subject:"Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Peirce's Theory of Thinking"


Gary R., list,

I agree, a hypothesis may be uncertain yet still be helpful, although 
it's important for a contrite fallibilism in any science that the 
uncertainty, possible errors, etc., be examined and expressed.


- Best, Ben

On 10/1/2016 12:53 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Ben, List,

Thanks for this clarification. You wrote: Researchers need to be able 
to state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words to 
keep communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry 
method that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They 
don't always say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled out" or 
"disconfirmed" or "disfavored" or the like.


I suppose the language of "ruled out" or "disconfirmed" seems sounder 
to me than "false;"  but perhaps it amounts to the same thing.


But aren't there some hypotheses which, while not fully borne out when 
tested, yet give information which is, for example, "statistically 
significant" in adding to the understanding of the question being 
inquired into such that that the direction of further inquiry may be 
informed by that, shall we say, incomplete  (although not strictly 
'false') result? This seems to me to happen, for example, in the 
social sciences (and other 'soft' sciences).


Best,

Gary  R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690 *

On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:



Gary R., list,

"Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified" when 
applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in falsehoods 
by vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can see both 
critical and methodeutical kinds of justification of an abductive 
inference that can nevertheless turn out, upon testing, to conclude 
in a falsehood, e.g., the hypothesis of a detectable ether wind in 
the theoretical effort to save the Galilean transformations; the 
disconfirmation of the ether wind led eventually to the triumph of 
the Lorentz transformations, amid which the Galilean transformations 
survive as an approximation for things moving slowly in one's 
reference frame, and it led to the quantitative unification of time 
and space (with lightspeed as yardstick, e.g., years and 
light-years), which simply isn't there in the Galilean and 
(unreconstructed) Newtonian pictures; in any case the hypothesis of 
an ether wind is quite dead, but it was critically and 
methodeutically justified as far as it went; it was plausible, 
distinctive predictions were deducible from it, and indeed its 
adoption bore fruit. Researchers need to be able to state that a 
hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words to keep 
communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry 
method that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They 
don't always say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled out" or 
"disconfirmed" or "disfavored" or the like. The majority of 
explanatory hypotheses, even the fruitful ones, turn out to be false; 
the surprising thing, as Peirce often pointed out, is that they 
aren't false much oftener. - Best, Ben


On 10/1/2016 11:34 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Ben, Jon, List,

Ben, you commented:

"An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the 
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a 
falsehood, if it nevertheless helps research by either making it 
positively fruitful (think of all the hypotheses that positively 
help lead to truth without scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by 
leading to knowledge of a previously unknown dead end that would 
otherwise have caused waste of time and energy."


I would tend to agree strongly with this but wonder whether 
'falsehood' is the best expression to describe what happens in such 
a case. The abduction is 'good' if it is testable, even if the 
hypothesis is not, or not fully, borne out. As you suggested, 
information is sometimes gained from testing such hypotheses which, 
in the economy of research, is useful for further inquiry.


Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690 *

On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell  > wrote:



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


Jon S., list,

Thanks, but I need to correct myself. I wrote,

   the scientific method is the inquiry method that, by its own
   account, can go wrong as well as right
   [End quote]

I should say instead that the scientific method is the inquiry method in 
which inquiry, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. One 
tends to have confidence in the method itself, a kind of ideal of 
self-criticism and self-correction, if not always in one's ability to 
recognize and implement it.


Best, Ben

On 10/1/2016 12:43 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:


Ben U., Gary R., List:

You have both made some great points today.  Peirce clearly considered 
economy of research to be an important purpose of methodeutic or 
speculative (i.e., theoretical) rhetoric.  He even advocated, under 
certain circumstances, admitting a hypothesis that we /expect /to fail 
under testing, if this can be done quickly and inexpensively, such 
that we may then dismiss it once and for all.  Even when a hypothesis 
apparently "passes" the tests to which we subject it, the point of 
Peirce's fallibilism is that we continue to hold it tentatively, at 
least to some degree, because it always remains subject to further 
testing that might reveal a need to adjust or perhaps abandon it.


Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
 - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 


On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:31 AM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:


Gary R., list,

"Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified"
when applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in
falsehoods by vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can
see both critical and methodeutical kinds of justification of an
abductive inference that can nevertheless turn out, upon testing,
to conclude in a falsehood, e.g., the hypothesis of a detectable
ether wind in the theoretical effort to save the Galilean
transformations; the disconfirmation of the ether wind led
eventually to the triumph of the Lorentz transformations, amid
which the Galilean transformations survive as an approximation for
things moving slowly in one's reference frame, and it led to the
quantitative unification of time and space (with lightspeed as
yardstick, e.g., years and light-years), which simply isn't there
in the Galilean and (unreconstructed) Newtonian pictures; in any
case the hypothesis of an ether wind is quite dead, but it was
critically and methodeutically justified as far as it went; it was
plausible, distinctive predictions were deducible from it, and
indeed its adoption bore fruit. Researchers need to be able to
state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words
to keep communication clear because the scientific method is the
inquiry method that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as
right. They don't always say "shown to be false," they'll say
"ruled out" or "disconfirmed" or "disfavored" or the like. The
majority of explanatory hypotheses, even the fruitful ones, turn
out to be false; the surprising thing, as Peirce often pointed
out, is that they aren't false much oftener. - Best, Ben

On 10/1/2016 11:34 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Ben, Jon, List,

Ben, you commented:

"An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of
the economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a
falsehood, if it nevertheless helps research by either making it
positively fruitful (think of all the hypotheses that positively
help lead to truth without scoring a 'hole in one') or at least
by leading to knowledge of a previously unknown dead end that
would otherwise have caused waste of time and energy."

I would tend to agree strongly with this but wonder whether
'falsehood' is the best expression to describe what happens in
such a case. The abduction is 'good' if it is testable, even if
the hypothesis is not, or not fully, borne out. As you suggested,
information is sometimes gained from testing such hypotheses
which, in the economy of research, is useful for further inquiry.

Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690 *




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-10-01 Thread Gary Richmond

Ben, List,

Thanks for this clarification. You wrote: Researchers need to be able to
state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words to keep
communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry method
that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They don't always
say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled out" or "disconfirmed" or
"disfavored" or the like.

I suppose the language of "ruled out" or "disconfirmed" seems sounder to me
than "false;"  but perhaps it amounts to the same thing.

But aren't there some hypotheses which, while not fully borne out when
tested, yet give information which is, for example, "statistically
significant" in adding to the understanding of the question being inquired
into such that that the direction of further inquiry may be informed by
that, shall we say, incomplete  (although not strictly 'false') result?
This seems to me to happen, for example, in the social sciences (and other
'soft' sciences).

Best,

Gary  R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Gary R., list,
>
> "Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified" when
> applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in falsehoods by
> vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can see both critical and
> methodeutical kinds of justification of an abductive inference that can
> nevertheless turn out, upon testing, to conclude in a falsehood, e.g., the
> hypothesis of a detectable ether wind in the theoretical effort to save the
> Galilean transformations; the disconfirmation of the ether wind led
> eventually to the triumph of the Lorentz transformations, amid which the
> Galilean transformations survive as an approximation for things moving
> slowly in one's reference frame, and it led to the quantitative unification
> of time and space (with lightspeed as yardstick, e.g., years and
> light-years), which simply isn't there in the Galilean and
> (unreconstructed) Newtonian pictures; in any case the hypothesis of an
> ether wind is quite dead, but it was critically and methodeutically
> justified as far as it went; it was plausible, distinctive predictions were
> deducible from it, and indeed its adoption bore fruit. Researchers need to
> be able to state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words
> to keep communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry
> method that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They don't
> always say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled out" or "disconfirmed"
> or "disfavored" or the like. The majority of explanatory hypotheses, even
> the fruitful ones, turn out to be false; the surprising thing, as Peirce
> often pointed out, is that they aren't false much oftener. - Best, Ben
>
> On 10/1/2016 11:34 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Ben, Jon, List,
>
> Ben, you commented:
>
> "An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the
> economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if
> it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful
> (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth without
> scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of a
> previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of time
> and energy."
>
> I would tend to agree strongly with this but wonder whether 'falsehood' is
> the best expression to describe what happens in such a case. The abduction
> is 'good' if it is testable, even if the hypothesis is not, or not fully,
> borne out. As you suggested, information is sometimes gained from testing
> such hypotheses which, in the economy of research, is useful for further
> inquiry.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
> <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-10-01 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Ben U., Gary R., List:

You have both made some great points today.  Peirce clearly considered
economy of research to be an important purpose of methodeutic or
speculative (i.e., theoretical) rhetoric.  He even advocated, under certain
circumstances, admitting a hypothesis that we *expect *to fail under
testing, if this can be done quickly and inexpensively, such that we may
then dismiss it once and for all.  Even when a hypothesis apparently
"passes" the tests to which we subject it, the point of Peirce's
fallibilism is that we continue to hold it tentatively, at least to some
degree, because it always remains subject to further testing that might
reveal a need to adjust or perhaps abandon it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:31 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Gary R., list,
>
> "Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified" when
> applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in falsehoods by
> vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can see both critical and
> methodeutical kinds of justification of an abductive inference that can
> nevertheless turn out, upon testing, to conclude in a falsehood, e.g., the
> hypothesis of a detectable ether wind in the theoretical effort to save the
> Galilean transformations; the disconfirmation of the ether wind led
> eventually to the triumph of the Lorentz transformations, amid which the
> Galilean transformations survive as an approximation for things moving
> slowly in one's reference frame, and it led to the quantitative unification
> of time and space (with lightspeed as yardstick, e.g., years and
> light-years), which simply isn't there in the Galilean and
> (unreconstructed) Newtonian pictures; in any case the hypothesis of an
> ether wind is quite dead, but it was critically and methodeutically
> justified as far as it went; it was plausible, distinctive predictions were
> deducible from it, and indeed its adoption bore fruit. Researchers need to
> be able to state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain enough words
> to keep communication clear because the scientific method is the inquiry
> method that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as right. They don't
> always say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled out" or "disconfirmed"
> or "disfavored" or the like. The majority of explanatory hypotheses, even
> the fruitful ones, turn out to be false; the surprising thing, as Peirce
> often pointed out, is that they aren't false much oftener. - Best, Ben
>
> On 10/1/2016 11:34 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Ben, Jon, List,
>
> Ben, you commented:
>
> "An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the
> economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if
> it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful
> (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth without
> scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of a
> previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of time
> and energy."
>
> I would tend to agree strongly with this but wonder whether 'falsehood' is
> the best expression to describe what happens in such a case. The abduction
> is 'good' if it is testable, even if the hypothesis is not, or not fully,
> borne out. As you suggested, information is sometimes gained from testing
> such hypotheses which, in the economy of research, is useful for further
> inquiry.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
> <718%20482-5690>*
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


Gary R., list,

"Good" is traditionally taken as meaning "valid" or "justified" when 
applied to an inference. Valid deductions can conclude in falsehoods by 
vice of falsehood among the premisses, and we can see both critical and 
methodeutical kinds of justification of an abductive inference that can 
nevertheless turn out, upon testing, to conclude in a falsehood, e.g., 
the hypothesis of a detectable ether wind in the theoretical effort to 
save the Galilean transformations; the disconfirmation of the ether wind 
led eventually to the triumph of the Lorentz transformations, amid which 
the Galilean transformations survive as an approximation for things 
moving slowly in one's reference frame, and it led to the quantitative 
unification of time and space (with lightspeed as yardstick, e.g., years 
and light-years), which simply isn't there in the Galilean and 
(unreconstructed) Newtonian pictures; in any case the hypothesis of an 
ether wind is quite dead, but it was critically and methodeutically 
justified as far as it went; it was plausible, distinctive predictions 
were deducible from it, and indeed its adoption bore fruit. Researchers 
need to be able to state that a hypothesis has been ruled out in plain 
enough words to keep communication clear because the scientific method 
is the inquiry method that, by its own account, can go wrong as well as 
right. They don't always say "shown to be false," they'll say "ruled 
out" or "disconfirmed" or "disfavored" or the like. The majority of 
explanatory hypotheses, even the fruitful ones, turn out to be false; 
the surprising thing, as Peirce often pointed out, is that they aren't 
false much oftener. - Best, Ben


On 10/1/2016 11:34 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Ben, Jon, List,

Ben, you commented:

"An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the 
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, 
if it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively 
fruitful (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to 
truth without scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to 
knowledge of a previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have 
caused waste of time and energy."


I would tend to agree strongly with this but wonder whether 
'falsehood' is the best expression to describe what happens in such a 
case. The abduction is 'good' if it is testable, even if the 
hypothesis is not, or not fully, borne out. As you suggested, 
information is sometimes gained from testing such hypotheses which, in 
the economy of research, is useful for further inquiry.


Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-10-01 Thread Gary Richmond

Ben wrote: "5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as Jerry R. has
been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim."

Exactly. As Jon made clear, 5.189 has its value in critical logic and ought
not be conflated with the PM. I have found Jerry's near obsession with
5.189 off putting so that putting it in its proper place, viz., critical
logic, has been helpful

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:32 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> I left one point murky; what I had failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s
> remarks, was that 5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as Jerry
> R. has been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben
>
>
> On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
>
> Jon S., Gary R., list,
>
> Jon, you wrote,
>
> CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet are
> *not* "capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not*
> admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation.
> In other words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may
> nevertheless turn out to be a *bad* abduction; whereas *any* abduction
> whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the
> other two stages of inquiry is a *good* abduction.
> [End quote]
>
> Excellent point. I could kick myself for not having seen that clearly,
> despite my own going on about the difference between critic (including CP
> 5.189) and methodeutic (including the pragmatic maxim). I would add one
> further point about your last clause,
>
> whereas *any* abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the
> PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good* abduction.
> [End quote]
>
> An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the
> economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if
> it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful
> (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth without
> scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of a
> previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of time
> and energy. This reflects the heuretic view of inquiry as opposed to the
> view concerned mainly with justifying already-accepted conclusions. (I said
> something like this at peirce-l in May but, in passing, accepted what I
> took to be my interlocutor's sense of "successful" abduction as meaning an
> abductive conclusion's being true.)
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 9/30/2016 8:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Jon, List,
>
> You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also
> very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and
> methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and
> pertains *only* to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism
> itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete* inquiry.
>
> Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction.
> While logical *critic* concerns itself with the nature and strength of
> the three types of inferences, *methodeutic* concerns itself with these
> three patterns of inference as *together* they figure in a complete
> inquiry.
>
> Thus, as you concluded: *any* abduction whose resulting hypothesis
> passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry
> is a *good* abduction.
>
> And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as
> semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic *rhetoric* by Peirce. For it
> is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that we are
> *persuaded* that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," that is,
> that it is a "good" abduction.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
> <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the last
> several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
> logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls
> under logical critic and pertains *only* to abduction, while the PM--like
> pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a
> *complete* inquiry.
>
> CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was
> recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
> hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain
> conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a
> hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or
> some of them.  The fo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jon S., Gary R., Jerry R., list, I left one point murky; what I had 
failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s remarks, was that 5.189 can't be 
regarded as a version, the best as Jerry R. has been urging, or 
otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben


On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Jon S., Gary R., list,

Jon, you wrote,

CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts,"
yet are /not/ "capable of experimental verification," and thus are
/not/ admissible for subsequent deductive explication and
inductive evaluation.  In other words, an abduction that fully
conforms to CP 5.189 may nevertheless turn out to be a /bad/
abduction; whereas /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis
passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of
inquiry is a /good/ abduction.
[End quote]

Excellent point. I could kick myself for not having seen that clearly, 
despite my own going on about the difference between critic (including 
CP 5.189) and methodeutic (including the pragmatic maxim). I would add 
one further point about your last clause,


whereas /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test
of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a
/good/ abduction.
[End quote]

An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the 
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, 
if it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively 
fruitful (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to 
truth without scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to 
knowledge of a previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have 
caused waste of time and energy. This reflects the heuretic view of 
inquiry as opposed to the view concerned mainly with justifying 
already-accepted conclusions. (I said something like this at peirce-l 
in May but, in passing, accepted what I took to be my interlocutor's 
sense of "successful" abduction as meaning an abductive conclusion's 
being true.)


Best, Ben

On 9/30/2016 8:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Jon, List,

You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has 
also very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic 
and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical 
critic and pertains /only/ to abduction, while the PM--like 
pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a 
/complete/ inquiry.


Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction. 
While logical /critic/ concerns itself with the nature and strength 
of the three types of inferences, /methodeutic/ concerns itself with 
these three patterns of inference as /together/ they figure in a 
complete inquiry.


Thus, as you concluded: /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis 
passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of 
inquiry is a /good/ abduction.


And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as 
semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic /rhetoric/ by Peirce. For 
it is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that 
we are /persuaded/ that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," 
that is, that it is a "good" abduction.


Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:



Gary R., List:

Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the 
last several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction 
between logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 
falls under logical critic and pertains /only/ to abduction, while 
the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and 
pertains to a /complete/ inquiry.


CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it
was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an
explanatory hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was
subject to certain conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be
admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it
would account for the facts or some of them.  The form of
inference, therefore, is this:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189,
EP 2.231)

But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough 
for a hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete 
inquiry.  As Ben U. brought to our attention ...


BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
"Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the
inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not
sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-10-01 Thread Gary Richmond

Ben, Jon, List,

Ben, you commented:

"An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if
it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful
(think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth without
scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of a
previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of time
and energy."

I would tend to agree strongly with this but wonder whether 'falsehood' is
the best expression to describe what happens in such a case. The abduction
is 'good' if it is testable, even if the hypothesis is not, or not fully,
borne out. As you suggested, information is sometimes gained from testing
such hypotheses which, in the economy of research, is useful for further
inquiry.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Jon S., Gary R., list,
>
> Jon, you wrote,
>
> CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet are
> *not* "capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not*
> admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation.
> In other words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may
> nevertheless turn out to be a *bad* abduction; whereas *any* abduction
> whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the
> other two stages of inquiry is a *good* abduction.
> [End quote]
>
> Excellent point. I could kick myself for not having seen that clearly,
> despite my own going on about the difference between critic (including CP
> 5.189) and methodeutic (including the pragmatic maxim). I would add one
> further point about your last clause,
>
> whereas *any* abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the
> PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good* abduction.
> [End quote]
>
> An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the
> economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, if
> it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively fruitful
> (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth without
> scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of a
> previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of time
> and energy. This reflects the heuretic view of inquiry as opposed to the
> view concerned mainly with justifying already-accepted conclusions. (I said
> something like this at peirce-l in May but, in passing, accepted what I
> took to be my interlocutor's sense of "successful" abduction as meaning an
> abductive conclusion's being true.)
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 9/30/2016 8:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> Jon, List,
>
> You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also
> very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and
> methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and
> pertains *only* to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism
> itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete* inquiry.
>
> Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction.
> While logical *critic* concerns itself with the nature and strength of
> the three types of inferences, *methodeutic* concerns itself with these
> three patterns of inference as *together* they figure in a complete
> inquiry.
>
> Thus, as you concluded: *any* abduction whose resulting hypothesis
> passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry
> is a *good* abduction.
>
> And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as
> semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic *rhetoric* by Peirce. For it
> is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that we are
> *persuaded* that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," that is,
> that it is a "good" abduction.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690
> <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote:
>
> Gary R., List:
>
> Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the last
> several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
> logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls
> under logical critic and pertains *only* to abduction, while the PM--like
> pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a
> *complete* inquiry.
>
> CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was
> recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
> hypothes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

I left one point murky; what I had failed to see clearly, until Jon S.'s 
remarks, was that 5.189 can't be regarded as a version, the best as 
Jerry R. has been urging, or otherwise, of the pragmatic maxim. - Best, Ben


On 10/1/2016 11:20 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:


Jon S., Gary R., list,

Jon, you wrote,

CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts,"
yet are /not/ "capable of experimental verification," and thus are
/not/ admissible for subsequent deductive explication and
inductive evaluation.  In other words, an abduction that fully
conforms to CP 5.189 may nevertheless turn out to be a /bad/
abduction; whereas /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis
passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of
inquiry is a /good/ abduction.
[End quote]

Excellent point. I could kick myself for not having seen that clearly, 
despite my own going on about the difference between critic (including 
CP 5.189) and methodeutic (including the pragmatic maxim). I would add 
one further point about your last clause,


whereas /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test
of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a
/good/ abduction.
[End quote]

An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the 
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, 
if it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively 
fruitful (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to 
truth without scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to 
knowledge of a previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have 
caused waste of time and energy. This reflects the heuretic view of 
inquiry as opposed to the view concerned mainly with justifying 
already-accepted conclusions. (I said something like this at peirce-l 
in May but, in passing, accepted what I took to be my interlocutor's 
sense of "successful" abduction as meaning an abductive conclusion's 
being true.)


Best, Ben

On 9/30/2016 8:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Jon, List,

You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has 
also very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic 
and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical 
critic and pertains /only/ to abduction, while the PM--like 
pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a 
/complete/ inquiry.


Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction. 
While logical /critic/ concerns itself with the nature and strength 
of the three types of inferences, /methodeutic/ concerns itself with 
these three patterns of inference as /together/ they figure in a 
complete inquiry.


Thus, as you concluded: /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis 
passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of 
inquiry is a /good/ abduction.


And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as 
semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic /rhetoric/ by Peirce. For 
it is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that 
we are /persuaded/ that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," 
that is, that it is a "good" abduction.


Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:



Gary R., List:

Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the 
last several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction 
between logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 
falls under logical critic and pertains /only/ to abduction, while 
the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and 
pertains to a /complete/ inquiry.


CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it
was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an
explanatory hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was
subject to certain conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be
admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it
would account for the facts or some of them.  The form of
inference, therefore, is this:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189,
EP 2.231)

But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough 
for a hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete 
inquiry.  As Ben U. brought to our attention ...


BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
"Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the
inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not
sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any
hypothesis which

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


Jon S., Gary R., list,

Jon, you wrote,

   CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts,"
   yet are /not/ "capable of experimental verification," and thus are
   /not/ admissible for subsequent deductive explication and inductive
   evaluation.  In other words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP
   5.189 may nevertheless turn out to be a /bad/ abduction; whereas
   /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM
   and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a /good/ abduction.
   [End quote]

Excellent point. I could kick myself for not having seen that clearly, 
despite my own going on about the difference between critic (including 
CP 5.189) and methodeutic (including the pragmatic maxim). I would add 
one further point about your last clause,


   whereas /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test
   of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a
   /good/ abduction.
   [End quote]

An abductive inference may be good and successful in terms of the 
economics of inquiry, even if it turns out to conclude in a falsehood, 
if it nevertheless helps research by either making it positively 
fruitful (think of all the hypotheses that positively help lead to truth 
without scoring a 'hole in one') or at least by leading to knowledge of 
a previously unknown dead end that would otherwise have caused waste of 
time and energy. This reflects the heuretic view of inquiry as opposed 
to the view concerned mainly with justifying already-accepted 
conclusions. (I said something like this at peirce-l in May but, in 
passing, accepted what I took to be my interlocutor's sense of 
"successful" abduction as meaning an abductive conclusion's being true.)


Best, Ben

On 9/30/2016 8:05 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Jon, List,

You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has 
also very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic 
and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical 
critic and pertains /only/ to abduction, while the PM--like 
pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a 
/complete/ inquiry.


Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction. 
While logical /critic/ concerns itself with the nature and strength of 
the three types of inferences, /methodeutic/ concerns itself with 
these three patterns of inference as /together/ they figure in a 
complete inquiry.


Thus, as you concluded: /any/ abduction whose resulting hypothesis 
passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of 
inquiry is a /good/ abduction.


And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as 
semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic /rhetoric/ by Peirce. For 
it is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that 
we are /persuaded/ that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," 
that is, that it is a "good" abduction.


Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond

*Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690*

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote:



Gary R., List:

Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the 
last several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction 
between logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 
falls under logical critic and pertains /only/ to abduction, while 
the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and 
pertains to a /complete/ inquiry.


CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it
was recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an
explanatory hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was
subject to certain conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be
admitted, even as a hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it
would account for the facts or some of them.  The form of
inference, therefore, is this:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189,
EP 2.231)

But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough 
for a hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete 
inquiry.  As Ben U. brought to our attention ...


BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
"Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the
inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not
sufficient that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any
hypothesis which explains the facts is justified critically. But
among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which is
suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb
"critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of
arguments. In the rest of that quote

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear all,

Perhaps I ought to point out the elephant in the room.

Despite your admission that:

"*any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis passes the test of the PM and
(ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry is a *good *abduction"

why do disagreements persist and why are disputants unable to work
themselves out of the problem?  I need not refer by name to any particular
instance...

Best,
Jerry R

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 7:05 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also
> very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and
> methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and
> pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism
> itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete *inquiry.
>
> Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction.
> While logical *critic* concerns itself with the nature and strength of
> the three types of inferences, *methodeutic* concerns itself with these
> three patterns of inference as *together* they figure in a complete
> inquiry.
>
> Thus, as you concluded: *any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis
> passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry
> is a *good *abduction.
>
> And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as
> semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic *rhetoric* by Peirce. For it
> is through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that we are
> *persuaded* that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," that is,
> that it is a "good" abduction.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the last
>> several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
>> logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls
>> under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the
>> PM--like pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a
>> *complete *inquiry.
>>
>> CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was
>> recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
>> hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain
>> conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a
>> hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or
>> some of them.  The form of inference, therefore, is this:
>>
>> The surprising fact, C, is observed;
>>
>> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
>>
>> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2.231)
>>
>>
>> But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough for a
>> hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete inquiry.  As
>> Ben U. brought to our attention ...
>>
>> BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
>> "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which
>> starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis
>> should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is
>> justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select
>> that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb
>> "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments.
>> In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved.
>>
>>
>> In other words, the PM is *required *before we can take that next step.
>> In fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this *later in the very same
>> lecture *in which he presented CP 5.189.
>>
>> CSP:  If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see
>> that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.  That
>> is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
>> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
>> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
>> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of
>> pragmatism really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to
>> logic, and is not understood as a proposition in psychology.  For the maxim
>> of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or import
>> differing from that of a second conception except so far as, taken in
>> connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably
>> modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception. (CP
>> 5.196, EP 2.234)
>>
>>
>> Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if sound,
>> must render needless

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, List,

You wrote: I think that the discussion over the last several days has also
very helpfully clarified the distinction between logical critic and
methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls under logical critic and
pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like pragmat[ic]ism
itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete *inquiry.

Yes, I agree that the discussion has helped clarify this distinction. While
logical *critic* concerns itself with the nature and strength of the three
types of inferences, *methodeutic* concerns itself with these three
patterns of inference as *together* they figure in a complete inquiry.

Thus, as you concluded: *any *abduction whose resulting hypothesis
passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages of inquiry
is a *good *abduction.

And perhaps this also helps explain why the third branch of logic as
semiotic was alternatively termed theoretic *rhetoric* by Peirce. For it is
through a complete inquiry involving a testable hypothesis that we are
*persuaded* that some given hypothesis "explains the facts," that is, that
it is a "good" abduction.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 5:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the last
> several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
> logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls
> under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like
> pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a
> *complete *inquiry.
>
> CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was
> recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
> hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain
> conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a
> hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or
> some of them.  The form of inference, therefore, is this:
>
> The surprising fact, C, is observed;
>
> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
>
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2.231)
>
>
> But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough for a
> hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete inquiry.  As
> Ben U. brought to our attention ...
>
> BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
> "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which
> starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis
> should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is
> justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select
> that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb
> "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments.
> In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved.
>
>
> In other words, the PM is *required *before we can take that next step.
> In fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this *later in the very same
> lecture *in which he presented CP 5.189.
>
> CSP:  If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see
> that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.  That
> is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
> really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
> not understood as a proposition in psychology.  For the maxim of pragmatism
> is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from
> that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with
> other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical
> conduct differently from that second conception. (CP 5.196, EP 2.234)
>
>
> Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if sound,
> must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of
> hypotheses."  Peirce subsequently explained why this is so.
>
> CSP:  Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of
> Abduction, let us consider it under that form.  What is good abduction?
> What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a
> hypothesis?  Of course, it must explain the facts.  But what other
> conditions ought it to fulfill to be good?  The question of the goodness of
> anything is whether that thing fulfills its end.  What, then, is the end of
> an explanatory hypothesis?  Its end is, through subjection to the test of
> experiment

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Jerry Rhee

Jon, Gary, list and friends,

In response to all those words, I say to you:

one two three...
*C A B*...
*CP 5.189*...

*as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions*

STRANGER: That the dialectical method is no respecter of persons, and does
not set the great above the small, but always arrives in her own way at the
truest result.

YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 4:53 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the last
> several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
> logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls
> under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like
> pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a
> *complete *inquiry.
>
> CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was
> recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
> hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain
> conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a
> hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or
> some of them.  The form of inference, therefore, is this:
>
> The surprising fact, C, is observed;
>
> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
>
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2.231)
>
>
> But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough for a
> hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete inquiry.  As
> Ben U. brought to our attention ...
>
> BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
> "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which
> starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis
> should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is
> justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select
> that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb
> "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments.
> In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved.
>
>
> In other words, the PM is *required *before we can take that next step.
> In fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this *later in the very same
> lecture *in which he presented CP 5.189.
>
> CSP:  If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see
> that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.  That
> is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
> really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
> not understood as a proposition in psychology.  For the maxim of pragmatism
> is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from
> that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with
> other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical
> conduct differently from that second conception. (CP 5.196, EP 2.234)
>
>
> Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if sound,
> must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of
> hypotheses."  Peirce subsequently explained why this is so.
>
> CSP:  Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of
> Abduction, let us consider it under that form.  What is good abduction?
> What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a
> hypothesis?  Of course, it must explain the facts.  But what other
> conditions ought it to fulfill to be good?  The question of the goodness of
> anything is whether that thing fulfills its end.  What, then, is the end of
> an explanatory hypothesis?  Its end is, through subjection to the test of
> experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the
> establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be
> disappointed.  Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the
> absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of
> experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such
> verification.  This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197,
> EP 2.235)
>
>
> CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet are
> *not *"capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not *admissible
> for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation.  In other
> words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may nevertheless turn
> out to be a *bad *abduction; whereas *any *abduction whose resulting
> hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages
> of inquiry is a *good *abduction.
>
> Regards,
>
>

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary R., List:

Thanks for your kind words.  I think that the discussion over the last
several days has also very helpfully clarified the distinction between
logical critic and methodeutic.  In particular, CP 5.189 falls
under logical critic and pertains *only *to abduction, while the PM--like
pragmat[ic]ism itself--falls under methodeutic and pertains to a *complete *
inquiry.

CSP:  Long before I first classed abduction as an inference it was
recognized by logicians that the operation of adopting an explanatory
hypothesis--which is just what abduction is--was subject to certain
conditions.  Namely, the hypothesis cannot be admitted, even as a
hypothesis, unless it be supposed that it would account for the facts or
some of them.  The form of inference, therefore, is this:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;

But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,

Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2.231)

But merely accounting for the facts (or some of them) is not enough for a
hypothesis to be admitted to the further stages of a complete inquiry.  As
Ben U. brought to our attention ...

BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic
has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a
scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be
a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified
critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one
which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb "critically"
is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of
that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved.

In other words, the PM is *required *before we can take that next step.  In
fact, Peirce also explicitly stated this *later in the very same lecture *in
which he presented CP 5.189.

CSP:  If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see
that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.  That
is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic, and is
not understood as a proposition in psychology.  For the maxim of pragmatism
is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from
that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with
other conceptions and intentions, it might conceivably modify our practical
conduct differently from that second conception. (CP 5.196, EP 2.234)

Rather than CP 5.189, it is the PM (as formulated here) that, "if sound,
must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of
hypotheses."  Peirce subsequently explained why this is so.

CSP:  Admitting, then, that the question of Pragmatism is the question of
Abduction, let us consider it under that form.  What is good abduction?
What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be worthy to rank as a
hypothesis?  Of course, it must explain the facts.  But what other
conditions ought it to fulfill to be good?  The question of the goodness of
anything is whether that thing fulfills its end.  What, then, is the end of
an explanatory hypothesis?  Its end is, through subjection to the test of
experiment, to lead to the avoidance of all surprise and to the
establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be
disappointed.  Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence
of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of
experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such
verification.  This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197,
EP 2.235)

CP 5.189 can and does produce hypotheses that "explain the facts," yet are
*not *"capable of experimental verification," and thus are *not *admissible
for subsequent deductive explication and inductive evaluation.  In other
words, an abduction that fully conforms to CP 5.189 may nevertheless turn
out to be a *bad *abduction; whereas *any *abduction whose resulting
hypothesis passes the test of the PM and (ultimately) the other two stages
of inquiry is a *good *abduction.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 3:29 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> Nice summary statement, Jon, which the quotation brings home.
>
> This discussion has been quite valuable for me as it clarified a matter
> which, as I noted in my initial post on the security/uberty question, has
> troubled me for some time. Perhaps most helpful was seeing that Houser had
> conflated the PM and 'pragmatism' in his introduction to the pie

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Helmut, List,

Nice summary statement, Jon, which the quotation brings home.

This discussion has been quite valuable for me as it clarified a matter
which, as I noted in my initial post on the security/uberty question, has
troubled me for some time. Perhaps most helpful was seeing that Houser had
conflated the PM and 'pragmatism' in his introduction to the piece, and
that much of my confusion arose from that (and that's yet another lesson
learned here, namely, that even a *great* Peirce scholar--which I and many
consider Nathan Houser to be--can err in any given interpretation).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 4:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Helmut, List:
>
> The justification of abduction/retroduction (by itself) falls under
> logical critic, rather than methodeutic.  However, pragmat[ic]ism as
> methodeutic tells us how abduction/retroduction fits within a complete
> inquiry--the justified hypotheses that it produces are admitted or rejected
> on the basis of the pragmatic maxim, and those that are admitted
> subsequently undergo deductive explication and inductive evaluation.
> Abduction/retroduction alone contributes to uberty, while the pragmatic
> maxim, deduction, and induction all contribute to security.  Quoting "A
> Neglected Argument" once again ...
>
> CSP:  Observe that neither Deduction nor Induction contributes the
> smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry.  They render
> the indefinite definite; Deduction Explicates; Induction evaluates:  that
> is all.  Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and
> such ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval
> wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the
> vaguest, he managed to communicate to some fellow, we are building a
> cantilever bridge of induction, held together by scientific struts and
> ties.  Yet every plank of its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone,
> that is to say, by the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason; and
> neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new concept to the
> structure.  Nor is this less true or less important for those inquiries
> that self-interest prompts. (CP 6.475, EP 2.443; 1908)
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 2:34 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>> yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a
>> deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility)
>> does. Obviously abduction is something personal/individual that escapes
>> methodeutics. So the problem of 
>> uberty/security/abduction/deduction/pragmatism/pragmatic
>> maxim etc. is not solved by my contribution.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>> 30. September 2016 um 20:49 Uhr
>> "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>>
>> Helmut:
>>
>> I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by *plausibility*,
>> which indeed pertains to the justification of abduction.  In your example,
>> it is *plausible* that these white beans are from this bag that contains
>> only white beans.  On the other hand, it would obviously *not *be
>> plausible to suggest that these white beans are from this other bag that
>> contains only black beans.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Jon, list,
>>>
>>> you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second
>>> statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...".
>>> This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the
>>> conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about
>>> abduction should have for first premiss an epistemologic explanation, what
>>> observer-personal possibility / abduction is, and for second premiss the
>>> case that suits to that. Like:
>>> 1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*.
>>> 2.: The fact that all beans from the bag are white, and that these beans
>>> are white, and nothing else that might contradict the possibility is known
>>> by the observer about the bag and the beans, suits the above scheme.
>>> 3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification
>>> of an abduction, that the beans are from the bag.
>>>
>>> But I dont know, if this helps the discussion.
>>> Best,
>>> Helmut
>>>
>>> 29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr
>>> "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
>>>
>>> Helmut, List:
>>>
>>> I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies
>>> as a genuine deduction.  It is not *necessarily* true that "it is
>>> possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible
>>> *for some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the
>>> beans.  In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified
>>> things

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, List:

The justification of abduction/retroduction (by itself) falls under logical
critic, rather than methodeutic.  However, pragmat[ic]ism as methodeutic
tells us how abduction/retroduction fits within a complete inquiry--the
justified hypotheses that it produces are admitted or rejected on the basis
of the pragmatic maxim, and those that are admitted subsequently undergo
deductive explication and inductive evaluation.  Abduction/retroduction
alone contributes to uberty, while the pragmatic maxim, deduction, and
induction all contribute to security.  Quoting "A Neglected Argument" once
again ...

CSP:  Observe that neither Deduction nor Induction contributes the smallest
positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry.  They render the
indefinite definite; Deduction Explicates; Induction evaluates:  that is
all.  Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and
such ideas of Man's environment as, coming over him during his primeval
wanderings in the forest, while yet his very notion of error was of the
vaguest, he managed to communicate to some fellow, we are building a
cantilever bridge of induction, held together by scientific struts and
ties.  Yet every plank of its advance is first laid by Retroduction alone,
that is to say, by the spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason; and
neither Deduction nor Induction contributes a single new concept to the
structure.  Nor is this less true or less important for those inquiries
that self-interest prompts. (CP 6.475, EP 2.443; 1908)

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 2:34 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, list,
> yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a
> deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility)
> does. Obviously abduction is something personal/individual that escapes
> methodeutics. So the problem of 
> uberty/security/abduction/deduction/pragmatism/pragmatic
> maxim etc. is not solved by my contribution.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 30. September 2016 um 20:49 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>
> Helmut:
>
> I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by *plausibility*,
> which indeed pertains to the justification of abduction.  In your example,
> it is *plausible* that these white beans are from this bag that contains
> only white beans.  On the other hand, it would obviously *not *be
> plausible to suggest that these white beans are from this other bag that
> contains only black beans.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second
>> statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...".
>> This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the
>> conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about
>> abduction should have for first premiss an epistemologic explanation, what
>> observer-personal possibility / abduction is, and for second premiss the
>> case that suits to that. Like:
>> 1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*.
>> 2.: The fact that all beans from the bag are white, and that these beans
>> are white, and nothing else that might contradict the possibility is known
>> by the observer about the bag and the beans, suits the above scheme.
>> 3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification
>> of an abduction, that the beans are from the bag.
>>
>> But I dont know, if this helps the discussion.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>> 29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr
>> "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
>>
>> Helmut, List:
>>
>> I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies
>> as a genuine deduction.  It is not *necessarily* true that "it is
>> possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for
>> some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans.
>> In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things,
>> at least somewhat.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Dear list members,
>>> I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag
>>> are white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an
>>> abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are
>>> white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a
>>> deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an
>>> abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But
>>> talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view
>>> it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the
>>> pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction.

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supplement: Maybe all about this is said already earlier in this thread. I am slow with catching up.

Jon, list,

yes. So I was wrong assuming, that talking about abduction implies a deduction. Only talking about the justification of abduction (plausibility) does. Obviously abduction is something personal/individual that escapes methodeutics. So the problem of uberty/security/abduction/deduction/pragmatism/pragmatic maxim etc. is not solved by my contribution.

Best,

Helmut

30. September 2016 um 20:49 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut:

I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by plausibility, which indeed pertains to the justification of abduction. In your example, it is plausible that these white beans are from this bag that contains only white beans. On the other hand, it would obviously not be plausible to suggest that these white beans are from this other bag that contains only black beans.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, list,

you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...". This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about abduction should have for first premiss an epistemologic explanation, what observer-personal possibility / abduction is, and for second premiss the case that suits to that. Like:

1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*.

2.: The fact that all beans from the bag are white, and that these beans are white, and nothing else that might contradict the possibility is known by the observer about the bag and the beans, suits the above scheme.

3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification of an abduction, that the beans are from the bag.

But I dont know, if this helps the discussion.

Best,

Helmut

29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies as a genuine deduction. It is not necessarily true that "it is possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be impossible for some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans. In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things, at least somewhat.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear list members,

I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction.

Best,

Helmut

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, list,

Best,

Helmut

30. September 2016 um 20:49 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt"

Helmut:

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Jon, list,

1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*.

3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification of an abduction, that the beans are from the bag.

But I dont know, if this helps the discussion.

Best,

Helmut

29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear list members,

Best,

Helmut

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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut:

I think that you are getting at what Peirce meant by *plausibility*, which
indeed pertains to the justification of abduction.  In your example, it is
*plausible* that these white beans are from this bag that contains only
white beans.  On the other hand, it would obviously *not *be plausible to
suggest that these white beans are from this other bag that contains only
black beans.

Regards,

Jon

On Fri, Sep 30, 2016 at 1:10 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> you are of course right. I might replace the conclusion in the second
> statement with: "So for the observer person it seems possible that...".
> This would be a true statement, but still not a deduction, because the
> conclusion is not based on the premisses. I think, a deduction about
> abduction should have for first premiss an epistemologic explanation, what
> observer-personal possibility / abduction is, and for second premiss the
> case that suits to that. Like:
> 1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*.
> 2.: The fact that all beans from the bag are white, and that these beans
> are white, and nothing else that might contradict the possibility is known
> by the observer about the bag and the beans, suits the above scheme.
> 3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification of
> an abduction, that the beans are from the bag.
>
> But I dont know, if this helps the discussion.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr
> "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies
> as a genuine deduction.  It is not *necessarily* true that "it is
> possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for
> some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans.
> In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things,
> at least somewhat.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien 
> wrote:
>>
>> Dear list members,
>> I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are
>> white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an
>> abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are
>> white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a
>> deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an
>> abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But
>> talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view
>> it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the
>> pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>

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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-30 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, list,

1.: Observer-personal possibility, i.e. abduction is: *Blahblahblah*.

3. So there is an observer-personal possibility, i.e. the justification of an abduction, that the beans are from the bag.

But I dont know, if this helps the discussion.

Best,

Helmut

29. September 2016 um 22:39 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Helmut, List:

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear list members,

Best,

Helmut

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-29 Thread Jerry Rhee

Helmut, list:

I think you’ve said something profound.

You said:

"So making an abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is
deductive). But talking about abduction is, because it includes a
deduction."

I think listers will object to your “abduction is not pragmaticism because
pragmaticism is deductive”.  That’s so wrong, it isn’t even wrong.

___

You said:

"With this view it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism
and the pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction."

To which I would ask, what makes pragmaticism pragmaticism?

Is it simply determinable based on *the* pragmatic maxim, which is about as
useful as a theory of everything would be in terms of a prescriptive method
for ascertaining truth about anything at all.

___

The most important issue I wish to bring to attention is your observation
that making an abduction *is not* pragmaticism.  Is the contrary so?

That is, *is making an abduction pragmaticism*?

Moreover, is making abduction without "beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon
abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity above
Animality'" truly making abduction?

This relates to what are the standards for pragmaticism, for the word was
invented as a response to pragmatism.  So, it cannot simply be pragmatism.

I would appreciate your thoughts on this matter.

Best,
Jerry R

On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 3:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Helmut, List:
>
> I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies
> as a genuine deduction.  It is not *necessarily* true that "it is
> possible that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for
> some reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans.
> In any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things,
> at least somewhat.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Dear list members,
>> I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are
>> white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an
>> abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are
>> white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a
>> deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an
>> abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But
>> talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view
>> it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the
>> pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction.
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-29 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Helmut, List:

I appreciate the comment, but I do not think that your example qualifies as
a genuine deduction.  It is not *necessarily* true that "it is possible
that they are from the bag"; it might, in fact, be *impossible *for some
reason, presumably having nothing to do with the color of the beans.  In
any case, again, hopefully my subsequent messages have clarified things, at
least somewhat.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 11:20 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Dear list members,
> I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are
> white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an
> abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are
> white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a
> deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an
> abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But
> talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view
> it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the
> pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-29 Thread Helmut Raulien


Dear list members,

I am not sure if this helps: I think, to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so these beans are from the bag" is an abduction. But to say: "All beans from the bag are white, these beans are white, so it is possible that they are from the bag" is sort of a deduction, isnt it, because the statement is necessarily true. So making an abduction is not pragmaticism (given that pragmaticism is deductive). But talking about abduction is, because it includes a deduction. With this view it may be not necessary to distinguish between pragmaticism and the pragmatic maxim concerning the matter of abduction.


Best,

Helmut


 28. September 2016 um 15:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Gary R., List:
 


GR:  But, in fact, Peirce does call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of pragmatism" in this essay.


 

Yes, but my point is that he does not call the PM the "rule of abduction"; so again, I am positing a distinction between Peirce's pragmatism (i.e., pragmaticism) as the "logic of abduction" and the PM as the "rule of pragmatism."  Pragmaticism as a whole--i.e., all three Stages of Inquiry, taken together--includes the PM, but the PM is not all there is to it.  The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.  I wonder if another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.

 

Frankly, Houser misquoted Peirce when he wrote, "Peirce had come to see that pragmatism has the limitations that come with choosing security over uberty:  '[it] does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity above Animality'" (EP 2.xxxii, emphasis added).  What Peirce actually wrote is, "Yet the maxim of Pragmatism does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity above Animality" (EP 2.465, emphasis added).

 

Regards,

 

Jon






 




 

On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:



Jon, List,

 

Jon, I think I am tending to agree with your conclusion, that "Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."

 

On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did."

 

But, in fact, Peirce does call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of pragmatism" in this essay. He writes:

 

"That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in 1871 to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465).

 

So, there is this sense in which Houser may not be entirely incorrect, at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism ought not be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism far beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "used. . .to call" it the rule of pragmatism). 

 

As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a footnote to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' somewhat different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic (Houser's "rich suggestiveness"). 

 


In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, Peirce wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring out the amount and kind of security (approach to certainty) of each kind of reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable uberty, or value in productiveness (emphasis added) of each kind (CP 8.384). [EP2:553, fn 7]


 

As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to some considerable degree.

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 










 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690





 



On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:


Gary R., List:
 


GR:  But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Hi everyone:

"We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out
whether, in fact, this is the case."

Where is genuine doubt?

Thanks,
Jerry R

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Clark, List:
>
> As (hopefully) clarified in my subsequent messages, I am not saying that
> the PM itself is "deductive"; rather, it serves as the rule for admitting
> hypotheses to the deductive stage of inquiry once they have been produced
> and justified--because they plausibly account for the facts--by abduction.
>
> CSP:  For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical
> effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far
> as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might
> conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second
> conception.  Now it is indisputable that no rule of abduction would be
> admitted by *any *philosopher which should prohibit on any formalistic
> grounds any inquiry as to how we ought in consistency to shape our
> practical conduct.  Therefore, a maxim which looks only to possibly
> practical considerations will not need any supplement in order to exclude
> any hypotheses as inadmissible.  What hypotheses it admits all philosophers
> would agree ought to be admitted.  On the other hand, if it be true that 
> nothing
> but such considerations has any logical effect or import whatever, it is
> plain that the maxim of pragmatism cannot cut off any kind of hypothesis
> which ought to be admitted.  Thus, the maxim of pragmatism, if true,
> fully *covers *the entire logic of abduction. (CP 5.196)
>
>
> My earlier point was that identifying *how *a conception "might
> conceivably modify our practical conduct" seems like (deductive)
> explication to me--the hypothesis that a diamond is hard means, for one
> thing, "that it will not be scratched by many other substances" (CP
> 5.403).  We can then (inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find
> out whether, in fact, this is the case.  In Peirce's words that I quoted
> previously, the PM also "cut[s] down *the premisses* of deduction" by
> rejecting hypotheses that have no bearing on "possibly practical
> considerations," and thus do not warrant any further attention.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
>> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> wrote:
>>
>> The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction;
>> which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.  I wonder if
>> another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical
>> critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.
>>
>> Why do you see it as primarily deductive? I ask since the mature form of
>> the pragmatic maxim is to consider all the possible consequences (meaning
>> practical differences we can detect). That seems inherently an abductive
>> consideration although the actual measurement would be a combination of
>> deductive and inductive against a perhaps more abductive theoretical
>> scaffolding. But any particular detection that something is hard is
>> different from the meaning of say a diamond being hard.
>>
>
>
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>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Clark, List:

As (hopefully) clarified in my subsequent messages, I am not saying that
the PM itself is "deductive"; rather, it serves as the rule for admitting
hypotheses to the deductive stage of inquiry once they have been produced
and justified--because they plausibly account for the facts--by abduction.

CSP:  For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical
effect or import differing from that of a second conception except so far
as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions, it might
conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second
conception.  Now it is indisputable that no rule of abduction would be
admitted by *any *philosopher which should prohibit on any formalistic
grounds any inquiry as to how we ought in consistency to shape our
practical conduct.  Therefore, a maxim which looks only to possibly
practical considerations will not need any supplement in order to exclude
any hypotheses as inadmissible.  What hypotheses it admits all philosophers
would agree ought to be admitted.  On the other hand, if it be true
that nothing
but such considerations has any logical effect or import whatever, it is
plain that the maxim of pragmatism cannot cut off any kind of hypothesis
which ought to be admitted.  Thus, the maxim of pragmatism, if true,
fully *covers
*the entire logic of abduction. (CP 5.196)

My earlier point was that identifying *how *a conception "might conceivably
modify our practical conduct" seems like (deductive) explication to me--the
hypothesis that a diamond is hard means, for one thing, "that it will not
be scratched by many other substances" (CP 5.403).  We can then
(inductively) experiment with actual diamonds to find out whether, in fact,
this is the case.  In Peirce's words that I quoted previously, the PM
also "cut[s]
down *the premisses* of deduction" by rejecting hypotheses that have no
bearing on "possibly practical considerations," and thus do not warrant any
further attention.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which
> is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.  I wonder if another
> way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but
> pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.
>
> Why do you see it as primarily deductive? I ask since the mature form of
> the pragmatic maxim is to consider all the possible consequences (meaning
> practical differences we can detect). That seems inherently an abductive
> consideration although the actual measurement would be a combination of
> deductive and inductive against a perhaps more abductive theoretical
> scaffolding. But any particular detection that something is hard is
> different from the meaning of say a diamond being hard.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Clark, list:

I've had the same difficulty, myself, except I cannot make up my mind since
I'm not even certain of the maxim to which is being referred.

For instance, here is an even different pragmatic maxim;
one that calls attention to making the speech outside of ourselves:

"I have long ago come to be guided by this maxim: that as long as it
is *practically
certain that we cannot* directly, nor with much accuracy even indirectly,
observe what passes in the consciousness of any other person, while it is
far from certain that we can do so (and accurately record what [we] can
even glimpse at best but very glibberly) even in the case of what shoots
through our own minds, *it is much safer to define all mental characters as
far as possible in terms of their outward manifestations*." ~Peirce

Best,
Jerry Rhee




On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:02 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which
> is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.  I wonder if another
> way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but
> pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.
>
>
> Why do you see it as primarily deductive? I ask since the mature form of
> the pragmatic maxim is to consider all the possible consequences (meaning
> practical differences we can detect). That seems inherently an abductive
> consideration although the actual measurement would be a combination of
> deductive and inductive against a perhaps more abductive theoretical
> scaffolding. But any particular detection that something is hard is
> different from the meaning of say a diamond being hard.
>
>
> -
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-28 Thread Clark Goble

> On Sep 28, 2016, at 7:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not abduction; which is 
> why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.  I wonder if another way 
> to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to logical critic, but 
> pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.

Why do you see it as primarily deductive? I ask since the mature form of the 
pragmatic maxim is to consider all the possible consequences (meaning practical 
differences we can detect). That seems inherently an abductive consideration 
although the actual measurement would be a combination of deductive and 
inductive against a perhaps more abductive theoretical scaffolding. But any 
particular detection that something is hard is different from the meaning of 
say a diamond being hard. 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jon, list:

You pull that quote as if everything is self-evident.  Yet, you never
provide that certain maxim that is posed by pragmatism, as if that is
understood.

Yet, if you pose it, state it clearly, say it explicitly, express it out
loud;
you will discover that it is the wrong maxim.

"...if our opponent will only say something; and if he says nothing, it is
absurd to seek to give an account of our views to one who cannot give an
account of anything, in so far as he cannot do so."

Best,
Jerry R


On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 2:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> This passage conveniently lays out Peirce's views on what we have been
> discussing today.
>
> CSP:  If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see
> that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.  That
> is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
> needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
> hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
> suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
> really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic ... Thus,
> the maxim of pragmatism, if true, fully *covers* the entire logic of
> abduction.  It remains to inquire whether this maxim may not have some 
> *further
> *logical effect.  If so, it must in some way affect inductive or
> deductive inference.  But that pragmatism cannot interfere with induction
> is evident; because induction simply teaches us what we have to expect as a
> result of experimentation, and it is plain that any such expectation may
> conceivably concern practical conduct.  In a certain sense it *must*
> affect *deduction*.  Anything which gives a rule to abduction and so puts
> a limit upon admissible hypotheses will cut down *the premisses* of
> deduction, and thereby will render a *reductio ad absurdum* and other
> equivalent forms of deduction possible which would not otherwise have been
> possible.  But ... to affect the premisses of deduction is not to affect
> the logic of deduction ... Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in
> the absence of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable
> of experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such
> verification.  This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism.  But just
> here a broad question opens out before us.  What are we to understand by
> experimental verification?  The answer to that involves the whole logic of
> induction. (CP 5.196-197)
>
>
> The pragmatic maxim "fully covers the entire logic of abduction" by
> serving as the rule that determines "the admissibility of hypotheses," not
> their generation or justification.  Although "pragmatism cannot interfere
> with induction," nevertheless "the whole logic of induction" is precisely
> the "experimental verification" of which a hypothesis must be capable in
> order to be admissible.  On the other hand, pragmatism "must affect
> deduction" by cutting down its premisses; but even so, it does not do so in
> such a way as "to affect the logic of deduction."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

List:

This passage conveniently lays out Peirce's views on what we have been
discussing today.

CSP:  If you carefully consider the question of pragmatism you will see
that it is nothing else than the question of the logic of abduction.  That
is, pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render
needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as
hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful
suggestions; and, furthermore, this is *all *that the maxim of pragmatism
really pretends to do, at least so far as it is confined to logic ... Thus,
the maxim of pragmatism, if true, fully *covers* the entire logic of
abduction.  It remains to inquire whether this maxim may not have some *further
*logical effect.  If so, it must in some way affect inductive or deductive
inference.  But that pragmatism cannot interfere with induction is evident;
because induction simply teaches us what we have to expect as a result of
experimentation, and it is plain that any such expectation may conceivably
concern practical conduct.  In a certain sense it *must* affect *deduction*.
Anything which gives a rule to abduction and so puts a limit upon
admissible hypotheses will cut down *the premisses* of deduction, and
thereby will render a *reductio ad absurdum* and other equivalent forms of
deduction possible which would not otherwise have been possible.  But ...
to affect the premisses of deduction is not to affect the logic of
deduction ... Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence
of any special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of
experimental verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such
verification.  This is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism.  But just
here a broad question opens out before us.  What are we to understand by
experimental verification?  The answer to that involves the whole logic of
induction. (CP 5.196-197)


The pragmatic maxim "fully covers the entire logic of abduction" by serving
as the rule that determines "the admissibility of hypotheses," not their
generation or justification.  Although "pragmatism cannot interfere with
induction," nevertheless "the whole logic of induction" is precisely the
"experimental verification" of which a hypothesis must be capable in order
to be admissible.  On the other hand, pragmatism "must affect deduction" by
cutting down its premisses; but even so, it does not do so in such a way as
"to affect the logic of deduction."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jon, Gary, list:

I do not see how we're back to anything at all about a complete inquiry
when you have not spoken a whit on "beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon
abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity above Animality'"

Best,
Jerry R

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 10:39 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed
> in critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about
> that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may
> think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen
> entertained in the literature.
>
>
> My default suspicion of novelty is flaring up again, so I am inclined to
> withdraw my off-the-cuff suggestion as having no merit.  I was just
> thinking that the validity of each individual reasoning type (abduction,
> deduction, induction) falls under logical critic, while complete inquiry
> that includes them all falls under methodeutic; and I see the PM as
> pertaining primarily to the Second Stage only, deduction--identifying
> practical consequences of a hypothesis so that it can be tested.  However,
> I went back and found this earlier quote and comment from Ben U.
>
> CSP:  Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made
> almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and of
> rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification.
> (L75.280)
>
>
> BU:  Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and
> of rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of
> methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is
> how the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference.
> Methodeutic does not have the same special interest in deduction and
> induction; the specific justifications of deductions and inductions as
> valid are topics of critical logic.
>
>
> I was evidently conflating the *justification *of deduction, which falls
> under logical critic, with the *application *of deduction within a
> complete inquiry--employing the PM--which falls under methodeutic.  But I
> also see Ben here explicitly associating the PM with "the logic of
> abductive inference," which confuses me again.  In my mind, "definition ...
> rendering ideas clear ... [and] consideration of conceivable experimental
> consequences" all pertain to the *explication* of hypotheses (deduction),
> not their *formulation *(abduction).  Ben also provided this quote ...
>
> CSP:  Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any
> special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental
> verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This
> is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, EP 2.235)
>
>
> ... but that is discussing the *admissibility *of a hypothesis *after *it
> has been formulated.  Does that assessment more properly fall under the
> justification of *abduction *(logical critic) or, as I just proposed, the
> application of *deduction *within a complete inquiry (methodeutic)?  Ben
> later seemed to favor the latter, as well ...
>
> BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said,
> "Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which
> starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis
> should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is
> justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select
> that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb
> "critically" is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments.
> In the rest of that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved.
>
>
> ... and I now find this analysis quite persuasive.  When Peirce calls
> pragmatism "the logic of abduction," he is not referring to the *validity
> *of abduction by itself, but how abduction fits into a *complete 
> *inquiry--i.e.,
> methodeutic rather than logical critic.  Bringing us back to the original
> thread topic--after all that, perhaps we can simply identify this as
> Peirce's "theory of thinking" in the context of "A Neglected Argument."
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> Reading over our several posts on this topic it appears that we are in
>> the main in agreement that the distinction between the PM and pragmaticism
>> in its fullness ought not be conflated as, apparently, Houser has to some
>> extent, for example, in his misquoting Peirce in the essay, replacing the
>> "pragmatic maxim" with "pragmatism."
>>
>> If we avoid this conflation then we can legitimately, I think, identify
>> the security offered by the pragmatic maxim and the uberty which
>> pragmaticism offers in the context of a complete inquiry.
>>
>> As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Gary R., List:

GR:  As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed
in critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about
that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may
think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen
entertained in the literature.

My default suspicion of novelty is flaring up again, so I am inclined to
withdraw my off-the-cuff suggestion as having no merit.  I was just
thinking that the validity of each individual reasoning type (abduction,
deduction, induction) falls under logical critic, while complete inquiry
that includes them all falls under methodeutic; and I see the PM as
pertaining primarily to the Second Stage only, deduction--identifying
practical consequences of a hypothesis so that it can be tested.  However,
I went back and found this earlier quote and comment from Ben U.

CSP:  Two other problems of methodeutic which the old logics usually made
almost its only business are, first, the principles of definition, and of
rendering ideas clear; and second, the principles of classification.
(L75.280)

BU:  Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and of
rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of
methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is
how the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference.
Methodeutic does not have the same special interest in deduction and
induction; the specific justifications of deductions and inductions as
valid are topics of critical logic.

I was evidently conflating the *justification *of deduction, which falls
under logical critic, with the *application *of deduction within a complete
inquiry--employing the PM--which falls under methodeutic.  But I also see
Ben here explicitly associating the PM with "the logic of abductive
inference," which confuses me again.  In my mind, "definition ... rendering
ideas clear ... [and] consideration of conceivable experimental
consequences" all pertain to the *explication* of hypotheses (deduction),
not their *formulation *(abduction).  Ben also provided this quote ...

CSP:  Any hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any
special reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental
verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This
is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism. (CP 5.197, EP 2.235)

... but that is discussing the *admissibility *of a hypothesis *after *it
has been formulated.  Does that assessment more properly fall under the
justification of *abduction *(logical critic) or, as I just proposed, the
application of *deduction *within a complete inquiry (methodeutic)?  Ben
later seemed to favor the latter, as well ...

BU:  Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic
has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a
scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be
a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified
critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one
which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb "critically"
is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of
that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved.

... and I now find this analysis quite persuasive.  When Peirce calls
pragmatism "the logic of abduction," he is not referring to the *validity *of
abduction by itself, but how abduction fits into a *complete *inquiry--i.e.,
methodeutic rather than logical critic.  Bringing us back to the original
thread topic--after all that, perhaps we can simply identify this as
Peirce's "theory of thinking" in the context of "A Neglected Argument."

Regards,

Jon

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:40 AM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Reading over our several posts on this topic it appears that we are in the
> main in agreement that the distinction between the PM and pragmaticism in
> its fullness ought not be conflated as, apparently, Houser has to some
> extent, for example, in his misquoting Peirce in the essay, replacing the
> "pragmatic maxim" with "pragmatism."
>
> If we avoid this conflation then we can legitimately, I think, identify
> the security offered by the pragmatic maxim and the uberty which
> pragmaticism offers in the context of a complete inquiry.
>
> As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed in
> critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about
> that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may
> think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen
> entertained in the literature.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-28 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, List,

Reading over our several posts on this topic it appears that we are in the
main in agreement that the distinction between the PM and pragmaticism in
its fullness ought not be conflated as, apparently, Houser has to some
extent, for example, in his misquoting Peirce in the essay, replacing the
"pragmatic maxim" with "pragmatism."

If we avoid this conflation then we can legitimately, I think, identify the
security offered by the pragmatic maxim and the uberty which pragmaticism
offers in the context of a complete inquiry.

As for your intriguing suggestion that the PM might better be placed in
critical logic rather than methodeutic, well, I'll have to think about
that. I'd be very interested, meanwhile, in what others on the list may
think of your suggestion, one which I don't recall previously having seen
entertained in the literature.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 9:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule
> of pragmatism" in this essay.
>
>
> Yes, but my point is that he does *not *call the PM the "rule of
> abduction"; so again, I am positing a distinction between Peirce's
> pragmatism (i.e., pragmaticism) as the "logic of abduction" and the PM as
> the "rule of pragmatism."  Pragmaticism as a whole--i.e., all three
> Stages of Inquiry, taken together--*includes *the PM, but the PM is not *all
> *there is to it.  The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication),
> not abduction; which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.
> I wonder if another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to
> logical critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.
>
> Frankly, Houser misquoted Peirce when he wrote, "Peirce had come to see
> that *pragmatism *has the limitations that come with choosing security
> over uberty:  '[it] does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral
> virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity
> above Animality'" (EP 2.xxxii, emphasis added).  What Peirce actually
> wrote is, "Yet *the maxim of Pragmatism* does not bestow a single smile
> upon beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things
> that alone raise Humanity above Animality" (EP 2.465, emphasis added).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that
>> "Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the
>> latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."
>>
>> On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I
>> keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction"
>> if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic
>> maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule
>> of abduction," as you did."
>>
>> But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of
>> pragmatism" in this essay. He writes:
>>
>> "That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in
>> 1871 to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465).
>>
>> So, there is *this* sense in which Houser may not be *entirely *incorrect,
>> at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to
>> imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism ought 
>> *not
>> *be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism
>> far beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "*used*. . .to call" it the rule
>> of pragmatism).
>>
>> As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a footnote
>> to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' somewhat
>> different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic (Houser's
>> "rich suggestiveness").
>>
>> In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, Peirce
>> wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring out the
>> amount and kind of *security* (approach to certainty) of each kind of
>> reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable *uberty*,
>> or *value in productiveness *(emphasis added) of each kind (CP 8.384).
>> [EP2:553, fn 7]
>>
>>
>> As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our
>> argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen
>> as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in
>> itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to
>> some considerable degree.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> [image: Gary Richmond]
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>> *C 745*

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Gary R., List:

GR:  But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of
pragmatism" in this essay.


Yes, but my point is that he does *not *call the PM the "rule of
abduction"; so again, I am positing a distinction between Peirce's
pragmatism (i.e., pragmaticism) as the "logic of abduction" and the PM as
the "rule of pragmatism."  Pragmaticism as a whole--i.e., all three Stages
of Inquiry, taken together--*includes *the PM, but the PM is not *all *there
is to it.  The PM pertains primarily to deduction (explication), not
abduction; which is why it contributes to security, but not to uberty.  I
wonder if another way to highlight the distinction is to assign the PM to
logical critic, but pragmaticism as a whole to methodeutic.

Frankly, Houser misquoted Peirce when he wrote, "Peirce had come to see
that *pragmatism *has the limitations that come with choosing security over
uberty:  '[it] does not bestow a single smile upon beauty, upon moral
virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that alone raise Humanity
above Animality'" (EP 2.xxxii, emphasis added).  What Peirce actually wrote
is, "Yet *the maxim of Pragmatism* does not bestow a single smile upon
beauty, upon moral virtue, or upon abstract truth, the three things that
alone raise Humanity above Animality" (EP 2.465, emphasis added).

Regards,

Jon

On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that "Houser's
> comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only
> one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."
>
> On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I
> keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction"
> if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic
> maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule
> of abduction," as you did."
>
> But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of
> pragmatism" in this essay. He writes:
>
> "That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in
> 1871 to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465).
>
> So, there is *this* sense in which Houser may not be *entirely *incorrect,
> at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to
> imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism ought 
> *not
> *be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism
> far beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "*used*. . .to call" it the rule
> of pragmatism).
>
> As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a footnote
> to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' somewhat
> different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic (Houser's
> "rich suggestiveness").
>
> In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, Peirce
> wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring out the
> amount and kind of *security* (approach to certainty) of each kind of
> reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable *uberty*,
> or *value in productiveness *(emphasis added) of each kind (CP 8.384).
> [EP2:553, fn 7]
>
>
> As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our
> argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen
> as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in
> itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to
> some considerable degree.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> GR:  But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the
>> pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
>> approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to
>> the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care"
>> (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that
>> it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what
>> Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my
>> thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all
>> three stages of a complete inquiry).
>>
>> GR:  So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM
>> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913
>> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to
>> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft.
>>
>>
>> I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that
>> there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-27 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear all:

It would help this conversation if you state clearly which maxim of
pragmatism to which you are referring.

Because this one following...there is a severe flaw in it:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we
conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of
these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

Best,
Jerry R


On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 11:23 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that "Houser's
> comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only
> one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."
>
> On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I
> keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction"
> if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic
> maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule
> of abduction," as you did."
>
> But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of
> pragmatism" in this essay. He writes:
>
> "That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in
> 1871 to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465).
>
> So, there is *this* sense in which Houser may not be *entirely *incorrect,
> at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to
> imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism ought 
> *not
> *be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism
> far beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "*used*. . .to call" it the rule
> of pragmatism).
>
> As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a footnote
> to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' somewhat
> different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic (Houser's
> "rich suggestiveness").
>
> In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, Peirce
> wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring out the
> amount and kind of *security* (approach to certainty) of each kind of
> reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable *uberty*,
> or *value in productiveness *(emphasis added) of each kind (CP 8.384).
> [EP2:553, fn 7]
>
>
> As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our
> argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen
> as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in
> itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to
> some considerable degree.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
> On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary R., List:
>>
>> GR:  But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the
>> pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
>> approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to
>> the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care"
>> (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that
>> it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what
>> Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my
>> thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all
>> three stages of a complete inquiry).
>>
>> GR:  So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM
>> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913
>> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to
>> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft.
>>
>>
>> I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that
>> there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the
>> "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of
>> pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did.
>> The two notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said,
>> "pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three
>> stages of a complete inquiry)."  Abduction, when employed with "solicitous
>> care," provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the
>> smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475,
>> EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security.  The
>> hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441).  The PM, on the other
>> hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning.
>> But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465).
>>
>> GR:  The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes
>> up each of the three forms of reas

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-27 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, List,

Jon, I think I am *tending* to agree with your conclusion, that "Houser's
comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only
one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."

On the other hand, you wrote: JS: "I have been mulling this over, and I
keep landing on the thought that there is only a "possible contradiction"
if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic
maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule
of abduction," as you did."

But, in fact, Peirce *does* call the pragmatic maxim (PM) the "rule of
pragmatism" in this essay. He writes:

"That maxim is, roughly speaking, equivalent to the one that I used in 1871
to call the rule of "pragmatism" (EP2:465).

So, there is *this* sense in which Houser may not be *entirely *incorrect,
at least about what Peirce wrote here (although I am still tending to
imagine, as I earlier did, and with you, that the PM and pragmaticism
ought *not
*be conflated and, further, that Peirce has developed his pragmaticism far
beyond that 1871 maxim, so that he "*used*. . .to call" it the rule of
pragmatism).

As for 'security' and 'uberty', the editors of EP direct us in a footnote
to this passage, which offers another definition of 'uberty' somewhat
different from the one I gave in my first post on this topic (Houser's
"rich suggestiveness").

In a letter to Frederic Adams Woods, written in the fall of 1913, Peirce
wrote: "I think logicians should have two principal aims: to bring out the
amount and kind of *security* (approach to certainty) of each kind of
reasoning, and second, to bring out the possible and esperable
*uberty*, or *value
in productiveness *(emphasis added) of each kind (CP 8.384). [EP2:553, fn 7]

As I am now seeing it, this definition of 'uberty' tends to support our
argument that, given the "value in productiveness" which pragmaticism (seen
as involving a theory of inquiry) would seem to offer, that while the PM in
itself offers but security, pragmaticism as a whole offers uberty, and to
some considerable degree.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 10:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the
> pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
> approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to
> the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care"
> (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that
> it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what
> Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my
> thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all
> three stages of a complete inquiry).
>
> GR:  So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM
> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913
> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to
> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft.
>
>
> I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that
> there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the
> "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of
> pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did.
> The two notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said,
> "pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three
> stages of a complete inquiry)."  Abduction, when employed with "solicitous
> care," provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the
> smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475,
> EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security.  The
> hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441).  The PM, on the other
> hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning.
> But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465).
>
> GR:  The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes
> up each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security
> and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how should
> we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty?
>
>
> To summarize my suggested answer--abduction provides uberty, by generating
> new hypotheses; deduction provides security, by explicating those
> hypotheses in accordance with the PM; and induction provides both, by
> evaluating those hypotheses against experience.  As you hinted, Houser's
> comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only
> one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Ol

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-27 Thread Jerry Rhee

Jon, list:

You said:
"As you hinted, Houser's comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim,
when the latter is only one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole."

What do you mean by *pragmaticism as a whole*?

Is there a complete maxim of pragmaticism that is
different from a complete maxim of pragmatism,
which would then make the latter an incomplete maxim of pragmaticism, or
even something else besides...


Thanks,
Jerry R

On Tue, Sep 27, 2016 at 9:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR:  But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the
> pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
> approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to
> the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care"
> (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that
> it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what
> Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my
> thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all
> three stages of a complete inquiry).
>
> GR:  So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM
> provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913
> text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to
> resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft.
>
>
> I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that
> there is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the
> "logic of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of
> pragmatism"; Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did.
> The two notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said,
> "pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three
> stages of a complete inquiry)."  Abduction, when employed with "solicitous
> care," provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the
> smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475,
> EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security.  The
> hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441).  The PM, on the other
> hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning.
> But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465).
>
> GR:  The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes
> up each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security
> and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how should
> we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty?
>
>
> To summarize my suggested answer--abduction provides uberty, by generating
> new hypotheses; deduction provides security, by explicating those
> hypotheses in accordance with the PM; and induction provides both, by
> evaluating those hypotheses against experience.  As you hinted, Houser's
> comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only
> one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:03 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Ben, Jeff D., Clark, Jon S, List,
>>
>> Ben concluded his argument (over several messages) by writing: "Peirce
>> made plausibility a question of logical critic, and testability, potential
>> fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus he separated them not
>> just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining to different levels
>> of logic - very apples versus oranges "
>>
>> I tend to agree with this and the whole thrust of your argumentation, all
>> nicely supported by the texts you've quoted, Ben. But I have one question
>> which keeps gnawing and deeply related to this.
>>
>> Nathan Houser comments in his introduction to the very late article
>> (1913), "An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and Uberty"
>> (EP2:463; note: "uberty" defined as "rich suggestiveness") that in this
>> text, written just months before Peirce died, that he is arguing that
>> "reasoning involves a trade-off between security and uberty," and that
>> "deductive reasoning provides the most security, but little uberty, which
>> abduction provides much uberty but almost no security." "Pragmatism, it
>> seems," Houser writes, "falls in on the side of security."
>>
>> But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the *pragmatic
>> maxim*, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
>> approximation to [the] *security* of reasoning. But it does not
>> contribute to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for
>> solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care"
>> to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but
>> the PM, what Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-27 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Gary R., List:

GR:  But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the
pragmatic maxim, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
approximation to [the] security of reasoning. But it does not contribute to
the uberty of reasoning, which far more calls for solicitous care"
(EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care" to suggest that
it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but the PM, what
Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical analysis." In my
thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all
three stages of a complete inquiry).

GR:  So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM
provides the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913
text (or at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to
resolve in my thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft.

I have been mulling this over, and I keep landing on the thought that there
is only a "possible contradiction" if we conflate pragmatism as the "logic
of abduction" with the pragmatic maxim (PM) as the "rule of pragmatism";
Peirce does not call it the "rule of abduction," as you did.  The two
notions are distinct, and both are necessary; as you said, "pragmatism
involves an entire theory of inquiry (including all three stages of a
complete inquiry)."  Abduction, when employed with "solicitous care,"
provides uberty as the only type of reasoning that "contributes the
smallest positive item to the final conclusion of the inquiry" (CP 6.475,
EP 2.443); but at the same time, it "does not afford security.  The
hypothesis must be tested" (CP 6.470, EP 2.441).  The PM, on the other
hand, "certainly aids our approximation to [the] security of reasoning.
But it does not contribute to the uberty of reasoning" (EP 2.465).

GR:  The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes up
each of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most security
and abduction the least with induction somewhere in between. But how should
we think of pragmatism itself in consideration of security and uberty?

To summarize my suggested answer--abduction provides uberty, by generating
new hypotheses; deduction provides security, by explicating those
hypotheses in accordance with the PM; and induction provides both, by
evaluating those hypotheses against experience.  As you hinted, Houser's
comment wrongly equates pragmatism with its maxim, when the latter is only
one aspect of pragmat[ic]ism as a whole.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:03 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Ben, Jeff D., Clark, Jon S, List,
>
> Ben concluded his argument (over several messages) by writing: "Peirce
> made plausibility a question of logical critic, and testability, potential
> fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus he separated them not
> just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining to different levels
> of logic - very apples versus oranges "
>
> I tend to agree with this and the whole thrust of your argumentation, all
> nicely supported by the texts you've quoted, Ben. But I have one question
> which keeps gnawing and deeply related to this.
>
> Nathan Houser comments in his introduction to the very late article
> (1913), "An Essay toward Improving our Reasoning in Security and Uberty"
> (EP2:463; note: "uberty" defined as "rich suggestiveness") that in this
> text, written just months before Peirce died, that he is arguing that
> "reasoning involves a trade-off between security and uberty," and that
> "deductive reasoning provides the most security, but little uberty, which
> abduction provides much uberty but almost no security." "Pragmatism, it
> seems," Houser writes, "falls in on the side of security."
>
> But what Peirce actually says in the article is that it is the *pragmatic
> maxim*, the "rule of 'pragmatism'," which "certainly aids our
> approximation to [the] *security* of reasoning. But it does not
> contribute to the *uberty* of reasoning, which far more calls for
> solicitous care" (EP2:465). So, I take this "far more. . .solicitous care"
> to suggest that it is not pragmatism itself that offers little uberty, but
> the PM, what Peirce tended to refer to as but "a maxim of logical
> analysis." In my thinking, pragmatism involves an entire theory of inquiry
> (including all three stages of a complete inquiry).
>
> So, if pragmatism is the "logic of abduction" (1903), and the PM provides
> the rule to abduction. I see a possible contradiction in the 1913 text (or
> at least in Houser's comment) which I've never been able to resolve in my
> thinking on the matter every time I read this short draft.
>
> The matter of security vs uberty seems clear enough when one takes up each
> of the three forms of reasoning, deduction having the most securi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Jerry Rhee

s I am 
>>> trying to explore. I'm starting to wonder if we might be working with 
>>> different notions of what is, on Peirce's account, more instinctive in our 
>>> habits of feeling, action and thought. The reason I suspect this might be 
>>> the case is because I'm not yet able to get a clear idea of what you seem 
>>> to be emphasizing when you talk about Peirce's account of "instinctual 
>>> plausibility." I'll keep working on it in the hopes of clearing up some of 
>>> the vagueness in my ideas.
>>>
>>> For my part, I think grounds of Peirce's the division between speculative 
>>> grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic can be interpreted in a number of 
>>> ways. Jeff Kasser has offered some nice explanations of what Peirce means 
>>> when he talks about methodeutical considerations pertaining to the economy 
>>> of research. Recently, I've been looking at Mats Bergman's Peirce's 
>>> Philosophy of Communication: The Rhetorical Underpinnings of the Theory of 
>>> Signs and have found his sorting of some of the competing lines of 
>>> interpretation to be helpful.
>>>
>>> As I have suggested in earlier posts, I think that Peirce's emphasis on the 
>>> relations between signs, object and interpretants that we need to focus our 
>>> attention on in each of these areas of semiotics can be used to help steer 
>>> the inquiries. When it comes to matters of the assurance of different forms 
>>> of inference, I am drawn to the idea that the sort of mediation that is at 
>>> work here involves relations of determination between the dynamical object 
>>> and sign (typically the focus of inquiry in critical logic) and between the 
>>> sign and normal interpretant (typically the focus of inquiry in 
>>> methodeutic). My interpretative suggestion is that the relation between the 
>>> dynamical object and the final interpretant (so that we have some assurance 
>>> that the final interpretant is in a relation to the same object that was 
>>> the object of the sign) should be understood as mediated by these two 
>>> relations. As such, the mediation involves a triadic relationship between 
>>> the three dyadic relations as well as a triadic relation between three 
>>> triads. Gary F. has indicated that he finds the diagrams I've offered hard 
>>> to make out, so I suspect that others might find them similarly puzzling. 
>>> Having said that, I'll continue to look at the textual support for this 
>>> interpretative hypothesis--and I'll see what might be done to make the 
>>> diagrams clearer.
>>>
>>> --Jeff
>>>
>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> Northern Arizona University
>>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>> 
>>> From: Benjamin Udell [baud...@gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 12:15 PM
>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>>
>>> Jeff D., Gary R., list,
>>>
>>> I assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we 
>>> variously may think for our own parts. Peirce spells out the difference 
>>> between critical and methodeutical justifications in the Carnegie 
>>> application _New Elements of Mathematics_ passage that I quoted earlier. 
>>> The fuller passage can be seen both by Google preview 
>>> https://books.google.com/books?id=aLxTkSob9UMC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=%22Methodeutic+has+a+special+interest+in+Abduction%22
>>>  in Joe Ransdell's reconstruction at Arisbe (although it looks like Joe 
>>> missed some italicizations) 
>>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 :
>>>
>>> MEMOIR   27: OF METHODEUTIC
>>>
>>> []
>>>
>>> >From Draft B - MS L75.279-280
>>>
>>> The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of the 
>>> nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it is assumed that the signs 
>>> considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and be true. But just 
>>> as critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its 
>>> intended ultimate object, the reality, so methodeutic looks to the purposed 
>>> ultimate interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to 
>>> in order to be pertinent to the purpo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Stephen C. Rose

ction
>> IV begins with a one-paragraph discussion of the validities of deduction
>> and induction as questions of logical critic, and spends the remaining four
>> paragraphs, beginning "Finally comes the bottom question of logical Critic,
>> What sort of validity can be attributed to the First Stage of inquiry? " on
>> the validity of abduction as a question of logical critic. He discusses
>> plausibility, concerning which hypothesis is to be favored, and proceeds to
>> discuss plausibility in terms of a simplicity that is not logical
>> simplicity but the natural, the facile, etc., as seen in Galileo's *il
>> lume naturale* (natural light of reason; Peirce was already discussing
>> such naturalness in 1901 in "On the Drawing of History from Ancient
>> Documents").
>>
>> Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic
>> has a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a
>> scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be
>> a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified
>> critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one
>> which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb "critically"
>> is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of
>> that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. In 1908 in "A
>> Neglected Argument" he discusses plausibilty as natural simplicity and is
>> explicit in placing the issue in logical critic.
>>
>> Best, Ben
>>
>> On 9/26/2016 12:11 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>>
>> Hello Ben U., List,
>>
>> I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we 
>> variously may think for our own parts. Having said that, my general aim is 
>> to draw from other sources, such as the lectures concerning the first 
>> principle of logic and the conception of continuity that are collected in 
>> Reasoning and the Logic of Things, as resources for interpreting "The 
>> Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." As such, it is possible that I 
>> might go too far at times when reading some of these ideas and arguments 
>> from earlier lectures and essays into what Peirce seems be saying, either 
>> explicitly or implicitly, in the Humble Argument and the Neglected Argument.
>>
>> For my part, I'm not yet able to see what you appear to be saying--which is 
>> that these passages from the Carnegie application and "Pragmatism as the 
>> Logic of Abduction" run at odds with the interpretative suggestions I am 
>> trying to explore. I'm starting to wonder if we might be working with 
>> different notions of what is, on Peirce's account, more instinctive in our 
>> habits of feeling, action and thought. The reason I suspect this might be 
>> the case is because I'm not yet able to get a clear idea of what you seem to 
>> be emphasizing when you talk about Peirce's account of "instinctual 
>> plausibility." I'll keep working on it in the hopes of clearing up some of 
>> the vagueness in my ideas.
>>
>> For my part, I think grounds of Peirce's the division between speculative 
>> grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic can be interpreted in a number of 
>> ways. Jeff Kasser has offered some nice explanations of what Peirce means 
>> when he talks about methodeutical considerations pertaining to the economy 
>> of research. Recently, I've been looking at Mats Bergman's Peirce's 
>> Philosophy of Communication: The Rhetorical Underpinnings of the Theory of 
>> Signs and have found his sorting of some of the competing lines of 
>> interpretation to be helpful.
>>
>> As I have suggested in earlier posts, I think that Peirce's emphasis on the 
>> relations between signs, object and interpretants that we need to focus our 
>> attention on in each of these areas of semiotics can be used to help steer 
>> the inquiries. When it comes to matters of the assurance of different forms 
>> of inference, I am drawn to the idea that the sort of mediation that is at 
>> work here involves relations of determination between the dynamical object 
>> and sign (typically the focus of inquiry in critical logic) and between the 
>> sign and normal interpretant (typically the focus of inquiry in 
>> methodeutic). My interpretative suggestion is that the relation between the 
>> dynamical object and the final interpretant (so that we have some assurance 
>> that the final interpretant

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Gary Richmond

hat in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic has
> a special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific
> hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a
> justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified
> critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one
> which is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb "critically"
> is a reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of
> that quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. In 1908 in "A
> Neglected Argument" he discusses plausibilty as natural simplicity and is
> explicit in placing the issue in logical critic.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 9/26/2016 12:11 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
>
> Hello Ben U., List,
>
> I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we 
> variously may think for our own parts. Having said that, my general aim is to 
> draw from other sources, such as the lectures concerning the first principle 
> of logic and the conception of continuity that are collected in Reasoning and 
> the Logic of Things, as resources for interpreting "The Neglected Argument 
> for the Reality of God." As such, it is possible that I might go too far at 
> times when reading some of these ideas and arguments from earlier lectures 
> and essays into what Peirce seems be saying, either explicitly or implicitly, 
> in the Humble Argument and the Neglected Argument.
>
> For my part, I'm not yet able to see what you appear to be saying--which is 
> that these passages from the Carnegie application and "Pragmatism as the 
> Logic of Abduction" run at odds with the interpretative suggestions I am 
> trying to explore. I'm starting to wonder if we might be working with 
> different notions of what is, on Peirce's account, more instinctive in our 
> habits of feeling, action and thought. The reason I suspect this might be the 
> case is because I'm not yet able to get a clear idea of what you seem to be 
> emphasizing when you talk about Peirce's account of "instinctual 
> plausibility." I'll keep working on it in the hopes of clearing up some of 
> the vagueness in my ideas.
>
> For my part, I think grounds of Peirce's the division between speculative 
> grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic can be interpreted in a number of 
> ways. Jeff Kasser has offered some nice explanations of what Peirce means 
> when he talks about methodeutical considerations pertaining to the economy of 
> research. Recently, I've been looking at Mats Bergman's Peirce's Philosophy 
> of Communication: The Rhetorical Underpinnings of the Theory of Signs and 
> have found his sorting of some of the competing lines of interpretation to be 
> helpful.
>
> As I have suggested in earlier posts, I think that Peirce's emphasis on the 
> relations between signs, object and interpretants that we need to focus our 
> attention on in each of these areas of semiotics can be used to help steer 
> the inquiries. When it comes to matters of the assurance of different forms 
> of inference, I am drawn to the idea that the sort of mediation that is at 
> work here involves relations of determination between the dynamical object 
> and sign (typically the focus of inquiry in critical logic) and between the 
> sign and normal interpretant (typically the focus of inquiry in methodeutic). 
> My interpretative suggestion is that the relation between the dynamical 
> object and the final interpretant (so that we have some assurance that the 
> final interpretant is in a relation to the same object that was the object of 
> the sign) should be understood as mediated by these two relations. As such, 
> the mediation involves a triadic relationship between the three dyadic 
> relations as well as a triadic relation between three triads. Gary F. has 
> indicated that he finds the diagrams I've offered hard to make out, so I 
> suspect that others might find them similarly puzzling. Having said that, 
> I'll continue to look at the textual support for this interpretative 
> hypothesis--and I'll see what might be done to make the diagrams clearer.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> From: Benjamin Udell [baud...@gmail.com]
> Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 12:15 PM
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Jeff D., Gary R., list,
>
> I assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than w

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Jerry Rhee

Clark, Ben, Edwina, list:

From your recent posts, I would say you are brightening the blind spot,
albeit not directly with help of the *lanterna*.  To that, your comments
have not been explicit, merely implicit; indexed as “structure pretty
similar to intuitions”, “common sensicalism”, *etc*., for why you choose to
invent new terms is either all very predictable or puzzling.

___

*It is walking upon a **bog**, and can only say, this ground seems to hold
for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way.** ~Peirce*

“*By their fruits, ye shall know them*” ~Peirce (Matthew)

*SOCRATES:... **Now this is an illustration of the nature of true opinions:
while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away
out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore they are **not
of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause; and this
fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection**, as you and I have agreed
to call it. But when they are bound, in the first place, they have the
nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are abiding. And this
is why knowledge is more honourable and excellent than true opinion,
because fastened by a chain.*

*MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.*

“*Intuition is nothing more and nothing less than recognition*.” ~Herbert
Simon

*Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little
function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering
the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is “up to us” to do
so.  In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is reasonableness; and
the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develop
knowledge the most speedily.” (1.615)*

*"The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a
word, number and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily
partake of them?" ~Plato *

“When a reputable witness makes, or witnesses make, an assertion which
experience renders highly improbable, or when there are other independent
arguments in its favor, each independent argument *pro* or *con* produces a
certain impression upon the mind of the wise man, dependent for its
quantity upon the frequency with which arguments of those kinds lead to the
truth, and the algebraical sum of these impressions is the resultant
impression that measures the wise man’s state of opinion on the whole…

The occasions when we naturally balance reasons *pro* and *con* mostly
relate to what we prefer to do, not to questions of fact.”  ~Peirce

The irony, I hope, is clear.

one two three… *pro con action*.

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 3:04 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

>
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do
> affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we
> cannot begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who
> self-describes as a 'Lutheran Layman' would have a different approach than
> my own, as I self-describe as an atheist. Our very understandings of even
> the term 'god' would therefore differ.
>
> And as Jerry points out - we don't 'begin' our understandings with Peirce.
> Many of us are aware of Plato and Aristotle - and after all, Peirce
> described himself as heavily influenced by Aristotle.
>
>
> Yes. I think someone characterized Peirce’s epistemology not as focused on
> beliefs and their justification but on the change of beliefs. This shifts
> it from the more traditional Aristotelian approach with its similarities to
> mathematics into a more process view. Peirce was really pushing back
> against the Foundationalist moves that characterized most philosophy well
> up to the middle 20th century since Descartes. Even when Foundationalism
> was discarded you had things like coherentism or the like that still
> adopted much of the structure of Descartes. It was a static analysis.
>
> If we do justice to abduction and the NA I think we have to avoid that
> static kind of analysis.
>
> Further the analysis can’t simply move towards the current perhaps
> somewhat contingent makeup of philosophy departments. Rather we have to ask
> about the diversity of views as they conduct the argument. It’d seem that
> only then can we make sense of its strength or weakness.
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do 
> affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we cannot 
> begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who self-describes 
> as a 'Lutheran Layman' would have a different approach than my own, as I 
> self-describe as an atheist. Our very understandings of even the term 'god' 
> would therefore differ. 
>  
> And as Jerry points out - we don't 'begin' our understandings with Peirce. 
> Many of us are aware of Plato and Aristotle - and after all, Peirce described 
> himself as heavily influenced by Aristotle. 

Yes. I think someone characterized Peirce’s epistemology not as focused on 
beliefs and their justification but on the change of beliefs. This shifts it 
from the more traditional Aristotelian approach with its similarities to 
mathematics into a more process view. Peirce was really pushing back against 
the Foundationalist moves that characterized most philosophy well up to the 
middle 20th century since Descartes. Even when Foundationalism was discarded 
you had things like coherentism or the like that still adopted much of the 
structure of Descartes. It was a static analysis.

If we do justice to abduction and the NA I think we have to avoid that static 
kind of analysis.

Further the analysis can’t simply move towards the current perhaps somewhat 
contingent makeup of philosophy departments. Rather we have to ask about the 
diversity of views as they conduct the argument. It’d seem that only then can 
we make sense of its strength or weakness.

-
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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 1:09 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> Yes, methodeutical reasoning can itself be abductive, and if one builds a 
> house of abductive inferences none of which are quite compelling, then it's 
> guesswork, it could be a house of cards.
> 
> In the end we base all our reasoning on perceptual facts reached by 
> abduction, insofar as perception is a kind of non-deliberate abduction. These 
> abductions are occur in actual practice of math (the mathematician physically 
> sees the diagram, etc.) and various abstract fields, but are (at least 
> usually) not formally incorporated into mathematical reasoning, nor into the 
> logical and mathematical reasoning in fields like statistics and experimental 
> design, although such inductive fields deal with issues of the reliability of 
> perceptual judgments.

I think what I’m getting at is that these “perceptual facts” aren’t necessarily 
facts but at a certain point of analysis have a structure pretty similar to 
intuitions. Indeed many schools of philosophy have often called intuitions 
perceptual facts or at least treated them as such. (The original 
phenomenologists in Husserl’s school perhaps fell into that at times although 
as a practical matter Platonists often make that move - think Godel’s 
mathematical platonism for instance)

I think what I’m getting at is that underneath all of this is the corrective of 
Peirce’s common sensicalism. That is we inquire and the community over time 
accepts some abductive conclusions and rejects others. They are heavily tested 
and yet may be wrong. This is ultimately how Peirce salvages metaphysics unlike 
the positivists. Yet relative to the NA and perhaps all abductive arguments we 
have to question what is common sensism. That is, we should be looking more 
closely at the community of inquirers rather than any one inquirer.

Still thinking through all this and rereading some of the old posts. Thanks for 
bringing this up as I think it really is a blind spot in my Peirce.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


Clark, list,

I usually worry when I see a quote of myself from 2007 - I was often 
very wordy in those days  but I didn't do too badly in that one.


I think that I still agree with the things in your quote of me, except 
the first thing, that economy is as important as chance in the world. 
What I think is that optima (and feasibilities) are just as important as 
probabilities in the world. I was trying to find a way to say that in 
terms of chance, and was wrong to talk as though economy were to optima 
as chance is to probability.


You wrote,

   As an aside, at the time I recall thinking this economic view
   applied not just to particular hypotheses but also what questions
   one takes up given finite time. So relative to the NA it may well be
   that many atheists or agnostics just don’t think it worth their time
   to inquire about God.

Peirce discusses the question of what questions one takes up given 
finite time. He addresses it in Memoir 28, on the economics of research 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m28 
in the Carnegie application, and he discusses the selection and ordering 
of hypotheses at some length in "On Drawing History from Ancient 
Documents" in CP 7, much of which is reprinted under a longer title in 
EP 2. The discussion of caution (as in 20 Questions), breadth, and 
incomplexity should not be missed by anybody interested in the topic, 
and there's plenty else there worth reading too about hypotheses, the 
pertinent discussion starts around EP 2:106 (CP 7.218).


Best, Ben

On 9/26/2016 2:53 PM, Clark Goble wrote:



On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:


Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, 
"Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or the inference 
which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a 
hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains 
the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses 
we have to select that one which is suitable for being tested by 
experiment." That adverb "critically" is a reference to logical 
critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of that quote he is 
discussing why methodeutic gets involved. In 1908 in "A Neglected 
Argument" he discusses plausibilty as natural simplicity and 
is explicit in placing the issue in logical critic.


Ben, I’m really learning a lot here. I confess I always separated the 
logical vs. methodeutic more as whether ones analysis was focused in 
on objects or interpretants. I think I’m rethinking this quite a bit.


I hope you won’t mind me quoting a selection from your discussion with 
Joe that you mentioned. I’d be very curious as to what, if anything, 
you disagree with now. (This is from May 25, 2007)


I meant that I see economy as an element at least as basic as
chance and probability in the world. (Between equi-feasibility
and chance as equi-probability, there's something obviously in
common, but I'm not sure how to think about this.)

In the Cotary Propositions, Peirce speaks of abductions which are
irresistable, abductions which shade into irresistability in
shading into being perceptual judgments. So there will also be
abductions which are very compelling even when not irresistable.
There'll be the whole continuum. Often, for instance, an abduction
is compelling not just in itself but in respect of the lack of
strong alternatives.

Peirce's argument for discovery's being an economic question is
beautiful, no question about it. Now, Peirce says in your third
quote, "Consequently, the conduct of abduction, which is chiefly a
question of heuretic and is the first question of heuretic, is to
be governed by economical considerations.  I show how this leads
to methodeutic inquiries of other kinds and at the same time
furnishes a key for the conduct of those inquiries."

Abduction, as an art, is to be governed by economical
considerations. This sounds like abduction as inference to the
simplest, most economic, most "natural" explanation. Methodeutic
is concerned not only with abduction per se but with applying such
economics as a key for the conduct of other kinds of methodeutic
inquiries into research -- _expanding_ that economism into an
economics of research generally. Abduction is the discovertive
mode of inference. Therefore it is to be govermed by economic
considerations, an economics of explanation. Research aims to
discover. Therefore it is likewise to be governed by economic
considerations, an economics of research.

Sometimes the simplest explanation is compelling enough that
inquiry reasonably settles there. Sometimes there is no single
simplest explanation, sometimes there's none at all, and then
inquiry reasonably proceeds further into the given question, and,
for instance, conducts tests of co

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Edwina, List:

JS:  I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was rooted
in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about whether
#3 is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce.

ET:  Jon, no, my argument with you was about your adamant denial, to the
point of what I felt were personal attacks, that my comments fit into the
first two approaches, and your insistence that your views were to be
accepted as the accurate interpretations.

Just as I suspected, we disagree about which approach your comments
reflect--I see them as falling under #3 (at best), you see them as falling
under #1 and/or #2.  There is no need to continue that debate, but I do see
no basis for characterizing anything that I have said previously as
"personal attacks."

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 1:57 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jeff, list - thank you for the interesting breakdown of different
> approaches to the study of Peirce.  I'm not sure that #4 has any relevance
> other than the case where people misuse Peircean [ and other] analyses to
> somehow support their own views.
>
> Jon, no, my argument with you was about your adamant denial, to the point
> of what I felt were personal attacks,  that my comments fit into the first
> two approaches, and your insistence that your views were to be accepted
> as the accurate interpretations.
>
> Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do
> affect one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we
> cannot begin with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who
> self-describes as a 'Lutheran Layman' would have a different approach than
> my own, as I self-describe as an atheist. Our very understandings of even
> the term 'god' would therefore differ.
>
> And as Jerry points out - we don't 'begin' our understandings with Peirce.
> Many of us are aware of Plato and Aristotle - and after all, Peirce
> described himself as heavily influenced by Aristotle.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -----
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard 
> *Cc:* Peirce-L 
> *Sent:* Monday, September 26, 2016 2:10 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Jeff, List:
>
> Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's
> writings.  I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was
> rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about
> whether #3 is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce.  I
> have been operating under the assumption that this term should be confined
> to #1 and #2--i.e., clarifying and applying Peirce's own views, rather than
> going beyond them.  I agree with your suggestion that #4 does not really
> belong on the List.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Hello Clark, List,
>>
>> I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that
>> might guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was
>> developing. Let's distinguish between three locations on the broad spectrum:
>>
>> 1.  Interpreting Peirce's texts as faithfully as possible, where the aim
>> is to find the truth about his particular arguments and philosophical views.
>>
>> 2.  Reconstructing the arguments so as to put them in the best shape,
>> where the aim is to find what are truly the best forms of those arguments
>> working from the assumptions and methods he was employing.
>>
>> 3. Drawing explicitly from Peirce's ideas and arguments for the purpose
>> of putting them to work to find the truth about what is really the case.
>>
>> 4. Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with very
>> little attention to or care for what Peirce wrote.
>>
>> For my part, I believe that all four approaches and aims may be
>> considered reasonable (although the fourth might suffer in ways that might
>> have been avoided). What is more, I believe that the first three sorts of
>> inquiries belong in the discussion on the Peirce-list. Having said that, I
>> do believe it is helpful to be clear about what one is doing in making a
>> given post--and to make that clear to others.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


Clark, list,

Yes, methodeutical reasoning can itself be abductive, and if one builds 
a house of abductive inferences none of which are quite compelling, then 
it's guesswork, it could be a house of cards.


In the end we base all our reasoning on perceptual facts reached by 
abduction, insofar as perception is a kind of non-deliberate abduction. 
These abductions are occur in actual practice of math (the mathematician 
physically sees the diagram, etc.) and various abstract fields, but are 
(at least usually) not formally incorporated into mathematical 
reasoning, nor into the logical and mathematical reasoning in fields 
like statistics and experimental design, although such inductive fields 
deal with issues of the reliability of perceptual judgments.


I'm no physicist, so my opinion on string theory matters little, but 
people do seem rather impatient with it. It unites GR & QFT, but look at 
all those vacua, etc. One finds people like Hawking and Witten on string 
theory's side, and Penrose against it.  As I understand it, the 
tiny-scale quantum-gravity phenomena would be, as a practical matter, a 
challenge for any quantum-gravity theory to test, not just string 
theory. People argue whether string theory is currently the only game in 
town (as a practical matter, not by mathematical proof) and whether it 
promotes progress in other ways, justifying itself through the economics 
of inquiry. There's the holographic stuff, black hole evaporation, the 
dualities, string phenomenology, and applications of analogues of ST 
ideas in condensed-matter physics (none of which topics I could discuss 
even semi-intelligently without surfing the Internet in preparation).  
Of course we would all like more.


Best, Ben

On 9/26/2016 2:28 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:13 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:


I'd like to emphasize again that it's a distinction that makes a 
difference: methodeutical promise is not the same thing as 
plausibility or (instinctual) assurance of truth. Many years ago here 
at peirce-l, Howard Callaway argued against the idea that a 
hypothesis was more plausible simply by being easier, more 
convenient, or the like to test. He ascribed the idea to Peirce, and 
Joe Ransdell tried to defend Peirce but forgot about the critical vs. 
methodeutical distinction (and I had forgotten about if I had ever 
known it in the first place). I agreed with Howard that it was a bad 
idea, but I couldn't believe that Peirce really believed it. I 
learned only later of how Peirce dealt with it. Peirce made 
plausibility a question of logical critic, and testability, potential 
fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus he separated them 
not just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining to 
different levels of logic - very apples versus oranges. - Best, Ben


Ben, that’s very helpful and I vaguely recall that discussion.

One problem I see though is that you have abduction built on top of 
conclusions of abduction. That is testability, fruitfulness and so 
forth might be a different level, but they are themselves abductive 
conclusions not all will agree with.


This isn’t me disagreeing with you mind you. I think this is both the 
weakness and strength of abduction. It allows one to look at say the 
debate over string theory or supersymmetry from the late 70’s up until 
recently. There were huge debates over what counted as testability, 
whether things were testable, what counted as most simple, as most 
fruitful and so forth. Very rarely were these debates really conducted 
in terms of hard empirical tests. I think from a Peircean paradigm one 
could see these as a debate over methodeutical distinction at these 
different layers, but with people arriving at very different abductive 
conclusions.


Further (and this is where I think Peirce’s common sensicalism comes 
into play) it seems to me that these change over time. So for instance 
early on in the 80’s you had many physicists like Feynman being very 
critical of a lack of testing along with the theories being too 
complex along certain criteria. (The math was very difficult) Then in 
the last decade you see the rise of a different set of criticisms 
closely related to the ones from the 80’s yet with different strength. 
So you have for instance Lee Smolin or Peter Woit emphasizing the lack 
of progress of string theory and it describing too much. Effectively 
they are making a kind of abductive argument against metaphysics that 
is quite Peircean. (In the case of Lee Smolin probably explicit 
influence since he’s noted the influence of Peirce on his thought)


The problem is that while abduction isn’t instinct or intuition, at a 
certain practical point it’s built on abductive foundations that are 
themselves just a matter of acceptance. Put an other way, while we may 
drop down to particular arguments (such as how testable string theory 
is) those are themselves often very similar to the met

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Jeff, list - thank you for the interesting breakdown of different approaches to 
the study of Peirce.  I'm not sure that #4 has any relevance other than the 
case where people misuse Peircean [ and other] analyses to somehow support 
their own views. 

Jon, no, my argument with you was about your adamant denial, to the point of 
what I felt were personal attacks,  that my comments fit into the first two 
approaches, and your insistence that your views were to be accepted as the 
accurate interpretations.

Clark, list - yes, I agree with you that one's beliefs about religion do affect 
one's interpretation of the NA. After all, as Peirce wrote, we cannot begin 
with an empty mind but begin with our beliefs. Jon, who self-describes as a 
'Lutheran Layman' would have a different approach than my own, as I 
self-describe as an atheist. Our very understandings of even the term 'god' 
would therefore differ. 

And as Jerry points out - we don't 'begin' our understandings with Peirce. Many 
of us are aware of Plato and Aristotle - and after all, Peirce described 
himself as heavily influenced by Aristotle. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Jeffrey Brian Downard 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 2:10 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Jeff, List:


  Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's 
writings.  I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was rooted 
in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about whether #3 
is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce.  I have been 
operating under the assumption that this term should be confined to #1 and 
#2--i.e., clarifying and applying Peirce's own views, rather than going beyond 
them.  I agree with your suggestion that #4 does not really belong on the List.


  Regards,


  Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
  Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
  www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


  On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 wrote:

Hello Clark, List,

I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that might 
guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was developing. Let's 
distinguish between three locations on the broad spectrum:


1.  Interpreting Peirce's texts as faithfully as possible, where the aim is 
to find the truth about his particular arguments and philosophical views.


2.  Reconstructing the arguments so as to put them in the best shape, where 
the aim is to find what are truly the best forms of those arguments working 
from the assumptions and methods he was employing.

3. Drawing explicitly from Peirce's ideas and arguments for the purpose of 
putting them to work to find the truth about what is really the case.

4. Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with very little 
attention to or care for what Peirce wrote.


For my part, I believe that all four approaches and aims may be considered 
reasonable (although the fourth might suffer in ways that might have been 
avoided). What is more, I believe that the first three sorts of inquiries 
belong in the discussion on the Peirce-list. Having said that, I do believe it 
is helpful to be clear about what one is doing in making a given post--and to 
make that clear to others. Otherwise, we will just be talking past one another. 
All things considered, I believe that you are correct in saying that Peirce 
thinks that the third sort of approach and aim should, in general, be 
controlling over the first and second. Having said that, he has written quite a 
lot on what it is to do the first or second sort of thing well or poorly.



--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard


Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354





    From: Clark Goble 
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking 
  On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 wrote:


  I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we 
variously may think for our own parts.
I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the social 
changes in the intervening century or so. As I mentioned a few weeks ago I 
think that most thinkers in the academy were they to conduct the experiment 
might come to somewhat different results. Since what counts is the community of 
inquirers and not just Peirce, it does seem that is a fruitful avenue to 
consider.


That’s not to deny the utility of focusing in on Peirce’s beliefs. It’s 
just that I think we can and must separate

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:01 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> Remember that in the Carnegie Application (1902) he said, "Methodeutic has a 
> special interest in abduction, or the inference which starts a scientific 
> hypothesis. For it is not sufficient that a hypothesis should be a 
> justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains the facts is justified 
> critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to select that one which 
> is suitable for being tested by experiment." That adverb "critically" is a 
> reference to logical critic, the critique of arguments. In the rest of that 
> quote he is discussing why methodeutic gets involved. In 1908 in "A Neglected 
> Argument" he discusses plausibilty as natural simplicity and is explicit in 
> placing the issue in logical critic.

Ben, I’m really learning a lot here. I confess I always separated the logical 
vs. methodeutic more as whether ones analysis was focused in on objects or 
interpretants. I think I’m rethinking this quite a bit. 

I hope you won’t mind me quoting a selection from your discussion with Joe that 
you mentioned. I’d be very curious as to what, if anything, you disagree with 
now. (This is from May 25, 2007)

I meant that I see economy as an element at least as basic as chance and 
probability in the world. (Between equi-feasibility and chance as 
equi-probability, there's something obviously in common, but I'm not sure how 
to think about this.)

In the Cotary Propositions, Peirce speaks of abductions which are irresistable, 
abductions which shade into irresistability in shading into being perceptual 
judgments. So there will also be abductions which are very compelling even when 
not irresistable. There'll be the whole continuum. Often, for instance, an 
abduction is compelling not just in itself but in respect of the lack of strong 
alternatives. 

Peirce's argument for discovery's being an economic question is beautiful, no 
question about it. Now, Peirce says in your third quote, "Consequently, the 
conduct of abduction, which is chiefly a question of heuretic and is the first 
question of heuretic, is to be governed by economical considerations.  I show 
how this leads to methodeutic inquiries of other kinds and at the same time 
furnishes a key for the conduct of those inquiries."

Abduction, as an art, is to be governed by economical considerations. This 
sounds like abduction as inference to the simplest, most economic, most 
"natural" explanation. Methodeutic is concerned not only with abduction per se 
but with applying such economics as a key for the conduct of other kinds of 
methodeutic inquiries into research -- _expanding_ that economism into an 
economics of research generally. Abduction is the discovertive mode of 
inference. Therefore it is to be govermed by economic considerations, an 
economics of explanation. Research aims to discover. Therefore it is likewise 
to be governed by economic considerations, an economics of research.

Sometimes the simplest explanation is compelling enough that inquiry reasonably 
settles there. Sometimes there is no single simplest explanation, sometimes 
there's none at all, and then inquiry reasonably proceeds further into the 
given question, and, for instance, conducts tests of competing hypotheses.

At that point you saw methodeutic as more about considering an abductive 
hypothesis in terms of further inquiry. It becomes a question of how economical 
inquiry is. As an aside, at the time I recall thinking this economic view 
applied not just to particular hypotheses but also what questions one takes up 
given finite time. So relative to the NA it may well be that many atheists or 
agnostics just don’t think it worth their time to inquire about God.

The problem as I see it is that these methodological considerations each depend 
upon abductive hypothesis quite far down in an argument. Again the history of 
string theory and supersymmetry offers interesting ways of thinking through 
this issue.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:13 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> I'd like to emphasize again that it's a distinction that makes a difference: 
> methodeutical promise is not the same thing as plausibility or (instinctual) 
> assurance of truth. Many years ago here at peirce-l, Howard Callaway argued 
> against the idea that a hypothesis was more plausible simply by being easier, 
> more convenient, or the like to test. He ascribed the idea to Peirce, and Joe 
> Ransdell tried to defend Peirce but forgot about the critical vs. 
> methodeutical distinction (and I had forgotten about if I had ever known it 
> in the first place). I agreed with Howard that it was a bad idea, but I 
> couldn't believe that Peirce really believed it. I learned only later of how 
> Peirce dealt with it. Peirce made plausibility a question of logical critic, 
> and testability, potential fruitfulness, etc., questions of methodeutic. Thus 
> he separated them not just as separate issues of abduction, but as pertaining 
> to different levels of logic - very apples versus oranges. - Best, Ben

Ben, that’s very helpful and I vaguely recall that discussion.

One problem I see though is that you have abduction built on top of conclusions 
of abduction. That is testability, fruitfulness and so forth might be a 
different level, but they are themselves abductive conclusions not all will 
agree with.

This isn’t me disagreeing with you mind you. I think this is both the weakness 
and strength of abduction. It allows one to look at say the debate over string 
theory or supersymmetry from the late 70’s up until recently. There were huge 
debates over what counted as testability, whether things were testable, what 
counted as most simple, as most fruitful and so forth. Very rarely were these 
debates really conducted in terms of hard empirical tests. I think from a 
Peircean paradigm one could see these as a debate over methodeutical 
distinction at these different layers, but with people arriving at very 
different abductive conclusions.

Further (and this is where I think Peirce’s common sensicalism comes into play) 
it seems to me that these change over time. So for instance early on in the 
80’s you had many physicists like Feynman being very critical of a lack of 
testing along with the theories being too complex along certain criteria. (The 
math was very difficult) Then in the last decade you see the rise of a 
different set of criticisms closely related to the ones from the 80’s yet with 
different strength. So you have for instance Lee Smolin or Peter Woit 
emphasizing the lack of progress of string theory and it describing too much. 
Effectively they are making a kind of abductive argument against metaphysics 
that is quite Peircean. (In the case of Lee Smolin probably explicit influence 
since he’s noted the influence of Peirce on his thought)

The problem is that while abduction isn’t instinct or intuition, at a certain 
practical point it’s built on abductive foundations that are themselves just a 
matter of acceptance. Put an other way, while we may drop down to particular 
arguments (such as how testable string theory is) those are themselves often 
very similar to the metaphysics Peirce argues for abductively.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 12:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's 
> writings.  I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was 
> rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about 
> whether #3 is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce.  I 
> have been operating under the assumption that this term should be confined to 
> #1 and #2--i.e., clarifying and applying Peirce's own views, rather than 
> going beyond them.  I agree with your suggestion that #4 does not really 
> belong on the List.

I think Edwina’s somewhat understandable complaints was more making the 
commenter’s personal views determinative. That does verge close to ad homen 
even though I recognize that wasn’t your intent.

As I think I said at the time, take Edwina out of the discussion and I think 
you raised a very important point. I wish more people had chimed in on the 
content of it. It seems to me that the pre-existing religious beliefs of a 
person conducting the NA will shape their conclusions. Peirce’s own odd mixture 
of Unitarianism, Anglicanism, and perhaps Hegelianism undoubtedly shaped his 
conclusions. How would other people conducting the experiment deal with it?

While abduction is not quite the same as intuition there are obvious parallels 
between Peirce’s use of abduction and the use of intuitions in the analytic 
tradition. Now I’ve been a long time critic of intuitions in analytic 
philosophy. I think at a minimum they tend to be biased towards a very narrow 
niche of views (i.e. upper middle class whites of a narrow range of political 
views) 

One interesting innovation in analytic philosophy starting in the late 90’s was 
the rise of experimental philosophy. Despite the name this was much more 
actually just attempting to more rigorously look at what people’s intuitions 
actually were rather than just what famous philosophers said intuitions were. 
Often there were interesting divergences between what intuitions were presented 
at and what preliminary investigations showed them to be.

Again, abduction isn’t intuition but there is a certain sense where something 
like experimental philosophy would be helpful in analyzing the NA.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

eirce's emphasis on the 
relations between signs, object and interpretants that we need to focus our 
attention on in each of these areas of semiotics can be used to help steer the 
inquiries. When it comes to matters of the assurance of different forms of 
inference, I am drawn to the idea that the sort of mediation that is at work 
here involves relations of determination between the dynamical object and sign 
(typically the focus of inquiry in critical logic) and between the sign and 
normal interpretant (typically the focus of inquiry in methodeutic). My 
interpretative suggestion is that the relation between the dynamical object and 
the final interpretant (so that we have some assurance that the final 
interpretant is in a relation to the same object that was the object of the 
sign) should be understood as mediated by these two relations. As such, the 
mediation involves a triadic relationship between the three dyadic relations as 
well as a triadic relation between three triads. Gary F. has indicated that he 
finds the diagrams I've offered hard to make out, so I suspect that others 
might find them similarly puzzling. Having said that, I'll continue to look at 
the textual support for this interpretative hypothesis--and I'll see what might 
be done to make the diagrams clearer.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________
From: Benjamin Udell [baud...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 12:15 PM
To:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jeff D., Gary R., list,

I assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we variously may think for 
our own parts. Peirce spells out the difference between critical and methodeutical 
justifications in the Carnegie application _New Elements of Mathematics_ passage that I 
quoted earlier. The fuller passage can be seen both by Google 
previewhttps://books.google.com/books?id=aLxTkSob9UMC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=%22Methodeutic+has+a+special+interest+in+Abduction%22
  in Joe Ransdell's reconstruction at Arisbe (although it looks like Joe missed some 
italicizations)http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27  :

MEMOIR   27: OF METHODEUTIC

[]

>From Draft B - MS L75.279-280

The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of the 
nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it is assumed that the signs 
considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and be true. But just as 
critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its intended 
ultimate object, the reality, so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate 
interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to in order to be 
pertinent to the purpose. Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or 
the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient 
that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains 
the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to 
select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment. There is no 
such need of a subsequent choice after drawing deductive and inductive 
conclusions. Yet although methodeutic has not the same special concern with 
them, it has to develop the principles which are to guide us in the invention 
of proofs, those which are to govern the general course of an investigation, 
and those which determine what problems shall engage our energies. It is, 
therefore, throughout of an economic character. Two other problems of 
methodeutic which the old logics usually made almost its only business are, 
first, the principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear; and second, 
the principles of classification.
[End quote]

Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and of 
rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of 
methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is how 
the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. Methodeutic does 
not have the same special interest in deduction and induction; the specific 
justifications of deductions and inductions as valid are topics of critical 
logic.

The difference matters because instinctual plausibility has to do with how much 
one thinks a hypothesis true. That a hypothesis is conceivably testable does 
not lend assurance of its truth. More specific concerns of methodeutic 
including the economics of resarch - the suitability of a hypothesis for 
testing because of cheapness, or because of its bearing on other hypotheses, 
i.e., its caution (as in 20 Questions), incomplexity, or breadth, have no 
direct bearing on one's assurance, going in, that the hypothesis is true. A 
hypothesis, merely by being easier or more promising to test, does not beco

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Jeff, List:

Thank you for this helpful breakdown of different approaches to Peirce's
writings.  I wonder if my dispute with Edwina earlier in this thread was
rooted in either misunderstanding or genuine disagreement between us about
whether #3 is properly characterized as an "interpretation" of Peirce.  I
have been operating under the assumption that this term should be confined
to #1 and #2--i.e., clarifying and applying Peirce's own views, rather than
going beyond them.  I agree with your suggestion that #4 does not really
belong on the List.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello Clark, List,
>
> I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that
> might guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was
> developing. Let's distinguish between three locations on the broad spectrum:
>
> 1.  Interpreting Peirce's texts as faithfully as possible, where the aim
> is to find the truth about his particular arguments and philosophical views.
>
> 2.  Reconstructing the arguments so as to put them in the best shape,
> where the aim is to find what are truly the best forms of those arguments
> working from the assumptions and methods he was employing.
>
> 3. Drawing explicitly from Peirce's ideas and arguments for the purpose of
> putting them to work to find the truth about what is really the case.
>
> 4. Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with very little
> attention to or care for what Peirce wrote.
>
> For my part, I believe that all four approaches and aims may be
> considered reasonable (although the fourth might suffer in ways that might
> have been avoided). What is more, I believe that the first three sorts of
> inquiries belong in the discussion on the Peirce-list. Having said that, I
> do believe it is helpful to be clear about what one is doing in making a
> given post--and to make that clear to others. Otherwise, we will just be
> talking past one another. All things considered, I believe that you are
> correct in saying that Peirce thinks that the third sort of approach and
> aim should, in general, be controlling over the first and second. Having
> said that, he has written quite a lot on what it is to do the first or
> second sort of thing well or poorly.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> --
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *Sent:* Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we
> variously may think for our own parts.
>
> I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the
> social changes in the intervening century or so. As I mentioned a few weeks
> ago I think that most thinkers in the academy were they to conduct the
> experiment might come to somewhat different results. Since what counts is
> the community of inquirers and not just Peirce, it does seem that is a
> fruitful avenue to consider.
>
> That’s not to deny the utility of focusing in on Peirce’s beliefs. It’s
> just that I think we can and must separate the arguments somewhat from the
> person proposing them. One danger I see in Peircean studies is that it
> falls into the trap of becoming purely about exegesis of Peirce’s thought.
> That’s an important step - especially given that many aspects of Peirce’s
> thought were so poorly understood for so many years. But when his thought
> isn’t extended beyond that, when a quote of Peirce becomes like a Bible
> verse quoted by a fundamentalist religious believer, I think we’re missing
> something fundamental about Peirce’s aims. (Not saying anyone here is doing
> that mind you - just that I think it’s an ever present danger I myself fall
> into occasionally) In Peircean terms we confuse the dynamic object with the
> immediate object.
>
> On Sep 25, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
>
> Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent
> that rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does
> not offer rules for instinct.
>
> Ben, do you think that Peirce distinguishes between those good at guesses
> or hypothesis formation and those who are not?
>
> For instance in a more contemporary context we

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Jerry Rhee

Clark, list:

I like your warnings.  And I like that they are coming from you and not
me.

___

Jeff said:

I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that might
guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was developing.

No, there is one and only one (one over many) which are summed in (1-3); CP
5.189, because if you closely examine the question of pragmatism, you will
see it is nothing else but the logic of abduction.

However, *if* you do decide to make your own “one and many”,

*then* don’t leave out what is neglected in your list, viz.;

5) Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with *CLOSE
ATTENTION* to or *care for* what Peirce wrote.

That is, one can also enter into Peirce through Plato, Aristotle or the
Bible.

However, if we only go by your list without 5), that inquirer will not be
welcome because he will be treated as a stranger; one who doesn’t have a
place in that world constructed based only on your list.  Because the
psychological effect will be that those who inhabit the world constructed
by your list will not want to learn Plato, Aristotle or the Bible because
Peirce is enough for them.  It never occurs to them that they might be
talking about a single, general, over-arching thing and to look for it
outside Peirce because Peirce is enough work and it is "good enough" work.
They won't want more work.

For instance, Jeff said, “What is more, I believe that the first three
sorts of inquiries *belong* in the discussion on the Peirce-list... I
believe that you are correct in saying that Peirce thinks that the third
sort of approach and aim should, in general, *be controlling*..."

This is a serious matter because the point is to convince the inquiring
community, viz., *us*.

Hth,

Jerry R

On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Hello Clark, List,
>
>
> I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that
> might guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was
> developing. Let's distinguish between three locations on the broad spectrum:
>
>
> 1.  Interpreting Peirce's texts as faithfully as possible, where the aim
> is to find the truth about his particular arguments and philosophical views.
>
> 2.  Reconstructing the arguments so as to put them in the best shape,
> where the aim is to find what are truly the best forms of those arguments
> working from the assumptions and methods he was employing.
>
> 3. Drawing explicitly from Peirce's ideas and arguments for the purpose of
> putting them to work to find the truth about what is really the case.
>
> 4. Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with very little
> attention to or care for what Peirce wrote.
>
>
> For my part, I believe that all four approaches and aims may be
> considered reasonable (although the fourth might suffer in ways that might
> have been avoided). What is more, I believe that the first three sorts of
> inquiries belong in the discussion on the Peirce-list. Having said that, I
> do believe it is helpful to be clear about what one is doing in making a
> given post--and to make that clear to others. Otherwise, we will just be
> talking past one another. All things considered, I believe that you are
> correct in saying that Peirce thinks that the third sort of approach and
> aim should, in general, be controlling over the first and second. Having
> said that, he has written quite a lot on what it is to do the first or
> second sort of thing well or poorly.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
>
> --
> *From:* Clark Goble 
> *Sent:* Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
>
> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we
> variously may think for our own parts.
>
>
> I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the
> social changes in the intervening century or so. As I mentioned a few weeks
> ago I think that most thinkers in the academy were they to conduct the
> experiment might come to somewhat different results. Since what counts is
> the community of inquirers and not just Peirce, it does seem that is a
> fruitful avenue to consider.
>
> That’s not to deny the utility of focusing in on Peirce’s beliefs. It’s
> just that I think we can and must separate the arguments somewhat from the
> person proposing them. One danger I see in Peir

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

 make out, so I suspect that others 
might find them similarly puzzling. Having said that, I'll continue to look at 
the textual support for this interpretative hypothesis--and I'll see what might 
be done to make the diagrams clearer.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________________
From: Benjamin Udell [baud...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 12:15 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jeff D., Gary R., list,

I assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we variously may think for 
our own parts. Peirce spells out the difference between critical and methodeutical 
justifications in the Carnegie application _New Elements of Mathematics_ passage that I 
quoted earlier. The fuller passage can be seen both by Google preview 
https://books.google.com/books?id=aLxTkSob9UMC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=%22Methodeutic+has+a+special+interest+in+Abduction%22
 in Joe Ransdell's reconstruction at Arisbe (although it looks like Joe missed some 
italicizations) http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 :

MEMOIR   27: OF METHODEUTIC

[]

>From Draft B - MS L75.279-280

The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of the 
nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it is assumed that the signs 
considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and be true. But just as 
critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its intended 
ultimate object, the reality, so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate 
interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to in order to be 
pertinent to the purpose. Methodeutic has a special interest in abduction, or 
the inference which starts a scientific hypothesis. For it is not sufficient 
that a hypothesis should be a justifiable one. Any hypothesis which explains 
the facts is justified critically. But among justifiable hypotheses we have to 
select that one which is suitable for being tested by experiment. There is no 
such need of a subsequent choice after drawing deductive and inductive 
conclusions. Yet although methodeutic has not the same special concern with 
them, it has to develop the principles which are to guide us in the invention 
of proofs, those which are to govern the general course of an investigation, 
and those which determine what problems shall engage our energies. It is, 
therefore, throughout of an economic character. Two other problems of 
methodeutic which the old logics usually made almost its only business are, 
first, the principles of definition, and of rendering ideas clear; and second, 
the principles of classification.
[End quote]

Note, that he is also saying that the principles of definition, and of 
rendering ideas clear, i.e., the principles of pragmatism, are part of 
methodeutic. The consideration of conceivable experimental consequences is how 
the logic of pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference. Methodeutic does 
not have the same special interest in deduction and induction; the specific 
justifications of deductions and inductions as valid are topics of critical 
logic.

The difference matters because instinctual plausibility has to do with how much 
one thinks a hypothesis true. That a hypothesis is conceivably testable does 
not lend assurance of its truth. More specific concerns of methodeutic 
including the economics of resarch - the suitability of a hypothesis for 
testing because of cheapness, or because of its bearing on other hypotheses, 
i.e., its caution (as in 20 Questions), incomplexity, or breadth, have no 
direct bearing on one's assurance, going in, that the hypothesis is true. A 
hypothesis, merely by being easier or more promising to test, does not become a 
more plausible and naturally simple explanation of a phenomenon.

In "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction" (Lecture VII of the 1903 Harvard 
lectures on pragmatism), see CP 5 196–200 http://www.textlog.de/7663.html , and somewhere 
in EP 2:226–241

 What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to be 
worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts. But what 
other conditions ought it to fulfill to be good?  Any hypothesis, 
therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special reasons to the 
contrary, provided it be capable of experimental verification, and only insofar 
as it is capable of such verification. This is approximately the doctrine of 
pragmatism.
[End quote]

Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent that 
rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does not 
offer rules for instinct.

Best, Ben

On 9/25/2016 1:56 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

Ben U., Gary R., List,

The following remarks seem--at least to my ear--to bear on th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Hello Clark, List,


I do think there are a spectrum of different approaches and aims that might 
guide our engagement with the ideas and arguments Peirce was developing. Let's 
distinguish between three locations on the broad spectrum:


1.  Interpreting Peirce's texts as faithfully as possible, where the aim is to 
find the truth about his particular arguments and philosophical views.

2.  Reconstructing the arguments so as to put them in the best shape, where the 
aim is to find what are truly the best forms of those arguments working from 
the assumptions and methods he was employing.

3. Drawing explicitly from Peirce's ideas and arguments for the purpose of 
putting them to work to find the truth about what is really the case.

4. Working with one's own methods and with one's own aims with very little 
attention to or care for what Peirce wrote.


For my part, I believe that all four approaches and aims may be considered 
reasonable (although the fourth might suffer in ways that might have been 
avoided). What is more, I believe that the first three sorts of inquiries 
belong in the discussion on the Peirce-list. Having said that, I do believe it 
is helpful to be clear about what one is doing in making a given post--and to 
make that clear to others. Otherwise, we will just be talking past one another. 
All things considered, I believe that you are correct in saying that Peirce 
thinks that the third sort of approach and aim should, in general, be 
controlling over the first and second. Having said that, he has written quite a 
lot on what it is to do the first or second sort of thing well or poorly.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Clark Goble 
Sent: Monday, September 26, 2016 9:37 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we 
variously may think for our own parts.

I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the social 
changes in the intervening century or so. As I mentioned a few weeks ago I 
think that most thinkers in the academy were they to conduct the experiment 
might come to somewhat different results. Since what counts is the community of 
inquirers and not just Peirce, it does seem that is a fruitful avenue to 
consider.

That’s not to deny the utility of focusing in on Peirce’s beliefs. It’s just 
that I think we can and must separate the arguments somewhat from the person 
proposing them. One danger I see in Peircean studies is that it falls into the 
trap of becoming purely about exegesis of Peirce’s thought. That’s an important 
step - especially given that many aspects of Peirce’s thought were so poorly 
understood for so many years. But when his thought isn’t extended beyond that, 
when a quote of Peirce becomes like a Bible verse quoted by a fundamentalist 
religious believer, I think we’re missing something fundamental about Peirce’s 
aims. (Not saying anyone here is doing that mind you - just that I think it’s 
an ever present danger I myself fall into occasionally) In Peircean terms we 
confuse the dynamic object with the immediate object.


On Sep 25, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Benjamin Udell 
mailto:baud...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent that 
rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does not 
offer rules for instinct.

Ben, do you think that Peirce distinguishes between those good at guesses or 
hypothesis formation and those who are not?

For instance in a more contemporary context we’d distinguish between the 
hypothesis of a scientist working in their area of knowledge and someone not 
with that background. It seems to me that while Peirce usually discusses 
critical common sensism in the context of regular broad social common sense 
that it applies even better to subgroups. That is subgroups develop a common 
sense based upon their experience over years.

It seems to me that if we distinguish the initial application of abduction 
towards a hypothesis with repeated community testing of the concept then things 
do get a bit trickier. I recognize that the discussion the past few days has 
primarily been on this initial application of abduction. The question then 
becomes to what degree continued inquiry upon what we might call metaphysical 
remains abductive and to what degree it goes beyond this.

Again science offers many examples here. Ideas often are not falsified by 
continued inquiry and experimentation. Rather they simply fall out of favor 
slowly as alternative hypothesis seems more persuasive. That is the normal idea 
of verification or falsification never happens simply because our experiments 
are themsel

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

> On Sep 26, 2016, at 10:11 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we 
> variously may think for our own parts.

I do think it’s worth asking how the argument itself fares given the social 
changes in the intervening century or so. As I mentioned a few weeks ago I 
think that most thinkers in the academy were they to conduct the experiment 
might come to somewhat different results. Since what counts is the community of 
inquirers and not just Peirce, it does seem that is a fruitful avenue to 
consider.

That’s not to deny the utility of focusing in on Peirce’s beliefs. It’s just 
that I think we can and must separate the arguments somewhat from the person 
proposing them. One danger I see in Peircean studies is that it falls into the 
trap of becoming purely about exegesis of Peirce’s thought. That’s an important 
step - especially given that many aspects of Peirce’s thought were so poorly 
understood for so many years. But when his thought isn’t extended beyond that, 
when a quote of Peirce becomes like a Bible verse quoted by a fundamentalist 
religious believer, I think we’re missing something fundamental about Peirce’s 
aims. (Not saying anyone here is doing that mind you - just that I think it’s 
an ever present danger I myself fall into occasionally) In Peircean terms we 
confuse the dynamic object with the immediate object.

> On Sep 25, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent that 
> rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does not 
> offer rules for instinct. 

Ben, do you think that Peirce distinguishes between those good at guesses or 
hypothesis formation and those who are not? 

For instance in a more contemporary context we’d distinguish between the 
hypothesis of a scientist working in their area of knowledge and someone not 
with that background. It seems to me that while Peirce usually discusses 
critical common sensism in the context of regular broad social common sense 
that it applies even better to subgroups. That is subgroups develop a common 
sense based upon their experience over years.

It seems to me that if we distinguish the initial application of abduction 
towards a hypothesis with repeated community testing of the concept then things 
do get a bit trickier. I recognize that the discussion the past few days has 
primarily been on this initial application of abduction. The question then 
becomes to what degree continued inquiry upon what we might call metaphysical 
remains abductive and to what degree it goes beyond this.

Again science offers many examples here. Ideas often are not falsified by 
continued inquiry and experimentation. Rather they simply fall out of favor 
slowly as alternative hypothesis seems more persuasive. That is the normal idea 
of verification or falsification never happens simply because our experiments 
are themselves so theory laden. (As Quine pointed out long ago although which I 
think one can find within Peirce as well) In turn this lines up with his 
critical common sensism. 

Allow me a quote from the archives. In this case from Teresa Calvet from way 
back in Feb 2006.

The bare definition of pragmaticism, writes Peirce (in "What Pragmatism Is "), 
"could convey no satisfactory comprehension of it to the most apprehensive of 
minds" of the doctrines "without the previous acceptance (or virtual 
acceptance) of which pragmaticism itself would be a nullity" (CP 5.416). Peirce 
says here that these preliminary propositions "might all be included under the 
vague maxim, 'Dismiss make-believes'", a maxim that could also be called, "the 
adoption of the general philosophy of common sense". This normative exhortation 
"do not make believe; (...) recognize, as you must, that there is much that you 
do not doubt, in the least" (CP 5.416) was enounced before by Peirce, in 1868, 
in "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" (W2, p. 212). Instead of presenting 
Peirce simply as anti-Cartesian, I prefer to follow what he himself said: 
"Although pragmaticism is not a philosophy, yet (...) it best comports with the 
English philosophy, and more particularly with the Scotch doctrine of common 
sense" (CP 8.207) and to insist that pragmaticism "involves a complete rupture 
with nominalism" (CP 8.208). To illustrate Peirce's position, William Davis 
suggests (already in 1972) the analogy of a jig-saw puzzle, "where each new bit 
adds significance to the whole, although each bit is incomplete in itself and 
there is no real foundation piece upon which all else is based. Any piece will 
do to start with, where nothing is infallible in principle, though much does 
not fail in practice" (Peirce's Epistemology, p. 20). Ten years later Susan 
Haack also uses that image (in the last section, "The Jigsaw of Knowledge", of 
her paper "Descartes, Peirce and the Cognitive Community"). But we could al

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-26 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Hello Ben U., List,

I, too, assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we 
variously may think for our own parts. Having said that, my general aim is to 
draw from other sources, such as the lectures concerning the first principle of 
logic and the conception of continuity that are collected in Reasoning and the 
Logic of Things, as resources for interpreting "The Neglected Argument for the 
Reality of God." As such, it is possible that I might go too far at times when 
reading some of these ideas and arguments from earlier lectures and essays into 
what Peirce seems be saying, either explicitly or implicitly, in the Humble 
Argument and the Neglected Argument.

For my part, I'm not yet able to see what you appear to be saying--which is 
that these passages from the Carnegie application and "Pragmatism as the Logic 
of Abduction" run at odds with the interpretative suggestions I am trying to 
explore. I'm starting to wonder if we might be working with different notions 
of what is, on Peirce's account, more instinctive in our habits of feeling, 
action and thought. The reason I suspect this might be the case is because I'm 
not yet able to get a clear idea of what you seem to be emphasizing when you 
talk about Peirce's account of "instinctual plausibility." I'll keep working on 
it in the hopes of clearing up some of the vagueness in my ideas.

For my part, I think grounds of Peirce's the division between speculative 
grammar, critical logic, and methodeutic can be interpreted in a number of 
ways. Jeff Kasser has offered some nice explanations of what Peirce means when 
he talks about methodeutical considerations pertaining to the economy of 
research. Recently, I've been looking at Mats Bergman's Peirce's Philosophy of 
Communication: The Rhetorical Underpinnings of the Theory of Signs and have 
found his sorting of some of the competing lines of interpretation to be 
helpful.

As I have suggested in earlier posts, I think that Peirce's emphasis on the 
relations between signs, object and interpretants that we need to focus our 
attention on in each of these areas of semiotics can be used to help steer the 
inquiries. When it comes to matters of the assurance of different forms of 
inference, I am drawn to the idea that the sort of mediation that is at work 
here involves relations of determination between the dynamical object and sign 
(typically the focus of inquiry in critical logic) and between the sign and 
normal interpretant (typically the focus of inquiry in methodeutic). My 
interpretative suggestion is that the relation between the dynamical object and 
the final interpretant (so that we have some assurance that the final 
interpretant is in a relation to the same object that was the object of the 
sign) should be understood as mediated by these two relations. As such, the 
mediation involves a triadic relationship between the three dyadic relations as 
well as a triadic relation between three triads. Gary F. has indicated that he 
finds the diagrams I've offered hard to make out, so I suspect that others 
might find them similarly puzzling. Having said that, I'll continue to look at 
the textual support for this interpretative hypothesis--and I'll see what might 
be done to make the diagrams clearer.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Benjamin Udell [baud...@gmail.com]
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 12:15 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jeff D., Gary R., list,

I assume we're discussing what Peirce thought, rather than what we variously 
may think for our own parts. Peirce spells out the difference between critical 
and methodeutical justifications in the Carnegie application _New Elements of 
Mathematics_ passage that I quoted earlier. The fuller passage can be seen both 
by Google preview 
https://books.google.com/books?id=aLxTkSob9UMC&pg=PA62&lpg=PA62&dq=%22Methodeutic+has+a+special+interest+in+Abduction%22
 in Joe Ransdell's reconstruction at Arisbe (although it looks like Joe missed 
some italicizations) 
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-08.htm#m27 :

MEMOIR   27: OF METHODEUTIC

[]

From Draft B - MS L75.279-280

The first business of this memoir is to develop a precise conception of the 
nature of methodeutical logic. In methodeutic, it is assumed that the signs 
considered will conform to the conditions of critic, and be true. But just as 
critical logic inquires whether and how a sign corresponds to its intended 
ultimate object, the reality, so methodeutic looks to the purposed ultimate 
interpretant and inquires what conditions a sign must conform to in order to be 
pertinent to the purpose. Methodeutic has a special in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-25 Thread Jerry Rhee

 incomplexity, or
> breadth, have no direct bearing on one's assurance, going in, that the
> hypothesis is true. A hypothesis, merely by being easier or more promising
> to test, does not become a more plausible and naturally simple explanation
> of a phenomenon.
>
> In "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction" (Lecture VII of the 1903 Harvard
> lectures on pragmatism), see CP 5 196–200 http://www.textlog.de/7663.html
> , and somewhere in EP 2:226–241
>
>  What is good abduction? What should an explanatory hypothesis be to
> be worthy to rank as a hypothesis? Of course, it must explain the facts.
> But what other conditions ought it to fulfill to be good?  Any
> hypothesis, therefore, may be admissible, in the absence of any special
> reasons to the contrary, provided it be capable of experimental
> verification, and only insofar as it is capable of such verification. This
> is approximately the doctrine of pragmatism.
> [End quote]
>
> Moreover, pragmatism is the logic of abductive inference to the extent
> that rules need to be specified for abductive inference at all. Peirce does
> not offer rules for instinct.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> *On 9/25/2016 1:56 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:*
>
> Ben U., Gary R., List,
>
> The following remarks seem--at least to my ear--to bear on the some
> relationships between plausibility and methodeutical justification.
>
> Peirce says: "As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible";
> this acceptance ranges in different cases -- and reasonably so -- from a
> mere expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting
> attention and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to
> uncontrollable inclination to believe."
>
> The inference to a hypothesis expressed in the interrogative mood suggests
> that the holding of the question to be "plausible" (e.g., well-fitted to
> the surprising phenomena, well-formed as having great uberty, etc.) does
> seem to derive its plausibility from the first rule of reason. At the very
> least, the idea that the question has been formulated by a sincere desire
> to learn, and in a manner that does not embody undue bias or prejudice, and
> that it does not close the door of inquiry all seem to provide some
> justification to the claim that the question is plausible.
>
> What is more, the suggestion that plausibility comes in varying degrees,
> ranging from the lowest levels of assurance up to the "high peaks" of
> plausibility does suggest that the principle of continuity applies to the
> manner in which seek and then provide degrees of assurance. For instance,
> the efforts to rid one’s estimations of plausibility of the undue effects
> of bias and prejudice are something that one might seek to improve on an
> incremental basis. What is more, the manner in which one might assure that
> the door of inquiry is kept open might vary from something like a door that
> is barely cracked open to one that is wide open. Furthermore, the way in
> which the door is held open might vary from a door that swings
> uncontrollably due to the "winds" of vicissitude, to one that is firmly
> held open with a wedge.
>
> Finally, the remark that "where conjecture mounts the high peaks of
> Plausibility -- and is *really* most worthy of confidence" suggest that
> what makes a conjecture really worthy of confidence is that the many
> estimations of the suitability of the hypothesis as an explanation is a
> process that has effectively been guided by the pragmatic maxim. If the
> leading conceptions in the hypothesis have been clarified up to the third
> degree, then it *really* is most worthy of our confidence as a
> hypothetical explanation of a set of surprising phenomena. The fact that
> the surprising character fades the more worthy it is of our confidence does
> suggest that the fit is one with a large system of our other beliefs that
> are relatively well settled as habits--and that the hypothesis is
> *sufficient* to explain all that was, initially, quite surprising.
>
> --Jeff
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>
> *From:* Benjamin Udell  
> *Sent:* Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:50 AM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Jeff D., Gary R., list,
>
> Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which
> Peirce elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, instinctual
> simplicity; it bears upon assurance by instinct; I don't find him
> discussing methodeutical justification (e.g., testability) of abductive
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-25 Thread Benjamin Udell

 the interrogative mood 
suggests that the holding of the question to be "plausible" (e.g., 
well-fitted to the surprising phenomena, well-formed as having great 
uberty, etc.) does seem to derive its plausibility from the first rule 
of reason. At the very least, the idea that the question has been 
formulated by a sincere desire to learn, and in a manner that does not 
embody undue bias or prejudice, and that it does not close the door of 
inquiry all seem to provide some justification to the claim that the 
question is plausible.


What is more, the suggestion that plausibility comes in varying degrees, 
ranging from the lowest levels of assurance up to the "high peaks" of 
plausibility does suggest that the principle of continuity applies to 
the manner in which seek and then provide degrees of assurance. For 
instance, the efforts to rid one’s estimations of plausibility of the 
undue effects of bias and prejudice are something that one might seek to 
improve on an incremental basis. What is more, the manner in which one 
might assure that the door of inquiry is kept open might vary from 
something like a door that is barely cracked open to one that is wide 
open. Furthermore, the way in which the door is held open might vary 
from a door that swings uncontrollably due to the "winds" of 
vicissitude, to one that is firmly held open with a wedge.


Finally, the remark that "where conjecture mounts the high peaks of 
Plausibility -- and is *really* most worthy of confidence" suggest that 
what makes a conjecture really worthy of confidence is that the many 
estimations of the suitability of the hypothesis as an explanation is a 
process that has effectively been guided by the pragmatic maxim. If the 
leading conceptions in the hypothesis have been clarified up to the 
third degree, then it *really* is most worthy of our confidence as a 
hypothetical explanation of a set of surprising phenomena. The fact that 
the surprising character fades the more worthy it is of our confidence 
does suggest that the fit is one with a large system of our other 
beliefs that are relatively well settled as habits--and that the 
hypothesis is /sufficient/ to explain all that was, initially, quite 
surprising.


--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

*From:* Benjamin Udell 
*Sent:* Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:50 AM
*To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Jeff D., Gary R., list,

Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which 
Peirce elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, instinctual 
simplicity; it bears upon assurance by instinct; I don't find him 
discussing methodeutical justification (e.g., testability) of abductive 
inference in the passage that you quoted. I've had some further thoughts 
on the nature of assurance by form, but they would just lead us further 
into byways.


You get into some of the bigger question that you raised in earlier 
posts, including the idea that Peirce's Humble Argument may be the only 
game in town (my words) on the questions that it concerns. I have lots 
of half-formed remarks that I could offer on that, and when I try to get 
started, I digress. Maybe I should just mention topics that occur to me 
but that I'm unsure of how to address:


• Only game in town - is the assurance of the Humble Argument's being 
the only game in town to be acheived by instinctual plausibility, by 
experience, or by form? Probably by a combination, but would one kind of 
assurance be foremost in the overall assurance? For example, suppose 
that string theory were proven mathematically to be the only consistent 
way to unite general relativity with quantum field theory. It would 
still have to have assurance by experience by accordance with all 
observations, but it would still lack confirmation of predictions that 
distinguish it from general relativity per se and quantum field theory 
per se, which predictions, since they are about quantum gravity, would 
currently require a particle collider the size of the known universe - a 
conceivable practical test, but contingently fantastically impractical 
for us. So, if it were to be found, I'd call such an assurance of string 
theory (as sole possible mathematico-physical unifier of GR and QFT) an 
assurance by form. See what I mean about my digressions? More to the 
point, I should just ask, how does one strengthen the assurance that the 
Humble Argument is the only game in town?


• Common elements in theological ideals of various religions - how alike 
are those ideals, really?


Best, Ben

*On 9/25/2016 12:06 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:*


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-25 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

Ben U., Gary R., List,


The following remarks seem--at least to my ear--to bear on the some 
relationships between plausibility and methodeutical justification.



Peirce says: "As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible"; this 
acceptance ranges in different cases -- and reasonably so -- from a mere 
expression of it in the interrogative mood, as a question meriting attention 
and reply, up through all appraisals of Plausibility, to uncontrollable 
inclination to believe."



The inference to a hypothesis expressed in the interrogative mood suggests that 
the holding of the question to be "plausible" (e.g., well-fitted to the 
surprising phenomena, well-formed as having great uberty, etc.) does seem to 
derive its plausibility from the first rule of reason. At the very least, the 
idea that the question has been formulated by a sincere desire to learn, and in 
a manner that does not embody undue bias or prejudice, and that it does not 
close the door of inquiry all seem to provide some justification to the claim 
that the question is plausible.



What is more, the suggestion that plausibility comes in varying degrees, 
ranging from the lowest levels of assurance up to the "high peaks" of 
plausibility does suggest that the principle of continuity applies to the 
manner in which seek and then provide degrees of assurance. For instance, the 
efforts to rid one’s estimations of plausibility of the undue effects of bias 
and prejudice are something that one might seek to improve on an incremental 
basis. What is more, the manner in which one might assure that the door of 
inquiry is kept open might vary from something like a door that is barely 
cracked open to one that is wide open. Furthermore, the way in which the door 
is held open might vary from a door that swings uncontrollably due to the 
"winds" of vicissitude, to one that is firmly held open with a wedge.



Finally, the remark that "where conjecture mounts the high peaks of 
Plausibility -- and is really most worthy of confidence" suggest that what 
makes a conjecture really worthy of confidence is that the many estimations of 
the suitability of the hypothesis as an explanation is a process that has 
effectively been guided by the pragmatic maxim. If the leading conceptions in 
the hypothesis have been clarified up to the third degree, then it really is 
most worthy of our confidence as a hypothetical explanation of a set of 
surprising phenomena. The fact that the surprising character fades the more 
worthy it is of our confidence does suggest that the fit is one with a large 
system of our other beliefs that are relatively well settled as habits--and 
that the hypothesis is sufficient to explain all that was, initially, quite 
surprising.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Benjamin Udell 
Sent: Sunday, September 25, 2016 9:50 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


Jeff D., Gary R., list,

Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which Peirce 
elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, instinctual simplicity; it 
bears upon assurance by instinct; I don't find him discussing methodeutical 
justification (e.g., testability) of abductive inference in the passage that 
you quoted. I've had some further thoughts on the nature of assurance by form, 
but they would just lead us further into byways.

You get into some of the bigger question that you raised in earlier posts, 
including the idea that Peirce's Humble Argument may be the only game in town 
(my words) on the questions that it concerns. I have lots of half-formed 
remarks that I could offer on that, and when I try to get started, I digress. 
Maybe I should just mention topics that occur to me but that I'm unsure of how 
to address:

• Only game in town - is the assurance of the Humble Argument's being the only 
game in town to be acheived by instinctual plausibility, by experience, or by 
form? Probably by a combination, but would one kind of assurance be foremost in 
the overall assurance? For example, suppose that string theory were proven 
mathematically to be the only consistent way to unite general relativity with 
quantum field theory. It would still have to have assurance by experience by 
accordance with all observations, but it would still lack confirmation of 
predictions that distinguish it from general relativity per se and quantum 
field theory per se, which predictions, since they are about quantum gravity, 
would currently require a particle collider the size of the known universe - a 
conceivable practical test, but contingently fantastically impractical for us. 
So, if it were to be found, I'd call such an assurance of string theory (as 
sole possible math

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-25 Thread Benjamin Udell


Jeff D., Gary R., list,

Your quote from "A Neglected Argument..." bears on plausibility, which 
Peirce elsewhere in the same essay discusses as natural, instinctual 
simplicity; it bears upon assurance by instinct; I don't find him 
discussing methodeutical justification (e.g., testability) of abductive 
inference in the passage that you quoted. I've had some further thoughts 
on the nature of assurance by form, but they would just lead us further 
into byways.


You get into some of the bigger question that you raised in earlier 
posts, including the idea that Peirce's Humble Argument may be the only 
game in town (my words) on the questions that it concerns. I have lots 
of half-formed remarks that I could offer on that, and when I try to get 
started, I digress. Maybe I should just mention topics that occur to me 
but that I'm unsure of how to address:


• Only game in town - is the assurance of the Humble Argument's being 
the only game in town to be acheived by instinctual plausibility, by 
experience, or by form? Probably by a combination, but would one kind of 
assurance be foremost in the overall assurance? For example, suppose 
that string theory were proven mathematically to be the only consistent 
way to unite general relativity with quantum field theory. It would 
still have to have assurance by experience by accordance with all 
observations, but it would still lack confirmation of predictions that 
distinguish it from general relativity per se and quantum field theory 
per se, which predictions, since they are about quantum gravity, would 
currently require a particle collider the size of the known universe - a 
conceivable practical test, but contingently fantastically impractical 
for us. So, if it were to be found, I'd call such an assurance of string 
theory (as sole possible mathematico-physical unifier of GR and QFT) an 
assurance by form. See what I mean about my digressions? More to the 
point, I should just ask, how does one strengthen the assurance that the 
Humble Argument is the only game in town?


• Common elements in theological ideals of various religions - how alike 
are those ideals, really?


Best, Ben

*On 9/25/2016 12:06 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:*

Hi Ben U., Gary R., List,

Responses inter polated:

*JD:* Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical 
in all three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience 
and according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should 
remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the 
argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible.

[End quote]

*BU:* The claim is rather that the conclusion is
1. plausible (assurance by instinct) **and**
2. verisimilar (in Peirce's sense, likeness of conclusion to premisses, 
the assurance by experience when experience has accumulated but is not 
yet conclusive), **and**
3. formally valid.  Abductive formal validity, if it does not include 
plausibility (instinctual assurance), still includes at least critical 
abductive formal validity (the abductive inference can be put into the 
form of /rule/, /result/, ergo /case/, or into the form of CP 5.189, or 
into whatever other form is accounted good for abduction at the critical 
level, i.e., the level of critique of arguments.


*JD:* Yes, I agree.

*BU: *In addition, in your paragraph beginning "Major premiss", you 
listed a series of _/methodeutical/_ (not critique-of-argument) 
justifications for an abductive inference, such as testability (I'll 
just discuss testability for simplicity's sake).  Indeed Peirce came to 
regard methodeutical justifications as needed for completing the 
justification (i.e., validation) of an abductive inference, whereas no 
particular methodeutical justification was needed for a deduction or an 
induction to be valid (Carnegie Application, L75, 1902, New Elements of 
Mathematics v. 4, pp. 37–38. 
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-carnegie-institution-correspondence-0 
)


JD: I am suggesting that the /methodeutical/ requirements for abduction 
that pertain to the first rule of reason, the principle of continuity 
and the pragmatic maxim do provide something by way of a justification 
for the validity of those abductive inferences that satisfy--in some 
degree, perhaps--the methological requirements.


BU: But I wonder whether the methodeutical justification can be 
considered assurance by (logical) form.  Is it _/assurance/_ at all?  
That a claim is testable in principle (idioscopically or otherwise) 
gives some kind of assurance versus claims that are untestable in 
principle or uncertain as to whether they're testable in principle. Yet 
such assurance in whatever degree is assurance not per se _/of truth/_ 
but of pragmatic meaningfulness, and that pragmatic meaningfulness is 
not in turn a source per se of assurance of truth, but only of the 
methodeutical possibility of reaching some sort of truth.  That see

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-24 Thread Jeffrey Brian Downard

credible 
conjecture, as premisses. On account of this Explanation, the inquirer is led 
to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, with favor. As I phrase it, he 
provisionally holds it to be "Plausible"; this acceptance ranges in different 
cases -- and reasonably so -- from a mere expression of it in the interrogative 
mood, as a question meriting attention and reply, up through all appraisals of 
Plausibility, to uncontrollable inclination to believe. The whole series of 
mental performances between the notice of the wonderful phenomenon and the 
acceptance of the hypothesis, during which the usually docile understanding 
seems to hold the bit between its teeth and to have us at its mercy, the search 
for pertinent circumstances and the laying hold of them, sometimes without our 
cognizance, the scrutiny of them, the dark laboring, the bursting out of the 
startling conjecture, the remarking of its smooth fitting to the anomaly, as it 
is turned back and forth like a key in a lock, and the final estimation of its 
Plausibility, I reckon as composing the First Stage of Inquiry. Its 
characteristic formula of reasoning I term Retroduction, i.e. reasoning from 
consequent to antecedent. In one respect the designation seems inappropriate; 
for in most instances where conjecture mounts the high peaks of Plausibility -- 
and is really most worthy of confidence -- the inquirer is unable definitely to 
formulate just what the explained wonder is; or can only do so in the light of 
the hypothesis. In short, it is a form of Argument rather than of 
Argumentation. CP 6.469
In many cases, we are able formulate a number of competing hypotheses that 
might explain some surprising phenomena. In other cases, however, the 
hypotheses that are able to satisfy the requirements of valid abduction are 
quite limited in number. I suspect that, in the case at hand, we are presented 
with something that is akin to what Kant calls a "need" of reason. In this 
case, where we seek an explanation that might be sufficient to bring unity to 
the three Universes into unity, the requirements for a plausible explanation 
are quite demanding--and it appears that only one key will fit the lock. After 
all, only one Ideal can, it would seem, really be highest.

As this point, let me offer a suggestion that draws on some remarks that Peirce 
makes about the Idea of the Absolute. As in projective geometry, where we call 
the point on the infinitely distant horizon where all lines of "perspectivity" 
converge the "Absolute," so too in philosophy, we need something that will 
enable us to ground the different standards we might use in evaluating the 
validity of the different forms of argument. In this case, the grounding is an 
"Absolute" Ideal that might enable us to see how the different standards for 
measuring the validity of arguments might be mapped--one onto another.

--Jeff



On 9/23/2016 2:32 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,

Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said that 
every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference 
is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken.

We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected Argument 
want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my part, I 
don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a response to 
the question.

Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate 
hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function that 
has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, in his 
Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of logic, 
metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant totalizing and 
synthesizing hypotheses.

One of Peirce's points is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings 
(such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and Ideals 
embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same need. He is 
asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our own feelings, 
imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we recognize a similar 
need? Like Schiller, I think the aim of further cultivating our habits of 
feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to call out for the kinds of 
Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer us hope as we seek to bring 
the conflicting tendencies in our personal and social lives into better 
harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or 
"God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, 
Goodness and Truth of its Divine character.


--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
___

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-24 Thread Benjamin Udell

l that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals 
"Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate 
the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character.


--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
____________________

*From: Gary Richmond
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking*

Ben, Jeff, List,

Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well taken, and I agree with your analysis.

Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the 
N.A. as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post:


JD: So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God 
involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of 
the inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on 
"The Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of 
these is the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same 
true of the alternate hypotheses?


Best,

Gary R

[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

*On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:*

Jeff, Edwina, list,

I've just a few quibbles, nothing major.

Jeff, you wrote:

   Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of
   inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear
   to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid,
   but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we
   have misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it
   is inductive, when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent
   invalidity is really just a lack of soundness in that something in
   the premisses involves an error on our part and it is really false.
   [End quote]

Some of that is very close to what Peirce said in his articles in 
_Journal of Speculative Philosophy_ in 1868, but with a decisive 
difference. Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid 
inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference. 
In "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," he said:


   It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results
   we are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any
   other supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental
   action to the formula of valid reasoning.
   [CP 5.266, W 2:214,
   http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm

Yes, invalidity of inference arises from mistaking what kind of 
inference it is - where "it" refers to the mental action. But saying 
that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference sounds 
confusingly like saying that there is no invalid inference.


An unsound deduction is unsound by virtue (or should I say 'vice') of a 
falsehood in the premisses, an invalidity in the deductive form, or 
both. A valid deduction is unsound if it has one or more false 
premisses, and is necessarily unsound if there is an inconsistency 
(a.k.a. necessary falsehood) in a premiss or among premisses. A 
'forward-only' deduction can be valid and unsound yet true in its 
conclusion, e.g., Socrates is a cro-magnon, all cro-magnons are mortal, 
ergo Socrates is mortal. (A particularly vacuous example, based on a 
necessarily false conjunction of premisses, is: /p/&~/p/, ergo /p/ or 
~/p/.) It's difficult to think of a deduction whose seeming invalidity 
boils down to the occurrence of something contingently or necessarily 
false in its premisses, maybe that difficulty is what Edwina was getting 
at in her reply (I haven't had time to catch up with this thread). 
Anyway, whether one can explain seeming invalidity as unsoundness in 
non-deductive inference modes depends I guess on how one defines 
validity and soundness for them.


Best, Ben

*On 9/21/2016 5:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:*

Hello Jon, List,

The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more 
fully in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in 
some of the details a bit more:


Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a 
pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that 
appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, 
valid, but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that 
we have misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is 
inductive, when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is 
really just a lack of soundness in that something in the premisses 
involves an error on our part and it is really false. As a form of 
inference, every retroductive conjecture that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-23 Thread CLARK GOBLE

> On Sep 23, 2016, at 2:24 PM, Eugene Halton  wrote:
> 
> And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of musement 
> and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language left behind? A 
> realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could not enter? You have 
> entered the musement language world, alive in verb processes, occasionally 
> stopping at a noun here and there, but never lingering; alive in the wonder.

You’d be Heidegger?   Only half joking. Obviously the clearing where 
phenomena manifests isn’t quite the same as Peirce’s musement nor is the later 
Heidegger’s notion of strife between things and the structures they participate 
in (polemos) quite the same as what Peirce gets at. But there are some 
interesting parallels none the less.

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Eugene, Edwina, list:

If we affix our gaze upon the wet lawn and muse about what it means, what
do you think we, as a community, will say?

What if instead we immanate about *quid sit deus*; "What would God be?"

one two three...Apollo Themis Zeus...mind body soul

Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:39 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Excellent, Eugene - that's exactly how Peirce described the dynamic
> semiosis of the universe/Mind.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Eugene Halton 
> *To:* Peirce List 
> *Sent:* Friday, September 23, 2016 4:24 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> I sent the post below on Sept 19 when there was some discussion of
> musement, but it appears it did not go thru so I'm posting again. Apologies
> if it did go thru the first time. Gene H
>
>
> …and musement musings…
>
> Peirce’s “The play of musement” is a beautiful way of putting
> it. It is a portal to a way of opening one’s body soul mind to experience.
> But what if, on entering that realm of spontaneity and freedom through the
> “play of musement” portal, one begins to realize there are shadings of
> musement as various as, for example, the varieties of signs Peirce
> outlined?
>
> And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of
> musement and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language
> left behind? A realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could not
> enter? You have entered the musement language world, alive in verb
> processes, occasionally stopping at a noun here and there, but never
> lingering; alive in the wonder.
>
> In this realm you realize through energetic projaculation
> that the Neglected Argument lies not in picturing Big Daddy Noun-concept in
> the Sky, fixed and unspontaneous, but rather, as D. H. Lawrence put it in
> describing Walt Whitman’s poetry, “lies in the sheer appreciation of the
> instant moment, life surging itself into utterance at its very
> well-head…The quivering nimble hour of the present, this is the quick of
> Time. This is the immanence.”
>
> You conjecture that not only, as Peirce put it, “When we gaze
> upon the multifariousness of nature we are looking straight into the face
> of a living spontaneity” (Peirce, 1887, 6.553), but that you yourself are
> participant in that living spontaneity. You realize that Peirce is not
> claiming “intelligent design” for the universe, but rather an “intelligent
> sign” argument energizing into being, a universe in active creation.
>
> And there you find yourself, back from the play of musement, yet still
> immersed in the living spontaneity.
>
> Gene Halton
>
> --
>
>
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-23 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Excellent, Eugene - that's exactly how Peirce described the dynamic semiosis of 
the universe/Mind.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Eugene Halton 
  To: Peirce List 
  Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 4:24 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

  I sent the post below on Sept 19 when there was some discussion of musement, 
but it appears it did not go thru so I'm posting again. Apologies if it did go 
thru the first time. Gene H

  …and musement musings…

  Peirce’s “The play of musement” is a beautiful way of putting it. 
It is a portal to a way of opening one’s body soul mind to experience. But what 
if, on entering that realm of spontaneity and freedom through the “play of 
musement” portal, one begins to realize there are shadings of musement as 
various as, for example, the varieties of signs Peirce outlined? 

  And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of musement 
and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language left behind? A 
realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could not enter? You have entered 
the musement language world, alive in verb processes, occasionally stopping at 
a noun here and there, but never lingering; alive in the wonder. 

  In this realm you realize through energetic projaculation that 
the Neglected Argument lies not in picturing Big Daddy Noun-concept in the Sky, 
fixed and unspontaneous, but rather, as D. H. Lawrence put it in describing 
Walt Whitman’s poetry, “lies in the sheer appreciation of the instant moment, 
life surging itself into utterance at its very well-head…The quivering nimble 
hour of the present, this is the quick of Time. This is the immanence.” 

  You conjecture that not only, as Peirce put it, “When we gaze 
upon the multifariousness of nature we are looking straight into the face of a 
living spontaneity” (Peirce, 1887, 6.553), but that you yourself are 
participant in that living spontaneity. You realize that Peirce is not claiming 
“intelligent design” for the universe, but rather an “intelligent sign” 
argument energizing into being, a universe in active creation. 

  And there you find yourself, back from the play of musement, yet still 
immersed in the living spontaneity.

  Gene Halton

--

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Aw: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-23 Thread Helmut Raulien


Jerry, list,

yes, and I think it was Aristotle, who thought, that a vacuum / void is impossible, so nature always fills it somehow. Anyway, "Horror Vacui" is a very ancient term, I think. But maybe modern physics corrobates it somehow: Virtual particles, dark matter, or whatver.

Best,

Helmut

 

23. September 2016 um 22:12 Uhr
 "Jerry Rhee"  wrote:
 



Helmut, list:

 

Void is a place/interval with nothing in it.  That conclusion is reached by syllogism.

 

Best,
Jerry R


 
On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote:





Edwina, list,


I dont remember, where I have got the term "Horror Vacui" from, but I think it means, that the nature is afraid of a vacuum, so there cannot be nothing, so there must always be something, by any means.

Best,

Helmut


 23. September 2016 um 21:47 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
 





Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll  quibble with a few terms. 

 

For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person' while an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way. 

 

An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to prevent the 'horror vacui - i.e., to prevent entropic dissipation of matter but this doesn't mean that achieving this result, along with its complexity, requires a supreme intelligence, which is the view of the theist.

 

And Jeff adds evaluative terms, such as 'beauty, goodness and truth' and adds a 'divine character' to its nature. I'm not sure what the latter term [divine character] means and the first three - I think need some clarification, at least, in my view.

 

Edwina


- Original Message -

From: Helmut Raulien

To: jeffrey.down...@nau.edu

Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L

Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM

Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

 


Jeff, list,

you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character."

I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying that philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but discussing about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to theologists, the medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I also think, that the discussion between atheists and theists is not about whether God exists or not, but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it means that He is a person, then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the meaning of the term "person": An atheist might say: Nature and evolution are nonpersonal, but nevertheless quite intelligent systems, and a theist might answer: But an intelligent system is a person, so why should I not call it "God". An atheist might claim, that everything is only based on a simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. Then a theist might answer: The simpler the tools are, that achieve great complexity, the greater must be the intelligence that has invented these tools. I can think of a discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater play, and in the end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, just the atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does.

Best,

Hlmut 


 23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr
 "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
 

Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,

Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken.

We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a response to the question.

Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses.

One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we recognize a similar need? Like Sc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-23 Thread Eugene Halton

I sent the post below on Sept 19 when there was some discussion of
musement, but it appears it did not go thru so I'm posting again. Apologies
if it did go thru the first time. Gene H


…and musement musings…

Peirce’s “The play of musement” is a beautiful way of putting
it. It is a portal to a way of opening one’s body soul mind to experience.
But what if, on entering that realm of spontaneity and freedom through the
“play of musement” portal, one begins to realize there are shadings of
musement as various as, for example, the varieties of signs Peirce
outlined?

And what if you allowed yourself to enter the realm of musement
and found your Indo-European or related noun-centered language left behind?
A realm where your noun-God, your concept-God, could not enter? You have
entered the musement language world, alive in verb processes, occasionally
stopping at a noun here and there, but never lingering; alive in the
wonder.

In this realm you realize through energetic projaculation that
the Neglected Argument lies not in picturing Big Daddy Noun-concept in the
Sky, fixed and unspontaneous, but rather, as D. H. Lawrence put it in
describing Walt Whitman’s poetry, “lies in the sheer appreciation of the
instant moment, life surging itself into utterance at its very
well-head…The quivering nimble hour of the present, this is the quick of
Time. This is the immanence.”

You conjecture that not only, as Peirce put it, “When we gaze
upon the multifariousness of nature we are looking straight into the face
of a living spontaneity” (Peirce, 1887, 6.553), but that you yourself are
participant in that living spontaneity. You realize that Peirce is not
claiming “intelligent design” for the universe, but rather an “intelligent
sign” argument energizing into being, a universe in active creation.

And there you find yourself, back from the play of musement, yet still
immersed in the living spontaneity.

Gene Halton

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Helmut, list:


Void is a place/interval with nothing in it.  That conclusion is reached by
syllogism.



Best,
Jerry R

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, list,
> I dont remember, where I have got the term "Horror Vacui" from, but I
> think it means, that the nature is afraid of a vacuum, so there cannot be
> nothing, so there must always be something, by any means.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  23. September 2016 um 21:47 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
>
> Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll  quibble with a few terms.
>
> For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person'
> while an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way.
>
> An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to
> prevent the 'horror vacui - i.e., to prevent entropic dissipation of matter
> but this doesn't mean that achieving this result, along with
> its complexity, requires a supreme intelligence, which is the view of the
> theist.
>
> And Jeff adds evaluative terms, such as 'beauty, goodness and truth' and
> adds a 'divine character' to its nature. I'm not sure what the latter term
> [divine character] means and the first three - I think need some
> clarification, at least, in my view.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Helmut Raulien <http://h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *To:* jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond <http://gary.richm...@gmail.com> ; Peirce-L
> <http://peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Jeff, list,
> you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals
> "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate
> the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character."
> I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying
> that philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but
> discussing about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to
> theologists, the medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I
> also think, that the discussion between atheists and theists is not about
> whether God exists or not, but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it
> means that He is a person, then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the
> meaning of the term "person": An atheist might say: Nature and evolution
> are nonpersonal, but nevertheless quite intelligent systems, and a theist
> might answer: But an intelligent system is a person, so why should I not
> call it "God". An atheist might claim, that everything is only based on a
> simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. Then a theist might answer:
> The simpler the tools are, that achieve great complexity, the greater must
> be the intelligence that has invented these tools. I can think of a
> discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater play, and in the
> end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, just the
> atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does.
> Best,
> Hlmut
>  23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr
>  "Jeffrey Brian Downard"  wrote:
>
> Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,
>
> Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said
> that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every
> inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken.
>
> We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected
> Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my
> part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a
> response to the question.
>
> Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate
> hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function
> that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that,
> in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of
> logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant
> totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses.
>
> One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings
> (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and
> Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same
> need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our
> own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we
> recognize a

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-23 Thread Helmut Raulien


Edwina, list,


I dont remember, where I have got the term "Horror Vacui" from, but I think it means, that the nature is afraid of a vacuum, so there cannot be nothing, so there must always be something, by any means.

Best,

Helmut


 23. September 2016 um 21:47 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
 



Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll  quibble with a few terms. 

 

For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person' while an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way. 

 

An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to prevent the 'horror vacui - i.e., to prevent entropic dissipation of matter but this doesn't mean that achieving this result, along with its complexity, requires a supreme intelligence, which is the view of the theist.

 

And Jeff adds evaluative terms, such as 'beauty, goodness and truth' and adds a 'divine character' to its nature. I'm not sure what the latter term [divine character] means and the first three - I think need some clarification, at least, in my view.

 

Edwina


- Original Message -

From: Helmut Raulien

To: jeffrey.down...@nau.edu

Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L

Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM

Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

 


Jeff, list,

you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character."

I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying that philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but discussing about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to theologists, the medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I also think, that the discussion between atheists and theists is not about whether God exists or not, but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it means that He is a person, then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the meaning of the term "person": An atheist might say: Nature and evolution are nonpersonal, but nevertheless quite intelligent systems, and a theist might answer: But an intelligent system is a person, so why should I not call it "God". An atheist might claim, that everything is only based on a simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. Then a theist might answer: The simpler the tools are, that achieve great complexity, the greater must be the intelligence that has invented these tools. I can think of a discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater play, and in the end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, just the atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does.

Best,

Hlmut 


 23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr
 "Jeffrey Brian Downard"  wrote:
 

Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,

Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken.

We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a response to the question.

Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses.

One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we recognize a similar need? Like Schiller, I think that aim of further cultivating our habits of feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to call out for the kinds of Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer us hope as we seek to bring the conflicting tendencies in our personal and social lives into better harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Edwina, list:



The *Divine* in Beauty, Goodness, Truth has a very particular position;

you could even say ordinality.



From Lawrence Dewan on ST. THOMAS AND THE RENEWAL OF METAPHYSICS:



As Thomas says:

The appetitive power moves [us] to inspect something, whether sensibly or
intelligibly, sometimes because of the love of the thing seen: because, as
Matthew 6 [21] says: "where your treasure is, there also is your heart";
but sometimes because of a love of the knowledge itself which results from
such inspection.



“Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation…”



":-- O wonderful being, and to what are you looking?”



Best,
Jerry Rhee

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll  quibble with a few terms.
>
> For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person'
> while an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way.
>
> An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to
> prevent the 'horror vacui - i.e., to prevent entropic dissipation of matter
> but this doesn't mean that achieving this result, along with
> its complexity, requires a supreme intelligence, which is the view of the
> theist.
>
> And Jeff adds evaluative terms, such as 'beauty, goodness and truth' and
> adds a 'divine character' to its nature. I'm not sure what the latter term
> [divine character] means and the first three - I think need some
> clarification, at least, in my view.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *To:* jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
> *Cc:* Gary Richmond  ; Peirce-L
> 
> *Sent:* Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM
> *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Jeff, list,
> you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals
> "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate
> the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character."
> I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying
> that philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but
> discussing about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to
> theologists, the medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I
> also think, that the discussion between atheists and theists is not about
> whether God exists or not, but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it
> means that He is a person, then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the
> meaning of the term "person": An atheist might say: Nature and evolution
> are nonpersonal, but nevertheless quite intelligent systems, and a theist
> might answer: But an intelligent system is a person, so why should I not
> call it "God". An atheist might claim, that everything is only based on a
> simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. Then a theist might answer:
> The simpler the tools are, that achieve great complexity, the greater must
> be the intelligence that has invented these tools. I can think of a
> discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater play, and in the
> end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, just the
> atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does.
> Best,
> Hlmut
>  23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr
>  "Jeffrey Brian Downard"  wrote:
>
> Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,
>
> Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said
> that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every
> inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken.
>
> We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected
> Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my
> part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a
> response to the question.
>
> Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate
> hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function
> that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that,
> in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of
> logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant
> totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses.
>
> One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings
> (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and
> Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same
> need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-23 Thread Edwina Taborsky

Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll  quibble with a few terms. 

For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person' while 
an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way. 

An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to 
prevent the 'horror vacui - i.e., to prevent entropic dissipation of matter but 
this doesn't mean that achieving this result, along with its complexity, 
requires a supreme intelligence, which is the view of the theist.

And Jeff adds evaluative terms, such as 'beauty, goodness and truth' and adds a 
'divine character' to its nature. I'm not sure what the latter term [divine 
character] means and the first three - I think need some clarification, at 
least, in my view.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: jeffrey.down...@nau.edu 
  Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM
  Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Jeff, list, 
  you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals 
"Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the 
Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character."
  I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying that 
philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but discussing 
about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to theologists, the 
medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I also think, that the 
discussion between atheists and theists is not about whether God exists or not, 
but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it means that He is a person, 
then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the meaning of the term "person": 
An atheist might say: Nature and evolution are nonpersonal, but nevertheless 
quite intelligent systems, and a theist might answer: But an intelligent system 
is a person, so why should I not call it "God". An atheist might claim, that 
everything is only based on a simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. 
Then a theist might answer: The simpler the tools are, that achieve great 
complexity, the greater must be the intelligence that has invented these tools. 
I can think of a discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater 
play, and in the end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, 
just the atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does.
  Best,
  Hlmut 
   23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr
   "Jeffrey Brian Downard"  wrote:
   
  Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,

  Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said that 
every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference 
is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken.

  We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected 
Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my 
part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a 
response to the question.

  Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate 
hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function that 
has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, in his 
Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of logic, 
metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant totalizing and 
synthesizing hypotheses.

  One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings 
(such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and Ideals 
embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same need. He is 
asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our own feelings, 
imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we recognize a similar 
need? Like Schiller, I think that aim of further cultivating our habits of 
feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to call out for the kinds of 
Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer us hope as we seek to bring 
the conflicting tendencies in our personal and social lives into better 
harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or 
"God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, 
Goodness and Truth of its Divine character.

  --Jeff

  Jeffrey Downard
  Associate Professor
  Department of Philosophy
  Northern Arizona University
  (o) 928 523-8354
  
  From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
  Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM
  To: Peirce-L
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

  Ben, Jeff, List,

  Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well

Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

2016-09-23 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jeff, list,

you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character."

I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying that philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but discussing about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to theologists, the medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I also think, that the discussion between atheists and theists is not about whether God exists or not, but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it means that He is a person, then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the meaning of the term "person": An atheist might say: Nature and evolution are nonpersonal, but nevertheless quite intelligent systems, and a theist might answer: But an intelligent system is a person, so why should I not call it "God". An atheist might claim, that everything is only based on a simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. Then a theist might answer: The simpler the tools are, that achieve great complexity, the greater must be the intelligence that has invented these tools. I can think of a discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater play, and in the end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, just the atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does.

Best,

Hlmut 


 23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr
 "Jeffrey Brian Downard"  wrote:
 

Hi Gary R., Ben U., List,

Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken.

We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a response to the question.

Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses.

One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we recognize a similar need? Like Schiller, I think that aim of further cultivating our habits of feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to call out for the kinds of Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer us hope as we seek to bring the conflicting tendencies in our personal and social lives into better harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
________
From: Gary Richmond [gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking

Ben, Jeff, List,

Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well taken, and I agree with your analysis.

Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post:

JD: So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the alternate hypotheses?

Best,

Gary R


[Gary Richmond]

Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690

On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote:

Jeff, Edwina, list,

I've just a few quibbles, nothing major.

Jeff, you wrote:

Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the appe

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking