date:20170124

Edwina, Clark, List:

ET:  That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a
general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated *in such a manner
that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. vSo, the Legisign
in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].

My understanding from Peirce's later work on semeiotic--with six or ten
trichotomies and 28 or 66 sign classes, rather than three and ten,
respectively--is that a legisign, *as *a legisign, *cannot *refer to an
Existent (2ns); it can *only *refer to a Necessitant (3ns).  When it is
instantiated, it is embodied as a replica--a sinsign (2ns), not a legisign
(3ns); this is, of course, the familiar type/token distinction.  An
indexical legisign thus can only represent a Necessitant (3ns) as its
object, but the *relation *between the sign and its object is nevertheless
"in a mode of 2ns."

CSP:  Sixth, a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is any general type or law,
however established, which requires each instance of it to be really
affected by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that
Object. Each Replica of it will be a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign of a
peculiar kind. The Interpretant of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign represents
it as an Iconic Legisign; and so it is, in a measure--but in a very small
measure. (CP 2.259, EP 2:294; 1903)

The CP editors suggested "a demonstrative pronoun" as an example.  The
object of "this" or "that" (as a legisign) is necessarily *general*,
because it can refer to *anything*.  It can only refer to something *in
particular*--something *actual*--when embodied (as a sinsign) in a specific
context.  At that point, it is obviously not a *concept*--and my contention
remains that all objects of concepts are general to some degree.  Is there
an example of a concept whose object is absolutely singular--determinate in
every respect?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 6:29 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to
> the Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.
>
> Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs
> that have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.
>
> But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of
> Thirdness.
>
> For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative
> pronoun].  Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode
> of Secondness [Indexical]. The relation between the
> representamen-Interpretant is in a mode of Firstness [rhematic]. The
> Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of Thirdness.
>
> As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however
> established, which requires each instance of it to be *really affected*
> by its Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object"
> [2.259 my emphasis]  That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself
> operating as a general type, nevertheless requires being *instantiated*
> in such a manner that it is indexically 'really affected by its Object'.
> So, the Legisign in this triad refers to an existent Object [in a mode of
> Secondness].
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
> Particular//Singular/Individual
>
> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> CG:  For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I
> think you’re talking about.
>
>
> Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent
> an object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.
>
> Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned
> about building up signs out of subsigns.
>
> My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics.
> That is there’s an element of equivocation in play.
>
> If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the
> general to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s
> semiotics. (This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist
> debate doesn’t matter as much as some think)
>
> I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later.
> Right now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is.
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, my understanding of the term 'legisign' is that it refers only to the 
Representamen-in-Itself, operating in a mode of Thirdness.

Since Peircean semiosis is triadic, then, there are six classes of Signs that 
have the Representamen in this mode of Thirdness, as a 'Legisign'.

But the other two nodes/Relations in the triad need not be in a mode of 
Thirdness. 

For example, take the Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative pronoun].  
Here, the relation between the representamen-Object is in a mode of Secondness 
[Indexical]. The relation between the representamen-Interpretant is in a mode 
of Firstness [rhematic]. The Representamen-in-itself is in a mode of Thirdness. 

As outlined by Peirce, this triad is "any general type or law, however 
established, which requires each instance of it to be really affected by its 
Object in such a manner as merely to draw attention to that Object" [2.259 my 
emphasis]  That is, this Rhematic Indexical Legisign, in itself operating as a 
general type, nevertheless requires being instantiated in such a manner that it 
is indexically 'really affected by its Object'. So, the Legisign in this triad 
refers to an existent Object [in a mode of Secondness].

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 6:50 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and 
Particular//Singular/Individual




On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
wrote:


  CG:  For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I 
think you’re talking about.


Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an 
object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.


  Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned about 
building up signs out of subsigns.


  My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics. That 
is there’s an element of equivocation in play. 


  If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the general 
to the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s semiotics. 
(This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist debate doesn’t 
matter as much as some think)


  I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later. Right 
now I’m just not clear where the disagreement is.


--



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Just to add, I think the big break between Peirce and the nominalists is 
because a general can’t be limited to any collection of actual entities. This 
is obvious in mathematics if we talk about a general like “even integers.” 
Clearly that’s an infinite collection. But if you say something like “white 
horses” you don’t just mean all white horses but all possible white horses. You 
can limit things more, but generals by their very nature have this connection 
to continuity. 

While I said in practice there isn’t as big a practical effect between 
nominalists and Peirce’s realism it’s because nominalists are fine to 
potentially quantify over future experienced entities. That is the way they 
conceive of possibilities is much more in an Aristotilean fashion. Potential is 
just an openness to new finite entities. Peirce is thinking much more 
logically. So it’s with his pragmatic maxim that I think you see his thinking 
regarding nominalism develop most.

The original pragmatic maxim starts with meaning be how you do measure 
something. But that’s clearly problematic as a rock is hard whether you measure 
it or not. He then moves to a moderate realism by invoking counterfactuals. 
It’s hard if I could measure it. But he keeps thinking through these questions 
of potentialities and realizes he has to deal with a continuous set of 
possibilities. Further that an entity’s properties are independent of what I 
think about it. That is when I ask about a property scientifically I’m not 
merely making a claim about a future measurement but a claim about the entity 
itself.

It’s at that point that I think the traditional nominalistic tendencies, 
especially within science, start to split off. In one sense it doesn’t matter 
because all we can test are potential measurements. Yet the significance of 
those measurements are the properties of the thing itself. 

This is also where I think Peirce (and later Dewey) chart a third way between 
the traditional poles of realism and idealism such as were found in the early 
20th century. Especially in the United States.

I bring all this up because my sense is that it’s to the pragmatic maxim we 
have to look for all these terms.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 3:40 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> I think our problem may be that we’re not using the term “general” in the 
> same way. I’m trying to observe what Peirce calls “the proper distinction 
> between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and generality, 
> of which the former consists in the sign's not sufficiently expressing itself 
> to allow of an indubitable determinate interpretation, while the latter turns 
> over to the interpreter the right to complete the determination as he 
> pleases” (EP2:394). He “completes the determination” by selecting an 
> individual from the universe of discourse defined by the general term, and 
> that individual is the dynamic object of the sign.

I’m still thinking through all this but I think you’re right. Particularly the 
place of secondness in signs. (Without getting into some of the debates of 
triadicity that raged here in prior years)

I’d say there are actually three types of indeterminism. First vagueness where 
there is a definite property that isn’t determinate in terms of an established 
interpretant. ("A man I could specify said…”). Second what I understand by 
generality. (“All white horses…”) Finally a more ontological or evolutionary 
conception where an object is still determining its properties (“The height of 
my son as an adult.”)

It seems to me this is pretty key to Peirce’s thinking and also where his terms 
avoid a lot of the muddled thinking and communication found in much of 20th 
century philosophical conceptions of vagueness or metaphor.

The relationship between the universe of discourse and the object is a bit 
trickier. Again here I think we have to distinguish between the immediate and 
dynamic object. As I understand it in a particular conversation the universes 
of discourse that matter are the shared ones between the communicator and 
communicatee. That is separate from the object although its via these universes 
that the object is determined. Yet the indexical relationship to the object(s) 
is by a hint or guess.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:11 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> In response I'd say that it is true that, as Peirce's own realism deepened in 
> the late 19th, early 20th century into an 'extreme scholastic realism' that, 
> as you noted, even his own earlier analyses of realism are revised in the 
> light of it (consider the famous revision of the diamond thought experiment, 
> for famous example). But it is not true in my view that he deemed other 
> philosophical stances and philosophers as nominalistic because "he disagreed" 
> with their views. Indeed, he draws philosophically a little or a lot from 
> most all of them, including Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, etc. 

An interesting book a few years back came out on this called Reading Peirce 
Reading. I confess I loved that book a lot. One chapter is about Peirce reading 
Mill who I think we can all agree is extremely nominalistic. Yet Peirce got a 
lot out of his close readings.

With regards to Duns Scotus I think Peirce ended up seeing nominalism there 
simply because Peirce came to see his system demanded the realism towards 
possibilities. That is what in contemporary terms we’d call a modal realist. 
I’d say the elements of this are in his earliest writings and it is interesting 
it took so long for him to deal with this. Even his discussions of frequentism 
vs. bayesianism strongly lead one towards modal realism long before he fully 
embraced it.

Eventually this allowed him to return to some elements of his early neoplatonic 
appropriations of Kant. That is he ends up being a neoPlatonic realist because 
he comes to see the forms as mind independent possibilities. Once he makes that 
move that then transforms how he sees his three types of causality: necessity, 
chance and agapism or teleology. Teleology ends up coming out of this 
pre-established sets of possibilities.

Again, for some pretty compelling reasons even today modal realism is pretty 
problematic. But it does avoid a lot of problems particular in science. I 
recognize there are still those who see a tension between the pragmatic maxim 
and modal realism but to my eyes they end up going hand in hand.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 4:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> CG:  For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I 
> think you’re talking about.
> 
> Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an 
> object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.

Yes, but I don’t see how that’s a problem for the reasons I mentioned about 
building up signs out of subsigns.

My sense is that we’re all talking past one an other due to semantics. That is 
there’s an element of equivocation in play. 

If I say, “all red objects” that is general but I can move from the general to 
the particulars. That doesn’t seem to be a problem with Peirce’s semiotics. 
(This is also why I think in practice the nominalist vs. realist debate doesn’t 
matter as much as some think)

I don’t have time to say much. I’ll think through it some more later. Right now 
I’m just not clear where the disagreement is.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List:

Correcting my earlier post ...

CG:  For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I
think you’re talking about.

Right, but a legisign/type can only be a collective; it cannot represent an
object that is a Possible or an Existent, only a Necessitant.

CG:  ... the object could be any sort of object (firstness, secondness,
thirdness).

Only for a qualisign/mark, according to Peirce's rule of determination (as
I call it).  Again, a legisign/type (sign 3ns) can only be a collective
(object 3ns).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 11:54 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>>
>> On Jan 24, 2017, at 10:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is
>> general have an object that is *not *general?
>>
>> Just a guess but I suspect the issue here is how one identifies a sign.
>> That is what makes a general sign be labeled as general. This is really
>> just a semantic issue.
>>
>> This confusion is why I don’t tend to use the phrase “general sign” as
>> it’s not obvious what is general. For a legisign the sign consists of a
>> general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about. (Correct me if
>> I’m wrong)
>>
>> To your other point regarding determination, the sign can be
>> indeterminate in terms of how it represents the object but the object could
>> be any sort of object (firstness, secondness, thirdness). In all cases the
>> sign would still be indeterminate. So I might signify a several elements of
>> firstnesses. What objects is indeterminate and thus general even though the
>> objects are not general.
>>
>> The nominalist view is that all general signs must ultimately refer to
>> individual objects rather than real structures. Peirce allows the real
>> structure to be the object independent of these other individual objects.
>> But for Peirce we must be able to signify both kinds of objects.
>>
>> Of course Peirce’s notion of continuity entails that any sign can itself
>> be broken up into further signs. So all this depends upon the type of
>> analysis one is conducting.
>>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary R., List:

Thanks for clarifying your (accurate) criticism.  The explanation that I
provided was just that--not a justification, by any means.  I agree
completely with your much more nuanced assessment.

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 5:11 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> .Jon, list,
>
> Jon, I don't think that there's a need for you to apologize, especially as
> this may simply be a matter of semantics (or an unfortunate phraseology, or
> my lacking a subtle sense of humor, etc.)
>
> You wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any
> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*"
> (emphasis added). Then in your response to my questioning this statement
> wrote: "My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious
> exaggeration, and it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor
> job of conveying that. I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone."
>
> I'm sorry if I didn't catch your humor and didn't see your remark as "an
> obvious exaggeration;" while I must add that your apology seems a bit
> strained since you followed the just quoted comment with this
> qualification/explanation:
>
> JS: I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized
> Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant,
> and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as
> nominalistic.  I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that
> as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described
> more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic;
> unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment.  Of
> course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c.
> 1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic."
>
>
> In response I'd say that it is true that, as Peirce's own realism deepened
> in the late 19th, early 20th century into an 'extreme scholastic realism'
> that, as you noted, even his own earlier analyses of realism are revised in
> the light of it (consider the famous revision of the diamond thought
> experiment, for famous example). But it is not true in my view that he
> deemed other philosophical stances and philosophers as nominalistic
> *because* "he disagreed" with their views. Indeed, he draws
> philosophically a little or a lot from most all of them, including Leibniz,
> Kant, Hegel, etc.
>
> It seems to me that Peirce held the realistism/nominalism problem to be of
> considerable importance, perhaps even decisive in the history and potential
> progress of philosophy. It it this nominalistic *facet* of any--and you
> seem to be suggesting, perhaps, all--philosophers' work, again including
> his own, which he found problematic *in the extreme*.
>
> So the long and short of my criticism of your stated position is just
> this: To suggest that Peirce called philosophers "nominalists" *just
> because he disagreed with them* is not only incorrect, but tends to make
> him sound petty which, in my opinion, he most certainly was not. This is
> what in your remarks I thought might tend to mislead.
>
> I might add that I think his assessment in this matter was correct and,
> further, that this strong nominalistic tendency in philosophy and science
> continues to this day.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and
>> it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying
>> that.  I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone.
>>
>> I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized
>> Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant,
>> and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as
>> nominalistic.  I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that
>> as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described
>> more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic;
>> unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment.  Of
>> course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c.
>> 1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic."
>>
>> Was the rest of my response to Helmut closer to the mark?  I hope so.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 9:56 PM, Gary Richmond 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon wrote:
>>>
>>> "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any
>>> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*"
>>> (emphasis added).
>>>
>>> Please offer sufficient (considerable) support for this statement, in my
>>> view,,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary F., List:

Yes, not getting a lot of work done today; just enough to stay out of
trouble.

I certainly do not intend to "deny the reality of 2ns" or to "deny that a
relation of 2ns can subsist between a sign and its object," so I would like
to understand why you see that as an implication of what I have said so
far.  The latter would just be an index, right?  In that case, the
sign-object relation is an Existent, but the sign itself could still be a
Necessitant (legisign/type), in which case the object would also have to be
a Necessitant.  The question remains whether a concept can be a
qualisign/mark or a sinsign/token; I do not believe so.  Again, do you
think otherwise?

Your usage of "collective" is right and mine was wrong; that term properly
refers to a sign whose Dynamic Object is a Necessitant, not that object
itself.  My (corrected) understanding is that all concepts are
legisigns/types, which requires them to be collectives, such that all of
their objects are Necessitants.  This is in accordance with EP 2:481--"It
is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is
equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a
Necessitant ... the Dynamoid Object determines the Immediate Object, which
determines the Sign itself ..."

As for "general," I was not thinking specifically of the communicative
context with utterer and interpreter; I had in mind simply the opposite of
"singular," fully determinate in every conceivable respect.  Note that
Peirce sometimes uses the term for *both* kinds of indeterminacy.
 "Generality is either of that negative sort which belongs to the merely
potential, as such, and this is peculiar to the category of 1ns, or it is
of the positive kind which belongs to conditional necessity, and this is
peculiar to the category of law [3ns]" (CP 1.427; c. 1896).

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 4:40 PM,  wrote:

> Jon, you’re having a busy day here!
>
>
>
> I see where you’re coming from now, but I can’t go there myself because
> that would deny the reality of Secondness (or else deny that a relation of
> Secondness can subsist between a sign and its object).
>
>
>
> I think our problem may be that we’re not using the term “general” in the
> same way. I’m trying to observe what Peirce calls “the proper distinction
> between the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and
> generality, of which the former consists in the sign's not sufficiently
> expressing itself to allow of an indubitable determinate interpretation,
> while the latter turns over to the interpreter the right to complete the
> determination as he pleases” (EP2:394). He “completes the determination” by
> selecting an individual from the universe of discourse defined by the
> general term, and that individual is the dynamic object of the sign.
>
>
>
> We may also be using the term “collective” differently. In Peirce’s letter
> to Welby (CP 8:366) a “collective” is a kind of sign, one whose dynamic
> object is a *collection*. Obviously your usage comes from somewhere else.
>
>
>
> Anyway I’m out of time for a day or two …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-24 Thread Gary Richmond

.Jon, list,

Jon, I don't think that there's a need for you to apologize, especially as
this may simply be a matter of semantics (or an unfortunate phraseology, or
my lacking a subtle sense of humor, etc.)

You wrote: "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any
philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*"  (emphasis
added). Then in your response to my questioning this statement wrote: "My
sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and it
was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying that.
I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone."

I'm sorry if I didn't catch your humor and didn't see your remark as "an
obvious exaggeration;" while I must add that your apology seems a bit
strained since you followed the just quoted comment with this
qualification/explanation:

JS: I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized
Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant,
and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as
nominalistic.  I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that
as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described
more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic;
unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment.  Of
course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c.
1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic."

In response I'd say that it is true that, as Peirce's own realism deepened
in the late 19th, early 20th century into an 'extreme scholastic realism'
that, as you noted, even his own earlier analyses of realism are revised in
the light of it (consider the famous revision of the diamond thought
experiment, for famous example). But it is not true in my view that he
deemed other philosophical stances and philosophers as nominalistic
*because* "he disagreed" with their views. Indeed, he draws philosophically
a little or a lot from most all of them, including Leibniz, Kant, Hegel,
etc.

It seems to me that Peirce held the realistism/nominalism problem to be of
considerable importance, perhaps even decisive in the history and potential
progress of philosophy. It it this nominalistic *facet* of any--and you
seem to be suggesting, perhaps, all--philosophers' work, again including
his own, which he found problematic *in the extreme*.

So the long and short of my criticism of your stated position is just this:
To suggest that Peirce called philosophers "nominalists" *just because he
disagreed with them* is not only incorrect, but tends to make him sound
petty which, in my opinion, he most certainly was not. This is what in your
remarks I thought might tend to mislead.

I might add that I think his assessment in this matter was correct and,
further, that this strong nominalistic tendency in philosophy and science
continues to this day.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*

On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 11:54 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> My sincere apologies--I thought that it was an obvious exaggeration, and
> it was supposed to be mildly humorous, but I did a poor job of conveying
> that.  I certainly did not intend to mislead anyone.
>
> I loosely had in mind CP 1.19 (1903), where Peirce characterized
> Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hartley, Hume, Reid, Leibniz, Remusat, Kant,
> and Hegel as nominalists, and "all modern philosophy of every sect" as
> nominalistic.  I also read somewhere recently the general suggestion that
> as Peirce's scholastic realism became more and more extreme, he described
> more and more philosophers and/or philosophical views as nominalistic;
> unfortunately, I cannot seem to find that comment at the moment.  Of
> course, at different times he wrote that even Duns Scotus (CP 8.208; c.
> 1905) and his younger self (CP 6.270; 1892) were "too nominalistic."
>
> Was the rest of my response to Helmut closer to the mark?  I hope so.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Mon, Jan 23, 2017 at 9:56 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon wrote:
>>
>> "Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label* any
>> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic*"
>> (emphasis added).
>>
>> Please offer sufficient (considerable) support for this statement, in my
>> view,, at very least a hugely overstated mere opinion. "Any philosophical
>> stance with which he disagreed.as "nominalistic."Really? Please offer
>> support for this, in my opinion quite misleading assertion.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*
>> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>>
>> On Mon, Ja

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Helmut, List:

My understanding of Peirce is that he emphasized final causation, such that
habit and (especially) continuity are in some sense more fundamental than
the individuals that they govern, while recognizing that efficient
causation is also necessary.

CSP:  Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts
compose the whole; final causation is that kind of causation whereby the
whole calls out its parts. Final causation without efficient causation is
helpless; mere calling for parts is what a Hotspur, or any man, may do; but
they will not come without efficient causation. Efficient causation without
final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos;
and chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final causation; it is
blank nothing. (CP 1.220)


So we are now right back where we started--mere chaos, efficient causation
without final causation, spontaneity and reaction without habit, 1ns and
2ns without 3ns, is blank nothing.

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 4:29 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon,
> I think my problem is that I see "habit" and "continuity" as phenomena, or
> effects, and ask myself: Effects of what? In my experience (or is it
> ideology?), effects/phenomena are caused by something, and I always suspect
> this more or less unknown something to be more fundamental (more general)
> than the effect. Because of that I seek the fundaments of habit in things
> like memory, cybernetic circles, and so on, and donot believe, that "habit"
> is the end of an analysis, or the basis, the first premiss of a hypothesis
> reversely engineered. As I said, to me habit seems like a complex affair.
> But maybe it is western analytic arrogance to always want to take things
> apart instead of not accepting complex affairs for fundamental or general?
> I dont know. An analogy in quantum physics may be: When you take particles
> apart, the parts first are smaller than the original particle. But from a
> certain smallness on they (the parts) start gettin bigger than the splitted
> thing. Maybe with causality it is the same?
> Best,
> Helmut
> 24. Januar 2017 um 22:55 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> Helmut:
>
> It is not so much that habit itself is fundamental, but that the tendency
> to take habits--i.e., generalization and continuity--is primordial.
>
>
> CSP:  I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of
> generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all
> regularities. (CP 6.63)
>
>
> CSP:  This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization,
> and as such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity. It must have
> its origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality.
> Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is
> essentially general. (CP 6.204)
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, List,
>> Ok, so, again, a term problem. so, if habit is not exclusively a mental
>> fact, I might agree. Like in cybernetics, there are catastrophic and
>> counter-regulative circles, and when first a catastrophic circle starts to
>> work, but then is inhibited by a regulative circle, but in the end the
>> catastrophical start has permanently increased something  (established it),
>> this is habit? Ok, it makes sense to me, I agree, habit may be inanimate.
>> It just is hard to see it as something fundamental, because you can analyse
>> it, take it apart into smaller concepts, like I did above. But a system is
>> said to be more than its parts, and maybe fundamentality does not have to
>> mean atomtized part(icle).
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>  24. Januar 2017 um 22:18 Uhr
>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
>> Helmut, List:
>>
>> Keep in mind that for Peirce, "habit" is a much broader term than how we
>> typically use it in ordinary conversation.  Every law of nature is a habit;
>> so indeed, stones, crystals, and sand dunes exhibit habits just as much as
>> people, pea plants, and dogs.  Peirce wrote that "habit is by no means
>> exclusively a mental fact ... The stream of water that wears a bed for
>> itself is forming a habit" (CP 5.492); that "matter is effete mind,
>> inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25); that he held "matter
>> to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); that "what
>> we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with
>> habits" (CP 6.158); and that "dead matter would be merely the final result
>> of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and
>> the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Helmut Raulien 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon, list,
>>> OK, Peirce said so, but I have problems with seeing "habit" as something
>>> fundamental, because to me it seems like a quite complex affair. I even had
>>> thought, that habit-taking requires a memory, which is a

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-24 Thread gnox

Jon, you’re having a busy day here!

 

I see where you’re coming from now, but I can’t go there myself because that 
would deny the reality of Secondness (or else deny that a relation of 
Secondness can subsist between a sign and its object). 

 

I think our problem may be that we’re not using the term “general” in the same 
way. I’m trying to observe what Peirce calls “the proper distinction between 
the two kinds of indeterminacy, viz.: indefiniteness and generality, of which 
the former consists in the sign's not sufficiently expressing itself to allow 
of an indubitable determinate interpretation, while the latter turns over to 
the interpreter the right to complete the determination as he pleases” 
(EP2:394). He “completes the determination” by selecting an individual from the 
universe of discourse defined by the general term, and that individual is the 
dynamic object of the sign.

 

We may also be using the term “collective” differently. In Peirce’s letter to 
Welby (CP 8:366) a “collective” is a kind of sign, one whose dynamic object is 
a collection. Obviously your usage comes from somewhere else.

 

Anyway I’m out of time for a day or two …

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 24-Jan-17 12:43
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and 
Particular//Singular/Individual

 

Gary F., List:

 

I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is general 
have an object that is not general?  My understanding is that all concepts are 
legisigns/types, which requires that all of their objects are collectives.  Are 
you suggesting that some concepts are qualisigns/marks or sinsigns/tokens?  
According to Peirce, the Universe of Necessitants "includes whatever we can 
know by logically valid reasoning" (EP 2:479; 1908).  I take this as 
encompassing all real objects of concepts, since Peirce held that there is 
nothing real that we cannot (in principle) come to know.  Aaron Bruce Wilson 
makes a similar point in his recent book, Peirce's Empiricism:  Its Roots and 
Its Originality.

 

ABW:  ... if knowledge of reality is possible, then there must be real 
generals.  [Peirce] argues:  "[S]ince no cognition of ours is absolutely 
determinate, generals must have a real existence" (5.312/W2:239).  By "no 
cognition of ours is absolutely determinate" I take him to mean that no object 
of cognition is absolutely determinate ... Peirce argues that we can cognize or 
represent only things possessing some indeterminate qualities because if one 
were to cognize something determinate in every respect, one would "have the 
material in each such representation for an infinite amount of conscious 
cognition, which we yet never become aware of" (5.305/W2:236).  For any given 
property, it seems that there is always some further property that is a further 
determination of it ... At some point, our minds simply fail to be powerful 
enough to represent any further determination, and must leave some property 
indeterminate ... either the properties of objects that we actually perceive 
are not real--and we have no empirical knowledge of reality--or they are real 
indeterminate properties or qualities and, thus, real generals. (pp. 63-64)

 

Regards,

 

Jon

 


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Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Jon,

I think my problem is that I see "habit" and "continuity" as phenomena, or effects, and ask myself: Effects of what? In my experience (or is it ideology?), effects/phenomena are caused by something, and I always suspect this more or less unknown something to be more fundamental (more general) than the effect. Because of that I seek the fundaments of habit in things like memory, cybernetic circles, and so on, and donot believe, that "habit" is the end of an analysis, or the basis, the first premiss of a hypothesis reversely engineered. As I said, to me habit seems like a complex affair. But maybe it is western analytic arrogance to always want to take things apart instead of not accepting complex affairs for fundamental or general? I dont know. An analogy in quantum physics may be: When you take particles apart, the parts first are smaller than the original particle. But from a certain smallness on they (the parts) start gettin bigger than the splitted thing. Maybe with causality it is the same?

Best,

Helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 22:55 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut:

It is not so much that habit itself is fundamental, but that the tendency to take habits--i.e., generalization and continuity--is primordial.

CSP: I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities. (CP 6.63)

CSP: This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity. It must have its origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general. (CP 6.204)

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

Ok, so, again, a term problem. so, if habit is not exclusively a mental fact, I might agree. Like in cybernetics, there are catastrophic and counter-regulative circles, and when first a catastrophic circle starts to work, but then is inhibited by a regulative circle, but in the end the catastrophical start has permanently increased something (established it), this is habit? Ok, it makes sense to me, I agree, habit may be inanimate. It just is hard to see it as something fundamental, because you can analyse it, take it apart into smaller concepts, like I did above. But a system is said to be more than its parts, and maybe fundamentality does not have to mean atomtized part(icle).

Best,

Helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 22:18 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

Keep in mind that for Peirce, "habit" is a much broader term than how we typically use it in ordinary conversation. Every law of nature is a habit; so indeed, stones, crystals, and sand dunes exhibit habits just as much as people, pea plants, and dogs. Peirce wrote that "habit is by no means exclusively a mental fact ... The stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a habit" (CP 5.492); that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25); that he held "matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); that "what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with habits" (CP 6.158); and that "dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201).

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, list,

OK, Peirce said so, but I have problems with seeing "habit" as something fundamental, because to me it seems like a quite complex affair. I even had thought, that habit-taking requires a memory, which is a solid with changeable spots, and in- and output connections, like a brain or a memory chip in a computer. In the realm of organisms, habit obviously does not require a brain, as biologists have found out lately, that a pea plant can be conditioned like a Pavlovian dog. But inanimate things like stones, crystals or sand dunes? I do not see that they habitize, I think they just obey to circumstance conditions (In case of a crystal the crystal itself belongs to its own circumstance conditions, the bigger it is, the faster it grows, but that has nothing to do with habit, just with its increasing exposed surface). So i just thought to replace or explain "habit" in case of inanimate, with "viability due to tautology/truth". Convince me otherwise.

Best,

helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 21:27 Uhr

"Jon Alan Schmidt" wote:

Helmut, List:

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Helmut:

It is not so much that habit itself is fundamental, but that the tendency
to take habits--i.e., generalization and continuity--is primordial.

CSP:  I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of
generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all
regularities. (CP 6.63)


CSP:  This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization,
and as such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity. It must have
its origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality.
Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is
essentially general. (CP 6.204)


Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:35 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> Ok, so, again, a term problem. so, if habit is not exclusively a mental
> fact, I might agree. Like in cybernetics, there are catastrophic and
> counter-regulative circles, and when first a catastrophic circle starts to
> work, but then is inhibited by a regulative circle, but in the end the
> catastrophical start has permanently increased something  (established it),
> this is habit? Ok, it makes sense to me, I agree, habit may be inanimate.
> It just is hard to see it as something fundamental, because you can analyse
> it, take it apart into smaller concepts, like I did above. But a system is
> said to be more than its parts, and maybe fundamentality does not have to
> mean atomtized part(icle).
> Best,
> Helmut
>  24. Januar 2017 um 22:18 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
> Helmut, List:
>
> Keep in mind that for Peirce, "habit" is a much broader term than how we
> typically use it in ordinary conversation.  Every law of nature is a habit;
> so indeed, stones, crystals, and sand dunes exhibit habits just as much as
> people, pea plants, and dogs.  Peirce wrote that "habit is by no means
> exclusively a mental fact ... The stream of water that wears a bed for
> itself is forming a habit" (CP 5.492); that "matter is effete mind,
> inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25); that he held "matter
> to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); that "what
> we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with
> habits" (CP 6.158); and that "dead matter would be merely the final result
> of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and
> the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, list,
>> OK, Peirce said so, but I have problems with seeing "habit" as something
>> fundamental, because to me it seems like a quite complex affair. I even had
>> thought, that habit-taking requires a memory, which is a solid with
>> changeable spots, and in- and output connections, like a brain or a memory
>> chip in a computer. In the realm of organisms, habit obviously does not
>> require a brain, as biologists have found out lately, that a pea plant can
>> be conditioned like a Pavlovian dog. But inanimate things like stones,
>> crystals or sand dunes? I do not see that they habitize, I think they just
>> obey to circumstance conditions (In case of a crystal the crystal itself
>> belongs to its own circumstance conditions, the bigger it is, the faster it
>> grows, but that has nothing to do with habit, just with its increasing
>> exposed surface). So i just thought to replace or explain "habit" in case
>> of inanimate, with "viability due to tautology/truth". Convince me
>> otherwise.
>> Best,
>> helmut
>>
>> 24. Januar 2017 um 21:27 Uhr
>>  "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wote:
>> Helmut, List:
>>
>> Rather than mathematics, tautology, or truth, Peirce identified the
>> psychical law--the Law of Mind, generalization, the habit-taking
>> tendency--as the primordial law, from which all physical laws are "derived
>> and special" (CP 6.24).  In "A Guess at the Riddle" (CP 1.412; 1887-1888),
>> he wrote that the "second flash" came about "by the principle of
>> habit"--which means that the latter must have already been in place.  In
>> fact, in an early draft of "A Neglected Argument" (R 842; 1908), Peirce
>> acknowledged that "there must have been some original tendency to take
>> habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis," crediting this
>> correction to Professor Ogden Rood.  If the tendency to take habits was
>> truly "original," then 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some
>> sense--presumably more logical than temporal, per Clark's comments.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Edwina, list,
>>> If there are limitless possibilities in the beginning, and then evolve
>>> things, matter, laws, due to habit-taking, one might ask, on which grounds
>>> and basis does this selection takes place? One might say, th

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Jon, List,

Best,

Helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 22:18 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, list,

Best,

helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 21:27 Uhr

"Jon Alan Schmidt" wote:

Helmut, List:

Rather than mathematics, tautology, or truth, Peirce identified the psychical law--the Law of Mind, generalization, the habit-taking tendency--as the primordial law, from which all physical laws are "derived and special" (CP 6.24). In "A Guess at the Riddle" (CP 1.412; 1887-1888), he wrote that the "second flash" came about "by the principle of habit"--which means that the latter must have already been in place. In fact, in an early draft of "A Neglected Argument" (R 842; 1908), Peirce acknowledged that "there must have been some original tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis," crediting this correction to Professor Ogden Rood. If the tendency to take habits was truly "original," then 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some sense--presumably more logical than temporal, per Clark's comments.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Edwina, list,

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Helmut, List:

Keep in mind that for Peirce, "habit" is a much broader term than how we
typically use it in ordinary conversation.  Every law of nature is a habit;
so indeed, stones, crystals, and sand dunes exhibit habits just as much as
people, pea plants, and dogs.  Peirce wrote that "habit is by no means
exclusively a mental fact ... The stream of water that wears a bed for
itself is forming a habit" (CP 5.492); that "matter is effete mind,
inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25); that he held "matter
to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind" (CP 6.102); that "what
we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind hidebound with
habits" (CP 6.158); and that "dead matter would be merely the final result
of the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and
the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201).

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, list,
> OK, Peirce said so, but I have problems with seeing "habit" as something
> fundamental, because to me it seems like a quite complex affair. I even had
> thought, that habit-taking requires a memory, which is a solid with
> changeable spots, and in- and output connections, like a brain or a memory
> chip in a computer. In the realm of organisms, habit obviously does not
> require a brain, as biologists have found out lately, that a pea plant can
> be conditioned like a Pavlovian dog. But inanimate things like stones,
> crystals or sand dunes? I do not see that they habitize, I think they just
> obey to circumstance conditions (In case of a crystal the crystal itself
> belongs to its own circumstance conditions, the bigger it is, the faster it
> grows, but that has nothing to do with habit, just with its increasing
> exposed surface). So i just thought to replace or explain "habit" in case
> of inanimate, with "viability due to tautology/truth". Convince me
> otherwise.
> Best,
> helmut
>
> 24. Januar 2017 um 21:27 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wote:
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> Rather than mathematics, tautology, or truth, Peirce identified the
> psychical law--the Law of Mind, generalization, the habit-taking
> tendency--as the primordial law, from which all physical laws are "derived
> and special" (CP 6.24).  In "A Guess at the Riddle" (CP 1.412; 1887-1888),
> he wrote that the "second flash" came about "by the principle of
> habit"--which means that the latter must have already been in place.  In
> fact, in an early draft of "A Neglected Argument" (R 842; 1908), Peirce
> acknowledged that "there must have been some original tendency to take
> habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis," crediting this
> correction to Professor Ogden Rood.  If the tendency to take habits was
> truly "original," then 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some
> sense--presumably more logical than temporal, per Clark's comments.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>> If there are limitless possibilities in the beginning, and then evolve
>> things, matter, laws, due to habit-taking, one might ask, on which grounds
>> and basis does this selection takes place? One might say, that for instance
>> mathematics is the basis for physics. But what is mathematics? A Platonian
>> idea? No, it is an elaboration of tautology, I guess. If somebody would
>> claim that "1+1=2" is only true in this universe, but in another universe
>> "1+1=3", he would be wrong, because "2" is defined as "1+1". So maybe the
>> one and only law that selects possibilities due to their viability, and
>> thus is responsible for habits, is the law of truth, which is nothing but
>> accordance to tautology. So maybe it is not even a law. But it is the only
>> A-Priori: Truth is tautology, or it is what it is. Maybe even the
>> categorical imperative is based on this not-law of identity. Maybe
>> identity, tautology, truth are (universal) thirdness concepts which are
>> there in the instant, secondness (something) is there? "Something", evolved
>> secondness, sticks out of the Tohuvabohu by adressing itself "I am like I
>> am, and remain so", permanent for some time in contrast to the brew of
>> possibilities, which are not permanent, but just a turbulent mess. What I
>> want to say, is, I agree with you that no God is necessary. But the
>> self-explaining concept of Truth is, which is very simple: Tautology. But
>> do religions say that God is not simple, or do they rather talk about
>> almightiness, so may we just say that it is ok. to call Truth/Tautology,
>> which obviously is almighty, and perhaps the only almighty thing/law,
>> "God"? Ok, I guess that would be too simple and silly. It was just a
>> "gedankenexperiment" of mine, having been gotten carried away somehow.
>> Best,
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Clark, List:

CG:  For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and that’s what I
think you’re talking about.

Right, but a legisign/type can only have a Dynamic Object that is
collective; it cannot represent a Possible or Existent, only a Necessitant.

CG:  ... the object could be any sort of object (firstness, secondness,
thirdness).

Only for a qualisign/mark, according to Peirce's rule of determination (as
I call it).  Again, a legisign/type (3ns) can only represent a collective
object (3ns).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 11:54 AM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Jan 24, 2017, at 10:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is
> general have an object that is *not *general?
>
> Just a guess but I suspect the issue here is how one identifies a sign.
> That is what makes a general sign be labeled as general. This is really
> just a semantic issue.
>
> This confusion is why I don’t tend to use the phrase “general sign” as
> it’s not obvious what is general. For a legisign the sign consists of a
> general idea and that’s what I think you’re talking about. (Correct me if
> I’m wrong)
>
> To your other point regarding determination, the sign can be indeterminate
> in terms of how it represents the object but the object could be any sort
> of object (firstness, secondness, thirdness). In all cases the sign would
> still be indeterminate. So I might signify a several elements of
> firstnesses. What objects is indeterminate and thus general even though the
> objects are not general.
>
> The nominalist view is that all general signs must ultimately refer to
> individual objects rather than real structures. Peirce allows the real
> structure to be the object independent of these other individual objects.
> But for Peirce we must be able to signify both kinds of objects.
>
> Of course Peirce’s notion of continuity entails that any sign can itself
> be broken up into further signs. So all this depends upon the type of
> analysis one is conducting.
>

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Jon, list,

Best,

helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 21:27 Uhr

"Jon Alan Schmidt" wote:

Helmut, List:

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Edwina, list,

If there are limitless possibilities in the beginning, and then evolve things, matter, laws, due to habit-taking, one might ask, on which grounds and basis does this selection takes place? One might say, that for instance mathematics is the basis for physics. But what is mathematics? A Platonian idea? No, it is an elaboration of tautology, I guess. If somebody would claim that "1+1=2" is only true in this universe, but in another universe "1+1=3", he would be wrong, because "2" is defined as "1+1". So maybe the one and only law that selects possibilities due to their viability, and thus is responsible for habits, is the law of truth, which is nothing but accordance to tautology. So maybe it is not even a law. But it is the only A-Priori: Truth is tautology, or it is what it is. Maybe even the categorical imperative is based on this not-law of identity. Maybe identity, tautology, truth are (universal) thirdness concepts which are there in the instant, secondness (something) is there? "Something", evolved secondness, sticks out of the Tohuvabohu by adressing itself "I am like I am, and remain so", permanent for some time in contrast to the brew of possibilities, which are not permanent, but just a turbulent mess. What I want to say, is, I agree with you that no God is necessary. But the self-explaining concept of Truth is, which is very simple: Tautology. But do religions say that God is not simple, or do they rather talk about almightiness, so may we just say that it is ok. to call Truth/Tautology, which obviously is almighty, and perhaps the only almighty thing/law, "God"? Ok, I guess that would be too simple and silly. It was just a "gedankenexperiment" of mine, having been gotten carried away somehow.

Best,

Helmut

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Edwina, List:

In several drafts of "A Neglected Argument" (R 843), Peirce explicitly
assigned Ideas and ideal possibilities to one Universe of Experience,
Matter and physical facts to a second, and Mind and minds to a third.  I
think that these three Universes clearly correspond to his three
Categories, but I know that you disagree.  Also, I take what you quoted
below from CP 6.490 to be part of a *reductio ad absurdum*, since there are
no "absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness."  I agree
that all three Categories are operative *within *our existing universe, but
this does not entail that none is primordial from a broader cosmological
standpoint.

Again, not looking to resume the debate, just presenting my alternative
interpretation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Clark:
>
> Agreed - Firstness has a character while Nothing does not. That's also how
> I read Peirce's outline of the three categories - that they operate within
> 'character' or boundaries, which means that none of the categories can be
> primordial or 'pre-matter'.
>
> Mind, which in my reading of Peirce, operates within all three modal
> categories, emerges with the emergence of the material universe.  He notes
> this in his outline of the emergence of matter in 1.412, and one can also
> read, that he considers "a state of things in which the three universes
> were completely nil. Consequently, whether in time or not, the three
> universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter
> nothingness" 6.490.
> The three universes operate within the three modal categories and
> therefore, none of them are prior to matter, for 'the universe of
> mind..coincides with the universe of matter' [6.501] by which I understand
> that the modal categories are correlated with each other and none is
> primordial. After all, 'habit-taking is intimately  connected with
> nutrition' 6.283, i.e., Thirdness is correlated with matter.
>
> As for WHAT the term of god means, Peirce says 'the analogue of a mind'
> [6.502] and since he has already considered that Mind and Matter are
> correlated - the one cannot exist without the other [Aristotle].
>
> Yes, I agree that original sources are vital - and that they disagree
> within texts and with each other.
>
> Would you say that agapasm is a 'drive towards unity' or is it a 'feeling'
> of attraction to Otherness, and an action of the development of some, just
> some, commonalities. That is, agapasm requires diversity of matter, for
> 'love' exists only within an attraction to the Not-Self and the 'power of
> sympathy' towards this otherness 6.307.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 2:40 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism
>
> On Jan 24, 2017, at 12:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two
> 'flashes' outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular
> matter also introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then
> start to limit and constrain the possibilities. So, I don't consider that
> the 'Nothing' is like Firstness, since my reading of Peirce posits that
> Firstness operates as a mode of organization of matter...and this requires
> matter to exist! That is, my reading of Peirce is that the three modal
> categories only develop when matter develops. So, before there was matter,
> this 'Nothing' is not Firstness. As Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'.
> Firstness is a powerful mode of organization of matter, rejecting closure,
> limits, borders. And certainly, since matter at this pretemporal
> phase hasn't developed any laws of modal organization, it doesn't yet
> function within Thirdness.
>
> As I understand it the main difference between nothing (or the zeroth
> category) and firstness is just how bounded it is. Firstness has a
> character whereas Nothing does not. Again Peirce is here following several
> types of neoPlatonism from the latter period of late antiquity that divide
> the One into two types of Oneness, one more primordial.
>
> It’s worth reading the SEP here although it doesn’t get into the nuances
> of differing schools of neoPlatonism.
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neoplatonism/#One
>
> You’ll note that the neoPlatonic notion of everything having an inner and
> an outer aspect is also part of Peirce’s thought. Even Peirce’s agapism is
> pretty much the neoPlatonism of Iamblichus where love is the drive towards
> unity. Within the One (unthinking limit) are two aspects — an inner and an
> outer. The One and the Many. (This is where he and a few other prominent
> neoPlatonists split with other schools) Unformed chaotic matter is the
> ultimate unlimited which is the One i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 1:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Would you say that agapasm is a 'drive towards unity' or is it a 'feeling' of 
> attraction to Otherness, and an action of the development of some, just some, 
> commonalities. That is, agapasm requires diversity of matter, for 'love' 
> exists only within an attraction to the Not-Self and the 'power of sympathy' 
> towards this otherness 6.307.

Think they end up being the same thing. For the Proclus strain of neoPlatonism 
you have that move away from unity which creates a gap. So there is something 
other to the not-self or the lack. In Plotinus it’s a bit more complex since 
matter as absolute private is Other and the One as absolute unity is also pure 
Other. Iamblicus and Proclus disagreed with Plotinus on the nature of matter. 
Plotinus is following Aristotle a little more closely here.

The full quote you reference is useful. (Emphasis mine)

The agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental 
tendencies, not altogether heedlessly, as in tychasm, nor quite blindly by the 
mere force of circumstances or of logic, as in anancasm, but by an immediate 
attraction for the idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind 
possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of 
mind; and this mental tendency may be of three varieties, as follows. First, it 
may affect a whole people or community in its collective personality, and be 
thence communicated to such individuals as are in powerfully sympathetic 
connection with the collective people, although they may be intellectually 
incapable of attaining the idea by their private understandings or even perhaps 
of consciously apprehending it. Second, it may affect a private person 
directly, yet so that he is only enabled to apprehend the idea, or to 
appreciate its attractiveness, by virtue of his sympathy with his neighbors, 
under the influence of a striking experience or development of thought. The 
conversion of St. Paul may be taken as an example of what is meant. Third, it 
may affect an individual, independently of his human affections, by virtue of 
an attraction it exercises upon his mind, even before he has comprehended it. 
This is the phenomenon which has been well called the divination of genius; for 
it is due to the continuity between the man’s mind and the Most High.

Later (315)

The agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be distinguished by 
its purposive character, this purpose being the development of an idea. We 
should have a direct agapic or sympathetic comprehension and recognition of it 
by virtue of the continuity of thought.

His later paper “On Signs” is useful to expand these ideas from “Evolutionary 
Love.” Again emphasis mine.

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something 
in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the 
mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That 
sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign 
stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all 
respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the 
ground of the representamen. “Idea” is here to be understood in a sort of 
Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in that sense in which 
we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we say that when a man 
recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he recalls the same 
idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for a tenth of a 
second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during that 
time, that is to have a likecontent, it is the same idea, and is not at each 
instant of the interval a new idea. (CP 2.228)

He doesn’t really speak in terms of love there. But you can see the parallels 
to how he describes agapism in “Evolutionary Love.” Beauty in the way 
neoPlatonists conceive of it is wrapped up with all this. Beauty for Peirce you 
might recall is making firstness intelligible. Again this is right out of 
Proclus. This issue ends up being how you represent iconicity. For Peirce what 
we mean by beauty is the greek kalos. For Proclus kalos is the call of Being. 
This triadic structure in Proclus emanation theory is tied to this. His 
“Elements of Theology” really is an important context for Peirce here.

When you remember what an idea is for Peirce this love is caught up with 
determining in signs the original form which often is manifest either via the 
unconscious or via a kind of quasi-revelatory form. Again this is pretty 
standard in the more religious form of neoPlatonism such as written of by 
Iamblicus and Proclus.

For Peirce I think it depends upon the time time frame. In the very early more 
Kantian Peirce you still have these neoPlatonic ideas with Being and Matter 
being the unthinkable limits. In the later Peirce it gets a bit

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Clark: 

Agreed - Firstness has a character while Nothing does not. That's also how I 
read Peirce's outline of the three categories - that they operate within 
'character' or boundaries, which means that none of the categories can be 
primordial or 'pre-matter'.

Mind, which in my reading of Peirce, operates within all three modal 
categories, emerges with the emergence of the material universe.  He notes this 
in his outline of the emergence of matter in 1.412, and one can also read, that 
he considers "a state of things in which the three universes were completely 
nil. Consequently, whether in time or not, the three universes must actually be 
absolutely necessary results of a state of utter nothingness" 6.490. 
The three universes operate within the three modal categories and therefore, 
none of them are prior to matter, for 'the universe of mind..coincides with the 
universe of matter' [6.501] by which I understand that the modal categories are 
correlated with each other and none is primordial. After all, 'habit-taking is 
intimately  connected with nutrition' 6.283, i.e., Thirdness is correlated with 
matter.

As for WHAT the term of god means, Peirce says 'the analogue of a mind' [6.502] 
and since he has already considered that Mind and Matter are correlated - the 
one cannot exist without the other [Aristotle].

Yes, I agree that original sources are vital - and that they disagree within 
texts and with each other. 

Would you say that agapasm is a 'drive towards unity' or is it a 'feeling' of 
attraction to Otherness, and an action of the development of some, just some, 
commonalities. That is, agapasm requires diversity of matter, for 'love' exists 
only within an attraction to the Not-Self and the 'power of sympathy' towards 
this otherness 6.307. 

Edwina


  - Original Message - 
  From: Clark Goble 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 2:40 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism




On Jan 24, 2017, at 12:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two 
'flashes' outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular matter 
also introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then start to limit 
and constrain the possibilities. So, I don't consider that the 'Nothing' is 
like Firstness, since my reading of Peirce posits that Firstness operates as a 
mode of organization of matter...and this requires matter to exist! That is, my 
reading of Peirce is that the three modal categories only develop when matter 
develops. So, before there was matter, this 'Nothing' is not Firstness. As 
Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'. Firstness is a powerful mode of 
organization of matter, rejecting closure, limits, borders. And certainly, 
since matter at this pretemporal phase hasn't developed any laws of modal 
organization, it doesn't yet function within Thirdness.


  As I understand it the main difference between nothing (or the zeroth 
category) and firstness is just how bounded it is. Firstness has a character 
whereas Nothing does not. Again Peirce is here following several types of 
neoPlatonism from the latter period of late antiquity that divide the One into 
two types of Oneness, one more primordial.


  It’s worth reading the SEP here although it doesn’t get into the nuances of 
differing schools of neoPlatonism.


  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neoplatonism/#One


  You’ll note that the neoPlatonic notion of everything having an inner and an 
outer aspect is also part of Peirce’s thought. Even Peirce’s agapism is pretty 
much the neoPlatonism of Iamblichus where love is the drive towards unity. 
Within the One (unthinking limit) are two aspects — an inner and an outer. The 
One and the Many. (This is where he and a few other prominent neoPlatonists 
split with other schools) Unformed chaotic matter is the ultimate unlimited 
which is the One in its inner form. Limit is the other principle. These then 
mix with each other in weird ways (this neoPlatonism was primarily religious 
rather than straightforwardly philosophical) allowing the emanation of the 
Forms (firstness for Peirce) and then to the World Soul which is roughly the 
neoPlatonic idea of thirdness.


  I don’t recall if Peirce read Iamblichus (although I assume he did) although 
I know he read Proclus who was influenced by both Iamblichus and Plotinus. 


  Again this to me is where Peirce is at his most controversial. But when 
reading these passages about limit, difference, and chaos of pure potency it’s 
worth reading the original sources Peirce is likely drawing upon. One should 
also note that the sources themselves didn’t always agree with each other in 
the details. 






--



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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Helmut, List:

Rather than mathematics, tautology, or truth, Peirce identified the
psychical law--the Law of Mind, generalization, the habit-taking
tendency--as the primordial law, from which all physical laws are "derived
and special" (CP 6.24).  In "A Guess at the Riddle" (CP 1.412; 1887-1888),
he wrote that the "second flash" came about "by the principle of
habit"--which means that the latter must have already been in place.  In
fact, in an early draft of "A Neglected Argument" (R 842; 1908), Peirce
acknowledged that "there must have been some original tendency to take
habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis," crediting this
correction to Professor Ogden Rood.  If the tendency to take habits was
truly "original," then 3ns must have preceded 1ns and 2ns in some
sense--presumably more logical than temporal, per Clark's comments.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 2:09 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, list,
> If there are limitless possibilities in the beginning, and then evolve
> things, matter, laws, due to habit-taking, one might ask, on which grounds
> and basis does this selection takes place? One might say, that for instance
> mathematics is the basis for physics. But what is mathematics? A Platonian
> idea? No, it is an elaboration of tautology, I guess. If somebody would
> claim that "1+1=2" is only true in this universe, but in another universe
> "1+1=3", he would be wrong, because "2" is defined as "1+1". So maybe the
> one and only law that selects possibilities due to their viability, and
> thus is responsible for habits, is the law of truth, which is nothing but
> accordance to tautology. So maybe it is not even a law. But it is the only
> A-Priori: Truth is tautology, or it is what it is. Maybe even the
> categorical imperative is based on this not-law of identity. Maybe
> identity, tautology, truth are (universal) thirdness concepts which are
> there in the instant, secondness (something) is there? "Something", evolved
> secondness, sticks out of the Tohuvabohu by adressing itself "I am like I
> am, and remain so", permanent for some time in contrast to the brew of
> possibilities, which are not permanent, but just a turbulent mess. What I
> want to say, is, I agree with you that no God is necessary. But the
> self-explaining concept of Truth is, which is very simple: Tautology. But
> do religions say that God is not simple, or do they rather talk about
> almightiness, so may we just say that it is ok. to call Truth/Tautology,
> which obviously is almighty, and perhaps the only almighty thing/law,
> "God"? Ok, I guess that would be too simple and silly. It was just a
> "gedankenexperiment" of mine, having been gotten carried away somehow.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism


Edwina, list,

If there are limitless possibilities in the beginning, and then evolve things, matter, laws, due to habit-taking, one might ask, on which grounds and basis does this selection takes place? One might say, that for instance mathematics is the basis for physics. But what is mathematics? A Platonian idea? No, it is an elaboration of tautology, I guess. If somebody would claim that "1+1=2" is only true in this universe, but in another universe "1+1=3", he would be wrong, because "2" is defined as "1+1". So maybe the one and only law that selects possibilities due to their viability, and thus is responsible for habits, is the law of truth, which is nothing but accordance to tautology. So maybe it is not even a law. But it is the only A-Priori: Truth is tautology, or it is what it is. Maybe even the categorical imperative is based on this not-law of identity. Maybe identity, tautology, truth are (universal) thirdness concepts which are there in the instant, secondness (something) is there? "Something", evolved secondness, sticks out of the Tohuvabohu by adressing itself "I am like I am, and remain so", permanent for some time in contrast to the brew of possibilities, which are not permanent, but just a turbulent mess. What I want to say, is, I agree with you that no God is necessary. But the self-explaining concept of Truth is, which is very simple: Tautology. But do religions say that God is not simple, or do they rather talk about almightiness, so may we just say that it is ok. to call Truth/Tautology, which obviously is almighty, and perhaps the only almighty thing/law, "God"? Ok, I guess that would be too simple and silly. It was just a "gedankenexperiment" of mine, having been gotten carried away somehow.  

Best,

Helmut

 

24. Januar 2017 um 20:11 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Yes, I suppose the Nothing of Peirce is akin to the biblican 'tohuvabohu 'formless chaos', but my point is that it does not include any direction. And certainly there is no metaphysical agent to introduce a direction.

 

This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two 'flashes' outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular matter also introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then start to limit and constrain the possibilities. So, I don't consider that the 'Nothing' is like Firstness, since my reading of Peirce posits that Firstness operates as a mode of organization of matter...and this requires matter to exist! That is, my reading of Peirce is that the three modal categories only develop when matter develops. So, before there was matter, this 'Nothing' is not Firstness. As Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'. Firstness is a powerful mode of organization of matter, rejecting closure, limits, borders. And certainly, since matter at this pretemporal phase hasn't developed any laws of modal organization, it doesn't yet function within Thirdness. 

 

Edwina


- Original Message -

From: Helmut Raulien

To: tabor...@primus.ca

Cc: Peirce List

Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 1:55 PM

Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

 



Edwina,

I agree, by adopting Peirce´s definition of "Nothing", which is only a no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are, even limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities. Maybe this Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical "Tohuvabohu"? In contrast to a nihilistic "Nothing", in which there is nothing, not even possibilities, unless whoever plants some ideas into it. What I wanted to say, is, I think I agree with you, there just has been or is an unclarity about the term "nothing".

Best,

Helmut

 

24. Januar 2017 um 19:30 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:


 



1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so.

 

Edwina: Agreed

 

2) HR:  Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the "mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric:

 

EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.

 

 

3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, but consists of symbols of secondnesses:

 

EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how a 'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is 'possibility' a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge that the force in matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively real.  A symbol is in a mode of Thirdness not Secondness.

 

 

4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an organis

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 12:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> As Edwina and I have discussed ad nauseam in the past, I disagree with her 
> interpretation that there was no "metaphysical agent," that there was no 3ns 
> prior to 1ns and 2ns, and that mind emerged with matter such that neither is 
> primordial.  Peirce explicitly affirmed the Reality of God as Ens 
> necessarium, the priority of continuity (3ns) relative to spontaneity (1ns) 
> and reaction (2ns), and the primordiality of mind (psychical law) with 
> respect to matter (physical laws).  I have no desire to re-litigate that 
> dispute, I am just noting it for the record.

Just to note the difficulty in these discussions is distinguishing between 
logical analysis and temporal analysis. When one says “prior” one has to be 
clear in what sense one is speaking. 

Time is itself an organized something, having its law or regularity ; so that 
time itself is a part of the universe whose origin is to be considered. We have 
therefore to suppose a state of things before time was organized. Accordingly 
when we speak of the universe as ‘arising’ we do not mean that literally. We 
mean to speak of some kind of sequence, say an objective logical sequence; but 
we do not mean in speaking of the first stages of creation before time was 
organized, to use ‘before,’ after,’ arising,’ and such words in the temporal 
sense. (6.214)

In Proclus’ emanation theory there’s a triadic structure of ontological 
constitution (monos) which is a kind of surplus (often translated as 
plentitude). As it proceeds you get the second part of the triad which is 
proceeding (prodos). This in turn causes a kind of reversal via desire for that 
surplus (episterophe) which is the third element and is a kind of reversal. 
This reversal is very similar to how the latter Peirce sees the relationship of 
the interpretant to the object. The sign indicates the object by way of a hint 
and what is produced is ‘less’ in a certain sense than the object. This 
reversal then creates a process that attempts to correctly represent the origin 
that is a surplus of what is represented.

So you have pure unbounded potential turning into potential of this or that 
sort (6.220) which then is a kind of platonic form where the form is 
possibility. Secondness for Peirce results from a first flash it resembles and 
results from (CP 1.412) Then this process continues until “the events would 
have been bound together into something like a continuous flow.” This is 
thirdness.

The important thing to note though is that first this is the same process as 
Proclus discusses (although he’s likely not the originator of it) and that this 
is ‘before’ any sense of temporality.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 12:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two 'flashes' 
> outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular matter also 
> introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then start to limit and 
> constrain the possibilities. So, I don't consider that the 'Nothing' is like 
> Firstness, since my reading of Peirce posits that Firstness operates as a 
> mode of organization of matter...and this requires matter to exist! That is, 
> my reading of Peirce is that the three modal categories only develop when 
> matter develops. So, before there was matter, this 'Nothing' is not 
> Firstness. As Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'. Firstness is a powerful 
> mode of organization of matter, rejecting closure, limits, borders. And 
> certainly, since matter at this pretemporal phase hasn't developed any laws 
> of modal organization, it doesn't yet function within Thirdness.

As I understand it the main difference between nothing (or the zeroth category) 
and firstness is just how bounded it is. Firstness has a character whereas 
Nothing does not. Again Peirce is here following several types of neoPlatonism 
from the latter period of late antiquity that divide the One into two types of 
Oneness, one more primordial.

It’s worth reading the SEP here although it doesn’t get into the nuances of 
differing schools of neoPlatonism.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/neoplatonism/#One 

You’ll note that the neoPlatonic notion of everything having an inner and an 
outer aspect is also part of Peirce’s thought. Even Peirce’s agapism is pretty 
much the neoPlatonism of Iamblichus where love is the drive towards unity. 
Within the One (unthinking limit) are two aspects — an inner and an outer. The 
One and the Many. (This is where he and a few other prominent neoPlatonists 
split with other schools) Unformed chaotic matter is the ultimate unlimited 
which is the One in its inner form. Limit is the other principle. These then 
mix with each other in weird ways (this neoPlatonism was primarily religious 
rather than straightforwardly philosophical) allowing the emanation of the 
Forms (firstness for Peirce) and then to the World Soul which is roughly the 
neoPlatonic idea of thirdness.

I don’t recall if Peirce read Iamblichus (although I assume he did) although I 
know he read Proclus who was influenced by both Iamblichus and Plotinus. 

Again this to me is where Peirce is at his most controversial. But when reading 
these passages about limit, difference, and chaos of pure potency it’s worth 
reading the original sources Peirce is likely drawing upon. One should also 
note that the sources themselves didn’t always agree with each other in the 
details. 

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Helmut, List:

I have reiterated my own views on what Peirce meant by "Nothing" in the
resurrected thread on "Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)."
 He explicitly associated *tohu wa bohu* with "the indeterminate germinal
Nothing" in the passage that I quoted there from NEM 4.138-139.

As Edwina and I have discussed *ad nauseam* in the past, I disagree with
her interpretation that there was no "metaphysical agent," that there was
no 3ns prior to 1ns and 2ns, and that mind emerged with matter such that
neither is primordial.  Peirce explicitly affirmed the Reality of God as *Ens
necessarium*, the priority of continuity (3ns) relative to spontaneity
(1ns) and reaction (2ns), and the primordiality of mind (psychical law)
with respect to matter (physical laws).  I have no desire to re-litigate
that dispute, I am just noting it for the record.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 1:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Yes, I suppose the Nothing of Peirce is akin to the biblican 'tohuvabohu
> 'formless chaos', but my point is that it does not include any direction.
> And certainly there is no metaphysical agent to introduce a direction.
>
> This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two
> 'flashes' outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular
> matter also introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then
> start to limit and constrain the possibilities. So, I don't consider that
> the 'Nothing' is like Firstness, since my reading of Peirce posits that
> Firstness operates as a mode of organization of matter...and this requires
> matter to exist! That is, my reading of Peirce is that the three modal
> categories only develop when matter develops. So, before there was matter,
> this 'Nothing' is not Firstness. As Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'.
> Firstness is a powerful mode of organization of matter, rejecting closure,
> limits, borders. And certainly, since matter at this pretemporal
> phase hasn't developed any laws of modal organization, it doesn't yet
> function within Thirdness.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca
> *Cc:* Peirce List 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 24, 2017 1:55 PM
> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism
>
> Edwina,
> I agree, by adopting Peirce´s definition of "Nothing", which is only a
> no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are,
> even limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities.
> Maybe this Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical
> "Tohuvabohu"? In contrast to a nihilistic "Nothing", in which there is
> nothing, not even possibilities, unless whoever plants some ideas into it.
> What I wanted to say, is, I think I agree with you, there just has been or
> is an unclarity about the term "nothing".
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 24. Januar 2017 um 19:30 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky" 
>
> Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:
>
>
> 1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?)
> everything to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute
> facts. So bio- and physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no
> symbolic language. Only humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me
> appears to be human hybris. Is the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I
> guess so.
>
> Edwina: Agreed
>
> 2) HR:  Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the
> "mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric:
>
> EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't
> worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.
>
> 3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself,
> but consists of symbols of secondnesses:
>
> EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how
> a 'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is
> 'possibility' a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge
> that the force in matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively
> real.  A symbol is in a mode of Thirdness not Secondness.
>
> 4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an
> organism, a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was
> possible (firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a
> copy or token of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea.
>
> EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by the above. Are you saying that the
> FORM of Platonism is in a mode of Firstness? I don't accept the notion of a
> divine ideaI think you are moving into Platonism!
>
> 5) HR: To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the
> beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not
> ideas, but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible"
>

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Yes, I suppose the Nothing of Peirce is akin to the biblican 'tohuvabohu 
'formless chaos', but my point is that it does not include any direction. And 
certainly there is no metaphysical agent to introduce a direction.

This nothing is limitless possibilities BUT, after those first two 'flashes' 
outlined by Peirce, these flashes which introduce particular matter also 
introduce Thirdness or habits of formation, and these then start to limit and 
constrain the possibilities. So, I don't consider that the 'Nothing' is like 
Firstness, since my reading of Peirce posits that Firstness operates as a mode 
of organization of matter...and this requires matter to exist! That is, my 
reading of Peirce is that the three modal categories only develop when matter 
develops. So, before there was matter, this 'Nothing' is not Firstness. As 
Peirce outlines it - it is 'nothing'. Firstness is a powerful mode of 
organization of matter, rejecting closure, limits, borders. And certainly, 
since matter at this pretemporal phase hasn't developed any laws of modal 
organization, it doesn't yet function within Thirdness. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: tabor...@primus.ca 
  Cc: Peirce List 
  Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 1:55 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism


  Edwina,
  I agree, by adopting Peirce´s definition of "Nothing", which is only a 
no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are, even 
limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities. Maybe this 
Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical "Tohuvabohu"? In 
contrast to a nihilistic "Nothing", in which there is nothing, not even 
possibilities, unless whoever plants some ideas into it. What I wanted to say, 
is, I think I agree with you, there just has been or is an unclarity about the 
term "nothing".
  Best,
  Helmut

  24. Januar 2017 um 19:30 Uhr
   "Edwina Taborsky" 
   
  Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:

1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything 
to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and 
physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only 
humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is 
the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so.

Edwina: Agreed

2) HR:  Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the 
"mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric:

EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't 
worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.


3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, 
but consists of symbols of secondnesses:

EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how a 
'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is 'possibility' 
a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge that the force in 
matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively real.  A symbol is in a 
mode of Thirdness not Secondness.


4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an 
organism, a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was 
possible (firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a copy 
or token of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea.


EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by the above. Are you saying that the 
FORM of Platonism is in a mode of Firstness? I don't accept the notion of a 
divine ideaI think you are moving into Platonism!

5) HR: To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the 
beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not ideas, 
but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible" possibility is 
everything). Or was there "nothing" in the beginning: In this case 
possibilities are ideas, planted into the nothing (by whom or what, Mr. 
Plato?), like in Platonism. I tend towards the Tohuvabohu-Hypothesis, and 
against Nominalism. My tentative attempt (to rescue Nominalism on the basis of 
universal mind) has failed, and I am happy about that.

EDWINA: I tend to agree with Peirce - that in the beginning, there was 
nothing. .."a state of mere indeterminancy in which nothing existed or really 
happened" 1.411. Then, "Out of the womb of indeeterminacy we must say that 
there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may 
call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second 
flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense 
after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other 
successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency 
to take them every strengthening themselves". 1.412.  He continues on outlining 
the development of habits within space and time...

You can read f

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Edwina,

I agree, by adopting Peirce´s definition of "Nothing", which is only a no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are, even limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities. Maybe this Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical "Tohuvabohu"? In contrast to a nihilistic "Nothing", in which there is nothing, not even possibilities, unless whoever plants some ideas into it. What I wanted to say, is, I think I agree with you, there just has been or is an unclarity about the term "nothing".

Best,

Helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 19:30 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:

1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so.

Edwina: Agreed

2) HR: Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the "mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric:

EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.

3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, but consists of symbols of secondnesses:

EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how a 'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is 'possibility' a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge that the force in matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively real. A symbol is in a mode of Thirdness not Secondness.

4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an organism, a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was possible (firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a copy or token of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea.

EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by the above. Are you saying that the FORM of Platonism is in a mode of Firstness? I don't accept the notion of a divine ideaI think you are moving into Platonism!

5) HR: To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not ideas, but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible" possibility is everything). Or was there "nothing" in the beginning: In this case possibilities are ideas, planted into the nothing (by whom or what, Mr. Plato?), like in Platonism. I tend towards the Tohuvabohu-Hypothesis, and against Nominalism. My tentative attempt (to rescue Nominalism on the basis of universal mind) has failed, and I am happy about that.

EDWINA: I tend to agree with Peirce - that in the beginning, there was nothing. .."a state of mere indeterminancy in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411. Then, "Out of the womb of indeeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them every strengthening themselves". 1.412. He continues on outlining the development of habits within space and time...

You can read from this that there was no a priori Agent [God]; no necessary determinism. "We start then, with nothing, pure zeroBut this pure zero is the nothing of not having been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom". 6.217.

You can read from this that Thirdness or Laws did not exist prior to Secondness or the appearance of particular matter. In this phase, there were only - the tendency to the three modal categories of the organization of matter. Thirdness, as a modal category, can be understood as akin to Mind, and emerges with matter. Peirce was quite open about his view that Mind exists and is operative in all forms of matter:

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, or crystals, and throught the purely physical world" 4.551.

This does then raise the question of 'what is Mind'? My answer, which i derive from Peirce, is that it is a process of all three modal categories where "Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in effec

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:

  1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything 
to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and 
physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only 
humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is 
the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so.

  Edwina: Agreed

  2) HR:  Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the 
"mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric: 

  EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't 
worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.


  3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, but 
consists of symbols of secondnesses: 

  EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how a 
'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is 'possibility' 
a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge that the force in 
matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively real.  A symbol is in a 
mode of Thirdness not Secondness.


  4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an organism, 
a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was possible 
(firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a copy or token 
of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea. 


  EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by the above. Are you saying that the FORM 
of Platonism is in a mode of Firstness? I don't accept the notion of a divine 
ideaI think you are moving into Platonism!

  5) HR: To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the 
beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not ideas, 
but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible" possibility is 
everything). Or was there "nothing" in the beginning: In this case 
possibilities are ideas, planted into the nothing (by whom or what, Mr. 
Plato?), like in Platonism. I tend towards the Tohuvabohu-Hypothesis, and 
against Nominalism. My tentative attempt (to rescue Nominalism on the basis of 
universal mind) has failed, and I am happy about that.

  EDWINA: I tend to agree with Peirce - that in the beginning, there was 
nothing. .."a state of mere indeterminancy in which nothing existed or really 
happened" 1.411. Then, "Out of the womb of indeeterminacy we must say that 
there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may 
call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second 
flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense 
after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other 
successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency 
to take them every strengthening themselves". 1.412.  He continues on outlining 
the development of habits within space and time...

  You can read from this that there was no a priori Agent [God]; no necessary 
determinism. "We start then, with nothing, pure zeroBut this pure zero is 
the nothing of not having been born.  There is no individual thing, no 
compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing in which the 
whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined 
and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and 
no law. It is boundless freedom". 6.217.

  You can read from this that Thirdness or Laws did not exist prior to 
Secondness or the appearance of particular matter. In this phase, there were 
only - the tendency to the three modal categories of the organization of 
matter. Thirdness, as a modal category, can be understood as akin to Mind, and 
emerges with matter. Peirce was quite open about his view that Mind exists and 
is operative in all forms of matter: 

  "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, or crystals, and throught the purely physical world" 4.551.

  This does then raise the question of 'what is Mind'? My answer, which i 
derive from Peirce, is that it is a process of all three modal categories  
where "Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such 
that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in 
effective intercommunication'. [Note. 4.550]. That is, Mind is not just 
Thirdness nor is it a metaphysical agent but is a semiosic action of all three 
categorical modes.

  Edwina


  Best,
  Helmut

   24. Januar 2017 um 16:07 Uhr
   "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
   
  Helmut - further to your post, where you write
  "if you believe that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part 
of an organism (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense?"

  I'd say 'no' to that. I, myself, consider that the universe is an organism, a 
massive operation of 'Mind', but that's not nominalism.

  Again

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

> On Jan 24, 2017, at 10:43 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is general 
> have an object that is not general?

Just a guess but I suspect the issue here is how one identifies a sign. That is 
what makes a general sign be labeled as general. This is really just a semantic 
issue. 

This confusion is why I don’t tend to use the phrase “general sign” as it’s not 
obvious what is general. For a legisign the sign consists of a general idea and 
that’s what I think you’re talking about. (Correct me if I’m wrong) 

To your other point regarding determination, the sign can be indeterminate in 
terms of how it represents the object but the object could be any sort of 
object (firstness, secondness, thirdness). In all cases the sign would still be 
indeterminate. So I might signify a several elements of firstnesses. What 
objects is indeterminate and thus general even though the objects are not 
general. 

The nominalist view is that all general signs must ultimately refer to 
individual objects rather than real structures. Peirce allows the real 
structure to be the object independent of these other individual objects.  But 
for Peirce we must be able to signify both kinds of objects.

Of course Peirce’s notion of continuity entails that any sign can itself be 
broken up into further signs. So all this depends upon the type of analysis one 
is conducting.
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http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Thank you, Edwina (and you all, Jon, John...). I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so. Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the "mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, but consists of symbols of secondnesses: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an organism, a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was possible (firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a copy or token of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea. To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not ideas, but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible" possibility is everything). Or was there "nothing" in the beginning: In this case possibilities are ideas, planted into the nothing (by whom or what, Mr. Plato?), like in Platonism. I tend towards the Tohuvabohu-Hypothesis, and against Nominalism. My tentative attempt (to rescue Nominalism on the basis of universal mind) has failed, and I am happy about that.

Best,

Helmut

24. Januar 2017 um 16:07 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:

Helmut - further to your post, where you write

"if you believe that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part of an organism (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense?"

I'd say 'no' to that. I, myself, consider that the universe is an organism, a massive operation of 'Mind', but that's not nominalism.

Again, as Peirce pointed out in 1.16 - the question is, 'whether laws and general types are figments of the mind or real". As I mentioned in an earlier post, the Saussurian semiology is an example of a perspective that considers that general types are mental concepts. That is, since nominalism is expressed in symbols/words, then, information becomes almost entirely operative in the human realm. Plants, animals, cells, molecules..become inanimate or dumb matter.

And further, as Peirce noted, the great era of nominalism emerged in the 14th century, with the rise of the battle against the control of thought by the Church. That is, with the emergence of a market economy and middle class, the civic individual, i.e., the non-clerical working man, began to require the political and economic right to individually and personally 'handle' the environment. This 'handling' was all about 'the being of individual thing or fact' [1.21]. This new age man was not interested in the amorphousness of general laws outside of his direct actual grasp and personal perception.

Thus, the world of nominalism reduces everything to only one mode of being; that of Secondness, or existent particular objects. It ignores Firstness, that mode of being of isolate free possibility - or, if it acknowledges it, it is to transform this mode into an 'unconscious' psychological feeling within that new age man..which can then be brought into the consciousness by ..guess what...by words.

And most certainly, nominalism rejects Thirdness, the mode of being made up of general laws - since, for the nominalist, laws are not real in themselves but are intellectual constructs of the human mind"this general rule is nothing but a mere word or couple of words" [1.26].

When we reject nominalism for its obvious limitations, I think that we have to be careful with analyzing the two modal categories absent in nominalism; Firstness and Thirdness. These are modes of being, actual means of organizing matter, and can't be reduced to terms or words.

Edwina

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary F., List:

I acknowledge that I may be confused here, but how can a sign that is
general have an object that is *not *general?  My understanding is that all
concepts are legisigns/types, which requires that all of their objects are
collectives.  Are you suggesting that some concepts are qualisigns/marks or
sinsigns/tokens?  According to Peirce, the Universe of Necessitants
"includes whatever we can know by logically valid reasoning" (EP 2:479;
1908).  I take this as encompassing all real objects of concepts, since
Peirce held that there is nothing real that we cannot (in principle) come
to know.  Aaron Bruce Wilson makes a similar point in his recent book,
*Peirce's
Empiricism:  Its Roots and Its Originality*.

ABW:  ... if knowledge of reality is possible, then there must be real
generals.  [Peirce] argues:  "[S]ince no cognition of ours is absolutely
determinate, generals must have a real existence" (5.312/W2:239).  By "no
cognition of ours is absolutely determinate" I take him to mean that no *object
of cognition* is absolutely determinate ... Peirce argues that we can
cognize or represent only things possessing some indeterminate qualities
because if one were to cognize something determinate in *every* respect,
one would "have the material in each such representation for an infinite
amount of conscious cognition, which we yet never become aware of"
(5.305/W2:236).  For any given property, it seems that there is always some
further property that is a further determination of it ... At some point,
our minds simply fail to be powerful enough to represent any further
determination, and must leave some property indeterminate ... either the
properties of objects that we actually perceive are *not* real--and we have
no empirical knowledge of reality--or they are *real indeterminate
properties* or qualities and, thus, real generals. (pp. 63-64)

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 10:55 AM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
>
>
> Yes, all *conceptions* are general. Conceptions are signs. But that
> doesn’t mean that their *objects* are all general. An object is general
> to the degree that it is itself a conception. The truth of a proposition
> “essentially depends upon that proposition's not professing to be exactly
> true,” as Peirce said in *Baldwin’s Dictionary*. But again, that does not
> entail that the *object* of the proposition is general, only that its
> determination of the sign is incomplete. In these passages you’ve been
> quoting, Peirce does not say that the *object* of every sign is “ideal.”
> You seem to be confusing the necessary generality of the sign with the
> *possible* generality of the object.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 24-Jan-17 11:09
> *To:* Gary Fuhrman 
> *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
> Particular//Singular/Individual
>
>
>
> Gary F., List:
>
>
>
> I had in mind Peirce's contention that the *absolute *individual--something
> determinate in *every *conceivable respect--is an ideal limit, rather
> than a reality.
>
>
>
> CSP:  The logical atom, or term not capable of logical division, must be
> one of which every predicate may be universally affirmed or denied ... Such
> a term can be realized neither in thought nor in sense ... A logical atom,
> then, like a point in space, would involve for its precise determination an
> endless process. We can only say, in a general way, that a term, however
> determinate, may be made more determinate still, but not that it can be
> made absolutely determinate ... as those who have used the word *individual
> *have not been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has
> come to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870)
>
>
>
> CSP:  The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or
> thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any
> time, however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time
> it will undergo some change in its relations. But what does not exist for
> any time, however short, does not exist at all. *All, therefore, that we
> perceive or think, or that exists, is general.* So far there is truth in
> the doctrine of scholastic realism. *But all that exists is infinitely
> determinate, and the infinitely determinate is the absolutely individual.*
> This seems paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That
> which exists is the object of a true conception. This conception may be
> made more determinate than any assignable conception; and therefore it is
> never so determinate that it is capable of no further determination. (CP
> 3.93fn, emphasis added; 1870)
>
>
>
> The first bolded sentence affirms that every object of cognition is
> general to *some *degree.  As you wrote in chapter 4 of *Turning Signs*,
> "All concepts are general – that is, every concept is a sign applicable to
> many individual instances or members – but so

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-24 Thread gnox

Jon,

 

Yes, all conceptions are general. Conceptions are signs. But that doesn’t mean 
that their objects are all general. An object is general to the degree that it 
is itself a conception. The truth of a proposition “essentially depends upon 
that proposition's not professing to be exactly true,” as Peirce said in 
Baldwin’s Dictionary. But again, that does not entail that the object of the 
proposition is general, only that its determination of the sign is incomplete. 
In these passages you’ve been quoting, Peirce does not say that the object of 
every sign is “ideal.” You seem to be confusing the necessary generality of the 
sign with the possible generality of the object.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 24-Jan-17 11:09
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and 
Particular//Singular/Individual

 

Gary F., List:

 

I had in mind Peirce's contention that the absolute individual--something 
determinate in every conceivable respect--is an ideal limit, rather than a 
reality.

 

CSP:  The logical atom, or term not capable of logical division, must be one of 
which every predicate may be universally affirmed or denied ... Such a term can 
be realized neither in thought nor in sense ... A logical atom, then, like a 
point in space, would involve for its precise determination an endless process. 
We can only say, in a general way, that a term, however determinate, may be 
made more determinate still, but not that it can be made absolutely determinate 
... as those who have used the word individual have not been aware that 
absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has come to be used in a more 
general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870)

 

CSP:  The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or thought, 
but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any time, however 
short, is capable of logical division, because in that time it will undergo 
some change in its relations. But what does not exist for any time, however 
short, does not exist at all. All, therefore, that we perceive or think, or 
that exists, is general. So far there is truth in the doctrine of scholastic 
realism. But all that exists is infinitely determinate, and the infinitely 
determinate is the absolutely individual. This seems paradoxical, but the 
contradiction is easily resolved. That which exists is the object of a true 
conception. This conception may be made more determinate than any assignable 
conception; and therefore it is never so determinate that it is capable of no 
further determination. (CP 3.93fn, emphasis added; 1870)

 

The first bolded sentence affirms that every object of cognition is general to 
some degree.  As you wrote in chapter 4 of Turning Signs, "All concepts are 
general – that is, every concept is a sign applicable to many individual 
instances or members – but some are more general than others" 
(http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/bdy.htm).  If all concepts are general 
(legisigns/types), then all of their objects must also be general (collectives) 
in accordance with the rule of determination (EP 2:481; 1908).  The second 
bolded sentence explains in what sense "the totality of all real objects" is 
singular; it is "infinitely determinate," but this means that any assignable 
(i.e., actual) conception is always capable of further determination--again, 
general to some degree.

 

Regards,

 

Jon

 

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 9:07 AM, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

Jon, you’ve acknowledged the point that Gary R. made about your post (below) 
but I see another problem with it. You wrote, “If all objects of cognition are 
general, but no generals are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything 
real.” But Peirce does not say that all objects of cognition are general. All 
thought is in signs which, if factual, have the structure of a proposition, as 
he says in “New Elements.” All propositions include predicates which are 
general, but the objects of those signs (and thus of cognition) are not all 
general. In fact, as I quoted earlier, Peirce says that “the totality of all 
real objects” is a singular, not a general (EP2:209, CP 5:152), even though 
some of them (such as “second intentions”) may be generals.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
 ] 
Sent: 23-Jan-17 21:01
To: Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> >
Cc: kirst...@saunalahti.fi  ; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and 
Particular//Singular/Individual

 

Helmut, List:

 

Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any philosophical 
stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic."  However, my understanding is 
that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still is) whether there are any 
real generals--or as Pe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Agreed. This nominalism fits into, at least in the early centuries, the 
political and economic need of 'civic man' [i.e., the ordinary 
man-of-the-work force rather than the intelligentsia of the church and 
nobles]...to gain the right to interact with the objective world, one-on-one 
so to speak.


It was rapidly taken over by the intellectuals who moved its focus on the 
individual into postmodern relativism. That's where Saussure's semiology is 
dominant in endless explanations that 'this image' really has 'that 
meaning'.


But I think one has to be careful of one's approach to realism as well, 
where one can ignore the evolutionary nature of Peircean Thirdness [which 
posits that the laws are real but are not 'a priori' but are dynamic and 
emerge and adapt with the organisms]. A dangerous slip in thinking means 
that one will instead move into a kind of theistic a priori 
essentialism...which is what the nominalists were fighting against when they 
threw out 'the baby with the bathwater' so to speak. In this case, the laws 
become rigid and necessary and in an interesting sense, alienated from the 
matter/organism's existentiality. That's not Peircean Thirdness; it can be 
idealism; it can be theism.


Edwina


Edwina

Edwina
- Original Message - 
From: "John F Sowa" 

To: 
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2017 10:55 AM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism



On 1/24/2017 6:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Essentially, nominalism denies universals or common attributes have
reality in themselves; it considers them to be mere terms created
by man for these 'commonalities'.


Yes.  And one of the worst examples is its treatment of the laws
of science.  Rudolf Carnap, for example, had studied physics, and
he taught a course on the philosophy of science for many years.
In it, he repeated Ernst Mach's claim that the "laws of physics"
are merely "summaries of data".

Martin Gardner, who took Carnap's course at the U. of Chicago,
organized his notes in book form and got Carnap's permission,
comments, revisions, and approval to publish it.  It explicitly
states that the laws of science are "summaries of data".

Carnap, Rudolf (1966) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science,
edited by Martin Gardner, New York: Dover.

Einstein denounced the "Angst vor der Metaphysik" of Mach, Russell,
and the logical positivists.  He called Mach "a good experimental
physicist, but a miserable philosopher".  He admitted that Mach's
emphasis on experiment and observation was important.  But the idea
of observation led Einstein to his Gedanken experiments, which were
a brilliant *perversion* of Mach.

Peirce would have been delighted with Einstein's Gedanken experiments
because they are a further development of his ideas about diagrammatic
reasoning.

See the quotation below.  In writing that, Peirce was thinking about
David Hume and "advanced thinkers of the present day" (1894), such
as Ernst Mach and Karl Pearson.  In his _Grammar of Science_ (1892)
Pearson said "science is in reality a classification and analysis
of the contents of the mind... In truth, the field of science is
much more consciousness than an external world."

John
___

From CP 1.129

Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics
-- not by any means every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of
metaphysicians in scorn -- and you have found one whose doctrines are
thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with
which they are packed.

We must philosophize, said the great naturalist Aristotle -- if only
to avoid philosophizing.  Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has
to have one; and it will influence his life greatly.  Far better,
then, that that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed
to run loose.









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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

Gary F., List:

I had in mind Peirce's contention that the *absolute *individual--something
determinate in *every *conceivable respect--is an ideal limit, rather than
a reality.

CSP:  The logical atom, or term not capable of logical division, must be
one of which every predicate may be universally affirmed or denied ... Such
a term can be realized neither in thought nor in sense ... A logical atom,
then, like a point in space, would involve for its precise determination an
endless process. We can only say, in a general way, that a term, however
determinate, may be made more determinate still, but not that it can be
made absolutely determinate ... as those who have used the word *individual
*have not been aware that absolute individuality is merely ideal, it has
come to be used in a more general sense. (CP 3.93; 1870)

CSP:  The absolute individual can not only not be realized in sense or
thought, but cannot exist, properly speaking. For whatever lasts for any
time, however short, is capable of logical division, because in that time
it will undergo some change in its relations. But what does not exist for
any time, however short, does not exist at all. *All, therefore, that we
perceive or think, or that exists, is general.* So far there is truth in
the doctrine of scholastic realism. *But all that exists is infinitely
determinate, and the infinitely determinate is the absolutely individual.*
This seems paradoxical, but the contradiction is easily resolved. That
which exists is the object of a true conception. This conception may be
made more determinate than any assignable conception; and therefore it is
never so determinate that it is capable of no further determination. (CP
3.93fn, emphasis added; 1870)

The first bolded sentence affirms that every object of cognition is general
to *some *degree.  As you wrote in chapter 4 of *Turning Signs*, "All
concepts are general – that is, every concept is a sign applicable to many
individual instances or members – but some are more general than others" (
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/bdy.htm).  If all concepts are general
(legisigns/types), then all of their objects must also be general
(collectives) in accordance with the rule of determination (EP 2:481;
1908).  The second bolded sentence explains in what sense "the totality of
all real objects" is singular; it is "infinitely determinate," but this
means that any assignable (i.e., actual) conception is always capable of
further determination--again, general to *some *degree.

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Jan 24, 2017 at 9:07 AM,  wrote:

> Jon, you’ve acknowledged the point that Gary R. made about your post
> (below) but I see another problem with it. You wrote, “If all objects of
> cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we can have no
> knowledge of anything real.” But Peirce does not say that all objects of
> cognition are general. All thought is in signs which, if factual, have the
> structure of a proposition, as he says in “New Elements.” All propositions
> include *predicates* which are general, but the *objects* of those signs
> (and thus of cognition) are not all general. In fact, as I quoted earlier,
> Peirce says that “the totality of all real objects” is a singular, not a
> general (EP2:209, CP 5:152), even though some of them (such as “second
> intentions”) may be generals.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 23-Jan-17 21:01
> *To:* Helmut Raulien 
> *Cc:* kirst...@saunalahti.fi; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and
> Particular//Singular/Individual
>
>
>
> Helmut, List:
>
>
>
> Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any
> philosophical stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic."  However,
> my understanding is that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still
> is) whether there are any real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real
> continua.  This includes both qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both
> "may-bes" and "would-bes."  Peirce was especially concerned about any
> approach that would posit something as real yet incognizable, or as
> inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking the way of inquiry.
> If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals are real, then we
> can have no knowledge of anything real.  If there are no real laws of
> nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)

> On Jan 23, 2017, at 6:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Whenever Peirce wrote about "nothing" as the starting point of "everything," 
> he seemed to have this idea of "boundless possibility" in mind, which I 
> associate with the clean blackboard in his RLT diagram.  It is indeed a 
> non-traditional notion of "nothing," but I disagree with your assertion "that 
> Peirce’s cosmology ends up providing that God himself as something real also 
> emerges out of the same nothingness from which creation proceeds."
> 
> On the contrary, Peirce identified God as Ens necessarium in "A Neglected 
> Argument."  In several different drafts, he explicitly called God the 
> non-immanent Creator of all three Universes of Experience and everything in 
> them, without exception.  In other words, God made the blackboard and draws 
> all of the chalk marks on it.  This is perhaps most clearly evident in 
> Peirce's brief but fascinating analysis of Genesis 1:2-5, an account that he 
> attributed to a "Babylonian philosopher."

I’m not sure God as ens necessarium is opposed to what I outlined. At least I 
don’t quite see the contradiction. God isn’t immanent in that he is real but 
not actual for Peirce. 

As I said I think the break with Augustine oriented Christianity is rather 
profound. It isn’t just what the nothing ‘is’ but also the fact that God itself 
is under evolution.

I’m not arguing any of this as theology of course. I admit I find rather 
unconvincing Augustine styled Christianity even though I consider myself a 
Christian. Just noting that Peirce’s view here is very much at odds with 
creation ex nihilo.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

2017-01-24 Thread John F Sowa


On 1/24/2017 6:33 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Essentially, nominalism denies universals or common attributes have
reality in themselves; it considers them to be mere terms created
by man for these 'commonalities'.


Yes.  And one of the worst examples is its treatment of the laws
of science.  Rudolf Carnap, for example, had studied physics, and
he taught a course on the philosophy of science for many years.
In it, he repeated Ernst Mach's claim that the "laws of physics"
are merely "summaries of data".

Martin Gardner, who took Carnap's course at the U. of Chicago,
organized his notes in book form and got Carnap's permission,
comments, revisions, and approval to publish it.  It explicitly
states that the laws of science are "summaries of data".

Carnap, Rudolf (1966) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science,
edited by Martin Gardner, New York: Dover.

Einstein denounced the "Angst vor der Metaphysik" of Mach, Russell,
and the logical positivists.  He called Mach "a good experimental
physicist, but a miserable philosopher".  He admitted that Mach's
emphasis on experiment and observation was important.  But the idea
of observation led Einstein to his Gedanken experiments, which were
a brilliant *perversion* of Mach.

Peirce would have been delighted with Einstein's Gedanken experiments
because they are a further development of his ideas about diagrammatic
reasoning.

See the quotation below.  In writing that, Peirce was thinking about
David Hume and "advanced thinkers of the present day" (1894), such
as Ernst Mach and Karl Pearson.  In his _Grammar of Science_ (1892)
Pearson said "science is in reality a classification and analysis
of the contents of the mind... In truth, the field of science is
much more consciousness than an external world."

John
___

From CP 1.129

Find a scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics
-- not by any means every man who holds the ordinary reasonings of
metaphysicians in scorn -- and you have found one whose doctrines are
thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with
which they are packed.

We must philosophize, said the great naturalist Aristotle -- if only
to avoid philosophizing.  Every man of us has a metaphysics, and has
to have one; and it will influence his life greatly.  Far better,
then, that that metaphysics should be criticized and not be allowed
to run loose.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and Particular//Singular/Individual

2017-01-24 Thread gnox

Jon, you’ve acknowledged the point that Gary R. made about your post (below) 
but I see another problem with it. You wrote, “If all objects of cognition are 
general, but no generals are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything 
real.” But Peirce does not say that all objects of cognition are general. All 
thought is in signs which, if factual, have the structure of a proposition, as 
he says in “New Elements.” All propositions include predicates which are 
general, but the objects of those signs (and thus of cognition) are not all 
general. In fact, as I quoted earlier, Peirce says that “the totality of all 
real objects” is a singular, not a general (EP2:209, CP 5:152), even though 
some of them (such as “second intentions”) may be generals.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 23-Jan-17 21:01
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: kirst...@saunalahti.fi; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Universal/General/Continuous and 
Particular//Singular/Individual

 

Helmut, List:

 

Peirce had a tendency, especially late in his life, to label any philosophical 
stance with which he disagreed as "nominalistic."  However, my understanding is 
that the fundamental issue was (and presumably still is) whether there are any 
real generals--or as Peirce once put it, any real continua.  This includes both 
qualities (1ns) and habits (3ns); i.e., both "may-bes" and "would-bes."  Peirce 
was especially concerned about any approach that would posit something as real 
yet incognizable, or as inexplicable; he saw both of these moves as blocking 
the way of inquiry.  If all objects of cognition are general, but no generals 
are real, then we can have no knowledge of anything real.  If there are no real 
laws of nature, then predictable regularities are just brute facts.

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA


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[PEIRCE-L] nominalism

Helmut - further to your post, where you write
"if you believe that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part of 
an organism (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense?"

I'd say 'no' to that. I, myself, consider that the universe is an organism, a 
massive operation of 'Mind', but that's not nominalism.

Again, as Peirce pointed out in 1.16 - the question is, 'whether laws and 
general types are figments of the mind or real". As I mentioned in an earlier 
post, the Saussurian semiology is an example of a perspective that considers 
that general types are mental concepts. That is, since nominalism is expressed 
in symbols/words, then, information becomes almost entirely operative in the 
human realm. Plants, animals, cells, molecules..become inanimate or dumb 
matter. 

And further, as Peirce noted, the great era of nominalism emerged in the 14th 
century,  with the rise of the battle against the control of thought by the 
Church. That is, with the emergence of a market economy and middle class, the 
civic individual, i.e., the non-clerical working man, began to require the 
political and economic right to individually and personally 'handle' the 
environment. This 'handling' was all about 'the being of individual thing or 
fact' [1.21]. This new age man was not interested in the amorphousness of 
general laws outside of his direct actual grasp and personal perception.

Thus, the world of nominalism reduces everything to only one mode of being; 
that of Secondness, or existent particular objects. It ignores Firstness, that 
mode of being of isolate free possibility - or, if it acknowledges it, it is to 
transform this mode into an 'unconscious' psychological feeling within that new 
age man..which can then be brought into the consciousness by ..guess what...by 
words.

And most certainly, nominalism rejects Thirdness, the mode of being made up of 
general laws - since, for the nominalist, laws are not real in themselves but 
are intellectual constructs of the human mind"this general rule is nothing 
but a mere word or couple of words" [1.26].

When we reject nominalism for its obvious limitations, I think that we have to 
be careful with analyzing the two modal categories absent in nominalism; 
Firstness and Thirdness. These are modes of being, actual means of organizing 
matter, and can't be reduced to terms or words.

Edwina


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[PEIRCE-L] nominalism