Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 10 Sep 2015, at 20:55, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > I will answer your next post if it contains something new. Then I guess it contained something new. >>> that can be emulated in arithmetic as all computations can be emulated >> Bullshit. > No, it is a theorem in computer science. Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of turing universality by physical devices. But number relations implement computations, in the sense of Turing. > computations, emulation are used in the original mathematical sense of Turing. Turing reduced a computer A human computer, yes; to it's essentials so we can understand how they work, no computer is simpler than a Turing Machine, but even a Turing Machine needs a tape made of matter and a read head that be changed by the physical tape and a write head that can make chances to that physical tape. Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico-mathematical sense of existence? If yes, you are using some non-standard definition different from the people working in the field. If no, just notice that the computations in the sense of Turing exists in a sense similar to the existence of prime numbers. > Those are arithmetical notion. Arithmetical notions don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. Arithmetical relations does implement computations. Indeed all universal system do that, and we know today that Robinson arithmetic is Turing universal. > The notion of physical computation is a different notion, Yes they are different, lots of people have made physical computations but NOBODY has ever made a non-physical computation Because BODY are physical. But a person can do a computation too, and they are not necessarily physical, and then number relations are not physical, and they can implement computations. and there is zero evidence anybody ever could, although I can't prove nobody ever will. You might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen, which explains this with some details. The book of Matiyasevich shiws in all details how Dipohantine polynomials can simulate an arbitrary universal Turing machine. >>There are levels in physical stuff like physical computer hardware, but there are no levels in computations! > What? This is just wrong. In arithmetic you do have a simulation of a fortran program elumating an algol program emulating a quantum computer emulating the game of life emulating ... There are arbitrary long chain of such simulation, And at the end of that long chain the answer you get when 2 is added to 2 is still 4, the exact same 4 you'd get if it was just calculated in your head; it's not a simulated 4 it's just 4 and it has all the properties of any other 4. But simulated water does NOT have all the properties of physical water and I'm still waiting for you to explain why not if arithmetic really is more fundamental than matter as you claim. That is the whole point of the UDA. Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one computations, but on an infinity of them, due to the First Person Indeterminacy. Once we look at ourselve or at our environment at a level below the substitution level, we find the *apparent* primary matter, which ca only emerge from those infinities, and a priori that is not emulable by a specific computer, although it has to be approximable, or we would not exist. > I have given the definition already, reread them, or buy a book in computer science. Definitions don't make calculations and neither do books , physical microprocessor chips do. Definition does not but relation does. Indeed a computation is a digital relation, and it does not depends on any physical assumption. Just read a book in theoretical computer science. >> Why can't a simulated water program get the computer wet? > Because you can't create primitive matter, A good answer or at least I can't think of a better one. If it's true then primitive matter must be more fundamental than arithmetic because it has something that numbers don't and can do things that numbers can't. Numbers can share relations, and if we assume computationalism, numbers can share relations which implement any computation. So if computationalism is correct, the existence of the computation in your current brain which allows you to read this post is implemented an infinity of times through an infinity of number relations which exists in the same sense that the relation x < y exists. Then from your first person perspective you cannot distinguish, without doing experiments, if you are emulated in a block material universe (if that could exist) or in the block mindscape constituted by the (Sigma_
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 , Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. > > > > > Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of turing > universality by physical devices. > What makes you so certain that Turing machines aren't just man made descriptions (and approximate descriptions at that) of physical computational devises? Usually the simpler thing simulates the more complex thing, but a physical computer is far more complex than a Turing Machine, so is a microprocessor implementing a Turing machine or is a Turing Machine implementing a microprocessor? > > Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico-mathematical sense of > existence? > It doesn't matter, prime number don't make calculations, physical microprocessors do. And all numbers may exist, but if the computational resources of the entire physical universe is finite then the set that contains all the prime numbers and only prime numbers may not. > > > a person can do a computation too, and they are not necessarily physical > In the history of the world a no person lacking a physical brain has ever made a calculation, and it is very easy to understand why if physics is more fundamental than mathematics. But if mathematics is more fundamental then that fact is quite odd. > > y > ou might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen, which > explains this with some details. > Books by Torket Franzen do not make calculations, physical microprocessors do. > > > Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one computations, > but on an infinity of them, > Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical number of calculations would be required to perfectly simulate water, but if you're right and a infinite amount of mathematics would be required to do what just a small amount of matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over and physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models can never be more than just approximations of the real deal. >> >> Definitions >> don't make calculations, physical microprocessors do. >> > > > > Definition does not but relation does. > Only if the relations are about the orientation of PHYSICAL things. > > > Indeed a computation is a digital relation, and it does not depends on any > physical assumption. Just read a book in theoretical computer science. > No book in theoretical computer science can make a calculation, but a physical microprocessor chip can. > >> >> >> I don't assume anything but I do know 4 things for certain: >> >> 1) Simulated water can *not* quench my thirst. >> > > > > That is ambiguous. > If that is ambiguous then EVERYTHING is ambiguous, and without contrast words have no meaning > > > you need to grasp step 3 before I can explain more on this. > There is nothing in step 3 to grasp, there is no there there. > >> > >> Proofs don't make calculations, > > > > > Sigma_1 proof and calculations are the same thing. > Then then I really *REALLY *don't understand why you don't start the Sigma_1 Proof Computer Hardware Corporation and become the richest man who ever lived. > > > Like fortran calculations are the same as algol calculations. > Yes, without physical hardware to run them on both FORTRAN and Algol are indeed the same, both are just squiggles on paper. > > comp is a theology, > Maybe, but I no longer care what "comp" is. > > When I prove the existence of a computation in the theory RA > [...] > I don't need the the theory RA to prove to me that computations exist, I already know that they do, what I want is for the theory RA , or anything else, to make a computation without the use of matter that obeys the laws of physics. And I don't want a proof, and I don't want a axiom, and I don't want a definition, and I don't want a book; *I want a computation. * > > > you need to get step 8 for this. > Until you fix step 3 any higher step is meaningless. > > Their argument is that a physical computer can only be an approciamation > of the mathematical one, like a physical circle can only approximate a > mathematica circle. > A physical circle, like one drawn by hand with ink on paper, if far far more complex than a mathematical circle; so you tell me, which is a approximation of which? > > >>> >> >>> that prime number existence does not depend on its computation, >> >> > >> >> I think maybe it does depend on the physical possibility of it >> being computed in the universe, although I could be wrong. > > > > That would make Euclid's wrong, > If so he wouldn't be the first ancient Greek that was dead wrong. > > Where John Clark is = where his body is, > So you think consciousness has a position, does consciousness have a velocity too, or a temperature, or a pressure, or a mass, or a magnetic moment
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 20 Sep 2015, at 03:17, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Sep 19, 2015 , Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Theorems don't make calculations, physical microprocessor chips do. > Physical computer are implementation, in the math sense, of turing universality by physical devices. What makes you so certain that Turing machines aren't just man made descriptions (and approximate descriptions at that) of physical computational devises? because they compute exactly the same thing that what you can compute assuming only classical logic and elementary arithmetic, or by assuming the identity axioms and Kxy = x and Sxyz = xz(yz). very different way to get the computable functions, with quite different assumpitions leads to the same class of functions. Then there is the fact that the set of partial computable function is close for the diagonalization of Kleene, making arithmetic (and combinators, Turing machines ...) which makes that notion as much solid as the notion of natural numbers. So, as I don't think that the natural numbers is a human invention, I don't think the notion of Turing machine is a human invention. You can prove their existence from the K and S axioms given above, or from addition and multiplication + a bit of logic. Usually the simpler thing simulates the more complex thing, but a physical computer is far more complex than a Turing Machine, so is a microprocessor implementing a Turing machine or is a Turing Machine implementing a microprocessor? Yes, arithmetic can simulates a Turing machine, a quantum computer, etc. It can, and it does, actually. But a primary physical reality, well I have already not much clue what that can be, and if it behaves like the primary matter which should appear to exist with computationalism, then a priori, such matter can only approximate the real thing, not really simulate it. > Does prime number needs paper to exist in the logico- mathematical sense of existence? It doesn't matter, prime number don't make calculations, I was just saying that the prime number, or the order relations, or the range of polynomila equation exist like the prime numbers, etc. That prime number does not compute is not clear for me.Such a question might depend from Riemann hypothesis. If the Hilbet- Montgommery hypothesis is correct (that the zeta non trivlal zeroes describe a quantum spectrum, it might be that the prime numbers already emulates a quantum computer). physical microprocessors do. Locally, but if quantum field theory is correct, it is an analog imitation of the digital. You need to make precise your theory of primary matter to proof that it can emulates all computations, like arithmetic or the combinators. That is not an obvious question. And all numbers may exist, but if the computational resources of the entire physical universe is finite then the set that contains all the prime numbers and only prime numbers may not. I don't believe in that type of God, to be sure. It does not work with either computationalism, nor quantum mechanics. > a person can do a computation too, and they are not necessarily physical In the history of the world a no person lacking a physical brain has ever made a calculation, and it is very easy to understand why if physics is more fundamental than mathematics. But if mathematics is more fundamental then that fact is quite odd. You can prove in PA the existence of all terlminating computation, and the existence of many non terminating computations, and RA already emulates them all. > you might read the book "Inexhaustibility" by Torket Franzen, which explains this with some details. Books by Torket Franzen do not make calculations, physical microprocessors do. Starw man! Nobody said that a book makes computation. I said just that if you study that book you will grasp why computations are realized in the arithmetical reality, or any model of a Turing universal theory. > Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one computations, but on an infinity of them, Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical number of calculations would be required to perfectly simulate water, but if you're right and a infinite amount of mathematics would be required to do what just a small amount of matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over and physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models can never be more than just approximations of the real deal. Not at all, as this is *derived* without any phsyical assumption other that the physical can emulate locall the universal digital machine. >> Definitions don't make calculations, physical microprocessors do. >Definition does not but relation does. Only if the relations are about the orientation of PHYSICAL things. In the theory Kxy = x & Sxyz
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Yes, arithmetic can simulates a Turing machine, > Arithmetic can't simulate anything unless it has access to something physical like a biological brain or a electronic microprocessor. > > > But a primary physical reality, well I have already not much clue what > that can be, > It means physics is the most fundamental science and mathematics is just a tool humans have invented to help them figure out how nature in general and physics in particular works; I'm not saying that it true, I don't know if it is or not, I'm just saying that's what it means. > > > if quantum field theory is correct, it is an analog imitation of the > digital. > The first word of the name should have tipped you off, if *QUANTUM * field theory is correct then nothing is analog. > > > You need to make precise your theory of primary matter to proof that it > can emulates all computations, > I'm just playing devil's advocate , unlike you I don't claim to have proven anything . I don't know if math or physics is more fundamental; you don't know either but you think you do. > > >> >> >> >> Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one >> computations, but on an infinity of them, >> > > > >> > Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical number of > calculations would be required to perfectly simulate water, but if you're > right and a infinite amount of mathematics would be required to do what > just a small amount of matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over > and physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models > can never be more than just approximations of the real deal. > > > > > Not at all, as this is *derived* without any phsyical assumption > You just assumed that any finite amount of mathematics can only approximate what matter does. So how can mathematics be more fundamental? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 21 Sep 2015, at 02:49, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Sep 20, 2015 at Bruno Marchal wrote: > Yes, arithmetic can simulates a Turing machine, Arithmetic can't simulate anything unless it has access to something physical like a biological brain or a electronic microprocessor. You confuse the notion a universal machine a implement a universal b, with the notion of a physical universal machine c implements a universal machine b. I don't assume a physical universe to start with, if only because it is one of the thing I want to have an explanation for (the appearance or the reality, as I am agnostic at the start). the machine a implements the machine b is an arithmetical notion. It can be defined *in* arithmetic, and the existence of particular computations and emulations of computations by other computations can be proved already in Robinson Arithmetic. > But a primary physical reality, well I have already not much clue what that can be, It means physics is the most fundamental science and mathematics is just a tool humans have invented to help them figure out how nature in general and physics in particular works; I'm not saying that it true, I don't know if it is or not, I'm just saying that's what it means. I am OK with that epistemological version, no problem. And then what I say is that digital mechanism, or computationalism is incompatible with physics being the most fundamental science, even if physics is quite important. the fundamental science is theoretical computer science, alias mathematics, alias machine's (and other entities) "theologies" (the science by machines of what is bigger than themselves, like a "reality". > if quantum field theory is correct, it is an analog imitation of the digital. The first word of the name should have tipped you off, if QUANTUM field theory is correct then nothing is analog. There is a continuous and a diecrete quantum teleportation technic, and the existence or not of a physical continuum is an open problem, both empirically (gravitation is not yet unified with the other forces) and computer-science theoretically, even if they are compelling argument for some continuum, if only the presence of some random oracle due to the global FPI. > You need to make precise your theory of primary matter to proof that it can emulates all computations, I'm just playing devil's advocate, unlike you I don't claim to have proven anything. Proving is my job. That is what I do. That is what mathematician does, in math or in applied theoretical field. When I say that RA proves the existence of the terminating computations, I am saying a standrd result. You oppose this by introducing a notion of physical computation, which you have not yet define. You are using vague undefined notions to criticize standard result in the field. I don't know if math or physics is more fundamental; you don't know either but you think you do. I know nothing. I give a deduction that IF computationalism is correct, then physics cannot be the fundamental science, and the proof is constructive and shows how to derive physics, and I have used this to derive the propositional logic of the observable, and it fits until now with the empirical facts. Advantage: it explains both the quanta and the qualia. Which was the goal: to have a testable explanation of the appearance of a universe without eliminating conscious and person. >>> Physical water, like any physical stuff does not rely on one computations, but on an infinity of them, >> Nobody knows if that is true or not, maybe only an astronomical number of calculations would be required to perfectly simulate water, but if you're right and a infinite amount of mathematics would be required to do what just a small amount of matter can do so effortlessly then it's game over and physics is more fundamental than mathematics, and mathematical models can never be more than just approximations of the real deal. > Not at all, as this is *derived* without any phsyical assumption You just assumed that any finite amount of mathematics can only approximate what matter does. So how can mathematics be more fundamental? I prove this. I don't assume it. Matter is given by the FPI on all computations in arithmetic. That is a priori not Turing emulable, but for computationalism to remain coherent with the empirical facts, we have to derive that the digital brains and the finite pieces of mathematics can explain the local facts and allow for digital universal machine to be enough stable, or we would not even exist in a physical mode at all. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > the existence of particular computations and emulations of computations by > other computations can be proved already in Robinson Arithmetic. > I don't want proof of computations, I want computations! > > There is a continuous and a diecrete quantum teleportation technic > I don't know what that means. But I do know that Quantum Mechanics can't deal with distances smaller than 1.6*10^-35 meters; if distances smaller than that exist then Quantum Mechanics will need a *MAJOR *overhaul. > >> >> I'm just playing devil's advocate >> , >> >> >> unlike >> you I don't claim to have proven anything >> . >> > > > > Proving is my job. That is what I do. That is what mathematician does, in > math or in applied theoretical field. When I say that RA proves the > existence of the terminating computations, I am saying a standrd result. > Very standard indeed! Every mathematician knows that some computations terminate, and some computations don't terminate, and for some computations there is no way to know if they terminate or not and all you can do is watch it and see. > > > You oppose this by introducing a notion of physical computation, which you > have not yet define. > I can provide something much *much* better than a definition, I can give A EXAMPLE. > > > even if physics is quite important. the fundamental science is theoretical > computer science > I do admit that sometimes physics papers about entropy and Black Holes look a lot like papers in computer science or information theory. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 24 Sep 2015, at 01:26, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Sep 21, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > the existence of particular computations and emulations of computations by other computations can be proved already in Robinson Arithmetic. I don't want proof of computations, I want computations! If you prove the existence of something in something else, you have that something, in that something else. If you want a physical computation, you need only to pray that a physical reality exist, and rich enough to be Turing complete, as it *looks* to be the case, and then you can build a computer, which can run physical computations. but that does not make the many non physical computation to continue to exist in arithmetic, and indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical computation from a non physical one, from its experience only: it needs to do 3p measurements. >There is a continuous and a diecrete quantum teleportation technic I don't know what that means. But I do know that Quantum Mechanics can't deal with distances smaller than 1.6*10^-35 meters; if distances smaller than that exist then Quantum Mechanics will need a MAJOR overhaul. >>I'm just playing devil's advocate, unlike you I don't claim to have proven anything. > Proving is my job. That is what I do. That is what mathematician does, in math or in applied theoretical field. When I say that RA proves the existence of the terminating computations, I am saying a standrd result. Very standard indeed! Every mathematician knows that some computations terminate, and some computations don't terminate, and for some computations there is no way to know if they terminate or not and all you can do is watch it and see. Exactly, but that makes my point. Each time a computation terminates, RA can prove that facts; like the universal dovetailer can run on all terminating computations, although it has to dovetail on all computations, terminating or not, to get all the terminating one. > You oppose this by introducing a notion of physical computation, which you have not yet define. I can provide something much much better than a definition, I can give A EXAMPLE. I gave you an example of an immaterial computation too. > even if physics is quite important. the fundamental science is theoretical computer science I do admit that sometimes physics papers about entropy and Black Holes look a lot like papers in computer science or information theory. OK, and I think that computationalism suggest explanations for this since a long time. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> I don't want proof of computations, I want computations! > > > > > If you prove the existence of something in something else, you have that > something, > Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely many primes, so if what you say above is true you must have the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100. So tell me what it is! You can't because to have that example, that something, it would have to be calculated; and neither you nor Euclid can do that. > > > indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical computation from > a non physical one, > I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example of something a non-physical machine can't do that a physical machine can. A physical machine, such as myself, has no difficulty whatsoever in making that distinction. >> >> >> I can provide something >> >> much *much* better than a definition, I can give A EXAMPLE. > > > > > I gave you an example of an immaterial computation too. > Somehow I must have missed that post, but if you did it once you can do it again, so just use immaterial computation to find the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100 and tell me what it is and you have won this argument. How hard can that be? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 25 Sep 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 1:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I don't want proof of computations, I want computations! > If you prove the existence of something in something else, you have that something, Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely many primes, so if what you say above is true you must have the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100. Now you equate existence with constructive existence, but that contradict your acceptance of the excluded middle principle. You have already agree that we can prove the existence of something without us being able to show an example. This is also needed to accept the classical Church-Turing thesis. So tell me what it is! You can't because to have that example, that something, it would have to be calculated; and neither you nor Euclid can do that. As you said, Euclid proves the existence of infinitely many prime numbers, so we (the classical mathematicians) knows that there is a prime bigger than 10^(100^100). No need to be able to give an example to believe in its existence independently of us. > indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical computation from a non physical one, I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example of something a non-physical machine can't do that a physical machine can. A physical machine, such as myself, has no difficulty whatsoever in making that distinction. Then you have magical abilities not shared by any Turing machine, physical or non physical. >> I can provide something much much better than a definition, I can give A EXAMPLE. > I gave you an example of an immaterial computation too. Somehow I must have missed that post, but if you did it once you can do it again, KKK K I gave you another example, but the one above is simpler, and I expect the same non-sense from you. Please don't confuse the computation with anything we use to represent and communicate about that computation. so just use immaterial computation to find the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100 and tell me what it is and you have won this argument. How hard can that be? Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation" without using the mathematical notion. You are the one using the term in highly non standard sense. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> >> >> >> If you prove the existence of something in something else, you have that >> something, >> > > > >> > Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely many primes, so if > what you say above is true you must have the 423rd prime greater than > 10^100^100. > > > > Now you equate existence with constructive existence, > What the hell? You're the one that is equating those two things not me! I don't want you to answer the question "does the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 exist?", I want you to tell me the answer to a completely different question, "what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?". And to figure out what that number is and answer my question you are going to have perform a calculation. And to do that you are going to have to use matter that obeys the laws of physics. And there may not be enough matter in existence to do it. And if there isn't then the question "what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?" is unanswerable. > > >> >> >> >> indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical computation from >> a non physical one, >> > > > >> > I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example of something a > non-physical machine can't do that a physical machine can. A physical > machine, such as myself, has no difficulty whatsoever in making that > distinction. > > > > Then you have magical abilities not shared by any Turing machine, physical > or non physical. > Bullshit. > > > Please don't confuse the computation with anything we use to represent and > communicate about that computation. > Gibberish. >> >> so just use immaterial computation >> to find >> the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100 >> and tell me what it is and you have won this argument. How hard can >> that be? >> > > > > Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation" > It means computation using physics. Bruno, couldn't you have figured that out by yourself? Did you really need my help? John K Clark > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 28 Sep 2015, at 18:21, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Sep 27, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> If you prove the existence of something in something else, you have that something, >> Euclid proved 2500 years ago that there are infinitely many primes, so if what you say above is true you must have the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100. > Now you equate existence with constructive existence, What the hell? You're the one that is equating those two things not me! I don't want you to answer the question "does the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 exist?", I want you to tell me the answer to a completely different question, "what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?". So you are asking me a constructive existence of such a number, and even a consturctive in a not well defined physical sense. But Computationalism, is at the start classical, not intutionist nor constructive. Some brnch of computer science are necessarily non constructive, and eventually we rediscover this in the epistemology of the machine. The question was: does computation (in the original standard sense of Turing's or Church's definition of computability, using the intensional Church thesis (which says that not only all universal machines compute the same class of functions, but all universal machines can emulate all universal machine, that is, all universal machine can imitate exactly all digital processes starting from finite conditions (relatively or not to some oracle). And the answer I gave was: I can prove (in RA, or let a theorem prover of RA prove ...) the existence of the terminating computations, and of all the segments of the infinite computations. This entails in particular that the computations are all emulated, or realized, in or by the usual "standard model" or arithmetic (N, 0, +, x) taught in high school. So the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations, exist in the usual 3p sense of asserting, for example, that the prime numbers, including those greater 100^(100^100). Such existence should not be confuse with a stronger feasible existence (in which case we ask for an algorithm generating the existing object + the constraint to present it in some reasonable delay). Nor, should that existence be confused with some notion of physical existence, especially in a context where we want explain the physical by something non-physical. And to figure out what that number is and answer my question you are going to have perform a calculation. And to do that you are going to have to use matter that obeys the laws of physics. And there may not be enough matter in existence to do it. And if there isn't then the question "what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100?" is unanswerable. I use computation is the mathematical sense of Alonzo Church, Emil Post, Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing, Matiyazevic, etc. >>> indeed a universal machine cannot distinguihs a physical computation from a non physical one, >> I know, and that lack of ability is yet another example of something a non-physical machine can't do that a physical machine can. A physical machine, such as myself, has no difficulty whatsoever in making that distinction. > Then you have magical abilities not shared by any Turing machine, physical or non physical. Bullshit. > Please don't confuse the computation with anything we use to represent and communicate about that computation. Gibberish. >> so just use immaterial computation to find the 423rd prime greater than 10^100^100 and tell me what it is and you have won this argument. How hard can that be? > Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation" It means computation using physics. Computation in which sense? If it is the Turing sense, then that exist in arithmetic. If by using physics you mean that there exist something which select one computation to make it more real, then that is using a god-of-the- gap to prevent the searching of a solution of the mind-body problem in the computationalist frame. Bruno, couldn't you have figured that out by yourself? Did you really need my help? I figure that out since long, I mean ... that you restrict the standard sense of computation to their possible realization in the physical reality. The problem is that you give the impression that you believe that computation does not exist in, or be emulated by, arithmetic. That has nothing to do with the question of the feasibility or of the physical realisability, especially in the context of the computational or digital thesis in philosophy of mind-matter. Then I exploit the fact that sigma_1 complete provability is equivalent with universal computability. And I interview machines having enough introspection power (in the standard Gödel sense) to know (in a technical sense) that they are
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Sep 29, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >> >> >> >> Now you equate existence with constructive existence, >> > > >> > What the hell? You're the one that is equating those two things not me! > I don't want you to answer the question "does the 423rd prime number > greater than 10^100^100 exist?", I want you to tell me the answer to > a > completely different question, "what is the 423rd prime number greater > than 10^100^100?". > > > > So you are asking me a constructive existence of such a number, > The question I am asking is precise, easy to understand, and impossible for you to answer; what is the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100? I know why I can't answer that question but you have no explanation why you can't answer that question. > > > and even a consturctive in a not well defined physical sense. > Oh for Christ's sake! I don't give a damn if it's in the Bozo the Clown sense, just tell me what the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is or tell me why you can't figure it out. I can't figure it out because there are not enough atoms in my brain that can be put into unique states that can individually correspond with 10^100^100 numbers; but your mind doesn't need matter that obeys the laws of physics to operate so I want to know why you can't figure it out. > > > But Computationalism, is > [blah blah blah blah] > Quit staling c ut the bafflegab and just tell me what the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is or tell me why you can't figure it out. You say computation doesn't need physics just numbers, well you have access to numbers, so why can't you tell me what the the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is ? What are you lacking? > > The question was: does computation (in the original standard sense of > Turing's or Church's definition of computability, using the intensional > Church thesis (which says that not only all universal machines compute the > same class of functions, but all universal machines can emulate all > universal machine, that is, all universal machine can imitate exactly all > digital processes starting from finite conditions (relatively or not to > some oracle). > *NO*, that wasn't the question at all! In fact the above doesn't even look like a question. The question was "what the the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 ?". > > So the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations, exist in > the usual 3p sense of asserting, for example, that the prime numbers, > including those greater 100^(100^100). > Well good for " the relative computations, the sigma_1 arithmetical relations ", I'm very happy for them. And now let's get back to the topic at hand, what is the the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 ? > I use computation is the mathematical sense of Alonzo Church, Emil Post, > Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing, Matiyazevic, etc. > That's nice good for you, then use use computation is the mathematical sense of Alonzo Church, Emil Post, Stephen Kleene, Alan Turing and Matiyazevic and tell me what what the 423rd prime number greater than 10^100^100 is. > > >>> >> >>> Just define what *you* mean by "physical computation" >> >> > >> >> >> It means computation using physics. > > > > Computation in which sense? > Sense in which sense? And I can't answer your question until you define "in". And then define "which". And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to definitions, it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop that people always use when they're losing a debate. > > The problem is that you give the impression that you believe that > computation does not exist in, or be emulated by, arithmetic. > I'm sorry if I only gave a vague impression of that so let me say as flatly and directly as I can that as of today there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics; that situation could change tomorrow but that's how things are right now. > > > I exploit the fact that sigma_1 complete provability is equivalent with > universal computability. Mathematical objects may or may not exist independently of physics, but mathematics proofs certainly do not; proofs are just a way humans have of discovering (or maybe inventing) those mathematical objects. > > Saying that there is a physical universe doing that is no better than > saying God made it. > Saying that there is a mathematical universe is no better than saying there is a physical universe . And the physical universe at the time of the Big Bang was far simpler that the universe is today, and was infinitely simpler than a omnipotent omniscient God. Bruno you're a logician so you tell me, if two logical systems produce the exact same conclusions but one starts out with fewer and simpler axioms than the other which one is superior? I think William of Ockham made a pretty good razor, there i
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 29 Sep 2015, at 23:51, John Clark wrote: snip And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to definitions, it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop that people always use when they're losing a debate. So by asking example when I give a definition, and asking a efinition when I give example is just to win the debate, and not to progress in understanding. > The problem is that you give the impression that you believe that computation does not exist in, or be emulated by, arithmetic. I'm sorry if I only gave a vague impression of that so let me say as flatly and directly as I can that as of today there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics; Because you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing. They do not assume anything physical to define computation. that situation could change tomorrow but that's how things are right now. > I exploit the fact that sigma_1 complete provability is equivalent with universal computability. Mathematical objects may or may not exist independently of physics, but mathematics proofs certainly do not; proofs are just a way humans have of discovering (or maybe inventing) those mathematical objects. I use "prove" in the purely mathematical sense of Gödel. > Saying that there is a physical universe doing that is no better than saying God made it. Saying that there is a mathematical universe is no better than saying there is a physical universe. I say only that 0+ x = 0, and things like that. I define computation and proof without assuming more. Then I explain why the immaterial machine develop beliefs in matter, and why the math shows that such matter obey quantum logic, and how to derive physics. Bruno And the physical universe at the time of the Big Bang was far simpler that the universe is today, and was infinitely simpler than a omnipotent omniscient God. Bruno you're a logician so you tell me, if two logical systems produce the exact same conclusions but one starts out with fewer and simpler axioms than the other which one is superior? I think William of Ockham made a pretty good razor, there is no point in adding wheels withing wheels if they're not needed. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to >> definitions, it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop that >> people always use when they're losing a debate. > > > > > So by asking example when I give a definition, and asking a efinition when > I give example is just to win the debate, and not to progress in > understanding. > When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of definition. > >> >> >> as of today there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything >> without the help of physics; > > > > Because > Because? It doesn't matter why there is zero evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics because whatever the reason is it doesn't change the fact that there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics . Excuses don't cut the mustard in science only evidence does. > > > you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing. > I use the term "computation" in the sense of actually finding a particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic; and neither Church nor Turing were fools so they meant the same thing. > > > They do not assume anything physical to define computation. > A Turing Machine is physical, not that it matters a hoot in hell what Turing or Church assumed because the fact remains there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics . > > I say only that 0+ x = 0, and things like that. I define computation and > proof without assuming more. > In the entire history of the world nobody has ever seen a proof or a definition make a calculation; as of September 30 2015 every calculation ever observed has involved matter that obeys the laws of physics. No exceptions, not a single one. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 30 Sep 2015, at 19:25, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Sep 30, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> And that my friends is exactly why examples are so superior to definitions, it avoids the absurd "define that word" endless loop that people always use when they're losing a debate. > So by asking example when I give a definition, and asking a efinition when I give example is just to win the debate, and not to progress in understanding. When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of definition. But this distracts us from what we should focus on. >> as of today there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics; > Because Because? It doesn't matter why there is zero evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics because whatever the reason is it doesn't change the fact that there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics. Excuses don't cut the mustard in science only evidence does. But here I have a problem. A computation can be defined by what universal machines do. A universal machine is defined by a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). The universal dovetailing is a example of non terminating computations, and it emulates all computations. All you need is to believe in some Turing complete reality, and I hesitate since 40 years between the Diophantine polynomial of degree 4, or just one of them, or the Turing machine, or the von Neuman Computer, or the combinators, or Robinson arithmetic. The choice of the theory does not matter, and I illustrated the ideas in many of them but usually with combinators, or lambda expression, or Lisp programs. None of those theories assume anything material. I can do that explicitly, but it is long, and well known by the theoreticians. > you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing. I use the term "computation" in the sense of actually finding a particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic; and neither Church nor Turing were fools so they meant the same thing. Come on! You are the guy which pretend to accept computationalisme. By computation we mean the process made by any universal number that your brain seems to approximate well enough to make you conscious, or better allow your consciousness to manifest itself here and now. Such a u exists, by computationalism, and indeed it is the number that we sent to Moscow and Washington, awaiting using the local physical u' to be reimplemented locally to the third person observer. In particular we are interested in non terminating computations, as much as on the terminating one. Then by mentioning "solving a problem", you allude to solvation, which is related to computation, notably through the domain w_i of the phi_i, but at some point we must be careful in distinguishing those two, and relating them correctly. There is a notion of universal problem, it is the creative (in the sense of post) set or number. u is creative if W_u is creative in the set of Post. technically I use two different definition of universality, both given by Martin Davis. The 1956 definition allows a creative number to be a universal number, and the 1957 definition in which the creative number are not universal, which can be useful to get nice recursive equivalence relation of the extensional computable functions. >They do not assume anything physical to define computation. A Turing Machine is physical, Absolutely not. Turing made it looking like that because he wanted to capture the essence of what a human does when he compute a function with pencil and paper. But he gave a purely mathematical definition, as did Church, Post, etc. Those system can be specified in formal "set of beliefs", and that leads to the creative set, and the Gödel-Löbian one are those who reflects those facts. Gödel could arithmetize meta-arithmetic, because mathematical reasoning system can reason mathematically on themselves. not that it matters a hoot in hell what Turing or Church assumed because the fact remains there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without the help of physics. Zero evidence is enough when we prove a theorem! I don't pretend it is simple to explain. It is already more or less explictly explained in Gödel 1931 paper, and the peak of that endeavour is perhaps in some chapter of Matiyazevic's book where he shows how diophantine polynomial emulates Turing machine. > I say only that 0+ x = 0, and things like that. I define comp
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and >> when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a >> definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to >> either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a >> definition of my own, a definition of definition. > > > > But this distracts us from what we should focus on. I agree it's a silly waste of time, so why did you demand a definition of physical computation ? > > A computation can be defined by what universal machines do. But that universal machine can't do a damn thing without the help of physics, therefore your definition is unimportant. > > A universal machine is defined by a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = > phi_x(y). You can define it however you like, but if that machine isn't made of matter that obeys the laws of physics it's not going to be doing any calculations, and it's not going to be doing anything else either. > > None of those theories assume anything material. And none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory can, only physical material can do that. >> >>> you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing. >> >> >> >> I use the term "computation" in the sense of actually finding a >> particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic; and neither >> Church nor Turing were fools so they meant the same thing. > > > > Come on! You are the guy which pretend to accept computationalisme. Why on earth would I pretend to accept computationalism if I did not? > >> A Turing Machine is physical, > > > Absolutely not. Turing made it looking like that because he wanted to > capture the essence of what a human does when he compute a function with > pencil and paper. Turing wanted to capture the essence of what ANYTHING does when a calculation is actually made; not talked about, not theorized, not defined, but actually MADE. > > > > he gave a purely mathematical definition That's nice, but defining a calculation and making a calculation is not the same thing, just as "a fast red car" is NOT a fast red car. Definition s can't make calculations, only matter that obeys the laws of physics can do that. >> there is ZERO evidence that arithmetic can calculate anything without >> the help of physics > > > Zero evidences enough when we prove a theorem! But that is not nearly enough if you want to know a particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic because neither proofs nor theorems can make a calculation; for that you need physics. > >> as of September 30 2015 every calculation ever observed has involved >> matter that obeys the laws of physics. No exceptions, not a single one. > > > But I am not talking about the computations that we (perhaps) observe. I > am talking about the computations which exist in arithmetic. So you're talking about computations that no machine and no person has ever performed or even observed, and calculations for which there is no evidence that they exist at all. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 01 Oct 2015, at 22:09, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of definition. > But this distracts us from what we should focus on. I agree it's a silly waste of time, so why did you demand a definition of physical computation? Because you seem to doubt that the existence of computation in arithmetic. But your argument relies on a notion of physical computation. When I ask what that is, your definition seems to be "implementation of computation (in the arithmetical sense) in a physical reality, which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in arithmetic. > A computation can be defined by what universal machines do. But that universal machine can't do a damn thing without the help of physics, therefore your definition is unimportant. It cannot do a damn thing in the physical reality indeed. But that is not relevant to the fact that it can do a lot of thing in arithmetic, and indeed, eventually we show that the physical computations emerge as a first person plural views of the machine emulated in arithmetic. > A universal machine is defined by a number u such that phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y). You can define it however you like, but if that machine isn't made of matter that obeys the laws of physics it's not going to be doing any calculations, and it's not going to be doing anything else either. This is simply wrong, and I think it means you persist in confusing what is a computation in the CHurch-Turing sense, which does not assume anything physical, and an implementation of such a machine in a physical reality. In the context of the mind-body problem, that is a crucial difference that we have to take into account. > None of those theories assume anything material. And none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory can, Actually theory are not necessarily supposed to be able to do that, only machine (in the mathematical sense) can do that. Now, it happens that if a theory is sigma_1 complete, like RA and PA, they can do that, because such theories are universal machine (again in the Turing sense). only physical material can do that. Physical material can do that in the physical world, but here we talk about the computation done in arithmetic. obviously, we cannot use them in any direct way, like we can do with a physical machine. That does not change the fact that a tiny part of the arithmetical truth can emulate some computation (indeed all of them). >> you use the term computation in the sense of Church-Turing. >> I use the term "computation" in the sense of actually finding a particular solution to a particular problem in arithmetic; and neither Church nor Turing were fools so they meant the same thing. > Come on! You are the guy which pretend to accept computationalisme. Why on earth would I pretend to accept computationalism if I did not? Not only you accept comp, but you have often argued that we need to be stupid to not accept it. Actually, you are even someone saying yes to a doctor. All your post illustrates that you are a sort of comp believer. Comp is put for computationalism. >> A Turing Machine is physical, > Absolutely not. Turing made it looking like that because he wanted to capture the essence of what a human does when he compute a function with pencil and paper. Turing wanted to capture the essence of what ANYTHING does when a calculation is actually made; not talked about, not theorized, not defined, but actually MADE. Not at all. Please read Turing before ascribing things that he never said. That computations exist in arithmetic (even in the small sigma_1 complete part) is accepted by all experts in the field. There is absolutely no controverse about that. I have even been asled to suppress the explanation of this in my french Phd thesis (to avoid the beligian critics that I explain too much elementary material known by everybody). > he gave a purely mathematical definition That's nice, but defining a calculation and making a calculation is not the same thing, Of course. But once Turing defined calculation/computation, it has been proved that it exists in any model of arithmetic, a fortiori in the standard model. just as "a fast red car" is NOT a fast red car. Definitions can't make calculations, only matter that obeys the laws of physics can do that. Not at all. You need a physical reality only to implement a physical computation. But that is trivial, because a physical co
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
O n Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wr rote > you seem to doubt that the existence of computation in arithmetic. Yes, I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have grave doubts about the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly nobody has ever seen even a hint of such a thing. > your argument relies on a notion of physical computation. Yes, I have no doubts whatsoever about the existence of computation in physics. > When I ask what that is, your definition seems to be "implementation of > computation (in the arithmetical sense) in a physical reality, > > which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in > arithmetic. Arithmetical objects (like numbers) can be computed no doubt about , it but as far as we know not by arithmetic, only by physics. > > which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in > arithmetic. There is no contradiction, a rithmetical objects can certainly be computed but the question is what is doing the computing, is physics doing it or is arithmetic doing it to itself? I think physics is more likely. > you persist in confusing what is a computation in the CHurch-Turing sense, If " computation in the C h urch-Turing sense " doesn't mean finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical problem then " computation in the C h urch-Turing sense " INTEL would not find it interesting and neither would I. > > > none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory can, I agree Actually theory are not necessarily supposed to be able to do that, I agree. > > only machine (in the mathematical sense) can do that. O nl y a machine (in the PHYSICAL sense) can do that. > > Now, it happens that if a theory is sigma_1 complete, like RA and PA, they > can do that, because such theories are universal machine If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation and change the world! > > Physical material can do that [computation] in the physical world Yes and only physical material can do that , and I have a explanation of why that is so. You do not. > but here we talk about the computation done in arithmetic. No , here we talk about the computation done *TO* arithmetical objects ( by physics). Arithmetic is unchanging, nothing can be done in it; if you want to actually DO something and not just define something physics is needed. > obviously, we cannot use them in any direct way, like we can do with a > physical machine. If mathematics is more fundamental than physics as you say then it's about as far from obvious as you can get to understand WHY we can't do calculations directly but must instead get our hands dirty and mess around with elements such as silicon. > > you accept comp, I do not accept "comp". > > All your post illustrates that you are a sort of comp believer. None of my posts illustrates that I am a "comp" believer. > Comp is put for computationalism. No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred s maybe thousands of times "according to comp this and according to comp th a t", but I am still unable to form a coherent picture of what you're talking about ; but I have a very clear understanding of computationalism so I know that whatever "comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism. > > > > That computations exist in arithmetic (even in the small sigma_1 complete > part) is accepted by all experts And yet for some strange reason like you none of these experts have become filthy rich by starting a computer hardware company that doesn't need to manufacture hardware. I find that very odd. > Of course. But once Turing defined calculation/computation > [...] > If definitions could make calculations INTEL would make definitions instead of silicon microchips because making definitions is one hell of a lot easier than making physical objects. > > it has been proved that it exists in any model of arithmetic, a fortiori > in the standard model. Proofs are no more adept than definitions at making calculations. > > You need a physical reality only to implement a physical computation. But > that is trivial, Try telling the stockholders and scientists at INTEL it's trivial! >> if you want to know a particular solution to a particular problem in >> arithmetic because neither proofs nor theorems can make a calculation; for >> that you need physics. > > > Yes, but it happens that we are not interested in having a solution, but > only in their existence, Then you're not interested in computations . T here is no disputing matters of taste but I am interested in computations and so is INTEL. John K Clark > How could a universal Turing machine makes
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark wrote: > > When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and > when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a > definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to > either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition > of my own, a definition of definition. You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. You just love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all because this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of ideas going on here. Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 03 Oct 2015, at 04:25, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Oct 2, 2015 at 10:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wr rote > you seem to doubt that the existence of computation in arithmetic. Yes, I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have grave doubts about the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly nobody has ever seen even a hint of such a thing. You are dead wrong here, as we don't need a hint, we have a proof, and it is in all textbook in mathematical logic. Unless you allude to a notion of "physical computation" which has not been defined. > your argument relies on a notion of physical computation. Yes, I have no doubts whatsoever about the existence of computation in physics. I translate: ... physical existence of the physical implementation of arithmetical computation. That is possible. But that has nothing to do with the proven existence of computation in arithmetic. You can emulate the (universal) computation even with only diophantine degree four polynomial. > When I ask what that is, your definition seems to be "implementation of computation (in the arithmetical sense) in a physical reality, which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in arithmetic. Arithmetical objects (like numbers) can be computed no doubt about, it but as far as we know not by arithmetic, only by physics. As far as you know, I would say. > which contradicts your statement that computation does not exist in arithmetic. There is no contradiction, arithmetical objects can certainly be computed but the question is what is doing the computing, The relative universal numbers, which exists like prime number exists. is physics doing it or is arithmetic doing it to itself? I think physics is more likely. Which explains a lot. You are unaware of what is a computation in computer science. > you persist in confusing what is a computation in the CHurch- Turing sense, If "computation in the Church-Turing sense" doesn't mean finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical problem then "computation in the Church-Turing sense" INTEL would not find it interesting and neither would I. The theory is born from reflexions in the foundation of math, if we except the work of Babbage. The physical implementation has come later, and although interesting, is not reated to the theory. It needs another theory which assumes a physical reality, or derive it from the numbers, and the notion of physical computations is a different concept. > none of those theories can perform calculations, no theory can, I agree Actually theory are not necessarily supposed to be able to do that, I agree. > only machine (in the mathematical sense) can do that. Only a machine (in the PHYSICAL sense) can do that. Not at all. In the arithmetical sense, they do it too, and no machine can know from personal introspection if they are primitively run by the arithmetical reality of by a physical reality. > Now, it happens that if a theory is sigma_1 complete, like RA and PA, they can do that, because such theories are universal machine If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation and change the world! Straw man. > Physical material can do that [computation] in the physical world Yes and only physical material can do that Sure, but circular with computationalism as we have to explain mind and matter appearance from number relations. It works up to now. , and I have a explanation of why that is so. You do not. You don't read it, that's all. You said it so. > but here we talk about the computation done in arithmetic. No, here we talk about the computation done TO arithmetical objects (by physics). No, we talk about computation done by universal number, through the Turing universal part of arithmetic. Arithmetic is unchanging, nothing can be done in it; The block universe is unchanging too. Time is an indexical in both arithmetic and some model of GR. if you want to actually DO something and not just define something physics is needed. You assume a physical universe, and I have explained this does not work if we are digitalizable machine. > obviously, we cannot use them in any direct way, like we can do with a physical machine. If mathematics is more fundamental than physics as you say then it's about as far from obvious as you can get to understand WHY we can't do calculations directly but must instead get our hands dirty and mess around with elements such as silicon. The notion of computation does not assume silicon, nor QM or anything like that. > you accept comp, I do not accept "comp". You do. You only don't accept that "comp
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have >> >> grave >> >> doubts >> >> about >> >> the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly >> >> nobody has ever seen >> >> even a hint of >> >> such a thing. > > > You are dead wrong here, as we don't need a hint, we have a proof, > A proof can't make a single calculation, but a silicon microprocessor can. > > and it is in all textbook in mathematical logic. > And a textbook in mathematical logic can't make a single calculation either, but a silicon microprocessor can. > > Unless you allude to a notion of "physical computation" which has not been > defined. > Physical computation means just what it seems to mean, computation done physically; if you still find that response unsatisfactory then you need to define define. > > > physical existence of the physical implementation of arithmetical > computation. That is possible. > I agree, I am certain that exists, I am far far less certain about the existence of the mathematical implementation of physical computation. > > > You can emulate the (universal) computation even with only diophantine > degree four polynomial. > And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses silicon and not diophantine degree four polynomial. How odd. > > You are unaware of what is a computation in computer science. > It is finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical problem >> >> If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it >> and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation >> and change the world! >> >> > > > Straw man. > Straw man my ass!! If somebody claims to be able to do something it is not unreasonable to ask to see them actually do it and not just talk about it. If you are correct about arithmetic being able to make calculations without the help of physics I can see absolutely no why the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation would't be a *HUGE *success, and yet nobody including you wants to start such a company. How odd. > > The notion of computation does not assume silicon, nor QM or anything like > that. > If so then "the notion of computation " can't actually perform one single calculation, but a silicon microchip can. > > >> >> >> >> you accept comp, > > >> > I do not accept "comp". > > > > You do. > No I do not. > > > > >> > Comp is put for computationalism. > >> > No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred > s > maybe thousands > of times "according to comp this and according to comp th > a > t", > > > Because that hs been proved, published, peer-reviewed, and accepted > It's certainly not accepted by Wikipedia, it lists 29 passable meanings of "comp" and not one of them has anything to do with AI or consciousness or computations or anything you're talking about. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comp Google doesn't know what the hell you mean by "comp" either, try it for yourself. >> >> I am >> still >> unable to form a coherent picture of what >> you're talking about >> ; >> but I have a >> very >> clear understanding of >> >> computationalism >> so I know that >> whatever "comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism. > > > > > Because you stop at step 3, > Because you made a blunder in step 3 that you won't or can't fix. Who in their right mind would keep reading a proof after they found a flaw? > >>> >> >>> >>> You need a physical reality only to implement a physical computation. >>> But that is trivial, >> >> > >> >> Try telling the stockholders >> >> and >> >> scientists >> >> at >> >> INTEL it's trivial! > > > > > Straw man again. > Try telling the stockholders and scientists at INTEL it's a straw man!! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote: On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark wrote: When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go- round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of definition. You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the- arse straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. You just love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all because this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of ideas going on here. Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is that his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when thinking on this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid, which is normal as the TOE has to be highly counter-intuitive if it can manage both mind and matter, as the platonist understood well when creating theology, math and physics. Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point. Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving. Bruno Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
2015-10-06 16:23 GMT+02:00 John Clark : > > On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a >> physical notion, > > > No, John Clark does not agree with that. > > > >> > >> because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics. > > > Because John Clark can find no evidence that > computation *NOT* done in physics exists, and INTEL can't find any > evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about " > physical computation > " > and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark > Bruno Marchal > thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical. > Then you have to define a computation *WITHOUT* using the mathematical definition of a computation.. which you've not done... > > John K Clark > > > > > > > >> On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote: >> >> >>> >>> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark wrote: When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of definition. >>> >>> You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. >>> An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse >>> straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not >>> boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you >>> are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart >>> to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. >>> You just love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all >>> because this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity >>> favourite. You are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous >>> bottleneck years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of >>> ideas going on here. >>> >> >> Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is that >> his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when thinking on >> this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid, which is normal >> as the TOE has to be highly counter-intuitive if it can manage both mind >> and matter, as the platonist understood well when creating theology, math >> and physics. >> >> Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a >> computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical >> computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point. >> Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >>> Kim >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a > physical notion, No, John Clark does not agree with that. > > > because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics. Because John Clark can find no evidence that computation *NOT* done in physics exists, and INTEL can't find any evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about " physical computation " and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark Bruno Marchal thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical. John K Clark > On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote: > > >> >> On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark wrote: >>> >>> When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that >>> and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a >>> definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to >>> either get off the silly definition merry-go-round or to demand a >>> definition of my own, a definition of definition. >>> >> >> You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. An >> academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the-arse straighto >> from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not boldly explore >> consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you are a mental >> midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart to shoot a >> giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. You just >> love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all because >> this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You >> are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck >> years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of ideas going on >> here. >> > > Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is that > his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when thinking on > this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid, which is normal > as the TOE has to be highly counter-intuitive if it can manage both mind > and matter, as the platonist understood well when creating theology, math > and physics. > > Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a > computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical > computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point. > Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving. > > Bruno > > > > >> Kim >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 10:38 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: >> >> >> Because John Clark can find no evidence that >> computation *NOT* done in physics exists, and INTEL can't find any >> evidence for it either. The only reason John Clark talks about " >> physical computation >> " >> and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark >> Bruno Marchal >> thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical. >> > > > > Then you have to define a computation *WITHOUT* using the mathematical > definition of a computation.. which you've not done... > I never said mathematics couldn't ask questions, another language, the English language, can ask questions too such as; what is the 423rd prime larger than 10^100^100? The question is clear as a bell but as far as is know to answer it matter that obeys the laws of physics is going to be needed, and perhaps more matter than exists in the entire universe will be needed. If it's true that only matter can make a calculation and if it's true that there just isn't enough matter to do so then it's not obvious to me that it's meaningful to say the 4 23rd prime larger than 10^100^100 exists. But what about Euclid who proved there are an infinite number of primes? Well, maybe mathematics doesn't get to have the last word on questions like this, maybe physics does. Or maybe not, I don't know. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Oct 2015, at 04:29, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I'm not dogmatic on the subject but I have grave doubts about the existence of computation in arithmetic; certainly nobody has ever seen even a hint of such a thing. You are dead wrong here, as we don't need a hint, we have a proof, A proof can't make a single calculation, but a silicon microprocessor can. Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, and it can not only compute all computable functions, but compute them in any possible way. > and it is in all textbook in mathematical logic. And a textbook in mathematical logic can't make a single calculation either, but a silicon microprocessor can. > Unless you allude to a notion of "physical computation" which has not been defined. Physical computation means just what it seems to mean, computation done physically; if you still find that response unsatisfactory then you need to define define. No, the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you mean by computation? If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then that is OK, but then all I say is that no Turing machine can aver distinguish an arithmetical computation from a physical one, without external clues. > physical existence of the physical implementation of arithmetical computation. That is possible. I agree, I am certain that exists, I am far far less certain about the existence of the mathematical implementation of physical computation. But I was talking on the computations in arithmetic. None of them are physical a priori, because the physical will be an appearance emerging from the FPI statistics on *all* of them. Arithmetic can simulate a silicon processor simulating a Turing machine, but arithmetic might not been able to simulate exactly the silicon atom, as it cannot simulate 2^aleph_0 computations at once. > You can emulate the (universal) computation even with only diophantine degree four polynomial. And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses silicon and not diophantine degree four polynomial. How odd. No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical computations. But the point is that with computationalisme, we must justify the existence of the appearance of the physical computations from the arithmetical one, or from any Turing universal system. > You are unaware of what is a computation in computer science. It is finding a particular solution to a particular arithmetical problem Hmm... Not quite close. >> If you know how to do that then for God's sake stop talking about it and just do it, start the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation and change the world! > Straw man. Straw man my ass!! If somebody claims to be able to do something it is not unreasonable to ask to see them actually do it and not just talk about it. You confuse "that physical entity can do this computation", with the arithmetical reality (a tiny part of the standard model of RA) emulate (in the sense of Church-Turing) this computation". If you are correct about arithmetic being able to make calculations without the help of physics I can see absolutely no why the Sigma 1 PARA Hardware Corporation would't be a HUGE success, and yet nobody including you wants to start such a company. How odd. > The notion of computation does not assume silicon, nor QM or anything like that. If so then "the notion of computation" can't actually perform one single calculation, but a silicon microchip can. lol >>> you accept comp, >>I do not accept "comp". > You do. No I do not. >>> Comp is put for computationalism. >> No it is not. Over the years I have heard you say hundred s maybe thousands of times "according to comp this and according to comp that", > Because that hs been proved, published, peer-reviewed, and accepted It's certainly not accepted by Wikipedia, it lists 29 passable meanings of "comp" and not one of them has anything to do with AI or consciousness or computations or anything you're talking about. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comp Google doesn't know what the hell you mean by "comp" either, try it for yourself. Of course, I use that abbreviation only in this list. it is a private thing between us, to avoid typing something like "the computationalist theory of mind", or "the computationalist hypothesis in cognitive science". >> I am still unable to form a coherent picture of what you're talking about; but I have a very clear understanding of computationalism so I know that whatever "comp" is it certainly isn't computationalism. > Because you stop at step 3, Because you made a blunder in step 3 that you won't or can't fix. Who in their right mind would keep reading a p
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, > But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing! No proof can. > > > the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you mean by > computation? > As I've said over and over and over again. I mean the process of finding a specific answer to a specific problem. > > > If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then > I mean the sort of computation that people are interested in, the sort they will pay money for, the sort of computations that INTEL does. > > > no Turing machine can aver distinguish an arithmetical computation from a > physical one, > That's not all it can't do! Unless the machine is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics no Turing machine can distinguish ANYTHING, and the blueprints of a 747 can flt you across the Atlantic either. > > > without external clues. > In other word physical external clues can provide something pure mathematics can not. > > > I was talking on the computations in arithmetic.None of them are physical > There are no computations IN arithmetic, computations are always done TO arithmetic by physics. > > > Arithmetic can simulate a silicon processor > s > imulating a Turing machine, > You've got it exactly backwards. The simple must simulate the complex not the reverse, otherwise there would be no point in doing simulations. A silicon processor is vastly more complex than a Turing machine. >> >> >> And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses silicon and not diophantine >> degree four polynomial. How odd. > > > > > No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical computations. > And INTEL makes machines like that because billions of people will happily pay trillions of dollars for physical computations, but they won't spend a nickle for a non- physical computation . Maybe those billions of people know something you don't. > > You are the guy who has been shown believing that 0 = 1, remember? > No, I do not remember and that is surprising. Zero being equal to one would be big news and I would have thought I would have remembered that. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
> On 6 Oct 2015, at 8:34 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation > is not a physical notion, because he defines physical computation by a > computation done in physics. So he lost the point. Unfortunately we can > expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving. > > Bruno Bruno - he is never ever going to admit it. Even now you are predicting above that he won’t admit it. So what really is going on here? Have either of you two noticed yet how there is really only the two of you left in this conversation? Does that suggest anything? Insults aside, I don’t honestly see the point of this any more. I have never seen so much dancing up and down on one spot over anything in my life. It really is starting to look like neither can let the other sign-off on it. It is simply not true that he who has the last word has the final word. Some things can be put aside “to come back to later"….in addition, I recall you saying several eons ago that you would no longer respond to JC unless he got beyond Step 3. Cheers, Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 11:51 PM, Kim Jones wrote: > > > I don’t honestly see the point of this any more. And yet you still post, therefore I can only conclude that you enjoy writing posts that have no point. > > I recall you saying several eons ago that you would no longer respond to > JC unless he got beyond Step 3. I recall that too, and that is yet another example of something Bruno said that turned out to be untrue. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Oct 2015, at 16:23, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a physical notion, No, John Clark does not agree with that. Then your earlier explanation of what is computation in "physical computation" is senseless. > because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics. Because John Clark can find no evidence that computation NOT done in physics exists, This shows that you have no knowledge of computer science and its history. Computation and computability have been discovered by mathematicians and they don't use any physical assumptions. and INTEL can't find any evidence for it either. INTEL is interested in physical computation, but they have a good idea of what a computation is so as to implement them in a physical way. The only reason John Clark talks about "physical computation " and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark Bruno Marchal thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical. It is not me. It is everybody in the field. Just open any book on that subject. Avoid books written by physicalist metaphysician of course (like Deutsch in FOR, for example). At least Deutsch agrees that he is in opposition with *all* mathematicians and computer scientists on this. Bruno John K Clark On 05 Oct 2015, at 00:52, Kim Jones wrote: On 1 Oct 2015, at 3:25 AM, John Clark wrote: When I say "physical computation" and you demand a definition of that and when I respond with "a computation done with physics" and you demand a definition of that too then I believe it is perfectly acceptable for me to either get off the silly definition merry-go- round or to demand a definition of my own, a definition of definition. You are here painting yourself with a very fine brush as what you are. An academic. A useless bloody argumentative broom handle-up-the- arse straighto from the planet Dork. You are out to win argument only, not boldly explore consequences of interesting ideas. That is beyond you; you are a mental midget; the equivalent of someone who thinks its really smart to shoot a giraffe or a lion and then pose for a photo against the carcass. You just love it when people engage with you at all over anything at all because this allows you to indulge in this very sporting activity favourite. You are sick. This list might have moved on from this ridiculous bottleneck years ago but for you. There used to be a lively exchange of ideas going on here. Academic? No need to insult people. The only thing which matters is that his argument are invalid. Not all academic are invalid when thinking on this subject, and very often non-academic can be invalid, which is normal as the TOE has to be highly counter- intuitive if it can manage both mind and matter, as the platonist understood well when creating theology, math and physics. Note that here John Clark agrees implicitly with the fact that a computation is not a physical notion, because he defines physical computation by a computation done in physics. So he lost the point. Unfortunately we can expect the usual self-deny and the handwaving. Bruno Kim -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@goo
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 07 Oct 2015, at 03:58, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Oct 6, 2015 at 3:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing! No proof can. That is false. Sigma_1 provability can compute what any other universal system can compute, and even in the same way/algorithm. > the problem is that in "computation done physically", what do you mean by computation? As I've said over and over and over again. I mean the process of finding a specific answer to a specific problem. That is "solving a problem", not computing a function. But that stoo can exist in arithmetic, and is a-handled more with the RE sets (the w_i), than with the phi_i. In that case, you still rely oin the purely mathematical theory. No physical assumption is needed, still less metaphysical materialist assumption. > If you mean it in the usual standard sense, then I mean the sort of computation that people are interested in, the sort they will pay money for, the sort of computations that INTEL does. OK? but that is not the standard one. > no Turing machine can aver distinguish an arithmetical computation from a physical one, That's not all it can't do! Unless the machine is made of matter that obeys the laws of physics no Turing machine can distinguish ANYTHING, and the blueprints of a 747 can flt you across the Atlantic either. False. true only if you add physical as a quality for the result. > without external clues. In other word physical external clues can provide something pure mathematics can not. If computationalism is correct, the physical is an epitsemological reality, not an ontological one. > I was talking on the computations in arithmetic.None of them are physical There are no computations IN arithmetic, computations are always done TO arithmetic by physics. Physical computations might do that. But arithmetical computations, which can emulate *all* computations (with Church-Turing thesis- does not assume anything physical. > Arithmetic can simulate a silicon processor simulating a Turing machine, You've got it exactly backwards. The simple must simulate the complex not the reverse, otherwise there would be no point in doing simulations. A silicon processor is vastly more complex than a Turing machine. All universal beings can simulate all universal beings when doing computations. It go in both direction. >> And yet for some strange reason INTEL still uses silicon and not diophantine degree four polynomial. How odd. > No, that is not odd. INTEL sold machine for physical computations. And INTEL makes machines like that because billions of people will happily pay trillions of dollars for physical computations, but they won't spend a nickle for a non-physical computation. Maybe those billions of people know something you don't. By definition, if those computations did not exist in arithmetic, they would not exist in the physical reality either. INTEL needs both mathematicians and physical engineers. The notion of computation has just nothing to do with physics. read the book by Davis with the original papers for god sake. Bruno > You are the guy who has been shown believing that 0 = 1, remember? No, I do not remember and that is surprising. Zero being equal to one would be big news and I would have thought I would have remembered that. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Fri, Oct 9, 2015 at 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > you have no knowledge of computer science and its history. Computation > and computability have been discovered by mathematicians and they don't use > any physical assumptions. > That is true, physical assumptions or assumptions of any sort are not needed to make a calculation, but matter that obeys the laws of physics is. > > INTEL is interested in physical computation, > INTEL is interested in computations period, if you know of a way to make calculations that isn't physical INTEL would very much want to hear from you! >> >> The only reason John Clark talks about " >> >> physical computation >> " >> and not just "computation" is that unlike John Clark >> Bruno Marchal >> thinks there is a type of computation that isn't physical. >> > > > > It is not me. It is everybody in the field. Just open any book on that > subject. > It doesn't matter if it's open or closed, no book on that subject can make a calculation. > > > Avoid books written by physicalist metaphysician of course > And books by " physicalist metaphysician s" (whatever the hell that is) can't make a calculation either, but a silicon microprocessor can, and that is why INTEL makes microprocessors and not books. John K Clark > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Fri, Oct 9, 2015 at 6:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>> >> >>> Sigma_1 complete provability is Turing universal, >> >> > >> >> But the proof or that can't compute one damn thing! >> >> No proof can. > > > > That is false. Sigma_1 provability can compute > Then for god's sake stop blabbing about it and just do it! Start the Sigma_1 Computer Corporation and drive INTEL into bankruptcy; they could never compete with your zero manufacturing costs. > > > No physical assumption is needed, > And no computation is performed. > > By definition, if those computations did not exist in arithmetic, they > would not exist in the physical reality either. > To hell with definitions they can't make calculations; if computations did not exist in the physical world arithmetic would not exist! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
O n Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> To hell with this 3p crap! We agreed that "you" meant remembering being >> a man in Helsinki > > > > > Yes. > Good. *PERIOD.* > > > > > No > Not good. To say that "you" "meant remembering being a man in Helsinki" does not > determined the 1p, > If "you" doesn't mean remembering being a man in Helsinki then I ask for the time, what the hell does the personal pronoun "you" mean? If Bruno is unable to give a coherent answer to that question, and by now it's pretty clear that Bruno can not, then please stop using that word when trying to tackle issues like personal identity or the unique feeling of self. > > you cannot live both experience at once Who cannot live both experiences at once? > The guy has been duplicated, there is no such thing as " *the* 1p". > > > It is, obviously, the 1p that you will live in > The 1p that who will live in? > > > You have agreed yourself that as long as the reconstitution boxes have not > been open, the same consciousness is attached to the copies > Yes. > > and you have agreed that they differentiate > > after opening the door. > Yes. > > > both individual are the H-man > Yes. > both have differentiate into person seeing one city > Yes. > > > both will admit they got one bit of information. > That is not new information. Even before the reconstitution boxes have been opened I (there was still only one John Clark then, so "I" is not ambiguous) knew that when those doors were opened one John Clark would receive photons from Moscow and one John Clark would receive photons from Washington. And I also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. Nothing new has been learned. > >> >> And how many cities will those two yous observe from the first person? >> >> John Clark believes the answer is 2. > > > Again you say a triviality in the 3p description, and a contradiction > *for* the 1p perspective, when seen *from* the 1p-perspective, which was > the point of the question. > If duplicating chambers are involved there is no such thing as *the *1p perspective when seen from *the* 1p-perspective . One perspective has just as much a right to be called "first" as another. > > > You try hard to blur the 1p/3p distinction > Don't be an ass. The trouble isn't the distinction between 1p and 3p, the trouble is the distinction between *the* 1p and *a* 1p. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 30 Jul 2015, at 22:09, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Jul 30, 2015 at 12:11 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> To hell with this 3p crap! We agreed that "you" meant remembering being a man in Helsinki > Yes. Good. PERIOD. > No Not good. To say that "you" "meant remembering being a man in Helsinki" does not determined the 1p, If "you" doesn't mean remembering being a man in Helsinki then I ask for the time, what the hell does the personal pronoun "you" mean? If Bruno is unable to give a coherent answer to that question, and by now it's pretty clear that Bruno can not, then please stop using that word when trying to tackle issues like personal identity or the unique feeling of self. You makes me say what I did not say. I repeat: "you" meant, since always, "remembering being the man in Helsinki". What I said, is that the definition, which I use, does not determine the 1p. Indeed that is the (interesting) problem of relating the 1p to 3p description. You can be in both city, but you will feel in once city. The solution is simple: your 1p experience is undetermined, like in the self-superposition in the MWI. > you cannot live both experience at once Who cannot live both experiences at once? Anyone, when the experience are logically exclusive, like you have admitted the W and M experiences are. > The guy has been duplicated, there is no such thing as " the 1p". > It is, obviously, the 1p that you will live in The 1p that who will live in? You, the two guys who remembers having seen Helsinki, and have differentiated in exclusive first person after pushing the button. > You have agreed yourself that as long as the reconstitution boxes have not been open, the same consciousness is attached to the copies Yes. >and you have agreed that they differentiate after opening the door. Yes. >both individual are the H-man Yes. both have differentiate into person seeing one city Yes. > both will admit they got one bit of information. That is not new information. Even before the reconstitution boxes have been opened I (there was still only one John Clark then, so "I" is not ambiguous) knew that when those doors were opened one John Clark would receive photons from Moscow and one John Clark would receive photons from Washington. And I also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. Nothing new has been learned. This confirms that you don't listen to what they say. because this, if correct would make the prediction "W & M", and both copies refute it. You just ignore what the copies testify. >>And how many cities will those two yous observe from the first person? John Clark believes the answer is 2. Again you say a triviality in the 3p description, and a contradiction *for* the 1p perspective, when seen *from* the 1p- perspective, which was the point of the question. If duplicating chambers are involved there is no such thing as the 1p perspective when seen from the 1p-perspective. One perspective has just as much a right to be called "first" as another. The point is that for both copies, each experience is exclusive of the other, and so from both their 1p views, the "the" made in Helsinki if sensical. Again, that is pretty obvious if you iterate the duplication. > You try hard to blur the 1p/3p distinction Don't be an ass. The trouble isn't the distinction between 1p and 3p, the trouble is the distinction between the 1p and a 1p. Then use "a 1p", as it works as well to get the indeterminacy of the subjective experiences---*all* the subjectives experienceS, which all get one bit of information at each duplication, as they will all confirm. You might be inspired to try to find a mistake in step 4-8, as you fail on step 3. On step 3 you are just successfully proving the vastness of your bad faith, and your diminishing ability to renew your handwaving technic and rhetorical means. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at htt
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 5:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> If "you" doesn't mean remembering being a man in Helsinki then I ask for >> the time, what the hell does the personal pronoun "you" mean? If Bruno >> is unable to give a coherent answer to that question, and by now it's >> pretty clear that Bruno can not, then please stop using that word when >> trying to tackle issues like personal identity or the unique feeling of >> self. > > > > > You makes me say what I did not say. > > I repeat: "you" meant, since always, "remembering being the man in > Helsinki". > > What I said, is that the definition, which I use, does not determine the > 1p. > Well of course it doesn't determine *THE* 1p because in a world with people duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE* 1p. > > > You can be in both city, but you will feel in once city. > Who can be in both cities but you will feel in one city? >>> >> you cannot live both experience at once >> > >> >> >> Who cannot live both experiences at once? > > > > > Anyone, > What about anytwo? > > >>> >>> >>> The guy has been duplicated, there is no such thing as " *the* 1p". >> >> > > > >> >> >> It is, obviously, the 1p that you will live in >> > > > >> > The 1p that who will live in? > > > > You, > And who is "you"? The 1p that you will live in . And who is "you" again? The person that has the 1p. And who has this 1p? You. A nd round and round we go. So at this point why would Bruno continue to use that personal pronoun? There can only be one reason, b ecause it is the only word with sufficient ambiguity to cover the gargantuan logical gaps in Bruno's argument. both will admit they got one bit of information. >> >> >> >> >> >> That is not new information. Even before the reconstitution boxes have >> been opened I (there was still only one John Clark then, so "I" is >> not ambiguous) knew that when those doors were opened one John Clark would >> receive photons from Moscow and one John Clark would receive photons from >> Washington. And I also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man >> would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his >> photons from Washington. Nothing new has been learned. > > > > > This confirms that you don't listen to what they say. because this, if > correct would make the prediction "W & M", and both copies refute it. > One copy would refute it but both copies confirm it. John K Clark > > > > > > > > > >> >> >>> And how many cities will those two yous observe from the first person? >>> >>> John Clark believes the answer is 2. >> >> >> Again you say a triviality in the 3p description, and a contradiction >> *for* the 1p perspective, when seen *from* the 1p-perspective, which was >> the point of the question. >> > > If duplicating chambers are involved there is no such thing as > *the *1p perspective when seen from *the* 1p-perspective > . One perspective has just as much a right to be called "first" as > another. > > > > The point is that for both copies, each experience is exclusive of the > other, and so from both their 1p views, the "the" made in Helsinki if > sensical. Again, that is pretty obvious if you iterate the duplication. > > > > > >> > >> You try hard to blur the 1p/3p distinction >> > > Don't be an ass. The trouble isn't the distinction between 1p and 3p, > the trouble is the distinction between *the* 1p and *a* 1p. > > > Then use "a 1p", as it works as well to get the indeterminacy of the > subjective experiences---*all* the subjectives experienceS, which all get > one bit of information at each duplication, as they will all confirm. > > You might be inspired to try to find a mistake in step 4-8, as you fail on > step 3. On step 3 you are just successfully proving the vastness of your > bad faith, and your diminishing ability to renew your handwaving technic > and rhetorical means. > > > > Bruno > > > > > > > John K Clark > > >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 31 Jul 2015, at 21:39, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Jul 31, 2015 at 5:05 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
>> If "you" doesn't mean remembering being a man in Helsinki
then I ask for the time, what the hell does the personal
pronoun "you" mean? If Bruno is unable to give a coherent answer to
that question, and by now it's pretty clear that Bruno can not, then
please stop using that word when trying to tackle issues like
personal identity or the unique feeling of self.
> You makes me say what I did not say. I repeat: "you"
meant, since always, "remembering being the man in Helsinki".
What I said, is that the definition, which I use, does not determine
the 1p.
Well of course it doesn't determine THE 1p because in a world with
people duplicating machines there is no such thing as THE 1p.
Then you die with the simple teleportation.
Of course there is a "the", even two, but only one is avaiblae for
both copies, and that is there is indetermination on the outcome of
the experience. The *the* is the one among {W, M} that you will live.
The question was "what do you expect to live when you will push on the
button", asked to your before the duplication (so, as you said
yourself, not ambiguous at all).
Let us count the subjective experiences available: two.
But you have agreed that they are incompatible, so you know that for
any first person experience pov, it will be like only one of the
outcome has been made available. As W and M are incompatible (they
refers to the two 1p experiences by definition) we can way that W v M
is equivalent with ((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)).
> You can be in both city, but you will feel in once city.
Who can be in both cities but you will feel in one city?
The guy who was in Helsinki and will remember that.
He can and will be in both city, but from their first person point of
view they both live ((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)).
Even ((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) & (~(W & M)).
>>>> The guy has been duplicated, there is no such thing as "
the 1p".
>>> It is, obviously, the 1p that you will live in
>> The 1p that who will live in?
> You,
And who is "you"? The 1p that you will live in. And who is
"you" again? The person that has the 1p. And who has this 1p? You.
And round and round we go.
Lol
So at this point why would Bruno continue to use that personal
pronoun? There can only be one reason, because it is the
only word with sufficient ambiguity to cover the gargantuan
logical gaps in Bruno's argument.
Asserting a proposition many times works when you are hunting a Snark,
but is useless as long as you don't show the gap. All last attempts
are repetition of changing the question.
Gargantuan logical gaps? You can be sure that if there was a nano-gap,
we would know it since long.
both will admit they got one bit of information.
>> That is not new information. Even before the
reconstitution boxes have been opened I (there was still only one
John Clark then, so "I" is not ambiguous) knew that when those doors
were opened one John Clark would receive photons from Moscow and one
John Clark would receive photons from Washington. And I also knew
which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his
photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons
from Washington. Nothing new has been learned.
> This confirms that you don't listen to what they say. because
this, if correct would make the prediction "W & M", and both copies
refute it.
One copy would refute it but both copies confirm it.
In linear logic, I might accept that, but again, it will be a 3-1
description, which is trivial.
The question is what do you (or anyone) could expect to live when you
or anyone are in Helsinki, before pushing on the button?
The answer that you gave us: " I expect W and I expect M" has already
been explained as correct for some outsider description, but is not a
description of a personal experience available. I remind you that you
agreed that the W and M experience are incompatible. The *experience*
W & M is false in both places.
Got the strong feeling that you persist in never listening to your
selves after the copy (optimistic view).
Or maybe, like most believe, that you fake being unable to listen to
your selves (pessimistic view).
Bruno
John K Clark
>>And how many cities will those two yous observe from the
first person? John Clark believes the answer is 2.
Again you say a triviality in the 3p description, and a
contradiction *for* the 1p perspective, when seen *from* the 1p-
perspective, which was the point of the question.
If duplicating chambers are involved there is no such thing as
the 1p perspective when seen from the 1p-perspective. One
perspective has just as much a right to be called "first" as
another.
The point is that for both copies, each exp
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sat, Aug 1, 2015 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> Well of course it doesn't determine *THE* 1p because in a world with >> people duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE* 1p. > > > > > Then you die with the simple teleportation. > Then who will die in t he simple teleportation ? If Bruno is unable to give a coherent meaning to the personal pronoun "you" , and by now it's pretty clear that Bruno can not, then Bruno should stop using that word when trying to tackle issues like personal identity or the unique feeling of self. >> > And who is "you"? > > The 1p that you will live in > > . And who is "you" again? The person that has the 1p. And who has this 1p? > You. And round and round we go. > > Lol Yes it is sorta funny, and the funniest part is that Bruno is laughing at the very absurdity of Bruno Marchal 's theory. > > Of course there is a "the", even two, but only one is avaiblae for both > copies, and that is there is indetermination on the outcome of the > experience. > Before the duplication there would be no uncertainty I (this is before duplication so that pronoun can be used), would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. What more is needed, what exactly is it that is supposed to be uncertain? Please please don't say it's uncertain what **you** will see from **the** 1p. > > Th > e question was "what do you expect to live when you will push on the > button" > That depends on who "you" is. John Clark has already explained what John Clark would expect; what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > L > et us count the subjective experiences available: two. > Correct, and if Bruno Marchal has been duplicated then Bruno Marchal can experience both of them. > > > But you have agreed that they are incompatible, > As explained over and over and over again, the Washington Man and the Moscow Man are incompatible with each other but they are *NOT* incompatible with both being Bruno Marchal . Are they i ncompatible with both being **you**? That is not a question, that is just a sequence of ASCII characters with a question mark at the end. > > > you know that for any first person experience pov, it will be like only > one of the outcome has been made available. > Yes but given the fact that *TWO* first person experiences have been made available and they are both Bruno Marchal 's that is not a problem. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 02 Aug 2015, at 18:44, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Aug 1, 2015 at 2:09 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Well of course it doesn't determine THE 1p because in a world with people duplicating machines there is no such thing as THE 1p. > Then you die with the simple teleportation. Then who will die in the simple teleportation? You, when you are in Helsinki. You agreed that before the duplication, this is not ambiguous. If Bruno is unable to give a coherent meaning to the personal pronoun "you", and by now it's pretty clear Rhetorical trick. You forget that you and Peck are the only one having a problem here. None of any member of the many jury having judge this work has have any problem with this. that Bruno can not, then Bruno should stop using that word when trying to tackle issues like personal identity or the unique feeling of self. So, to be clear, this contradict your own admission that "you" is unambiguous before the duplication. Then to get the simple answer, all you need is to keep in mind that it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first person experience that you will live (again, with that non ambiguous definition of identity that we have agree on). >> And who is "you"? The 1p that you will live in . And who is "you" again? The person that has the 1p. And who has this 1p? You. And round and round we go. > Lol Yes it is sorta funny, and the funniest part is that Bruno is laughing at the very absurdity of Bruno Marchal's theory. > Of course there is a "the", even two, but only one is avaiblae for both copies, and that is there is indetermination on the outcome of the experience. Before the duplication there would be no uncertainty I (this is before duplication so that pronoun can be used), would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. What more is needed, what exactly is it that is supposed to be uncertain? Please please don't say it's uncertain what *you* will see from *the* 1p. You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing the button. If there is no uncertainty, give the prediction. W and M has been refuted already, and your comment on that was just that the 1p/3p was ... pee pee (your term). That is just unintelligible. > The question was "what do you expect to live when you will push on the button" That depends on who "you" is. John Clark has already explained what John Clark would expect; what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > Let us count the subjective experiences available: two. Correct, and if Bruno Marchal has been duplicated then Bruno Marchal can experience both of them. A couple of person is not a person. You are just playing with word. If you expect to live both, then the simple verification (reading of the diaries in W and M) refutes your prediction. > But you have agreed that they are incompatible, As explained over and over and over again, the Washington Man and the Moscow Man are incompatible with each other but they are NOT incompatible with both being Bruno Marchal. of course. This follows from the definition, but does not address the question of what you can expect to live from the first person pov. Are they incompatible with both being *you*? That is not a question, that is just a sequence of ASCII characters with a question mark at the end. > you know that for any first person experience pov, it will be like only one of the outcome has been made available. Yes but given the fact that TWO first person experiences have been made available and they are both Bruno Marchal's that is not a problem. No, it is an explanation of why there is a first person indeterminacy. There will be two first person experiences, but each one excludes the others. The W-guy and the M-guy both agree that P(W & M) = 1 was wrong, and that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1. You persist faking to ignore the question. That is what is pretty clear for everybody in and out this list. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> >> >> >> Then you die with the simple teleportation. > > > >> >> >> Then who will die in the simple teleportation >> ? >> > > > > You, when you are in Helsinki. > For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark: 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". 2) Keep in mind that after the duplication there is no such thing as **THE** 1p that John Clark will experience in the future. Thank you for your cooperation. > > > it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first person > experience > There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > > "you" is unambiguous before the duplication. Yes, but Bruno is talking about expectations and that implies the future, stuff that happens after the duplication, and then its Ambiguity City. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > that you will live (again, with that non ambiguous definition of identity > that we have agree on). > The definition John Clark agreed on is "you" is somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki. On Monday Wednesday and Friday Bruno agrees with this definition, on Tuesday Thursday and Saturday Bruno does not, and on Sunday Bruno is a bit confused. > > You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing > the button. Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. " > > > you and Peck are the only one having a problem here. Then Peck and Clark are the only ones here who can think rationally on this subject. > > You are just playing with word. > And you are using words like a naive child not like a logician with a disciplined mind. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 03 Aug 2015, at 18:51, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Aug 3, 2015 at 5:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> Then you die with the simple teleportation. >> Then who will die in the simple teleportation? > You, when you are in Helsinki. For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark: 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1- Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. not in the use of names and pronouns. 2) Keep in mind that after the duplication there is no such thing as *THE* 1p that John Clark will experience in the future. Thank you for your cooperation. Yes, but we have refuted this. Indeed all your copies refute that prediction, as anyone able to read can see. You are continuing your rhetorical tricks. > it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first person experience There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. "The" refers to that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to refer to it. > that you will live (again, with that non ambiguous definition of identity that we have agree on). The definition John Clark agreed on is "you" is somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki. On Monday Wednesday and Friday Bruno agrees with this definition, on Tuesday Thursday and Saturday Bruno does not, and on Sunday Bruno is a bit confused. Lies. The same definition is used for the person. The difference you see is when we address the question, we need to emphasize the 1p refered to in the question. > You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing the button. Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self." You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live as first person experience? - I expect to die. - I expect to feel myself in two cities at once. - I expect to feel myself in only one city. I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion (remembering Helsinki and the personal pushing on the button), and the definition of the first person experience (here it is just remembering it and its description in the personal diary). This leads, assuming computationalism of course (or more general), only one option above open, as the diaries of both copies confirmed (for people able to read). Bruno > you and Peck are the only one having a problem here. Then Peck and Clark are the only ones here who can think rationally on this subject. > You are just playing with word. And you are using words like a naive child not like a logician with a disciplined mind. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John >> Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple >> changes in future correspondence with John Clark: >> 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > > > > > We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark > and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. > Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > >> >> >> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first >> person experience > > > >> > There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking > about? > > > We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason > that P(coffee) = 1. > > So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will > have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. > "The" refers to that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, > as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the > 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to > refer to it. > Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, t here are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > >> You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after >> pushing the button. > > >> > Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell > "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future > the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see > Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] > > also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his > photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from > Washington. [...] > > what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares > because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do > with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I > think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You > are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you > expect to live as first person experience? That depends on who "you" is. John Clark would expect that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. And John Clark would also know which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from Washington. W hat Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you > expect to live as first person experience? > - I expect to die. > - I expect to feel myself in two cities at once. > - I expect to feel myself in only one city. > I, that is to say John Clark in Helsinki, would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Moscow, and I would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Washington. I would further expect that from **THE** 1P John Clark will not experience anything at all. John Clark would not expect **THE** 1P to exist at all because John Clark expects John Clark to be duplicated. What Bruno Marchal would expect in a similar situation only Bruno Marchal knows, not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > I recall you that we have agreed on the identity criterion > We only agree on Mondays Wednesdays and Fridays, on the other days we disagree except for Sunday, on Sunday I don't know if we agree or disagree. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
@ Bruno >> You forget that you and Peck are the only one having a problem here. Im not sure thats true. True, there is a fair amount of uncritical support, but from what I see people kind of give you the benefit of the doubt at step 3 agreeing that there is something wishy washy about it. People kind of accept there would be a continuity of consciousness from H to W and from H to M, and they believe that is the important thing, then they blindly succer into the idea that because W and M only see one city this has some baring on how H should calculate his 'expectancies'. They make a fundamental and understandable error, and you push them very hard to make that error. The truth is that if you knew you were going to be duplicated you would bet on W very differently than if you know you have been duplicated and havent opened the door yet. Knowing you have been duplicated is a very different situation from knowing you are going to be. I can imagine my subjective view evolving seamlessly from H to W, and also imagine my view evolving seamlessly from H to M. But to ask which one will be me asks me to suppose that one evolution over the other is THE valid evolution of the subjective view. But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other. So to bet one which one I will be is a stupid thing to do. You try to get away from that fact by torturing semantics. You ask 'which one will you live to be' and what have you, but really, the question is just silly. BUT, They are both *A* valid evolution. So it is possible to talk sensibly about them both being valid evolutions of a 1P view and that H can expect both. You can't have it both ways Bruno. If THE 1p of W is not THE 1p of M, and clearly they are not, then equally neither THE 1p of W or THE 1p of M are THE 1p of H. Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:47:57 -0400 Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again From: johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark: 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". >>> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first person experience >> There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. "The" refers to that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1-pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to refer to it. Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, there are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing the button. >> Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live as first person experience? That depends on who "you" is. John Clark would expect that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. And John Clark would also know which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from Washington. What Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or inco
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
ey get both, they still live only one of them, as they both confirm. You seem to just persist ignoring the question like John Clark. We don't ask an intellectual description, which indeed follows trivially from the protocols, we ask about you you expect to live, and all copies, they get that unique experience that they were not able to predict in advance. They guy who get the sequence (in the iterated duuplication) MWWMMWW say: "no I could not have predicted that," and most people get something similar. You can't have it both ways Bruno. If THE 1p of W is not THE 1p of M, and clearly they are not, then equally neither THE 1p of W or THE 1p of M are THE 1p of H. You continue to use the Leibiz identity rule where eeven John Clark is aware this makes no sense. Bruno Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2015 13:47:57 -0400 Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again From: johnkcl...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark: 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". >>> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first person experience >> There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. "The" refers to that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1- pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to refer to it. Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, there are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing the button. >> Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live as first person experience? That depends on who "you" is. John Clark would expect that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. And John Clark would also know which one would be which, the Moscow Man would get photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get photons from Washington. What Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live as first person experience? - I expect to die. - I expect to feel myself in two cities at once. - I expect to feel myself in only one city. I, that is to say John Clark in Helsinki, would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Moscow, and I would expect that tomorrow John Clark will feel to be in Washington. I would further expect that from *THE* 1P John Clark will not experience anything at all. John Clark would not expect *THE* 1P to exist at all because John Clark expects John Clark to be duplicated. What Bruno Marchal would expect in a similar situation only Bruno Marchal knows, not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeli
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 04 Aug 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 7:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> For the sake of clarity and consistency when dealing with this topic John Clark humbly requests that Bruno Marchal make the following simple changes in future correspondence with John Clark: 1) Substitute "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > We have explained to you that the key is in the difference between 1-Clark and 3-Clark, or 1-you and 3-you, or 1-me and 3-me. Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". We did this already, but you came up with non sense again. More than one person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/ 3-1p difference. For a period of time, I have no more use pronouns, but you kept confusing the 1p and the 3p, and we get the same non-sense, at it comes exclusively from that confusion. It is not the pronoun, or the name, or the person where you are ambiguous, it is on the point of view. The question is what can *anyone* expect to *live* (to be conscious of, first person, subjective experience) in the (iterated, for a change) self-duplication? All sequences? No, as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live* all experiences. An arbitrary sequence of W and M? yes, as all copies will confirmed that they have indeed live a precise particular sequence, and the stat shows indeed that most look quite arbitrary. >>> it is not abaout the lmocation of your bodies, but about the first person experience >> There are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > We have shown that P((W & ~M) v (M & ~W)) = 1, for the exact same reason that P(coffee) = 1. So you can be sure (modulo the hypothesis and the protocole) that you will have a unique experience of seeing a unique city after pushing the button. "The" refers to that unique experience. "unique" from the 1-pov, of course, as from the 3-1 view, they are not unique. But they $are* unique from the 1- pov, ad as the question is about that 1-pov prediction, it makes sense to refer to it. Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, there are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively, which is either W or M, but cannot be both, nor none. > You avoid to answer the question/ What do you expect to live after pushing the button. >> Avoid the question my ass! Just yesterday John Clark said clear as a bell "that depends on who "you" is. John Clark would know that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. [...] And I [John Clark] also knew which one would be which, I knew the Moscow Man would get his photons from Moscow and the Washington Man would get his photons from Washington. [...] what Bruno Marchal would expect John Clark neither knows nor cares because expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have nothing to do with the continuity of consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > You make my point by avoiding the question again and again and again. I think it is hopeless, as you just avoid systematically the question. You are in Helsinki, you will push the button. The question is what do you expect to live as first person experience? That depends on who "you" is. No, it works with anybody, even robots, as the 1p definition is 3p sharable (unlike in the math part which gives a more precise definition---but it is not needed for grasping the Universal Dovetailer Argument). John Clark would expect that in the future the Moscow Man would see Moscow and the Washington Man would see Washington. Ok, but we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington man is the Helsinki man. Your use of "Moscow-man" hides the indeterminacy when the H-guy differentiate into the H-M-guy and the H-W-guy, so that they personally become either the H-M-guy, OR the H-W-guy. here you talk like if the Moscow-man was a new person: but we have agreed that he is the H-man. Indeed both are, which explains why the H- man can only be uncertain if he (the 1p, well defined in H) will live the W or the M experience. Here you suppress pronouns just to avoid the question, by abstracting from the definition we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man, despite the W-man and the M-man are now different persons. But they remains both the H-guy, and that is why the pronouns are not ambiguous. The only ambiguity is if the question bears on the 1p personal future subjective experience (guarantied to exist by the mechanist assumption) or a 3p description of those expe
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in >> complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal >> pronoun "you". >> >> > > We did this already, but you came up with non sense again. More than one > person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is not in the name or in > the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference. > In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the difference between *THE* 1p and the 3p difference and the difference between *THE* 1-1p and the 3- 1 p difference ? And whose "1p" is it anyway? > > > you kept confusing the 1p and the 3p, > In short, YCT1PAT3P. And it's true, John Clark is very confused about which 1p Bruno Marchal is talking about, although probably not as confused as Bruno Marchal. > > as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live* all experiences. > John Clark is profoundly uninterested in "comp" and does not believe that "comp" can explain anything at all. > >> >> Well now that's all very nice but >> John Clark still has one question, >> t >> here are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > > > > > The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively, > Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things. But why is this even relevant? The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively *NOTHING *to do with it. That's why trying to define personal identity by looking to the future rather than the past is just nuts. > > we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington man is the > Helsinki man. > What day is itlets see... it's Wednesday, so yes today we agree on that. Tomorrow we won't. > > w > > e have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's important to remember that t he Washington man is *NOT* the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future. > > > which explains why the H-man can only be uncertain if he (the 1p, well > defined in H) will live the W or the M experience. > The only uncertainty is who "he" is. If "he" is the guy experiencing Helsinki today then "he" will experience *NEITHER *Washington nor Moscow tomorrow. However if "he" is the guy who remembers experiencing Helsinki today (or if "he" is Bruno Marchal) then "he" will experience Washington *AND* Moscow tomorrow. > > I > n Helsinki, we decide with a coin between the alternative described just > below, but we don't let you know the result: > - tail : you are duplicated in M and W > - head: you are not duplicated, but teleported to one of the city (also > chosen with a coin) > This time John Clark would have less information to work with so not surprisingly John Clark would not know what to expect, maybe one city maybe two. Not that expectations, correct or incorrect, have any bearing on the question at hand. > > So you don't know if you will be simply teleported in one of the two city, > or be duplicated in both, once you push the button. > The question is: do you think that without external clue you could know > which one of the alternative has been realized after pushing the button? > Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark had NOT been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not have been. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other. > > > > > Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of information, No new information has been received. Long before the duplication button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new information was generated. > > > You > [ > C > hris > P > eck > ] > seem to just persist ignoring the question like John Clark. Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore; there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a question mark. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep taking the troll bait Bruno? JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. He just loves tormenting you. You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of its error. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 8:39 PM, Pierz wrote: > > > if the quantum state evolves deterministically The wave function most certainly evolves deterministically but that's not important because the wave function is not observable, I want to know if the actual physical state evolves deterministically. The answer is far from obvious. If everything that can happen does happen then did anything determine one particular branch of the multiverse? > > > where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to hear JC's > answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the observer > ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he > understands. Of course I understands that! If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think he has. I think he's just rehashing the sort indeterminacy first discovered about 90 years ago. > > Why do you keep taking the troll bait Bruno? Clearly a troll, Bruno and you are so brilliant nobody could really disagree, they can only pretend to disagree for some obscure but undoubtedly sinister reason. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Aug 2015, at 00:57, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Since Bruno is clear about all this Bruno should have no difficulty in complying to the request of substituting "John Clark" for the personal pronoun "you". > We did this already, but you came up with non sense again. More than one person did this. It changes nothing, as the nuance is not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference. In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the difference between THE1p and the 3p difference and the difference between THE 1-1p and the 3- 1p difference? And whose "1p" is it anyway? It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a person, and what an outsider can describe as exclusive content of a collection of diaries. It is the difference , in this case, between the semantic of "I open the door and saw M (resp W) and the list "I open the door and saw M" + "I opened the door and saw M". In this case the difference is the difference between "and" and "or". > you kept confusing the 1p and the 3p, In short, YCT1PAT3P. And it's true, John Clark is very confused about which 1p Bruno Marchal is talking about, although probably not as confused as Bruno Marchal. > as comp explains that NO copies at all will *live* all experiences. John Clark is profoundly uninterested in "comp" and does not believe that "comp" can explain anything at all. Computationalism is used only to formulate the problem, to get the shape of the solution (the reversal), and to motivate for the technical definitions and the mathematical solution (the Arithmetical UDA, alias the machine's interview, where the "pronouns" are defined with the technic exposed in Smullyan's Forever Undecided, notably. >> Well now that's all very nice but John Clark still has one question, there are two first person experiences, which one is Bruno talking about? > The one the Helsinki guy expect to live subjectively, Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things. But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember Helsinki. But why is this even relevant? You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear idea why it is relevant (of course). The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has The point is that there are more than one which is available. and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively NOTHING to do with it. ? That's why trying to define personal identity by looking to the future rather than the past is just nuts. Yes, but that has not been done. > we have agreed that both the Moscow man and the Washington man is the Helsinki man. What day is itlets see... it's Wednesday, so yes today we agree on that. Tomorrow we won't. You should try to not show so much clearly that you are a troll, as I will lose credits just by answering such remark. > we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's important to remember that the Washington man is NOT the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future. Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately. You confirms (if that was necessary) that you never complete the thought experience. You don't interview the copies. You don't put your shoes in their shoes. > which explains why the H-man can only be uncertain if he (the 1p, well defined in H) will live the W or the M experience. The only uncertainty is who "he" is. We have agreed that he is the guy remembering pushing the button. We have agreed that he will find himself in bioth city, and we have agreed that in both cities both live an experience logically incompatible with their doppelganger experience, and thus live W or M (even W xor M). If "he" is the guy experiencing Helsinki today then "he" will experience NEITHER Washington nor Moscow tomorrow. However if "he" is the guy who remembers experiencing Helsinki today (or if "he" is Bruno Marchal) then "he" will experience Washington AND Moscow tomorrow. That will never happen. Nobody will experience W and M tomorrow or any day. Both experience will occur, but a couple of incompatible experience is NOT an experience. It is only two experience of different person, who happen to be both the H-guy. I think you have stabilized on the first/third person pov. > In Helsinki, we decide with a coin between the alternative described just below, but we don't let you know the res
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other. > Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of information, No new information has been received. Long before the duplication button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new information was generated. You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information. So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information. Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself. But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of "pushing on the button and deciding which cities is behind" is always either W or M, and never both. > You [Chris Peck] seem to just persist ignoring the question like John Clark. Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore; there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a question mark. The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp, without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both. "W & M" is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience that they directly live (which was what the question is all about). Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a doppelganger in the other city. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep taking the troll bait Bruno? Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the person who have a problem with this are troll. JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this, but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the goal of answering) that he is a troll. He just loves tormenting you. Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say "I was wrong"? I try to understand such "bad faith" as this might make the difference between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of its error. John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago, and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist. But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some (non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40 years) so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness, to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is probably just unwillingness. Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how obscurantist people can be on this subject. Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, makes me think that maybe the FPI does deserve the Nobel Prize after all. If it is that subtle to grasp for grown up, it might be worth to make clearer. After all, all the rest of the work exploit that FPI. Tegmark and Schmidhuber missed it, as Tegmark confirms by "rediscovering it" in his book (as Jason Resch quoted some times ago). So, the FPI is certainly very simple, but the 1p/3p difference is not that simple for some physicists and philosophers (sic), as the way JC and some part of the academical world have illustrated since long. Another problem, is that his post confused people, so we have to answer them for possible new bees. Now, anyone can ask more interesting question, or discuss other points... It is not difficult to filter the thread if annoyed by the admittedly boring repetition of Clarks last attempt to ridicule the notion. It is "holiday". The list is quite, so take this as a little snack, like an attempt to understand the psychology of trolls and harassers, or just skip those posts, and enjoy the sun and the beach :) Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>> >>> the nuance is not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p >>> difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference. >> >> >> >> In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the >> difference between >> *THE* >> 1p >> and the >> 3p difference >> and >> >> the difference between >> *THE* >> 1-1p >> and the >> 3- >> 1 >> p difference >> ? And whose "1p" is it anyway? >> > > > > > It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a person, > > and what an outsider can describe > If after the duplication Bruno Marchal can point to the one and only person that unambiguously wrote all that stuff in that diary then it will have been proven that there really is such a thing as **THE** 1P, if not then Bruno Marchal is talking gibberish. > >> > Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as > interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and > Bruno Marchal expect very different things. > > > > But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember Helsinki. > But today is thursday so we don't agree. >> >> But why is this even relevant? > > > > You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear idea why it is > relevant > If step 4 is built on the foundations of step 3 then it would be pointless to read step 4 until the blunders in step 3 are repaired, and if it is not built on those foundations then it was unnecessary and foolish to include step 3 at all in your "proof". > >> >> The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has > > > > > The point is that there are more than one which is available. > So you agree the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective experience of Moscow and you agree the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective experience of Washington but insist the Helsinki guy will not experience Moscow and Washington in the future. Are you sure you're a logician? > >> and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively >> *NOTHING >> *to do with it. > > > ? > Which word didn't you understand? > > >>> >> >>> >>> w >>> >>> e have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's >> important to remember that >> t >> he Washington man >> is *NOT* the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be >> traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future. >> > > > > Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately. > Bullshit. W says I remember seeing Washington one minute ago, and M says I remember seeing Moscow one minute ago, so W is *NOT* M . But both W and M say I remember seeing Helsinki one hour ago so both W and M *are* H. > > >> Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark had NOT >> been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not have been. > > > > So you say that at a time he might know what happened. Pure nonsense. > Until different outside stimulation is received , like seeing a different city , both brains would be running identical programs in parallel , so John Clark would have only one conscious experience regardless of how many identical brains were involved. > > He should just never expect experiencing being in two cities, and the > point is that the guy cannot see the difference, unless telepathy Telepathy?? Oh for christ sake! John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment, which includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication experiments, so the string of the "W"'s and "M"'should be included in the definition of "you". You can also invent a machine that creates a consciousness that has false memories of having been Bruno and also John Clark in the past, but such that these memories are inconsistent with each other. E.g. it has the memory of having been at Brussels, but also in New York at the same time. But there is not problem here if you just take the formal description of any conscious being as defining its personal identity. Saibal On 06-08-2015 11:27, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the other. > Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of information, No new information has been received. Long before the duplication button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new information was generated. You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information. So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information. Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself. But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of "pushing on the button and deciding which cities is behind" is always either W or M, and never both. > You [ Chris Peck ] seem to just persist ignoring the question like John Clark. Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore; there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a question mark. The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp, without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both. "W & M" is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience that they directly live (which was what the question is all about). Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a doppelganger in the other city. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list [1]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout [2]. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ [3] -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list [1]. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout [2]. Links: -- [1] http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list [2] https://groups.google.com/d/optout [3] http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 11:39:47 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 at 8:39 PM, Pierz > > wrote: > > >> > >> if the quantum state evolves deterministically > > > The wave function most certainly evolves deterministically but that's > not important because the wave function is not observable, I want to know > if the actual physical state evolves deterministically. The answer is far > from obvious. If everything that can happen does happen then did anything > determine one particular branch of the multiverse? > My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion, to use Bruno's detested terminology. I don't understand your last sentence/question. The laws of the physics determined every branch, and none of them are privileged in any way. > > > >> > >> where does randomness come from according to MWI? I'd like to hear JC's >> answer to that. If he says it's due to multiple versions of the observer >> ending up in different branches of the multiverse, he's shown he >> understands. > > > Of course I understands that! > I know you do - because who could fail to understand it? > If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, > but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of > both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think > he has. > To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. i.e., the duplication or branching of an observer leads to the appearance of randomness from the perspective of that observer, even though the objective situation contains no indeterminacy. If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the logic of FPI, which is entirely abstractable from the context in which it occurs. If you can see how indeterminacy works *logically* in MWI, you have agreed with the *logic* of step 3. If that is not the case, you need to explain how the situations are logically different, because AFAICT the only difference between the two cases is the nature of the duplicator. Perhaps you can explain why it matters whether the duplicator is the multiverse or a teleportation device? > I think he's just rehashing the sort indeterminacy first discovered about > 90 years ago. > > OK, so Bruno is an upstart! A pompous ass! An incompetent fewl! And what's worse, these dorks on the Everything List treat his damnfool ideas with respect, stroke his bloated ego and foster his pretensions to genius! Let's face it, that's what gets your goat and why you will never in a million years admit that step 3 is valid even though you admit to the validity of Everett's identical logic. > > >> Why do you keep taking the troll bait Bruno? > > > Clearly a troll, Bruno and you are so brilliant nobody could really > disagree, they can only pretend to disagree for some obscure but > undoubtedly sinister reason. > The motivations of trolls are not obscure and yours are no exception. > > John K Clark > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: > > > Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that > > started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep > > taking the troll bait Bruno? > > Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the > person who have a problem with this are troll. > > > > > JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he > > understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. > > See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this, > but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the > goal of answering) that he is a troll. > > > > > > > He just loves tormenting you. > > Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say "I was wrong"? > > I try to understand such "bad faith" as this might make the difference > between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next > century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner > we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. > > > > > You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves > > deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? > > I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to > > multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of > > the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to > > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > > effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of > > its error. > > John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between > accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it > is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on > the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the > next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows > prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. > > Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago, > and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist. > But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some > (non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not > exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40 > years) I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your prize, and you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice. You're still trying to deal with your hurt. In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; it's considered a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever someone sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or originality, somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy and small-mindedness. John tries to act as if it's all about the logic, but his nastiness and sarcasm give away the underlying emotional motivations of a thwarted embittered person who hasn't achieved the recognition he craves and so feels compelled to cut down anyone who dares to stand out with a claim for attention. > so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot > in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness, > to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and > verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is > probably just unwillingness. > Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is > just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms > that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how > obscurantist people can be on this subject. > Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, makes me think that maybe the FPI > does deserve the Nobel Prize after all. If it is that subtle to grasp > for grown up, it might be worth to make clearer. After all, all the > rest of the work exploit that FPI. Tegmark and Schmidhuber missed it, > as Tegmark confirms by "rediscovering it" in his book (as Jason Resch > quoted some times ago). > > So, the FPI is certainly very simple, but the 1p/3p difference is not > that simple for some physicists and philosophers (sic), as the way JC > and some part of the academical world have illustrated since long. > > Another problem, is that his post confused people, so we have to > answer them for possible new bees. > > Yes. The western scientific mindset has become so conditioned to think only in terms of 3p, that it is difficult for some people to think any other way. These are the same people who fail to grasp the "hard problem". > Now, anyone can ask more interesting question, or discuss other > points... It is not difficult to filter the thread if an
RE: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
@ Pierz >> If he refuses to > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > effect. but isn't John's point that pro-nouns do not cause much trouble when duplicates end up in separate universes? Thats a fair point right? So, Im not sure he feels his concerns are relevent to Everett. Ive never seen Bruno respond adequately to that point. All this 'troll' baiting reminds me of when I first came into contact with step 3. Bruno and a bunch of others were mocking John for saying that 1 person could experience being in moscow and washington at the same time. I thought it was odd that someone like John would think that, so I looked up what he had actually written and lo and behold Bruno and co. were just lying. lying out of their lazy fat academic arses! lol. He'ld said nothing of the sort. So you have to be careful to read what John says rather than rely what Bruno says John says. The two can be very different. Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:59:25 -0700 From: pier...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: > Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that > started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep > taking the troll bait Bruno? Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the person who have a problem with this are troll. > JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he > understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this, but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the goal of answering) that he is a troll. > He just loves tormenting you. Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say "I was wrong"? I try to understand such "bad faith" as this might make the difference between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. > You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves > deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? > I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to > multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of > the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of > its error. John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago, and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist. But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some (non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40 years) I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your prize, and you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice. You're still trying to deal with your hurt. In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; it's considered a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever someone sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or originality, somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy and small-mindedness. John tries to act as if it's all about the logic, but his nastiness and sarcasm give away the underlying emotional motivations of a thwarted embittered person who hasn't achieved the recognition he craves and so feels compelled to cut down anyone who dares to stand out with a claim for attention. so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness, to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is probably just unwillingness. Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is just jealousy or s
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Friday, August 7, 2015 at 1:41:51 PM UTC+10, chris peck wrote: > > @ Pierz > > >> If he refuses to > > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > > effect. > > but isn't John's point that pro-nouns do not cause much trouble when > duplicates end up in separate universes? Thats a fair point right? > Is it? To be honest I can't make sense of his objection and the so-called "trouble" caused by pronouns. To me step 3 is obvious, as it seems to be to most people. Bruno's argument could just as easily run: person A ends up in universe 1 and person B ends up in universe 2, or two different simulations which do not allow either copy to meet again. What relevance does this have to the logic of the situation? Would JC then say, "oh well that's OK then! Now they of course will experience indeterminacy!" Of course he won't, and he can't if he's to be consistent. > So, Im not sure he feels his concerns are relevent to Everett. Ive never > seen Bruno respond adequately to that point. > > All this 'troll' baiting reminds me of when I first came into contact with > step 3. Bruno and a bunch of others were mocking John for saying that 1 > person could experience being in moscow and washington at the same time. I > thought it was odd that someone like John would think that, so I looked up > what he had actually written and lo and behold Bruno and co. were just > lying. lying out of their lazy fat academic arses! lol. > lol? Whatever you might think of his ideas, I've never known Bruno to be intellectually dishonest and deliberately misrepresent someone's position. Mockery is not part of his standard polemical armoury either AFAICT. The problem is that what John is actually arguing is unclear, and therefore easily misunderstood. It seemed to me early in this interminable debate that he was indeed saying that the person could experience Moscow and Washington simultaneously. That was from reading his words, not Bruno's. In that case the problem *was* pronouns, because it is both true and untrue to say that "I" will experience both Moscow and Washington simultaneously if I am duplicated in those cities. True in Bruno's 3p sense, and false in the 1p sense. > He'ld said nothing of the sort. So you have to be careful to read what > John says rather than rely what Bruno says John says. The two can be very > different. > > -- > Date: Thu, 6 Aug 2015 17:59:25 -0700 > From: pie...@gmail.com > To: everyth...@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again > > > > On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: > > > Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that > > started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep > > taking the troll bait Bruno? > > Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the > person who have a problem with this are troll. > > > > > JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he > > understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. > > See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this, > but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the > goal of answering) that he is a troll. > > > > > > > He just loves tormenting you. > > Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say "I was wrong"? > > I try to understand such "bad faith" as this might make the difference > between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next > century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner > we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. > > > > > You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves > > deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? > > I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to > > multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of > > the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to > > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > > effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of > > its error. > > John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between > accepting the FPI o-and rejecting i
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Aug 2015, at 19:38, smitra wrote:
You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment,
That is dangerous talk, but i see what you mean.
which includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication
experiments, so the string of the "W"'s and "M"'should be included
in the definition of "you".
That is implied by the definition: content of the diary taken by the
experiencer in the teleportation box. OK.
You can also invent a machine that creates a consciousness that has
false memories of having been Bruno and also John Clark in the past,
but such that these memories are inconsistent with each other. E.g.
it has the memory of having been at Brussels, but also in New York
at the same time.
But there is not problem here if you just take the formal
description of any conscious being as defining its personal identity.
Yes, but usually we prefer to avoid the term "conscious" too early. In
fact, I agree on this last sentence, but only because we recover that
when we translate the 3p self by the arithmetical provability (Gödel's
beweisbar) predicate "[]A", and the 1p self by the conjunction of the
provability and truth ("[]p & p"). Here we get an explanation of a
difficulty which is hidden in step 3 (but withoit making the reasoning
invalid as it is not used thanks to the 3p definition of the 1p), and
which is that the 1p cannot be defined by the machine. This is
coherent with introspection, with duplication, with the fact that
"consciousness" is not definable (like truth), and with the greek
notion of inner God (which does play the role of the universal first-
person, the one described by the logic of []p & p (S4Grz1).
Thanks for the suggestion, but I am not sure that any help can change
John Clark's behavior. I am not sure he believes himself that his
prose is related to the subject.
Bruno
Saibal
On 06-08-2015 11:27, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:37, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Aug 5, 2015 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> But there is no genuine reason to prefer one over the
other.
> Thta's the point, and that is why they both get one bit of
information,
No new information has been received. Long before the duplication
button was pressed John Clark already knew that one John Clark would
receive a W bit and one John Clark would get a M bit. No new
information was generated.
You go ou of your body to get the 3-1 view, but forget that from the
copies perspective, it does look like they are in only one place, and
looking at which one, they do get 1 bit of information.
So, what you say is that in the 3-view, there is no new information.
Indeed the 3-view is the protocol itself.
But the question was about the expected 1p experience, and both
confirm that they got one bit of information. The result of "pushing
on the button and deciding which cities is behind" is always either W
or M, and never both.
> You
[
Chris
Peck
] seem to just persist ignoring the question like John
Clark.
Ignore isn't the right word, there is no question to ignore;
there is just a sequence of personal pronouns, none of which has a
referent but all are liberally spiced with peepee and with a
question mark at the very end. A question needs more than a
question mark.
The question is what do you expect to live, and every one grasp,
without any trouble, that it can only be W, or M, and never both.
"W &
M" is never written in any copies' diary, except when they describe
the 3-1 view that they *imagine* correct instead of the 1p-experience
that they directly live (which was what the question is all about).
Sorry John, but your hand-waving does not succeed in hiding that you
avoid the question asked. We have agreed on all definitions, but you
keep talking like if someone can distinguish, directly from its
subjective experience, the difference between a simple teleportation
and a duplication. So you need some magic to get your point
meaningful. But mechanism does not allow it. Without magic, both
copies see only one city, and cannot decide if there is or not a
doppelganger in the other city.
Bruno
John K Clark
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Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 07 Aug 2015, at 02:59, Pierz wrote: On Thursday, August 6, 2015 at 8:06:31 PM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Aug 2015, at 02:39, Pierz wrote: > Mein Gott, this argument reminds me of the fire in Siberia that > started burning in the Holocene and is still going. Why do you keep > taking the troll bait Bruno? Because it is not under my back, and I want to make clear that the person who have a problem with this are troll. > JC is a physicist so I presume he understands Everett. Ergo, he > understands, in principle, first person indeterminacy. See the attempt by Quentin and others to make John C realizing this, but he answers by the same hand-waving method, confirming (that's the goal of answering) that he is a troll. > He just loves tormenting you. Possible. But then why? Jealousy? Inability to say "I was wrong"? I try to understand such "bad faith" as this might make the difference between coming back to the scientific attitude in theology next century or next millennium. My goal is harm reduction, and the sooner we can be serious on this, the less useless suffering for humans. > You can ask the simple question: if the quantum state evolves > deterministically where does randomness come from according to MWI? > I'd like to hear JC's answer to that. If he says it's due to > multiple versions of the observer ending up in different branches of > the multiverse, he's shown he understands. If he refuses to > acknowledge MWI as a valid account due to his pronoun concerns, then > fine, maybe he should publish a refutation of Everett to that > effect. I'm sure the physics world would be fascinated to learn of > its error. John Clark has given already both answers, and has oscillate between accepting the FPI o-and rejecting it. When he accepts it, he insist it is trivial and does not deserve the Nobel Prize (like if that was on the table!), but fail to explain why he still does not address the next step in the reasoning. I think that to avoid this, he knows prefer to stick on his 1p3p-difference abstraction of. Keep in mind that I got the 1p-indeterminacy more than 40 years ago, and that I have never had any problem in explaining it to scientist. But then some scientist decided that it was philosophy, and hired some (non-analytical) philosopher who pretended that the FPI does not exist. As I have never been able to met them, I felt frustated (for 40 years) I see, I think. JC is a proxy for the guy who robbed you of your prize, and you're still hoping for a victory of logic over malice. Actually, that is what I try to see. I am still not sure. Sometimes ago there was a guy named "digital physics". That was a proxy if not one of the main guy, perhaps push by his own colleagues. You're still trying to deal with your hurt. Certainly. But not to ease the hurting (I know very good medication for that), but to grasp where such "malice" comes from, as eventually, those people only advertize their own dumbness (and then are forced to not deviate from it as they thought that would it more publicly palpable). But, yes, when I got the price, I really thought that this was the end of 20 years of harassment. But then the price has only spread the harrasment in other countries. Once that kind of things happens, it concerns no more just me, but everyone. It means we are confronted with either bandits (like in the health politics) or a dangerous form of fundamentalism. In Australia we have a term for what John is doing; it's considered a national pastime: cutting down the tall poppies. Whenever someone sticks their head up above the crowd with a claim to greatness or originality, somebody will try to lop their head off out of jealousy and small-mindedness. John tries to act as if it's all about the logic, but his nastiness and sarcasm give away the underlying emotional motivations of a thwarted embittered person who hasn't achieved the recognition he craves and so feels compelled to cut down anyone who dares to stand out with a claim for attention. I am afraid you are right. so I still try to see where is the problem: and JC helps a lot in showing that the problem is simply its inability, or unwillingness, to take the 1p/3p difference into account in the question and verification. But he has show to grasp the difference, so it is probably just unwillingness. Then the question remains: why such unwillingness? I'm afraid it is just jealousy or something of that type. each post by JC confirms that, and it *might* someday help people to understand how obscurantist people can be on this subject. Then JC, like Jean-Paul Delahaye, makes me think that maybe the FPI does deserve the Nobel Prize after all. If it is that subtle to grasp for grown up, it might be worth to make clearer. After all, all the rest of the work exploit that FPI. Tegmark and Schmidhuber missed it, as Tegmark confirms by "rediscovering it" in his book (as Jason Resch quo
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 06 Aug 2015, at 19:23, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 5:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> the nuance is not in the name or in the pronouns, but in the 1p/3p difference, or in the 1-1p/3-1p difference. >> In a world with people duplicating machines what exactly is the difference betweenTHE1p and the 3p difference and the difference between THE 1-1p and the 3-1p difference? And whose "1p" is it anyway? > It is the difference between what is written in a diary of a person, and what an outsider can describe If after the duplication Bruno Marchal can point to the one and only person that unambiguously wrote all that stuff in that diary then it will have been proven that there really is such a thing as *THE* 1P, if not then Bruno Marchal is talking gibberish. >> Expects? That depends entirely on who the Helsinki guy is, as interminable posts on this subject have conclusively shown John Clark and Bruno Marchal expect very different things. > But we do agree on who the guy is. He is the guy who remember Helsinki. But today is thursday so we don't agree. Lie. >> But why is this even relevant? > You would read step 4, 5, ... you would have a pretty clear idea why it is relevant If step 4 is built on the foundations of step 3 then it would be pointless to read step 4 until the blunders in step 3 are repaired, and if it is not built on those foundations then it was unnecessary and foolish to include step 3 at all in your "proof". Lol. >> The Helsinki guy will have whatever future subjective experience he has > The point is that there are more than one which is available. So you agree the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective experience of Moscow and you agree the Helsinki guy will have a future subjective experience of Washington Yes, in the 3p view. but insist the Helsinki guy will not experience Moscow and Washington in the future. Yes, in the 1p view. Are you sure you're a logician? Yes, you do just for the bilionth time the 1p-3p confusion. > and his expectations, correct or incorrect, have absolutely positively NOTHING to do with it. ? Which word didn't you understand? I have no clue to what "it" is referring. >>> we have agreed on: both the M and W men are the same person as the H-man >> Yes the Moscow man and the Washington man are the Helsinki man, but it's important to remember that the Washington man is NOT the Moscow man; and that's why personal identity can only be traced from the past to the present, never from the present to the future. > Your own copies in W and M refute this immediately. Bullshit. W says I remember seeing Washington one minute ago, and M says I remember seeing Moscow one minute ago, so W is NOT M . Correct. But both W and M say I remember seeing Helsinki one hour ago so both W and M are H. Correct. But you don't give any clue explaining why this prevents any of the copies to refute that we can predict what will happen in the future. > Until a city was spotted John Clark would know that John Clark had NOT been duplicated, although John Clark's body may or may not have been. > So you say that at a time he might know what happened. Pure nonsense. Until different outside stimulation is received, like seeing a different city, both brains would be running identical programs in parallel, so John Clark would have only one conscious experience regardless of how many identical brains were involved. True, but what is the relevance? The differentiation *has* already occurred. > He should just never expect experiencing being in two cities, and the point is that the guy cannot see the difference, unless telepathy Telepathy?? Oh for christ sake! Ok, nice. No telepathy, but then you are the one who seem to imply that we can distinguish a simple teleportation from a duplication- differentiation. If that is not telepathy ... Of course comp disallow such telepathy, thus you can't distinguish a simple teleportation from a duplication, and thus my point in the preceding post was not refuted. Try again, Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-l
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz wrote: > > > My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it > leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. > > Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion > It's either an illusion or it is not and peepee is not involved. And it is an experimental fact that Bell's inequality is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed) or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami today because one year in the **future** a butterfly in Australia will flap his wings). So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that things are realistic , local , and deterministic can not be correct , at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be. >> >> If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, >> but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of >> both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think >> he has. >> > > > > To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. > MWI says everything that can happen to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are lots and lots of "yous" but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word "you"; pronouns like that disguise the fact that "you" is not singular, it is plural. Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say THE 1p you who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all that stuff in the diary. > > > If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of > FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. > Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because consciousness has nothing to do with it. Bruno's great discovery is in finding out that sometimes "you" doesn't know what "you" will see next, but I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years. > > > Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy > occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a > physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather > than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the > validity of the logic > But it is not irrelevant to the question of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with people duplicating machines. Stage magicians use pretty assistants to distract the audience from their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. Bruno says that c omputationalism can't predict what *YOU* will see next so there must be some aspect of consciousness that the computational theory of mind can not explain, but in reality what c omputationalism (or anything else) can't explain is what the hell Bruno means by "you". John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 smitra wrote: > > You can just define personal identity as a single observer moment, which > includes any memories of the outcomes of the duplication experiments, so > the string of the "W"'s and "M"'should be included in the definition of > "you". > OK. > > But there is not problem here if you just take the formal description of > any conscious being as defining its personal identity. But if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one and only one city did you end up seeing?" has no answer because it is not a question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of which happens to be a question mark. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Saturday, August 8, 2015 at 5:09:49 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz > > wrote: > >> > > >> My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it >> leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. >> >> Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion >> > > It's either an illusion or it is not > > and peepee is not involved. > And you wonder why people think you're a troll. > And it is an experimental fact that > Bell's inequality > is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are > deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not > realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or > counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed) > or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami > today because one year in the **future** a butterfly in Australia will > flap his wings). > So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that > things > are realistic > , > local > , > and deterministic can > not > be correct > , at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be. > > >> >>> If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum >>> indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy >>> independent of both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and >>> I don't think he has. >>> >> >> > >> To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. >> > > MWI says everything that can happen > to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the > only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are > lots and lots of "yous" but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or > a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is > why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word > "you"; pronouns like that disguise the fact that "you" is not singular, it > is plural. > Bruno knows that observer or 'you' is plural, and in fact that plurality is the basis of the first person indeterminacy. If you're an amoeba and you divide, there are now two amoebas who remember having been you (if amoebas had memories). That's it. Post duplication there's an illusion of indeterminacy about which amoeba 'you' became, but the pronoun here is just a figure of speech. I'm starting to think from this and the statements below that you actually have misunderstood what Bruno is claiming. In the above statement you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe. In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the definition of the observer as comprised in the digital state of some machine, that has now been replicated. Obviously such a duplicated observer can't observe the other machine's environment or internal state, so the same separation has been achieved as the laws of physics achieve in MWI. No 'peepee' involved. > > Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects > to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say > THE 1p you > who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because > after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all > that stuff in the diary. > > Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after the duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim. > > >> If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of >> FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. >> > > Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great > strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations > it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because > consciousness has nothing to do with it. Bruno's great discovery is in > finding out that sometimes "you" doesn't know what "you" will see next, but > I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years. > You have the wit of a Wilde. > > >> > >> Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy >> occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a >> physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather >> than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the >> validity of the logic >> > > But it is not > irrelevant to the question > of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with > pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure > that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with > people duplicating machines. > Stage magicians use pretty > assistants > to distract > the audience > > from > their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. > > Bruno says that c > omputationalism >
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 07 Aug 2015, at 21:09, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 8:40 PM, Pierz wrote: > My point isn't that MWI is true. My point is you understand it and how it leads to the appearance of indeterminacy in a completely determined system. Indeterminacy is a 1-p illusion It's either an illusion or it is not and peepee is not involved. And it is an experimental fact that Bell's inequality is violated therefore we know for certain that if things really are deterministic then even stranger things must be true; either things are not realistic (an electron is not spinning clockwise or counterclockwise until it is measured, nothing exists until it is observed) or non-local (forget the butterfly effect, a hurricane arrived in Miami today because one year in the *future* a butterfly in Australia will flap his wings). So we know for sure that Einstein's idea that things are realistic, local, and deterministic can not be correct, at least one of them must be false and all 3 could be. >> If the multiverse really exists then that explains quantum indeterminacy, but Bruno claims he has found a new sort of indeterminacy independent of both the quantum type and also of the Godel/Turing type and I don't think he has. > To my mind, the logic is completely isomorphic with MWI. MWI says everything that can happen to you will happen to you, so you can see everything that can happen; the only way these 2 things can be consistent with experience is if there are lots and lots of "yous" but the laws of physics only allow an observer (or a you) to see one of them. And that is why Bruno loves pronouns and that is why despite the criticism Bruno insists on continuing to use the word "you"; pronouns like that disguise the fact that "you" is not singular, it is plural. It is plural in the 3-1 view, but it remains singular in the 1-view. The JC who sees M can only say: "I see M and not W". The JC who sees W can only say "I see W and not M". Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects to mention which 1p you. Why do you still say that? Did I not insist that we need to interview *all* copies? Well OK Bruno does say THE 1p you who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all that stuff in the diary. Why do you still say that. You have repeated this many times, and I have always told you that "the one guy", being, from the 3p-view, in both W *and* M, must be very naturally interviewed in both W and M, and indeed both confirms the prediction that they saw only one city, - and were unable to predict which one in advance. > If Bruno is claiming there is some striking originality about his idea of FPI then I'd point to Everett and say, that guy thought of it first. Everett said nothing about consciousness and didn't need to, one great strength of Many Worlds is that unlike some other quantum interpretations it doesn't need to explain what consciousness is or how it works because consciousness has nothing to do with it. Everett talk about consciousness or subjective experience, and what is nice, use computationalism, but then he fails to see that the indterminacy, a priori, get larger than the one given by the universal wave, and so, if we want savev both comp and QM, we will have to justify the QM by the same type of phenomenology used by Everett to justofy the collapse. With comp, both the collapse and the wave becomes machine's phenomenology. Bruno's great discovery is in finding out that sometimes "you" doesn't know what "you" will see next, but I think Og The Caveman beat him to the punch on that by a few years. OK, you oscillate again. Tell me if Og the Caveman has gone as far as step 4, and 5, and 6, ... You are the only one insisting that step 3 already deserves the Nobel Prize ... > Obviously Bruno's argument hypothesises this first-person indeterminacy occurring in a context of computationally defined observers (whether in a physical machine, a duplication experiment, or pure mathematics) rather than the multiverse, but that context is irrelevant to the question of the validity of the logic But it is not irrelevant to the question of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with pronouns. You are quite unfair. Not only I have given presentation, just for you, without pronouns (and others have done that too), but we have explained why "pronouns" are not problematic, once you put the "1" or "3" or '3-1" in front of them. You do point on a difficulty which plays an important role in the mathematical translation. Indeed, once you defined a machine or person by its set of beliefs, the 1-you can be proved to be undefinable, like truth or consciousness. But UDA has been const
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sat, Aug 8, 2015 Pierz wrote: > > > If you're an amoeba and you divide, there are now two amoebas who remember > having been you (if amoebas had memories). > Yes, and it would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if **you** will swim to the left or to the right after the division, almost as silly as asking which of the 2 amoebas was *THE* one true original amoeba that had "*THE* 1p you". > > > you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe. > Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that the laws of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same way as it treats non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different language, MWI has nothing specific to say about consciousness. > > > In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the definition of > the observer as comprised in the digital state of some machine, > But definitions are exactly the problem. In Bruno's thought experiment what is the definition of "you"? One some days Bruno says it's the man who remembers being a man in Helsinki and that's fine, but on other days Bruno adds the mysterious proviso "in THE 1p" and on still other days the definition of "you" must include "in the 3p. So what the hell is the definition of "you"? > >> >> Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects >> to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say >> THE 1p you >> who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because >> after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all >> that stuff in the diary. >> > > > > Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after the > duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim. > If John doesn't understand Bruno but Pierz says he does then Pierz should be able to tell John exactly what "*THE* 1p you" means in a world with people duplicating machines. I'm all ears! >> >> But it is not >> irrelevant to the question >> of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with >> pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure >> that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with >> people duplicating machines. >> Stage magicians use pretty >> assistants >> to distract >> the audience >> >> from >> their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. >> >> Bruno says that c >> omputationalism >> can't predict what *YOU* will see next so there must be some aspect of >> consciousness that the >> computational theory of mind >> can not explain, >> > > > > Say what? Say WHAT? Bruno's argument is based purely on a computational > theory of mind! > Bruno argument is that if the computational theory of mind is correct (and only a fool would say it is not) then it should be able to determine the future state of a conscious observer, but Bruno says it cannot and indeterminacy remains so computationalism can't be the entire story. However Bruno is incorrect, computationalism precisely determines that t he Moscow man will be the man who sees photons from Moscow because a photons from Moscow is the very thing that turns the Helsinki man into the Moscow man , and a corresponding thing happens to the Washington man. C omputationalism tells you that you will be duplicated and one you will see Moscow and one you will see Washington. Will the you who sees Moscow and not Washington be surprised? Will the you who sees Washington and not Moscow be surprised? No, not if you is rational, it's exactly what you , a believer in c omputationalism , predicted would happen. John Clark of course know what the response to this will be, "You forgot *THE* peepee! What about *THE *peepee? In the future what will **YOU**see in the peepee?". There is no answer to that because unfortunately Bruno never specifies in whose peepee, Bruno doesn't have a consistent definition of "you". > > > Bruno's argument needs no pronouns to go through. > Then why does Bruno throw around pronouns like a drunken sailor throws around money in ever post Bruno writes? And why does Bruno talk about *THE *X even when X is clearly plural? John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 09 Aug 2015, at 01:00, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Aug 8, 2015 Pierz wrote: > If you're an amoeba and you divide, there are now two amoebas who remember having been you (if amoebas had memories). Yes, and it would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if *you* will swim to the left or to the right after the division, almost as silly as asking which of the 2 amoebas was THE one true original amoeba that had "THE 1p you". But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only one such "the". On the cntrary, we have insisted that to get the statistics of the 1p we have to accept that the verification is done on all copies. It is annoying how much you use the "straw man" trick, criticizing stupid idea like if someone was defending them. > you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe. Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that the laws of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same way as it treats non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different language, MWI has nothing specific to say about consciousness. False. The MWI invoke the computationalist theory of consciousness. > In Bruno's formulation it's not the laws of physics but the definition of the observer as comprised in the digital state of some machine, But definitions are exactly the problem. In Bruno's thought experiment what is the definition of "you"? One some days Bruno says it's the man who remembers being a man in Helsinki and that's fine, but on other days Bruno adds the mysterious proviso "in THE 1p" and on still other days the definition of "you" must include "in the 3p. So what the hell is the definition of "you"? Because we take into account the difference of perspective of any person. We don't use "you", nor "JC". We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1-JC. 3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot. Or, if you argue that 1-you can be in both place, it means you talk about the 3-1-you. 1-you can't be in both place, as 1-you refer to the content of the subjective experience lived by those having the memory of Helsinki, and fater the duplication and differentiation, such 1-you have 1- incompatible experience: as no person can open a door and feel personally to see the two cities, as you have agreed often. >> Admittedly Bruno does say "THE 1p you" but unfortunately always neglects to mention which 1p you. Well OK Bruno does say THE 1p you who wrote all that stuff in the diary, but that does no good because after the duplication Bruno is unable to point to the one guy who wrote all that stuff in the diary. > Don't be daft. There are two people writing in diaries after the duplication, and Bruno knows it. You've misunderstood the claim. If John doesn't understand Bruno but Pierz says he does then Pierz should be able to tell John exactly what "THE 1p you" means in a world with people duplicating machines. I'm all ears! If you did the thought experiment, you would get the answer to this. Assuming comp you have the following belief: I will push the button, open a door and see once city among W and M, and never both. So THE future experience means THE experience of the one city that I will feel personally to live (and given comp and the protocole, it will be either W or M (and never both). Then by reading BOTH diaries, we get that this is confirmed by both copies (and W & M is refuted by both copies). >> But it is not irrelevant to the question of pronouns and Bruno's arguments are always filled wall to wall with pronouns. When discussing the multiverse the very laws of physics ensure that pronouns cause no ambiguity, but that is certainly not the case with people duplicating machines. Stage magicians use pretty assistants to distract the audience from their sleight of hand, Bruno uses pronouns. Bruno says that computationalism can't predict what YOU will see next so there must be some aspect of consciousness that the computational theory of mind can not explain, > Say what? Say WHAT? Bruno's argument is based purely on a computational theory of mind! Bruno argument is that if the computational theory of mind is correct (and only a fool would say it is not) then it should be able to determine the future state of a conscious observer , but Bruno says it cannot and indeterminacy remains so computationalism can't be the entire story. However Bruno is incorrect, computationalism precisely determines that the Moscow man will be the man who sees photons from Moscow because a photons from Moscow is the very thing that turns the Helsinki man into the Moscow man, and a corresponding thing happens to the Washington man. Then again, your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM. As, exactly what you say here applies i
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if **you** will >> swim to the left or to the right after the division, almost as silly as >> asking which of the 2 amoebas was *THE* one true original amoeba that >> had "*THE* 1p you". > > > > > But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only one such "the". > Someone on this list has. In nearly every post Bruno Marchal says that from *THE *1p *you* will see this but from *THE* 1p*you* will not see that; but if there is more than one then the statement becomes meaningless. > > We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1-JC. > So in Bruno's unusual peepee notation 1-JC is John Clark's subjective experience and 3-JC is John Clark's objective actions, but what the hell is 3-1-JC and how does it differ from regular old 3-JC? > > > 3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot. > Maybe maybe not, it all depends on what "you" means, but neither JC nor 3-JC nor 3-1JC nor 1-3-1JC knows what Bruno Marchal means by that pronoun, and by now it's pretty obvious that Bruno Marchal doesn't either. > > > > if you argue that 1-you can be in both place, it means you talk about the > 3-1-you. > Is Bruno Marchal "you", or *the* 1-you, or *the *3-you, or *the* 3-1-you? >>> >> you say that the laws of physics only allow you to see one universe. > > > >> > Yes, or to say the same thing with different words, MWI says that the laws > of physics treats conscious observers in EXACTLY the same way as it > treats non-conscious stuff. Or to use still different language, MWI has > nothing specific to say about consciousness. > > > > False. The MWI invoke the computationalist theory of consciousness. The MWI is perfectly compatible with the computationalist theory of consciousness so you can stick it on if you want but it is not necessary , the MWI works just fine without it or without any theory of consciousness at all . > > Assuming comp > John Clark does not assume "comp". > > > you have the following belief: I will > [...] > The word "will" implies the future and if you thinks that computationalism is true, that is to say that you is rational, then you thinks that the subjective future will bifurcate. If you is not rational then you could believe anything, but you's beliefs in what will happen, true or false, will in no way effect what will in fact happen. > > > push the button, open a door and see > [...] > What I believes I will see depends entirely on what I means by I when dealing with the future in a world with "I" duplicating machines. The English language in general and in person pronouns in particular was never designed with this sort of thing in mind . > > > your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM. > I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was deterministic. > > Nobody can figure out what your theory predict > C omputationalism predicts that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Moscow will turn the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Moscow (aka The Moscow Man). And c omputationalism says that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Washington will turn the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Washington (aka The Washington Man). What remains indeterminate? What has the computational theory of mind failed to predict? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 09 Aug 2015, at 22:53, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> would be silly to ask the amoeba before the division if *you* will swim to the left or to the right after the division, almost as silly as asking which of the 2 amoebas was THE one true original amoeba that had "THE 1p you". > But no-one in this list has ever pretend than there is only one such "the". Someone on this list has. In nearly every post Bruno Marchal says that from THE 1p *you* will see this but from THE 1p*you* will not see that; but if there is more than one then the statement becomes meaningless. Not at all. Because the question is on the 1-p you, and you know (in advance, in Helsinki) that there will be only one 1-view from any of the two 3-1 p view available. You look like trying to be wrong on purpose. > We always use 3-you or 1-you, or we use 1-JC and 3-JC, or 3-1- JC. So in Bruno's unusual peepee notation 1-JC is John Clark's subjective experience and 3-JC is John Clark's objective actions, but what the hell is 3-1-JC and how does it differ from regular old 3-JC? 3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities. 3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience, of frst person view ascribed to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view lived by the person attached to such bodies. 1p are always single solitary and definite. > 3-you can be in W and M. But 1-you cannot. Maybe maybe not, it all depends on what "you" means, but neither JC nor 3-JC nor 3-1JC nor 1-3-1JC knows what Bruno Marchal means by that pronoun, and by now it's pretty obvious that Bruno Marchal doesn't either. In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition of the 1p-you, more precise than "the one who remember ..", but for the UDA reversal, the first definition is quite enough. > if you argue that 1-you can be in both place, it means you talk about the 3-1-you. Is Bruno Marchal "you", or the 1-you, or the 3-you, or the 3-1- you? For *any* creature, you can consider its "you" in the 1p sense, or the 3-1p sense, or the 3p sense, etc. If Bruno Marchal has an headache, this is pure 1p, if he send a mail, that is 3p (at first). Much later, if we ever arrive there, we will see that the body is not really a 3p thing, but an 1p-plural object, but this is not relevant here(it is relevant for "after-life" type of question, though, but useless and confusing to accept at this stage, despite QM suggests it (but we can't use QM). > you have the following belief: I will [...] The word "will" implies the future and if you thinks that computationalism is true, that is to say that you is rational, then you thinks that the subjective future will bifurcate. That is the point. And if you agree it bifurcates, a simple reasoning (that we have done many times) shows that you are unable to predict the 1p outcomes of that bifurcation. If you is not rational then you could believe anything, but you's beliefs in what will happen, true or false, will in no way effect what will in fact happen. > push the button, open a door and see [...] What I believes I will see depends entirely on what I means by I when dealing with the future in a world with "I" duplicating machines. But as we assume computationalism, there is no ambiguity at all, and the result depends only on the maning of "I" or "you" on which we have already agreed, but of course we need to take into account the 1p/3p nuances to get the answer right, given that the question bears on that 1p perspective. The English language in general and in person pronouns in particular was never designed with this sort of thing in mind . Sure, but computationalism makes what happens crystal clear, unless you forget that the question bears on the subjective experiences. > your argument suppress the indeterminacy in Everett QM. I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was deterministic. In the 3p view, but for the 1p (and here 1p-plural) we have to derive and use the Born probability rule, like in the WM-duplication we have to use the P(W v M) = 1 and P(W & M) = 0 rule. > Nobody can figure out what your theory predict Computationalism predicts that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Moscow will turn the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Moscow (aka The Moscow Man). And computationalism says that after the bodies have been duplicated photons from Washington will turn the Helsinki Man into the Helsinki Man who remembers seeing photons from Washington (aka The Washington Man). What remains indeterminate? The experience that the guy will who undergone such duplication can expect to live. Obviously, given the protocol he must expect to wake up in W or in M, and not
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > there will be only one 1-view from any of the two 3-1 p view > Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view ! > 3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities. > OK, or in non-peepee notation the objective actions of John Clark's body or bodies. > > > 3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience > In non-peepee notation the subjective experience. > > > of frst person view > That is redundant because the first person is the only type of subjective experience there is. > > > ascribed to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view lived by the > person attached to such bodies. > I have no idea what that means and think your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by who? If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view, and if it's the first person then the 3-1 view is just the 1 view. > > > 1p are always single solitary > Are? I t should be "1p is always solitary" but I think the idea and not just the grammar is wrong. I can't prove it but I have a hunch that solipsism is untrue, so right now I think there are about 7.1 billion 1ps on planet earth and maybe more if animals are conscious and many probably are. > > > In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition of the > 1p-you, more precise than "the one who remember . > Regardless of how advanced the mathematics precision is not achieved if the symbols used (like *the* 3-1you) don't mean anything. > > > if you agree it bifurcates > Of course I agree that the subjective experience bifurcates when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites when looking along the opposite direction. And that is why personal identity can only be defined by looking toward the past and not the future. > > a simple reasoning (that we have done many times) shows that you are > unable to predict the 1p outcomes of that bifurcation. > Not true the outcome is perfectly predictable. The guy who intercepts a photon from Moscow will turn into the guy who experiences Moscow and the guy who intercepts a photon from Washington will turn into the guy who experiences Washington. I honestly don't know what more needs to be predicted. >> >> I though you were the guy who kept saying that Everett's MWI was >> deterministic. > > > > > > In the 3p view, but for the 1p (and here 1p-plural) > > we have > [...] > > I REALLY don't understand your homemade peepee notation! You just said " 1p are always single solitary ". > > > What your computational theory of mind fails to predict is the outcome of > the result of pushing on the button from the first person perspective > That is gibberish. In looking toward the future in a world with person duplicating machines there is no such thing as *THE* the first person perspective; such a term is only meaningful in looking toward the past because things bifurcate going in one direction and converges going in the opposite direction. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 11 Aug 2015, at 01:43, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Aug 10, 2015 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > there will be only one 1-view from any of the two 3-1 p view Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view! We have this since the beginning. 3-JC is refers to the bodies which in this case are in the two cities. OK, or in non-peepee notation the objective actions of John Clark's body or bodies. + the first person ascribed to the (two) persons (here: the copies). > 3-1 refers to the subjecyive experience In non-peepee notation the subjective experience. Considered ascribed to some person. It is not the 1p view *itself*. This is capital to grasp to get the result. > of frst person view That is redundant because the first person is the only type of subjective experience there is. That is why the 1-view = the 1-1-view = the 1-1-1view. But this is different of the 3-1 view. You can say that both copies have the 1- view of the H-guy, but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as you agree they are incompatible. > ascribed to both bodies, which is different from the 1p view lived by the person attached to such bodies. I have no idea what that means and think your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by who? By anyone, and to make things more complex, that includes any copies, as they can ascribe the 1p view of the Helsinki (himself) to its doppeganger. Tha "pee-pee" notation has been introduced to invalidate your point that both 1-views, of both 3-copies exists, but that is a description from outside of bodies, to which indeed we can ascribe a 1- view of the H-guy. If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view, No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an 1- view. So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of the diary, which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view, but not necessarily our own. I needed to introduce it only to invalidate the point you made that even if we consider the 1-view, there are both in W and M, but that is a view from outside (the boxes) and does not answer the question asked; which is about a personal expectation of a personal experience. With the math, where the povs (1-view, 3-view, 3-1 view ...) this is given by the multimodal logic mixing the [1]p = []p & p, with []p. The 1-views are (up to a technical nuance beyond the scope of this post) given by [1]A, The 3view by []A, the 3-1 view by [][1]A, etc. and if it's the first person then the 3-1 view is just the 1 view. 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else. Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true (assuming comp). But the 1-views themselves can only W or M, as you have agreed that those 1-views have differentiated and become incompatible. We cannot feel to be in both city simultaneously. So in the 3-1 view, you can say I will survive in both city, but this entails that in the future 1-views (or 1-1-views) I will feel to be in only one of those 2 cities. > 1p are always single solitary Are? It should be "1p is always solitary" but I think the idea and not just the grammar is wrong. I can't prove it but I have a hunch that solipsism is untrue, so right now I think there are about 7.1 billion 1ps on planet earth and maybe more if animals are conscious and many probably are. But they all feel to be different from the others, and that is needed to predict what can happen to a self-duplicating person, or to the self-superposing also. That is why we have an FPI in computationalism, and we have still statistics in the QM without collapse. So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which is a particular case of 3p/1p confusion. > In the math translation, eventually, we get a meta-definition of the 1p-you, more precise than "the one who remember . Regardless of how advanced the mathematics precision is not achieved if the symbols used (like the 3-1you) don't mean anything. "the" is not need in the math part, and makes an easy sense with the definition of the views based on the diaries (entering or not the boxes). > if you agree it bifurcates Of course I agree that the subjective experience bifurcates when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites when looking along the opposite direction. And that is why personal identity can only be defined by looking toward the past and not the future. Then how do you justify that someone prepares a cup of coffee, if it is not because he associates a personal satisfaction to its future self drinking the coffee. It is enough that anyone makes and drink that coffee, which is absurd. Without that 1p-prediction, the notion of experimental verification of any laws would no more make any sense. It is made implicitly in the whole of experimen
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view >> ! >> > > > > We have this since the beginning. > That explains your profound confusion. > > > You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy, > Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to experience different things there is only one person so naturally there is only one first person view; after the door is opened there are many persons and a corresponding number of views. > > but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as you agree > they are incompatible. > Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as "*the* 1-view". >> >> >> your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by >> > >> who? > > > > > By anyone, > By any third party, in other words the third party view. I don't understand the difference between "3p view" and "3-1" view. >> >> If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view, > > > > > No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an > 1-view. > If we had such access there would be no difference between objective and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since we can't a different name is required and it's called, in your homemade terminology, "3p view". And I still don't understand the difference between "3p view" and "3-1" view. Do you? > > > So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of the diary, > In other words the 3 view. > > > which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view, > In other words the 3 view. > > > but not necessarily our own. > In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. And I still don't understand the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1 view. > > 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else. > Aka the 3 view. > > Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true > That may or may not be true depending on what you mean by "the guy", you change it so often it's difficult to keep track. > > > (assuming comp). > I do not assume "comp". > > > But they all feel to be different from the others > Yes, and that's exactly why there are 7.1 billion 1ps and not just one. > > > So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which is a > particular case of 3p/1p confusion. > Don't be ridiculous, nobody on planet Earth is confused by the difference between the first person and the third person, but everybody on planet Earth is confused by the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1 view , and nobody is more confused than Bruno Marchal. > > > "the" is not need in the math part, and makes an easy sense with the > definition of the views based on the diaries > Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after the duplication unless the person who wrote them could be unambiguously identified and you can't do that; and even if you could it would only tell you if a prediction turned out to be right or not, it would tell you nothing about the nature of consciousness. > >> Of course I agree that the subjective experience > > bifurcates >> when looking along the timeline in one direction, and it unites when >> looking along the opposite direction. And that is why personal identity >> can only be defined by looking toward the past and not the future. >> > > > > Then how do you justify that someone prepares a cup of coffee, if it is > not because he associates a personal satisfaction to its future self > drinking the coffee. > There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not to make coffee, but people who enjoy being alive and are good at hypothesizing what the future will be like are more likely to pass more of their genes into the next generation than people who don't enjoy life and aren't good at making plans for the future. So you prepared that coffee because you have some of those genes. >> >> >> Not true the outcome is perfectly predictable. The guy who intercepts a >> photon from Moscow will turn into the guy who experiences Moscow and the guy >> who intercepts a photon from >> Washington >> will turn into the guy who experiences >> Washington. I honestly don't know what more needs to be predicted. >> > > > > The guy in M sees M, sure, and the guy in W sees W. Nobody doubt this: it > is tautological. > I agree it most certainly is, but tautologies are always true, so what's the problem? What remains un-predicted? > > > But the prediction is asked in Helsinki. > Yes, and more important the answer was given in Helsinki too, if the question was asked in Moscow the answer would be different. The Moscow Man did not see Washington, but the Helsinki Man did, The Washington Man did not see Moscow, but the Helsinki Man did. > And ask if you will be that M
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
So here's an excerpt from this paper: h ttp://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/9609006v1.pdf, which was recently linked in response to a question I asked about MWI. This seems to echo *exactly* your concerns about identity/pronouns in the duplication experiment, and to resolve them, even though this is of course talking about MWI. You can just substitute "Washington" for |up⟩, and Helsinki man for neutron, duplicator for beam splitter etc. What this shows is that you are exactly in the position of the "neutron" that knows about MWI when evaluating Bruno's scenario. You are simply refusing to take the "sleeping pill". It is more difficult to define a concept of probability for those experimenters and those neutrons who know MWI. They understand that the belief of the neutron (it might be more correct to say “the belief of both neutrons”), that there is just one world, is an illusion. There are two worlds in parallel: one with the neutron in the state |up⟩ and the other with the neutron in the state |down⟩. Thus, the phrase “the probability for the neutron to be found at D1” seems senseless. Indeed, it is not clear what “the neutron” in this phrase means, and it seems that whatever neutron we consider, we cannot obtain |α|2 for the probability. For the neutron passing through a beam splitter the probability to end up at D1 as opposed to D2 is meaningless because this neutron becomes two neutrons. The two new neutrons are identified with the old one: the neutron detected by D1 and the neutron detected by D2 both entered the beam splitter. The new neutrons have no identity problem; the neutron at D1 has the direct experience of being at D1 as opposed to D2, but it seems that the probability for that neutron to be at D1 is just 1. We cannot assign any other number to this probability, but the neutron can. Suppose that the neutron (not enjoying beam splitters) took a sleeping pill and slept until it reached a detector. Now, if it awakes inside the detector but has not yet opened its eyes, the neutron (an expert in quantum mechanics) can say: “I have a probability |α|2 to find myself in D1”. This is an “ignorance-type” probability. We, like any external system, cannot be ignorant about the location of the neutron since we identify it using its location, while each sentient neutron does not need information to identify itself.4 The second new neutron, the one at D2, before opening his eyes has exactly the same belief: “I have a probability |α|2 to find myself in D1”. The neutron entering the beam-splitter converts into two neutrons which have the same belief about probability. This allows us to associate the probability for the neutron entering the beam-splitter to end up at D1 as the probability of its ancestors to end up there. On Wednesday, August 12, 2015 at 10:46:54 AM UTC+10, John Clark wrote: > > > On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > >> > Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view > ! > > > > > We have this since the beginning. > > > That explains your profound confusion. > > > > > You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy, > > > Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before the > door of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to experience > different things there is only one person so naturally there is only one > first person view; > > after the door is opened there are many persons and a corresponding > number of views. > > > > but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as you agree > they are incompatible. > > > Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as "*the* > 1-view". > > > > >> > your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by > > > who? > > > > > By anyone, > > > By any third party, in other words the third party view. > I don't understand the difference between "3p view" and "3-1" view. > > >> > If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view, > > > > > No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an > 1-view. > > > If we had such access there would be no difference between objective > and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since we can't a > different name is required and it's called, in your homemade terminology, > "3p view". And I still don't understand the difference between "3p view" > and "3-1" view. Do you? > > > > > So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of the diary, > > > In other words the 3 view. > > > > > which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view, > > > In other words the 3 view. > > > > > but not necessarily our own. > > > In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. And I still don't > understand the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1 view. > > > > 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else. > > > Aka the 3 view. > > > > > Like when we say that the guy survived
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 12 Aug 2015, at 02:46, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Aug 11, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> Oh no, now we have the two 3-1 p view! > We have this since the beginning. That explains your profound confusion. > You can say that both copies have the 1-view of the H-guy, Regardless of how many bodies there are after duplication before the door of the duplicating chamber is opened and they start to experience different things there is only one person so naturally there is only one first person view; after the door is opened there are many persons and a corresponding number of views. Yes, but none can be lived simultaneously, so when you do the prediction on your future personal experience you need to replace the (3-1p) AND by a XOR, as you have agreed that the M and W experiences are incompatible from each 1p view available. > but none of the copies have the 1-view of the two copies, as you agree they are incompatible. Because after the door is opened there is no such thing as "the 1- view". I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies. It is simpler in the iterated case, as it shows better a natural confusion between 3-1 views and 1-views. See below for more. Read this with the mind state "maybe I miss something", and not "let me try to find a critics". >> your peepee notation really sucks.. Ascribed by > who? > By anyone, By any third party, in other words the third party view. I don't understand the difference between "3p view" and "3-1" view. That is why, I usually use only the 3p terminology. I use "3-1" for people like you who insist that they talk about the 1-views of the copies, when saying P(W & M) = 1. But to ascribe an 1-view to a number of persons different from oneself-or not, it can only be when we ascribe 1p views to third person object of description, that is, to other than oneself subjectively, as opposed to the 1p person that we can live (and can have direct local access to memory). So 3p is a 3p description of the locus or object to which we can ascribe a first person point of view, intellectually, that means without living them, like both copies can do for their doppelgangers, or like we do more or less for our human fellows. 3-1p belongs to the 3p description. Consciousness, soul, first person does not admit 3p description, but can be ascribed to 3p object, like a body or a machine. 3-1p is just the case where we describe in the 3p way, first person attributed to other people (including oneself). We use I for both in Natural Language, and someone can say before the duplication that: I can predict that tomorrow I will be in Washington and I will be in Moscow" but I can predict that tomorrow I will feel being in Washington" or "I will feel being in Moscow". Of course, you can always step back, and say, no "I will feel to be in Washington" and "I will will to be in Moscow", as you did sometimes agoo, and precisely that is the 3-1 versus 1 confusion. At least you avoided, contrary to my prediction (!), to fall in the trap of the 3-3-1 versus 1 confusion. The complete disambiguition is: Tomorrow 3-1-I will be in the two cities, but 1-I will feel being in only one of them. >> If it's the by a third person then the 3-1 view is just the 3 view, > No, because we cannot see or measure or have any direct access to an 1-view. If we had such access there would be no difference between objective and subjective and it would all just be 1-view, but since we can't a different name is required and it's called, in your homemade terminology, "3p view". And I still don't understand the difference between "3p view" and "3-1" view. Do you? > So 3-1 means that it is something considered from a non owner of the diary, In other words the 3 view. > which nevertheless is interpreted as an 1-view, In other words the 3 view. > but not necessarily our own. In other words a non-solipsistic interpretation. And I still don't understand the difference between the 3 view and the 3-1 view. > 3-1 is when we talk of the 1-view of someone else. Aka the 3 view. > Like when we say that the guy survived in both W and M. That is true That may or may not be true depending on what you mean by "the guy", you change it so often it's difficult to keep track. > (assuming comp). I do not assume "comp". Lie. > But they all feel to be different from the others Yes, and that's exactly why there are 7.1 billion 1ps and not just one. Sure, in the 3-1 view. But all those T billions 1p views, can experience only one, like all copies confirmed all the time, in all situation. You just fake to never listen to them. > So here, you do confuse the 3-1 views and the 1-views, which is a particular case of 3p/1p confusion. Don't be ridiculous, nobody on planet Earth is
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> >> if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one and >> only one city did you end up seeing?" has no answer because it is not a >> question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of >> which happens to be a question mark. >> > > > > > You might argue that it is false, > If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what is the answer? > > but not that it is meaningless. > I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is *the* one color of *the* one and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that is not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of which is a question mark. > > > Each observer moment believes they are a unique individual with a unique > past and a unique future. > People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person enters a person duplicating machine that person will still have a unique past but will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but odd things happen when a person is duplicated. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> > >> >>> if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one and >>> only one city did you end up seeing?" has no answer because it is not a >>> question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of >>> which happens to be a question mark. >>> >> >> >> > >> You might argue that it is false, >> > > If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what is > the answer? > The answer that you saw one and only one city is false if there are multiple versions of "you". > >> but not that it is meaningless. >> > > I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is *the* one color of *the* > one and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that > is not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of > which is a question mark. > The question is if there are two versions of you, one with a red cupcake and one with a blue cupcake, which cupcake will you see? The nature of our minds is such that, even if we know as a matter of fact that there are multiple versions of us, it seems that there is only one version. > > >> Each observer moment believes they are a unique individual with a unique >> past and a unique future. >> > > People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person enters a > person duplicating machine that person will still have a unique past but > will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but odd things happen when > a person is duplicated. > And both versions of that duplicated person - even if it's John Clark, who knows very well the facts of the matter - will feel that they are the unique continuation of the original. It's a question about psychology, not physics. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
> On 14 Aug 2015, at 12:38 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > >> if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one and > only one city did you end up seeing?" has no answer because it is not a > question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of which > happens to be a question mark. > > > You might argue that it is false, > > If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what is the > answer? > > The answer that you saw one and only one city is false if there are multiple > versions of "you". > > > but not that it is meaningless. > > I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is the one color of the one > and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that is > not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of which > is a question mark. > > The question is if there are two versions of you, one with a red cupcake and > one with a blue cupcake, which cupcake will you see? The nature of our minds > is such that, even if we know as a matter of fact that there are multiple > versions of us, it seems that there is only one version. Maybe the conclusion is that things are not always the way they seem. Bruce > > > Each observer moment believes they are a unique individual with a unique > past and a unique future. > > People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person enters a > person duplicating machine that person will still have a unique past but > will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but odd things happen when a > person is duplicated. > > And both versions of that duplicated person - even if it's John Clark, who > knows very well the facts of the matter - will feel that they are the unique > continuation of the original. It's a question about psychology, not physics. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 14 August 2015 at 12:45, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On 14 Aug 2015, at 12:38 pm, Stathis Papaioannou > wrote: > > > > On 14 August 2015 at 06:28, John Clark wrote: > > > > On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > >> if that definition of "you" is used then the question "What one > and only one city did you end up seeing?" has no answer because it is not a > question at all, it is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of > which happens to be a question mark. > > > > > You might argue that it is false, > > > > If it's a question how can it be false? And if it is a question what > is the answer? > > > > The answer that you saw one and only one city is false if there are > multiple versions of "you". > > > > > but not that it is meaningless. > > > > I have 2 cupcakes one red and one blue, what is the one color of the > one and only cupcake that I have? That is another example of something that > is not a question but is just a sequence of ASCII characters the last of > which is a question mark. > > > > The question is if there are two versions of you, one with a red cupcake > and one with a blue cupcake, which cupcake will you see? The nature of our > minds is such that, even if we know as a matter of fact that there are > multiple versions of us, it seems that there is only one version. > > Maybe the conclusion is that things are not always the way they seem. Of course not - but how things seem is important and worth careful consideration. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> after the door is opened there is no such thing as "*the* 1-view". > > > > > I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies. > So is *THE* 1-view a view of Moscow or of Washington? > > > a natural confusion between 3-1 views and 1-views. > Confusion naturally arises because Bruno Marchal can not explain what the " 3-1 views " is supposed to mean without lots of personal pronouns that are all rendered meaningless in a world with people duplicating machines. > > > See below for more. > Why? There is little of substance below. > > >>> >> >>> they all feel to be different from the others >> >> > > >> > Yes, and that's exactly why there are > 7.1 billion 1ps and not just one. > > > > Sure, in the 3-1 view. But > [...] > To hell with the "but", unless you're a solipsist and believe there are 7.1 billion zombies on the Earth not people then the are 7.1 billion 1ps on this planet, and there are no buts about it. > > see above. > Why? There is little of substance above. >> >> >> Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after the duplication >> unless the person who wrote them could be unambiguously identified and you >> can't do that; > > > > > False. (Easy exercise, done many times). > Somehow I missed that so please do that exercise one more time and point to *THE* one and only one person who wrote the diary now that the duplication has been made. Or if you think pointing is impolite just tell me if "he" lives in Washington or Moscow. >> >> >> There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not to make coffee, >> but >> people who enjoy being alive >> and >> are good >> at >> hypothesizing what the future will be >> >> like are more likely to pass more of their genes into the next generation >> than people who don't enjoy life and aren't good at making plans for the >> future. So you prepared that coffee because you have some of those genes. > > > > You make my point, > Glad to be of service. > > > and explicitly contradict yours. > Where? Show me! > > Search on "Searle" in the archive for more. > Why should I search for more idiocy? Searle is a moron and his Chinese room is imbecilic. >> >> What remains un-predicted? > > > > > The personal experience that the candidate in Helsinki can expect to live. > If The Helsinki Man's name is Ed and if Ed is logical and if Ed expects to be duplicated then Ed would expect that there would not be just one answer to that question there would be two because that's what happens when people are duplicated. Yes that seems unusual but it's not illogical and it's only unusual because we haven't seen it yet , and we haven't seen it yet for technological reasons and not for scientific, logical or philosophical reasons. A few decades from now this entire debate will seem as quaint as a butterchurn. > > By reasoning, and using comp, > I never use "comp" and never will until I know what it means and I don't and neither do you. > >> > >> >> >> >> And ask if you will be that M guy or that W guy. > > > > >> > You you and you! Even at this late stage Bruno Marchal just can't stop > using that god damn ambiguous personal pronoun! > > > > Because it was just made clear that the question was asked in Helsinki, > and you have recently, and more than once, accepted that the pronoun was > not ambiguous in Helsinki (i.e. before the duplication). > Yes, but to confirm or reject the prediction THE one and only "you" must be found and interviewed *AFTER* the duplication. It would be easy to find Bruno Marchal after the duplication and easy to find Ed, but it would be impossible to find "you" because people duplicating machines have made that personal pronoun ambiguous. And that is exactly why Bruno Marchal loves personal pronouns, only by liberally using them can Bruno Marchal state a ambiguous theory of personal identity. > > the ambiguity of pronouns is in your head only, as most of us have shown > to you more than once. > Then prove me wrong by giving The Helsinki Man a name and stop using those stupid pronouns! But of course Bruno Marchal will never do that. > > I was in Helsinki, and did not know if I would have become the W or the M > guy, > And even after the duplication "I" still doesn't know if "I" is the W guy or the M guy because that personal pronoun has become meaningless by people duplicating machines, and that is why Bruno Marchal loves them so much, ambiguous words come in very handy in describing ambiguous ideas. > > > given that I become both of them in the 3-1 description of the protocol. > But unfortunately nobody, including Bruno Marchal , knows what the 3-1 description is supposed to mean. > > > Yet, after pushing the button, I get the personal, private, and non > justifiable feeling that I am the one in W, >
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 13 Aug 2015, at 22:28, John Clark wrote: People can believe all sorts of foolish things, but if a person enters a person duplicating machine that person will still have a unique past but will NOT have a unique future. Yes that is odd, but odd things happen when a person is duplicated. Nothing odd happens if we remind ourselves that we assume computationalisme. You have two futures in the 3-1 view, like you have many one in the MWI. But you have only one future in the 1-view, and that if confirmed by the two persons. As long as you dismiss the 1-3 difference, you will see odd things happening, which in fact never happpens. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 14 Aug 2015, at 07:48, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 12, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> after the door is opened there is no such thing as "the 1- view". > I have explained why this is directly refuted by all copies. So is THE 1-view a view of Moscow or of Washington? > a natural confusion between 3-1 views and 1-views. Confusion naturally arises because Bruno Marchal can not explain what the "3-1 views" I explained it, so I will look at your critics below. is supposed to mean without lots of personal pronouns that are all rendered meaningless in a world with people duplicating machines. you have failed to show any problem with the name and pronouns. Each time you equivocate the 1p and the 3p, or the 1-1p and the 3-1p, etc. > See below for more. Why? There is little of substance below. I hope that this is not the critics. >>> they all feel to be different from the others >> Yes, and that's exactly why there are 7.1 billion 1ps and not just one. > Sure, in the 3-1 view. But [...] To hell with the "but", unless you're a solipsist and believe there are 7.1 billion zombies on the Earth not people then the are 7.1 billion 1ps on this planet, and there are no buts about it. Stathis answered this recently, and others did regularly since, and your critics consists just in avoiding the question by avoiding the 1-3 nuances. Some scientist believe that we cannot talk on the 1p in science, but they do an level confusion error. We cannot use 1p in a proof, but we can use proof about 1p, once we have a good 3p definition of it, which is given in the UD Argument. With the diary (but of course your comment was "the hell of the diary ..."). >> Those damn diaries again! The diaries are useless after the duplication unless the person who wrote them could be unambiguously identified and you can't do that; > False. (Easy exercise, done many times). Somehow I missed that so please do that exercise one more time and point to THE one and only one person who wrote the diary now that the duplication has been made. Or if you think pointing is impolite just tell me if "he" lives in Washington or Moscow. I have answered that question many times. In the 3-1 view, you will exist in W and in M. From the 1-1 view, you will feel to be in one city. And the question is on the "pure" 1-view, like in "what do you expect to live as experience". >> There is no purely logical reason to make coffee or not to make coffee, but people who enjoy being alive and are good at hypothesizing what the future will be like are more likely to pass more of their genes into the next generation than people who don't enjoy life and aren't good at making plans for the future. So you prepared that coffee because you have some of those genes. > You make my point, Glad to be of service. > and explicitly contradict yours. Where? Show me! Stathis just did that. You say that yhe subjective first person experience that we denote by W and M are incompatibe subjective experience, but you keep talking like if P(W & M) ≠ 0.. > Search on "Searle" in the archive for more. Why should I search for more idiocy? Searle is a moron and his Chinese room is imbecilic. Searles argument is invalid to refute comp. We agree on that. >> What remains un-predicted? > The personal experience that the candidate in Helsinki can expect to live. If The Helsinki Man's name is Ed and if Ed is logical and if Ed expects to be duplicated then Ed would expect that there would not be just one answer to that question there would be two because that's what happens when people are duplicated. In the fairy tales. But after a duplication, subjectively, ypu don't feel the split, cannot even be' sure there has been one, except by believing the protocol. 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ... Yes that seems unusual but it's not illogical and it's only unusual because we haven't seen it yet , and we haven't seen it yet for technological reasons and not for scientific, logical or philosophical reasons. A few decades from now this entire debate will seem as quaint as a butterchurn. yes, everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp the FPI, which will be lived by all possible experiencer (or digital mechanism is false). > By reasoning, and using comp, I never use "comp" and never will until I know what it means and I don't and neither do you. See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive. Comp is the doctrine according to which the brain is turing emulable at some level so that we can accept an artificial brain, or do teleportation as described in our thought experiment, etc. Your unwillingness to accept that definition might say long on your state of mind. You really looks like someone d
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > And the question is on the "pure" 1-view, like in "what do you expect > [...] > You again! John Clark expects that Bruno Marchal will continue to use words in the "proof" that implicitly assumes the very thing it's trying to prove. > > 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ... > Not one person on planet Earth is or has ever been confused by the difference between 1p and 3p, but EVERYBODY on planet Earth (especially Bruno Marchal ) is confused about what the hell 1-1p and the 3-1p is supposed to mean. > > everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp the FPI, > And not one person on planet Earth has failed to realize that sometimes they don't know what the future will bring. >> >> I never use "comp" and never will until I know what it means and I don't >> and neither do you. > > > > > See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive. > I'm not interested in your definition, usage is always vastly more important than definitions and I have been unable to extract one particle of consistent meaning from the usage of your homemade word "comp" > > > Comp is the doctrine according to which the brain is turing emulable > That's computationalism not "comp". I don't know what "comp" means but I do know that if it means anything at all it's certainly not computationalism . > >> STOP USING PRONOUNS!! > > > > > Show me why I can't use pronoun, WITHOUT ABSTRACTING YOURSELF FROM PERSONS > POV! > That would be very very difficult, but why is it John Clark's responsibility? John Clark is not the one who claims to have made new and profound discoveries about the nature of consciousness and personal identify, and if Bruno Marchal can't write the proof without using words that already assume what is supposed to be proven then Bruno Marchal hasn't made any new profound discoveries on this subject either. > > > after the duplication, Ed is in both W and M, Ed, in both place, > Then obviously the prediction that Ed would see both places turned out to be correct. > > > both Ed are forced to realize that, after all, they see only (W xor M). > Ed-M and Ed-W bitterly regret not having have had the foresight on this > The prediction was that Ed would see both places and that prediction was correct. The prediction was that Ed -w would see Washington and that prediction was correct.The prediction was that Ed -m would see Moscow and that prediction was correct. Exactly what prediction was incorrect? > > > There is no unanimity on how to interpret the quantum wave or matrix > equation > It doesn't matter because they both make exactly the same predictions, and they both give probabilities not certainties. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
Le 15 août 2015 23:50, "John Clark" a écrit : > > On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> > >> And the question is on the "pure" 1-view, like in "what do you expect >> [...] > > > You again! John Clark expects that > Bruno Marchal > > will continue to use words in the "proof" that implicitly assumes the very thing it's trying to prove. > > >> > >> 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ... > > > Not one person on planet Earth is or has ever been confused by the difference between 1p and 3p, but EVERYBODY on planet Earth (especially > Bruno Marchal > ) > is confused about what the hell > 1-1p and the 3-1p > is supposed to mean. > >> > >> everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp the FPI, > > > And not one person on planet Earth has failed to realize that sometimes they don't know what the future will bring. > >>> >> >>> I never use "comp" and never will until I know what it means and I don't and neither do you. >> >> >> > >> See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive. > > > I'm not interested in your definition, usage is always vastly more important than definitions and I have been unable to extract one particle of consistent meaning from the usage of your homemade word "comp" > >> >> > >> Comp is the doctrine according to which the brain is turing emulable > > > > That's > computationalism > not "comp". > I don't know what "comp" means but I do know that if it means anything at all it's certainly not > computationalism > . > >>> > >>> STOP USING PRONOUNS!! >> >> >> > >> Show me why I can't use pronoun, WITHOUT ABSTRACTING YOURSELF FROM PERSONS POV! > > > That would be very very difficult, but why is it John Clark's responsibility? John Clark is not the one who claims to have made new and profound discoveries about the nature of consciousness and personal identify, and if Bruno Marchal can't write the proof without using words that already assume what is supposed to be proven then Bruno Marchal hasn't made any new profound discoveries on this subject either. > >> >> > >> after the duplication, Ed is in both W and M, Ed, in both place, > > > Then obviously the prediction that Ed would see both places turned out to be correct. > > >> >> > >> both Ed are forced to realize that, after all, they see only (W xor M). Ed-M and Ed-W bitterly regret not having have had the foresight on this > > > The prediction was that Ed would see both places and that prediction was correct. > The prediction was that Ed > -w would see Washington > and that prediction was correct.The prediction was that Ed > -m > would see > Moscow > and that prediction was correct. > Exactly what prediction was incorrect? > >> >> > >> There is no unanimity on how to interpret the quantum wave or matrix equation > > > It doesn't matter because they both make exactly the same predictions, and they both give probabilities WTF... really, Liar Clark saying this... Must be a parallel universe... With probability one. not certainties. > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 15 Aug 2015, at 23:50, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 14, 2015 at 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > And the question is on the "pure" 1-view, like in "what do you expect [...] You again! John Clark expects that Bruno Marchal will continue to use words in the "proof" that implicitly assumes the very thing it's trying to prove. Are you joking or what? YOU told me that "YOU" is not ambiguous BEFORE the duplication, which is when the question "What do you expect..." is asked. Sorry John, this is too gross. Come up with an argument, not ridiculous opportunist rhetorical maneuver. It is like when you say you don't know what comp is, when by definition comp is used for the indexical version I gave of computationalism, which actually implies all the other versions, and that you agree on, given that you go at least up to step 2 (and actually arguably practice, as you know). You just disbelieve that comp -> step 3, but that's different. Then you have fail to show an error in the reasoning, and actually your rhetorical maneuvers can only confuse people and become extremely boring. Try harder, in case you really miss the point, but avoid *all* your rhetorical tricks, as they have all been debunked, by a majority of people participating in this list. From now on, I will answer only *arguments*, and put the post with rhetorical maneuvers in the trash. Bruno > 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again and again ... Not one person on planet Earth is or has ever been confused by the difference between 1p and 3p, but EVERYBODY on planet Earth (especially Bruno Marchal) is confused about what the hell 1-1p and the 3-1p is supposed to mean. > everyone will asks themselves how you were unable to grasp the FPI, And not one person on planet Earth has failed to realize that sometimes they don't know what the future will bring. >> I never use "comp" and never will until I know what it means and I don't and neither do you. > See the definition in any of my paper, or in the archive. I'm not interested in your definition, usage is always vastly more important than definitions and I have been unable to extract one particle of consistent meaning from the usage of your homemade word "comp" > Comp is the doctrine according to which the brain is turing emulable That's computationalism not "comp". I don't know what "comp" means but I do know that if it means anything at all it's certainly not computationalism. > STOP USING PRONOUNS!! > Show me why I can't use pronoun, WITHOUT ABSTRACTING YOURSELF FROM PERSONS POV! That would be very very difficult, but why is it John Clark's responsibility? John Clark is not the one who claims to have made new and profound discoveries about the nature of consciousness and personal identify, and if Bruno Marchal can't write the proof without using words that already assume what is supposed to be proven then Bruno Marchal hasn't made any new profound discoveries on this subject either. > after the duplication, Ed is in both W and M, Ed, in both place, Then obviously the prediction that Ed would see both places turned out to be correct. > both Ed are forced to realize that, after all, they see only (W xor M). Ed-M and Ed-W bitterly regret not having have had the foresight on this The prediction was that Ed would see both places and that prediction was correct. The prediction was that Ed-w would see Washington and that prediction was correct.The prediction was that Ed-m would see Moscow and that prediction was correct. Exactly what prediction was incorrect? > There is no unanimity on how to interpret the quantum wave or matrix equation It doesn't matter because they both make exactly the same predictions, and they both give probabilities not certainties. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 12:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> You again! John Clark expects that Bruno Marchal >> >> will continue to use words in the "proof" that implicitly assumes the >> very thing it's trying to prove. >> > > > > > Are you joking or what? > I'm not joking so I guess it's what. > YOU told me that "YOU" is not ambiguous BEFORE the duplication, > Yes. > > > which is when the question "What do you expect..." is asked. > First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing on this matter, only what does happen is important . And secondly the entire question is "what will happen to you *AFTER* YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?". And the answer to that question has no single answer because *YOU *HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. To maintain that only one thing can happen to two things is just silly. > > It is like when you say you don't know what comp is, when by definition > comp is used for the indexical version I gave of computationalism > I know what computationalism is, and countless times on this list I've seen "according to comp this will happen but according to comp that will not happen"; so I know that "comp" and computationalism are not the same thing and are not even close, but what "comp" actually is remains a mystery to me. > > You just disbelieve that comp -> step 3, but that's different. > I neither believe nor disbelieve in "comp". John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 16 Aug 2015, at 22:24, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Aug 16, 2015 at 12:08 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> You again! John Clark expects that Bruno Marchal will continue to use words in the "proof" that implicitly assumes the very thing it's trying to prove. > Are you joking or what? I'm not joking so I guess it's what. YOU told me that "YOU" is not ambiguous BEFORE the duplication, Yes. OK, so you agree on this important thing. Let us see where is the problem, then... > which is when the question "What do you expect..." is asked. First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing on this matter, Look again at the paper or the post. The question in step 3 bears explicitly on what somebody expect to live subjectively. This is your other frequent maneuver: you change the question asked. only what does happen is important . NOT AT ALL. What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p. You just change the question asked. And secondly the entire question is "what will happen to you AFTER YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?". AFTER, yes. But the question is asked before. And the answer to that question has no single answer because YOU HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. Absolutely correct ... if we were asked what will happen, and not, as in step 3, what we expect to live subjectively. To maintain that only one thing can happen to two things is just silly. False. When we interview the two copies, they both confirm that they live only one thing (W or M) happening. And comp makes this predictable in advance. You just keep taking about the 3p, but that is NOT was is asked at the step 3. > It is like when you say you don't know what comp is, when by definition comp is used for the indexical version I gave of computationalism I know what computationalism is, and countless times on this list I've seen "according to comp this will happen but according to comp that will not happen"; so I know that "comp" and computationalism are not the same thing and are not even close, but what "comp" actually is remains a mystery to me. Comp means computationalism, and if you believe something is wrong in "comp => step 3", it is up to you to just show the flaw. Not just chnaging the 1p into 3p in the question. But you illustrate that you got the point here, as you are forced to change the step 3 question to maintain your point, but that is logically equivalent to a proof by a reductio ad absurdum of my point. You have just brilliantly show that when you try to avoid making a blatant logical error in the attempt of a refutation that COMP entails STEP 3, you are FORCED to change the question. So come back to the question which is explicitly on what the guy in Helsinki can expect to happen subjectively. Once you keep in mind the question asked, P(W v M)= 1 is trivial, and P(W & M) = 0 is false. So your error, or better, your maneuver in this post has consisted in changing the 1p notion used in the question by the 3p. It is no more a confusion between 1p and 3p, it is a direct change of the 1p of the question into a 3p. That is hardly equivalent with finding a flaw. Try better, or just stop denying that you get the point, and move on step 4. Bruno PS got a lot of work. My comment might be delayed a bit. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing on this >> matter,only what does happen is important . > > > > NOT AT ALL. > Bruno Marchal expects one thing to happen, John Clark expects another thing to happen and Ed expects a third, we can't all be right but we can all be wrong. > > > What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p. > What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal after the duplication there will be no 1p? After the duplication Bruno Marchal will have no subjective experience?? > > > You just change the question asked. > No I didn't change a question, I changed gibberish into a question. >> > And secondly the entire question is "what will happen to you AFTER YOU > HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?". > > > AFTER, yes. But the question is asked before. > To answer the question "what one and only one thing will happen to you AFTER the duplication?" there must be a clear understanding of what one and only one thing YOU will be AFTER the duplication when YOU is no longer one and has become *TWO*. And a clear understanding of gibberish can never happen so there is no answer because there is no question. However if we asked "what will happen to Ed after the duplication?" then that question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed could correctly answer it. > > And comp makes this predictable in advance. > I don't care what "comp" does. >> >> I know what computationalism >> is, and countless times on this list I've seen "according to comp this >> will happen but according to comp that will not happen"; so I know that >> "comp" and >> computationalism >> are not the same thing and are not even close, but what "comp" actually >> is remains a mystery to me. >> > > > > Comp means computationalism > I know what computationalism is, and countless times on this list I've seen "according to comp this will happen but according to comp that will not happen"; so I know that "comp" and computationalism are not the same thing and are not even close, but what "comp" actually is remains a mystery to me. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 17 Aug 2015, at 18:31, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> First of all what somebody expects to happen has no bearing on this matter,only what does happen is important . > NOT AT ALL. Bruno Marchal expects one thing to happen, John Clark expects another thing to happen and Ed expects a third, we can't all be right but we can all be wrong. You don't quote what I said. I don't understand what you say here. > What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p. What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal after the duplication there will be no 1p? Why would I ask you to predict the 1p if there were none? Why do you say this? After the duplication Bruno Marchal will have no subjective experience?? After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite) subjective experience. > You just change the question asked. No I didn't change a question, I changed gibberish into a question. Rhetorical trick. You did change the question. >> And secondly the entire question is "what will happen to you AFTER YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED?". > AFTER, yes. But the question is asked before. To answer the question "what one and only one thing will happen to you AFTER the duplication?" there must be a clear understanding of what one and only one thing YOU will be AFTER the duplication when YOU is no longer one and has become TWO. But from the 1p view, we never become two, we don't even feel the split. We assume comp, remember? And a clear understanding of gibberish You beg the question. It is up to you to show what is gibberish. can never happen so there is no answer because there is no question. However if we asked "what will happen to Ed after the duplication?" then that question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed could correctly answer it. "What will happen" in this context is ambiguous. It can mean "what will happen from the 1p view", or "what will happen from the 3p view". > And comp makes this predictable in advance. I don't care what "comp" does. >> I know what computationalism is, and countless times on this list I've seen "according to comp this will happen but according to comp that will not happen"; so I know that "comp" and computationalism are not the same thing and are not even close, but what "comp" actually is remains a mystery to me. > Comp means computationalism I know what computationalism is, and countless times on this list I've seen "according to comp this will happen but according to comp that will not happen"; so I know that "comp" and computationalism are not the same thing and are not even close, but what "comp" actually is remains a mystery to me. Rhetroical trick. comp is computationalism. By definition. All what you say is that the question is gibbersih, but that is what you were supposed to say. So in this post you are unclear, + two rhetorical tricks. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > > >>> >> >>> What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p. >> >> >> >> What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal >> after the duplication there will be no 1p? >> > > > > Why would I ask you to predict the 1p if there were none? > No idea, but John Clark is not required to explain Bruno Marchal 's actions. > > Why do you say this? > Because the only way John Clark knows how to interpret " " What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p " is that the 1p does not happen after duplication in which case John Clark has no idea what "1p" means. > >> >> After the duplication >> >> Bruno Marchal >> will have no subjective experience?? >> > > > > After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite) subjective > experience. > And BOTH are Bruno Marchal from their subjective point of view. John Clark makes no claim that either of them is or is not "you" because John Clark does not know what one and only one thing that personal pronoun means in a world with "you" duplicating machines. > > > We assume comp, remember? > I don't assume "comp", remember? > > Rhetroical trick. comp is computationalism. By definition. > Usage is always more important that definitions. I don't care about your homemade definition of your homemade baby talk word, I care about your usage of the word, and from usage I conclude that "comp" has little or nothing to do with computationalism. > > > It is up to you to show what is gibberish. > It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the duplication who go by the name of "you" is THE One True YOU, the only "you" that is relevant in determining if the prediction made in Helsinki was correct or not. But of course prediction, correct or incorrect, have nothing to do with consciousness or the continuous feeling of personal identity. >> >> >> if we asked "what will happen to Ed after the duplication?" then that >> question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed >> could correctly answer it. > > > > > "What will happen" in this context is ambiguous. It can mean "what will > happen from the 1p view", or "what will happen from the 3p view". > To hell with viewing peepee! To avoid ambiguity after the duplication simply ask the man, or rather the men, "are you Ed?" and if they say "yes" that that ends the matter, they are Ed. Therefore if Ed were rational back in Helsinki Ed would predict that Ed would see Moscow AND Ed would see Washington. And Ed's prediction would turn out to have been correct. However after the duplication if Bruno Marchal asked John Clark "are you you in the 1p view or are you you in the 3p view" John Clark wouldn't have any idea how to respond to such a silly question. Therefore "what one and only one thing will *you* see after the duplication?" has no answer because it is not a question at all, it is just gibberish with a question mark at the end. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 18 Aug 2015, at 23:19, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Aug 18, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p. >> What! So whatever really does happen to Bruno Marchal after the duplication there will be no 1p? > Why would I ask you to predict the 1p if there were none? No idea, but John Clark is not required to explain Bruno Marchal 's actions. > Why do you say this? Because the only way John Clark knows how to interpret " "What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p" is that the 1p does not happen after duplication in which case John Clark has no idea what "1p" means. No the 1p happens in the two places. When I say that the question is about the 1p, it means the content of the 1p. That is a subjective happening. Other post have shown you did understand this, so again I have that feeling that you are just playing with word, or just doing the stable confusion between, the 3-1p, and the 1p itself. >>After the duplication Bruno Marchal will have no subjective experience?? > After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite) subjective experience. And BOTH are Bruno Marchal from their subjective point of view. Sure. John Clark makes no claim that either of them is or is not "you" because John Clark does not know what one and only one thing that personal pronoun means in a world with "you" duplicating machines. You omit that after the duplication, both know very well who they are, and computationalism entails it can only be W, or M. The guy in Helsinki knows that in advance, and so can predict P(W v M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0. (Where W and M refer to the 1p experiences, not the 3p description of those experiences (the 3-1p). > We assume comp, remember? I don't assume "comp", remember? Sorry, but you accepted the step 0 and the step 1, which means that by definition you assume or accept computationalism (abbreviated by comp). > Rhetroical trick. comp is computationalism. By definition. Usage is always more important that definitions. Not in science. I don't care about your homemade definition of your homemade baby talk word, I care about your usage of the word, and from usage I conclude that "comp" has little or nothing to do with computationalism. Because you put step 3 in comp, but step 3 is not part of comp. You just confuse people with this. > It is up to you to show what is gibberish. It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the duplication who go by the name of "you" is THE One True YOU, the only "you" that is relevant in determining if the prediction made in Helsinki was correct or not. This is ridiculous. There are no TRUE you, or if you prefer the TRUE you is at BOTH places. But comp entails that BOTH feels to be at one place, and this makes the probability calculus easy. But of course prediction, correct or incorrect, have nothing to do with consciousness or the continuous feeling of personal identity. Of course, but 100% irrelevant. >> if we asked "what will happen to Ed after the duplication?" then that question would not be gibberish and if Ed were rational Ed could correctly answer it. > "What will happen" in this context is ambiguous. It can mean "what will happen from the 1p view", or "what will happen from the 3p view". To hell with viewing peepee! See below. To avoid ambiguity after the duplication simply ask the man, or rather the men, "are you Ed?" and if they say "yes" that that ends the matter, they are Ed. Therefore if Ed were rational back in Helsinki Ed would predict that Ed would see Moscow AND Ed would see Washington. And Ed's prediction would turn out to have been correct. Ed is in W and Ed in M is not the same as Ed feels to be in W and in M. For the billionth time, you give me the correct 3-1 prediction, but the question is about the future 1p that you will live, and that future 1p does not, with P = 1, contain the W & M experience. By saying the "hell with viewing peepee", is like saying "the hell with the question you asked", but then why take some much pain in criticizing the answer I give to that question if you are not interested in that question. However after the duplication if Bruno Marchal asked John Clark "are you you in the 1p view or are you you in the 3p view" John Clark wouldn't have any idea how to respond to such a silly question. Indeed, very silly question. I can't agree more. But that question has never been asked by me or anyone on this list, except you. Therefore "what one and only one thing will *you* see after the duplication?" The question is more how you evaluate the chance of seeing Moscow (say). If you say P = 1, then in the iterated case you must predict MMM... and the chance of this diminish like 2^n, as almost all c
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> the only way John Clark knows how to interpret " > > What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p > " is that the 1p does not happen after duplication in which case John > Clark has no idea what "1p" means. > > > > > No the 1p happens in the two places. > The? A 1p happens in two places, and there is nothing very unusual in 2 diferent things, like 2 different things that go by the name "you", occupying 2 different places except that due to technological limitations (not scientific ones) you duplicating machines haven't been invented yet. But it's coming. > > > When I say that the question is about the 1p, it means the content of the > 1p. That is a subjective happening. > Obviously, otherwise it would be 3p unless you've suddenly changed your homemade peepee notation. > > >> > >> After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite) subjective >> experience. > > > > Sure. > So both will have a 1p and neither will have *THE* 1p because *THE* 1p does not exist. > > after the duplication, both know very well who they are, > They both say that they are Bruno Marchal and if Bruno Marchal is rational neither would dispute the other's claim. As for deciding if one or both or neither is "you" that depends entirely on what "you" means in a world that has "you" duplicating machines in it. > > > computationalism entails it can only be W, or M. > The above depends entirely on what the referent to "it" is. Goddamn pronouns! > > > The guy in Helsinki knows that in advance, and so can predict P(W v M) = > 1, and P(W & M) = 0. > Sure that's possible, if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could predict monkeys will fly out of his ass. But I'm more interested in what will happen that in what some jackass believes will happen. >> >> I don't assume "comp", remember? > > > > > Sorry, but you accepted the step 0 and the step 1, which means that by > definition you assume or accept computationalism > I accepted computationalism when I was about 16 and can find no reason to think differently today. > > > abbreviated by comp. That is no abbreviation! As I've said, the way you use your baby talk word "comp" has little or nothing to do with computationalism. >> >> Usage is always more important that definitions. > > > > Not in science. > In everything. Definitions are made of words and those words also have definitions also made of words and round and round we go; the only thing that breaks us out of that infinite loop is usage. Where do you think lexicographers got the information to write their dictionaries? Only one place, usage. > > > Because you put step 3 in comp, > I have never put anything in "comp". > > > but step 3 is not part of comp. > I don't care if step 3 is part of "comp" or not. >> >> It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the duplication who >> go by the name of "you" is THE One True YOU, the only "you" that >> is relevant in determining if the prediction made in Helsinki was correct >> or not. > > > > This is ridiculous. There are no TRUE you, > John Clark is glad Bruno Marchal agrees, but if there is no TRUE *you* then Bruno Marchal has no business using that ambiguous personal pronoun in thought experiments. However there is a TRUE Ed, two in fact, so that word should be used instead. > > > comp entails that > [...] > I don't care what "comp" entails. > > Ed is in W and Ed in M is not the same as Ed feels to be in W and in M. > So Ed is in W but Ed does not feel to be in W and the duplication has turned Ed into a zombie who feels nothing. Perhaps that is what "comp" entails but it is certainly not what computationalism entails; I believe in computationalism but have no opinion about "comp". > > > For the billionth time, you give me the correct 3-1 prediction, but > John Clark is surprised John Clark gave the correct 3-1 prediction because John Clark does not know what a 3-1 prediction is and has grave doubts that Bruno Marchal does either. > > the question is about the future 1p that you will live, > The future 1p that who will live? And in a world with "you" duplicating machines why "the future" and not "a future"? > > By saying the "hell with viewing peepee", is like saying "the hell with > the question you asked" > Yes to hell with the "question" because nobody asked a question, somebody just typed a bunch of ASCII characters and then put a question mark at the end. And to hell with that. >> >> >> However >> after the duplication if >> Bruno Marchal >> asked John Clark "are you you in the 1p view or are you you in the 3p >> view" John Clark wouldn't have any idea how to respond to such a silly >> question. >> > > > > Indeed, very silly question. I can't agree more. > > Silly though it undoubtedly is It's very unclear why
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 20 Aug 2015, at 21:21, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 20, 2015 at 4:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> the only way John Clark knows how to interpret " What does happen is 3p, and the question is about the 1p" is that the 1p does not happen after duplication in which case John Clark has no idea what "1p" means. > No the 1p happens in the two places. The? A 1p happens in two places, and there is nothing very unusual in 2 diferent things, like 2 different things that go by the name "you", occupying 2 different places except that due to technological limitations (not scientific ones) you duplicating machines haven't been invented yet. But it's coming. > When I say that the question is about the 1p, it means the content of the 1p. That is a subjective happening. Obviously, otherwise it would be 3p unless you've suddenly changed your homemade peepee notation. >> After duplication, both copies will have a (single, definite) subjective experience. > Sure. So both will have a 1p and neither will have THE 1p because THE 1p does not exist. Each will have the 1p he was attempting to predict in Helsinki. Nobody will have two 1p from an 1p pov. > after the duplication, both know very well who they are, They both say that they are Bruno Marchal and if Bruno Marchal is rational neither would dispute the other's claim. As for deciding if one or both or neither is "you" that depends entirely on what "you" means in a world that has "you" duplicating machines in it. We have agreed that both are "you". That is even the reason why we listen to both copies, and both comfirm the W v M prediction, and both refute the W & M prediction (with W and M refering to the 1p experiences, see the preceding post if you have forgotten this). > computationalism entails it can only be W, or M. The above depends entirely on what the referent to "it" is. Goddamn pronouns! > The guy in Helsinki knows that in advance, and so can predict P(W v M) = 1, and P(W & M) = 0. Sure that's possible, if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could predict monkeys will fly out of his ass. But I'm more interested in what will happen that in what some jackass believes will happen. In that case you change the subject, which is not what will happen, but what will be experienced (assuming the person believes or assumes computationalism). >>I don't assume "comp", remember? > Sorry, but you accepted the step 0 and the step 1, which means that by definition you assume or accept computationalism I accepted computationalism when I was about 16 and can find no reason to think differently today. OK, but we don't philosophy. The point is that comp entails step 3. > abbreviated by comp. That is no abbreviation! It is. As I've said, the way you use your baby talk word "comp" has little or nothing to do with computationalism. Then what am I using in step 0, 1, and 2? You have agreed on those steps. You only mean that computationalism does not entail step 3, but fail to find a reason why not, except by either confusing 1p and 3p, or your by changing the question. >> Usage is always more important that definitions. > Not in science. In everything. Definitions are made of words and those words also have definitions also made of words and round and round we go; the only thing that breaks us out of that infinite loop is usage. Where do you think lexicographers got the information to write their dictionaries? Only one place, usage. In science we use axiomatics, and you can replace each word by ANY words. It will change absolutely nothing, except it will look like jargon. You forget that the WHOLE argument is entirely translated in arithmetic. part two needs only the believe in elmentary arithmetic, + at the meta level the thesis by Church-Turing. > Because you put step 3 in comp, I have never put anything in "comp". Then you accept that comp is just an abbreviation of computationalism. > but step 3 is not part of comp. I don't care if step 3 is part of "comp" or not. >> It is up to you to show which of the 2 people after the duplication who go by the name of "you" is THE One True YOU, the only "you" that is relevant in determining if the prediction made in Helsinki was correct or not. > This is ridiculous. There are no TRUE you, John Clark is glad Bruno Marchal agrees, but if there is no TRUE you then Bruno Marchal has no business using that ambiguous personal pronoun in thought experiments. However there is a TRUE Ed, two in fact, so that word should be used instead. > comp entails that [...] I don't care what "comp" entails. > Ed is in W and Ed in M is not the same as Ed feels to be in W and in M. So Ed is in W but Ed does not feel to be in W and the duplication has turned Ed into a zombie who feels
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Nobody will have two 1p from an 1p pov. > If Ed remains somebody even after Ed is duplicated then somebody will have two 1p from a 1p pov. However John Clark is reluctant to say what will happen to "you" until Bruno Marchal gives a much better explanation about what that personal pronoun means in a world with "you" duplicating machines. > > > We have agreed that both are "you". > Yes, and so "you" will be in Washington AND Moscow, and from that Bruno Marchal concludes that "you" will see only one city. And all the peepee in the world can't sweep that logical contradiction under the rug. > > > That is even the reason why we listen to both copies, and both comfirm the > W v M prediction, > > and both refute the W & M prediction > We must listen to both copies because the prediction was about "you" and because both are "you" and both CONFIRM the W AND M prediction. Not that predictions, correct or incorrect have anything to do with the continuous feeling of a unique self. >> >> >> if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could predict monkeys will fly out of >> his ass. But I'm more interested in what will happen that in what some >> jackass believes will happen. > > > > > In that case you change the subject, which is not what will happen, but > what will be experienced (assuming the person believes or assumes > computationalism). > What the hell are you talking about?? What will happen *IS *what will be experienced and it doesn't matter one bit if the person assumes computationalism or not! >> >> >> Definitions are made of words and those words also have definitions also >> made of words and round and round we go; the only thing that breaks us out >> of that infinite loop is usage. Where do you think lexicographers got >> the information to write their dictionaries? Only one place, usage. > > > > > In science we use axiomatics, > Yes, you say computationalism is an axiom and then you use it in a "proof" that you claim proves this and that, but you're like a geometer what says that a Euclidean axiom is that 2 parallel lines never meet and then in a direct Euclidean "proof" starts talking about point X where 2 parallel lines meet. Usage beats definitions every time. > > you are just playing with word > AKA thinking. > > > as you have agreed that "you" is not ambiguous before the duplication. > And "you" *is* ambiguous after the duplication which is what the prediction was about. So why doesn't Bruno just substitute "Ed" for "you" and end this "you" controversy? Because "Ed" contains no ambiguity and thus Bruno would have no place to hide sloppy thinking. > > > I don't think anybody understand your point, > Yes, I'm the only one on the planet who failed to recognize the brilliance of your proof, and that is why you won the Nobel Prize. Oh wait > > Come on, you don't even try to answer a precise question asked in my last > post. > If I ever find a precise question in one of your posts I will answer it or say I don't know, but gibberish is not a question even if it has a question mark at the end. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
John, All here is pure rhetorical tricks which have already been debunked many times, by many people. I will no more comment those ad hominem spurious trolling posts. Bruno On 21 Aug 2015, at 19:26, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 21, 2015 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Nobody will have two 1p from an 1p pov. If Ed remains somebody even after Ed is duplicated then somebody will have two 1p from a 1p pov. However John Clark is reluctant to say what will happen to "you" until Bruno Marchal gives a much better explanation about what that personal pronoun means in a world with "you" duplicating machines. > We have agreed that both are "you". Yes, and so "you" will be in Washington AND Moscow, and from that Bruno Marchal concludes that "you" will see only one city. And all the peepee in the world can't sweep that logical contradiction under the rug. > That is even the reason why we listen to both copies, and both comfirm the W v M prediction, and both refute the W & M prediction We must listen to both copies because the prediction was about "you" and because both are "you" and both CONFIRM the W AND M prediction. Not that predictions, correct or incorrect have anything to do with the continuous feeling of a unique self. >> if the guy in Helsinki is a fool he could predict monkeys will fly out of his ass. But I'm more interested in what will happen that in what some jackass believes will happen. > In that case you change the subject, which is not what will happen, but what will be experienced (assuming the person believes or assumes computationalism). What the hell are you talking about?? What will happen IS what will be experienced and it doesn't matter one bit if the person assumes computationalism or not! >> Definitions are made of words and those words also have definitions also made of words and round and round we go; the only thing that breaks us out of that infinite loop is usage. Where do you think lexicographers got the information to write their dictionaries? Only one place, usage. > In science we use axiomatics, Yes, you say computationalism is an axiom and then you use it in a "proof" that you claim proves this and that, but you're like a geometer what says that a Euclidean axiom is that 2 parallel lines never meet and then in a direct Euclidean "proof" starts talking about point X where 2 parallel lines meet. Usage beats definitions every time. > you are just playing with word AKA thinking. > as you have agreed that "you" is not ambiguous before the duplication. And "you" is ambiguous after the duplication which is what the prediction was about. So why doesn't Bruno just substitute "Ed" for "you" and end this "you" controversy? Because "Ed" contains no ambiguity and thus Bruno would have no place to hide sloppy thinking. > I don't think anybody understand your point, Yes, I'm the only one on the planet who failed to recognize the brilliance of your proof, and that is why you won the Nobel Prize. Oh wait > Come on, you don't even try to answer a precise question asked in my last post. If I ever find a precise question in one of your posts I will answer it or say I don't know, but gibberish is not a question even if it has a question mark at the end. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 , Bruno Marchal wrote: > > All here is pure rhetorical tricks which have already been debunked many > times, by many people. > Bullshit. > > > I will no more comment > Coward. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 28 Aug 2015, at 19:47, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 28, 2015 , Bruno Marchal wrote: > All here is pure rhetorical tricks which have already been debunked many times, by many people. Bullshit. Sure. > I will no more comment Coward. You don't even quote the entire sentence. You don't even quote and answer any of the question asked in any of the last post. I don't think anyone find sense in your "refutation", and if they did, I invite them to expose and defend it. But it is clear that your ambiguity comes from your systematic and local opportunistic 1p/3p confusion. Convince just one person (on or out of line) and ask him/ her to expose it here. Your own arguments is like in this post, just a sequence of insults, which are not a valid way to clarify a point. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > You don't even quote the entire sentence. > You mean the one where you said " I will no more comment " ? > > > You don't even quote and answer any of the question asked in any of the > last post. > I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw no questions. Ask me any question and I'll give you an answer or say I don't know, but I can't respond to gibberish. > > > your systematic and local opportunistic 1p/3p confusion. > I don't know about " systematic and local opportunistic " but there is not one person on the planet who suffers from 1p/3p confusion , however *EVERYBODY* on the planet suffers from 1 -1p /1p confusion and 3 -1 p/3p confusion, and the most confused of all is Bruno Marchal. > > > Convince just one person (on or out of line) and ask him/her to expose it > here. > Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that you're not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and then convince the International Congress of Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields Metal and announce it all here. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 29 Aug 2015, at 18:59, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Aug 29, 2015 at 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > You don't even quote the entire sentence. You mean the one where you said "I will no more comment " ? Yes. > You don't even quote and answer any of the question asked in any of the last post. I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw no questions. Ask me any question and I'll give you an answer or say I don't know, but I can't respond to gibberish. I was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you do an experience in physics in a robust universe (running a universal dovetailer). > your systematic and local opportunistic 1p/3p confusion. I don't know about "systematic and local opportunistic" but there is not one person on the planet who suffers from 1p/3p confusion, however EVERYBODY on the planet suffers from 1-1p/ 1p confusion and 3-1p/3p confusion, and the most confused of all is Bruno Marchal. None of the members of any of the three juries who have study the proof has had any problem with that. Only materialist philosophers have had a problem, and not even with this, but with the conclusion, and those wre philosophers having already harrass students daring to say that people like Everett or Gödel were interesting (sic). > Convince just one person (on or out of line) and ask him/her to expose it here. Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that you're not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and then convince the International Congress of Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields Metal and announce it all here. I never thought on that. Actually, I have *never* submitted anything. I just sometimes publish when some people invite me to publish. Tha math part is not enough to be proposed to Fields Medals, as it is to simple (yet origianl) theorems and less simple open problems (one of which has been solved since). You are basically making an argument by authority here, and you confess that you don't take my work seriously only because you think it is a startling result (thanks!) and that it would not have be admitted by the scientific communauty. But it is admitted by all scientists, and analytical philosophers, having read the work. And only one of them has changes his mind, indeed on step 3, but I know no-one having read his argument without sighing or laughing, and suggesting me to not answer it, as it is grossly self-defeating (like your post actually, to which I answer as I am interested in the bad-faith phenomenon (I encouter it also in antisemitisme and antisionnisme propaganda, and the whole wars on drug, and more recently wars on terror). Now, as it bears also on philosophy and theology, it is true that some religiously-minded materialists philosophers does not like at all the type of reality that computationalism is leading to. Crazily enough, they believe that, by being philosophers, it is enough to argue from personal conviction. (But this illustrates some key point that I derive from self-reference, and which indeed shows that a part of the academical philosophy is just using philosophy to keep alive their favorite dogma in that field). Focus on the point. Tell me if you critics makes still sense at step 4. Stop faking to have problem with the vocabulary, as I have been able to show to everybody that you do understand the definition (and even vindicate them), so the last non-understanding are indeed 100% opportunist. Also, by the way, you said that you were open to the idea that mathematics could be more fundamental than physics. This contradict your use of primitive "hardware" to pretend that a computation needs to be run physically to exist. This is even more astonishing, given that everybody in the filed knows that computations and computability are provably arithmetical notion (assuming Church or Turing's theses). If you have heard of some scientist having both read the work, and disagree with it, just give me a name, as I have never encouter one. Suggest them to make the remark here, or to publish a refutation, or to send it to me. The most negative statements I have ever heard are of the type "The mind-body problem is not my expertise". And what you said on Plato proves that it is not really your "cup of tea" either, isn't it? Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- Y
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 6:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw no questions. >> Ask me any question and I'll give you an answer or say I don't know, but I >> can't respond to gibberish. > > > > > I was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you do > an experience in physics > That is true but only part of the truth, Bruno Marchal was alluding on how *you* predict *your *subjective experience when *you* do an experience in physics where *"you"* has been duplicated and thus making that personal pronoun ambiguous. > > > you said that you were open to the idea that mathematics could be more > fundamental than physics. > I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I can't prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has been able to do any better. When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know. > > > This contradict your use of primitive "hardware" to pretend that a > computation needs to be run physically to exist. > No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody has ever made one single calculation without the use of physical hardware and that statement is 100% correct. There is some evidence that physics is more fundamental but it falls far short of a proof. It could still go either way. > > > This is even more astonishing, given that everybody in the filed knows that > [...] > > And it is even more astonishing given that here is zero evidence that anybody in any field would know anything at all without physical hardware. > [...] > computations and computability are provably arithmetical notion > And up to now nobody has been able to perform one single arithmetical operation without the use of physical hardware. And up to now nobody has ever had a "notion" without physical hardware either. > > > If you have heard of some scientist having both read the work, and > disagree with it, just give me a name, as I have never encouter one. > If they are so common then please answer just one question, why hasn't at least one of those numerous scientists started their own computer hardware company with zero manufacturing costs and become a trillionaire? This is not a rhetorical question, I'd really like an answer. > >> >> Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that you're >> not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and then convince the >> International Congress of Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields >> Metal and announce it all here. > > > > You are basically making an argument by authority here, And your multiple statements that I have not convinced anybody else on this list is not an argument from authority?? If you're going to make an argument from authority it's best to have a good authority, and I think the average member of the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society has a higher scientific reputation than the average member of this list. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: 1P/3P CONFUSION again and again
On 30 Aug 2015, at 19:04, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Aug 30, 2015 at 6:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> I saw several question marks in the last post but I saw no questions. Ask me any question and I'll give you an answer or say I don't know, but I can't respond to gibberish. > I was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you do an experience in physics That is true but only part of the truth, Bruno Marchal was alluding on how you predict your subjective experience when you do an experience in physics where "you" has been duplicated and thus making that personal pronoun ambiguous. I have repeated many times that the question is always asked before the duplication. In this case the question is asked to anybody in a physical universe where a universal dovetailer is executed. > you said that you were open to the idea that mathematics could be more fundamental than physics. I can't prove mathematics is more fundamental than physics and I can't prove it isn't, and as of September 30 2015 nobody else has been able to do any better. If my body is a machine, then there is not much choice in the matter. You beg the question with respect to step 3. When I don't know I'm not afraid to say I don't know. Then you contraidct yourself. By the way, your argument that there is no computation in arithmetic is isomorph to the argument that a simulated typhon cannot make someone wet, which I know you don't believe in. > This contradict your use of primitive "hardware" to pretend that a computation needs to be run physically to exist. No it does not. What I said was that up to now nobody has ever made one single calculation without the use of physical hardware How do you know that? How do you know that there is physical hardware? If you don't know if math is or not the fundamental science, then you cannot refer to primary hardware physical hardware in your argument. and that statement is 100% correct. Adding this show how much you are not sure. There is some evidence that physics is more fundamental but it falls far short of a proof. It could still go either way. But we know as a fact that elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic) contains all terminating computations, and all pieces on the non terminating computations. That is already a reason to be skeptical with ontological physical universe. But then if you could progress a little bit in the argument, you would see that any invocation of an ontological physical reality is equivalent with a non-computationalist god-of-the-gap type of argument. > This is even more astonishing, given that everybody in the filed knows that [...] And it is even more astonishing given that here is zero evidence that anybody in any field would know anything at all without physical hardware. The fact that nature obeys to the physical hypostases is a strong evidences that the notion of hardware is an internal and relative arithmetical notion. Of course you need to stop at some step in the UD Argument to deny this. > [...] computations and computability are provably arithmetical notion And up to now nobody has been able to perform one single arithmetical operation without the use of physical hardware. And up to now nobody has ever had a "notion" without physical hardware either. As you said above, you don't know if there is physical hardware. You continue to contradict yourself. > If you have heard of some scientist having both read the work, and disagree with it, just give me a name, as I have never encouter one. If they are so common then please answer just one question, why hasn't at least one of those numerous scientists started their own computer hardware company with zero manufacturing costs and become a trillionaire? This is not a rhetorical question, I'd really like an answer. For the same reason that nobody would drink simulated water, unless they are simulated themselves. The math ^part of the theory explain why hardware seems to exist, in the same phenomenological way that Everett explains why a collapse seems to exists, despite it doesn't. >> Convince the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society that you're not talking nonsense and have them make you a member; and then convince the International Congress of Mathematicians and have them award you the Fields Metal and announce it all here. > You are basically making an argument by authority here, And your multiple statements that I have not convinced anybody else on this list is not an argument from authority?? No, it is not. It is a simple observation that anybody can verify. If you're going to make an argument from authority it's best to have a good authority, and I think the average member of the National Academy of Science or the Royal Society h
