whole (sinsigns) such that the abductive hypotheses can be distinguished 
from one another.



Agreed.

5. The assertion "Empiricists typically claim that we don't need anything more 
t

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

[John Collier]

This what I responded to the links when they were put up in a physics group on 
Facebook:
It isn't clear to me that this is different to matter. Geometrodynamics is a 
theory that matter has dimensions of space. It is interesting, if truly 
violating Einstein's theory of gravity, but that doesn't mean that we need to 
reject matter. I await further analysis.

And, responding to a further inquiry:
My Philosophy of Science teacher as an undergrad had just published a book on 
geometrodynamics. He was a student of Wheeler's, who was a proponent of the 
idea. The big problem is explaining QM in the approach. Particles have to 
grounded in wormholes, or strings, or something else with only spatial and 
temporal dimensions. So I raise it as an objection, but not necessarily a 
critical flaw.
 Conceptual Foundations of Contemporary Relativity Theory: .
https://www.amazon.com/Conceptual-Foundations.../0262570491<https://l.facebook.com/l.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.amazon.com%2FConceptual-Foundations-Contemporary...%2F0262570491=KAQEcp75m>
by John C. Graves (Author)

Later posts were made along the same line as mine. So far I don’t see a 
significant difference.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Monday, 19 December 2016 1:37 AM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

John C, Helmut, Clark, list,

Perhaps you've seen this recent report, "Verlinde's new theory of gravity 
passes first test." In a word, Verlinde's theory sees gravity as an emergent 
phenomenon which does not involve dark matter.

[Verlinde's theory] explains the mechanism behind gravity with his alternative 
to Einstein's theory, but also the origin of the mysterious extra gravity, 
which astronomers currently attribute to dark matter. Verlinde's new 
theory<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entropic_gravity> predicts how much 
gravity there must be, based only on the mass of the visible 
matter<http://phys.org/tags/visible+matter/>.
http://phys.org/news/2016-12-verlinde-theory-gravity.html#jCp

See also:

First proposed back in 2010<https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0785>, the new 
hypothesis states that gravity might behave and arise very differently than 
Einstein predicted, and an independent study of more than 30,000 galaxies has 
now found the first evidence to back this up.
http://www.sciencealert.com/a-controversial-new-gravity-hypothesis-has-passed-its-first-test

This initial test is described here:


[Astronomer Margot Brouwer at the Leiden Observatory] and her team measured the 
distribution of gravity around more than 33,000 galaxies to put Verlinde's 
prediction to the test. She concludes that Verlinde's theory agrees well with 
the measured gravity distribution. The results have been accepted for 
publication in the British journal Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical 
Society.

http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2016/12/-new-theory-of-gravity-as-an-emergent-phenomena-in-the-universe-first-tests-looks-interesting.html

Needless to say, Verlinde's theory is quite controversial.

Best,

Gary R



[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Sun, Dec 11, 2016 at 4:19 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Dark matter was first hypothesized in the 1930s to explain the motion of 
galaxies that could not be explained by the visible matter. It is called 
matter, because it exerts a gravitational effect. So there is good 
observational evidence for it. Other explanations, involving variations in the 
theory of gravity, have so far failed to fit the observations. What we don’t 
know is what makes it up. Also, there might be some other explanation for the 
observations, but that is pure speculation.

I agree with the criticism of string theory.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Gary Richmond 
[mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Sunday, 11 December 2016 1:14 AM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

Helmut, list,

Helmut wrote:

The hypothesis is dark matter, but there is no dark matter available for 
experiments. Also the string theory is not verifiable with experiments, because 
the hypothetic strings are smaller than anything detectable. So nowadays 
physics is somehow comparable with medieval scholastic theology.

Sometimes some of these postmodern theories (how many string theories have been 
proposed now?--I think over 12; and 'dark matter' seems almost an oxymoron), 
many o

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

[John Collier]

Just one small correction, John. For some theories, like number theory and set 
theory, there are statements that are true but not deducible. I would think 
they are entailed by the theory even if not provable, so I would call them part 
of the theory. Not everyone likes that, but I think we are stuck with that. 
There are also physical theories (Newtonian mechanics is one, but only in the 
limit; better cases come in thermodynamic theory in which the energy in a 
system can change by becoming unavailable). I use this as a criterion for 
emergence -- true under the theory but not deducible -- in a couple of my 
papers on my web site). I think these true but non-deducible consequences 
(entailments) of a theory are not laws, but ironically, as Prigogine (and also 
David Layzer) showed the existence of these cases is deducible from the theory. 
Likewise for number theory, as Goedel showed, though they are usually called 
theorems, not laws, in logic and mathematics. Interestingly, we can test some 
of these non-deducible consequences even though we can't deduce them from the 
theory. A relatively simple example is the formation of Bénard cells. We can 
understand the physics involved, and write the equations of motion, and 
determine the transformation point, but we can't predict the direction of 
movement of the cells. Planetary dynamics has many cases, my favourite being 
the 3-2 resonance of Mercury's rotation period to it revolution period -- it 
used be assumed that it would 1-1 like the moon. I learned about it from one of 
the discoverers, who demonstrated a similar phenomenon in class with a piece of 
aluminium wire loosely couple to a fan rotor. I suspect it was no accident that 
we were in the same building that Edward Lorenz worked in. The slightest 
difference in starting conditions could lead to different resonances. My point 
here is that the issue I am bringing up here has measurable but not predictable 
consequences in physics. I don't think Peirce was aware of such situations, 
though it was known in France at the end of the 19th Century that there were 
possible cases (but they are rather improbable). Lorenz came up with a real 
case from studying problems in meteorology.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: Tuesday, 13 December 2016 5:12 AM
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)
> 
> On 12/12/2016 1:24 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
> > I don’t like the term “legitimate” precisely because it’s ambiguous.
> > However I think good theories are theories that allow us to inquire
> > about their truthfulness by making somewhat testable predictions.
> 
> I agree with both points.
> 
> I think that some of the objections arise from different uses of the word
> 'theory'.  Logicians typically use the word 'theory'
> for the deductive closure of a set of propositions called axioms.
> They impose no constraints the relevance or applicability of the axioms to
> any kind of phenomena.
> 
> But scientists make a three-way distinction of hypotheses, theories, and
> laws:
> 
>   1. A law is a theory that has been thoroughly tested on some
>  observable phenomena and shown to be reliable in making
>  predictions about the future development of those phenomena.
> 
>   2. A theory is a hypothesis that has some relevance to some
>  observable phenomena about which it makes some testable
>  predictions.  But its reliability has not yet been
>  sufficiently tested for it to be accepted as a law.
> 
>   3. A hypothesis is any theory in the logicians' sense.
>  No tests of relevance or reliability have yet been made.
> 
> This distinction allows anyone to suggest a hypothesis at any time -- there is
> no penalty for proposing something irrelevant or untestable.  Then a
> community of inquirers may choose to collaborate in exploring some
> interesting hypotheses to determine which might be sufficiently promising
> for further development.
> 
> John
> 
> 


-
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

[John Collier]

I agree, Edwina, though I tell my students to always check with other sources 
(and don’t copy!). One of our brightest students, and my TA for a couple of 
years, was a big contributor of articles and editor for Wikipedia. He took it 
very seriously. There are rules about citing sources (failures to do this are 
typically noted). There is supposed to be no creative writing, just reporting 
wahat is said in identifiable sources. Both of these rules are often violated.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Tuesday, 13 December 2016 5:09 PM
To: Benjamin Udell <baud...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)

I don't think one should take a 'snooty' or elitist approach to Wikipedia. 
Their site is not totally filled with simplistic ignorant commentary by and for 
the unwashed masses. Their political commentary is, yes, biased as are most 
political commentaries. But their strictly mathematical and scientific comments 
are, as written by mathematicians and scientists, usually quite acceptable and 
informative.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell<mailto:baud...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce List<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, December 13, 2016 9:58 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Science (was Democracy)


I stated that it was Wikipedia to make clear that it was "for what it's worth". 
I confess that I was pressed for time. I did subsequently send a link to an 
article on the Planck length for the general public from Fermilab Today: 
http://www.fnal.gov/pub/today/archive/archive_2013/today13-11-01_NutshellReadMore.html
 . The other links that I sent were from the NYT (2009) about the 2009 paper in 
Nature, and the abstract of a scientific paper (2014) which contained a link to 
a PDF of the 2014 paper itself.

In addition, here's a link to Nature's summary "An intergalactic race in space 
and time: A burst of γ-rays lets scientists test quantum theories of gravity", 
for the general public, of the 2009 paper: 
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091028/full/news.2009.1044.html .
Here's a link to the 2009 paper itself (requires payment) "A limit on the 
variation of the speed of light arising from quantum gravity effects" 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v462/n7271/full/nature08574.html .
Here is the abstract http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2009Natur.462..331A :

A cornerstone of Einstein’s special relativity is Lorentz invariance—the 
postulate that all observers measure exactly the same speed of light in vacuum, 
independent of photon-energy. While special relativity assumes that there is no 
fundamental length-scale associated with such invariance, there is a 
fundamental scale (the Planck scale, lPlanck ~1.62×10-33 cm or EPlanck = 
MPlanck c2 ~1.22×1019 GeV), at which quantum effects are expected to strongly 
affect the nature of space-time. There is great interest in the (not yet 
validated) idea that Lorentz invariance might break near the Planck scale. A 
key test of such violation of Lorentz invariance is a possible variation of 
photon speed with energy. Even a tiny variation in photon speed, when 
accumulated over cosmological light-travel times, may be revealed by observing 
sharp features in γ-ray burst (GRB) light-curves. Here we report the detection 
of emission up to ~31GeV from the distant and short GRB090510. We find no 
evidence for the violation of Lorentz invariance, and place a lower limit of 
1.2EPlanck on the scale of a linear energy dependence (or an inverse wavelength 
dependence), subject to reasonable assumptions about the emission (equivalently 
we have an upper limit of lPlanck /1.2 on the length scale of the effect). Our 
results disfavour quantum-gravity theories in which the quantum nature of 
space-time on a very small scale linearly alters the speed of light.
[highlighting added]

Best, Ben

On 12/13/2016 9:29 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi<mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi> 
wrote:
If Wikipedia is taken as a scientific authority, then the situation is really 
bad.

Kirsti

Jerry LR Chandler kirjoitti 11.12.2016 22:36:

Ben, List:


On Dec 11, 2016, at 1:48 PM, Benjamin Udell 
<baud...@gmail.com><mailto:baud...@gmail.com>
wrote:

According to Wikipedia, the Planck length is, in principle, within a
factor of 10, the shortest measurable length – and no
theoretically known improvement in measurement instruments could
change that. But some physicists have found that that's not quite as
much of a barrier as it may seem to be.
 Your post is unclear. I know of no mathematical nor physical nor
chemical reason for such a conclusion about measurements of
commensurabilities.
Is the mathematics of electric field theory constrained by the
physical principles that motivate this

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[John Collier]

I haven’t been following this discussion closely due to illness, but it seems 
to me that a lot of the trouble with the role of subjects and predicates can be 
alleviated in favour of predicates) by Peirce’s colocalization. The SP 
distinction can be reinterpreted so that the subject becomes identified by a 
predicate with an index, making it in itself a dicisgn (proposition). So a 
subject-predicate form really combines two (or more) propositions). There is an 
extensive discussion of this in Frederik Sternfelt,  Natural Propositions, 4.2 
Co-localization as the basis of syntax (pp. 108-114). Unfortunately, to fully 
understand what Sternfelt is saying and how it relates to Peirce requires 
reading a good deal more in chapter 4 as well as chapter 3.

I am not sure that this solves the problem of the relation between Categories 
and Universes, but it did help me.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 20 October 2016 3:15 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)

Jeff, List:

JD:  I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes 
of signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, 
existents and necessitants.

That is certainly the dominant interpretation.  I only started questioning it 
because Peirce explicitly situated Possibles, Existents, and Necessitants in 
the three Universes in 1908; and two years earlier, he seemed to indicate that 
Universes only contain Subjects, while Categories only contain Predicates 
(including relations).  However, I now notice that he added the caveat that 
whether this is correct "is a question for careful study" (CP 4.545), and then 
proceeded to present a long and complicated analysis of propositions to explain 
why he found it unsatisfactory to view Universes as "receptacles of the 
Subjects alone" (CP 4.548).  So I am back to being confused about the 
distinction (if there is one) between Universes and Categories, especially 
since a predicate can be turned into a subject by hypostatic abstraction.

JD:  As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb ...

Ah, I guess this reference to Lieb is what you meant in the other thread.

Thanks,

Jon

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hi Jon S,

I believe that all of Peirce's tripartite distinctions between the classes of 
signs in the 66-fold system are based on the division between possibles, 
existents and necessitants. As such, I agree with Irwin Lieb when he argues in 
the essay at that is appended to the collection on Semiotics that consists of 
the Letters to Lady that all of the classes of signs can be understood on the 
basis of this division.

So, we have the following classifications of signs:
A. Mode of Apprehension of Sign itself: Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign
B. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Object: Descriptives, Designatives, 
Copulatives
C. Mode of Presentation of Immediate Interpretant: Hypotheticals, Categoricals, 
Relatives
D. Mode of Being of Dynamical Object: Abstractives, Occurrences, Collectives
E. Nature of the Dynamical Interpretant: Sympathetics, Percussives, Usuals
F. Nature and Purpose of the Final Interpretant: Emotional (aesthetic-produce 
feeling), Energetic (moral-produce action), Logical (scientific-produce self 
control)
G. Relation of Sign to its Dynamical Object: Icons (image, diagram, metaphor), 
Indices (reference to objects or facts), Symbols (general rule)
H. Relation of Sign to Dynamical Interpretant: Suggestives, Imperatives (e.g. 
interrogatives), Indicatives
I. Relation of Sign to the Final Interpretant: Rheme (Seme), Dicent (Pheme), 
Argument (Delome)
J. Nature of assurance in the triadic relation between sign, object and 
interpretant: Instinct, Experience, Form

So, for example, I think that the division of signs into suggestives, 
imperatives, indicatives hinges on the character of the relation of the sign to 
dynamical Interpretant as being a possible, an existent or an necessitant. How 
might a relation between a sign and a dynamical interpretant have such a 
character? My hunch is that his long discussions of the different kinds of 
relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories 
from within" and in his discussions of the nomenclature and division of dyadic 
and triad relations is meant to work that out.

--Jeff

--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354>


From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Wednesday, Oc

RE: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}

[John Collier]

From: John Collier
Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 10:16 AM
To: 'peirce-l'
Subject: FW: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}



From: John Collier
Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 10:05 AM
To: 'Jerry Rhee' <jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}



I see no problem here.  It is your linear rendition that gives the illusion it 
is a special problem. It isn’t a problem, so your rendition is off, being to 
narrow and isolated.



John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 9:26 AM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}



Wait, are you saying that the standards you use to determine good/bad is not a 
part of your consideration for determining the pragmatic maxim?



Then what is?







On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 2:24 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

I don’t. I only talk about g=better or worse.



John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 9:23 AM

To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}



and you get no recommendations for how to do any of that with the original 
maxim.  So, why do you say that it ought to be the pragmatic maxim?



On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 2:20 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Good ones support by explaining well established inductions, mostly. But more 
importantly they stand the test of time, as we get our ideas more clear and 
strengthen the inductions new discover by explaining them. That will do, but 
there is mot to it than that, like fitting into our other reasoning, and 
setting up novel inductive tests. Among other things like reasoning about 
immediate and final interpretants in the light of certain abductuions sand 
then, of course, testing the bringing us to a new spot in inquiry into the 
nature of things).



John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 9:05 AM

To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}



John,



Let me ask you.



How do you distinguish a good pragmatic maxim from a bad one?



Thanks,
J



On Sun, Oct 16, 2016 at 1:43 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Jerry, you are just not putting things together. I see liittle function in 
further discussion on this.



John Collier

Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate

Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Sunday, 16 October 2016 6:45 AM

To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] was Peirce's Cosmology {and Pragmatic Maxim}



oh, and btw, you said:

"Peirce himself tied the pragmatic maxim more closely to induction “Abduction … 
furnishes the reasoner with the problematic theory which induction verifies” CP 
2.776. In this case it is induction that connects us most closely to the world, 
providing the expectations of the pragmatic maxim."



Abduction provides the problematic theory:

1)  pragmaticism (C) is represented by CP 5.189 (A).  Then the inquirer is 
asked to render judgment for whether this is a good theory or not in induction, 
which calls for reasoning, pairing/parting/comparing C with A with standards 
for what is expected of C and what is explicitly stated of A.  This is 
induction.



Compare that against:

2)  pragmaticism (C) is represented by CP 5.402 (A).



To render a judgment for whether 1) is better than 2) is to ask what you think 
pragmaticism is.  There are lots of things in pragmaticism but the very least 
is knowing about the three categories and why C has to be First, A has to be 
Second and B has to be Third.  These are questions you can't even ask of CP 
5.402.  So, if that is the criterion, then 1) beats 2) because criterion.



The issue is whether we are brave enough to state what such standards are 
before we examine the theory, which can't even be expressed with help of 5.402 
but can be expressed through 5.189.  This is so obvious and matter of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

[John Collier]

I agree with Jon, of course. He is right about the confusion, and the issue I 
tried to address in my previous post was to find some common unifying factor, 
not necessarily the best statement of the pragmatic maxim. Nonetheless, I 
believe there are better and worse versions, and that these are far outweighed 
by partial versions (not to mention outright misunderstandings).

The non-existence of a single or best pragmatic maxim in Peirce makes Jerry’s 
request of me impossible to satisfy., as I tried in a rather around about way 
to explain.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 8:24 PM
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Maxims (was Peirce's Cosmology)

List:

Per Gary R.'s request, I am shifting this discussion to a new thread topic.  I 
would appreciate it if others would do likewise when extending any of the other 
ongoing conversations about pragmatic maxims or other subjects besides Peirce's 
cosmology.

There seems to be a confusion here between "the pragmatic maxim," which is a 
very specific principle of methodeutic with multiple formulations in Peirce's 
writings, and "the best pragmatic maxim," which is not something that Peirce 
ever discussed as far as I can tell.  In particular, CP 5.189 is not the 
pragmatic maxim, nor even a pragmatic maxim in the same sense, so it is 
certainly not the best pragmatic maxim.  For one thing, as we established 
recently in another thread, it is the form of inference for abduction only, and 
thus falls under logical critic.  The pragmatic maxim subsequently serves as a 
tool for admitting hypotheses that are amenable to deductive explication and 
inductive evaluation, and rejecting those that are not.

In any case, there is no need to guess or speculate which pragmatic maxim 
Peirce had in mind when he wrote the following ...

That is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render 
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as 
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful 
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is all that the maxim of pragmatism really 
pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is not 
understood as a proposition in psychology. (CP 5.196; 1903)

... because he told us in the very next sentence.

For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or 
import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in 
connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify 
our practical conduct differently from that second conception.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 12:14 PM, Jerry Rhee 
<jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>> wrote:
John Collier, John Sowa, Kirsti Maatanen, Edwina Taborsky, list:

John Collier:
But that is my point.  Isn't a pragmatic maxim to be taken strictly since it is 
carefully crafted, with logographic necessity, then it shouldn't be handled 
loosely.  To say that such things are in the pragmatic maxim (the pragmatic 
maxim and not a pragmatic maxim) also implies that it is in ONE pragmatic 
maxim, the best one.  So, which one?  I think this is the matter that does not 
get criticized enough.
__

John Sowa, Edwina:

"logos means something rather like calculation than religion..." ~Strauss

“The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number 
and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them?

Sophist, statesman, philosopher! O my dear Theodorus, do my ears truly witness 
that this is the estimate formed of them by the great calculator and 
geometrician?”
~Plato

“By understanding both sophistry (in its highest as well as in its lower 
meanings) and statesmanship, one will understand what philosophy is.”~Strauss

“When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which 
experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent 
arguments in its favor, each independent argument pro or con produces a certain 
impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its quantity upon the 
frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to the truth, and the 
algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant impression that measures 
the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole.” ~Peirce

The way begets one;
One begets two;
Two begets three;
Three begets the myriad creatures.
~Lau 42


Kirsti,

You said:
I just wished to point out that it indeed is ver

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[John Collier]

Jerry, there are various differently stated versions of the pragmatic maxim, 
and it is also implicit in other work by Peirce.

One way of putting the maxim is that any difference in meaning implies a 
difference in the possibilities of (external) experience on which they are 
grounded. You can experience this as a feeling (what might be true) as an 
inferred difference, or as an explanation of the difference. Of course, 
separating the three except in the abstract, is impossible. That is what I 
meant when I said I thought Edwina was right about inseperability. She may have 
meant more or less that I didn’t notice.

This sort of thinking is found throughout Peirce’s writing. I don’t think there 
are any grounds for controversy about that. The interesting thing to me, in 
this case, is that it can be applied reflectively.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 6:31 PM
To: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

John Collier, list:

You said:  I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in the 
pragmatic maxim.

Do you mind stating where, in the pragmatic maxim, it says this?

I'm not questioning whether it is or not.  I'm just not sure to what you are 
referring.

Thank you,
Jerry R

On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 11:26 AM, John F Sowa 
<s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:
On 10/15/2016 9:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Since I am rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin
of the universe, I stick with the Big Bang for now.

I agree with Heraclitus and my namesake, John the Evangelist:

Heraclitus wrote about the logos — translated variously as word,
speech, or reason: "all things (panta) come into being according to
this logos." The Greek concept of logos, which can also be translated
account, reckoning, or even computation is broad enough to encompass
all the abstractions of mathematics, metaphysics, and the sciences.

A few centuries after Heraclitus, John the Evangelist wrote "In the
beginning was the logos, and the logos was with God, and God was the
logos. It was in the beginning with God. All things (panta) came into
being through it, and without it nothing that has come to be came into
being" (1,1-3).  John and Heraclitus used the same words logos, panta,
and gignomai (come to be).  What they meant by those words, however,
has been a matter of debate for millennia.

As a realist, I believe that the logos exists.  To relate it to modern
science and to Peirce, I believe that the logos is the truth that is
the goal of unrestricted inquiry by unlimited generations of "scientific
intelligence" by which Peirce meant any intelligence that is capable of
learning from experience.

John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

[John Collier]

I agree with Edwina that all three elements are involved in the pragmatic 
maxim. Itself it is a representamen of the possibility of (discovering) meaning 
(or at least meaning differences). It is also, as an object, a methodology, but 
understood not as some theory but was a way in which something, in this case 
the determination of meaning, is done. As interpretant it gives the meaning of 
meaning, or perhaps better, the meaning of how to determine meaning.

It is tempting to see the representamen as possible meaning (or difference in 
meaning – the  version I prefer), its object as meaning, and it gives the 
meaning of meaning, its final interpretant being the integrated whole of 
meaning. However I think this would ignore its pragmatic aspect, which places 
emphasis on doing things like making mean9ngs clear.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, 15 October 2016 2:32 AM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>; Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

Edwina, list:

I apologize if I missed something but what you just stated was basically all 
only generals.

What I am asking for is to apply those generals to the question of the 
pragmatic maxim and provide the argumentation, that is, the specific premisses 
(e.g., what is the object or original stimuli?).

That is,

1) If the pragmatic maxim is the object,
then what is the representamen and what the interpretant?

2) If the pragmatic maxim is the representamen/index,
then what is the object/icon and what the interpretant/symbol?

_

Here is a clearer way of putting things.  You said:

The Object of a syllogism is the minor premise  (the surprising fact, C, is 
observed...)

the Representamen is the major premise  (But if A were...)

the Interpretant is the Conclusion. (B, that which goes from surprise to 
suspect is true).

So, is the following correct?  If not, please correct me.

1)C = pragmatic maxim
   A = Consider what effects…
   B = lots of freedom for what I can conceive about which you will deny

or,

2)C = pragmaticism
   A = pragmatic maxim
   B = Consider what effects…

For case 2), do you see why I object to “Consider what effects…”?
It doesn’t fully/wholly/completely capture the essence of pragmaticism, e.g., 
things like the categories, of which there are three; ordinality, philosophy of 
Socrates, the commens, convergence to truth, etc...

Best,
Jerry Rhee

Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you 
conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those 
effects is the whole of your conception of the object.

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 7:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Gary R., List:

Thanks for the reminders about Sheriff's book; it was one of my first 
introductions to Peirce's thought, and I even re-read it recently, but I need 
to review the portions that you mentioned in light of the discussions in this 
thread.  Thanks also for the additional information on the role of the 
categories in Peirce's classification of the sciences.

GR:  I would tend to disagree with you, Jon, that this ur-continutiy is 
"created" 3ns; rather, I see it as "creative" 3ns as distinguished from the 3ns 
that become the habits and laws of a created universe. So, in a word, my view 
is that only these laws and habits are the 'created' 3nses.

As I said, taking the blackboard to be created Thirdness is no more than a 
working hypothesis at this point.  If the diagram is confined to the blackboard 
itself, as Peirce's description seems to indicate, then your characterization 
makes more sense.  I am still toying with a couple of other alternatives, as 
well.

GR:  How can one deny Peirce's own words here?

Yes, any alleged "reading" or "interpretation" that directly contradicts what 
an author explicitly states in the text is obviously untenable.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Fri, Oct 14, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Jon, Edwina, Gary F, Soren, List,

John Sheriff, in Charles Peirce's Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human 
Significance, in commenting on what Peirce calls the "pure zero" state (which, 
in my thinking, is roughly equivalent to the later blackboard metaphor) quotes 
Peirce as follows: "So of potential being there was in that initial state no 
lack" (CP 6.217) 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[John Collier]

I assume Peirce is distinguishing from Cartesian doubt. Genuine doubt has a 
reason (or at least prima facie reason) for the doubt. Doubt based on mere 
possibilities of something being false is not genuine doubt.

John Collier
Emeritus Professor and Senior Research Associate
Philosophy, University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 29 September 2016 5:52 AM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>>; Peirce-L 
<PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu<mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Hi everyone:

"We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out whether, 
in fact, this is the case."

Where is genuine doubt?

Thanks,
Jerry R

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Clark, List:

As (hopefully) clarified in my subsequent messages, I am not saying that the PM 
itself is "deductive"; rather, it serves as the rule for admitting hypotheses 
to the deductive stage of inquiry once they have been produced and 
justified--because they plausibly account for the facts--by abduction.

CSP:  For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical 
effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far as, 
taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably 
modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception.  Now it 
is indisputable that no rule of abduction would be admitted by any philosopher 
which should prohibit on any formalistic grounds any inquiry as to how we ought 
in consistency to shape our practical conduct.  Therefore, a maxim which looks 
only to possibly practical considerations will not need any supplement in order 
to exclude any hypotheses as inadmissible.  What hypotheses it admits all 
philosophers would agree ought to be admitted.  On the other hand, if it be 
true that nothing but such considerations has any logical effect or import 
whatever, it is plain that the maxim of pragmatism cannot cut off any kind of 
hypothesis which ought to be admitted.  Thus, the maxim of pragmatism, if true, 
fully covers the entire logic of abduction. (CP 5.196)

My earlier point was that identifying how a conception "might conceivably 
modify our practical conduct" seems like (deductive) explication to me--the 
hypothesis that a diamond is hard means, for one thing, "that it will not be 
scratched by many other substances" (CP 5.403).  We can then (inductively) 
experiment with actual diamonds to find out whether, in fact, this is the case. 
 In Peirce's words that I quoted previously, the PM also "cut[s] down the 
premisses of deduction" by rejecting hypotheses that have no bearing on 
"possibly practical considerations," and thus do not warrant any further 
attention.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Clark Goble 
<cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote:
On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:

The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is 
why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.  I wonder if another way to 
highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but 
pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.
Why do you see it as primarily deductive? I ask since the mature form of the 
pragmatic maxim is to consider all the possible consequences (meaning practical 
differences we can detect). That seems inherently an abductive consideration 
although the actual measurement would be a combination of deductive and 
inductive against a perhaps more abductive theoretical scaffolding. But any 
particular detection that something is hard is different from the meaning of 
say a diamond being hard.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

[John Collier]

I used Peirce’s ideas fairly prominently in my philosophy of science courses in 
the 1980s and 90s. I also used his work to cast light on Kuhnian issues both in 
my classes and in my doctoral dissertation. Although the last was accepted 
enthusiastically, I continually got grumblings about how  was not teaching the 
Standard View properly.

Maybe things have improved, with more naturalistic approaches becoming more 
prevalent, but the culture wars really made a mess of trying to bring in 
Peircean ideas because the view that science was a mere social construct seemed 
to be supported by naïve interpretations of Peirce. So I found myself 
apparently fighting myself at some times.

Joh

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Monday, 12 September 2016 11:32 PM
To: Gary Richmond; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


On Sep 10, 2016, at 7:57 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:

Edwina wrote: And I recall a Nobel Laureate in physics, in a conference, 
declaring that Peircean semiotics was a vital analytic framework for physics.

This might very well have been Ilya Prigogine, the Belgian physical chemist who 
won the Nobel prize for his work in complex systems, irreversibility and what, 
perhaps, he's become best known for, dissipative structures in thermodynamic 
systems far from equilibrium.

Several years ago I briefly discussed how he was influenced by Peirce as, for 
example, he discussed it in Order Out of Chaos(1984) which he co-authored with 
Isabel Stengers (Jaime Nubiola commented on the list that Prigogine was 
probably introduced to Peirce by Stengers who, apparently, knew his work well).

“Peirce’s [work]. . . appears to be a pioneering step towards the understanding 
of the pluralism involved in physical laws." Prigogine


There appear to be a surprising number of physicists who are Peircean. Lee 
Smolin is a prominent one who used a lot of Peircean notions in his critique of 
physics culture and in particular string theory. Peirce pops up in various 
guises in many of his writings. Every now and then an article on him appears in 
Physics Today. While I don’t know enough string theory to say anything 
intelligent I know there are a few papers applying Peirce there including one 
by a Nicolaidis at the theoretical physics department at the University of 
Thessaloniki in Greece. Glancing at the paper it seems he’s trying to tie 
together Peirce and category theory.

I’m actually frequently surprised that a Peircea style philosophy of science 
hasn’t been more prominent let alone more significant. That may just be 
reflecting my far more limited reading in that field of late.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] How to judge what is pseudoscience?

[John Collier]

I can’t post to the Sadhu Sanga list (and don’t want to), so I am posting to 
Peirce-L

Not the Lorenz transformations alone. They would not give the right result for 
Mercury’s precession. In fact it would be hard to apply them in a non ad hoc 
way.

Something many people don’t know is that STR is incompatible with gravity. It 
was developed to explain electrodynamics. Einstein used a non-empirical 
assumption, that the correct laws of physics should be the same from all frames 
of reference. This gives STR pretty much directly from Maxwell’s equations. But 
gravity doesn’t fit. So he needed a more inclusive theory. There may be other 
ways to make gravity fit (Mach’s Principle was one proposal, but nobody has 
ever been able to figure out how it would work mathematically).

Some philosophers and historians have argued that Lorenz’ theory of the 
electron gives a better theory than STR. The famous British astronomer, E.T. 
Whittaker argued for Lorenz’ approach as late as 1931, and didn’t eve n mention 
Einstein. I haven’t seen it argued recently except to note that the way to 
Quantum Mechanics might have been more straightforward if Einstein hadn’t come 
up with STR.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: online_sadhu_sa...@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:online_sadhu_sa...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Stephen Jarosek
Sent: Friday, 08 July 2016 10:24 AM
To: online_sadhu_sa...@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [Sadhu Sanga] How to judge what is pseudoscience?

>”Einstein's work took longer to gain acceptance, and as we have seen, there 
>are hold-outs to this day (100 years later).”

As a non-physicist, I pose the question… might the Lorentz transformations, in 
the absence of the assumptions of relativity theory, be sufficient to account 
for the anomalous precession of Mercury that has been observed?


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific method

[John Collier]

Dear Olga, List,

Science has both advantages and limitations due to its method. On the advantage 
side, one can come up with ideas galore, but to be accepted as scientific they 
have to be tested and alternative explanations of the phenomena be shown to not 
provide an explanation. This requires that a) all scientific hypotheses must be 
falsifiable, b) there must be methods for testing these hypotheses (not quite 
the same as (a)), and c) due to the mutual dependence of (a) and especially (b) 
on other assumptions (called “auxiliary assumptions” in most places, science 
has to progress piecemeal based on previous scientific knowledge. Science is 
also subject to major shifts (revolutions) when we have ignored evidence (e.g., 
the properties of the very small as found in quantum mechanics) or 
misinterpreted it (e.g., Mercury’s precession values). Typically, though, much 
of established science is retained at least as an approximation in any new 
theory. I could add a lot (found in Kuhn, Feyerabend and other 
anti-reductionist-empiricists) about how science can progress in order to add 
to scientific knowledge, but it would take too long here. Suffice to say that 
these things further limit point (b). On the disadvantage side, the problems 
follow from the same factors, especially (b) and (c), since it means that 
science must proceed piecemeal, and at any given time there will be large areas 
that are not accessible to current science with it current methods and 
presuppositions. Much of this area to which current science is blind is exactly 
there area that is of most interest in our human pursuits. I might add that 
when science does try to deal outside of its current scope it often gets into 
trouble. I am thinking in particular of recent work that shows that fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) has serious problems as it has been 
used in at least thousands of important neuropsychological studies, meaning  
they will need to be done over again, at the very least. This is hardly the 
only example, just one that is currently shaking things up. At least, though. 
The very methods of science can (and did in this case) find such problems and 
show how to correct them. The biggest strength of science is not its scope or 
ability to find general truths about the world, but its self-correcting 
character.

When dealing with things outside the scope of science, and even inside (given 
the fallibility of science) other areas of human knowledge are need. They are 
what we can fall back on. Myth, religion, literature, philosophy and so on can 
be very useful as long as we don’t place them on the same level of precision 
and  verifiability as we can science.

I think it helps even in these areas, though, to keep some of the scientific 
attitude and remain somewhat skeptical of untested results, taking them as at 
best tentative (and not God-given or from some other source of certainty). Our 
past experience has shown us that almost none of these other areas are 
universal for all space and time, or even between cultures.

So even if science has its built in limitations, and is far from being able to 
answer all the questions we might have about humans in the world, elements of 
the scientific attitude are still very helpful. But I think it would be to 
throw the baby out with the bathwater to just ignore everything that doesn’t 
meet current scientific standards.

I haven’t discussed the abuse of science, which like other sources of power 
gets misused by powerful and/or charismatic people, but it is  a danger that at 
least science itself is in principle capable of meeting through it very methods.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Olga [mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, 05 July 2016 11:35 PM
To: Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The auhor's claim: There is no *distinctly* scientific 
method

Gary,

List,

I am certainly overwhelmed and lost in translation so have mercy on me, simply 
try to find this merely amusing but how taking into account "revelation" or 
"miracles"

"how is it that the results of science are more reliable than what is provided 
by these other forms?"


Imho science is way behind in defining certain processes, concepts or things 
comparing to other forms...


As an example of revelation,
Dmitri Mendeleev<http://www.famousscientists.org/dmitri-mendeleev/> was 
obsessed with finding a logical way to organize the chemical elements. It had 
been preying on his mind for months but... he made his discovery in a dream...

Imho science is slowly describing in its own language of numbers and parameters 
what can be or was already fully grasped by a human mind and vivid imagination. 
It seems to me that

Quantified precision with exceptions defeats ideal as a whole

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

[John Collier]

OK, this seems better to me, especially in communication among people, but I 
still resist the idea that the immediate object is generally an average in any 
sense. My problem is trying to fit that idea into my understanding of 
information flow (using Barwise and Seligman’s technical approach to make sense 
of Dretske’s Knowledge and the Flow of Information). David Lewis’s work on the 
conventionality of meanings in communication does seem to require something 
like what you identify.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 24 June 2016 8:48 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being
I think this notion of “true in the main” is more or less what average means 
relative to the immediate object. It’s not really average in the sense of mean 
in its strict mathematical sense. Rather it’s the distinction between what 
Peirce calls the coenoscopic and idioscopic senses of such terms.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being

[John Collier]

The “average” notion is distinctly misleading. Suggests an external averager 
that does not exist. It is an abstraction at best, and typically ignores 
aspects of the dynamics object (but I think could even get it entirely wrong 
and still be the immediate object – it depends on context for this to happen)

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Thursday, 23 June 2016 12:07 AM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Copula and Being


On Jun 22, 2016, at 1:10 PM, Benjamin Udell 
<baud...@gmail.com<mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote:

   i. Immediate object: the object as represented in the sign [DELETE], a kind 
of statistical, "average" version of the given object [END DELETE. Gary 
Richmond, as I recall, convinced me that my text there was mistaken].

Yes, I’m not sure I’d agree with the “average” notion either.

At the Wikipedia articles there are footnotes with references to primary 
sources, often with links to the primary sources.

I have to confess I don’t check Wikipedia on technical topics often due to most 
being a mix of good and egregious. But I think you and others are to be praised 
for trying to improve the Peirce related areas.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[John Collier]

Clark, on my information-theoretic account of causation (and I think generally 
on Russellian “at-at” accounts of causal connection, the evolution of the wave 
function is causal. As Nancy Cartwright has argued, causation is used in many 
ways that overlap like a family resemblance. Perhaps I should have made it 
clear that I was thinking in terms of causation as a process, not some general 
unrestricted view of causation (which I don’t think exists, despite centuries 
of philosophers trying to find one).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Monday, 23 May 2016 8:25 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@LIST.IUPUI.EDU>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns


On May 20, 2016, at 2:56 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

There are versions of what science is supposed to do that don’t worry about 
causation, but just try to find regularities. The more extreme forms of this 
are instrumentalism (like Mach) or Pierre Duhem’s antirealist view of physics 
in Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Duhem thought that the real causes 
were supernatural (he was very religious) and were not captured by physics, 
which merely “saves the appearances”.

I prefer the causal view of scientific explanation because it puts on a 
stronger constraint (though Bas van Fraassen, another believer, would argue 
that it doesn’t really). In any case, testing scientific theories typically 
requires interacting with their objects, which can only be done causally – our 
connection to the natural world is causal. If there is no difference in 
detectable causes, then there is no real difference in the theories. This is 
not quite the same as Peirce, but not so different to his pragmaticism either.

It’s worth asking how Peirce would have seen Dewey’s particular form of 
instrumentalism. Of course Dewey’s tendency to deny that truth was relevant for 
such instruments goes against Peirce’s particular conceptions. But I think once 
we break out the ideas of “in the long run” as Peirce’s conception of truth 
from more short term facets of instrumental use that perhaps Dewey and Peirce 
are more compatible here than many assume.

I confess I get skeptical about the way causation tends to get thrown around in 
descriptions. Perhaps it’s just from calculating far too many Hamiltonians in 
my undergraduate education. With the Hamiltonian it’s just harder to think in 
terms of causation rather than evolution of the wave function.

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RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[John Collier]

Helmut,

There are versions of what science is supposed to do that don’t worry about 
causation, but just try to find regularities. The more extreme forms of this 
are instrumentalism (like Mach) or Pierre Duhem’s antirealist view of physics 
in Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Duhem thought that the real causes 
were supernatural (he was very religious) and were not captured by physics, 
which merely “saves the appearances”.

I prefer the causal view of scientific explanation because it puts on a 
stronger constraint (though Bas van Fraassen, another believer, would argue 
that it doesn’t really). In any case, testing scientific theories typically 
requires interacting with their objects, which can only be done causally – our 
connection to the natural world is causal. If there is no difference in 
detectable causes, then there is no real difference in the theories. This is 
not quite the same as Peirce, but not so different to his pragmaticism either.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Friday, 20 May 2016 9:54 PM
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: g...@gnusystems.ca; 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

John,
that is interesting to me, as I did not know, that reverse engineering is 
merely about the result or function, but not about the codes or causes. Still I 
wonder, how can a scientist be sure, that the causal structure in his 
hypotheses duplicates the causal structure of nature, and is not a parallel, 
equally working, but different, structure. I guess, this has to do with 
induction: Again and again, there are no deviations found between theory and 
nature. And if a deviation is found, then a new part of hypothesis is formed, 
that explains it, and must be experimentally verified (like the Higgs-boson). 
Maybe the string theory suffers from the lack of possibility to verify it, 
because nobody can detect anything in this small scale? I wonder whether Rosen 
claims, that there can be a final evidence, that theoretical and natural 
structures are the same. But maybe this is a deviation from the topic, or a too 
early anticipation to the topic induction, and whether there can be a complete 
induction, and whether completeness of induction may have two different causal 
/ coding paths or not... (I guess, not), and so on.
Best,
Helmut

 20. Mai 2016 um 20:48 Uhr
 "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Helmut,

Although the idea of science as reverse engineering is intriguing, it does not 
fit my view of what science does when it is successful. Reverse engineering 
studies how something works in order to reproduce the function. It doesn’t 
necessarily, and usually does not, use the same causes: the reverse engineered 
program and the program that results from reverse engineering may well not have 
much at all in terms of common code (inferences). My understanding was that 
this is why reverse engineered programs don’t violate copyright.

Science, on the other hand, tries to find the actual causes. A common view of 
the relation between theory and reality (due to Hertz originally, but developed 
in detail by Robert Rosen) is that the logical structure of the theory should 
duplicate the causal structure of what the theory is about. This is a much 
tighter relationship than required for successful reverse engineering.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Friday, 20 May 2016 6:28 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

List,
when I read about the comparison of science / mathematics with engineering, the 
term "reverse-engineering" comes into my mind. Perhaps a hypothesis in physics 
is an attempt to reverse-engineer an aspect of nature, and a mathematical 
hypothesis, to reverse-engineer an aspect of logic?
In creativity though, it is somehow different, say, in biological evolution and 
in arts: Here there is no reverse-engineering of something already existing, 
but the hypothesis is a hypothesis of viability: Might this or that new 
combination work out to be fulfilling (in evolution) a species members needs, 
conquer a niche, or, in arts, be esthetic, logical, or deliver an extraordinary 
view of some kind- or even an- even more viable-  combination of the three, 
like a complex emotion. I think, Ezra Pounds parts of poetry (melopoeia, 
logopoeia, phanopoeia) apply to music and painting too: A picture can have a 
melody and a logic , a peace of music a logic (eg. Bach), or even paint 
something in the mind. S

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

[John Collier]

Helmut,

Although the idea of science as reverse engineering is intriguing, it does not 
fit my view of what science does when it is successful. Reverse engineering 
studies how something works in order to reproduce the function. It doesn’t 
necessarily, and usually does not, use the same causes: the reverse engineered 
program and the program that results from reverse engineering may well not have 
much at all in terms of common code (inferences). My understanding was that 
this is why reverse engineered programs don’t violate copyright.

Science, on the other hand, tries to find the actual causes. A common view of 
the relation between theory and reality (due to Hertz originally, but developed 
in detail by Robert Rosen) is that the logical structure of the theory should 
duplicate the causal structure of what the theory is about. This is a much 
tighter relationship than required for successful reverse engineering.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Friday, 20 May 2016 6:28 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns

List,
when I read about the comparison of science / mathematics with engineering, the 
term "reverse-engineering" comes into my mind. Perhaps a hypothesis in physics 
is an attempt to reverse-engineer an aspect of nature, and a mathematical 
hypothesis, to reverse-engineer an aspect of logic?
In creativity though, it is somehow different, say, in biological evolution and 
in arts: Here there is no reverse-engineering of something already existing, 
but the hypothesis is a hypothesis of viability: Might this or that new 
combination work out to be fulfilling (in evolution) a species members needs, 
conquer a niche, or, in arts, be esthetic, logical, or deliver an extraordinary 
view of some kind- or even an- even more viable-  combination of the three, 
like a complex emotion. I think, Ezra Pounds parts of poetry (melopoeia, 
logopoeia, phanopoeia) apply to music and painting too: A picture can have a 
melody and a logic , a peace of music a logic (eg. Bach), or even paint 
something in the mind. So, abduction in this case is not only telling something 
about the origin of a sample of beans or something else, already existing, but 
to create something new. This new thing though must fit somehow into old 
schemes, otherwise it would not be regarded as viable or extraordinary. But, 
once established, it changes or widenes the old schemes. This evolutionary 
thing, maybe, is the uniqueness of abduction?
Best,
Helmut

Gesendet: Freitag, 20. Mai 2016 um 15:45 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
An: 'Peirce-L' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: 6 vectors and 3 inference patterns
Jon,

Ben’s post has said a lot of what I would have said, so I’ll just add a few 
notes by insertion here …

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 19-May-16 09:13

Gary F., List:
Gf: Science as a discipline of engineering? That’s too much of a stretch for me 
... It would be like claiming that mathematics is a discipline of physics. Only 
more so.  ☺
Js: Well, I acknowledged that it is a provocative notion.  The point is that 
science is pursued with the same basic motivation--transforming dissatisfaction 
into satisfaction--as engineering and any other human endeavor.
Gf: Now I’m seeing the limitations of your hypothesis that ALL human endeavor 
is rooted in dissatisfaction. It seems to ignore more positive motivations such 
as curiosity, participation and playfulness in all its forms. The quest for 
knowledge can be much more than an escape from a state of dissatisfaction. 
Peirce’s dictum would, I suppose, portray not yet possessing the object of 
one’s quest as a “state of dissatisfaction,” but that’s only one perspective on 
the questing tendency.
Gf: Engineering, as I understand it, always involves some technology, some 
manipulation of the physical world for some conscious purpose other than 
discovery of its nature.
Js: Why should discovering the nature of the physical world be privileged over 
all other conscious purposes?
Gf: It isn’t, except by a physicist per se. But discovery of principles in 
nature — including the nature of conscious purposes as a specialized subset of 
final causes, or natural purposes — is, for any philosopher, ethically 
privileged over manipulation of any kind, because self-control depends on it. 
It is also privileged over “Practice,” according to Peirce, because for 
Science, “Nature is something great, and beautiful, and sacred, and eternal, 
and real,— the object of its worship and its aspiration. It therein takes an 
entirely different attitude toward facts from that which Practice takes” 
(EP2:55).
Gf: The conception or sel

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems Of Interpretation

[John Collier]

Thanks for the context, Jerry. I am not familiar with the passage, but it does 
seem, by your account, to be peculiar at best. I would agree that the standard 
representation of NH3 puts all of the nodes (the endpoints, or perhaps the 
branches, representing hydrogen atoms and the centre the nitrogen atom). This 
is a structure of relations, and I see no reason why it would need to be 
interpreted as a third. That is quite unlike the triple relation of the sign, 
unless we are missing something here, I have no idea what it might be. Your 
explanation seems plausible to me, given Peirce's (near) obsession with threes, 
but it is also such an obvious error that I can't help but wonder if we are 
missing something.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

> -Original Message-
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, 05 April 2016 6:24 AM
> To: Peirce List
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems Of Interpretation
> 
> Jon, John:
> 
> Thanks, Jon.
> 
> The question I raised was in order to seek alternative interpretations of 
> CSP’s
> diagram of a chemical structure, ammonia.  (NH3)
> 
> He showed it as a triad.  The nitrogen atom was in the middle of the three
> hydrogens, each at the end of a spoke.  NOT a triangle.
> 
> But, the chemical atoms are all of the nature and co-exist as relatives.  So,
> four atoms but only a triad.
> Why?
> 
> My feeling is that CSP wanted a triad so that he made one.
> This is not a satisfactory inquiry into a  diagrammatic assertion.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> 
> 
> > On Apr 3, 2016, at 5:04 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
> >
> > Peircers,
> >
> > Questions about the meaning of the “central hub” in the “three-spoked”
> > picture of an elementary sign relation have often come up, just
> > recently among Jerry Chandler's questions and a question Mary Libertin
> > asked on my blog.
> > Maybe the answer I gave there can help to clear that up:
> >
> > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/31/systems-of-interpretation-%E2
> > %80%A2-5/#comment-32800
> >
> > The central “spot”, as Peirce called it [in his logical graphs], is
> > located on a different logical plane, since it is really a
> > place-holder for the whole sign relation or possibly for the
> > individual triple.  Normally I would have labeled it with a letter to
> > indicate the whole sign relation, say L, or else the individual
> > triple, say ℓ = (o, s, i).
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Jon
> >
> > On 3/31/2016 1:24 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> >> Post : Systems Of Interpretation • 5
> >> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/31/systems-of-interpretation-%e
> >> 2%80%a2-5/
> >> Date : March 31, 2016 at 10:24 am
> >>
> >> Subthread:
> >> MB:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18534
> >>
> EVD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18540
> >>
> JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18552
> >> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18553
> >> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18554
> >>
> >> Mike, Val, Jerry, List,
> >>
> >> Here is the revised edition of my last comment on the order issue.
> >> (I am hoping I can get to the rest of Jerry's questions eventually.)
> >>
> >> Figure 2. An Elementary Sign Relation (and see attached)
> >> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/awbrey-awbrey-
> >> 1999-elementary-sign-relation.gif
> >>
> >> An elementary sign relation is an ordered triple (o, s, i).
> >> It is called ''elementary'' because it is one element of a sign
> >> relation L ⊆ O × S × I, where O is a set of objects, S is a set of
> >> signs, and I is a set of interpretant signs that are collectively
> >> called the ''domains'' of the relation.
> >>
> >> But what is the significance of that ordering?
> >>
> >> In any presentation of subject matter we have to distinguish the
> >> natural order of things from the order of consideration or
> >> presentation in which things are taken up on a given occasion.
> >>
> >> The natural order of things comes to light through the discovery of
> >> invariants over a variety of presentations and representations.
> >> That type of order tends to take a considerable effort to reveal.
> >>
> >> The order o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems Of Interpretation

[John Collier]

I strongly agree, Jon. Reading meaning into artefacts of the representation is 
not typically transparent. I would say that the whole symbol represents the 
sign with its threefold character and that the node is not some separate 
signifier. To put it on this level is, as you suggest, a category error.



Sent from my Samsung device


 Original message 
From: Jon Awbrey 
Date: 2016/04/04 00:04 (GMT+02:00)
To: Peirce List 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems Of Interpretation

Peircers,

Questions about the meaning of the “central hub” in the
“three-spoked” picture of an elementary sign relation
have often come up, just recently among Jerry Chandler's
questions and a question Mary Libertin asked on my blog.
Maybe the answer I gave there can help to clear that up:

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/31/systems-of-interpretation-%E2%80%A2-5/#comment-32800

The central “spot”, as Peirce called it [in his logical graphs],
is located on a different logical plane, since it is really a
place-holder for the whole sign relation or possibly for the
individual triple.  Normally I would have labeled it with a
letter to indicate the whole sign relation, say L, or else
the individual triple, say ℓ = (o, s, i).

Regards,

Jon

On 3/31/2016 1:24 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> Post : Systems Of Interpretation • 5
> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/03/31/systems-of-interpretation-%e2%80%a2-5/
> Date : March 31, 2016 at 10:24 am
>
> Subthread:
> MB:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18534
> EVD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18540
> JLRC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18552
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18553
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18554
>
> Mike, Val, Jerry, List,
>
> Here is the revised edition of my last comment on the order issue.
> (I am hoping I can get to the rest of Jerry's questions eventually.)
>
> Figure 2. An Elementary Sign Relation (and see attached)
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/awbrey-awbrey-1999-elementary-sign-relation.gif
>
> An elementary sign relation is an ordered triple (o, s, i).
> It is called ''elementary'' because it is one element of a
> sign relation L ⊆ O × S × I, where O is a set of objects,
> S is a set of signs, and I is a set of interpretant signs
> that are collectively called the ''domains'' of the relation.
>
> But what is the significance of that ordering?
>
> In any presentation of subject matter we have to distinguish
> the natural order of things from the order of consideration or
> presentation in which things are taken up on a given occasion.
>
> The natural order of things comes to light through the discovery
> of invariants over a variety of presentations and representations.
> That type of order tends to take a considerable effort to reveal.
>
> The order of consideration or presentation is often more arbitrary,
> making some aspects of the subject matter more salient than others
> depending on the paradigm or perspective one has chosen.
>
> In the case of sign relations, the order in which we take up
> the domains O, S, I or the components of a triple (o, s, i)
> is wholly arbitrary so long as we maintain the same order
> throughout the course of discussion.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>

--

academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Anything can be  a Peircean object, including how something feels, what is 
felt, and any other category you might want. Peircean objects, as he says, are 
rather like Platonic ideas, but without the Platonism. They are close to what 
analytic philosophy calls the referent.

Weather in Chicago can certainly be a sign, but in the example coolness is a 
sign of rain.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, 18 March 2016 3:26 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


-- Forwarded message --
From: Tom Gollier <tgoll...@gmail.com<mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com>>
Date: Thu, Mar 17, 2016 at 6:25 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry
To: Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>>

Jon,

Thanks for your reply.

If we take "object" in sense of an objective, why isn't "avoiding rain" the 
object?  I really don't see how "rain" gets to be the object in either sense of 
"object".

As for "coolness" being a sign of impending rain, that it is, but only within 
the context of a diagrammatic understanding of the "weather in Chicago".  Other 
signs also function within such a sign/diagram — "cloudiness" for example.  
And, of course, the diagram/sign being employed could vary in complexity from 
something created in terms of temperature gradients, continental air masses, 
and such as that to one consisting of a couple of rules of thumb.

In short, I'm not arguing there is no an object-sign-interpretant where 
"coolness" is the sign, but:

1. I would interpret this as: what is being felt (object), "coolness" (sign), 
and "rain" (interpretant),

2. And, this object-sign-interpretant is just one relationship within the 
diagram/sign, "weather in Chicago," that would, it seems to me, more clearly 
correspond with the situation being described.

Tom


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Jerry,

The example I gave (bucket experiment) involved genuine doubt about what at 
least some (e.g., Newton) took to be a real world situation.

Your example is within normal science (the Kuhnian notion of cumulative science 
under a single interpretative paradigm). I was focussing more on cases in which 
doubt has been raised about the suitability of a paradigm for explaining the 
phenomena. This has been a long standing area of interest of mine, and the 
further concern I raised about abduction arises primarily if not always in 
cases in which a paradigm has fallen into doubt. In normal science there are 
common exemplars and preferred analogies(ways of extending a theory to new 
applications). In this case my concerns would not typically arise, except as a 
practical issue resulting from our limited abilities to understand our methods, 
not more basic logical difficulties. So I think we are talking past each other 
here by focussing on significantly different kinds of cases (normal science 
versus revolutionary science). I raised Feyerabend at least in part because he 
focuses on problems for empiricism in the revolutionary case, but also because 
that is the sort of case I see as being especially problematic. In my paper 
“Pragmatic Incommensurabiity (1984)” I argued that the sort of problem that 
Kuhn and Feyerabend raised arise from the lack of an available common 
interpretative framework. In my dissertation I argued that the solution was to 
use the available interpretations of the theories involved to tease out 
discordant implicit presuppositions of the paradigms. As I said, I am still 
working on this problem. I am pretty sure that there is more than just luck 
involved in finding a good resolution. In my dissertation I explained how this 
was done in relativity theory, as an example. I am not yet happy with any 
analysis of this how that I have seen so far. It may be there in Peirce, and I 
am certain that Peircean methods are needed to find a solution.

In any case, I repeat that I would agree that there is no special problem of 
the sort I was worried about that arises in the course of normal science.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, 10 March 2016 9:15 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

John,

To me, we are talking about whether Feyerabend or Peirce can offer a definite 
suggestion on how to proceed if we are frozen with respect to advancing on a 
problem.  To say there’s no systematic way to proceed is antithetical to 
Peirce, who offers abduction, a very definite formalism that asks you to be 
explicit about three things, the icon (C), index (A) and symbol (B) and to 
consider them in relation according to CP 5.189.  Yes, there are a number of 
things to consider in order to assess the goodness of an explanation, some 
criteria that you list in the last part of your post.  But these things are not 
really assessable by talking strictly in abstraction.  The possibilities are 
simply too numerous.

But why not take genuine doubt about a real-world phenomenon in a real-world 
situation to test your assertions about quality, index, interpretation, 
practice, effectiveness, goodness, space and time, testing of explanation...?  
There is such a phenomenon in phi spiral abduction.  It is an abductive 
inference about a regularity that comes in perceptual judgment.  There were 
others with different collateral experience who saw the phenomenon but did not 
see the same icon.  I proposed an alternative index, one that implicates 
optimal stromal collagen organization.  It is a definite prediction.  It is 
testable, etc.…

Is it a good explanation?  I think so because eros, that is, it is suggestive 
of "effective surprise".  Reasons for eros are many.  These reasons go beyond 
materials and corneal science; justifications that flow into philosophy and 
education.  I trust that good ideas take care of themselves and that there is a 
good chance for consilience here because if not this, which?

Are such justifications allowable for assessing an explanation?  What does 
Newton have to say on the matter?  Who decides if I disagree with his silence?  
Importantly, what if it turns out my idea is true; that it does what I say it 
does.  Is that reason enough to agree that there is a systematic approach to 
creativity and that it is complete in CP 5.189?

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 10:53 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Jerry,

That is certainly the main issue that needs to be resolved in full. The 
phenomena to be explained have to be identified by the abductive inference. 
This would be the index part of the proposition.  The qualitative part has to 
be able to all

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Jerry,

That is certainly the main issue that needs to be resolved in full. The 
phenomena to be explained have to be identified by the abductive inference. 
This would be the index part of the proposition.  The qualitative part has to 
be able to allow this identification. Together they must permit an 
interpretation that we have a way to use in pactice. I would say that it is the 
effectiveness of the last that determines how good the abduction is. I suspect 
that the answer involves considering a number of factors.

For example, Newtonian space and time are one way to explain the bucket thought 
experiment. But even in Newton's own time it was observed  (e.g.  by Leibniz) 
that the explanation couldn't be tested (it failed the pragmatic maxim). Mach 
made the problem even more clear.  It was not a good explanation on those 
grounds,  though it was good enough for Newton and for most physicists up to 
Einstein.

John



Sent from my Samsung device


 Original message 
From: Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>
Date: 2016/03/10 00:07 (GMT+02:00)
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

John, Clark,  List:


On Mar 9, 2016, at 1:59 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly.

The simple question arises:
If an abductive step is taken by the inquirer, then what?

For example, say that a sinsign and its legisigns and qualisigns provide the 
informative extension to generate an index, how does one take this abductive 
object and move through the inferential steps needed to generate a valid 
argument?

Or, from a different logical perspective, what information is needed to extend 
(in the Aristotelian sense of intensional logic) the index to the 
(telelogical?) goal of the inquirer?

Cheers

Jerry








From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not "inference to the best explanation".
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like "inference
to any explanation" - or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, "conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity".  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it's not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn't appear to be workable. I'd argue 
that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he's much more 
after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I'd have to go 
through all the quotes to be sure that's fair to the texts)



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

Jerry,
Although Feyerabend is arguably a pragmatic realist, I think there should be no 
thinking of him as a Peircean. Nonetheless I think that there is some 
convergence on the idea that we can't specify in advance which ideas will be 
successful between Feyerabend and Peirce. I think that rhetorically Feyerabend 
exaggerates this aspect, but other things he says, for example in his 
historical treatment of Galileo in Against Method, treat the justification of 
new ideas in terms that are comprehensible in terms of the old (in this case 
Aristotelean). His rhetoric tends to undermine the continuity. It was directed 
at a specific form of cumulative empiricism, the dominant view at the time.

I wrote my PhD dissertation on the problems with empiricism of that kind, and I 
gave an analysis and proposed solution that is basically Peircean, I think. I 
am still working on the solution part more than three decades later. The 
linguistic creativity paper is part of that project.

John



Sent from my Samsung device


 Original message 
From: Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
Date: 2016/03/10 09:40 (GMT+02:00)
To: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
Cc: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>, Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

Hi John,

I agree with your conclusion of the paper (although I did not read the body).  
I was objecting to this portion of your post: "There are no magic rules for 
finding the truth (or "anything goes" as Feyerabend would say in his typically 
provocative manner)."

I think although unsound, and with consideration to its relatedness to context 
and usage, Peirce's abduction can be an extremely helpful prescription for how 
to progress honestly and earnestly in inquiry.  The Feyrabend quote has the 
effect of diminishing the value of this great tool.

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Mar 10, 2016 at 1:20 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
I am not at all clear what you are getting at here, Jerry. I thought Jon 
Awbrey's recent remarks 1 and 2 were spot on.

On his reference to 3, creativity, I would follow the approach I give for 
creativity in language, but restricted to the formation of hypotheses, in

  *   Informal Pragmatics and Linguistic 
Creativity<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Informal%20pragmatics%20and%20Linguistic%20Creativity%20version2.pdf>,
 South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014


John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com<mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Wednesday, 09 March 2016 11:02 AM
To: John Collier
Cc: Clark Goble; Peirce List

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

Hi all,
It seems paradoxical to me that a Peircean doesn't believe in Peirce's method 
to inferencing truth under uncertainty.

There must be a way out of this dilemma...one, two, three...CP 5.189.
Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 1:59 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly. There are no magic rules for finding the truth (or 
"anything goes" as Feyerabend would say in his typically provocative manner).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not "inference to the best explanation".
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like "inference
to any explanation" - or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, "conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity".  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it's not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn't appear to be w

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

I am not at all clear what you are getting at here, Jerry. I thought Jon 
Awbrey’s recent remarks 1 and 2 were spot on.

On his reference to 3, creativity, I would follow the approach I give for 
creativity in language, but restricted to the formation of hypotheses, in

  *   Informal Pragmatics and Linguistic 
Creativity<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Informal%20pragmatics%20and%20Linguistic%20Creativity%20version2.pdf>,
 South African Journal of Philosophy, 2014


John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 09 March 2016 11:02 AM
To: John Collier
Cc: Clark Goble; Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

Hi all,
It seems paradoxical to me that a Peircean doesn't believe in Peirce's method 
to inferencing truth under uncertainty.

There must be a way out of this dilemma...one, two, three...CP 5.189.
Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Mar 9, 2016 at 1:59 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly. There are no magic rules for finding the truth (or 
“anything goes” as Feyerabend would say in his typically provocative manner).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best explanation”.
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference
to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. I’d argue 
that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he’s much more 
after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I’d have to go 
through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to the texts)




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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry

[John Collier]

List,

Another point that is often overlooked in discussions of inference to the best 
explanation, which I agree is not the same as abduction, though I think 
abduction is more restrictive than just inference to any hypothesis from which 
the evidence might be inferred, is that the best explanation need not be a good 
explanation, so we need more than inference to the best explanation to carry 
out inquiry responsibly. There are no magic rules for finding the truth (or 
“anything goes” as Feyerabend would say in his typically provocative manner).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 04 March 2016 12:35 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Abduction, Deduction, Induction : Analogy, Inquiry


On Mar 3, 2016, at 3:25 PM, Jon Awbrey 
<jawb...@att.net<mailto:jawb...@att.net>> wrote:

Let me just say again that abduction is not “inference to the best explanation”.
That gloss derives from a later attempt to rationalize Peirce's idea and it has
led to a whole literature of misconception.  Abduction is more like “inference
to any explanation” — or maybe adapting Kant's phrase, “conceiving a concept
that reduces a manifold to a unity”.  The most difficult part of its labor
is delivering a term, very often new or unnoticed, that can serve as
a middle term in grasping the structure of an object domain.

I fully agree and many of his quotations make clear it’s not inference to the 
best explanation. However we should admit that in some places he sure seems to 
get close to that idea. Even if it doesn’t appear to be workable. I’d argue 
that even when he appears to be talking about best explanation he’s much more 
after the fact our guesses are so often quite good. (Although I’d have to go 
through all the quotes to be sure that’s fair to the texts)



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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

[John Collier]

Thanks Clark. I don’t think of Heidegger as a phenomenologist as much as an 
existentialist (view from studying Heidegger from Bert Dreyfus). Merleau Ponty 
fits the Husserlian model more closely, I think.

Husserl distinguished between surface and depth phenomenology. The second, 
while not analytical, does involve a further degree of abstraction. I think it 
is there that Husserl become more clearly non or anti psychological. Surface 
phenomenology can be seen as psychological, I suppose, but I was taught not to 
see it that way, because of the bracketing. That leads away from a number of 
important psychological aspects of our normal experience. I do think that 
Ransdell is right in negatively comparing Merleau Ponty’s view of science with 
Peirce’s, but I am not sure that Husserlian deep phenomenology has the same 
problem, nonetheless, despite the second order bracketing involved. It just 
isn’t of the same nature as the move to scientific thinking, which certainly 
does care about existence issues.

Though I agree that Husserl was Cartesian in some respects, his 
anti-psychologism in this bracketing form undermines the similarity with 
Cartesian access to the mental. I suppose that bracketing could be seen as 
doubt based, but I don’t think it needs to be seen that way. However, I agree 
with Ransdell that the phenomenological reduction does not apply in a 
straight-forward way to Peirce’s thinking.

I think that the way in which objects of thought are understood in Husserl and 
Peirce are quite different, for example. (I have always found Husserl’s 
approach to psychologistic for my taste, or at least too reductive.) I think 
Ransdell was correct in focusing on the differences with Peirce here.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: CLARK GOBLE [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Friday, 19 February 2016 9:14 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?


On Feb 19, 2016, at 9:08 PM, CLARK GOBLE 
<cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote:


On Feb 19, 2016, at 4:03 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in 
phenomenology. In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues.

Yes, in that they are similar. In other ways they are quite different. The list 
starter, Joe Ransdell, did a nice overview. I think Joe neglects the range of 
views in post-Husserlian phenomenology but for Husserl himself I think he gets 
the big points.

Whoops. Forgot the link:  
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHENOM.HTM

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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

[John Collier]

Husserl explicitly uses the idea of “bracketing” questions of existence in 
phenomenology. In other words, you ignore existence and truth issues. I see 
this as a form of abstraction, so the phenomena for Husserl are an abstraction 
form everyday experience, in which we do presume existence (typically at 
least). I am unclear if Peirce had a similar view, but the quote Helmut gave 
from Peirce does suggest that, in the setting aside of questions of reality.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Friday, 19 February 2016 3:32 PM
To: cl...@lextek.com
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Is there a phaneron?

Clark, list,
thank you for the hint to Husserl. Now I just have looked him up at Wikipedia, 
and I think I like his phenomenology. I just had read something about and from 
Habermas, especially about the dualism of system and "Lebenswelt" (life-world). 
Now just I have seen, that the term "Lebenswelt" is from Husserl. Is it a sort 
of collective Umwelt? If it is, then is it the Umwelt (subjective environment) 
not of an organism as a subject, but of a society-as-a-subject? In this case, 
"Lebenswelt" is not something objective either, but subjective too, but with 
the subject not being an individual, but a society. Regularly at this point, 
with me, an objecting reflex is excited: I do not want to take a society for a 
subject. If a society is about to become a subject, it is lethal for the 
individuals, because they will cease to be subjects. This is, because in a 
systems hierarchy, there can only be one subject-level (one system of 
interpretance, one interpreting sytem, or one subject, that makes everything 
else objects). But this is opening another barrel. But all in all, I would say, 
that "Lebenswelt" is not something objective or ontologic as my 
had-been-understanding of the Peircean "phaneron", as I think, that you have 
also pointed out, and also, that even for Peirce, "phaneron" may not be a 
"definite idea", but "something pointed to in experience". Vagueness, alright. 
We cannot fix an egg to a jelly fish with a nail, but can talk about both.
Best,
Helmut

 19. Februar 2016 um 22:27 Uhr
"Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote:


On Feb 19, 2016, at 1:47 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:

"[B]y the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in 
any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to 
any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that 
I leave these questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those 
features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times 
and to all minds." (Adirondack Lectures, 1905; in Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce, vol. 1 [eds. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss; Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931], paragraph 284)

So Peirce has not entertained a doubt. But that is not a scientifical premiss. 
Or has he justified this idea somewhere else? Because this idea of the phaneron 
perhaps is the only idea from Peirce I cannot approve, because I do not 
understand it: Our minds are separated, arent they? Besides very rare events 
that seem to be telepathic.


The other problem of course is what presence means in this context. (Not a 
small point - as I’ve noted Derrida’s critique of presence draws a lot on 
Peirce’s semiotics)

Sticking with Peirce it’s worth asking about the relationship between place and 
time in the formulation of presence. Especially when a doctrine of continuity 
of some sense is part of Peirce’s thinking.

I tend to read Peirce as speaking rather loosely here to get the general idea 
of the phaneron in experience without necessarily making it a definite idea. 
That is it is something pointed to in experience rather than an artificial 
category with carefully delineated meaning. This would of course also be more 
in keeping with Peirce’s maxim and his logic of vagueness.

The other interesting part are the universal aspects of the phaneron. Again 
this pops up in German phenomenology with Husserl as well as post-Husserlean 
phenomenologists. Peirce is of course doing something different from Husserl. 
One has to be very careful reading one in terms of the other as there are so 
many places they differ. But the question of what is common to minds is a 
problem for Husserl as well. I think Peirce’s assumption something is common is 
a typical one. However I again think that some of Peirce’s other arguments and 
ideas should make us careful here.
- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or 
"Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

[John Collier]

OK, Robert. That puts a somewhat different light on it, since the issue is then 
an empirical one rather than the conceptual relations. I was mostly addressing 
the latter issue. (As was Frederik, I think.)

It is certainly possible that the same brain processes could be involved in 
more than one function, depending on how they are connected to other brain 
areas that might serve different functions, or to external factors that govern 
functions. My understanding is that syntactic and semantic functions interact, 
but are distinguished by different brain processes. That doesn’t mean that 
there might not be a common area that actually carries out the process of both 
coupling and merging, and then feeds them back to the relevant divergent 
functional regions for further processing. Chomsky and his colleagues in their 
recent work argue for the convergence of a number of different processes in 
syntax, but the most significant for its power is recursion, which underlies 
the merge function in particular. They argue that this function is especially 
general in humans, but not other animals, and there is a lot of experimental 
evidence for this (but based on behaviour, not brain studies). It might well be 
that the RAS plays an essential role here for recursion in general, whether 
semantic or syntactic (also tool use). I don’t know of any studies, though, 
that would make the RAS function in recursion show the right sort of activity 
and structure to explain the human capacity for recursion. One worry I have is 
that tool use also requires recursion, and some birds show this ability, even 
showing planning of tool use (in corvids in particular). This has led me to 
suspect that an old hypothesis that language capacity has an evolutionary 
origin in tool use might have something to it. However I know little about the 
equivalent of the RAS in corvids, if any. Their forebrains are quite different 
from ours and  our close relatives that also use tools.

Again, more to untangle here, but it seems to me that the conceptual issues and 
the brain structure and function issues are at least partially independent. 
Your hypothesis might be correct, but still not tell us very much about the 
functions involved and their relations to each other.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu]
Sent: Sunday, 24 January 2016 6:21 PM
To: John Collier; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

John, List,

What I am suggesting is that the same triadic neurophysiological synthesizing 
mechanism accounts for both semantic coupling and syntactic merging. The same 
neurophysiological structure, the "coupler", that Percy suggests accomplishes 
symbolization  makes the formation of both words and sentences possible.

The elements of grammar are themselves signs. Universal grammar restricts 
output and structure. The coupler synthesizes the relation between meaningful 
elements.

The results of this throwing together mechanism are different--semantics is not 
syntax, but the underlying merging/coupling mechanism can still be the same.

This hypothesis is a bit of a stretch

my guess--the coupler is the reticular formation, or reticualr activating 
system, as it controls the pryamidal system from its position at the 
decussation of pyramids (where the neurons of our "cross-wired" nervous system 
cross) in the brain stem. The system responsible for wakefulness and arousal is 
the same system that wakes us into the form of consciousness made possible by 
the use of symbol systems lie language. The recognized areas of the cortex like 
Wernicke's and Broca's areas are involved, but do not control, the elements of 
language which suffer when these areas are damaged. The neurophysiological 
activating mechanism for language is the reticular activating system.




=


On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 12:40 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation.

One difference I see is that Chomsky’s merge is a syntactic operation, whereas, 
If I understand him correctly, Peircean coupling has a semantic aspect as well. 
Chomsky consistently separates syntax and semantics, but he perhaps has a more 
narrow view of semantics than Peirce did. This latter issue is especially worth 
exploring, I think.

I believe that Chomsky’s merge (and many if not all of his earlier syntactic 
operations) is nonreducible to component parts (especially linguistic 
behaviours), and in this respect seems to be a Peircean third. Likewise for 
Peircean coupling. So in this respect they are species of a common genus. But I 
don’t think this directly implies they are of the same species of this genus 
for the reasons I gave before.

I have cons

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

[John Collier]

Interesting questions, Robert. They certainly deserve further investigation.

One difference I see is that Chomsky’s merge is a syntactic operation, whereas, 
If I understand him correctly, Peircean coupling has a semantic aspect as well. 
Chomsky consistently separates syntax and semantics, but he perhaps has a more 
narrow view of semantics than Peirce did. This latter issue is especially worth 
exploring, I think.

I believe that Chomsky’s merge (and many if not all of his earlier syntactic 
operations) is nonreducible to component parts (especially linguistic 
behaviours), and in this respect seems to be a Peircean third. Likewise for 
Peircean coupling. So in this respect they are species of a common genus. But I 
don’t think this directly implies they are of the same species of this genus 
for the reasons I gave before.

I have considerably more I could say, but I will leave it at that for now. I 
was exposed to Chomsky (as a professor of mine) and to Peirce (by independent 
study) more or less at the same time as an undergraduate, and I am probably 
more inclined than many to see connections between the two. This has only been 
reinforced by my subsequent studies, though the differences have also become 
more apparent.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
University of KwaZulu-Natal
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Robert Eckert [mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 January 2016 1:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Thirdness, coupling and merging

Dear list,

Is it possible that Peirce's thirdness, Percy's coupling and Chomsky's merging 
are the same?

Could this bringing together, symbolization, merging, of two other things, 
explain our language ability?

If so, this basic exemplification in diagrammatic form defines humans.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

OK, thanks, Jerry. I don’t disagree. It may well be worthwhile to look at 
metalanguage to understand further what is going on in the process of 
hypostatic abstraction. I would want to look at the difference in how something 
is represented and what it is, as I suggested in my response below. This itself 
involves semiotics, of course, giving the issue an involuted*, but  that makes 
it complex in Robert Rosen’s sense of involving irreducible impredicatiivity 
(Essays on Life Itself). It would follow that it can’t be dealt with fully in 
1st order logic. My suggestion (below) was to go to 2nd order logic (which 
quantifies over properties), following Ramsey’s method (used in structural 
realism and some other forms of structuralism), but this has known problems 
itself. Perhaps the basic problem is that 2nd order logic is incomplete, and 
thus impredicative. The bump in the rug doesn’t go away easily.

I suspect that there is no way to deal with it fully, but I think it is still 
helpful to think of the grammar of  semiotic properties in terms of relations 
by using Peirce’s hypostatic abstraction.  Switching back and forth can help to 
get past the issues of the particular language, which are not essential to the 
subject. As for any possible application to the logic of chemistry, that is 
outside of my areas of expertise, but I would guess that shifting back and 
forth between chemical properties and relations via hypostatic abstraction 
might be informative by eliminating some accidents of representation system. 
That is just a guess on my part, though.

*From the Free Dictionary:
1.
a. The act of involving.
b. The state of being involved.
2. Intricacy; complexity.
3. Something, such as a long grammatical construction, that is intricate or 
complex.


John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 05 January 2016 6:07 AM
To: John Collier; Peirce List
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John, List:
My response follows the original message

- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Peirce List
Cc: Gary Richmond
Sent: Monday, December 28, 2015 5:41 PM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

All I can say, Jerry, is to read it more carefully. There are no 
contradictions, so you must be misreading what I said. I have no idea why you 
relate what I said to Tarski’s views, with which I am quite familiar. The move 
that I think lies behind the connection between the triadic relations of the 
sign and the relations that I think Edwina is talking about is hypostatic 
abstraction, which is a technical device for reinterpreting a property as a 
relation. Other than that, I was trying to get how the two implied relations to 
the representamen become three, and it seemed to me that that the third is on a 
more abstract level, a relation of relations, again, and perhaps even more 
obviously if I am right about that, though Edwina seems to differ than the 
relations it relates. The third relation I am referring to seems to me to be 
the relation between the object the interpretant. The object and interpretant 
are properties (despite the grammatical nominatives used to refer to them), 
which are turned into relations by the abstraction, which is a standard method 
for understanding things, especially for semiotic vehicles, in Peirce’s work. 
Taken this way there is a sense in which I am suggesting that it is “meta”, but 
so are the relations related, as they also are grasped through hypostatic 
abstraction. If there is an apparent inconsistency I am pretty sure that it 
arise from not understanding and being able to recognize hypostatic 
abstraction, and confusing the way in which something is picked out with its 
essential nature. The same thing can be both a property and a relation, 
depending on how we look at it. This is not possible to represent in the 
language of first order logic due to its formal limitations. Second order logic 
makes the possible, e.g., in the Ramsification of theories (which basically 
replaces properties with relational structures). Ramsey tried to get a logic 
grounded solely in relations, but he was unsuccessful. I have little hope of 
doing what Ramsey failed to do despite his being one of the most insightful 
logicians of the first half of the last century, so I did not try, and I won’t 
try now, either. But I will say that Peirce’s hypostatic abstraction is 
probably the key. Tarski’s satisfaction notion of truth, though it fits nicely 
with Ramsey’s work on the nature of theories and their reference, doesn’t need 
hypostatic abstraction to be stated. “Snow is white” is true if and only if 
snow is white involves only properties. Unless, like Frege, one thinks that to 
be true is a relation between

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

[John Collier]

Yes. We’ve discussed this before here. We disagree on the usefulness of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics for dealing with the problem. I also think that 
he informational approach by itself is insufficient. I think we need to 
understand the dynamics involved as well as using a semiotic perspective to 
explain why the problem seems intractable. Nut I don’t have the time to go into 
this here and now.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Rsearcch Associate, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sb@cbs.dk]
Sent: Wednesday, 30 December 2015 4:33 PM
To: John Collier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Dear John

I agree on the irreducibility of the sign triad. My main point is that we do 
not from the material, energetic or the informational ontology worldview have 
any idea of how it could emerge from that foundation. It only works from 
Peirce’s foundation. That is the geniality of what he created – in my view. 
Everyone who wants to use his concepts has to use his philosophical foundation 
or create a better one. And the so called scientific ones that does not 
integrate phenomenological and hermeneutic views are not able to do the job. 
The informational and the info-computational do not.

   Søren

Fra: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 30. december 2015 11:01
Til: Søren Brier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Søren,

I have argued for some time that if Peircean thirds are irreducible they must 
be emergent. I see no reason to doubt that. I think that Deacon’s views are 
reductionist in some respects, though he is changing that slowly (he quotes me 
on information in his second book, for example, but I don’t think he absorbed 
the significance of the quote). I believe that information is fundamental, and 
that it is physical, but that is not a materialist view.

I don’t see Stjernfelt the same way as you do. He doesn’t talk about 
self-organization or emergence directly, but he does think that thirds are 
irreducible. His arguments about the centrality of dicisigns don’t make a lot 
of sense otherwise. But perhaps he is a more cryptic version of Marcello 
Barbieri. I doubt that, though.

Marcello is indeed very much upfront that he doesn’t see Piece as scientific. I 
have argued that his views imply anti-reductionism, however, in spite of 
himself. He denies that. Howard Pattee disappointed Marcello when he said he 
took a basically antireductionist view on meaning. My views are similar to 
Howard’s but I don’t like his epistemic and other cuts. I see the problem they 
are supposed to address; I don’t think they are a solution. Even if you take a 
non-materialist view (idealist or neutral) there is still a problem of how 
local consciousness emerges. But I think that from our previous discussions we 
might disagree about that last point.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sb@cbs.dk]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 6:50 PM
To: John Collier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Dear John and Stephen

I think there is an ontological difference between your views as Deacon and to 
a certain degree Stjernfelt’ s views are based on ,to me unclear “scientific 
worldviews”, which in the end means physicalism. None of them has taken a clear 
opposition to physicalism. They are not mechanical materialist but believe in 
thermodynamic self-organization through Prigogine’s non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics. Deacon is close to general system theory but does not accept it 
openly probably because Bertalanffy was an organicist and therefore not 
compatible with the physicalist scientific worldview. Never the less he endorse 
a developmental theory combined with evolution theory from matter, over 
objective information to icons. Stuart Kaufmann seems also to attempt to make 
signs emerge from a physicalist worldview.  Stjernfelt seem to run a standard 
scientific ontology parallel with a Peircean semiotic as far as I can read, 
never going into self-organization and theories of emergence.  But in my view a 
Peircean icon does not work without his whole pragmaticist  philosophy with its 
foundation in his hylozoist, thycistic ontology, combined with his  aesthetics, 
ethics and semiotic logic as the base of his phaneroscopic epistemology. There 
are a lot of attempts to use Peirce’s semiotics and pragmaticism on other 
philosophical foundations than the one he painstakingly developed over his 
life. One of the more obvious is Barbieri’s codebiology, but he is so honest 
and explicit in his argumentation that it is possible to discuss it, as I have 
done in the attached article from Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology. 
Am I wrong?

Best
  Søren


Fra: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 29. december 2015 04:13
Til: Stephen C. Rose

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Triadic Philosophy • Sign Relations

[John Collier]

Jon,

If you mean “start” as in time, that is irrelevant to the emergence issue here. 
 If you mean dynamically or logically emergent (or both if you follow my 
analysis of emergence in dynamical terms) then I fail to see the point you are 
trying to make. My analysis is in A dynamical account of 
emergence<http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Account%20of%20Emergence.pdf>
 (Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 15, no 3-4 2008: 75-100), among other places.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Assoicate, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
Sent: Wednesday, 30 December 2015 3:12 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Søren Brier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: Re: Triadic Philosophy • Sign Relations

John, Søren, Stephen, all,

I have always found “emergent talk” to constitute a kind of backhanded 
reductionism.  Being irreducible means never having to say it wasn't. That is,  
triadic relational irreducibility must have been there from the start.

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com

On Dec 30, 2015, at 5:01 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Søren,

I have argued for some time that if Peircean thirds are irreducible they must 
be emergent. I see no reason to doubt that. I think that Deacon’s views are 
reductionist in some respects, though he is changing that slowly (he quotes me 
on information in his second book, for example, but I don’t think he absorbed 
the significance of the quote). I believe that information is fundamental, and 
that it is physical, but that is not a materialist view.

I don’t see Stjernfelt the same way as you do. He doesn’t talk about 
self-organization or emergence directly, but he does think that thirds are 
irreducible. His arguments about the centrality of dicisigns don’t make a lot 
of sense otherwise. But perhaps he is a more cryptic version of Marcello 
Barbieri. I doubt that, though.

Marcello is indeed very much upfront that he doesn’t see Piece as scientific. I 
have argued that his views imply anti-reductionism, however, in spite of 
himself. He denies that. Howard Pattee disappointed Marcello when he said he 
took a basically antireductionist view on meaning. My views are similar to 
Howard’s but I don’t like his epistemic and other cuts. I see the problem they 
are supposed to address; I don’t think they are a solution. Even if you take a 
non-materialist view (idealist or neutral) there is still a problem of how 
local consciousness emerges. But I think that from our previous discussions we 
might disagree about that last point.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sb@cbs.dk]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 6:50 PM
To: John Collier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Dear John and Stephen

I think there is an ontological difference between your views as Deacon and to 
a certain degree Stjernfelt’ s views are based on ,to me unclear “scientific 
worldviews”, which in the end means physicalism. None of them has taken a clear 
opposition to physicalism. They are not mechanical materialist but believe in 
thermodynamic self-organization through Prigogine’s non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics. Deacon is close to general system theory but does not accept it 
openly probably because Bertalanffy was an organicist and therefore not 
compatible with the physicalist scientific worldview. Never the less he endorse 
a developmental theory combined with evolution theory from matter, over 
objective information to icons. Stuart Kaufmann seems also to attempt to make 
signs emerge from a physicalist worldview.  Stjernfelt seem to run a standard 
scientific ontology parallel with a Peircean semiotic as far as I can read, 
never going into self-organization and theories of emergence.  But in my view a 
Peircean icon does not work without his whole pragmaticist  philosophy with its 
foundation in his hylozoist, thycistic ontology, combined with his  aesthetics, 
ethics and semiotic logic as the base of his phaneroscopic epistemology. There 
are a lot of attempts to use Peirce’s semiotics and pragmaticism on other 
philosophical foundations than the one he painstakingly developed over his 
life. One of the more obvious is Barbieri’s codebiology, but he is so honest 
and explicit in his argumentation that it is possible to discuss it, as I have 
done in the attached article from Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology. 
Am I wrong?

Best
  Søren


Fra: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 29. december 2015 04:13
Til: Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Stephen, List,

That is similar to Terry Deacon’s view in The Symbolic Species (1997), and also 
later in Incomplete Nature (2012). He argues that the evolution of symbols 
starts with icons, icons combine to form indexes, and we end up with, in 
humans, full 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

[John Collier]

That would be a good focus for an issue. I do think that Peirce has a lot to 
say about it. I have argued this with David Chalmers, and he was somewhat 
sympathetic. But I think my approach is rather different from yours. Perhaps a 
focussed issue on consciousness and the failings of reductionist and 
information based approaches as a starting point might be a very good idea.  I 
do think we have significant areas of agreement. Disagreements trend to get 
amplified in this sort of exchange. Peirce himself seems ot have thought that 
idealism is the answer. Again, I don’t think it really helps, but there are 
eleemtns of Peirce that I htrink are promising.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sb@cbs.dk]
Sent: Wednesday, 30 December 2015 8:23 PM
To: John Collier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Dear John

That is a pity, because for me this is such a central question, which so many 
with a background in the science or logic and mathematical philosophy avoids to 
deal with. That maybe why I have so few suggestions to improve my attempt in 
Cybersemiotics.  I would really like to have papers on this to Cybernetics & 
Human Knowing. A special issue if there are several that want to attempt this 
difficult area.

Best
Søren

Fra: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 30. december 2015 19:09
Til: Søren Brier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Yes. We’ve discussed this before here. We disagree on the usefulness of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics for dealing with the problem. I also think that 
he informational approach by itself is insufficient. I think we need to 
understand the dynamics involved as well as using a semiotic perspective to 
explain why the problem seems intractable. Nut I don’t have the time to go into 
this here and now.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus and Senior Rsearcch Associate, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sb@cbs.dk]
Sent: Wednesday, 30 December 2015 4:33 PM
To: John Collier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Dear John

I agree on the irreducibility of the sign triad. My main point is that we do 
not from the material, energetic or the informational ontology worldview have 
any idea of how it could emerge from that foundation. It only works from 
Peirce’s foundation. That is the geniality of what he created – in my view. 
Everyone who wants to use his concepts has to use his philosophical foundation 
or create a better one. And the so called scientific ones that does not 
integrate phenomenological and hermeneutic views are not able to do the job. 
The informational and the info-computational do not.

   Søren

Fra: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 30. december 2015 11:01
Til: Søren Brier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Søren,

I have argued for some time that if Peircean thirds are irreducible they must 
be emergent. I see no reason to doubt that. I think that Deacon’s views are 
reductionist in some respects, though he is changing that slowly (he quotes me 
on information in his second book, for example, but I don’t think he absorbed 
the significance of the quote). I believe that information is fundamental, and 
that it is physical, but that is not a materialist view.

I don’t see Stjernfelt the same way as you do. He doesn’t talk about 
self-organization or emergence directly, but he does think that thirds are 
irreducible. His arguments about the centrality of dicisigns don’t make a lot 
of sense otherwise. But perhaps he is a more cryptic version of Marcello 
Barbieri. I doubt that, though.

Marcello is indeed very much upfront that he doesn’t see Piece as scientific. I 
have argued that his views imply anti-reductionism, however, in spite of 
himself. He denies that. Howard Pattee disappointed Marcello when he said he 
took a basically antireductionist view on meaning. My views are similar to 
Howard’s but I don’t like his epistemic and other cuts. I see the problem they 
are supposed to address; I don’t think they are a solution. Even if you take a 
non-materialist view (idealist or neutral) there is still a problem of how 
local consciousness emerges. But I think that from our previous discussions we 
might disagree about that last point.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sb@cbs.dk]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 6:50 PM
To: John Collier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Dear John and Stephen

I think there is an ontological difference between your views as Deacon and to 
a certain degree Stjernfelt’ s views are based on ,to me unclear “scientific 
worldviews”, which in the end means physicalism. None of them has taken a c

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

[John Collier]

Søren,

I have argued for some time that if Peircean thirds are irreducible they must 
be emergent. I see no reason to doubt that. I think that Deacon’s views are 
reductionist in some respects, though he is changing that slowly (he quotes me 
on information in his second book, for example, but I don’t think he absorbed 
the significance of the quote). I believe that information is fundamental, and 
that it is physical, but that is not a materialist view.

I don’t see Stjernfelt the same way as you do. He doesn’t talk about 
self-organization or emergence directly, but he does think that thirds are 
irreducible. His arguments about the centrality of dicisigns don’t make a lot 
of sense otherwise. But perhaps he is a more cryptic version of Marcello 
Barbieri. I doubt that, though.

Marcello is indeed very much upfront that he doesn’t see Piece as scientific. I 
have argued that his views imply anti-reductionism, however, in spite of 
himself. He denies that. Howard Pattee disappointed Marcello when he said he 
took a basically antireductionist view on meaning. My views are similar to 
Howard’s but I don’t like his epistemic and other cuts. I see the problem they 
are supposed to address; I don’t think they are a solution. Even if you take a 
non-materialist view (idealist or neutral) there is still a problem of how 
local consciousness emerges. But I think that from our previous discussions we 
might disagree about that last point.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Søren Brier [mailto:sb@cbs.dk]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 6:50 PM
To: John Collier; Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Subject: SV: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Dear John and Stephen

I think there is an ontological difference between your views as Deacon and to 
a certain degree Stjernfelt’ s views are based on ,to me unclear “scientific 
worldviews”, which in the end means physicalism. None of them has taken a clear 
opposition to physicalism. They are not mechanical materialist but believe in 
thermodynamic self-organization through Prigogine’s non-equilibrium 
thermodynamics. Deacon is close to general system theory but does not accept it 
openly probably because Bertalanffy was an organicist and therefore not 
compatible with the physicalist scientific worldview. Never the less he endorse 
a developmental theory combined with evolution theory from matter, over 
objective information to icons. Stuart Kaufmann seems also to attempt to make 
signs emerge from a physicalist worldview.  Stjernfelt seem to run a standard 
scientific ontology parallel with a Peircean semiotic as far as I can read, 
never going into self-organization and theories of emergence.  But in my view a 
Peircean icon does not work without his whole pragmaticist  philosophy with its 
foundation in his hylozoist, thycistic ontology, combined with his  aesthetics, 
ethics and semiotic logic as the base of his phaneroscopic epistemology. There 
are a lot of attempts to use Peirce’s semiotics and pragmaticism on other 
philosophical foundations than the one he painstakingly developed over his 
life. One of the more obvious is Barbieri’s codebiology, but he is so honest 
and explicit in his argumentation that it is possible to discuss it, as I have 
done in the attached article from Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology. 
Am I wrong?

Best
  Søren


Fra: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sendt: 29. december 2015 04:13
Til: Stephen C. Rose; Peirce List
Emne: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

Stephen, List,

That is similar to Terry Deacon’s view in The Symbolic Species (1997), and also 
later in Incomplete Nature (2012). He argues that the evolution of symbols 
starts with icons, icons combine to form indexes, and we end up with, in 
humans, full symbols. Frederick Stjernflelt takes issue with this 
(Diagrammatology, chapter 11, 2007; Natural Propositions, chapter 6, 2014), 
arguing that dicisigns can be found, and are needed, right back to the 
beginning of signs in biology, so that (proto)symbolic symbols and arguments as 
well are original, both factually and as a requirement for understanding how 
signs evolved. I am currently inclined to agree with Stjernfelt (Collier, 2014, 
Signs without minds. V. Romanini, E. Fernández (eds.), Peirce and Biosemiotics, 
Biosemiotics 11), though I didn’t know about his work at the time.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 3:47 AM
To: Peirce List
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

I see a sign as something that emerges in the vague penumbra called First or by 
me Reality. It is named and acquires identity rising from its primal being. It 
naturally encounters a blunt index of truths which I call Ethics (Second) and 
is composed of Values (not virtues) and from there it passes through a the 
doorway to the Third which I call

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

All I can say, Jerry, is to read it more carefully. There are no 
contradictions, so you must be misreading what I said. I have no idea why you 
relate what I said to Tarski’s views, with which I am quite familiar. The move 
that I think lies behind the connection between the triadic relations of the 
sign and the relations that I think Edwina is talking about is hypostatic 
abstraction, which is a technical device for reinterpreting a property as a 
relation. Other than that, I was trying to get how the two implied relations to 
the representamen become three, and it seemed to me that that the third is on a 
more abstract level, a relation of relations, again, and perhaps even more 
obviously if I am right about that, though Edwina seems to differ than the 
relations it relates. The third relation I am referring to seems to me to be 
the relation between the object the interpretant. The object and interpretant 
are properties (despite the grammatical nominatives used to refer to them), 
which are turned into relations by the abstraction, which is a standard method 
for understanding things, especially for semiotic vehicles, in Peirce’s work. 
Taken this way there is a sense in which I am suggesting that it is “meta”, but 
so are the relations related, as they also are grasped through hypostatic 
abstraction. If there is an apparent inconsistency I am pretty sure that it 
arise from not understanding and being able to recognize hypostatic 
abstraction, and confusing the way in which something is picked out with its 
essential nature. The same thing can be both a property and a relation, 
depending on how we look at it. This is not possible to represent in the 
language of first order logic due to its formal limitations. Second order logic 
makes the possible, e.g., in the Ramsification of theories (which basically 
replaces properties with relational structures). Ramsey tried to get a logic 
grounded solely in relations, but he was unsuccessful. I have little hope of 
doing what Ramsey failed to do despite his being one of the most insightful 
logicians of the first half of the last century, so I did not try, and I won’t 
try now, either. But I will say that Peirce’s hypostatic abstraction is 
probably the key. Tarski’s satisfaction notion of truth, though it fits nicely 
with Ramsey’s work on the nature of theories and their reference, doesn’t need 
hypostatic abstraction to be stated. “Snow is white” is true if and only if 
snow is white involves only properties. Unless, like Frege, one thinks that to 
be true is a relation between a proposition and the True, which goes a good 
deal further, and may involve hypostatic abstraction. But it is late and I am 
not going to think that through right now.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com]
Sent: Monday, 28 December 2015 9:51 PM
To: Peirce List
Cc: John Collier; Gary Richmond
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John:

Whatever are you seeking to communicate in this post?

These numerous assertions can be interpreted as mutually contradicting, so it 
would be nice if you could list the propositions that are motivating the 
predications.

One possible interpretation of these sentences is that you are intentionally 
denying Tarski’s view of the nature of a proposition with respect to a 
meta-language and its material implications for predications of terms, such as 
relations / illations / copula (as “yoking”)

Is my wild guest off-base?

Cheers

Jerry



On Dec 28, 2015, at 6:45 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Edwina, List,

I worry a bit about the idea that there are three relations involved might lead 
to exactly the mistake that Edwina is arguing against, that the triadic 
relation is somehow composed of three more basic relations. I suggested a while 
back that the triadic sign relation is not reducible, and hence can’t be 
composed of more basic relations. This is a common situation in emergent 
phenomena in general. A decomposition would leave something out, basically the 
nonreducibility of the triad, which requires further explanation in terms of 
what the triad itself is. This is not to say that Edwina is not right that 
there are three relations involved in the triad, and that ignoring this 
obscures their role. It’s just that the relation among them is not simple 
composition, but a more complexly organized and irreducible relation (which is 
the triad itself).

Edwina talks of inputs and outputs. I have no problem with this, since an 
irreducible triad can be related to other things via its nodes. But this is not 
what Edwina means. She refers to the relations between the other nodes and the 
representamen, which is also OK as long as they are not merely composed to make 
the triadic relation. I am a bit puzzled because I co

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

The way I understand this continuation is that mere similarity (a second) is 
not enough, but similarity is not the only way of being of the same sort.  I 
think that this actually supports the interpretation I was giving, that it is 
of the same kind (or sort), a triadic kind. I am not quite awake yet (still 
drinking my morning cuppa), so I am not thinking this through right now, just 
responding from habit. So I might change my mind about this, but I am pretty 
sure I have Peirce right here.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 6:17 AM
To: John Collier
Cc: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

John, List:

Well, the passage that I quoted previously continues, "Nor can the triadic 
relation in which the Third stands be merely similar to that in which the First 
stands, for this would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate 
Secondness merely.  The Third must, indeed, stand in such a relation, and thus 
must be capable of determining a Third of its own; but besides that, it must 
have a second triadic relation in which the Representamen, or rather the 
relation thereof to its Object, shall be its own (the Third's) Object, and must 
be capable of determining a Third to this relation.  All this must equally be 
true of the Third's Thirds and so on endlessly ..." (EP2:273)  Not sure if this 
clarifies things, or just muddies the waters further, which is why I hesitated 
to include it initially.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 9:58 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Jon, List,

The interpretant is itself a sign, so at least implicitly there is a separate 
triad (and on to infinity, given Peirce’s continuity of thought):
1902 | Carnegie Institution Correspondence | NEM 4:54
“A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, 
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower 
implied sort) with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to 
C.”

I think “same” in the quote you give has to be understood as the same kind, not 
the identical relation. The above quote makes this more clear.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
[mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com<mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 5:28 AM
To: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

Edwina, List:

Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the interpretant-object 
relation is necessarily the same as the representamen-object relation?  If so, 
then there is no need for a separate trichotomy to characterize it.

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  That is the reason that the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." 
(EP2:272-273)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
John, list:
That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is that 
between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as the 9 
relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated in terms of 
the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object relation.

They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a 
relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of 
habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the 
relation between the representamen-interpretant.
I consider the representamen, which must act as 'mind-mediator' a vital 
relation, bringing its informational depth to deal with the R-O and R-I 
transitions.

But the interpretant-object interaction - is it a relation? What mediates this 
interaction? I'm not denying its importance, for objective referentiality is 
v

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

[John Collier]

Jon, List,

The interpretant is itself a sign, so at least implicitly there is a separate 
triad (and on to infinity, given Peirce’s continuity of thought):
1902 | Carnegie Institution Correspondence | NEM 4:54
“A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, 
determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence (or a lower 
implied sort) with something, C, its object, as that in which itself stands to 
C.”

I think “same” in the quote you give has to be understood as the same kind, not 
the identical relation. The above quote makes this more clear.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 29 December 2015 5:28 AM
To: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - 
meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

Edwina, List:

Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the interpretant-object 
relation is necessarily the same as the representamen-object relation?  If so, 
then there is no need for a separate trichotomy to characterize it.

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.  The triadic relation is 
genuine, that is, its three members are bound together by it in a way that does 
not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.  That is the reason that the 
Interpretant, or Third, cannot stand in a mere dyadic relation to the Object, 
but must stand in such a relation to it as the Representamen itself does." 
(EP2:272-273)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 7:14 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:
John, list:
That's an extremely interesting suggestion, that the 'third relation' is that 
between the interpretant and the object. I have trouble with that, as the 9 
relations (parameters according to Gary R) which are differentiated in terms of 
the modal category, do not refer to this interpretant-object relation.

They refer to the representamen-in-itself, which I consider to be a 
relation-of-depth (providing an evolved over time generalization/set of 
habits); then, to the relation between the representamen-object; and the 
relation between the representamen-interpretant.
I consider the representamen, which must act as 'mind-mediator' a vital 
relation, bringing its informational depth to deal with the R-O and R-I 
transitions.

But the interpretant-object interaction - is it a relation? What mediates this 
interaction? I'm not denying its importance, for objective referentiality is 
vital to validate our experiences - otherwise we live within a purely 
rhetorical, fictional world detached from reality.

Edwina

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FW: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

I had intended to send this to the list as well. But forgot. I see that Helmut 
has addressed my concern in a post to the list that crossed mine to him.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: John Collier
Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 01:36
To: 'Helmut Raulien'
Subject: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Helmut,

That is pretty close to my understanding, but I definitely would not refer to 
the “whole triadic sign” as a composition of three relations. That would 
suggest that a decomposition is possible, but it is not, according to Peirce. I 
take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise relations are abstractions, 
and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So talking about, say, the relation 
between the representamen and its object always has the interpretant in the 
background. I think that this is especially clear when we consider the relation 
of each kind to itself, say, the representamen to the representamen. As has 
been noted a number of times on this thread, a qualisign has the same thing 
playing all three roles. It contains its own object and its own interpretant. 
But to say that it is some composition of the three would be misleading. I 
agree with Edwina when she says that it is best to think of these as relations: 
the interpretant determines the object of the sign. So we can think of this 
determination (the – abstract -- relation) as being the interpretant. The 
interpretant, in the same way, determines the object of the representamen. The 
inverse relations give the object relation and the representamen relation, 
which in the light of the interpretant are the determination of the (abstract) 
relation between the representamen and its object. But none of this makes sense 
two by two; the whole sign can’t be broken up that way. The closest you can 
come is to put the third into the background in each case of what appears to be 
a dyadic relation, on the surface at least. This is a Lockean partial 
consideration, a Peircean prescinding, or, as I have called it, abstracting.

I think that of the nine possible “types” some are not signs at all, or even 
abstractions from  signs. All of the ten are signs.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: Monday, 21 December 2015 00:41
To: John Collier
Cc: Sungchul Ji; PEIRCE-L
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

John, Sung, list,
for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The 
difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, 
as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a 
type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 
types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 
object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear 
about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation 
with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the 
representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations 
between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some 
circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or 
composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal 
understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen 
relations". Is that correct?
Best,
Helmut

20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
 "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only 
picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, but 
they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no difference 
in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not shown this. You 
need tof show how the different classifications are grounded in different 
expectations about possible experiences. You haven't done that yet. From your 
response here it seems that you are confusing different ways of talking about 
the same things with different objects. I don't know of anyone who makes the 
mistake of confusing the objects of the classifications. Perhaps you could give 
an example. Of course someone could be misled by the difference in the 
immediate objects, which depends on how we are thinking, if they are confused 
about what Peirce is talking about with these classifications, I don't think 
that there are Peirce scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could 
provide examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. 
There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where 
the difference has experimental consequences.

John

Sent from m

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Sung, Lists,

I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is important is 
that if there is no difference to possible experience, by the Pragmatic Maxim 
there is no difference in meaning. No elementary particle properties are 
directly measurable.  The best we can do is to have evidence for them by way of 
properties that are directly measurable, together with the theory (the 
measurements of quark properties are what is called “theory-laden”). So the 
notion of measurement that you are using is void unless there is some 
measurable difference between “there are nine elementary signs” and “there are 
ten composite signs”). The same would, of course hold for quarks and baryons 
unless there is a detectable difference to experience. In this case the 
difference is, of course, by your notion of a baryon as isolatable, that we can 
isolate baryons but not quarks (for a combination of theoretical and 
experimental reasons). So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special 
meaning for “measurable” (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I 
cannot fathom without more clarity than I have now by what you mean by 
distinction you are trying to make, the distinction between elementary signs 
and composite signs have no basis in what exists; you would be making a 
distinction without a difference, and thus containing no information.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Sunday, 20 December 2015 07:05
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi Gary R,

You wrote :

"As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not 
consider the 9 parameters  (121915-1)
as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, 
I am always referring to
the 10 classes."


I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion:

(1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the word "sign" 
in "qualisign" ?

(2)  The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an 
unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is only 
one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or the 10 
classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two kinds of 
signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, although he used 
the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as physicists use the same 
word "particles" for both quarks and baryons.  They are both particles but 
physicists discovered that protons and neutrons are not fundamental particles 
but are composed of triplets of more fundamental particles called quarks.

(3)  I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to have 
contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of 
signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different names (belatedly) 
for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "elementary signs" for the 9 types and 
the "composite signs" for the 10 classes of signs as I recommended in 
[biosemiotics:46]. The former is monadic and incomplete as a sign, while the 
latter is triadic and hence complete as a sign.  Again this situation seems 
similar to the relation between quarks and baryons: Quarks are incomplete 
particles in that they cannot be isolated outside baryons whereas baryons 
(which are composed of three quarks) are complete particles since they can be 
isolated and experimentally measured.

All the best.

Sung





On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond 
<gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
Sung, list,

When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess all 
the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of that 
more complex sign,"  I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic qualisign 
following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To designate a qualisign as a 
rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] because a qualisign can only be 
rhematic and iconic."
http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html

As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not 
consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs 
as possibly embodied signs, I am always referring to the 10 classes.

What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that is, 
the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign (clear 
enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it simply 
cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a 'feeling of 
red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe).

Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point clea

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Jerry,

I think you are making this seem more mysterious than it is. My understanding 
is that degeneracy means that there is a restriction from the general case 
(generate) to a less than general case. This is how Robert Rosen, e.g., uses 
the notion, and I don't see any good reason to think that Peirce is using it 
any differently. Basically, something is degenerate if it obscures generic 
differences in the way it can be produced. If we treat the degenerate as 
general, then we will be likely to make bad inferential extensions to general 
cases by overlooking crucial differences in the general cases.

In the passage from Peirce that you quote below, by way of Clark, I think the 
distinction is that the degenerate seconds consider them in terms of their form 
alone, which degenerates our understanding of them to firsts associated with 
them, making our understanding of something that is internal. The alternative 
is to regard them in terms of their true causes, which are external or 
extrinsic, and may be multiple for the same (indistinguishable internally) 
cases.

A couple of examples are 1) spectral lines that can be produced by more than 
one transition that nonetheless indicate the same energy levels, and 2) isomers 
of compounds when they are regarded just in terms of stoichiometric relations, 
ignoring their chirality.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Thursday, 17 December 2015 01:52
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Clark Goble; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Clark, Jeffrey, List:

Allow me to expand on the nature of my ignorance of the meaning of degeneracy.

Clearly, CSP's usage of this term with respect to mathematical objects, that is 
conic sections, is crisp and meaningful within the Pythagorean-Cartesian 
perspective of relations.  Jeff's reference is crisp and, of course, well known 
within the scientific community.

In this case, the generacy, which must be antecedent to the degeneracy, is also 
clear.  The two lines cross or they do not cross.  If they cross, then a new 
object is generated, a cone and it mirror image.  And this diagram plays a 
critical role in the physics of the Minkowski's "space-time" debacle.

My feeling is that this notion of "degeneracy" is difficult, if not 
intractable, when applied to ordinary linguistic terms which do not imply a 
"crossing" or parallelism.
Another example is, of course, chemical atoms or molecules.

I feel a different notion for generating functions is necessary both chemistry 
and biology..

However, from:
On Dec 16, 2015, at 4:01 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


But the relations of
reason and these self-relations are alike in this, that they arise from the
mind setting one part of a notion into relation to another. All degenerate
seconds may be conveniently termed internal, in contrast to external
seconds, which are constituted by external fact, and are true actions of one
thing upon another. (CP 1.365 (1890))

one get's a better notion of the concept I was missing.

Here, CSP brings the concepts of internal and external, also known as intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties in physical-chemical textbooks.

As I understand this quote, CSP is contrasting the relations of reason (logic?) 
with the relation that everything has with itself, namely, it identity.  In 
other words, the "intrinsic properties" in physical - chemical terms.

A curious conjecture emerges from CSP's views.
Thus, one could conjecture that the relations of reason and external properties 
are percepts of thermodynamics.  Further, that the self-relations of identity 
are the antecepts of quantum mechanics.

Amusing to think about.  Any other conjectures of interest?

A bit of light has been cast on whatever CSP may have intended.

Cheers

Jerry







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[PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Jon,

It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to many 
pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are ineffable, to use 
Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions because there is no need 
to eff them. In order to save them. The current discussion about the nature of 
percepts and their distinction from perceptual judgements is relevant here. 
There is nothing in appearances alone that makes the distinction, since any 
qualisign must be interpreted to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can 
separate the two abstractly, however, and with distinctions, their quality 
implies their existence directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self 
distinction (basic to using the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction 
involved to the self and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions 
alone we have experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and 
interpretation (thirdness) as either "this" or "that". 

John

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

> -Original Message-
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 19:21
> To: John Collier; Matt Faunce; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> Subject: Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
> 
> John, List,
> 
> I have personally always understood “saving the phenomena” to mean
> preserving the appearances, that is, whatever explanation we come up with
> must leave the appearances invariant.
> 
> I remember reading somewhere that the Greek “sozein” could mean either
> save or solve.  I thought it was Ian Hacking but not sure.
> Poking around the web for it did turn up this historical comment:
> 
> https://thonyc.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/%CF%83%E1%BF%B4%CE%B6%C
> E%B5%CE%B9%CE%BD-%CF%84%E1%BD%B0-
> %CF%86%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%B
> 1-sozein-ta-phainomena/
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On 12/13/2015 5:28 AM, John Collier wrote:
> > Peirce List,
> >
> > Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point Matt
> has made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in the
> process of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of continuity of
> knowledge through radical theory change (and across different discourses
> and cultures, for that matter). There was some brief attention to that work at
> the time, but I was already working with biologists on an information
> dynamics approach to self-organization in evolution, and I set it aside. My 
> co-
> author on the paper is a former student of mine who is one of the few to
> maintain and interest in the issues, though he is making his name more in the
> cognitive science of religion and superstition these days.
> >
> > * Saving the distinctions: Distinctions as the epistemologically
> > significant content of
> experience<http://bacon.umcs.lublin.pl/~ktalmont/pdf/Save%20distinctions
> .pdf> (2004, with Konrad Talmont-Kaminski) The title is a sideways reference
> to “saving the phenomena” as used by Bas van Fraassen, who seems to have
> got it from Duhem.
> >
> > John Collier
> > Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> > http://web.ncf.ca/collier
> >
> 
> --
> 
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:
> http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Franklin, List,

I agree about Peirce’s difference with Lewis wrt the a priori. I don’t see how 
that is related to the issue of the effability of percepts, though.

You are arguing below that each percept has its own individuality. I have no 
quarrel with that. My concern is that, since all thought is in signs, either 
percepts are thoughts and they have secondness and thirdness as well as 
firstness (I have called them existence and interpretation, respectively, 
recently here and argued that only distinction, among experiences, is 
self-contained in all of these respects, or else they are not thoughts. If they 
are not thoughts, then I question whether it makes sense to refer to them as 
determinate contents of experiences. It seems to me that Quine, Sellars and 
Lewis share my concerns. Though their arguments are somewhat different I think 
there is a convergence of their inferences towards what Lewis called 
ineffability. The main problem generated is for the grounds of empirical 
claims, which become very much more fluid than in most versions of empiricism 
and positivism. I don’t see that Peirce avoids this in any interesting way, nor 
does it seem to me that, given his fallibilism and also his view that all 
thought is in signs, he should avoid it.

I would argue that the grounds for knowledge are the topological structures of 
the distinctions in our experience. This is a form of information theoretic 
structure that I think Dretske, for one, has shown to be much more productive 
than might seem at first. Nonetheless, it is a pretty radical idea in 
epistemology at this stage. What I have called the effability issue is the 
motivation for moving in this radical direction, since it seems to rule out 
other kinds of ground for knowledge.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 23:19
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

John, list,

I will become much less active for the next few months after today.

I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as ineffable, 
and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of Sellars, I 
couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable though.

It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which 
together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of 
empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves 
empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and thereby 
give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible. If I 
understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between these 
analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical knowledge 
(i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly. In any case, 
there is the attempt to describe the given for both.

I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual pragmatism', 
and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a priori is really a 
sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed. The appearances, or 
phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual judgments would be impossible 
as judgments about percepts. Note that perceptual judgments are not the result 
of applying a priori concepts to percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For 
Lewis, the pragmatic a priori can be held by the mind regardless of their 
truth; he insists that they are held by the mind as being useful for 
interpreting the given, but can never be false, because they make falsity 
possible in empirical knowledge; the a priori concepts can only be rejected 
because they cease to be useful. But for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any 
other judgments, can be false, and we can learn that they were false later. It 
is simply the case that at the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we 
are in no position to question its veracity or to control conduct with respect 
to it.

I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality unique to 
it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis. Only this does 
not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not mean the quality is 
not like other qualities experienced, but only that it is not precisely the 
same as those other qualities.

-- Franklin

-


On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Jon,

It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to many 
pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are ineffable, to use 
Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions because there is no need 
to eff them. In order to save them. The current discussion about the nature of 
percepts and their distinction fro

RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[John Collier]

Clark, List,

I agree with the connection to the Pragmatic Maxim, especially in its later 
formulations, but I am pretty sure that there are even earlier formulations 
have a subjunctive component.

I think that verificationism is about meaning in all cases, not about the 
definition or nature of truth, though the two are connected by the notion of 
“truthmakers” – that which makes something true. I am not keen on possible 
worlds as a way to deal with modality, partly because of the Platonic 
implications. This is part of the reason I spoke of functions and 
cross-products of possible functions (the latter being the domain of possible 
worlds, if there are such things). As I described it, this takes us Aleph 3 
cardinality at least, raising issues about accessibility of the possible worlds 
for things like verifiability (or truth, for that matter). I don’t see this as 
a bad thing, though it takes us some way from the usual interpretations of 
acceptance in the long run that people like Putnam and Rescher ascribe to 
Peirce. Since I think that this idea leads to at best internal realism, and 
Peirce has a stronger form of realism, I would say that Peirce should have had 
a stronger form of the end of though, not just the end in our world, but, as 
you suggest, across all possible worlds (assuming a rigorous notion of possible 
worlds, perhaps of the form I have suggested).

In any case, we seem to be convergent on what Peirce requires.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: CLARK GOBLE [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Monday, 14 December 2015 06:58
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering


On Dec 12, 2015, at 12:49 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

I tend to see “in the long run” as more a regulatory concept rather than 
something actual. For a long time I did worry about how the “in the long run” 
worked and raised concerns similar to yours. The question of whether it really 
functions the way Peirce needs it to function if it’s not potentially actual in 
some sense is still a big issue I think gets neglected too much. So don’t think 
I’m brushing that aside. I do share some of your concerns there. I’ve just come 
to think that for Peirce the fundamental issue is the meaning of truth which 
then brings in the issues I raised as regulatory concepts.

[JDC] Agreed. There are a number of counter-examples to convergence that are 
worrisome, such as counter-induction, sets that show arbitrarily long patterns 
for finite stages that aren’t reflected in the overall statistics of the whole 
set, and so on.

One more thing I forgot to add.

I think there’s a certain similarity here to the pragmatic maxim. By his mature 
era Peirce realized that the maxim only made since when considered in terms of 
counterfactuals. Put in more modern jargon Peirce realizes meaning isn’t an 
issue of the actual but of possible worlds. That seems pretty radical yet makes 
a ton of sense.

Now we can perhaps quibble about whether the maxim is really a 
verificationalist theorem if it is verification only in possible worlds rather 
than actual worlds. It seems undeniable that this is how Peirce takes it.

Along the same lines I think this “truth in the long run” need not be 
considered in a single actual world. It is enough that inquiry takes place 
through all possible worlds. The truth is what is knowable across all possible 
worlds with the constraints the object of knowledge places upon possibilities. 
i.e. to know what is aesthetic to human beings applies only to possible worlds 
where there are humans like us.

If this is correct and “truth in the long run” is using the same sort of 
reasoning as the pragmatic maxim then of course the problems fall away. Having 
an infinite community of inquirers is a big problem in the actual world. It’s 
less of an issue when one is looking across all possible worlds. And it’s that 
appeal to possible worlds that I think moves Peirce a tad closer to the 
Platonic treatment of the issues.

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[John Collier]

Clark, List,



Just a couple of points to take up something that Clark says within the more 
general context of logic and formal mathematics, and, in this case, its 
relation to physics, but still very Peircean I think. See below.



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]

Sent: Friday, 11 December 2015 19:41

To: Peirce-L

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering



I tend to see “in the long run” as more a regulatory concept rather than 
something actual. For a long time I did worry about how the “in the long run” 
worked and raised concerns similar to yours. The question of whether it really 
functions the way Peirce needs it to function if it’s not potentially actual in 
some sense is still a big issue I think gets neglected too much. So don’t think 
I’m brushing that aside. I do share some of your concerns there. I’ve just come 
to think that for Peirce the fundamental issue is the meaning of truth which 
then brings in the issues I raised as regulatory concepts.



[JDC] Agreed. There are a number of counter-examples to convergence that are 
worrisome, such as counter-induction, sets that show arbitrarily long patterns 
for finite stages that aren’t reflected in the overall statistics of the whole 
set, and so on.


All that said, I’m not sure infinity works quite the way you suggest simply 
because Peirce is not dealing with a normal potentially countable infinity. 
That is his continuity ends up dealing with higher order infinities - even if 
he does differ from the typical cardinal/ordinal sets we deal with in 
mathematics. Now I’ll confess it’s been more than 10 years since I last studied 
Peirce on these particular issues or where he differs from Cantor and company. 
So my memories are a tad fuzzy. Forgive me for errors. I think however that if 
there’s a potential countable infinity of the sort [\aleph_0]  that Peirce’s in 
the long run in his semiotics allows this to be dealt with by semiotics running 
in higher orders like [\aleph_1]  or so on. I’m curious as to what others thing 
here.



My logic professor, George Boolos, dreamed up a being he called Zeus (so-called 
as to not pre-empt contemporary religious concerns) that got better at 
processes if it repeats them. The idea is that in calculating an infinite 
series, Zeus could do each step twice as fast as the previous one, and be able 
to complete a series in finite time. Obviously, neither we nor any other finite 
system could be a Zeus demon, but it does give a way to interpret infinite 
convergence. I see this as a case of going from [\aleph_0]   to [\aleph_1] . 
The relevant set becomes the cross-product. I came up with a somewhat similar 
demon I called the Hermes demon, which can make every increasingly accurate 
measurements in the same way. It can achieve [\aleph_1]  accuracy in 
measurement. Combine the two, and you have a Laplacean demon, making some sense 
of an otherwise somewhat mysterious idea. We could carry this to higher levels 
by calculating over all functions possible on an [\aleph_1]  sized set, and so 
on, if necessary. Is this outside of the range of semiotics because it uses 
infinite methods and assumes creatures that could not exist (Peircean sense)? I 
think not, since it is an extension of ideas in the finite realm to the 
continuous in a fairly straight-forward way that is already pretty well 
understood.



The second issue is whether we really need this. The concern ends up being more 
or less a common critique of convergence theories. That is you might test out 
to Tx but that the pattern completely shifts at Tx+1. I think Peirce’s 
conception works simply because in the long run is regulative as I mentioned 
but also because what is doing the testing is an infinite community rather than 
a finite one. That is the way Peirce attempts to get out of this is via his 
Hegelian/neoPlatonic like conception of the universe as an argument working 
itself out. So when we talk about truth it’s this universe that counts. That is 
we can maintain Peirce’s notion without having to deal with a practical knowing 
community.



I think we need it. Testing the infinite community of functions seems to me to 
require at least two levels past [\aleph_0] , with the set of possible 
functions, as I mentioned above. The order, in this case, becomes irrelevant, 
because all orderings are included if the demon is carefully rendered. As 
someone who doesn’t find the Hegelian/neo-Platonic outlook very perspicuous 
(though for a time I thought it solved all outstanding metaphysical problems). 
In any case, from my current perspective to understand even the problem 
requires going to higher order infinities, let alone to understand how we might 
deal with actual cases. I am pretty sure that the Axiom of Choice, or one of 
many equivalent forms (well-ordering, basically) is required for bringing the 
abstract Laplacean demon I outlined down to earth

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Jerry, List:



I believe my metaphysics are those of C.S. Peirce.  Peirce's pope-positivism is 
also assumed explicitly in our book, Every Thing Must Go, which does take 
modern physics as a starting point. So perhaps I have made my ideas clear, and 
the resulting argument is pretty straight-forward. Most metaphysical problems, 
especially of the sort you are concerned with, are dissolved on this approach, 
which was certainly Peirce's intention. As I said in  my response to Franklin, 
you can take the negation of some of Peirce's central claims, and get other 
results. I have yet to see a clear statement of either your objections to the 
Peircean position, or what you consider to be an alternative. Starting by 
stating explicitly which parts of Peirce's methodology you reject might help me 
here. I have been using Peircean methodology more and more explicitly since my 
PhD thesis (1984), which uses Peirce's pragmatic maxim (a version of it - he 
had many versions that are presumably equivalent at some level - much like 
Kant's categorical imperative) and his positivist motives.  I have been 
minimizing my metaphysical commitments for some time, though I spent a period 
as a raving Platonist when I was an undergraduate, probably under the influence 
of reading too much B. Russell rather naively.



This is a Peirce list, after all. But I think that it is actually a relevant 
question which of Peirce's basic assumptions (all thought is in signs, 
objectivity requires that differences in meaning are determined by differences 
in expectations of possible experience, there is an identifiable set of 
external object to which some of our signs pick out that are mostly accessible 
through sensory observations - some exceptions involving evaluation of 
outcomes, but still involving observation and possible observations) one can 
coherently give up. Assuming we disagree, and I am not convinced there is any 
meaningful basis for the apparent disagreement, and I don't yet see what it is, 
I proposed some possibilities recently of where we disagree, like rationalism 
of a form that rejects the Pragmatic Maxim, or Peirce's empirical criterion for 
cognitive significance, or both. (Rationalism I take to be, as is traditional, 
that there are synthetic a priori truths, i.e., truths discoverable and 
justifiable by reason that are not the results of definitions and/or 
methodological commitments). Unlike the Logical Positivists, I don't think it 
is possible or wise to try to eliminate metaphysics entirely. Their program 
collapsed in its own terms. But it is best to keep it minimal. I think the 
alternative produces unclear ideas of an especially convoluted (involuted?) 
sort. However that may be, I am still not at all clear what our different 
presuppositions are, let alone what the basis of the difference might be.



My metaphysics is not just physics, but a physics supported but not implied 
position called Structural Realism in the philosophical literature. Actually, I 
have a slightly more restrictive form that Cliff Hooker and I call Dynamical 
Realism. Being more restrictive means that it requires additional argument, the 
arguments being distinctly metaphysical and not physical.  It is the starting 
point for many of my recent papers that have something like "A dynamical 
approach to ..." in the title. My scientific background (I did research in 
government, business and academics) is in planetary science, which is mostly 
the study of inorganic dynamical systems, so it is my touchstone for scientific 
methodology (arguably the notion of complexly organized systems originated in  
a lab in the building that held most of my classes, run by Lorenz - planetary 
dynamics is another source).



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]

Sent: Sunday, 06 December 2015 7:13 PM

To: Peirce-L

Cc: John Collier

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.



List, John:



3.418.  "Thus, the question whether a fact is to be regarded as to referring to 
a single thing or to more is a question of the form of the proposition under 
which it suits our purposes to state the fact."





On Dec 6, 2015, at 6:26 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote:







On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote:



Jerry,

I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of 
firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking 
about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You 
aren't talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like





[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.



Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.



Basically, that is irrel

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Dear Franklin, List members:

I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out now. It 
is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit subtle. I left 
it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce scholars It appears 
in several places in slightly different forms in Peirce’s writings. I would 
argue that it is very difficult if not impossible to accept many of Peirce’s 
more systematic ideas without accepting this argument I lay out.

Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to 
something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in  one sense), or we 
go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to Peirce). 
Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the objectivity test. 
Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has to be given up. Now 
that there are experiences, including mental experiences, is objective, but 
meaning cannot be referred ultimately to mental experiences alone without 
making it depend on psychology rather than objective conditions. Other than for 
logic, which has its own grounds for objectivity in things that are external, 
the experience ultimately referred to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would 
include emotions, which I see to have a propositional or cognitive component) 
that also must have an external aspect in order to support objective 
differences in meaning. Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of 
experiences that are of external things. The child, he says, learns to 
recognize that not all things are under his control, but must be at least in 
part caused by external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of 
the external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this 
class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just 
identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are 
illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and 
dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples – though 
Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but Peirce would 
require an additional reason for doubt over the mere possibility – a “defeater” 
in terms of contemporary pragmatist epistemology), but the basic way to check 
membership is whether or not they are at least in part not under our control. 
This needs to be tested, as we can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in 
general (or we violate the defeater requirement).

Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of definitions 
floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine defines the physical 
as that which is accessible through the senses (not what physics tells us is 
physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me) since there are the 
afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics tells us is physical is a 
good place to start, but of course physics has been wrong, so this is more of a 
control than a criterion. I think it is safe to say, though, that everything 
that science has been able to study effectively so far has a physical basis. I 
would think that the physical has a number of signs, and that there is a 
consilience that eventually leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce 
was, in fact, a kind of idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there 
is presumably no contradiction  between his views about experience, and the 
physical, and at least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, 
but that is neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument 
that I have reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or 
mental experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical, 
mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least. In 
order to make our ideas clear we need to make reference to this external 
component, on pain of subjectivism, psychologism, and making distinctions in 
thoughts that have no distinction in their objects. So Peirce’s prope-postivism 
also takes us back to the Pragmatic Maxim, that thought is all in signs, and 
his notion of the basis of experience.

Obviously there are some assumptions here, and one could reject any one of them 
(accept subjectivism, or psychologism, or other forms of antirealism, as 
examples), which many philosophers do. But the assumptions are made deeply in 
Peirce’s philosophy. I think he was right about this.

I could give a bunch of references to Peirce’s writings that support my 
interpretation, but this is long enough already and I have to go shopping. I 
hope it is at least close to sufficient to respond to your worry.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, 06 December 2015 2:26 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Jerry,

I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of 
firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking 
about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You 
aren't talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce's views on 
firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion).

Unless you understand  this you are going to be asking questions without an 
answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with my 
physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe). The 
physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference in 
meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with Quine's 
idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it that the last 
is also Peirce's view, and he is no materialist. Basically, you err, as I see 
it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in meaning, however much 
it might seem to. It violates Peirce's prope-positivism, which he uses to 
deflate a lot of metaphysics.

Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of 
experience Peirce uses, or both, in  order to save your distinction. But then 
you aren't talking about Peirce's firsts when you say they have structure.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Friday, 04 December 2015 11:32 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Peirce-L; Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.

List, John:


On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote:


Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
explain. See interspersed comments.
The message was only questions, with one except.
What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine.


I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures 
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations.

Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, 
featureless.

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

[John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
(qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. 
Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but 
then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities,

Well...
FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate.

But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his 
arguments.
Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in 
various forms of diagrams / mereology.  To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the 
critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms  / formal 
logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use.

CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related 
terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The 
goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that 
is recursive.  In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) 
premises for constructing consistent arguments.   The index is the central term 
in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices.  The construction 
of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately 
connected to the indices.  It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. 
 That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of 
the sin-sign into rhema  The proposed self-consistency of the sentences 
(propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns.

Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of 
legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new 
qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1.

In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises 
augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine 
terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics 
such that recursive calculations  would be consistent, complete and decidable.

As I have previously noted

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
explain. See interspersed comments.


John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM
To: Peirce-L
Cc: Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.

List, Clark:

On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:


I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures 
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations.


>From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, of 
>part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and as 
>"scaling" in physics.

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 

A noun is what?  a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? a 
grammatical structure?

[John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
(qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. 
Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but 
then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities,

If an atom is a noun, does it inherently have a structure? When was the concept 
of the structure of an atom introduced into science?  philosophy?

[John Collier] If an atom is a noun then it is a second, and there is no reason 
why it can't have a structure. Atomness, though, is iconic, and cannot signify 
a structure in itself.

If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a 
structure?  Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms 
and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this 
relation?

[John Collier] No, see my last interjection.

In short, does a concept of "firstness", as a "thing in itself" inherently 
require a metaphysical view of all nouns?

[John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here by 
your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term.

If a unit is a firstness, then:

The union of units unifies the unity.    

Is this logically  True?  or False?   
What is your reasoning for your conclusion?

[John Collier] Clark will have to address this. I find it very obscure.

Best,
John


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Sung,

I assume no such thing. Where did you get this idea from?  You are unreasonably 
adept at setting up straw men to try to justify yourself. You did it recently 
with Edwina as well. This is not only bad reasoning, but it is rather rude as 
well.

Your claims overall make no sense, since there is little relation between 
Popper’s “worlds” and the Peircean categories, especially in trying to relate 
them to fields of studies, which the Popperian worlds bridge completely, as do 
the Peircean categories.

As I have said, your first mistake is that you are applying the notion of 
structure to firsts, which is a violation of both the common sense and 
technical notions of ‘structure’.

You are stumbling around in your own conceptual fog, and it isn’t nice to watch.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Thursday, 03 December 2015 12:30 AM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi Clark, lists,

You wrote:

"I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
structures (120215-1)
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations."

(1)  It seems that everybody, including you, John (and myself until recently), 
assumes that there is only one way to distribute the Peircean categories of 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness over the three worlds of Burgin, denoted as 
S (World of Structures), P (Physical world),and M (Mental world).  Let me 
designate such a view as the 1-to-1 view, according to which only one of the 6 
possibilities shown in Table 1 is true and the rest are not.  The alternative 
view would be that more than one of the 6 possibilities listed in Table 1 can 
be true, depending on context. I will refer to this view as the "1-to-many" 
view.


Table 1.  Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the worlds and 
Peircean categories.

Possibilities

Firstness

Secondness

Thirdness

 Context or Field of Studies

1

S*

P

M

?

2

S

M

P

?

3

P

S

M

?

4

P

M

S

?

5

M

S

P

?

6

M

P

S

?


*S = World of structures
  P = Physical world
  M = Mental world

(2)  It may be necessary to invoke at least two kinds of "structures" -- (i) 
"mental structures", i.e, those structures in the world whose existence depends 
on the human mind (through discovery, creativity, and production), and (ii) 
"real structures" that can exist independent of human mind.  The S in 
Possibility 1 and 2 above are of the first kind (i.e., real structures) and the 
S  in Possibilities 4 and 6 are of the second kind (i.e., mental structures).

(3)  Even with my very limited reading of Peirce, I can recognize that Table 1 
is consistent with the basic tenet of the Peircean semiotics that all signs 
(including S, P and M in Table 1) have in each the three basic aspects of 
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, although each of the 6 possibilites shown 
in Table 1 PRESCINDS different aspect of each sign.  For example, Possibility 1 
rescinds the Firstness aspect of S, the Secondness aspect of P, and the 
Thirdness aspect of M.  In contrast, Possibility 6 prescinds the Firstness 
aspect of M, the Secondness aspect of P and the Thirdness aspect of S, etc.


If (2) and (3) are right, the 1-to-many view described in (1) would be 
validated.


All the best.

Sung



On Wed, Dec 2, 2015 at 11:18 AM, Clark Goble 
<cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>> wrote:

On Dec 1, 2015, at 7:16 PM, Sungchul Ji 
<s...@rci.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu>> wrote:

(1)  I agree with you on the definition of these categories of Peirce.
We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three worlds of 
Burgin and the three roses of Scotus.

I’m not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures 
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations.

You seem to be using firstness due to invariant and thus structures. But I 
don’t see how that works. Being invariant is not the same as being unrelated.


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--
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net<http://www.confor

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Sung,

I repeat, firsts are not structures and structures are not firsts. Firsts don’t 
permit the sort of relational properties required of structures, though there 
is a first corresponding to any structure, properly called an icon, but 
structures are never icons. Structures can exist as seconds, and be real as 
thirds. This is the way the notion of structure is used in logic and in network 
theory (nodes and connections among them, which is logically identical to a 
structure).

This sort of abuse of terminology undermines what you are saying, and in fact 
makes it false. This is a shame.

On the issue of cardinality and ordinality, you have them backwards.  The 
numbers are given in terms of the closure of equinumerosity, the closure being 
at least a second order property, which is just cardinality. Once this is 
established by some method , we can define ordinality in terms of it. This is 
how it has been done since at least Peano, and the contemporary set theoretic 
definition of the counting numbers in terms of the empty set and constructions 
(either Zermelo-Fraenkel or von Neumann) on it follow the same pattern by 
ensuring equinumerosity first through defining a second order property, and 
then proving the ordinality. I addressed this before, but obviously you don’t 
care about getting it right.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 4:16 AM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

Hi Clark,

". . .  Firstness is the world of raw experience, ideas or possibility, 
secondness the world  (120115-1)
of reactions, brute force & actuality and thirdness the world of signs, 
connections and power
(not necessarily mental unless one is careful what one means by that)."


(1)  I agree with you on the definition of these categories of Peirce.
We seem to disagree on how to assign these categories to the three worlds of 
Burgin and the three roses of Scotus.

(2)  In principle, there are 6 (and only 6) ways of assigning the three objects 
(whether words or roses) to the Peircean categories as shown in Table 1.  
Although I adopted Possibility 1 in Figure 1 of my PEIRCE-L post of 11/302015, 
I cannot rule out some of the other possibilities listed in Table 1.


Table 1.  Non-deterministic relation between triadic model of the worlds and 
Peircean categories.

Possibilities

Firstness

Secondness

Thirdness

 Context or Field of Studies

1

S*

P

M

?

2

S

M

P

?

3

P

S

M

?

4

P

M

S

?

5

M

S

P

?

6

M

P

S

?


*S = World of structures
  P = Physical world
  M = Mental world

(3)  The non-determinism indicated in Table 1 is frustrating if we assume, 
whether correctly or not, that there should be only one unambiguous assignment 
possible if our theories are right. Such an assumption may be valid and future 
studies may indeed reveal an unambiguous categorial assignment.  Alternatively, 
the non-determinism of Table 1 may be real and reflects a deep structure of 
reality as discussed below.

(4)  The non-determinism of Table 1 reminded me of a similar non-determinism in 
gauge field theories in physics.  Simply put

". . .  a gauge theory is a type of field 
theory<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Field_theory_(physics)> in which the 
Lagrangian<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lagrangian_(field_theory)> is  
 (120115-2)
invariant<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invariant_(physics)> under a continuous 
group<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuous_group> of local transformations"
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gauge_theory).


Replacing "Lagrangian" with "Peircean categories" and identify the 6 
possibilities of Table 1 with "local transformations"  in (1201156-2) logically 
leads to

"A gauge theory may be said to apply to semiotics qualitatively, if the 
Peircean ITR(120115-3)
(Irreducible Triadic Relation) remains invariant upon transforming the nature 
of the
objects occupying the three positions in the commutative triangle, Figure 1"


 fg
  Firstness > Secondness ---> Thirdness
(Real Rose)   (Rose)  (Mental 
Rose)
 [World of Structures]   [Physical World]  [Mental World]
 |  
  ^
 |  
  |
 |___|
h
Figure 1.  The Peircean ITR as the conserved property of semiotics (or sign 
physics (?))
 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Clark,



I share your scepticism about psychoanalysis



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: CLARK GOBLE [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]

Sent: Tuesday, 01 December 2015 4:48 AM

To: Peirce-L

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations





On Nov 30, 2015, at 2:18 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote:



Snip ...



Lacan was interested in the unconscious from a psychoanalytic point of view, 
and he learned that besides his "the imaginary" (1ness) and "the symbolic" 
(3ness, both derived from Ferdinand de Sussure's linguistic sign) he had to add 
"the real" (2ness) that he defined as "the impossible", « la grimace du réel 
»... or better (or in a more perverse way): "what never ceases to not join the 
symbolic" (the translation from the Spanish version is mine...) apparently, the 
French (original version) is. « ce qui ne cesse de ne pas s'écrire »...

I think that it is a good conceptual approach to the Dynamic Object by Peirce. 
For that and else... he was expelled from the IPA (International Psychoanalytic 
Association)...



I think that is not promising for several reasons, not the least because of the 
identity of 2ness with the real rather than the existing, though there is a 
sense of ‘real’ in which it means the actual as opposed to the possible. 
Adopting this sense, the real is independent of symbolism. One might think of 
it as the integration of “brute facts”, but there is (or at least seems to me 
to be) a psychological aspect to symbolism in this that comes out in « ce qui 
ne cesse de ne pas s'écrire », at least in my Quebec French. Perhaps this is a 
good focus for psychoanalytic analysis, but it doesn’t generalize well. 
Application to dynamical objects, on this account, seems to me to be restricted 
to the realm of 2ness, which is also much too restrictive.

Interesting again, although I admit to a very strong skepticism of 
psychoanalysis in general. My friends who do like it tend to like it more as a 
source of metaphors and structures than really taking it seriously on its own 
terms.



But it is exactly the metaphorical aspects that, connected with an emotional 
appreciation, permit a change from one psychological state to another. Despite 
the name, analytical and formal implications, psychoanalysis does not work 
without the emotional component, at least according to a psychiatrist I worked 
with in Calgary to the extent of doing Psychiatric Grand Rounds with at the 
local teaching hospital. I am completely convinced he is right about this. 
Being too rational (on either side) sets up an obstacle to successful change. 
So I think htat the metaphorical aspect is more than incidental, though not 
sufficient itself.



It is interesting that I’ve heard that Saussure’s semiotics in practice (rather 
than as received) really was more Peircean than most realize. I’ve never been 
able to confirm this though.



Interesting indeed. I haven’t studied Saussure directly at all, in English 
translation let alone the French, because of his bad reputation and obvious 
failures of applications of his work that I am familiar with. Perhaps there is 
something worth investigating here by some able graduate student who would be 
interested in clearing the record.



Cheers,

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

Quite, Clark. On our naturalistic metaphysics in Every Thing Must Go, which 
takes both Peircean prope-positivism (based on the Pragmatic Maxim) and modern 
physics seriously, basically 2nd-ness is structural, and the law-like aspects 
are thirdness, not mental. The world that exists is nothing more, 
fundamentally, than structure. This view is sometimes called “structural 
realism”. Sung has produced another gross misrepresentation of not only the 
Peircean view, but of the concepts Peirce uses. It is annoying to have ones own 
views ruled out by an error like that (though some of our reviewers have done 
something similar).

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Monday, 30 November 2015 8:10 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations


On Nov 30, 2015, at 10:50 AM, Sungchul Ji 
<s...@rci.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu>> wrote:


  f  g
  Real Rose  > Rose  ---> Mental Rose
  (Firstness)  (Secondness)  (Thirdness)
 [World of Structures] [Physical World]  [Mental World]
 |  
  ^
 |  
  |
 ||
   h

Peirce’s ontology doesn’t quite follow that. Firstness is the world of raw 
experience, ideas or possibility, secondness the world of reactions, brute 
force & actuality and thirdness the world of signs, connections and power (not 
necessarily mental unless one is careful what one means by that). So depending 
upon what one means by structure you’d have that in the third universe.

Again though one has to be careful with terminology and Peirce’s shifts around 
a bit over time.

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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

This can’t be correct, Sung, since you don’t distinguish between ‘exists’ (you 
use it improperly) and ‘is real’. Firsts are real, but they don’t exist. 
Seconds exist (and are real). Thirds are real, and may have a mode of existence 
through seconds.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Sunday, 29 November 2015 11:56 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Cc: biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Auletta Gennaro; Ed Dellian; Robert E. 
Ulanowicz; Mark Burgin
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier] snip …

"First determines Second and Second determines Third, or Third                  
              (112915-3)
 cannot exist without Second and Second cannot exist without First."

We may refer to (112915-3) as the ontological constraint.  By the same token, 
we may refer to the second column as the epistemological constraint, and  the 
Peircean selection selection rule,(112915-2), that governs the interior 
elements of Table 1 and Figure 1 as the 'onto-epistemological' constraint. 

[John Collier]  Once again you have Peirce wrong, and miss much of the subtlety 
of his views. First you mess up the ontology, and then you make epistemological 
claims about things that are not necessarily dependent on mind, let alone 
knowledge. Whatever the system behind you numerology it has little to do with 
Peirce, and if it happens to, it is by accident. Normally I just delete your 
posts without reading them because they are so careless and I don't need the 
noise, but this one was such a mess, and so misleading, that I had to show how 
it was basically and irretrievably wrong. You are very clever, but your wit is 
mostly wasted. That is a shame.

John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

[John Collier]

I don’t have quotes handy, but I am pretty sure that Peirce uses “sign” in both 
ways. This caused me some problems in the past in applying his ideas to 
biosemiotics and other non-mental phenomena until I realized he was using the 
term in more than one way. I think if one is careful about the context it is 
possible to select which usage Peirce makes in each case.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: g...@gnusystems.ca [mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Thursday, 26 November 2015 4:14 AM
To: 'PEIRCE-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates and triadic relations

Yes, Peirce says that “meaning is a triadic relation.” But meaning is not a 
sign. Edwina, you say that a sign is a triadic relation, or a “triad,” while 
Peirce says that a sign is “a correlate of a triadic relation.” Do you really 
not see the difference?

Likewise with reference to CP 1.540, you don’t acknowledge the difference 
between representation and a representamen. It might help if you quoted 
Peirce’s whole sentence, and the one following it:
[[ In the first place, as to my terminology, I confine the word representation 
to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of 
the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a sign or a 
representamen. ]]
Once again, Peirce says that representation is a triadic relation – and that a 
sign, or representamen, is the correlate of the relation that represents the 
object for the interpretant.

You still have not cited a single quote where Peirce says that a sign is either 
a “triadic relation” or a “triad.” No amount of repeated recapitulation on your 
part can conceal that fact, or the obvious inference from it, that Peirce 
simply does not use the word “sign” that way.

Gary f.

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 25-Nov-15 13:51
Gary F - the triad is a basic component of Peircean semiosis. If you know of 
any place where he rejects the triad as this basic component, please inform us.

Please see his diagramme, 1.347 (The Categories in Detail) and his insistence 
on this triad (1.345) where 'meaning is obviously a triadic relation' - which 
means, that it is not mechanical (which is dyadic). You can also read his 
discussion of the triad in 'A Guess at the Riddle'. And of course, since his 
semiosis is triadic, then, you can read this perspective all through his work.

You can read his definition of the Representamen, which is the mediate part of 
the triad, in various parts of his work as well: "I confine the word 
representation to the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the 
interpreter of the representation" 1.540.
Note that this necessarily is a RELATIONAL process and not singular; the 
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.

" A Representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to a second, called its 
object, for a third, called its Interpretant, this triadic relation being such 
that the Representamen determines its interpretant to stand in the  same 
triadic relation to the same object for some interpretant" 1.541.

Note again: This is a RELATIONAL PROCESS in A TRIADIC SEMIOSIS. Again, the 
Representamen does not exist 'per se'.

Kindly remember that Peirce often used the term 'sign' to stand for the 
Representamen in itself. Not for the whole triad.  Again,

"A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic 
relation to a Second, called its Object as to be capable of determining a 
Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which stands itself to the same Object". 2.274.

Again- it's in a  triadic relation. The Representamen does not stand on its own.

Thirdness, by the way, is the same as mediation (5.104) which of course implies 
relations..and the Representamen is in a mode of Thirdness in 6 of the ten 
Signs.

Edwina


- Original Message -
From: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
To: 'PEIRCE-L'<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, November 25, 2015 9:33 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Edwina,

Again, you are saying that the Sign is a “triad” and that the Representamen is 
a part of that triad. I’m not sure what Frances is saying, but what Peirce is 
saying in these quotes is that “A Sign is a representamen,” which is “a 
correlate of a triadic relation.” Peirce does not say that a Sign is a “triad” 
or a “triadic relation”: it is a correlate of a triadic relation, and a 
Representamen (though perhaps not the only kind). If you know of any Peirce 
quote saying that a sign is a “triad”, please post it here. Otherwise please 
stop claiming that your peculiar use of the word “Sign” is the same as Peirce’s.

Gary f.

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Gary F - Again, the Representamen does not exist, as Frances is using it, on 
its own; it's an integral part of the triad. The 2.274 r

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[John Collier]

I don’t think that all rationalists were foundationalists. Descartes perhaps, 
but I don’t think Leibniz or Spinoza were. Empiricists up to Reid were 
foundationalists, and Mill was not. I think it is an independent issue.

Since there is a clear distinguishing feature, belief in the synthetic apriori 
in today’s terms, I prefer to use that to distinguish rationalists, not some 
rather vague ideal that probably nobody held. I am pretty sure that it 
distinguishes consistently those who are called rationalists, though there are 
some who would call, e.g., Russell, a rationalist, and Peirce, because of the 
role of logic in their views, but this seems wrong to me. Peirce was a 
fallibilist sort of positivist, and Russell was an empirically oriented 
Platonist.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 24 November 2015 6:23 PM
To: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific


On Nov 24, 2015, at 12:03 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

I disagree with the sharp division between empiricists and rationalists as Jon 
draws it. He quotes:

Rationalism:  A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, in which the
criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive.  Usually
associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into
philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza.  (Vernon J. Bourke)

This is not correct. Most rationalists allow for truth to be determined not 
only by reason but also by experience. Extreme rationalists like Aristotle 
require that essential properties and their consequences be understood 
rationally, but not accidents. Descartes, much less extreme, made most truths 
dependent on experience.  Leibniz is perhaps the most consistent rationalist 
(if we require the split with empiricism to be really deep) in that he thought 
the nature of the whole universe was fully determined by rationality. However 
he also thought that because our (some of) perceptions are confused we must 
rely on experience to determine at least some truths, even if on the scale of 
God they are determined solely by reason.

Isn’t the issue with Rationalists and truth from senses that they are 
foundationalists? That is truths of experience start with a point of 
infallibility and then draw deductive consequences from it. They still see it 
in terms of experience but induction just isn’t part of their reasoning in any 
strong sense. For something to be known it has to have that absolute reason.

Of course as I said I doubt anyone was a pure Rationalist. So I doubt anyone 
only thought in that way. But that was the ideal.

I confess it’s been an awful long time since I last read seriously Leibniz and 
company. So I can’t recall off the top of my head how they dealt with confused 
perceptions in this.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific

[John Collier]

Sorry for the delay in responding. I am catching up. I have had acute kidney 
failure and my time and energy are not focussed on mailing lists right now. I 
am recovereing fairly well, and the long term prognosis is unclear, but I am 
assuming it will not be good.

I disagree with the sharp division between empiricists and rationalists as Jon 
draws it. He quotes:
> Rationalism:  A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, in which the
> criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive.  Usually
> associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into
> philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza.  (Vernon J. Bourke)

This is not correct. Most rationalists allow for truth to be determined not 
only by reason but also by experience. Extreme rationalists like Aristotle 
require that essential properties and their consequences be understood 
rationally, but not accidents. Descartes, much less extreme, made most truths 
dependent on experience.  Leibniz is perhaps the most consistent rationalist 
(if we require the split with empiricism to be really deep) in that he thought 
the nature of the whole universe was fully determined by rationality. However 
he also thought that because our (some of) perceptions are confused we must 
rely on experience to determine at least some truths, even if on the scale of 
God they are determined solely by reason.

This why I defined rationalism as the belief that there are truths that are not 
analytic that can be ascertained by reason. Empiricists like Locke (pretty much 
-- he vacillates a bit), Hume and Mill deny this. But most rationalists allow 
for empirical determination of classes of truths, whether for ontological or 
epistemological reasons.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

> -Original Message-
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> Sent: Monday, 23 November 2015 4:25 AM
> To: Peirce List
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific
> 
> Thread:
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17681
> 
> Peircers,
> 
> I'm sure we all learned in one place or another that Locke, Berkeley, and
> Hume belonged to a group called “The Empiricists” while Descartes, Spinoza,
> and Leibniz belonged to a group called “The Rationalists”, where “empiricism”
> and “rationalism”
> were described or exemplified as positions or tendencies the former and the
> latter, respectively, bore in common.  That's all very pat, and pat enough to
> content the mind for a time, but if one gets the idea that thinkers split in
> their practices as cleanly and deeply as gradgrinds teach undergrads to
> categorize their thought then that would be a mistake.
> 
> Consulting my Runes, I find the following definition.
> 
> 
> 
> Rationalism:  A method, or very broadly, a theory of philosophy, in which the
> criterion of truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive.  Usually
> associated with an attempt to introduce mathematical methods into
> philosophy, as in Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza.  (Vernon J. Bourke)
> 
> The history of rationalism begins with the Eleatics (q.v.), Pythagoreans, and
> Plato (q.v.) whose theory of the self-sufficiency of reason became the
> leitmotif of neo-Platonism and idealism (q.v.).
> 
> 
> 
> I will try to remember that people still attach those meanings to the word
> “rationalism” but I'm pretty sure I never thought of empiricism and
> rationalism as “never the twain shall meet” ways of approaching the world.
> So I'll take a cue from the passage that Clark quoted, and call the brand of
> rationalism that Peirce deprecated by the name of “philosophical
> rationalism”.  Personally, I have never found much use for it, but I don't 
> have
> much use for any ism that is taken to such extremes that it become a religion,
> so there is nothing very surprising about that.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> --
> 
> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ inquiry list:
> http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[John Collier]

I wrote and Clark replied:



I think that rationalism normally and traditionally means 
accepting that there are truths that can be known a priori that are not merely 
matters of convention.



Maybe I am wrong, but it seems like those are two separate claims and they must 
be broken out separately. Certainly that is where I take Quine to have been 
pushing the more Kantian conceptions. With regards to Peirce it may well be 
they are not convention (or as Peirce puts it not dependent upon a finite 
number of minds) but that we still learn them in a mediated form as they act 
upon us indirectly.



I would agree, but most rationalists would not, I think. I should have made it 
clear that I was restricting to a priori truths. Synthetic a priori truths, 
which rationalists accept the existence of, are typically taken by rationalists 
to have only conventions as an alternative. But even then there is a problem. 
The problem is that naturalist approaches make some a priori truths 
consequences of the discoverable nature of things, and not a result of reason 
alone. We don’t intuit them on this account, in the rationalist sense.



I think it is questionable whether Chomsky was really a rationalist, since he, 
like Pinker, often spoke of syntax as something that evolved, and therefore 
contingent. Mark Bickhard has argued that given a rich enough form of language 
we can derive Chomsky’s syntactic rules. The rules would still be contingent, 
though. It gets a bit muddy from there, since there are various views of 
law-like necessity available.



John

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[John Collier]

Yes, this agrees with my understanding, which has not changed, but has matured 
and become more clear over time.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 9:46 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments


On Nov 19, 2015, at 12:23 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

An idealist like Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by 
Platonists like Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that 
thoughts are out there in the world as well as in our heads. This view requires 
further argument from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker position is 
that propositions but not thoughts are out there in the world (early 
Wittgenstein is an example – a view I share, though I don’t share his view that 
true propositions = facts).


Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of humans 
requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that forms are 
meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I disagree with Jerry, 
I think). In this case logic can apply independently of thought, just as can 
mathematics, to the world. In other words, the world can be both logical and 
mathematical.

I think it’s probably better to think of Peirce here in terms of his scholastic 
realism instead of in terms of the rationalists like Descartes or Leibniz. I 
say that as I always took the key aspect of the rationalists to be an 
epistemological question rather than a metaphysical one. It seems to me Peirce 
isn’t arguing against more empirical ways of learning mathematics or logic. 
(Maybe I’m forgetting something where he attacks those) It’s just that he 
thinks their structure is independent of any finite number of minds.

The reason I think it unwise to call Peirce a rationalist is that he seems to 
ridicule the idea we are ever acting from pure reason.

Reason is of its very essence egotistical. In many matters it acts the
fly on the wheel. Do not doubt that the bee thinks it has a good
reason for making the end of its cell as it does. But I should be very
much surprised to learn that its reason had solved that problem of
isoperimetry that its instinct has solved. Men many times fancy that
they act from reason when, in point of fact, the reasons they attribute
to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents
to satisfy the teasing “why’s” of the ego. The extent of this
self-delusion is such as to render philosophical rationalism a farce.
(EP 2.32)

I assume this is tied up with evolutionary conceptions of the development of 
reasoning. His scholastic realism would allow that these structures act on 
creatures such that they develop a mind to recognize them (much as with the 
bee) but that it’s just not reason the way a Rationalist would conceive of it.

This isn’t psychologism of course since the issue (if I’m right) is the 
reasonableness of these structures independent of the creatures learning about 
it. It’s not really normal empiricism either since the empiricists were 
typically nominalists. It’s a third way due to this particularly narrow type of 
idealism.




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[PEIRCE-L] RE: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[John Collier]

Jon, Lists,

I think that rationalism normally and traditionally means accepting that there 
are truths that can be known a priori that are not merely matters of 
convention. This can allow for truths that don't require knowledge of any 
specific particular instances to know, but require knowledge of some particular 
instances. At the very least that is how I understand the term, and it is the 
basis for the distinction between rationalists and empiricists. But reason and 
observation can certainly complement each other in both cases. Philosophies 
rejecting reason in other aspects than the epistemological sense above do 
exist. Some versions of existentialism and of postmodernism fit that bill. They 
tend to focus on unfortunate and even destructive uses of reason (a useful type 
of scepticism, I think, when done in what Hume called the academic mode), but 
less useful I think when the critiques is grounded in a rejection of the 
association of reason with power, as when some feminists adopt antirationalism 
(in this sense) as masculine and demeaning to women. I think this gets more 
into psychological and social issues than philosophical ones, though there is 
no clear boundary between the two. The extremes of each are fairly different, 
however. I think men appropriated reason (and religion, and a number of other 
sources of power) rather than their being strictly masculine, as we see in some 
world views, for example some interpretations of Yin and Yang. There is enough 
empirical connection there to make the assimilation fit observation, but I 
think this is only because of the appropriation, e.g., of reason by men, is 
widespread.

Isms tend to exaggerate tendencies, so I would agree that they can be 
systematically misleading, but there are also real historical characters who 
occupy the various isms, even if only in their systematic writing. One thing I 
have always liked about Peirce is that although he is systematic 
methodologically (as a virtue), he is not obsessed with consistency in this 
trend, and isn't afraid of tensions in his thinking. His fallibilism and some 
other isms he adopts are all tentative hypotheses rather than a priori truths, 
as Gary recently noted.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier


> -Original Message-
> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]
> Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 9:04 PM
> To: John Collier
> Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L
> Subject: Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments
> 
> Terms, Propositions, Arguments:
> FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582
> FR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17629
> JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17639
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17640
> JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17642
> JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17644
> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17645
> JC:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17646
> 
> Jeff, John, all,
> 
> It may be that different people have different things in mind under the
> heading of rationalism.
> 
> I think of "the empirical" and "the rational" as pointing to complementary
> aspects of an adequate worldview, not as isms that mark a philosophical
> watershed, in other words, an exclusive either-or that we have to choose
> between.
> 
> Taken that way, rationalism allows for the possibility of rational concepts
> having extensions that include but exceed any enumeration of empirical
> instances.
> 
> So I see Peirce as sharing that much rationalism with Descartes.
> Cartesian dualism or dyadic reductionism is where their ways part.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On 11/19/2015 11:37 AM, John Collier wrote:
> > OK, thanks Jon. That is clear enough. You are right on all counts, I
> > think. I would think that Russell and Frege come out as rationalists
> > (my version) on this account, but Peirce does not (on these grounds at
> > least). That would put Peirce closer to my position than I could argue
> > for previously, though I suspected it. I was strongly influenced by
> > reading Peirce as an undergrad, though I did it without guidance and
> > paid more attention to how it influenced my own thinking than to what
> > the correct interpretation of Peirce was. My 1984 PhD thesis refers to
> > Peirce as an influence, but I am a bit cagey on this, and remarked in
> > a footnote that it depended on how Peirce was interpreted. People like
> > Nicholas Rescher and Hilary Putnam were also influenced by Peirce, but
> > drew some conclusions diametrically opposite t

[PEIRCE-L] RE: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[John Collier]

OK, thanks Jon. That is clear enough. You are right on all counts, I think. I 
would think that Russell and Frege come out as rationalists (my version) on 
this account, but Peirce does not (on these grounds at least). That would put 
Peirce closer to my position than I could argue for previously, though I 
suspected it. I was strongly influenced by reading Peirce as an undergrad, 
though I did it without guidance and paid more attention to how it influenced 
my own thinking than to what the correct interpretation of Peirce was. My 1984 
PhD thesis refers to Peirce as an influence, but I am a bit cagey on this, and 
remarked in a footnote that it depended on how Peirce was interpreted. People 
like Nicholas Rescher and Hilary Putnam were also influenced by Peirce, but 
drew some conclusions diametrically opposite to what I was arguing. Our 2007 
book, Every Thing Must Go, opens with a Peircean positivism that is also 
present in my thesis (not to be confused with either that of Comte or the 
Logical Positivists like A.J. Ayer, which are considerably more strict in 
rejecting metaphysics). The only paper I have published from my thesis so far 
was titled “Pragmatic Incommensurability”, a take on Kuhn. Both Kuhn and 
Phillip Kitcher praised it, but a number of more radical idealists were more 
critical. My own approach lends itself to naturalism rather than the 
anti-psychologism you mention, which I tend to associate with rationalism. 
Another place I deviate from Russell, but perhaps not Peirce, if you are right.



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



> -Original Message-

> From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net]

> Sent: Thursday, 19 November 2015 5:27 PM

> To: John Collier

> Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; PEIRCE-L

> Subject: Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

>

> John, all,

>

> This is just one of those points I've been pressing for the last quarter of a

> century or so, for example, if I may append a self-quotation:

>

> 

>

> Peirce's claim that his definition of a sign involves no reference to human

> thought means no necessary reference.

> The adjective "nonpsychological" that he often attaches to this conception of

> signs and logic is not intended to be exclusive of human thought but to

> expand the scope of the concepts beyond it (Peirce, NE 4, 21).  The prefix

> "non"

> is better read as an acronym for "not of necessity," and is commonly used in

> mathematical discourse in just this way.

> It extends the use of a concept into wider domains than the paradigm cases

> upon which our original intuitions were formed.

>

> 

>

> Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (Autumn 1995), “Interpretation as Action :

> The Risk of Inquiry”, _Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines_ 
> 15(1),

> 40–52.

> Archive:

> https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http://chss.montclair.edu/in<https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http:/chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html>

> quiry/fall95/awbrey.html<https://web.archive.org/web/19970626071826/http:/chss.montclair.edu/inquiry/fall95/awbrey.html>

> Journal:

> https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040<https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052>

> _0052<https://www.pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/inquiryct_1995_0015_0001_0040_0052>

> Online:

> https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_o<https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry>

> f_Inquiry<https://www.academia.edu/1266493/Interpretation_as_Action_The_Risk_of_Inquiry>

>

> Peirce's non-psychological definition of logic as formal (= normative)

> semiotics and his non-psychological definition of signs in terms of triadic 
> sign

> relations yield very different fruit from Frege's anti-psychological harvest,

> especially in the raw state picked by Russell.

>

> Regards,

>

> Jon

>

> On 11/19/2015 9:09 AM, John Collier wrote:

> > Jon, Lists,

> >

> > I agree that starting with Cartesian dualism will give a bad

> > interpretation of Peirce, but I am not sure what you mean by your first

> distinction.  Could you expand?

> >

> > The Cartesian position is a consequence of what I called rationalism

> > if it accepts material substance. Idealism is the result if it does

> > not (what I take to be Russell’s position, though he also argued for

> > what he called neutral monism, which is not technically idealistic in,

> > e.g., the Berkeleyan sense). I am unclear if Peirce was a rationalist,

> > but I suspect that his idealism stems from this. It would be a mistake

> > to understand this more or less as Russell as a 

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

[John Collier]

Lists,

At the end of the 19th Century there was a reaction against the idea that logic 
was a human creation and depended on the mind. This view is called 
psychologism. The founders of modern logic, including in particular Frege and 
Peirce, were anti-psychologists who argued that logic is independent of human 
psychology. I won’t give the arguments here, since they are readily available 
(see, e.g., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/psychologism/). Whether logic is 
independent of thought depends on what you take thought to be. An idealist like 
Peirce takes a very broad view of propositions (shared by Platonists like 
Russell, and many rationalists in general) to the effect that thoughts are out 
there in the world as well as in our heads. This view requires further argument 
from the arguments against psychologism. A weaker position is that propositions 
but not thoughts are out there in the world (early Wittgenstein is an example – 
a view I share, though I don’t share his view that true propositions = facts).

Personally I find that putting thoughts in the world independently of humans 
requires a degree of rationalism that I cannot accept: that forms are 
meaningful independent of their existence (this is where I disagree with Jerry, 
I think). In this case logic can apply independently of thought, just as can 
mathematics, to the world. In other words, the world can be both logical and 
mathematical. I go a bit further and argue that logic and mathematics depend on 
the nature of the world, and that we must discover them through hypothetical 
reasoning rather than a priori (for example whether continuity exists, the 
infinite exists and similar). This allows a version of non-psychologistic 
naturalism that is somewhat similar to what I take to be Mill’s position, 
though he is often interpreted as a psychologist. So I don’t see Jerry’s worry 
that there is a gap between the formal aspects of, say, information theory and 
its manifestation as making sense. It seems to me that this presupposes that 
the formal aspects can exist independently, involving either a rationalism or 
an idealism or both that I cannot accept, as I find it ontological otiose. This 
is my argument against Jerry’s objection. I also deviate from Peirce here, I 
think, and certainly from my philosophical hero, Bertrand Russell.

However my views may be, there is a clear antipsychologist position on logic 
that is associated with the greatest logicians, and I think it very hasty to 
adopt Stan’s classification of logic.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Stanley N Salthe [mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu]
Sent: Wednesday, 18 November 2015 10:34 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: Ed Dellian; PEIRCE-L; Sergey Petoukhov; Robert E. Ulanowicz; Auletta 
Gennaro; Hans-Ferdinand Angel; Rudiger Seitz
Subject: [biosemiotics:8949] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments

Sung, all --
Logic is a product of a human culture. The universe (as understood in 
cosmology) is a logical product of that human culture.
{everything {biology {primates {humans {culture {universe }}

STAN

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:42 PM, Sungchul Ji 
<s...@rci.rutgers.edu<mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu>> wrote:
Ed,

Thanks for your response.
You wrote :

"Logic" is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product 
of the human brain,(111815-1)
and therefore it is not logical."

I can't quite agree with (111815-1).  Instead I would assert that

"Logic may be a product of the Universe as is the human brain. Hence it is not 
surprising(111815-2)
that that the logical reasoning of the human mind agrees with what happens in 
the Universe."

All the best.

Sung






On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 8:56 AM, Ed Dellian 
<ed.dell...@t-online.de<mailto:ed.dell...@t-online.de>> wrote:
Sung,

You say that the Universe is "by and large logical". This is not true. "Logic" 
is a product of the human brain only. "The Universe" is not a product of the 
human brain, and therefore it is not logical, and its language is not the human 
mathematical logic of algebra. The rational language of the Universe is 
Geometry (Plato, 400 BC, Galileo, 1623 AD). Geometry as the art of measuring 
refers to everything "which is really there" and therefore has its distinct 
measure. Mathematical logic, or the art of calculating, refers to "what could 
be there" (cf. my 2012 essay "The language of Nature is not Algebra", on my 
website www.neutonus-reformatus.com<http://www.neutonus-reformatus.com>, entry 
nr. 40, 201). Logic and algebra is an "anthropocentric" art rooted in the human 
brain only; geometry is "cosmocentric" and refers to the reality and truth of 
Nature (based on the reality and measurability of space and time)

Ed.


Von: sji.confor...@gmail.com

RE: Units of the Universe (was) Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)

[John Collier]

Jerry,

It is fairly obvious that we disagree about ontological commitment. When I talk 
of "its" I am talking about existents, not merely realities. Likewise, when I 
talk of "bits", which I take to be grounded in existent distinctions.  So I 
don't know what it would mean to in addition to explain how bits "come into 
being".  I would assume you mean come into existence, but I am already assuming 
they exist - existent distinctions; there is no other kind of distinctness 
except ones in Peirce's realm of reality, but these differences do not imply 
existent differences.

I have no idea why there are existents (something rather than nothing), and I 
have never claimed to. Quite the contrary on this and other lists, in fact. So 
I see your complaint as misguided and without basis as applied to my expressed 
positions.

Anything tautological applies to all existents, so if there is a difference in 
"philosophical content" it is going to be in the existence of the application. 
However, if we have existing harmonics, then they are analyzable into discrete 
components, even if infinite. It is also quite possible using similar 
techniques (following Shannon) to talk about information in continuous 
functions.  If the functions are realized (exist), so is the information.

You seem to see a difference where I see no existent distinction. I would say 
that any such difference can contain no information, and is at best misleading 
because expressing a concern here suggests that there is a difference that is 
somehow informative. Since it isn't, I think that thinking about it (very much) 
is a waste of time and effort.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: November 14, 2015 8:00 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Cc: Sungchul Ji; John Collier
Subject: Units of the Universe (was) Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Universe as a 
Self-Organizing Musical Instrument (USOMI)

List, John, Sung:

Gentle responses inserted.   :-)

On Nov 14, 2015, at 4:49 AM, John Collier wrote:


Jerry,

Isn't this just a straightforward consequence of Fourier analysis?

Of course, yes.  My first sentence is merely a factual statement.


Are you implying that Fourier analysis has no scientific value (it is 
tautological, so no additional information content - so no additional empirical 
content),

 The mathematical content of the two forms of representation is analogous.

But, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Musica_universalis
 for the difference in philosophical content.
[Old wine in new bottles?]


or do you mean to imply some other value with your use of "scientific"? I would 
prefer to keep the term from being value laden, but I know it is used that way, 
though usually pejoratively. I really don't understand your usage here.

My question, a second independent thought,  was:

How does your work relate to any form of scientific conclusion?

Generally speaking, as an everyday term, "science" means well-defined objective 
knowledge, usually consistent and reproducible and independent of the observer.
Hilbert's criteria of consistency, completeness and decidability are the first 
logical steps for evaluating scientific papers, are they not?

The conceptual forms of mathematics do not infer any units of measure, 
scientific units being terms that are necessary to associate the scientific 
identity of a quality with number and hence quantity.

In certain of your writings, John, such as your vigorous insistence of the 
problematic notion of "It's from bits", you choose to ignore how the units of 
"its" come into being.

I believe that this is both a metaphysical and a scientific flaw in your 
positions, in this instance and elsewhere in other of your writings.

Would your position on "It's from Bits" be consistent with:

"The union of units unites the unity of the Universe." ?

Cheers

Jerry


BTW, the quote:
"The undertaking which this volume inaugurates is to make a philosophy like 
 (111315-1)
that of Aristotle, that is to say, to outline a theory so comprehensive that, 
for a
long time to come, the entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every
school and kind, in mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history,
in sociology, and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as
the filling up of its details.  The first step toward this is to find simple 
concepts
applicable to every subject. " (Heartshorne and Weiss, 1931, p. vii; emphases
were added)."

is directly from CP1. paragraph 1 of the "preface" which is actually from a CSP 
paper.

The deep question is:

Can any concept meet this stringent criteria?
If so, which one or ones?
Would such a concept be a unit?

JLRC



John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Novemb

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories

[John Collier]

Gary, List,

This issue has been discussed before at least once. I don’t agree with Gary 
because I don’t think we ever experience phenomena as pure phenomena, so I 
don’t think we ever directly experience firsts. I see them as abstractions that 
must be there (both logically and psychologically) for us to experience 
phenomena in any way. My position is similar to that of a number of American 
pragmatists including Sellars (Myth of the Given) and C.I. Lewis (pure 
phenomena re ineffable), as well as Quine (whether or not you want to classify 
him as a pragmatist). Joseph Ransdell was able to convince me of the reality of 
firsts, including qualia and the like, partly because of his moderate view. I 
am unclear what Peirce’s view on the issue would be (perhaps he changed views, 
or maintained an ambiguity throughout), but he certainly said things that make 
Gary’s interpretation not unreasonable.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: October 29, 2015 4:43 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories

Jeff wrote:

If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an 
abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the 
first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what is 
first?  In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red thing, and 
not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of relationship that 
obtains when the predicate is considered separately from the things that might 
stand in that relationship.

From the standpoint of logic, I would tend to fully agree with you. But from 
that of phenomenology, I have some reservations. There *are* in fact red 
things, and blue things, and snow may indeed appear much more blue than white 
in a given situation of light and shade. And there are, in addition, possible 
firstnesses which even modal logics can't really quite handle in reality.

This is to suggest that firstness, logically speaking, *is*, as you say, an 
abstraction, but that the "first instance" is *not* a logical abstraction, but 
a phenomenon. and even, for the sake of argument, a mere possible phenomenon.

So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the 
thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is first, 
y--is second and z--is third.  By pealing the things that x, x and z might 
stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the relationships of 
firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in themselves.  Here, I am 
following Peirce's explanations of how we should talk about relatives, 
relations and relationships.

Again, I would tend to agree with you--and Peirce--when one considers the 
categories strictly from the standpoint of logic.

Btw. Joe Ransdell and I tended to disagree on this matter. He would, I think, 
be siding with you in this matter, in a sense suggesting that logic as semiotic 
was 'sufficient', not quite imagining that phaneroscopy could really be a 
scientific discipline--at least, not much of one.

Best,

Gary R




[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690<tel:718%20482-5690>

On Wed, Oct 28, 2015 at 9:10 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:
Gary F., Gary R., List,

If Redness is understood, in the first instance, as the result of an 
abstraction from the conception of red, why not think of Firstness, in the 
first instance, as the result of an abstraction from the conception of what is 
first?  In this way, we focus the attention not on this or that red thing, and 
not even on this or that feeling of red, but on the kind of relationship that 
obtains when the predicate is considered separately from the things that might 
stand in that relationship.

So, from the conceptions of first, second and third, we abstract from the 
thought of any particular thing that might stand in relation to x--is first, 
y--is second and z--is third.  By pealing the things that x, x and z might 
stand for away from the relation, we get the notions of the relationships of 
firstness, secondness and thirdness considered in themselves.  Here, I am 
following Peirce's explanations of how we should talk about relatives, 
relations and relationships.

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com<mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com>]
Sent: Wednesday, October 28, 2015 4:07 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce's categories

Matt wrote;

My uses of 'First', 'Second', or 'Third' are to denote specific instantiations 
of the categories of Firstness, Secondness, or Thirdness. This is similar to 
how I use 'a ge

RE: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[John Collier]

My understanding of Dawkins’ notion of meme is that it is specifically not 
anything more than a causal entity, passed on by repetition through receptive 
channels common to the transmitter and receiver. Meaning is not a part of their 
transmitability, though we can assign meaning to them, and often do, but this 
is an overlay, and not part of their essence as transmitable units. I think 
there are problems with making sense of their transmitability, not to mention 
of their identity conditions, but it seems to me that their “not being 
semiosic” is beside the point. Dawkins sees their dynamics as very much like 
that of solid material particles.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: October 20, 2015 9:36 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

Helmut - I'm against the very notion of 'memes' because they are non-semiosic. 
They are akin to solid material particles - and the cognitive process does not 
swallow solid material particles. It transforms them within the semiosic 
process. Again, memes are non-semiosic and not amenable to semiosis; you 
swallow them.

I don't get your binary sets of
Meme-vs - rational belief
Diffusion - vs -narrative

Diffusion is a process; narrative is a 'thing'.
Meme is a 'thing'; a rational belief is a conclusion arrived at via reason.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: Helmut Raulien<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>
To: h.raul...@gmx.de<mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>
Cc: cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com> ; 
Peirce-L<mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:10 PM
Subject: Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)




Supplement:
Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about diffusion 
I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water and turns 
it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when it is put 
into a proper social environment, that is a social system with a structure that 
allows the idea to diffuse (and copy itself). That is why I think, that the 
diffusion concept is not wrong, but neither complete.
Clark, Edwina, Stephen, List,
I do not see, that there is an either-or, regarding memes and rational beliefs, 
or diffusion versus narratives, or subconscious versus conscious 
structure-elements. I think, that there is both, and that it always is good to 
make the subconscious conscious, that is, to uncover memes to see where they 
come from. Many of them are myths, that is lies- and these lies may have been 
told deliberately, or they may have come up by a social systems own dynamics, 
as any system intends to reinforce itself. Anyway, to make the subconscious 
conscious is the way of psychoanalysis, and I do not see, what is so wrong 
about it, fundamentally. Of course, it is bad to have a wrong analysis, and 
Freud probably was wrong in many places (eg., that a child is 
polymorph-pervert). But I think, it is very good to replace a diffusion with a 
narrative- if the narrative is telling the truth, and if this can be made sure. 
Can it? By scientific method?
Best,
Helmut

"Clark Goble" <cl...@lextek.com<mailto:cl...@lextek.com>>


On Oct 19, 2015, at 1:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca<mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote:

Clark - I prefer not to think of Jung.  You wrote:

"the sorts of things structuralism dealt with in treating the mind as 
literature were correct."

I'm not sure what you mean by the above.
In most ways psychoanalysis is treating the mind (especially dreams) as if they 
were a literary work to be interpreted with the various ways literature was 
interpreted.  That’s why even though Jung, Freud and company aren’t typically 
taken seriously in science they still are in literature departments.

The way a person interprets literature simply is quite different from say what 
goes on in contemporary psychology or cognitive science.


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion

[John Collier]

I like this. It agrees fairly well with my understanding of what Piaget was 
trying to say. My feeling is that Peirce's notions. especially of the 
interpretant in its manifestations (immediate, final, etc) should be relevant 
to explication of the idea.

With respect to unfalsifiability, I think that as thirds are not reducible 
there can be no irrefutable evidence for any of them (explaining why science 
has tended to ignore them, or at least to oversimplify them). However I think 
that if we can work out the underlying dynamics we can get a model that we can 
match up. The problem is the essential (for Piaget) openness of instinct 
(unlike behaviorism), which implies that it cannot be circumscribed precisely. 
Piaget says he tried to use the behaviorist method (his formalist inclinations 
would have made this natural), but he had decided it did not work.

On pragmatism, it is not simply things that matter for Peirce, but things that 
could potentially make a difference. The distinction here is between simple 
logic and modal logic. That has been a controversial issue for at least 150 
years now.

Best,
John
On 2015-07-20 11:33 AM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au]
Sent: July 20, 2015 11:34 AM
To: 'Edwina Taborsky'; 'Thomas'; 'Stephen C. Rose'
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion

List,
Many of us seem to be persisting with the narrative that instincts are 
programmed into the DNA. Edwina, you make reference to a socializing instinct. 
Might it be that this socializing instinct is not an instinct at all, but a 
manifestation of knowing how to be (relates to pragmatism)? Allow me to 
explain. At least as far as higher level organisms are concerned, a newborn 
entering the world is entering a scary unknown. Mothers of all kinds across all 
species pick up on this vulnerability (it never ceases to amaze me the 
affection that mothers of all kinds lavish upon their offspring). The newborn’s 
mother provides a known familiarity with which the youngster assimilates and 
becomes comfortable with. Under the mother’s nurturance and care, the scary 
unknown into which it first enters quickly becomes the familiar known that 
informs how it should be... and that’s why, if you want such a critter as a 
pet, it has to interact with humans from an early age in order to become 
domesticated.
Consider the phenomenon of feral children, like the famous “wild boy of 
Aveyron.” An abandoned infant that is taken into the care of a matriarchal wolf 
has to contend with a scary, alien world that its adoptive mother makes 
comfortable and familiar. This ensures its survival, but the things that come 
to matter to it, as a wolf-child, are going to make it impossible for it to 
assimilate to a human society, should it ever venture there again.
Thus my thesis is that “instincts” (for want of a better word) subscribe fully 
to the principles of pragmatism and the three categories, but that they occur 
at deeper levels. For example, in the narrative of chaos theory, associations 
made before birth and shortly after birth provide the “initial conditions” onto 
which all subsequent associations (experiences) accrue. Also, the organism’s 
physiology provides the predispositions for making choices... a critter with 
hands is predisposed to grasping things, a critter with a tongue and vocal 
chords is predisposed to vocalizing things. Neither the impulse to grasp nor 
the impulse to vocalize is an instinct. The impulse to grasp and the impulse to 
vocalize are just what you do when you have a body built to do these things, 
and you have a bucket of plastic neurons in your skull that organise themselves 
to accommodate the choices you make. The idea of instinct as somehow hardwired 
into the DNA is a red herring that is not falsifiable... to be blunt, it’s 
nonsense and the genocentrists peddling this nonsense need to lift their game. 
ALL thought, whether impulsive or directed, must necessarily subscribe to 
exactly the same Peircean categories and in accordance with the principles of 
pragmatism. Heck, even the mother’s “instinct” to nurture subscribes to the 
same Peircean principles... it’s not an instinct, maybe it’s just what it seems 
to be... an awareness that her little one is vulnerable and helpless. Perhaps 
it tugs at something in her own memory, back when she was a newborn first 
entering a scary unknown.
The bottom line... a socializing “instinct” is just a manifestation of the need 
to know how to be. Infinity is scary, and socialization provides us with the 
fixations of belief to which we can anchor our identities... this applies to 
all organisms, not just humans. There is no such thing as an “instinct” 
hardwired into the genetic code... such a belief allows us to be led down a 
merry garden path that doesn’t take us anywhere. Of course if anyone does 
believe that instincts are coded into the DNA, I’m open to 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion

[John Collier]

Folks,

I am intrigued that this topic has kept on so long, but this response has 
little to do with the concept I was concerned with. The use of “triggered” in 
the second sentence is not correct for Piaget’s concept of instinct. It was 
exactly the point of his introduction of the notion into his work in the late 
60s that instincts are not simply triggered. Thomas’s reply does not address 
the concept I was interested in knowing Peirce’s views about.


John

From: Thomas [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com]
Sent: July 20, 2015 2:03 AM
To: Stephen C. Rose
Cc: Edwina Taborsky; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct and emotion

Stephen, Edwina, List ~

I agree that instinct leads to physical activity (though sometimes inside the 
body where it can't be seen).  But it is triggered by environmental changes.  
That is the standard definition of instinct.  It is not so much an 
inclination as who you are in a certain environment.  But you may never 
encounter that environment, so you would never know.

I do believe we have a socializing instinct, because we were part of someone 
else before birth and closely tended to for several years after birth, often in 
the presence of siblings.  We therefore perceive living with others as the norm.

So this instance raises the possibility that instincts are gene-based *except 
in one case:  where the mother (i.e., a loving, attentive mother) is involved.  
Then, genes and baby/infant emotions both originate from the same source -- so 
their effects (in the child) are blended and confound analysis.  In that case I 
don't have a firm opinion.  My *guess: we have socialization instincts (genes) 
AND socialization habits learned during infancy AND emotional feelings related 
to other people (community) shaped by the infant experience (with 
mother+father).

Officially, though, instincts are hard-wired into us (DNA), and do not have a 
community trigger -- unless the community alters the environment.  Individuals 
isolated from their communities have the same instincts:  drop a young bird 
from a tree that never met another bird, and it will flap its wings and fly.

Regards,
Tom Wyrick


On Jul 19, 2015, at 3:19 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
stever...@gmail.commailto:stever...@gmail.com wrote:
I wonder what controls instincts which I see as somewhat like inclinations 
which suggest movement and power. I am inclined to think it is the interplay 
within a community though not always in ways that can be understood. I wonder 
of Peirce with his seemingly default inclining toward the community as a sort 
of teleological destiny and his sense of the porousness of the individual 
ultimately felt that instincts have something like consciousness?

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 at 4:05 PM, Ozzie 
ozzie...@gmail.commailto:ozzie...@gmail.com wrote:
Edwina ~
My notes on habit and evolution are more wide-ranging (random?) than your 
comments/questions.  These are my interpretation of the science, but of course 
I can be wrong.

1- Is instinct a property only of the more complex realms?  That depends on how 
one interprets instinct.  If we define instinct as behavioral feature shared 
by all members of a species, then protons and electrons DO have an instinct 
to spend time with each other, when the opportunity presents itself.  The +/- 
attraction characterizes all protons and electrons, and they always exhibit the 
expected behavior in a neutral environment.  I consider that an instinct.  
Other subatomic particles don't (necessarily) possess it.  Some may label this 
a characteristic of protons and electron, instead of an instinct, which is 
fine with me -- if it is understood this characteristic describes behavior, not 
physical attributes.

2- Those protons and electrons can change into altered versions of their 
original states if placed in a different environment.  However, I don't 
consider that evolution.  It is a reaction to the environment. The +/- 
characteristics of atomic particles don't change physically or alter their 
behavior without something happening in the neighborhood/environment where they 
reside.  Chemists change their environment, but so do other things (e.g., heat 
in stars, electromagnetic radiation from the earth's core, nearby atoms).  If 
evolution occurred, then we could not reverse the process and break materials 
down into the original atoms.

3- Evolution modifies living things (over time) to add physical features to 
them that incorporate regular/everyday life activities into the physical body 
of species members.  Then, behavior originally attributed to volition become 
instinctual.  Theoretically, nature decides that a one-time investment of 
resources (so to speak) reduces physical and cognitive effort that would 
otherwise be required throughout the lifetimes of the species members.  
Following evolution, the individual can devote effort and cognitive attention 
to more 

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recently published: Hitler and Abductive Logic

[John Collier]

Yes, this seems to me to be very much an Early Modern view of instinct that I 
would associate with Peirce. It puts too much emphasis on reason (whatever that 
is – you can find a few talks of mine on my web site that argue that values and 
reason cannot be separated in the way that this quote requires). I have little 
doubt that it is an accurate representation of Peirce’s thinking since it was a 
common view at the time.

In any case, I think it deprives instinct of its greatest virtues, though it 
does identify potential vices. We tend to evolve to take advantage of virtues, 
even if they can’t be fully specified.

Messengers not blamed in my understanding.

John

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.com]
Sent: July 14, 2015 7:37 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recently published: Hitler and Abductive Logic

I was merely being a messenger John. I respect some of the names you mention 
and have little to offer on the subject other than the thought that the mind 
trumps instincts if consciousness is active.

Here is another squib from CP

178. And the reason is very plain and simple. The instincts of the lower 
animals answer their purposes much more unerringly than a discursive 
understanding could do. But for man discourse of reason is requisite, because 
men are so intensively individualistic and original that the instincts, which 
are racial ideas, become smothered in them. A deliberate logical faculty, 
therefore, has in man to take their place; and the sole function of this 
logical deliberation is to grind off the arbitrary and the individualistic 
character of thought. Hence, wherever the arbitrary and the individualistic is 
particularly prejudicial, there logical deliberation, or discourse of reason, 
must be allowed as much play as possible.
Peirce: CP 1.179 Cross-Ref:††

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 1:22 PM, John Collier 
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
Thanks, Stephen, but these raise precisely the complaints about the triviality 
of instinct that I have been trying to get past. To be more specific, the 
compla9int is that they fail with both the “language instinct” (Chomsky, 
Pinker) and “moral instinct” (Darwin, Richards, Collier, Stingl). Perhaps these 
are “All the other relations of things concerning which we must suppose there 
is vast store of truth are for us merely the object of such false sciences as 
judicial astrology, palmistry, the doctrine of signatures, the doctrine of 
correspondences, magic, and the like.”, but they seem to me to be too robust to 
be so easily explained.

John

From: Stephen C. Rose [mailto:stever...@gmail.commailto:stever...@gmail.com]
Sent: July 14, 2015 7:14 PM
To: John Collier; Peirce List
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recently published: Hitler and Abductive Logic

Here is a squib:

118. In the first place all that science has done is to study those relations 
between objects which were brought into prominence and conceiving which we had 
been endowed with some original knowledge in two instincts -- the instinct of 
feeding, which brought with it elementary knowledge of mechanical forces, 
space, etc., and the instinct of breeding, which brought with it elementary 
knowledge of psychical motives, of time, etc. All the other relations of things 
concerning which we must suppose there is vast store of truth are for us merely 
the object of such false sciences as judicial astrology, palmistry, the 
doctrine of signatures, the doctrine of correspondences, magic, and the like.
Peirce: CP 1.119 Cross-Ref:††

Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU Art: http://buff.ly/1wXAxbl
Gifts: http://buff.ly/1wXADj3

On Tue, Jul 14, 2015 at 1:08 PM, John Collier 
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:
Folks,

I am very interested in instincts for various reasons. I recently gave a talk 
on Piaget’s views on instincts at the International Society for Philosophy, 
History and Social Sciences in Biology in Montreal last week. I would be most 
interested if there is a Peircean position on instincts that can be supported 
by his writings. I would be surprised if this were not so, but so far I have 
not seen anything that I could use.

Best to all,
John

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.demailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: July 12, 2015 8:04 PM
To: ozzie...@gmail.commailto:ozzie...@gmail.com
Cc: Stephen Jarosek; Edwina Taborsky; Benjamin Udell; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recently published: Hitler and Abductive Logic

Ozzie, Stephen, Stephen, List,
I agree. And I think, that idealists are in fact realists, because: Liberty, 
equality, fraternity and justice are not only ideals, but also human instincts, 
inherited structure of the human race, written down in the DNA. That is so, 
because genetically we are still hunters and collectors, and they have led a 
free life

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Instinct

[John Collier]

Thanks to everyone who responded, but especially to Miguel for sending this 
gem. Now I just have to figure out what lies behind it.

I agree with Jeff that the Century Dictionary entries are not particularly 
useful.

I should be asleep. Best to all,

John

From: mig...@cegri.es [mailto:mig...@cegri.es]
Sent: July 15, 2015 1:18 AM
To: John Collier; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recently published: Hitler and Abductive Logic

Dear John,

In the last paragraph of an extremely interesting text, A Theory of Probable 
Inference, W4: 408-450 (1883); Peirce points that Side by side, then, with 
the well established proposition that all knowledge is based on experience, and 
that science is only advanced by the experimental verifications of theories, we 
have to place this other equally important truth, that all human knowledge, up 
to the highest flights of science, is but the development of our inborn animal 
instincts.

Best,

Miguel Angel Fernandez

El 14/07/2015 a las 19:08, John Collier escribió:
Folks,

I am very interested in instincts for various reasons. I recently gave a talk 
on Piaget’s views on instincts at the International Society for Philosophy, 
History and Social Sciences in Biology in Montreal last week. I would be most 
interested if there is a Peircean position on instincts that can be supported 
by his writings. I would be surprised if this were not so, but so far I have 
not seen anything that I could use.

Best to all,
John

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: July 12, 2015 8:04 PM
To: ozzie...@gmail.commailto:ozzie...@gmail.com
Cc: Stephen Jarosek; Edwina Taborsky; Benjamin Udell; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Recently published: Hitler and Abductive Logic

Ozzie, Stephen, Stephen, List,
I agree. And I think, that idealists are in fact realists, because: Liberty, 
equality, fraternity and justice are not only ideals, but also human instincts, 
inherited structure of the human race, written down in the DNA. That is so, 
because genetically we are still hunters and collectors, and they have led a 
free life, people were quite equal with their rights and plights, everybody was 
dependent on everybody else, and they had to solve conflicts in a just way. So 
I think, that culture is often overestimated, a rigid culture can block these 
instincts for a while, but they will reappear soon. This view is just rosy 
because of its hope, that no rigid culture will gain total control.
Best,
Helmut


Ozzie ozzie...@gmail.commailto:ozzie...@gmail.com

Stephen ~
I don't go along with your characterization of American history in such generic 
terms.  You seem to say the founding fathers supported personal freedom -- end 
of story.  But America's founding fathers revolted for a specific reason: 
English citizens living in the American colonies did not have representatives 
in the British Parliament or the protections of British law.

The US Constitution established a central government with constraints on what 
it could do, but among those constraints we do not find a limit on the size of 
government, special rights for a privileged minority or protection of the 
status quo (independent of other legally recognized rights).  Live-and-let-live 
is the law of the land, but when enough citizens support new policies the 
founding fathers provided them/us a means of promoting their/our aspirations.  
New laws, new states, new voters, and Constitutional amendments were all 
anticipated within their master plan. Change.

Thus America was a controlled social experiment.  The founding fathers 
established a mechanism for seeking the most beneficial social policies, but 
didn't prescribe them.

As far as outcomes, everyone has an opinion.  That's politics.

Regards,

Tom Wyrick




On Jul 12, 2015, at 6:54 AM, Stephen Jarosek sjaro...@iinet.net.au wrote:

It would seem that Edwina and I are on the same page throughout most of this 
topic. It is often said that the founding fathers of America understood 
something about human nature, hence their emphasis on minimal government. What 
was that “something?” Let me posit a guess. IMHO, it would proceed by way of 
the following reasoning:

1.   Idealists are usually well-intentioned enough. They see the world 
through rose-coloured glasses and want to fix things that they perceive are 
“wrong” or “broken.” But accompanying their best intentions is a problem... a 
very intractable problem;

2.   To make the naive but well-intentioned vision of idealists work, they 
need to harness cultural groupthink, and they need to implement the machinery 
of bureaucracies... ie, big government. They need to give license to groupthink 
to make it work. The person that assimilates well into the cogs of bureaucratic 
groupthink is a very different kind of animal to the naive but well-intentioned 
idealist;

3.   The typical idealist is usually a very congenial person with passions

RE: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

[John Collier]

Jeremy, I will try to answer.

From: Jeremy Evans [mailto:jeremy.ev...@me.com]
Sent: May 30, 2015 12:30 AM
To: John Collier; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Cc: Jeremy Evans
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

John, [Peirce-L] List

I found your post below fascinating and informative.  May I nit-pick a few 
points with the aim of seeking to comprehend what exactly you were seeking to 
convey?  I apologise for nit-picking, but the post is so pregnant with meaning 
that I am keen to reach full understanding of it.

Line 2: 'That view ...'.  Do you mean by this the former or latter view or, in 
other words, the genic- or species-selectionist view?
[John Collier] I meant species selection. That may be due to individual 
organism selection, but not genic selection generally (there are genuine 
cases), since the cause acts at the individual organism level or above. As 
individuals, species can be in competition with each other through species 
strategies, but typically it usually isn't right to talk of selection for the 
good of the species, though there are cases of this (processes that enhance 
gene distribution within a species, for example).

Line 3: Are the 'holdouts' the species and/or group selectionists?
[John Collier] The holdouts are the genic selectionists. If E.O. Wilson ever 
was one, he isn't now, or at least I think that is the most charitable reading 
of his recent work.

Who was GCW's father, and and what was the 'paradigmatic case of group 
selection' which these two 'showed', by which I take it you mean 'made a case 
for'?  Simple ignorance here
[John Collier] No, they showed it to hold. There isn't any doubt. Making a 
case for would be far too weak. It was his wife, Doris, who was D.C. Williams. 
I don't have a reference to the article here - I am travelling. Interestingly, 
Wikipedia says:
In later books, including Natural Selection: Domains, Levels and Challenges, 
Williams softened his views on group selection, recognizing that 
cladehttps://www.wikiwand.com/en/Clade selection,trait group 
selectionhttps://www.wikiwand.com/en/Group_selection#The_haystack_model_and_trait_groups
 and multilevel 
selectionhttps://www.wikiwand.com/en/Group_selection#Multilevel_selection_theory
 did sometimes occur in nature, something he had earlier thought to be so 
unlikely it could be safely ignored
Clade selection includes species selection.

Searching further, I see the paper was Natural Selection of Individually 
Harmful Social Adaptations among Sibs with Special Reference to Social 
Insects, was coauthored with Doris, and published in Evolution.  That was his 
first paper in that prestigious journal, and it could be read as presaging 
Hamilton's work on kin selection, so it isn't clear that it is a group 
selection paper. But it is also not clear that it was not.

Para 1 further on: 'You end up having to invoke groups as filtering units for 
gene selection in any case'.  Should this sentence not read at the very least 
'...invoke species and groups...'
No, I would stop at groups. Species are groups as well as individuals.

Para 2, line 1: 'Wilson's way ...'. Are you referring here to EOW or to DSW? 
E.O. Wilson, if it was indeed his way.

I am impressed by the case that S J Gould makes - if I understand him well - in 
'The Structure of Evolutionary Theory' for multilevel selection - of genes, 
groups of genes no doubt, species, groups, clades.

Yeh, but he was not the first by any means. It is an old debate, and more 
complicated than I thought.

John

Jeremy

On 30 May 2015, at 8:54 am, John Collier 
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za wrote:

Jeff, Lists,

I haven't read this book. Wilson is widely regarded as a genic selectionist 
(genes are the units of selection). This doesn't fit the species as individuals 
view very well, but it can be made to. That view is held by almost all 
systematists now, but there are still some evolutionary theorists who are 
holdouts to the classification methodology and data. Others, Like Richard 
Dawkins take this view. And others, like David Sloan Wilson, disagree. The 
history is a bit complex, with some bizarre generalizations and 
misinterpretations of both evolutionary processes. It is supposed that group 
selection, for example, was disproved by George C. Williams on theoretical 
grounds, but interestingly Williams and his father had earlier shown one of the 
paradigmatic cases of group selection. You can make the process of evolution 
fit the gene selection account -- there is no logical failing, but it focuses 
attention on the wrong causal processes to explain evolution. You end up having 
to invoke groups as filtering units for gene selection in any case. Joel 
Cracraft was asking at one point do species do anything?, the idea being that 
if they did not, then they were not causal units. They do indeed do something 
by constraining evolutionary possibilities through the constraints they put on 
what gene combination can be presented

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

[John Collier]

Jeff, Lists,

I haven't read this book. Wilson is widely regarded as a genic selectionist 
(genes are the units of selection). This doesn't fit the species as individuals 
view very well, but it can be made to. That view is held by almost all 
systematists now, but there are still some evolutionary theorists who are 
holdouts to the classification methodology and data. Others, Like Richard 
Dawkins take this view. And others, like David Sloan Wilson, disagree. The 
history is a bit complex, with some bizarre generalizations and 
misinterpretations of both evolutionary processes. It is supposed that group 
selection, for example, was disproved by George C. Williams on theoretical 
grounds, but interestingly Williams and his father had earlier shown one of the 
paradigmatic cases of group selection. You can make the process of evolution 
fit the gene selection account -- there is no logical failing, but it focuses 
attention on the wrong causal processes to explain evolution. You end up having 
to invoke groups as filtering units for gene selection in any case. Joel 
Cracraft was asking at one point do species do anything?, the idea being that 
if they did not, then they were not causal units. They do indeed do something 
by constraining evolutionary possibilities through the constraints they put on 
what gene combination can be presented for selection. This is equally, if not 
more important, than the selection process itself. (Darwin had a passage to 
this effect in the 5th edition of The Origin of Species.)

So the evidence allows going in a number of directions about the units of 
selection, but Wilson's way (if it is indeed his) is a bit more strained than 
others, and is not the way that species individuation experts, systematists, 
have gone. I should say that there are some holdout systematists, but there 
aren't very many. They take a cluster view of species rather than a constraint 
view, which would allow species to be epiphenomenal, but would not imply it. 
Wilson's view makes them epiphenomenal, if his view is like Dawkins' view, as I 
have been assuming here, but not from systematists. I would say that E.O. 
Wilson, all evidence I have considered, has always accepted multilevel 
selection, and his views have been misrepresented by himself or others. He is 
not always that careful about consistency, in my opinion. 

In any case, I would throw my lot in with the systematists, who are the experts 
on identifying species, rather than evolutionary theorists, who have an 
annoying habit of giving post facto explanations (abductions without the 
follow-up testing). Lewontin and Gould have complained that this methodological 
error is rank in the field. I once had an optimality theorist go in a two 
sentence circle without even recognizing it, which indicates how deep seated 
the idea is that if you can give an account that fits the genic selection view 
and optimizes some property you have attributed, then it is a good explanation; 
no further testing required. This was a major objection to Wilson's 
sociobiology (sometimes justified) and that may be where the idea he was a 
genic selectionist came from. 

John

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: May 29, 2015 2:51 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

Hi John, Lists,

In the The Diversity of Life, E.O. Wilson devotes of few chapters to the 
conception of a species.  As far as I can tell, he takes the account he is 
arguing for to be a mainstream position amongst evolutionary theorists and 
ecologists.  Is your account consistent the position he articulates, or are the 
positions at odds with one another?

--Jeff

Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: John Collier [colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: Wednesday, May 27, 2015 9:04 AM
To: Benjamin Udell; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

Ben, Lists,

I mean a historical individual with an origin and probably an end, localized in 
space. A concrete individual. This is the Hull-Ghiselen view that Is almost 
universally accepted by systematists and evolutionary biologists these days. It 
follows from the phylogenetic view of species, developed by Cladists and for 
which the standard text for a long time was Phylogenetic Systematics by my 
friend Ed Wiley.

John

From: Benjamin Udell [mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: May 27, 2015 2:43 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R


John C.,

Just curious, by an _individual species_ do you mean something like an 
individual kind or do you mean (and I suspect that you don't) the species 
population as a large, somewhat scattered, collective concrete individual?

Best, Ben

On 5/26/2015 2:27 PM, John Collier

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8676] Re: self-R

[John Collier]

Helmut, Lists,

Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems 
do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion 
in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. 
There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they 
are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, 
also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent 
property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for 
example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but 
almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I developed the 
nonreducible notion autonomy based on ideas from Kant that is based on boundary 
conditions and self-organization and thus is basically information based. I 
also have about 10 articles on autonomy on my web page. One that might be 
particularly useful here is Self-organization, individuation and 
identityhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/SOIIF.PDF, Revue Internationale de 
Philosophie 59 (2004): 151-172. A more recent one with similar ideas is A 
dynamical approach to identity and diversity in complex 
systemhttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdfshttp://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/A%20Dynamical%20Approach%20to%20Identity%20and%20Diversity.pdf.
 In Paul Cilliers, Rika Prieser eds. Complexity, Difference and Identity: an 
Ethical 
Perspectivehttp://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/book/978-90-481-9186-4.
 2010 Berlin: Springer.

Obviously, I don’t think that “self” is hard to grasp scientifically, if you 
accept self-organization as a possibility. Maturana does not, and thus leaves 
self (and thus his notion of autopoiesis) rather lame.

I would say, though, that some form of self-production is required for a self, 
but not self-reproduction, though it may often be a part of self-production.

Cheers,
John

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: May 25, 2015 5:53 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Aw: [biosemiotics:8676] Re: self-R

Jeff, Lists,
John Collier wrote, that memory is not the same as same body. So, is 
self-organizing (as phenomenon) the same as memory as phenomenon? There are 
metal alloys that have a memory. Also a computer has a memory. So I like the 
self-organizing aspect, which you have mentioned at the end of your post, 
better than the memory aspect. What makes self-organizing observable, i.e., 
what is the phenomenon about it? I think, it is in the first place something 
quite visible and touchable: a membrane or skin, like any organism has got. But 
also an air bubble in water has a sort of membrane. Now the distinction between 
systems with and without a self, I think, lies in the question why?, i.e. 
causality: Why does an air bubble have a membrane? Because of surface tension, 
that is caused by natural laws, i.e. efficient cause. And why does a bacterium 
have a membrane? In order to have a boundary that leads the molecules it needs 
in, and the molecules it doesnt need (and which would disturb it) out. So here 
we have the reason of need, final cause with its finis/end to fulfill (put an 
end to) the actual need of the bacterium, and other needs that will be its own 
in the future. But isnt all this a supposition? Maybe the observable phenomenon 
about this is, that the membrane is kept up and repaired by determinate actions 
of the bacterium, and not by natural laws alone. One problem is, that anything 
that happens, not only happens obeying a final cause, but efficient cause too. 
Otherwise it would not work. So one can always say: It works because of 
efficient cause, and needs (final cause) are just anthropocentric 
suppositions by the human observer. In fact, neither the bacterium, nor the 
observer has or is a self, there is no such thing as a self, it is all illusion 
and recursive circulation. But if self and life conceptually is a circle, it 
nevertheless exists and is a phenomenon. Is self hard to grasp 
scientifically? It is, if the definition of science is based solely on 
deduction and efficient causation. It is not, if you define science as also 
conceptually appreciating induction and final causation (About abduction and 
example causation not now).
Helmut

Jeffrey Brian Downard 
jeffrey.down...@nau.edumailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu

Helmut, Ben, Lists,

I agree with what you say here, Helmut: Pitifully, this sort of distinction is 
not a scientific one. What I mean in saying this is that I don't believe that 
the distinctions you are making are problematic for the practice of doing 
science. That is, scientists don't start by reflecting on the kinds of worries 
you are expressing about the nature of the real relations between observer, 
observation, and phenomena observed. For the most part, they get the enterprise

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

[John Collier]

We mean something different by “individual”, Edwina. I am using it in the sense 
that species are individuals. It was David HulI who put the ecologists onto me 
because of my work on individuality.  I don’t think that further discussion 
with you on this topic is likely to be fruitful for either of us.

John
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: May 26, 2015 8:23 PM
To: John Collier; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

I don't see an ecosystem as an individual but as a system, in its case, a CAS. 
It doesn't have the distinctive boundaries of an individual - either temporally 
or spatially. I see a human being as a system, in that its parts co-operate in 
a systemic manner; and it is also an individual - with distinctive temporal and 
spatial boundaries. But a human being is not a CAS, for it lacks the wide range 
of adaptive flexibility and even transformative capacities of a CAS.

I have long argued that societies are a CAS; they are socioeconomic ecological 
systems, operating as logical adaptations to environmental realities - which 
include soil, climate, water, plant and animal typologies etc. All of these 
enable a particular size of population to live in the area and this in turn, 
leads to a particular method of both economic and political organization.

Unfortunately, the major trends in the social sciences have been to almost 
completely ignore this area  - except within the alienated emotionalism of AGW 
or Climate Change...Instead, the social sciences tend to view 'culture' or 
'ideology' as the prime causal factors in societal development and 
organization. Whereas I view these areas as emotionalist psychological 
explanations, as verbal narratives for the deeper causal factors of ecology, 
demographics, economic modes.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
To: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za ; 
biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 1:59 PM
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

I should have further remarked that socio-ecological systems (SESs) are a 
fairly recent area of study, and I would suppose that society is part of the 
ecology in general and separating cause involved will not be easy, if it is 
possible at all, so more holistic methods are needed. This seems to be a 
growing consensus of people who work in the field, mostly ecologists, not 
social scientists.

John

From: John Collier [mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za]
Sent: May 26, 2015 7:52 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). 
They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about 
societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I 
don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on 
political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good 
CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea 
fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, 
though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I 
call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt 
internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience 
is. They don’t do it very well.

John
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a  society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, 
which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly 
not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R

Helmut, Lists,

I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like 
Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob 
Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are 
not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. 
 That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and 
furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first 
three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on 
ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

[John Collier]

No, ecosystems, at least are individuals (but also systems, but so are we). 
They satisfy identity conditions that are not reducible. I can’t say about 
societies. I would have to work with suitable social scientists to find out. I 
don’t have the knowledge in that area yet, though I do have one paper on 
political science that is suggestive. Ecosystems actually are not very good 
CASs for a number of reasons, though some of their functions fit the idea 
fairly well. They lack an environment they adapt to typically, for one thing, 
though there are some cases in which they have adapted to variations in what I 
call services like water, sunlight, heat, and so on. They do have to adapt 
internally to the point of adequacy for resilience, though, whatever resilience 
is. They don’t do it very well.

John
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: May 26, 2015 7:17 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [biosemiotics:8690] Re: self-R

Wouldn't an ecosystem (and a  society) be a CAS, a complex adaptive system, 
which is not an individual and therefore has no 'self' but is most certainly 
not a collection of singular units and thus is not reducible.

Edwina
- Original Message -
From: John Colliermailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Sent: Tuesday, May 26, 2015 12:36 PM
Subject: [biosemiotics:8688] Re: self-R

Helmut, Lists,

I am reluctant to say outright that an ecosystem is a self, but people like 
Robert Rosen (Life Itself), Timothy Allen (Towards a Unified Ecology), and Bob 
Ulanowicz (Ecology, the Ascendent Perspective) all argue that ecosystems are 
not reducible to natural laws, member organisms, or individual local processes. 
 That is, the ecosystem behaviour cannot be a sum of any of these, and 
furthermore has no largest model that is fully inclusive. They are the first 
three volumes in a series on ecosystem complexity. I am currently working on 
ecosystem function, which does fit with a basic self model I developed of 
autonomy, but only weakly – not enough to be called autonomous per se. They do 
have many of the characteristics of what we call selves. In particular their 
identity is maintained as an organization that requires the interaction of more 
local and more global constraints and processes. These maintaining aspects make 
up the ecosystem functions. I am pretty sure that they cannot be dissected or 
localized and still maintain their integrity, but I have to rely a lot on the 
ecologists with whom I work for the evidence.

Sorry for the cautious statement of my position, but that is my way in general.

I don’t know enough to comment on Luhmann, but I do think that societies cannot 
be fully understood as the sum of individual societally constrained actions, as 
I think the theory would break down if we try to make it complete. I am just 
beginning to address this issue, and I will talk about it in Vienna. I will 
make some strong claims, but I will so make clear that at this point, for me, 
they are speculative. I am much surer of the ecology case.

The papers might help if you have time, but the basics are above.

John


From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de]
Sent: May 26, 2015 6:17 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee
Cc: biosemiot...@lists.ut.eemailto:biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edumailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [biosemiotics:8687] Re: self-R

John, Stan, lists,
In fact, if an ecosystem has got a self, based on self-organization, then my 
theory about the clear-boundaries-premise is wrong. So I am asking: Is the self 
of the ecosystem reducible or not reducible to: 1.: Natural laws, and 2.: The 
selves of the organisms taking part of the ecosystem and their communication 
with each other? Eg. Does a social system have a self? Luhmann said, it has an 
intention. According to my view (final cause, needs / example cause, wishes) it 
has a self then. But: Is this really so? Or is the self of the ecosystem 
reducible to the selves of the members? I guess the answer is in your papers 
you mentioned (John).
Cheers,
Helmut


Von: John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za

Helmut, Lists,

Some identifiable entities that have self-organizing properties like ecosystems 
do not have clear boundaries in most cases. I developed the notion of cohesion 
in order to deal with dynamical identity in general following the memory case. 
There are too many papers I have written on this to summarize here, but they 
are on my web site. I have two papers on ecosystem identity with an ecologist, 
also accessible through my web site. I do think that memory is an emergent 
property, but I don’t think it need be (memory in current computers, for 
example). Cohesion is often reducible (as in a quartz crystal, perhaps, but 
almost certainly in an ionic crystal like salt). So I