- Original Message -
From: "Mr.Bad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2000 11:22 AM
Subject: Re: [Freenet-dev] Don't Talk To Strangers
> >>>>> "TM" == Timm Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> w
On Thu, Dec 28, 2000 at 07:25:49PM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote:
> I think you might be saying that you can only have "I Am Spartacus"
> protection if there is massive deployment. We don't have this, and I
> don't think we're going to have it before a technology like
> copyright.net's starts attacking node
On Sat, Dec 30, 2000 at 02:58:02PM +0100, Oskar Sandberg wrote:
> Freenet is a complicated system with a lot of aspects. Depending on what
> one is refering to, the amount of trust needed varies. If you are looking
> at the anonymity of the node operator, then it is 100% trust - you need to
> trus
On 30 Dec 2000, Mr.Bad wrote:
> > "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> SGM> No, you're blowing that out of proportion. The idea is give
> SGM> people technologies that are less difficult to fuck up.
>
> ...or no technologies at all (current proposal).
No,
> "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
SGM> No, you're blowing that out of proportion. The idea is give
SGM> people technologies that are less difficult to fuck up.
...or no technologies at all (current proposal).
~Mr. Bad
--
No, you're blowing that out of proportion. The idea is give people
technologies that are less difficult to fuck up. Clusters give people a
false sense of security, as discussed (gateway capture increases
liability, can't really ensure trusted links in truely dangerous
environments).
Sco
On Sat, Dec 30, 2000 at 12:56:01AM -0500, Scott Gregory Miller wrote:
<>
> Its hardly a 100% trust system.. If that were true we wouldnt have any
> secure keytypes. You can't have a zero-trust system, but you also have to
> realize that relying on humans for security is also a bad idea. If
> hi
> "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
SGM> This is one of the shadows over proposals like clustering
SGM> that rely on humans to create the security. In many cases,
SGM> the security they create it only in their heads.
This has got to be the most back-asswa
On 29 Dec 2000, Mr.Bad wrote:
> > "IC" == Ian Clarke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> IC> I don't think that there is any system that could facilitate
> IC> scalable information request/retrieval which doesn't at least
> IC> place some trust somewhere.
>
> I totally agree. Howe
On Fri, Dec 29, 2000 at 07:24:44PM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote:
> > "IC" == Ian Clarke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> IC> I don't think that there is any system that could facilitate
> IC> scalable information request/retrieval which doesn't at least
> IC> place some trust somewhere.
>
> "IC" == Ian Clarke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
IC> I don't think that there is any system that could facilitate
IC> scalable information request/retrieval which doesn't at least
IC> place some trust somewhere.
I totally agree. However, the person I was responding to (gosh, lost
On Fri, Dec 29, 2000 at 11:22:23AM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote:
> I think that I don't feel comfortable extending even that *level* of
> trust to every Tom Dick and Harriet on the Innurnet. I'd prefer to
> choose who I let do that -- expecially when I know that there are
> people out there who will abuse
> "TM" == Timm Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
TM> The only time I could possibly trust other nodes for
TM> estabilishing a cluster is when I control every computer in
TM> that cluster. Other then that, Freenet *must* operate in a
TM> zero-trust environment.
Of course, th
> B> There are two types of attacks, those in which they seize the
> B> IP list of the detected node, and those in which they do
> B> not. MediaEnforcer's attack is of the first type. Nothing
> B> protects against the second type, so I'm discussing the first
> B> type.
>
> B,
> Evil Bad Guy (no relation to Mr. Bad): A-ha! I found a freenet node! now I
> will request MSK@illegalporndepot//kiddie.html through it and then use it to
> justify burning down a village/shooting the node operator/getting his ISP to
> pull his account.
>
> Freenet Node: (doesn't say anythi
> > But it -decreases- their chance of getting identified, in cases where
> > the enemy cannot seize the gateway computer.
> Why would they not be able to seize the gateway computer? It has to be
> the one connected to the public Freenet, and is going to be the first
> discovered.
MediaEnforcer
> "B" == Brandon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
B> There are two types of attacks, those in which they seize the
B> IP list of the detected node, and those in which they do
B> not. MediaEnforcer's attack is of the first type. Nothing
B> protects against the second type, so I'm d
> > Getting a list of cluster nodes is exactly as bad as getting a list of
> > public nodes when the attacker's goal is to shut down Freenet nodes.
>
> kARGHH. Then WHY THE FUCK ARE YOU CREATING A CLUSTER?
> I'm sorry, I'm loosing my patience here. You keep failing to addre
> "TM" == Timm Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
TM> Catch-22: You can't have protection without massive
TM> deployment, and you can't have massive deployment without
TM> protection.
I don't see how that follows at all! I can set up a disconnected
network, not attached in any wa
On Tue, 26 Dec 2000 Scott G Miller wrote:
> Different kind of security. Freenet is perfectly fine from a "Dont let
> anyone find out whats going on/being transmitted" sort of stance.
I'm thinkin' Freenet is also good for secure publication. There is a lot
to be said for knowing the document I
On Wed, Dec 27, 2000 at 07:16:22PM -0500, Benjamin Coates wrote:
> What I meant is:
>
> Evil Bad Guy (no relation to Mr. Bad): A-ha! I found a freenet node! now I
> will request MSK@illegalporndepot//kiddie.html through it and then use it to
> justify burning down a village/shooting the node o
Mr.Bad wrote on 12/27/00 2:02 am:
>I think what Brandon and I
>are saying is that we won't
>have ANY network if we
>don't make a priority of
>protecting node operators
>or at least giving them some
>ability to protect
>themselves -- even at the
>possible expense of speed or
>scalability
- Original Message -
From: "Brandon" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, December 27, 2000 2:42 PM
Subject: Re: [Freenet-dev] Don't Talk To Strangers
>
> > As Scott has pointed out, capturing the gateway node would provide
- Original Message -
From: "Brandon" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, December 27, 2000 2:01 PM
Subject: Re: [Freenet-dev] Don't Talk To Strangers
>
> > You just keep missing this point. If you shut down the gateway act
> SGM> references on your node.
>
> This is a very good point. Having evidence that you've made some
> out-of-band arrangements with other node operators would be somewhat
> incriminating -- probably some kind of collusion.
>
> However, does this detriment really cancel out completely the b
> "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
Me> But it -decreases- their chance of getting identified, in
Me> cases where the enemy cannot seize the gateway computer.
SGM> Why would they not be able to seize the gateway computer?
Like, if they were an entity with
> > > Because you get a nice collected list of the dissidents on the Gateways
> > > node, where you don't in normal Freenet. You just get a bunch of
> > > unrelated nodes.
> >
> > We're talking about a situation where running a Freenet node is in itself
> > persecuted. So everyone is a dissiden
On 27 Dec 2000, Mr.Bad wrote:
> > "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> SGM> kARGHH. Then WHY THE FUCK ARE YOU
> SGM> CREATING A CLUSTER? I'm sorry, I'm loosing my patience here.
> SGM> You keep failing to address this point. The p
>= Original Message From Brandon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> =
>> If the legal attacker isn't going to play by the rules (i.e. no
entrapment),
>> then you don't have a chance. 'They' could make a plausible case that
running
>> a Freenet node is conspiring to duplicate any content that happens t
> "SGM" == Scott Gregory Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
SGM> kARGHH. Then WHY THE FUCK ARE YOU
SGM> CREATING A CLUSTER? I'm sorry, I'm loosing my patience here.
SGM> You keep failing to address this point. The point of
SGM> creating a cluster was to
On Wed, 27 Dec 2000, Brandon wrote:
>
> > You just keep missing this point. If you shut down the gateway actively
> > (i.e. you bang on the guys door and steal his computer) then the attacker
> > gets to find everyone else and take them down too. Moreso than general
> > Freenet, since he get
> > > discover.
> > Because you get a nice collected list of the dissidents on the Gateways
> > node, where you don't in normal Freenet. You just get a bunch of
> > unrelated nodes.
>
> We're talking about a situation where running a Freenet node is in itself
> persecuted. So everyone is a dissi
> "B" == Brandon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
B> Same thing if you're trying to shut down Freenet nodes. Also,
B> let's be clear about the MediaEnforcer attack. They scan
B> IPs. They do not cease node lists from detected nodes. Public
B> key crypto defeats the MediaEnforcer a
> > Varying HTL
> >decrements, though, doesn't
> >change anything.
>
> Yes it does, since once that is in, they are more likely to be doing
> entrapment.
The MediaEnforcer attack *is* entrapment. Entrapment works
sometimes. That's the point. If this was a legal question we've already
spent 2
> If the legal attacker isn't going to play by the rules (i.e. no entrapment),
> then you don't have a chance. 'They' could make a plausible case that running
> a Freenet node is conspiring to duplicate any content that happens to be on
> Freenet, even if they can't actually access your node.
> As Scott has pointed out, capturing the gateway node would provide a nice
> neat list of nodes whose owners previously believed were safe as houses,
> where as capturing a normal Freenet node would give you a somewhat random
> list of other nodes which could be anywhere in the world.
Same th
> You just keep missing this point. If you shut down the gateway actively
> (i.e. you bang on the guys door and steal his computer) then the attacker
> gets to find everyone else and take them down too. Moreso than general
> Freenet, since he gets all the participants in the cluster, not just n
> Yeah, and as I keep arguing, that makes clusters useless for what you
> keep pushing them for. The mediaenforcer attack is resisted by PK (as
> well as it can be), and the rest you just have to let go because theres
> nothing you can do about it (without breaking Freenet).
Running an evil nod
> > > Yeah, but with a fully connected graph, you'd need a far greater number of
> > > hops to locate a document than in a small-world graph. Too large for
> > > Freenet to be effective.
> >
> > No, with a fully connected graph you are one hop away from the
> > "epicenter". A fully connected gr
> "TM" == Timm Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
TM> If gatewayed private networks ever get implemented and Freenet
TM> becomes very widespread, then this discussion is just the
TM> first in a very long list of flame wars.
Cool! First post!
~Mr. Bad
--
~~
> "BC" == Benjamin Coates <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
BC> p.s. Wow, you have the google 'I'm feeling lucky' for "decss".
Yeah, because practically every other DeCSS site has been shut down.
~Mr. Bad
--
~
/\/\ Mr.
> Let me also point out that "I'm Spartacus" did -not- work in the DeCSS
> case. Hundreds and maybe thousands of people mirrored DeCSS, and
> hundreds of people got network disconnections and/or lawsuits that
> shut them down. Everyone else backed off when they realized how
> dangerous it was. A y
Yeah, but they'd lose this argument in court. A company that attacks in
this manner (in a country with a decent legal system) would quickly have
no business.
On Wed, 27 Dec 2000, Benjamin Coates wrote:
> >From Mr.Bad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> >I think that's the "cluster" idea. "Don't talk to st
Brandon wrote on 12/26/00 1:45 pm:
> Varying HTL
>decrements, though, doesn't
>change anything.
Yes it does, since once that is in, they are more likely to be doing
entrapment.
Timm Murray
---
Microsoft: Re-inventing square wheels
___
F
The Tianenmen Square people's only mistake was not carrying
non-violent resistance to an inevitable succsesful conclusion.
Eric wrote on 12/25/00 11:46 pm:
>On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at
>10:41:01PM -0500, Travis
>Bemann wrote:
>>
>>
>> The people at Tianenmen
>(sp?) Square all got killed
>beca
Brandon wrote on 12/25/00 11:41 pm:
>If you have the resources to
>port scan blocks of IPs (which
>I think is a reasonable power
>to give a theoretical
>attacker) then you can't
>make node fishing less
>effective. I stand by my
>position that the option to
>reject unknown connections
>i
If gatewayed private networks ever get implemented
and Freenet becomes very widespread, then this discussion
is just the first in a very long list of flame wars.
Timm Murray
---
Microsoft: Re-inventing square wheels
___
Freenet-dev mailing l
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 11:19:37PM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote:
<>
> Let me also point out that "I'm Spartacus" did -not- work in the DeCSS
> case. Hundreds and maybe thousands of people mirrored DeCSS, and
> hundreds of people got network disconnections and/or lawsuits that
> shut them down. Everyone el
>From Mr.Bad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Agreed here. "I'm Spartacus" works only when the real message is,
>"None of us are actually Spartacus, and it's absurd for you to
>persecute any of us." In our case, everyone really *IS* Spartacus, and
>the Man will be quite happy to screw over as many of us as h
>From Mr.Bad <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>I think that's the "cluster" idea. "Don't talk to strangers" means:
>"Even if someone knows I'm running Freenet, don't let them use my node
>to entrap me."
>
>~Mr. Bad
If the legal attacker isn't going to play by the rules (i.e. no entrapment),
then you don't h
> Speak in haste, regret in leisure. I deeply apologize for questioning
> your intentions. After cooling my heels for 36 hours, I'm very sorry
> for flaming you in such a stupid way.
Apology accepted. Fortunately I never lose my temper, or say things I
later regret, so it is really big of me to
> "IC" == Ian Clarke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
IC> I will ignore the fact that you question my integrity given
IC> that I have spent the better part of the last two years
IC> working on a project designed to help people like you. Don't
IC> do it again.
Speak in haste, regr
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 11:21:21PM -0800, Mr.Bad wrote:
> > "SGM" == Scott G Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> SGM> Different kind of security. Freenet is perfectly fine from a
> SGM> "Dont let anyone find out whats going on/being transmitted"
> SGM> sort of stance. The arg
> "SGM" == Scott G Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
SGM> Different kind of security. Freenet is perfectly fine from a
SGM> "Dont let anyone find out whats going on/being transmitted"
SGM> sort of stance. The argument is over "Dont let anyone find
SGM> out we're running Fre
> "B" == Brandon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
B> I suppose that's the fundamental point of disagreement. I don't
B> think that people will run nodes if node runners are being
B> persecuted and have no way to protect themselves.
Agreed here. "I'm Spartacus" works only when the rea
> "IC" == Ian Clarke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
IC> The point is that the best defense against this is an "I'm
IC> Sparticus" approach, where Freenet is widely deployed, and
IC> used for a diverse range of things.
OK, well, I think you have a bad metaphor here. The thing about "
- Original Message -
From: "Mr.Bad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Wednesday, December 27, 2000 12:46 AM
Subject: Re: [Freenet-dev] Don't Talk To Strangers
> >>>>> "SGM" == Scott G Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]&
> "SGM" == Scott G Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
SGM> The mediaenforcer attack is resisted by PK (as well as it can
SGM> be)
I don't understand how this is true.
~Mr. Bad
--
~
/\/\ Mr. Bad <[EMAIL PROTECT
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 04:35:52PM -0500, Chris Anderson wrote:
>
> Java has the ability to grant permissions like accept and connect without
> program modification.
>
> See http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.3/docs/guide/security/PolicyFiles.html for
> administrative details. See
> http://java.sun.com
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 12:48:42PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > In that case, they would eventualy find the gateway node,
> > shut it down, at which point everyone in that cluster is screwed.
>
> Better for the gateway to be shut down than all the nodes in the clusters,
> don't you think? You can
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 07:37:56PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > Not true. If they capture the gateway, then they get a list of all the
> > gateways contacts, most of which would be the clusters members due to the
> > frequent contact they would have with it.
>
> The goal is to avoid giving node
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 07:28:40PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > > is only one hop worse than path compression occuring between the given
> > > cluster node and other nodes.
> > Yeah, but with a fully connected graph, you'd need a far greater number of
> > hops to locate a document than in a small-
> Can't Fred be patched in binary by supplying new .class files of the modified
> .java sources? That would be a pretty lightweight distribution...
Oh yeah! That's super clever. That's what we'll do if you have to provide
an alternative distribution.
>From Brandon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> > I also think that it's silly to fork over around 10 lines of code (just
>> > guessing).
>>
>> Not fork so much as provide a patch or an alternate distribution.
>
>We can't provide a patch. We're distributing a product for people, not a
>library for programmer
> I thought one of the points of Freenet was to make it so that if some
> nodes are taken out of the network, all of the other nodes still can
> function as a network (publicly). No node is dependant on any
> other. With clusters, it seems that if *one* node, namely the gateway,
> is removed fr
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 01:45:51PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> I don't see your logic here. Anyone in the cluster can become a gateway if
> they so choose. Shutting down the gateway does isolate the cluster. It
> just means that someone else has to put themselves in danger. Without
> gateways they
> Not true. If they capture the gateway, then they get a list of all the
> gateways contacts, most of which would be the clusters members due to the
> frequent contact they would have with it.
The goal is to avoid giving node IPs to Them. If you shutdown a normal
node or a gateway node and don'
> Has anyone suggested IP tunneling yet? Make a 10.x.x.x between your Focus
> Group, some smart routing rules and you can achieve exactly this with no
> changes to the node. Freenet will not forward 10.x addresses to the rest of
> the internet; block your node from the regular net, add your peers
> > is only one hop worse than path compression occuring between the given
> > cluster node and other nodes.
> Yeah, but with a fully connected graph, you'd need a far greater number of
> hops to locate a document than in a small-world graph. Too large for
> Freenet to be effective.
No, with a
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 01:51:02PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > But the point is that the only thing your are claiming to solve that isnt
> > solved by existing or near-existing solutions is the paranoid-dissident
> > mode. And there just *arent* trusted links. Any of them can be
> > monitored.
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 01:45:51PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > > Freenet node. What do they do? They might be able to shut down a node if
> > > they happened to be fishing and catch an IP address within China, however
> > > the vast majority of Freenet nodes will not be within China meaning tha
> is only one hop worse than path compression occuring between the given
> cluster node and other nodes.
Yeah, but with a fully connected graph, you'd need a far greater number of
hops to locate a document than in a small-world graph. Too large for
Freenet to be effective.
>
> > > Why have nod
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 12:32:04AM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > How are gateways chosen?
>
> Someone volunteers.
>
> > What is to stop gateways from being taken down (using the "flaw" that you
> > talk about) isolating a potentially large group of nodes?
>
> Nothing. A gateway is a public node.
> The point is that the best defense against this is an "I'm Sparticus"
> approach, where Freenet is widely deployed, and used for a diverse range of
> things. In a totalitarian state this makes it too expensive to try to
> shut-down all Freenet nodes, particularly when most of the network resid
Java has the ability to grant permissions like accept and connect without
program modification.
See http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.3/docs/guide/security/PolicyFiles.html for
administrative details. See
http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.3/docs/api/java/net/SocketPermission.html for
socket permissions.
Tha
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 01:15:57PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > > A good question. Setting my node to transient and adding other people's
> > > node to my nodes.config file fails against an Enforcer attack. The purpose
> > > of my proposal is to defend against an Enforcer attack. The key element i
> And do you suppose that a Freenet where every node needed a reference to every
> other node would be scalable?
Um...that's not in any way related to anything I'm talking about.
> > Second, path compression still occurs
> > between clusters.
>
> You mean between gateway nodes - you may-as-wel
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 01:49:09PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > > Freenet does not inherently need path compression to scale. It depends on
> > > how you construct your network topology. With inform.php, Freenet needs
> > > path compression to scale because otherwise the topology becomes strung
>
On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at 11:58:47PM -0600, Eric wrote:
> On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at 10:41:01PM -0500, Travis Bemann wrote:
> >
> >
> > The people at Tianenmen (sp?) Square all got killed because they were
> > stupid and naive. They thought that the Chinese gov't was going to be
> > all nice and suc
> But the point is that the only thing your are claiming to solve that isnt
> solved by existing or near-existing solutions is the paranoid-dissident
> mode. And there just *arent* trusted links. Any of them can be
> monitored. This just doesnt fix that. In that sort of operation, there
> are
> > Freenet node. What do they do? They might be able to shut down a node if
> > they happened to be fishing and catch an IP address within China, however
> > the vast majority of Freenet nodes will not be within China meaning that
> > even if they shut-down *every* Chinese Freenet node they wo
> > Freenet does not inherently need path compression to scale. It depends on
> > how you construct your network topology. With inform.php, Freenet needs
> > path compression to scale because otherwise the topology becomes strung
> > out. Path compression is not needed at all inside of a cluster.
> Oh no. Freenet *relies* on path compression. Without it you can't use a
> linear search to get data. A couple of studies have been done on
> small-world networks like Freenet, where its shown that without far
> reaching links (created by path compression) they fail. One is included
> in an
> > A good question. Setting my node to transient and adding other people's
> > node to my nodes.config file fails against an Enforcer attack. The purpose
> > of my proposal is to defend against an Enforcer attack. The key element is
> > rejecting connections from nodes which are not in my nodes.
> > Anyone in fear of having their Freenet shutdown *must have* this
> > option. This is the *only* way to solve the MediaEnforcer problem. The
> Um. No? The mediaenforcer problem is solved with the varying htl
> decremenet.
Not at all. MediaEnforcer isn't using HTL 1 (from what I've read). T
> > This is an awful lot of pain for the package maintainers over 10-20 lines
> > of code which a lot of people seem to want anyway.
> >
> No its really not. This is not a mainline feature. Its 10-20 lines now,
> but "Freenet for the Paranoid" (Which I'm not against, mind you) won't
> always b
> In that case, they would eventualy find the gateway node,
> shut it down, at which point everyone in that cluster is screwed.
Better for the gateway to be shut down than all the nodes in the clusters,
don't you think? You can find another gateway, but if you're shut down
then it's over.
___
On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at 10:59:13PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > It would seem that the scheme proposed (limiting connections to
> > a few other nodes) doesn't really help in a totalitarian country.
> > The government can set up a tap (or one could be already active, a la
> > Carnivore) and discove
>
> There's one thing I know: I don't plan on being the patsy who loses
> his ISP account for the greater glory of Freenet. I've already turned
> off my nodes and contacted friends to set up a private net (protected
> by our firewalls). I can't honestly encourage anyone to use Freenet,
> knowing
>
> Freenet does not inherently need path compression to scale. It depends on
> how you construct your network topology. With inform.php, Freenet needs
> path compression to scale because otherwise the topology becomes strung
> out. Path compression is not needed at all inside of a cluster. Path
>
> So it scans all 64,000 or whatever ports on every possible IP address,
> doing a DH key-exchange on each one? Hmmm, yeah, that will work!
That really wouldn't slow them down Ian, because only the port running the
node will initiate a key exchange. The rest would be silent and could be
trivi
On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at 03:12:24PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > The entire Freenet mechanism depends upon the "path compression" effect
> > which you get when data is requested, however (as was pointed out the last
> > time this was suggested) with this mechanism this path compression would
> > no
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 12:34:02AM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > Also, what is the difference between your proposal and setting your node
> > to transient and adding other people's nodes to your nodes.config file?
>
> A good question. Setting my node to transient and adding other people's
> node t
>
> Anyone in fear of having their Freenet shutdown *must have* this
> option. This is the *only* way to solve the MediaEnforcer problem. The
Um. No? The mediaenforcer problem is solved with the varying htl
decremenet.
> same goes for the people in China. If the Chinese government wants to sc
>
> I think that it is *very* unlikely that this would be achieved by
> port-scanning (do you know how long a port-scan would take over a 56k
> modem, particluarly where a DH key-exchange must be attempted for each
> port?). Additionally, with the introduction of Public-key crypto, a port
> scan
On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at 03:23:53PM -0600, Brandon wrote:
>
> > > I also think that it's silly to fork over around 10 lines of code (just
> > > guessing).
> >
> > Not fork so much as provide a patch or an alternate distribution.
>
> We can't provide a patch. We're distributing a product for peop
On Mon, Dec 25, 2000 at 03:26:39PM -0800, Mr. Bad wrote:
> Many, many universities shut down Napster even before getting RIAA
> letters. Those gutsy schools are the exception, not the rule.
Almost all US universities are utter chickenshits when it comes to
Internet policy, and give in to unjusti
Brandon wrote on 12/25/00 3:32 pm:
>Anyone in fear of having
>their Freenet shutdown
>*must have* this option.
>This is the *only* way to
>solve the MediaEnforcer
>problem. The same goes for
>the people in China. If the
>Chinese government wants
>to scan IPs looking for
>Freenet nodes a
> Also, what is the difference between your proposal and setting your node
> to transient and adding other people's nodes to your nodes.config file?
A good question. Setting my node to transient and adding other people's
node to my nodes.config file fails against an Enforcer attack. The purpose
> How are gateways chosen?
Someone volunteers.
> What is to stop gateways from being taken down (using the "flaw" that you
> talk about) isolating a potentially large group of nodes?
Nothing. A gateway is a public node. Currently there is nothing to stop a
public node from being taken down. Th
1 - 100 of 156 matches
Mail list logo
