subject:"\[PEIRCE\-L\] Laws of Nature as Signs"

 

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}Jon, list - yes, makes sense. Yes - I meant the internal Sign
triadAnd yes, the three correlates are in 'other Sign
relations'enables diversity

Edwina
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 On Thu 13/04/17  6:16 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose
ends' or blank forms -  which means, as I understand it, that it is
open to being filled by some subject.
 So far, so good.  The triadic Sign relation has three loose ends,
which are filled by three subjects--the Sign itself, the Dynamic
Object, and the Dynamic Interpretant. 
 ET:  So, the representamen as a predicate connects to the 'subjects'
of the Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to
its own nature in itself.
 We have agreed that the Representamen is part of the (internal)
triad that constitutes the Sign, so I am guessing that you meant Sign
here, since you went on to mention the (external) Dynamic Object and
Dynamic Interpretant.  The predicate is not the Sign  itself, but the
triadic Sign relation.  Again, the Sign itself is one of the three
subjects that are the correlates of that relation, the others being
the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant.
 ET:  That, to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is
the 'loose ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than
dyadic closure or monadic/medad closure. 
 Remember, the triad is internal to the Sign (Oi-R-Ii), rather than
external (Od-S-Id).  The interaction that you are rightly concerned
to maintain comes about because the three correlates are in other
triadic Sign relations, not just the specific one that we are
discussing in any particular case.  To show this, we would need to
incorporate these additional relations into the diagram; but it would
not take long for the resulting complexity to overwhelm our ability to
comprehend any  visual representation of what is happening.
 Put another way, every relation has a specific valency--e.g., three
for a triadic relation--but each correlate is effectively unlimited
in the number of relations that it can have.  I assume that is why
Peirce held that there are no absolute singulars in the sense of
being completely determinate in every conceivable respect; every
subject has infinitely many potential predicates.  Hence the openness
and diversity that your are seeking is not a property of the triadic
Sign  relation; instead, it reflects the capacity of subjects to
occupy any of the three spots (Sign, Dynamic Object, Dynamic
Interpretant)--or rather, all of the three spots with respect to
various other subjects.
 Does that make sense?
 Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a
few questions:

1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in
chemistry and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in
Robert's, p.115, he shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents
triadic spots'. And he explains that the definition of the rhema or
spot, which is the proposition [subject and predicate] - can be shown
by a line/tail and heavy dot, so to speak. A monad has one dot and an
open/loose end or tail. If you join two monads/spots you get closure,
i.e., no open ends.  A dyad has two open ends/tails but if you add
another, you'll get another dyad [which is the problem with
linearity]. But the triad - and the image is the same as that given
in 1.347- obviously, since Roberts is working from that section. [See
also Peirce 3.470]. I hope I've understood you correctly. 

2) I still don't see why this isn't an image of the semiosic triad.
The rhema is the proposition, i.e., a semiosic relation made up of a
subject and predicate. In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has
three 'loose ends' or blank forms -  which means, as I understand it,
that it is open to being filled by some subject. So, the representamen
as a predicate connects to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to
the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. That,
to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose
ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than dyadic
closure or monadic/medad closure. 

Now- what am I missing in this view?

Edwina
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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-13 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement:

I have made a mistake with my explaining a relation with itself: If there is a set that has a relation with itself, this relation is not a subset of all tupels possibly formed by any two elements of this set, but of the set that would be formed by all tupels of the set and a copy of this set, meaning:

A tupel may contain same elements, like in the relation "same size as": ((mouse,mouse), (dog,dog), (elephant, elephant)).

I am afraid, by this attempt to be correct, I only have confused you, so if so, ignore.

Jon, List,

You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller than", then the relation is ((mouse,dog), (mouse, elephant), (dog, elephant)). The dyadic relation is a subset of all couples (tupels) that can be formed out of the elements of the set. If you have two sets, then the dyadic relation is a subset of tupels, each containing one element from one set, and one from the other.

In the case of representamen relation, mathematics transferred, the one set is the representamen (or sign), and there are three possible relation reasons/relations: Qualisign, sinsign, legisign.

I think, that the "proper" kind of projectional reduction is applied by Ogden/Richards, but Peirce did it differently, for some reason, and he also, for some reason, used the term "sign" for both representamen and triad. I guess, because projectionally (in his way) reduced, there is no difference: In eg. "Rhematic indexical legisign" the first two words are adjectives, traits, of the legisign, the representamen.

About the dynamical object, the dynamical and final interpretant: They are, spatially and/or temporally, outside of the sign as irreducible triad. But not outside of the projectionally-reduced-to-dyads-sign. Because indication towards something located outside, and anticipation into the future may both be called projections, I guess. But I am just guessing all the time..

Best,

Helmut

13. April 2017 um 22:26 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in the past. He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a triadic relation that is "projectively reducible." I still wonder, though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications?

By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S). The reason why Peirce never discusses the (O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation. The first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

You wrote:

"To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations. Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that."

I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following:

A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for some triadic relations.

Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).

My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).

It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate.

Best,

Helmut

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

Edwina, List:

ET:  In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or
blank forms -  which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being
filled by some subject.

So far, so good.  The triadic Sign relation has three loose ends, which are
filled by three subjects--the Sign itself, the Dynamic Object, and the
Dynamic Interpretant.

ET:  So, the representamen as a predicate connects to the 'subjects' of the
Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to its own nature
in itself.

We have agreed that the Representamen is part of the (internal) triad
that *constitutes
*the Sign, so I am guessing that you meant Sign here, since you went on to
mention the (external) Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant.  The
predicate is not the Sign *itself*, but the triadic Sign *relation*.
Again, the Sign itself is one of the three *subjects* that are the *correlates
*of that relation, the others being the Dynamic Object and Dynamic
Interpretant.

ET:  That, to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the
'loose ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than dyadic
closure or monadic/medad closure.

Remember, the triad is *internal *to the Sign (Oi-R-Ii), rather than *external
*(Od-S-Id).  The interaction that you are rightly concerned to maintain
comes about because the three correlates are in *other *triadic Sign
relations, not just the specific one that we are discussing in any
particular case.  To show this, we would need to incorporate these *additional
*relations into the diagram; but it would not take long for the resulting
complexity to overwhelm our ability to comprehend any *visual *representation
of what is happening.

Put another way, every *relation *has a specific valency--e.g., three for a
triadic relation--but each *correlate *is effectively *unlimited *in the
number of relations that it can have.  I assume that is why Peirce held
that there are no absolute singulars in the sense of being completely
determinate in every conceivable respect; every subject has *infinitely
many* potential predicates.  Hence the openness and diversity that your are
seeking is not a property of the triadic Sign *relation*; instead, it
reflects the capacity of *subjects *to occupy *any *of the three spots
(Sign, Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant)--or rather, *all *of the three
spots with respect to various *other *subjects.

Does that make sense?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a few
> questions:
>
> 1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in chemistry
> and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in Robert's, p.115, he
> shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents triadic spots'. And he
> explains that the definition of the rhema or spot, which is the proposition
> [subject and predicate] - can be shown by a line/tail and heavy dot, so to
> speak. A monad has one dot and an open/loose end or tail. If you join two
> monads/spots you get closure, i.e., no open ends.  A dyad has two open
> ends/tails but if you add another, you'll get another dyad [which is the
> problem with linearity]. But the triad - and the image is the same as that
> given in 1.347- obviously, since Roberts is working from that section. [See
> also Peirce 3.470]. I hope I've understood you correctly.
>
> 2) I still don't see why this isn't an image of the semiosic triad. The
> rhema is the proposition, i.e., a semiosic relation made up of a subject
> and predicate. In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose
> ends' or blank forms -  which means, as I understand it, that it is open to
> being filled by some subject. So, the representamen as a predicate connects
> to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to the Dynamic
> Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. That, to me - shows
> the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose ends or blank forms
> which enable interactions rather than dyadic closure or monadic/medad
> closure.
>
> Now- what am I missing in this view?
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

2017-04-13 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List, Edwina
> On Apr 13, 2017, at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Now- what am I missing in this view?

I do not understand how your question(s) relate to the concept of identity. 

Perhaps if you can clearly state the premises and the conclusions of your 
arguments, I might be able to decipher your meaning.  

Perhaps you noted the distinction between figure 5 and 6 of Roberts. 
Figure 5 putatively relates three nouns in what one might call an ill-defined 
diagram that makes no linguistic sense to me.   “John gives John to John”  
The point of intersection of the lines apparently represents the verb “gives" 
What is the apperception of this sentence?  Is an appellation for this sentence 
structure known?  How does any logically apprehend this sentence?  How does 
this sentence appeal to one imagination iconically?  (And so forth…)

Figure 6 is the standard CHEMICAL representation of the ammonia molecule.  Each 
line that connects the pair of symbols, N—H, represents a chemical bond.  In 
figure 6, FOUR nouns are represented by the four chemical symbols, yet only 
THREE pairs of relations are shown for TWO types of atoms representing a SINGLE 
appellation for the “symbol”, which is an iconic perspective of the sinsign 
which is experience by the sign of its odor and the chemical argument is that 
an atom of valence three may combine with three atoms of valence one.  Note how 
remote this chemical argument is from that proposed for dicisigns by FS.

I could expound several other aspects of the figure, but the essential notion 
is that chemical sentences are vastly more complex than ordinary linguistic 
sentences.  Frankly, it is now my view that CSP’s noble attempt to capture the 
logic of chemistry was a dismal failure from a scientific point of view.  
Although more than a century has past since CSP past, the scientific community 
has focused on reducing chemical logic to mere physical terminology, ignoring 
the necessity for graphic representations of chemical structures as relations 
among the atomic numbers of the table of elements in order to construct the 
identity, such as “ammonia” is constructed from relations between nitrogen and 
hydrogen.  

Cheers

Jerry 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

2017-04-13 Thread John F Sowa


On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian Bed
essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in CSP’s
theory of logical graphs of relations?  Or, is a semantic explanation
possible?


Peirce published his algebraic notation for logic in 1885.
The greater flexibility of the 2-D surface allowed more notational
variants for existential graphs.  He discussed them in many pages
of MSS.  But I have never seen any example of an Alpha or Beta graph
that was inconsistent with a straightforward mapping to his 1885
notation.

Do you know of any examples for which there is an inconsistency?

If not, I would claim that the issues you raised concern various
19th century theories of chemistry.  That's an interesting subject
in itself, but I don't believe that it raises any questions that
are inconsistent with mapping any Alpha or Beta graph to the
algebraic notation.

For the Gamma graphs, there are many variations that raise complex
issues, but Peirce admitted that much of that work was tentative.
I believe that those issues are independent of any questions about
chemistry.

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

 
 Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a
few questions:

1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in
chemistry and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in
Robert's, p.115, he shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents
triadic spots'. And he explains that the definition of the rhema or
spot, which is the proposition [subject and predicate] - can be shown
by a line/tail and heavy dot, so to speak. A monad has one dot and an
open/loose end or tail. If you join two monads/spots you get closure,
i.e., no open ends.  A dyad has two open ends/tails but if you add
another, you'll get another dyad [which is the problem with
linearity]. But the triad - and the image is the same as that given
in 1.347- obviously, since Roberts is working from that section. [See
also Peirce 3.470]. I hope I've understood you correctly.

2) I still don't see why this isn't an image of the semiosic triad.
The rhema is the proposition, i.e., a semiosic relation made up of a
subject and predicate. In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has
three 'loose ends' or blank forms -  which means, as I understand it,
that it is open to being filled by some subject. So, the representamen
as a predicate connects to the 'subjects' of the Dynamic Object and to
the Dynamic Interpretant..and even, to its own nature in itself. That,
to me - shows the triad - but the key to this semiosis is the 'loose
ends or blank forms which enable interactions rather than dyadic
closure or monadic/medad closure.

Now- what am I missing in this view?

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 13/04/17  3:59 PM , Jerry LR Chandler
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent:
 List:
 (This post is rather technical and the contents may be intractably
perplex for many readers of this list.  One purpose of this post is
to crisply separate the fundamental philosophical concept of identity
from the mathematical concept of identity.  To differentiate CSP view
of lines of identity from classical views, see McGinn’s, Logical
Properties, 2000, OUP Chapter 1, p.1-14, Identity, for an overview of
one philosopher’s notion of “Identity" ) 
 On Apr 13, 2017, at 8:14 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote:
 But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean
some of Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight
acquaintance with existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at
1.347, the lines (Peirce calls them “tails” here) are lines of
identity each representing that  something exists. The relation is
represented in the graph by the labelled spot to which they are all
attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In propositional
terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three
subjects, (i.e. with a “valency” of three). To read the  lines in
the graph as relations is to misread the graph. The graph is itself a
diagrammatic sign, but there is no attempt to represent its object(s)
or its interpretant on the sheet of assertion. In fact, I have never
seen, anywhere in Peirce’s writings, an attempt to represent the
basic triadic sign relation in a single diagram. I think the reason
is simple:  thatkind of triadic relation cannot be represented that
way. But if someone can show me a text where Peirce has done that,
I’ll happily retract that claim.This would explain, by the way,
why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize' what 'one triadic Relation'
would look like or how it would function.” If you represent
relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent dyadic
relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of
(dyadic) relations.
 I think Gary’s conclusion is problematic because of the the way
CSP uses the concept of identity in chemistry as a basis for his
concept of identity in logic and / or mathematics.  
 First, a bit of historical context for the emergence of CSP’s view
of lines of identity in relation to concrete signs and symbols in
applied mathematics and graph theory.
  CSP's early writings (1860’s, 1870’s) were very accurate
representations of the facts of chemistry as they stood in his day. 
But, following the Karlsruhe  Conference of 1861(?), the
relationships between chemical symbols and chemical signs underwent
rapid development during the remainder of the  19 th Century with
three major changes. With the development the electrical structure of
atom (1913) and Quantum Chemistry (Schodinger, 1926), and Pauling’s
notion of the mechanics of the chemical bond, further profound
changes in the logic of chemistry emerged in the 20 th Century. 
 The three major changes following the 1860’s were:
 1. Acceptance of the concept of atom identities as separate units
conjoined by a chemical bond, forming the relations WITHIN molecules
with clear and distinct IDENTITIES different from atoms.
 2. Acceptance of the notion of

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-13 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, List,

In the case of representamen relation, mathematics transferred, the one set is the representamen (or sign), and there are three possible relation reasons/relations: Qualisign, sinsign, legisign.

Best,

Helmut

13. April 2017 um 22:26 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut, List:

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, List,

You wrote:

I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following:

Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).

My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).

Best,

Helmut

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Helmut, List:

That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms
that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in
the past.  He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a
triadic relation that is "projectively reducible."  I still wonder,
though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise
explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications?

By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first
guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S).  The reason why Peirce never discusses the
(O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation.  The
first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides
the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of
anything to itself is simply *identity*.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> You wrote:
> "To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely *triadic*, I
> have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the
> basis of one correlate and two *dyadic *relations.  Perhaps others on the
> List can shed some light on that."
>
> I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about
> relation reduction something like the following:
> A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot
> compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional
> reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of
> reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind
> of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for
> some triadic relations.
> Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to
> (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).
> My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction:
> (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).
> It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would
> say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the
> representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

ere
> Peirce uses them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into a
> scheme of our own invention.
>
>
>
> Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is
> something like  a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from
> this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image.” But in its
> context, that image is NOT a diagram of the S-O-I relation, the essential
> “sign relation.” That image is in fact an existential graph with three
> “tails.”
>
> The context, CP 1.343-9, is “From the “Lowell Lectures of 1903,” III, vol.
> 1, 3d Draught.” The larger context is the Lowell lectures (pieces of which
> are unfortunately scattered here and there in the CP) and the Syllabus
> which Peirce wrote to accompany them. The Syllabus of course includes the
> “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”, which ought to be the
> go-to text for Peirce’s explanation of the triadic relations involved in
> semiosis.
>
>
>
> But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean some of
> Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight acquaintance with
> existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at 1.347, the lines (Peirce
> calls them “tails” here) are lines of identity each representing that 
> something
> exists. The relation is represented in the graph by the labelled spot to
> which they are all attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In
> propositional terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three
> subjects, (i.e. with a “valency” of three). To read the lines in the
> graph as relations is to misread the graph. The graph is itself a
> diagrammatic sign, but there is no attempt to represent its object(s) or
> its interpretant on the sheet of assertion. In fact, I have never seen,
> anywhere in Peirce’s writings, an attempt to represent the basic triadic
> sign relation in a single diagram. I think the reason is simple: that
> kind of triadic relation cannot be represented that way. But if someone can
> show me a text where Peirce has done that, I’ll happily retract that claim.
>
>
>
> This would explain, by the way, why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize'
> what 'one triadic Relation' would look like or how it would function.” If
> you represent relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent
> dyadic relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of
> (dyadic) relations.
>
>
>
> Gary’s point about the time dimension is crucial here: existential graphs
> are “moving pictures of thought” in which semiosis is represented by
> transformations of the graphs. I think an attentive reading of CP 1.343-9
> should clarify why it is that the essential sign relation, and the
> Thirdness of semiosis, cannot be adequately represented in a single image.
> In that passage, Peirce is trying to give an experiential account of
> Thirdness and triadic relations to his audience. CP 1.345:
>
> “I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of
> quality and reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that
> every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a
> triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by
> means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to
> convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic
> relation involves meaning.”
>
>
>
> If anyone wants to study this passage from the Lowell lectures but doesn’t
> have access to the Collected Papers, let me know and I’ll provide you with
> a copy. Or post it here, if there’s enough interest. But I hope that at
> least those who do have access to CP will take a closer look at it.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
>
>
>
> Edwina, Jon S, List,
>
>
>
> First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I
> think the three pronged spoke does exactly represent a triadic relation,
> not three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node
> from which the three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.
>
>
>
> But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've
> discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and
> duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis.
>
>
>
> For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present
> anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in
> "Peirce's Logic of Information"
> <http://www.un

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?

2017-04-13 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List:

(This post is rather technical and the contents may be intractably perplex for 
many readers of this list.  One purpose of this post is to crisply separate the 
fundamental philosophical concept of identity from the mathematical concept of 
identity.  To differentiate CSP view of lines of identity from classical views, 
see McGinn’s, Logical Properties, 2000, OUP Chapter 1, p.1-14, Identity, for an 
overview of one philosopher’s notion of “Identity" ) 

> On Apr 13, 2017, at 8:14 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean some of 
> Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight acquaintance with 
> existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at 1.347, the lines (Peirce 
> calls them “tails” here) are lines of identity each representing that 
> something exists. The relation is represented in the graph by the labelled 
> spot to which they are all attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In 
> propositional terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three 
> subjects, (i.e. with a “valency” of three). To read the lines in the graph as 
> relations is to misread the graph. The graph is itself a diagrammatic sign, 
> but there is no attempt to represent its object(s) or its interpretant on the 
> sheet of assertion. In fact, I have never seen, anywhere in Peirce’s 
> writings, an attempt to represent the basic triadic sign relation in a single 
> diagram. I think the reason is simple: thatkind of triadic relation cannot be 
> represented that way. But if someone can show me a text where Peirce has done 
> that, I’ll happily retract that claim. 
>  
> This would explain, by the way, why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize' what 
> 'one triadic Relation' would look like or how it would function.” If you 
> represent relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent dyadic 
> relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of (dyadic) 
> relations.
> 
I think Gary’s conclusion is problematic because of the the way CSP uses the 
concept of identity in chemistry as a basis for his concept of identity in 
logic and / or mathematics.  

First, a bit of historical context for the emergence of CSP’s view of lines of 
identity in relation to concrete signs and symbols in applied mathematics and 
graph theory.

 CSP's early writings (1860’s, 1870’s) were very accurate representations of 
the facts of chemistry as they stood in his day.  But, following the Karlsruhe  
Conference of 1861(?), the relationships between chemical symbols and chemical 
signs underwent rapid development during the remainder of the  19 th Century 
with three major changes. With the development the electrical structure of atom 
(1913) and Quantum Chemistry (Schodinger, 1926), and Pauling’s notion of the 
mechanics of the chemical bond, further profound changes in the logic of 
chemistry emerged in the 20 th Century.

The three major changes following the 1860’s were:

1. Acceptance of the concept of atom identities as separate units conjoined by 
a chemical bond, forming the relations WITHIN molecules with clear and distinct 
IDENTITIES different from atoms.

2. Acceptance of the notion of Kekule’s aromatic compounds, benzene, etc. 
forming cyclic compounds, that is, chemical IDENTITIES with cyclic graphs. The 
concept of aromatic compounds also modified Dalton’s notion of valence of whole 
numbers to include fractional valences of ratios of numbers.  

3. Pasteur’s separation of molecules with IDENTICAL atomic identities into the 
optical isomers of D and L tartaric acid with separate physical IDENTITIES.  
The tetrahedral carbon atoms of tartaric acid must be fitted onto a Procrustean 
bed in order to maintain a triadic view of chemistry.  The fitting process is 
logically simple. Simply assert that four relations is a combination of three 
relations.  

This is his famous reduction hypothesis. 

It is critical to observed that:
the first of these is change in the meaning of chemical signs in relation to 
chemical symbols; 
the second of these is a fundamental abstraction about the relationship between 
atoms and geometry;
the third of these is a deep conundrum that DISASSOCIATES the symbol system of 
chemistry from the  symbol system of physics.
Thus, these three conceptual scientific break-throughs all extended the notion 
of chemical identity to aspects of graph theory. Were these concepts the origin 
of CSP’s views on the  supreme importance of identity in the logic of his “chef 
d’oeuvre"?

In Robert’s “The Existential Graphs of Charles S Peirce”, (1973) p. 25, Figures 
5 and 6, (3.469 and 4.561) two apodeictic representations of the forms of 
triadic relations are presented for scrutiny and analysis. The linguistic 
sentence "John gives John to John” is contrasted with the sentence of a logical 
graph for ammonia.

Is this an adroit usage of the procrustian bedding process to seduce the reader 
to believe that triadicity

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-13 Thread kirstima


John,

Thanks a lot! A most interesting post. I'll look up your paper.

Even though I have approached these questions from a  different angle , 
I wholly agree with your conlusion views on  the nature of thirds. And 
on the arguments offered  by Peirce. - It has seemed to me, too, that he 
did not solve these issues, but he pointed the ways on how to get on 
solving them.


I do lack expertice on the topics you deal with. Still, I have been 
groping  for undestanding the connections between triadic thinking, 
three-body problem & dissipative systems for a long time.


So,thanks & my very best regards,

Kirsti

John Collier kirjoitti 12.4.2017 23:45:

Three body problem is computable for any finite amount of time (like
all conservative systems). To get problems the end state must be
reached in a finite time. This can happen in dissipative systems.

There are many cases where you can’t even get approximate solutions,
though you can get probabilities of various solutions. For example,
Mercury is in a 3/2 rotation to revolution rate around the Sun. It was
expected to be 1:1 like the Moon around the Earth. A bit of a
surprise, since the 1-1 ratio is the lowest energy one. However,
everything near the 3/2 state is higher energy, so it is stable. Now
the interesting thig is that the boundaries between the attractors are
such that there are regions in which any two points in one attractor
has a point in the other attractor between them. So no degree of
accuracy of measurement can allow predicting which attractor the
system is in. So Frances Darwin’s explanation of why the Moon always
faces the Earth is incomplete, and can never be fully completed. There
is about 50% likelihood of 1-1 capture, 33% for 3-2 capture, and the
rest take up the remaining chances. Note that the end states aren’t
just a little bit different, but a lot different. Things get much more
complicated in evolution and development, where more factors are
involved. I argue that information dissipation (e.g., through death
eliminating genetic information) works the same way. I first published
on this as the first paper in the journal _Biology and Philosophy_ n
1986.

The main point is the problem is not one of our limited calculation
capacity. It holds in principle. Even Laplace’s demon, if they are
like a regular computer, but arbitrarily large, could not do the
calculations. Basically, there are far more functions that are not
Turing computable than are, and many of these give widely different
possible solutions. It’s really just another case of the number of
theorems being aleph 1, but the number of possible proofs is only
aleph 0.

I call systems like the Mercury –Sun system reductively explainable,
but not reductive. Physicalism is not violated, but reduction is not
possible. But we can get a good idea of what is going on, after the
fact (though our first guess in the Mercury-Sun case was wrong).

Personally, I think all thirds are of this nature, which is why they
can’t be reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments
convincing about the irreducibility.

John

FROM: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
 SENT: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
 TO: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
 SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs


On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za>
wrote:

Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not
computable, even in Newtonian mechanics.


Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things
like the three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking of
rather I was more thinking that any solution is approximate and the
errors can propagate in weird ways.

But that’s true of almost any real phenomena which is more complex
than we can calculate. It’s not just an issue of reduction although
it clearly manifests in the problem of reduction and emergence.



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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon - I see your point about what we have discussed is an INTERNAL
semiosis of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant. I agree with this - since they are all in the same
mode, then, I can understand its being ONE Relation split into three
sectors. BUT, the point is, that this Internal Triad is not all there
is to semiosis. If there were - then frankly, semiosis wouldn't
exist...nor would anything else [i.e., matter/concepts]. 

The point is that this strictly internal complexity is necessarily
linked to the external world, in the basic case: with a Dynamic
Object. And possibly generating a Dynamic Interpretant. It is this
image that I am considering is the three-spokes.

The trichotomies are not relevant to this; they are simply
sets-of-three modes.

I'd agree with your suggestion that the rheme/dicent/argument might
work with the Dynamic Interpretant - considering that the Final
Interpretant has a more powerful function 'in the future', so to
speak.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 13/04/17  9:40 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents
one triadic relation.  As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten
trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the
Sign to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP
2:483), which divides the Sign "As to the Nature of the Assurance of
the Utterance" (EP 2:490) into Instinct/Experience/Form.  Hence the
spokes themselves  are all in the same mode, even though the
correlates at their ends and the dyadic relations between those
correlates can be in different modes.
 By contrast, the three trichotomies of 1903 are for "the sign in
itself" as Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, "the relation of the sign to
its Object" as Icon/Index/Symbol, and how "its Interpretant
represents it" as Rheme/Dicent/Argument (EP 2:291-292).  Peirce
subsequently characterized the latter as "the Relation of the Sign to
the Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), but I have been suggesting
recently that it should be associated instead with the relation of
the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant. 
 To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I
have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on
the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others
on the List can shed some light on that.
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:

1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's
8.335,8.337 comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object,
Relations to the Interpretant..but the reason is that each of the
three 'spikes' so to speak, can be in a different modal category. So,
in a rhematic indexical legisign, the Representamen spoke can be in
Thirdness; the relation to the Dynamic Object in a mode of
Secondness; the relation to the Dy. Interpretant in a mode of
Firstness. That's why I refer to relations in the plural. These
interactions most certainly are NOT independent - and my use of the
plural of RelationS doesn't imply their independence. Instead, it
implies their modal differentiation within this singular semiosic
interaction.  

2) The problem I have with the linear image of the movement from DO
to DI...and Peirce often uses it, which is one relation with three
correlates, is that I also am interested in the morphological result
of the semiosis. Not simply in the passing of X via Y to Z. But the
physiological FORM.  That is - referring to my oft-quoted 4.551 'Mind
..in crystal, in the work of bees'...etc... I am considering that the
Sign, that triad, takes on a FORM. This FORM is the full Sign. So, a
cell - let's say a single cell - is the semiosic Form, a Sign. This
is the result of the interaction of the Representamen HABITS
interacting with many Dynamic Objects [water, nutrients, chemicals,
etc etc]...which are then transformed via the HABITS held within the
Representamen into the Dynamic Interpretant - that CELL. BUT - all
three parts of this whole FORM/SIGN must be operative in this
semiosic process:   The input from the various multiple Dynamic
Interpretants.transformed via the general rules held by the
Representamenresulting in the Dynamic Interpretant FORM of the
whole system...that particular cell. 

Edwina

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 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
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 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Wed 12/04/17  6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the
representamen alone? Or is it

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary F- thanks for your comments, but I disagree with your
explanation.

A dyad is between TWO existential entities. A Relation, such as
between the Representamen and the Interpretant is not between two
existential entities, but is an interaction that actually enables
both to function. Neither exists per se on their own - and therefore
- this is NOT a dyad. A dyadic interaction would be a rock hitting
the water. Two existential 'things'; rock and water. That is NOT a
RELATION.

I have said repeatedly that I do NOT consider these interactions to
be dyads. So - why keep bringing it up?

The Peircean 'spoke' is not a triad of dyadic interactions. But, to
me, a model showing how ONE semiosic process, the Sign [capital S]
functions as a whole within three - not one- but three Relations. The
Relation between the Representamen-Object; that between the
R-Interpretant; and the R in itself. Each of them can be in a
different categorical mode.

"Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic relationships and
three monadic characters" 6.331

BUT - "every triad is either monadically degenerate, dyadically
degenerate or geuine. A monadically degenerate triad is one which
results from the essence of three monads, its subjects" 1.473. NOTE -
this is what you, Gary F, seem to be suggesting - with your comments
on 'subjects'...

Peirce continues: "A dyadically degenerate triad is one which
results from dyads" 1.473. NOTE: This - is what you, Gary, seem to be
suggesting is my view.

Peirce continues: "A genuine triad is one which cannot be resolved
in any such way..." 1.473. NOTE: And the genuine triad introduces
the mediation of generalization among its interactors - and THIS is
what makes the triadic interaction 'genuine'.."the genuine triad
must involve generality" 1.477

Then, Peirce goes on to explain the nature of 'it involves a sign,
or representamen, of some kind outward or inward, mediating between
an object and an interpreting thought" 1.480.

And I referenced Peirce's writing on Relations - 8.335-7. I won't
repeat them.

My point is that the triad is a complex process of transformation of
information. That is why I cannot see it as ONE Relation but as a
complex one; of three Relations bonded irreducibly together.

Edwina
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http://www.primus.ca
On Thu 13/04/17 9:14 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R, Edwina, Jon S, list,
I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to
say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms
— especially what he means by a triadic relation — we need to
read them in the context where Peirce uses them, not lift them out of
their context and drop them into a scheme of our own invention.
Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which
is something like a three spoked umbrella: -

Links:
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List:

Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one
triadic relation.  As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten
trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign
to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), which
divides the Sign "As to the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" (EP
2:490) into Instinct/Experience/Form.  Hence the spokes *themselves *are
all in the *same *mode, even though the *correlates *at their ends and the
*dyadic* *relations *between those correlates can be in *different *modes.

By contrast, the three trichotomies of 1903 are for "the sign in itself" as
Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, "the relation of the sign to its Object" as
Icon/Index/Symbol, and how "its Interpretant represents it" as
Rheme/Dicent/Argument (EP 2:291-292).  Peirce subsequently characterized
the latter as "the Relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant" (EP
2:483), but I have been suggesting recently that it should be associated
instead with the relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant.

To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely *triadic*, I have
never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis
of one correlate and two *dyadic *relations.  Perhaps others on the List
can shed some light on that.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:
>
> 1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's 8.335,8.337
> comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object, Relations to the
> Interpretant..but the reason is that each of the three 'spikes' so to
> speak, can be in a different modal category. So, in a rhematic indexical
> legisign, the Representamen spoke can be in Thirdness; the relation to the
> Dynamic Object in a mode of Secondness; the relation to the Dy.
> Interpretant in a mode of Firstness. That's why I refer to relations in the
> plural. These interactions most certainly are NOT independent - and my use
> of the plural of RelationS doesn't imply their independence. Instead, it
> implies their modal differentiation within this singular semiosic
> interaction.
>
> 2) The problem I have with the linear image of the movement from DO to
> DI...and Peirce often uses it, which is one relation with three correlates,
> is that I also am interested in the morphological result of the semiosis.
> Not simply in the passing of X via Y to Z. But the physiological FORM.
> That is - referring to my oft-quoted 4.551 'Mind ..in crystal, in the work
> of bees'...etc... I am considering that the Sign, that triad, takes on a
> FORM. This FORM is the full Sign. So, a cell - let's say a single cell - is
> the semiosic Form, a Sign. This is the result of the interaction of the
> Representamen HABITS interacting with many Dynamic Objects [water,
> nutrients, chemicals, etc etc]...which are then transformed via the HABITS
> held within the Representamen into the Dynamic Interpretant - that CELL.
> BUT - all three parts of this whole FORM/SIGN must be operative in this
> semiosic process:   The input from the various multiple Dynamic
> Interpretants.transformed via the general rules held by the
> Representamenresulting in the Dynamic Interpretant FORM of the whole
> system...that particular cell.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Wed 12/04/17 6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen
> alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate
> Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object?
>
>
> I believe that our recent joint resolution to use "Sign" only for the
> internal Oi-R-Ii triad could go a long way toward clearing up this
> particular terminological difficulty.  The external Dynamic Object is not
> part of the Sign itself, it is something distinct that is in a single
> triadic relation with both the Sign and the external Dynamic Interpretant.
>
> ET:  My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation
> means. I can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is
> something like  a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from
> this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image.
>
>
> Lake Gary R., my understanding of that particular diagram is that its
> spokes do not correspond to three distinct relations; instead, it
> represents one triadic relation with three distinct subjects (correlates).
> The three-pronged shape is intended to convey that none of the correlates
> is in an independent relation with either of the other correlates; the triadic
> relation is not reducible to multiple dyadic relations.  The basic idea
> is the same as when

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-13 Thread gnox

Gary R, Edwina, Jon S, list,

 

I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to say (one more 
time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms — especially what he means 
by a triadic relation — we need to read them in the context where Peirce uses 
them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into a scheme of our own 
invention.

 

Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is something 
like  a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from this that there 
are THREE spokes or Relations in that image.” But in its context, that image is 
NOT a diagram of the S-O-I relation, the essential “sign relation.” That image 
is in fact an existential graph with three “tails.” 

The context, CP 1.343-9, is “From the “Lowell Lectures of 1903,” III, vol. 1, 
3d Draught.” The larger context is the Lowell lectures (pieces of which are 
unfortunately scattered here and there in the CP) and the Syllabus which Peirce 
wrote to accompany them. The Syllabus of course includes the “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations”, which ought to be the go-to text for Peirce’s 
explanation of the triadic relations involved in semiosis. 

 

But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean some of 
Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight acquaintance with 
existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at 1.347, the lines (Peirce calls 
them “tails” here) are lines of identity each representing that something 
exists. The relation is represented in the graph by the labelled spot to which 
they are all attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In propositional 
terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three subjects, (i.e. 
with a “valency” of three). To read the lines in the graph as relations is to 
misread the graph. The graph is itself a diagrammatic sign, but there is no 
attempt to represent its object(s) or its interpretant on the sheet of 
assertion. In fact, I have never seen, anywhere in Peirce’s writings, an 
attempt to represent the basic triadic sign relation in a single diagram. I 
think the reason is simple: that kind of triadic relation cannot be represented 
that way. But if someone can show me a text where Peirce has done that, I’ll 
happily retract that claim. 

 

This would explain, by the way, why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize' what 
'one triadic Relation' would look like or how it would function.” If you 
represent relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent dyadic 
relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of (dyadic) 
relations.

 

Gary’s point about the time dimension is crucial here: existential graphs are 
“moving pictures of thought” in which semiosis is represented by 
transformations of the graphs. I think an attentive reading of CP 1.343-9 
should clarify why it is that the essential sign relation, and the Thirdness of 
semiosis, cannot be adequately represented in a single image. In that passage, 
Peirce is trying to give an experiential account of Thirdness and triadic 
relations to his audience. CP 1.345:

“I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of 
quality and reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that every 
genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a triadic 
relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by means of 
dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to convince 
yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic relation involves 
meaning.”

 

If anyone wants to study this passage from the Lowell lectures but doesn’t have 
access to the Collected Papers, let me know and I’ll provide you with a copy. 
Or post it here, if there’s enough interest. But I hope that at least those who 
do have access to CP will take a closer look at it.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
To: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 

Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think the 
three pronged spoke does exactly represent a triadic relation, not three 
relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from which the 
three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.

 

But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've 
discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and 
duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis. 

 

For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present 
anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in 
"Peirce's Logic of Information" http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html 
(a paper, btw, which I find both intriguing, but have some reservations 
about--but not regardin

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread John Collier

Three body problem is computable for any finite amount of time (like all 
conservative systems). To get problems the end state must be reached in a 
finite time. This can happen in dissipative systems.

There are many cases where you can’t even get approximate solutions, though you 
can get probabilities of various solutions. For example, Mercury is in a 3/2 
rotation to revolution rate around the Sun. It was expected to be 1:1 like the 
Moon around the Earth. A bit of a surprise, since the 1-1 ratio is the lowest 
energy one. However, everything near the 3/2 state is higher energy, so it is 
stable. Now the interesting thig is that the boundaries between the attractors 
are such that there are regions in which any two points in one attractor has a 
point in the other attractor between them. So no degree of accuracy of 
measurement can allow predicting which attractor the system is in. So Frances 
Darwin’s explanation of why the Moon always faces the Earth is incomplete, and 
can never be fully completed. There is about 50% likelihood of 1-1 capture, 33% 
for 3-2 capture, and the rest take up the remaining chances. Note that the end 
states aren’t just a little bit different, but a lot different. Things get much 
more complicated in evolution and development, where more factors are involved. 
I argue that information dissipation (e.g., through death eliminating genetic 
information) works the same way. I first published on this as the first paper 
in the journal Biology and Philosophy n 1986.

The main point is the problem is not one of our limited calculation capacity. 
It holds in principle. Even Laplace’s demon, if they are like a regular 
computer, but arbitrarily large, could not do the calculations. Basically, 
there are far more functions that are not Turing computable than are, and many 
of these give widely different possible solutions. It’s really just another 
case of the number of theorems being aleph 1, but the number of possible proofs 
is only aleph 0.

I call systems like the Mercury –Sun system reductively explainable, but not 
reductive. Physicalism is not violated, but reduction is not possible. But we 
can get a good idea of what is going on, after the fact (though our first guess 
in the Mercury-Sun case was wrong).

Personally, I think all thirds are of this nature, which is why they can’t be 
reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments convincing about the 
irreducibility.

John

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
To: Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs


On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier 
<colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even 
in Newtonian mechanics.

Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the 
three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking of rather I was more 
thinking that any solution is approximate and the errors can propagate in weird 
ways.

But that’s true of almost any real phenomena which is more complex than we can 
calculate. It’s not just an issue of reduction although it clearly manifests in 
the problem of reduction and emergence.





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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, Jon S, List,

First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think
the three pronged spoke *does *exactly represent a triadic relation, not
three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from
which the three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.

But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've
discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and
duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis.

For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present
anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in
"Peirce's Logic of Information"
http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html (a paper, btw, which I find
both intriguing, but have some reservations about--but not regarding the
present point). De Tienne comments and then quotes Nadin, who here
concentrates on 'anticipation' and Peirce's notion of 'final cause' (and
teleology).

In a remarkable programmatic paper titled "Anticipation: A Spooky
Computation" Mihai Nadin has written that "every sign is in anticipation of
its interpretation". He explains (NADIN 2000: §5.1.1):

Signs are not constituted at the object level, but in an open-ended
infinite sign process (semiosis). In sign processes, the arrow of time can
run in both directions: from the past through the present to the future, or
the other way around, from the future to the present. Signs carry the
future (intentions, desires, needs, ideals, etc., all of a nature different
from what is given, i.e., all in the range of a final cause) into the
present and thus allow us to derive a coherent image of the universe.
Actually […], a semiosis is constituted in both directions: from the past
into the future, and from the future into the present, and forward into the
past. […] The two directions of semiosis are in co-relation. In the first
case, we constitute understandings based on previous semiotic processes. In
the second, we actually make up the world as we constitute ourselves as
part of it. This means that the notion of sign has to reflect the two
arrows.

De Tienne's comments just following this quotation relate directly to a
consideration of the nature of the growth of symbols (" as having the
nature of a law, symbols are partly general, partly vague enunciations of
what *could* happen in the future given certain antecedent conditions that
they spell out to some degree"), as I remarked in an earlier post. Thus
they have this living quality--"symbols grow" Peirce says.

Anticipation is a process through which the representation of a future
state determines a present semiotic event, and this implies a teleological
dimension, not of an Aristotelian, but of a Peircean kind. Put briefly, one
simply needs to remember that for Peirce every symbol is teleological in
the sense that, being preoccupied with its own development into new
interpretants, some of which are dynamic and thus anchored in an experience
they modify, it adopts a conditional (would-be) form that orients it toward
the future.

As legisigns, thus as having the nature of a law, symbols are partly
general, partly vague enunciations of what *could* happen in the future
given certain antecedent conditions that they spell out to some degree.
Such an evolving, self-correcting outlook toward the likely future is
structurally embedded within symbols and distinguishes them from other
types of signs. In addition, all symbols are signs that seek to "replicate"
themselves, since there is no law that governs no event. Replicated symbols
are a special kind of sinsigns: they are rule-bound semiotic events whose
instantiation occurs under the rule’s guidance. Each instantiation thus
anticipates the rule that it replicates, and in doing so it anticipates the
future: the instantiation takes it into account, and thus is determined by
it, although that determination is, as Nadin says, in the range of a final
cause rather than of an efficient cause.

Semiotic events are vectorized, they happen not at random but within an
inferential continuum that ensures that propositions that conclude
arguments, especially ampliative ones, become themselves premises to new
arguments, in the same way as any symbolic sign has first been an
interpretant before serving as a sign solicitor of new signs.

And recall that while Nadin is especially concerned with the symbol in the
passage quoted above, he's written that " "every sign is in anticipation of
its interpretation," or, better, its interpretant.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 4:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years -  where I think that
> there are three relations rather than one triadic relation.
>
> A

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Edwina Taborsky

  BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }see
my comments
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
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 On Wed 12/04/17  1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 1) ET:  BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE
SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this
internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way
- although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as
'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.
 Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate
Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when
making the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and
we now agree that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute
the Sign.  As such, I am inclined to think of them as more analytic
than actual; specifically, as constraints on  how the Sign can
represent its Dynamic Object and determine a Dynamic Interpretant.
 EDWINA: Agreed - more analytic than actual. And agreed, acting as
constraints on HOW the Sign [that internal triad] represents the DO
and determines the DI. But, as constraints - isn't there an aspect of
ACTUAL force/behaviour - within the constraint? 
 2) ET:  As to your last question - I think I see what you are
talking about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more
unpacking.
 Probably so.  Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close
synonym of "predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for
what it means to say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a
relation is a Sign.
 EDWINA: A law is a habit; i.e., operative in Thirdness. I can see
this as a predicate, for 'a proposition can have any number of
subjects but can have but one predicate which is invariably general"
5.151..But what about: ."the interpretant of a proposition is its
predicate" 5.474. This moves the laws, so to speak, which I have
located in the Representamen - to the Interpretant! So- I have no
idea...for I  tend to see the Interpretant as a result of the actions
of the Laws.
 Thanks,
 Jon S. 
 On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list

1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where
are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a
cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and
its interactions with other cells - are, as I understand it,
operative within  Thirdness and  carried within the Representamen.

So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it
for now.

2) I agree with your second paragraph.  - just a few quibbles.. 

JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was
that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the
(internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense
as the first correlate of a  triadic relation in which the Dynamic
Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external)
correlates, such that every Sign  must be determined by a Dynamic
Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the
same page here?"

EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE
SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this
internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way
- although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as
'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.  I agree with
its being the first correlate of a  larger triadic Set, made up of
the other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal
triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad,
as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them
open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the
Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but
not necessarily doing so.

So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble
with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and
probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able
to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the
three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal
bond. 

3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking
about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.

Edwina

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 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

ET:  BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three
irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as
made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is
so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual relations';
i.e., not as THREE Relations.


Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate
Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when making
the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and we now agree
that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute the Sign.  As such,
I am inclined to think of them as more analytic than actual; specifically,
as constraints on *how *the Sign *can *represent its Dynamic Object and
determine a Dynamic Interpretant.

ET:  As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about -
but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.


Probably so.  Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close synonym of
"predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for what it means to
say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a relation is a Sign.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are
> these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its
> habits, which function to mould its material content and its interactions
> with other cells - are, as I understand it, operative within  Thirdness and
>  carried within the Representamen.
>
> So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it for now.
>
> 2) I agree with your second paragraph.  - just a few quibbles..
>
> JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that
> going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad
> of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we
> would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a 
> triadic
> relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the
> other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined
> by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
> Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the same
> page here?"
>
> EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of
> three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal
> triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the
> bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual
> relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.  I agree with its being the first
> correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the other two external
> correlates in addition to this basic Internal triad. These two external
> correlates are not bonded within the triad, as the interactions are within
> the Internal Triad. That leaves them open. I agree with the necessary
> determination of the DO, and the Sign [that internal triad] being capable
> of determining a DI - but not necessarily doing so.
>
> So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble with
> that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and probably
> operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able to
> differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the three
> 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant] can have
> any actuality except within that internal bond.
>
> 3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about -
> but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and
> associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.
>
> My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going
> forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of
> Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would
> always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic
> relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the
> other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined
> by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
> Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the same
> page here?
>
> My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign
> from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation.  Every
> Sign has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external
> (Od-S-Id).  We also sometimes talk about

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list

1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where
are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a
cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and
its interactions with other cells - are, as I understand it,
operative within  Thirdness and  carried within the Representamen.

So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it
for now.

2) I agree with your second paragraph.  - just a few quibbles..

JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was
that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the
(internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense
as the first correlate of a  triadic relation in which the Dynamic
Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external)
correlates, such that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic
Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the
same page here?"

EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE
SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this
internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way
- although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as
'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.  I agree with
its being the first correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the
other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal
triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad,
as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them
open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the
Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but
not necessarily doing so.

So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble
with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and
probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able
to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the
three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal
bond.

3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking
about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation"
and associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.
 My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that
going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal)
triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant;
and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first
correlate of a  triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and
Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such
that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every
Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might
never actually do so).  Are we still on the same page here?
 My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a
Sign from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation. 
Every Sign  has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and
external (Od-S-Id).  We also sometimes talk about "the Sign
relation," usually meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign,
Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three correlates. 
What I am asking now is whether there is such a thing as a Sign that
is itself a relation.
 Thanks,
 Jon S.  
 On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on
the terminology.

For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen,
which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the
habits developed within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of
Firstness or Secondness]. 

I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object
can be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential.
But, it remains a triad. 

And - what does the term relation mean? 

So- "can a relation be a Sign'?  It depends what you mean by each
term. 

For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the
semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I
consider that there are three key relations within the triad; that
between the R-O; between the  R-I,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Clark Goble

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> I'm guessing an engineer would have some acquaintance with
> relational databases, which have after all a history going
> back to Peirce, and I would recommend keeping that example
> in mind for thinking about k-adic relations in general.

I didn’t know that. Was the computer science that developed relational 
databases engaging with Peirce explicitly? Any good place to get a primer on 
that history?

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Clark Goble

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> CG
>> I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t
>> reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the
>> reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think
>> more carefully about the type of descriptions they make.
> 
> You could say the same about "reducing" meteorology to computational
> physics.  Weather predictions today are far more reliable than they
> were 50 years ago.  But it's good to have an alternate date when
> you're planning a picnic.

Yes that’s the exact way I think about it. It’s a practical issue not a 
metaphysical one. Further non-linear dynamics (not always at work) can make 
some reductions as difficult as some predictions. A little error can sometimes 
spiral out of control such as with a double pendulum.

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and
associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.

My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going
forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) *triad *of
Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would
always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a *triadic
relation* in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other
two (external) correlates, such that every Sign *must *be determined by a
Dynamic Object, and every Sign is *capable *of determining a Dynamic
Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the same
page here?

My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign
from a logical standpoint as a *subject*, rather than a relation.  Every
Sign *has *relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external
(Od-S-Id).  We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation," usually
meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign, Dynamic Object, and Dynamic
Interpretant are the three correlates.  What I am asking now is whether
there is such a thing as a Sign that *is itself *a relation.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on the
> terminology.
>
> For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen, which I
> consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the habits developed
> within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of Firstness or
> Secondness].
>
> I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object can
> be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential. But, it
> remains a triad.
>
> And - what does the term relation mean?
>
> So- "can a relation be a Sign'?  It depends what you mean by each term.
>
> For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the semiosic
> process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I consider that there
> are three key relations within the triad; that between the R-O; between
> the  R-I, and the Representamen in itself. The Representamen -in-itself is,
> in my view, a Relation, seeking out its habits of organization and linking
> them to the object and transforming them into the interpretant.
>
> So- at first thought, I'd say that A single relation can't be a Sign,
> since the Sign requires a networked set of triadic Relations.
>
> But  - is a law of Nature a Relation I'd say, yes, since the Law of Nature
> operates as the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Wed 12/04/17 10:14 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List:
>
> I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, Peirce's
> Empiricism:  Its Roots and Its Originality, via interlibrary loan this
> week.  Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I
> could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading.  He points out
> in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a relation, which leads me to pose a
> new question--can a relation be a Sign?  Again, I am referring to the
> relation itself, not its representation in verbal, diagrammatic, or other
> form.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-12 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

List:

I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, *Peirce's
Empiricism:  Its Roots and Its Originality*, via interlibrary loan this
week.  Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I
could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading.  He points out
in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a *relation*, which leads me to pose a
new question--can a relation be a Sign?  Again, I am referring to the
relation *itself*, not its representation in verbal, diagrammatic, or other
form.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-11 Thread kirstima


Jon A.,

I was attepting to express as understandably as possible. To offer 
answers to your quest for exactness would take more time than I have at 
my disposal. - Sorry for that!!


Best,

Kirsti

Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 10.4.2017 21:44:

Kirsti, List:

I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified,
but not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do.  On the
contrary, I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one
in particular--which is why I sought input from the List.

"Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the
future, but it obviously does not include any other universes or
"Platonic worlds."

How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an
sich'?  What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out
of" it?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]

On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:29 AM,  wrote:


Jon,

The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. -
If you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of
signs, and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.

"Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws of
nature". The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will
happen (if so and so...). So they are about the future, just as
well.

It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the
Kantian question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. -
There is no short and simple way!
That much is shown beyond doubt by today.

Best, Kirsti Määttänen



Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

2017-04-10 Thread John F Sowa


On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical
sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems.


I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable
than most systems in nature, but that is only a matter of degree.

Every element that occurs in nature occurs as a mixture of isotopes.
Every chemical reaction depends on quantum mechanical effects, and
the different masses of various isotopes shift the probabilities
of side effects for different isotopes.

When you add the uncertainty principle as a fundamental limit
on measurements, chemical sentences have nothing special to
offer "as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems."

I agree with Wittgenstein that natural languages are a better
model for communication than any artificial notation -- including
chemical notation.  I also believe that Frank Ramsey, whom LW
credited with the insights that led him to develop his later
philosophy, had conveyed some Peircean insights in the discussions
they had in the late 1920s.

I also believe that Peirce himself would have approved of the
general direction that LW pursued in his debates with Alan Turing
in the late 1930s.  (But I'm sure that CSP would have added much
more to that debate, if he could have been present.)

My claim (which I believe is compatible with the writings of
both LW and CSP):

 1. Every artificial notation that anyone has ever invented
is a language game (Sprachspiel) whose symbols may be
interpreted as abbreviations for words or phrases in
at least one natural language.

 2. The moves (syntactic and semantic transformations) in
any such language game may be explained and taught by
the same methods as those used to describe any NL.

 3. Because of points #1 and #2, any statement in any
artificial notation can be translated to a statement
in a natural language that is just as precise as the
version in the artificial notation -- however, the NL
translation is likely to be much more verbose.

 4. Because of points #1, #2, and #3, I believe that any
artificial language may be viewed as a specialized
language game whose rules and symbols are a stylized
(abbreviated and rigidified) version of a natural language.

I believe that the notation of chemistry is a fine example
that could be used to illustrate these principles.  But there
are many other notations that would also be good examples.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-10 Thread Clark Goble

> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?  
> What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?

I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While Peirce does have the 
index, he doesn’t require firm ground to use the index. It’s signs all the way 
down due to the way he conceives of signs. 

> "Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future, 
> but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds."

Not sure what you mean by that. 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-10 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Kirsti, List:

I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but
not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do.  On the contrary,
I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in
particular--which is why I sought input from the List.

"Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future,
but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds."

How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?
What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:29 AM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
> presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you
> look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and
> you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.
>
> "Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws  of nature".
> The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if so
> and so...). So they are about the future, just as well.
>
> It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian
> question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no short
> and simple way!
> That much is shown beyond doubt by today.
>
> Best, Kirsti Määttänen

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

2017-04-10 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jerry, List,

did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only for them. But, as Gary wrote, it is possible to assume, that there is always a representation, if not by humans, then by "some vast consciousness", which is "a Deity relatively to us". Peirce called it "Quasi-mind of the universe". So- problem about the incomprehensibility of "thing in itself" solved.

So why did you write, that the ""laws of nature"...are a product of the human mind"? They can also be a product of the universe´s mind, I guess, otherwise there would not have been planets before there have been humans. Other than the human representations of the laws of nature, they are a product of the human mind. Oh, I see: You wrote ""laws of nature"", in quotation marks, and these quotation marks indicate, that a representation of the human mind is meant, so your statement is correct.

Did I get it right?

Best,

Helmut

10. April 2017 um 17:46 Uhr
Von: "Jerry LR Chandler"

List:

The following quote deserves rigorous study. It is deeply relevant to three critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:

1. issues that relate realism to idealism

2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and

3. issues that relate the sciences to the relationships between reality and mathematics.

(Thanks to Gary for posting this quotes from the Harvard lecture (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):

On Apr 8, 2017, at 4:17 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.”

A literal interpretation of EP2:184, CP 5.106-7 is as follow:

All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol.

The “laws of nature” as well as the symbols of mathematics are a product of the human mind. The existence of the formula is expressed in symbol systems generated as descriptions of thoughts and observations. The formula is only one possible representation among all possible representations of a thing. Thus, the second sentence can be thought of as the inverse order of CSP’s earlier assertion regarding “thing, representation, form.” This is the basis of scientific realism and the development of the logic of the natural sciences. Note that the distinction between the laws of physics and the habits of chemistry is missing!

An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.

The second part of this sentence:

thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.

focuses on the absence of “representation” in the concept of a thing.

Things, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to create symbols and to create a symbolic logic.

In particular, mathematical symbols are “utterly foreign” to things.

Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.

The contrast is between the general formulas of mathematics and the "the principle of individuation”. This “utter foreign”ness persists today.

Two deep consequences follow from these assertions.

The critical importance of this clear and crisp distinction between the “general” and the "the principle of individuation” lies in the nature of empirical observations.

1. Empirical observations can only be made on specific objects. Consequently, any generalization to mathematical symbols

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-10 Thread Clark Goble

> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have
> exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
> and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).
> 
> The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from
> all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject
> to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental
> (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming
> themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water).
> 
> Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions
> of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some
> of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health.

This seems right, although the word vague in a Peircean sense might not quite 
fit. I think not well defined is a better way to put it.

I especially like the point you and Kirstima make about non-human cells. Our 
body is very much a symbol in a certain sense that when examined closely does 
not have the type of unity we like to imagine. Even ignoring the issue of the 
human biome, we’re finding that even the DNA of our food can end up in odd 
places of our body, potentially interacting in more complex ways than we can 
yet determine. In the bodies of mothers the remnants of their children’s DNA 
can remain and have effects. Lines become blurry and complex. Even the very 
notion of inside and outside fail us. (Is the digestion system ‘inside’ and if 
so when?)

> Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl)
> rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are
> organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms
> of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions.

And the very notion of atoms and molecules when examined more technically is 
better seen as a quantum field which is itself a type of potentiality.

We simplify both because we have to in order to reason about these things, but 
also because our simplifications work most of the time. Even if we could create 
a gigantic complex Hamiltonian to express the field of salt crystal, it 
wouldn’t necessarily help us.

> I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
> But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first
> quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness
> (purpose, goals, or intentions).

I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t reducible to 
chemistry or physics. Although for all the problems philosophy of science 
created here in the 50’s through 70’s attempting to make the reduction, I think 
it did perhaps help in getting biologists to think more carefully about the 
type of descriptions they make.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

2017-04-10 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

List:

The following quote deserves rigorous study.  It is deeply relevant to three 
critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:
1. issues that relate realism to idealism 
2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and
3. issues that relate the sciences to the relationships between reality and 
mathematics. 

 (Thanks to Gary for posting this quotes from the Harvard lecture  (EP2:184, CP 
5.106-7):

> On Apr 8, 2017, at 4:17 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
> matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An 
> existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all 
> generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general 
> formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be 
> of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least 
> constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we 
> have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the 
> scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were 
> obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that 
> the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast 
> consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to 
> us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely 
> philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by 
> analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination 
> it is of any particular scientific service.”
>  

A literal interpretation of EP2:184, CP 5.106-7 is as follow:

> All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
> matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol.

The “laws of nature” as well as the symbols of mathematics are a product of the 
human mind.  The existence of the formula is expressed in symbol systems 
generated as descriptions of thoughts and observations.  The formula is only 
one possible representation among all possible representations of a thing.  
Thus, the second sentence can be thought of as the inverse order of CSP’s 
earlier assertion regarding “thing, representation, form.”  This is the basis 
of scientific realism and the development of the logic of the natural sciences. 
 Note that the distinction between the laws of physics and the habits of 
chemistry is missing!   

> An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all 
> generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.

The second part of this sentence: 

>  thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is 
> utterly foreign.

focuses on the absence of “representation” in the concept of a thing.  
Things, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to create symbols and to create 
a symbolic logic. 
In particular, mathematical symbols are “utterly  foreign” to things. 

> Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the 
> scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were 
> obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.

The contrast is between the general formulas of mathematics and the "the 
principle of individuation”.  This “utter foreign”ness persists today. 

Two deep consequences follow from these assertions.  

The critical importance of this clear and crisp distinction between the 
“general” and the "the principle of individuation” lies in the nature of 
empirical observations. 
1.  Empirical observations can only be made on specific objects.  Consequently, 
any generalization to mathematical symbols requires judgments and substitution 
of mathematical symbols for symbols representing “things”
2. "the principle of individuation” plays a fundamentally different role in the 
physical and chemical sciences in the following sense, a sense which a 
consequence of the representation of things. (CSP ignores the physical concept 
of mass!) The table of chemical elements represents individual forms of matter, 
each form of matter carries intrinsic physical assets of mass and electricity. 
The compositions of matter (molecules, cells, organisms, human bodies,…, 
planets,…,???)  are directly reducible to the individual members of the 
chemical table of elements. "the principle of individuation” is applicable to 
all compositions of individuals.  Generality in the sense of mathematical 
symbols infers the loss of individuality.  For examples, the mathematical 
terms, such as token, type and category are “utterly foreign" to the concept of 
individuality. 

A direct pragmatic consequence of "the principle of individuation” is the 
language of chemistry.  Each unique molecule must be assigned a specific name 
that represents the thing itself.  Each and every atom in the molecular formula

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-10 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think
that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of
these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness.
That is, complexity, which operates via both  differentiations and
commonalities, is a key factor in the ability of the universe to
prevent entropy. 

Therefore, the development of differentiation of Form, which implies
boundaries to that Form, and a severance of This from That, and thus
enables Secondness, is a reality in our universe. Just as is the
vagueness of Firstness and the commonalities of Thirdness.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sun 09/04/17  9:41 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, 
 Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.

 There is a continuum.  The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp 
 boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's 
 atmosphere).  The borders of living things are an intermediate case.

 HR 
 > In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin
surface. 
 The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have 
 exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) 
 and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). 
 The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from 
 all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject 
 to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental 
 (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming 
 themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water). 
 Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions

 of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some 
 of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health. 
 HR 
 > I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous)

 > by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily... 
 Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk. 
 The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm. 
 We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground, 
 but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of
trunks. 
 ET 
 > The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e., 
 > a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it 
 > a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE 
 > of chemical. 
 Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl) 
 rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are 
 organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms 
 of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions. 
 ET 
 > in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique 
 > from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That
is, 
 > a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different 
 > in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE 
 > particular Type/Breed of dog... 
 There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and 
 species.  Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with 
 coyotes.  Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats. 
 The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as 
 gene transfers that occur naturally. 
 Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing 
 throughout life.  Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary 
 for maturation.  Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral. 
 And many can be inherited.  The only reason why DNA remains 
 relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are 
 constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors. 
 ET 
 > in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar.

 > This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. 
 The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations 
 called laws of physics):  conservation of mass-energy, momentum, 
 angular momentum, charge, etc. 
 But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting. 
 Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of 
 years.  But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in 
 a camera, they change. 
 Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most 
 other particles are highly unstable.  In quantum electrodynamics, 
 the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are 
 constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the 
 borderline of existence. 
 JAS 
 > biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than 
 > most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is 
 > not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. 
 I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-10 Thread kirstima


John,

I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with 
"laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science 
with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got 
angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just 
something unthinkable for them.


I assume something like that is still going on within computer science. 
Artificial Intelligence being notoriously unable to handle anything like 
that. - To the detriment of all of us.


You used the term in a very, vary vague sense. - The quote you were 
commenting on, nothing metaphorical was intended. You presented your 
point very nicely, by taking up a language game "gone on a holiday".


Have you given any thought on the difference between unintended and 
intended metaphors? And on kinds of metaphors which work, do the job, 
and kinds which fail?


I also thank you for the papers you have shared in the List. Truly 
admiradle, truly clear.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen





John F Sowa kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:35:


Jon

What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina

But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday".  It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for
which we have no words for describing.  In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth:  If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared:  x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits:  Planets in the solar system travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity:  A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity:  A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability.  The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe.  The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate.  But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-10 Thread kirstima


Jon,

The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the 
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If 
you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, 
and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.


"Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws  of nature". 
The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if 
so and so...). So they are about the future, just as well.


It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian 
question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no 
short and simple way!

That much is shown beyond doubt by today.

Best, Kirsti Määttänen


Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:51:

John S., List:


JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a
metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.


Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature _themselves_, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs
are they?  Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that
general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe
consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:


Jon and Edwina,

Jon


What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how
we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or
other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature
/itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina


But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is
strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a
language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from
Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language
game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real"
for
which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared: x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system
travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread John F Sowa


Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list,

Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.
There is a continuum.  The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp
boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's
atmosphere).  The borders of living things are an intermediate case.

HR

In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface.


The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have
exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).

The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from
all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject
to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental
(e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming
themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water).

Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions
of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some
of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health.

HR

I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous)
by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily...


Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk.
The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm.
We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground,
but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of trunks.

ET

The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e.,
a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it
a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE
of chemical.


Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl)
rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are
organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms
of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions.

ET

in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique
from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is,
a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different
in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE
particular Type/Breed of dog...


There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and
species.  Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with
coyotes.  Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats.
The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as
gene transfers that occur naturally.

Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing
throughout life.  Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary
for maturation.  Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral.
And many can be inherited.  The only reason why DNA remains
relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are
constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors.

ET

in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar.
This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability.


The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations
called laws of physics):  conservation of mass-energy, momentum,
angular momentum, charge, etc.

But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting.
Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of
years.  But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in
a camera, they change.

Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most
other particles are highly unstable.  In quantum electrodynamics,
the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are
constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the
borderline of existence.

JAS

biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than
most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is
not reducible to chemistry and/or physics.


I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first
quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness
(purpose, goals, or intentions).

John

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, Jon, List,

I agree, that a molecule (and an atom, a particle...) is a token. But, when something happens with this molecule due to a natural law, eg. the law of gravitation, is then the spatial section of this law that works upon the molecule a token of the law? I was thinking no, because the law continuously pervades the whole cosmos, and to think, that saying "instantiation of a law" would mean to construct a concept of spatial section of the law, and that this concept would be sort of anthropocentric or organismocentric. But maybe I am too hairsplitting, and anthropocentrism cannot totally be avoided by us humans anyway. I think I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous) by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily- Ok!

Best,

Helmut

09. April 2017 um 22:09 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, Edwina, List:

HR: my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body) ...

In this context, "embodied" does not necessarily mean that a Token "has a body," it just means that it is existentially instantiated in some way. The word "Token" is a Type, but it is embodied every time someone actually says, writes, or thinks that word. Water is a Type, but it is embodied in every molecule that consists of two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen atom.

ET: in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE.

In a sense, this is true even in the physico-chemical realm. Although every molecule of water is "the same" in terms of its composition and structure, each one is a different particular with different constituent parts--two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom with their corresponding protons, neutrons, electrons, etc. This is why I keep saying that the Dynamic Object of a general Type is the continuum of its potential Tokens, not the (discrete) collection of its actual Tokens. Given any two actual Tokens of a given Type, there is an inexhaustible supply of potential Tokens of that same Type that would be intermediate between them.

ET: The fact that in the biological realm, each individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more adaptive diversity - and less stability.

Agreed, biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is not reducible to chemistry and/or physics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 9, 2017 at 8:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical.

in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE particular Type/Breed of dog. But - in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. The fact that in the biological realm, each individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more adaptive diversity - and less stability.

I agree with your outline of the difference between the two realms - the biological realm moved differentiation INTO each separate Token, removing the constant bonding to all other Tokens, so that changes from the Type could emerge rapidly and in response to local stimuli.

Edwina

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On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would

Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, Edwina, List:

HR:  my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear
borders (of it´s body) ...

In this context, "embodied" does not necessarily mean that a Token "has a
body," it just means that it is existentially instantiated in some way.
The word "Token" is a Type, but it is embodied every time someone actually
says, writes, or thinks that word.  Water is a Type, but it is embodied in
every molecule that consists of two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen
atom.

ET:  in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional
facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all
belong to the same TYPE.

In a sense, this is true even in the physico-chemical realm.  Although
every molecule of water is "the same" in terms of its composition and
structure, each one is a different particular with different constituent
parts--two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom with their corresponding
protons, neutrons, electrons, etc.  This is why I keep saying that the
Dynamic Object of a general Type is the *continuum *of its *potential *Tokens,
not the (discrete) *collection *of its *actual *Tokens.  Given any two
actual Tokens of a given Type, there is an inexhaustible supply of
potential Tokens of that same Type that would be intermediate between them.

ET:  The fact that in the biological realm, each individual token might be
slightly different, enables this realm to provide more adaptive diversity -
and less stability.

Agreed, biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than
most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is not
reducible to chemistry and/or physics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 9, 2017 at 8:19 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self with
> distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact that its
> composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of
> electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that
> differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical.
>
>  in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional facet.
> Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if they all belong
> to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of dog will, each one, be
> slightly different in temperament and even look, but all will be members of
> ONE particular Type/Breed of dog.   But -  in the physico-chemical realm,
> the majority of tokens are similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a
> great deal of stability. The fact that in the biological realm, each
> individual token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide
> more adaptive diversity - and less stability.
>
> I agree with your outline of the difference between the two realms - the
> biological realm moved differentiation INTO each separate Token, removing
> the constant bonding to all other Tokens, so that changes from the Type
> could emerge rapidly and in response to local stimuli.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, List,
> my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear
> borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are
> borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is
> borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg.
> "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have
> clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs
> of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in
> self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause?
> (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there
> obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean,
> that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate).
> Best, Helmut
>
>

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self
with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact
that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of
electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that
differentiates it from another TYPE of chemical. 

 in the biological realm, the token has a different and additional
facet. Each token is more or less unique from other tokens even if
they all belong to the same TYPE. That is, a particular species of
dog will, each one, be slightly different in temperament and even
look, but all will be members of ONE particular Type/Breed of dog.  
But -  in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are
similar. This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of
stability. The fact that in the biological realm, each individual
token might be slightly different, enables this realm to provide more
adaptive diversity - and less stability. 

I agree with your outline of the difference between the two realms -
the biological realm moved differentiation INTO each separate Token,
removing the constant bonding to all other Tokens, so that changes
from the Type could emerge rapidly and in response to local stimuli. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sun 09/04/17 12:32 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, List, my point was, that a token is embodied, but a
molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains
electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and
other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in
physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability
of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear
borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs
of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears
in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause?
(...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there
obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would
mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate). Best, Helmut
08. April 2017 um 22:20 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky"   

Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point. 

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law
in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming
you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the
laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual
molecule is a token of the type/law. 

Edwina
 --
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
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 http://www.primus.ca [1]
 On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there
are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have
been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the
instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at
work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed
systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with
all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs
either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient
causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" wrote:
   Jon and Edwina,
 Jon
 > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
 > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
 > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
 could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
 Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
 or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
 tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
 "A cat on a red mat".
 All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with
just
 monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
 to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
 The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
 which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
 observations.
 Edwina
 > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
 > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
 > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
 > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
 > own [or both sets of] laws.

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread gnox

Helmut,

 

Your idea of “self-defined bodies” is essentially the “autopoiesis” of Maturana 
and Varela, and the idea of final causation being intrinsic to animate bodymind 
is shared by Gregory Bateson and, I think, by Peirce. My book Turning Signs 
joins these concepts with Robert Rosen’s concepts of “anticipatory systems” and 
the Uexkullian “Innenwelt” as internal model, and identifies all this with 
semiosis (drawing very heavily on Peirce, of course). The central idea is that 
living beings are self-guided, relatively autonomous, and incorporate semiosic 
“guidance systems.” For more on this see especially my Chapter 3, 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 9-Apr-17 00:32



 

Edwina, List,

my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of 
it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the 
gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in 
physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of 
electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin 
surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, 
if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be 
in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate 
physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like 
law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate).

Best, Helmut

  


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Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread Stephen C. Rose

Gene's Lawrence quote is apposite and not at all inconsistent with a decent
theology that recognizes what Lawrence says. What theology might add is
that part of creation is the existence of word, words. These single us out
and call us to account and must be included in any effort to frame a
philosophy that is true. The names Spinoza, Einstein and Jesus appears to
me as a sort of triad that addresses this.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Apr 9, 2017 at 7:11 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:

> Edwina, I think that what you call atheism, some people call “religious
> naturalism” — a more positive expression of the “wonder of creation.”
>
> https://religiousnaturalism.org/
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* 8-Apr-17 19:37
> *To:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Eugene Halton <
> eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
>
>
>
>
> Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote
> from Peirce,
>
> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work
> of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551.
>
> That's a beautiful quote from Lawrence - and says in a broad sense what I
> feel and think as well. But - I call that atheism!
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> *On Sat 08/04/17 7:03 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu
> <eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> sent:*
>
> Dear Edwina,
>
> Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be
> “reasonableness energizing in the world.”
>
> Not “universe.”
>
> I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given
> that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious
> atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence
> gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924
> description of attending an Apache ritual:
>
> “There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly.
> There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation,
> the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in
> every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes
> of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the
> yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is
> no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the
> dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were,
> in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal
> God”
>
> Gene
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-09 Thread gnox

Edwina, I think that what you call atheism, some people call “religious 
naturalism” — a more positive expression of the “wonder of creation.”

https://religiousnaturalism.org/

 

gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 8-Apr-17 19:37
To: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Eugene Halton 
<eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 


Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote from 
Peirce,

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world" 4.551.

That's a beautiful quote from Lawrence - and says in a broad sense what I feel 
and think as well. But - I call that atheism! 

Edwina
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This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Sat 08/04/17 7:03 PM , Eugene Halton  <mailto:eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu> 
eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent:

Dear Edwina,

Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be 
“reasonableness energizing in the world.”

Not “universe.” 

I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given that 
I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious atheist,” though 
that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence gets closer to it, the 
idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924 description of attending an Apache 
ritual: 

“There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly. 
There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation, the 
wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in every 
thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes of the 
fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the yell of 
the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is no God 
looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the dramatic 
wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were, in creation, 
not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal God”

Gene

 


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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, List,

Best, Helmut

08. April 2017 um 22:20 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"

Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure of your point.

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the type/law.

Edwina
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On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

John, List,

Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
"John F Sowa" wrote:

Jon and Edwina,

Jon
> I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> reality as consisting entirely of Signs.

Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina
> the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> own [or both sets of] laws.

I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

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Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often
quote from Peirce,

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world" 4.551.

That's a beautiful quote from Lawrence - and says in a broad sense
what I feel and think as well. But - I call that atheism!

Edwina
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On Sat 08/04/17 7:03 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu
sent:
Dear Edwina,

Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should
be “reasonableness energizing in the world.”

Not “universe.”

I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to
say, given that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a
“religious atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I
find D.H. Lawrence gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in
creation,"from his 1924 description of attending an Apache ritual:

“There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all
is godly. There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the
mystery of creation, the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers
in every leaf and stone, in every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the
rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes of the fawn. Things utterly
opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the yell of the mountain
lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is no God looking
on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the dramatic
wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were, in
creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal
God”

Gene
On Apr 8, 2017 6:39 PM, "Edwina Taborsky" wrote:
Gene - thanks. Your last paragraph on knowledge says what I was
trying to say and I didn't express it very well - you've said it
perfectly.

Edwina
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http://www.primus.ca [2]
On Sat 08/04/17 6:30 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu
[3] sent:
John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by
abduction. Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an
abduction. An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling,
imitates the babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring
rewards.”
The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative
mind of the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational
process rather than inaugurates it through observation. We are born
to be wild intersocial, communicative abductors! The dialogue
continues over time as the infant’s upper brain starts to come
online, becoming more vocally-gesturally engaged, eventuating in both
the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the toddler as a
symbolizer.
Jon Alan Schmidt: “this raises the question of what Peirce meant
by "God's purpose." As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to
be the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth
of knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).”
Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere
growth of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of
creation. Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced
itself from the living spontaneity, as though true living would have
as its ultimate goal to become a know-it-all. True living involves
participation in creation through the primacy of affirmative mind, in
bodying forth and learning, to which knowing is at best secondary.
That is how I take Peirce’s statements that “the continual
increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is the summum
bonum,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.”
Gene Halton

Links:
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[2] http://www.primus.ca
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread Eugene Halton

Dear Edwina,

Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be
“reasonableness energizing in the world.”

Not “universe.”

I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given
that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious
atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence
gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924
description of attending an Apache ritual:

“There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly.
There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation,
the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in
every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes
of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the
yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is
no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the
dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were,
in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal
God”

Gene


On Apr 8, 2017 6:39 PM, "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:

Gene - thanks. Your last paragraph on knowledge says what I was trying to
say and I didn't express it very well  - you've said it perfectly.

Edwina

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On Sat 08/04/17 6:30 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent:

John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”



The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of
the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than
inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial,
communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s
upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally
engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the
toddler as a symbolizer.



Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum
bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).”



Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth
of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation.
Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the
living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal
to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation
through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to
which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements
that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is
the summum bonum,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.”



Gene Halton

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread Eugene Halton

John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”



The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of
the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than
inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial,
communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s
upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally
engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the
toddler as a symbolizer.



Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum
bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).”



Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth
of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation.
Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the
living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal
to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation
through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to
which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements
that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is
the *summum bonum*,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.”



Gene Halton

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary F., List:

GF:  In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.)
which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used
and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.”

This is very helpful.  My mistake has been thinking of the Sign-Object
relation as conventional for a Symbol, rather than more broadly habitual.

CSP:  Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in
the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate,
is a Deity relatively to us.

So, just as ideas or resolutions in a human mind result in actions by a
human body, likewise the laws of nature have existential effects within the
universe.

GF:  But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in
His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit, and
since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is
either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at
all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no
consciousness” (CP6.489).

I think that there is some equivocation on "consciousness" between the two
passages.  In the earlier one, it seems to me that Peirce may have chosen
that word mainly to avoid repeating "mind."  In the later one, he clearly
associated consciousness with bodily sensation and therefore 2ns or
existence, which (as I just mentioned in another post) he did not consider
to be applicable to God.

GF:  I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think it’s possible
that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the *Ens
necessarium/Creator* God you believe in may not be the same as the *agency *God
that Edwina disbelieves in.

That is an interesting suggestion, although I have a hard time seeing how
God could be the Creator *without *possessing agency.  I am reminded of
these remarks by Peirce.

CSP:  "God" is a vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than
almost any, is *vague*. No words are so well understood as vernacular
words, in one way; yet they are invariably vague; and of many of them it is
true that, let the logician do his best to substitute precise equivalents
in their places, still the vernacular words alone, for all their vagueness,
answer the principal purposes. This is emphatically the case with the very
vague word "God," which is not made less vague by saying that it imports
"infinity," etc., since those attributes are at least as vague. (CP 6.494;
c. 1906)

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 4:17 PM,  wrote:

> Jon Alan,
>
>
>
> The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In 
> *Baldwin’s
> Dictionary,* Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is
> constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and
> understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
> without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.”
>
>
>
> Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here
> (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):
>
> “That thoughts act on the physical world and *conversely*, is one of the
> most familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories
> are stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible
> for us, in the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very
> promising guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be
> made which suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of
> ultimate solution.
>
>
>
> All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature
> influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or
> symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not
> merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The
> general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But
> it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not
> in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the
> thing. Here we have that great problem of the *principle of individuation*
> which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible
> analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.
> Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the
> mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a
> Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and
> Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the
> advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that
> beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific
>

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

John S., Helmut, Edwina, List:

JFS:  Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a
Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that embodies it--right?

JFS:  The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

I agree, except that I would substitute "reality" for "existence," since
the law itself is 3ns while its instantiations are 2ns.

HR:  ... I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work ...So law is all type, there are no tokens of it
in inanimate world of efficient causation.

Given my agreement with John S. above, it seems to me that a type
(3ns) can *only
*be experienced through its tokens (2ns).  We then use
reason--retroduction, deduction, induction--to formulate, explicate, and
evaluate the hypothesis that what we are observing is the manifestation of
a real law.

ET:  A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.

Yes, the law as a *type *governs an inexhaustible continuum of
*potential *cases;
its instantiation as a *token *is any *actual *case that it governs.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that
> law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a
> general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure
> of your point.
>
> I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the
> inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the
> physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a
> hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the
> type/law.
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> John, List,
> Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws
> existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed
> by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there
> are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not
> interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are
> no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
> type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation.
> Is my guess.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
> "John F Sowa" wrote:
> Jon and Edwina,
>
> Jon
> > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
>
> Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
> could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
>
> Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
> or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
> tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
> "A cat on a red mat".
>
> All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
> monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
> to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
>
> The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
> which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
> observations.
>
> Edwina
> > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> > own [or both sets of] laws.
>
> I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
> Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
> An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
> babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

John S., Helmut, List:

Of course, Peirce famously argued for the *Reality *of God, not the *existence
*of God.  He explained why in one of the manuscript drafts of "A Neglected
Argument."

CSP:  Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular
Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing subject to
brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,) and so opposed
in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely say that He is a
Spirit, or Mind. (R 843; 1908)

He also addressed this a couple of years earlier.

CSP:  ... I myself always use *exist *in its strict philosophical sense of
"react with the other like things in the environment." Of course, in that
sense, it would be fetichism to say that God "exists." (CP 6.495; c. 1906)

As for "the *logos *is God," consistent with the possible connection
between the beginning as an indeterminate symbol (EP 2:322) and John 1:1, I
think that this is 3ns (reality) rather than 2ns (existence)--at least,
until "the *logos *became flesh and dwelt among us."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:05 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> John, List,
> I think so, after your proof!
> Best, Helmut
> 08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr
>  "John F Sowa" 
>
> On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> > I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> > but the law itself at work.
>
> I agree.
>
> > So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
> > of efficient causation. Is my guess.
>
> For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
> be a token.
>
> For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.
>
> But does that mean no token can exist? What would existence mean
> for such a thing? Perhaps you could call it logos. As John the
> Evangelist said, "The logos is God." Does God exist?
>
> John
>

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Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Edwina, List:

ET:  Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'.

I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is
"God's purpose" as "the development of Reason."  CP 1.615 (1903) continues
beyond what you quoted.

CSP:  Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods
as must develope knowledge the most speedily.

So it seems to me that Peirce *equated *knowledge and reasonableness, such
that the growth of one *is *the growth of other.  I would also suggest that
this is the *summum bonum* precisely because choosing to pursue it aligns *our
*purpose with *God's *purpose.  In other words, we have the opportunity to
participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative activity.

I see no conflict between this interpretation and what you quoted from CP
5.433 (1905), especially since Peirce added in that same passage, "In its
higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through
self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for
making the rational purport to be general."  We contribute to evolution,
the growth of reasonableness, by exercising self-control.  In fact, right
after stating what you quoted from CP 5.427 (1905), Peirce went on to
explain what he meant.

CSP:  It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the
proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those
special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design,
but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every
situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning in
future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to
self-control.

Meaning is in the future, but purpose is in the present as the end that *guides
*our future self-controlled conduct.  And since God (or Mind, as you
prefer) "has its being outside of time" (CP 6.490; 1908), its purpose is
neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, but simply eternal.

ET:  I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and
therefore, not really debatable.

I agree that ultimately this is not a topic to argue about on the List.
However, I am not convinced that either theism or atheism is completely
devoid of evidentiary support.  Many people adopt one or the other for
various reasons that they consider well-grounded, but often they differ on
what *counts *as evidence, as well as *how *it should be evaluated.

ET:  I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical and
biological semiosis within it.

I continue to share this interest and appreciate being able to set aside
our differences to discuss it.

Thanks,

Jon

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list: And here is a key difference.
>
> Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum
> bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create
> (CP 1.615; 1903)."
>
> I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you, Jon, as a
> theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a contentious issue.
>
> Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can never
> have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General, of Reason,
> is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's actually
> governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason, consists in
> its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such
> that its being never can have been completely perfecfed. It always must be
> in a state of incipiency, of growth. ...So, then, the development of Reason
> requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than can
> ever occur. ...This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
> embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which
> did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is
> going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".
>
> Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is
> the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES write
> that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning universe' by
> ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the same

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread gnox

Jon Alan,

 

The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In 
Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is 
constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood 
as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to 
the motives which originally governed its selection.”

 

Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here 
(EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):

“That thoughts act on the physical world and conversely, is one of the most 
familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories are 
stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible for us, in 
the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very promising 
guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be made which 
suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of ultimate solution.

 

All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing 
thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but 
even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically 
determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature 
general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any 
participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great 
problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a 
century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite 
incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or 
resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or 
subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up 
Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the 
advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond 
that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.”

 

But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in His 
essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since 
there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely 
the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some 
visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness” (CP6.489). Yet 
he had earlier referred to God as a “vast consciousness.” I don’t want to get 
into theological issues, but I think it’s possible that, given the necessary 
vagueness of its terminology, the Ens necessarium/Creator God you believe in 
may not be the same as the agency God that Edwina disbelieves in.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 8-Apr-17 14:21
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 

Gary F., List:

 

There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a 
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" 
(CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the 
universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since 
that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902).  As 
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would presumably have the 
same Object ("God's purpose") and the same relation to that Object (Symbol) as 
the universe itself.  Besides the still-difficult (for me) notion of a 
non-conventional Symbol--which obviously applies to the universe itself, not 
just the laws of nature within it--this raises the question of what Peirce 
meant by "God's purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be 
the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge 
about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 
1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in some sense represent the development 
of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them "something in 
nature to which the human reason is analogous."

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 


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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 
 Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point.

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law
in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming
you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the
laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual
molecule is a token of the type/law.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17  2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that
there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they
have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the
instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at
work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed
systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with
all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs
either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient
causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
 "John F Sowa"  wrote:
   Jon and Edwina,
 Jon
 > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
 > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
 > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
 could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
 Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
 or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
 tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
 "A cat on a red mat".
 All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with
just
 monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
 to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
 The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
 which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
 observations.
 Edwina
 > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
 > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
 > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
 > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
 > own [or both sets of] laws.
 I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
 Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
 An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
 babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
 John
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Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list: And here is a key difference.

Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903)."

I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you,
Jon, as a theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a
contentious issue.

Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can
never have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General,
of Reason, is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's
actually governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason,
consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of
Reason is such that its being never can have been completely
perfecfed. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.
...So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the
occurrence of more individual events than can ever occur. ...This
development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that
is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is going on
today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".

Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES
write that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning
universe' by ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the
same thing.

My own view is that the universe was not created 'by God' and God
does not continue to create it. My view is that the universe, which
is an act of Reason - is a creation of transforming energy to matter
- by 'governing individual existentialities/events' which function
according to habits, laws and thus, prevent entropic dissipation of
that same matter. 

Certainly, Peirce uses many metaphors to describe this continuous
nature of the transformative embodiment of Reason: - that it is a
"vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities.The Universe as an argument is
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem" 5.119 which can be
even compared with a painting..

But WHY is the universe? Since I reject the notion of agency [God],
then, I'd prefer the articulation of Mind, that energy-to-matter
function, where "the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable. 5.433

And since "5.427 "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in
the future" - then, this suggests to me, that there is no a priori
purpose [i.e., God's purpose]. 

---

I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary
support and therefore, not really debatable. 

I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical
and biological semiosis within it.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17  2:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary F., List:
 There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the
universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to
me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and
"living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what
the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902).  As
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would
presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself.  Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the 
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in
some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the
very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human
reason

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread John F Sowa


On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work.


I agree.


So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
of efficient causation. Is my guess.


For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
be a token.

For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.

But does that mean no token can exist?  What would existence mean
for such a thing?  Perhaps you could call it logos.  As John the
Evangelist said, "The logos is God."  Does God exist?

John

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread Helmut Raulien

John, List,

Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
"John F Sowa"  wrote:

Jon and Edwina,

Jon
> I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> reality as consisting entirely of Signs.

Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina
> the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> own [or both sets of] laws.

I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

2017-04-08 Thread John F Sowa


Jon and Edwina,

Jon

I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting entirely of Signs.


Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark.  Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat.  Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads.   As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication.  Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina

the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
with another external organism, to informationally connect with
the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
own [or both sets of] laws.


I agree.  But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

Gary F., List:

There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is
the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its
Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP
2.95; 1902).  As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature
would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself.  Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum
bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in some sense *represent *the
development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them
"something in nature to which the human reason is analogous."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 7:47 AM,  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon S.,
>
>
>
> As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I
> supplied is “that there is something in nature to which the human reason
> is analogous.” If all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge
> is in signs. If we ask what kind of sign the laws of nature are analogous
> to, those laws are dynamic objects of the signs we are now using to
> describe them. If we agree that those objects are themselves signs, that
> the real Universe is a vast representamen, “precisely an argument,” any
> knowledge we can have of them must be both *in* signs and *of* signs
> which are real. It follows that the real signs we are talking about are
> analogous to the signs we are using to talk about them, which are
> propositions (symbolic dicisigns as well as legisigns).
>
>
>
> But one thing we know about the symbols we use is that they cannot supply
> acquaintance with their dynamic objects. Only by collateral experience can
> we know anything about those objects, the signs we call “the laws of
> nature.” If you assert that they are symbols, your assertion is meaningless
> unless you call upon your collateral experience of symbols to indicate the
> dynamic object of the symbols we are using. Your collateral experience
> consists of having done the sort of thing we are doing right now,
> participating in an ongoing argument. Our hypothesis that the “laws of
> nature” are symbols participating in an argument is empty of content unless
> those laws, those signs, are analogous to the signs in which our thought
> about them is expressed. Our thought is thus metaphorical insofar as it
> deploys that analogy.
>
>
>
> In short, my claim was not “that our primary experience of these natural
> laws is metaphorical.” My claim was that our primary experience of
> *symbols* and of *propositions* is our own use of them to participate in
> arguments. Unless your use of the word “symbol” differs from the
> conventional use well formulated by Peirce, our acquaintance with its
> dynamic object can only be drawn from the *commens*, and only by analogy
> with that can we mean something definite by asking whether the laws of
> nature are symbols.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

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Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

n an argument that, they of course,
> play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the
> little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our
> perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual
> judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are
> immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The
> premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements
> of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian
> supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world,
> but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions.
> Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual
> facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being
> premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the
> premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]
>
>
>
> Gary F.
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
> Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
>
> Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:
>
> "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents
> of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to
> call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is
> anthropomorphic"
>
> As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or
> symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because
> WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our
> experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form
> individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical
> but as real.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Jon A.S., John S.,
>
>
>
> I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below.
>
>
>
> Gary F.
>
>
>
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52
>
> John S., List:
>
>
>
> JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
> for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
>
>
>
> Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our
> linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs are
> they?  Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general
> laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs
> all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
> not composed exclusively of signs."
>
> [GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies
> what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”:
>
> “It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign
> should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the
> explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,—
> not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe,
> embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are
> all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth,’— that all this universe is
> perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394).
>
>
>
> Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of
> nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out its
> conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols,
> though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form
> of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our
> primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We
> ascribe these forms to the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”:
> “What we call a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition,
> but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of
> every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to
> approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would
> be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may
> use this language) would be the very Universe” (EP2:304).
>
>
>
> To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your question,
> although it may not use the language you are looking for.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
Jon, list - hmm - that is interesting and I'd agree; the Dynamic
Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also Thirdness.
This enables individual organisms, when they interact with another
external organism, to informationally connect with the external
organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their own [or both sets
of] laws.
--

Edwina
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largest alternative telecommunications provider.
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On Sat 08/04/17 12:58 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, John S., List:
JFS: Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that
makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world.
That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it
isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.
I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that
real aspect/regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate
to treat reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
ET: I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour;
i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.
I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law
of nature is the continuum of its potential instantiations (3ns),
not the (discrete) collection of its actual instantiations (2ns).
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
John, list:

I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e.,
among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.

That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of
chickens, which have an ability to reproduce their type via
eggs-to-chickens. It would refer to the continuity of the type of
flower - which has the ability to reproduce that type year after year
in particular form after form.

A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that
particular individual and does not continue on after that individual.

Edwina
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On Fri 07/04/17 9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net [5] sent:
On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is
> a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
>
> Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not
our
> linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of
Signs
> are they?
Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
reliable predictions reflects something real about the world.
That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But
it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.
For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his
neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time
he went out for his daily walk. That is an example of law-like
behavior. But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law
embodied in Kant's nature. That's just the way he behaved.
> Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general
> laws of nature are real,
If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be
something real that makes it true. But that something may be
as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior.
Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that
we don't understand in detail.
For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler,
Newton, and Einstein. Then think of the thousands or millions
of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws. Then
imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium.
An interesting joke: "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks."
For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is
as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries.
John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs