Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Hi Bruce, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Jun 2015, at 00:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ... Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...? Aaaahh! That is what you mean by a rock think?!? Then ... I am still not OK. It is no more the rock that do the thinking than it is the transistor of the computer running Deep Blue which win the chess game. It is the program defined at a higher level. The fact that the computer use transistor is simply not relevant, even if accidently and ciontingnetly, transistiors were used. It is not part of the program Deep Blue. C'mon, Bruno. It was a joke. :-) Thanks for reassuring me. Sorry for not having seen the joke. You might try to make joke more absurd than the post of some people here. Oh..., maybe John Clark is also just joking, since years. It is probably better to see it that way. Best, Bruno Bruce Here, you do Searle's confusion of level error. RA can emulate PA, even ZF, like I can emulate the brain of a chinese person, but that does not mean I am the one having the thought of the chinese person. I am just the low level processor, and it does not do the thinking. (by definition of the machine substitution level). Likewise, RA can emulate PA proving the consistency of RA, but this does not mean that RA can prove its own consistency. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You claim that physics emerges from the UD, I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from the UD. But I don't think you've shown that. Comp1 doesn't imply that all possible computations exist. You don't need comp1 for that. That each computations exist is already a theorem in RA. That's a separate assumption you slip in that all computations or all arithmetic exists. You need only that 2+2=4 independently of you, and this is assumed already when we assume Church's thesis. The notion of computation itself assumes either the numbers and some relations between them, or anything else Turing equivalent. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
John Mikes wrote: (Brent): But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable. (Bruno): Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self- referentially correct machine theory. ... The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on Planet Earth for us. If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed' in the Entirety, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics, universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc. Theory of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything' TOGETHER(?) may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety', of which we got glimpses of details only and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less sophisticated believers (scientists?). One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super- intelligence. I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the one we are talking about is 'super' indeed. I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter- lego) i.o.w. to consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled out. In such respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain. IFFF? Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason, why I went with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified nature) upon relations (unidentified and unrestricted) over the entire Entirety. Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to humans (machines). With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness) John, you cannot use agnosticism to criticize the search of a theory, be it on atoms, persons, or everything. You can criticize the lack of modesty and foolishness of the pseudo- scientists who would pretend we know the truth of this or that theory, but you cannot use agnosticism to forbid attempt to theorize on anything, including on everything. If you do that you introduce a separation between science and theology, and this is what will make people stopping modestly theorizing, and taking the first pseudo-scientist or guru for granted. If you decide that all theory of everything are hoaxes, only hoaxes will develop. But we can propose precise theories, in the modest way (that is never pretending they are true, even when not yet refuted) and then test them empirically, like with any other subject matter. Without naïve things, like the Atom of Bohr, we can't progress. To do theology scientifically, is just the right to propose wrong, but improvable, theories, in that realm. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:50, meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily) make that understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true, but might be of the type G* minus G.) What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/knowledge come from, in a testable way? That is exactly my criticism of your theory. I think you do need to invoke a universe, i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning to computations and avoid the absurdity of the rock that computes everything. I need a universal system, or a universal machine, or a universal number (we get all of those simultaneously). I made my assumpition clear: I assume K, S, their combinations, and the axioms Kxy = x, and Sxyz= xz(yz), or if you prefer, the numbers, + RA axioms. Nothing more, in the TOE. But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how computation instantiates thought I need only a universal machine, which instanciates the thought of other machine. you can't use thought to explain the universe. Nor to explain numbers or combinators. That is why I need to postulate them. Logic alone cannot do that, but I don't need to assume a physical universe. On the contrary, adding that assumption makes us losing the mind-body solution provided by computationalism. It's just another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose name I have never understood; white rabbits are common). I quoted the passage of Alice in Wonderland which justifies that appellation. The white rabbit has a coat, a clock, and say too late, too late ..., and then go in the deep rabbit hole :) It's all very well to say thought is computation Thought is as much a computation than a centimeter is energy. Computation can support a thought in some relative way (relative to one universal number above the substitution level, and an infinity of computations below). and all computation is implicit in arithmetic Well, it is implicit if you agree that the distribution of the prime numbers is implicit in arithmetic. OK. so all thought is implicit in arithmetic. The problem is getting it out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything. A rock does not compute, and with UDA a rock is a first person sharable product of the universal mind (the mind of the universal machine). The problem is only to get the measure, and here the machine itself gives sense to a quantization whoich seems promising to get something close to the empiric quantum measure. So we can test the idea. Keep in mind that we try to solve the mind-body problem. That we get an explanation why there is something instead of nothing, assuming arithmetic, is a by product. That explains it all (almost) as the Löbian machine, like PA, can already justify why, if consistent, they cannot justify the SK axioms (or the arithmetical axioms) from less. It might be the only thing that we cannot explain. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:03, meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 6:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: nor have you produced a conscious program or computer. Here is one: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x + for all F first order arithmetical formula: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x). That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is the one interviewed on the theological and physical question in the work. That seems more absurd than the reductio of the MGA. One must ask of what is the program conscious?...all theorems of PA? That's not only very different from what I am aware of, it's also infinitely greater. Yes, it is very great, and should plausibly be seen as an alternated state of consciousness, of the dissociative kind. It is what you would be conscious of when you calm down enough neurons in your brain. It is almost maximally conscious, except that apparently, the induction axioms is the main filter of consciousness, so that the virgin universal machine without induction (and thus with less theorem, and less constraints) is more conscious. So, PA is not conscious a priori of the theorems. it is more subtle, and I have not solved the details of that problem. Indeed, as I said, it is the place where the salvia reports made my personal feeling changing here. Above the treshold of Turing universality, the biggest your brain are, the less conscious you become, and the more able to say stupidities you become. I find that weird, but it is hard to interpret the machine's discourse in a different way. I am aware this might be shocking in the aristotelian tradition especially if you add axioms like God made us in its own image. To be sure, this is not used in UDA, nor in AUDA, but might belong to the further consequences of the classical version of comp (classical= with excluded middle and the use of the Theatetus' idea). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 13 Jun 2015, at 00:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ... Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...? Aaaahh! That is what you mean by a rock think?!? Then ... I am still not OK. It is no more the rock that do the thinking than it is the transistor of the computer running Deep Blue which win the chess game. It is the program defined at a higher level. The fact that the computer use transistor is simply not relevant, even if accidently and ciontingnetly, transistiors were used. It is not part of the program Deep Blue. Here, you do Searle's confusion of level error. RA can emulate PA, even ZF, like I can emulate the brain of a chinese person, but that does not mean I am the one having the thought of the chinese person. I am just the low level processor, and it does not do the thinking. (by definition of the machine substitution level). Likewise, RA can emulate PA proving the consistency of RA, but this does not mean that RA can prove its own consistency. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 12 Jun 2015, at 22:34, meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 1:01 PM, John Mikes wrote: You wrote: (Brent): But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable. (Bruno): Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self- referentially correct machine theory. ... The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on Planet Earth for us. If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed' in the Entirety, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics, universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc. Theory of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything' TOGETHER(?) may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety', of which we got glimpses of details only and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less sophisticated believers (scientists?). One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super- intelligence. I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the one we are talking about is 'super' indeed. I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter-lego) i.o.w. to consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled out. In such respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain. IFFF? Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason, why I went with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified nature) upon relations (unidentified and unrestricted) over the entire Entirety. Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to humans (machines). With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness) JM On Fri, Ju That sounds like Darwin's worry when he concluded that we were descended from an ape ancestor that he could not trust his own thought processes because they were also descended from an ape ancestor. To which someone no doubt replied, Whose thoughts will you trust if not your own. Samiya has an answer to this, but I think Darwin would have chosen to stick with his own. Or like rejecting a thesis on the brain, invoking circularity because the candidate used a brain to write it. Only plant should have the right to study zoology, in that case. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 12 Jun 2015, at 20:54, meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism. Bruno One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has implications for physics which are not metaphysical. There are many speculative theories of physics that are based on information as the ur-stuff and one would naively suppose that a computationalist theory of the world would have something to say about them. It is comp. Just more fuzzy, more empirically based, and less advanced, except of course for the matter part (with the Landauer result, and the Feynman-Deutsch universal quantum Turing computer). But some people plays with the word information, as in the mundane sense, it points on the semantic of the information, and not his possible Shannon or algorithmic measure (classical or quantum). With computationalism this is easier: we have the bit of information, and we have the universal machine which will interpret that information, and we have the arithmetical truth, which gauge that interpretation. Most people in the field seems still unaware of the FPI, and invoke an Aristotelian God (Primary Matter) which makes no sense if we take computationalism seriously enough. The information paradigm hides the one who interprets the information: the universal numbers/systems. They miss thus also the opportunity to use Theoretical Computer Science. Comp makes easy to distinguish the 3p and 1p notions, which in the case of information is something very important to do, as it is almost as different than quanta and qualia. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Jun 2015, at 00:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ... Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...? Aaaahh! That is what you mean by a rock think?!? Then ... I am still not OK. It is no more the rock that do the thinking than it is the transistor of the computer running Deep Blue which win the chess game. It is the program defined at a higher level. The fact that the computer use transistor is simply not relevant, even if accidently and ciontingnetly, transistiors were used. It is not part of the program Deep Blue. C'mon, Bruno. It was a joke. :-) Bruce Here, you do Searle's confusion of level error. RA can emulate PA, even ZF, like I can emulate the brain of a chinese person, but that does not mean I am the one having the thought of the chinese person. I am just the low level processor, and it does not do the thinking. (by definition of the machine substitution level). Likewise, RA can emulate PA proving the consistency of RA, but this does not mean that RA can prove its own consistency. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ... Where do you think Intel get the silicon for their chips...? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
You wrote: *(Brent):* *But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable.* *(Bruno):* *Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self-referentially correct machine theory.* *...* The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on Planet Earth for us. If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed' in the *Entirety*, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics, universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc. *Theory* of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything' TOGETHER(?) may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety', of which we got glimpses of details only and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less sophisticated believers (scientists?). One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super-intelligence. I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the one we are talking about is 'super' indeed. I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter-lego) i.o.w. to consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled out. In such respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain. IFFF? Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason, why I went with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified nature) upon relations (unidentified and unrestricted) over the entire Entirety. Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to humans (machines). With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness) JM On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 2:54 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism. Bruno One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has implications for physics which are not metaphysical. There are many speculative theories of physics that are based on information as the ur-stuff and one would naively suppose that a computationalist theory of the world would have something to say about them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily) make that understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true, but might be of the type G* minus G.) What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/knowledge come from, in a testable way? That is exactly my criticism of your theory. I think you do need to invoke a universe, i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning to computations and avoid the absurdity of the rock that computes everything. But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how computation instantiates thought you can't use thought to explain the universe. It's just another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose name I have never understood; white rabbits are common). It's all very well to say thought is computation and all computation is implicit in arithmetic so all thought is implicit in arithmetic. The problem is getting it out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism. Bruno One might be interested in the idea that computationalism has implications for physics which are not metaphysical. There are many speculative theories of physics that are based on information as the ur-stuff and one would naively suppose that a computationalist theory of the world would have something to say about them. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 1:01 PM, John Mikes wrote: You wrote: /(Brent):/ /But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable*.*/ /(Bruno):/ /Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self-referentially correct machine theory./ /.../ / / The entire train of sophistication is based on 'human logic' as derived on Planet Earth for us. If I allow contents 'more' and 'so far unaccessed' in the *Entirety*, our the sophistication may reduce to a flimsy explanatory ignorance. Including physics, universal (self-referentially correct) machine, etc. */_Theory_/* of Everything is spellable 'h o a x', since 'everything' TOGETHER(?) may be a balanced and inseparable - well - 'Entirety', of which we got glimpses of details only and used our extremely sophisticated brains (!) to explain it all to less sophisticated believers (scientists?). One more: there were several questions about a fitting ID of super-intelligence. I would start with a 'fitting ID' of intelligence and then decide if the one we are talking about is 'super' indeed. I proposed the Latin origination of 'reading between the lines' (inter-lego) i.o.w. to consider more than the plain dictionary definition for concepts spelled out. In such respect 'Watson' would be a good example. We do it simpler(?) in our brain. IFFF? Considering our 'intelligence' we are still at human levels. The reason, why I went with 'consciousness' a step further to consider responses (unidentified nature) upon relations (unidentified and unrestricted) over the entire Entirety. Most of the discussion on this (and other?) lists restrict both concepts to humans (machines). With agnostically restricted intelligence (consciousness) JM On Fri, Ju That sounds like Darwin's worry when he concluded that we were descended from an ape ancestor that he could not trust his own thought processes because they were also descended from an ape ancestor. To which someone no doubt replied, Whose thoughts will you trust if not your own. Samiya has an answer to this, but I think Darwin would have chosen to stick with his own. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
meekerdb wrote: On 6/12/2015 8:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/knowledge come from, in a testable way? That is exactly my criticism of your theory. I think you do need to invoke a universe, i.e. an environment, in order to supply meaning to computations and avoid the absurdity of the rock that computes everything. But if you have to invoke a universe to explain how computation instantiates thought you can't use thought to explain the universe. It's just another aspect of the white rabbit problem (whose name I have never understood; white rabbits are common). You mean that you don't get the allusion to 'Alice in Wonderland'? All the best phrases come from Lewis Carroll. Like 'Humpty Dumpty Dictionary' and 'What I tell you three times is true.' Bruce It's all very well to say thought is computation and all computation is implicit in arithmetic so all thought is implicit in arithmetic. The problem is getting it out - showing that the rock computes something, not everything. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 14:41, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning. So a computer computing without us, is not computing The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence of state + a transition table relating the states. Yes, and the mapping is defined, and implemented in arithmetic by the universal number. As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ? It is weird that John Clark does not intervene here to say that Bruce Kellet would be a millionaire if he was able to make a rock computing ... Well, I guess it is not weird, as Bruce seems to have also that typical negative tone of those who criticizing without studying. Why people does that is beyond my comprehension, but I am interested, as this is rather frequent (with humans). Bruno Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:41, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- commutation? For the yes-no operator in general. They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are more interested. I'm interested. I know that more best in the journal I publish in, more difficult it is to get it without being in an institution, but this is explained in most paper. You need to understand many representation theorem. That computability can be represented in arithmetic by sigma_1 provability, that sigma_1 provability represent an idea scientist having self- referential abilities, that the logic of self-reference is axiomatized (that the modal propositional level) by *two* logic: G and G* (also know as GL and GLS, Prl and prl-omega, K4W (for G) in the literature). That a logic of knowledge is canonically associated, and can be represented in G and G* (but there they coincide). That an intuitionist logic is associated, and can be represented, by that logic of knowledge. That a logic of observability (in a simple direct sense provided by the UDA, which I illustrate recently (thank to John Clark!) with the step 3 protocol + the 2 coffees. That logic of observability is a B- type of modal logic. That quantum type of logic admits representation in term of B-type of modal logic. All the representation theorem are constructive, and all logics, and the multimodal logic (like the 3-1 notions) are, by composition of representations; inherit the decidability of G. G* itself is representable, mechanical emulable, by G. making all of the material logic decidable, but they are also untractable, when you get many modal nesting. G is what the machine can say about itself, about what it can say and not say. G* is what is true about what the machine can say and not say. Typically, self-consistency, belongs to G* minus G, the proper classical theology of the machine looking inward. I don't believe that PA is a zombie, even if that discourse, in the third person way, appears to be atemporal: it is itself infinity recurrent in arithmetic. You need only a passive, but genuine, understanding of Gödel's paper, fundamentally. He is the one starting the interview. He missed the reversal, because he was sceptical on mechanism. he missed the Church- thesis too, and the *universal* beast. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. To be sure, I have some conjecture which would entail that space and time existence belong to the physical. I have explained this, but this needs Temperley Lieb algebra, the braid group, and some relation with the comp Quantum Logic. Where have you explained it? On this list? Yes. You might search on temperley and/or lieb on the archive. The winner might be a universal subgroup of the braid group. the physicist in me suspect some Moonshine Magic and role for finite simple group, and the number 24 (which might intervene in dimension comp theory). But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux. If the stability of consciousness is not explained then consciousness is not explained. Agreed. It's no good saying, There must be an explanation if my theory is right. It depends. When you do reasoning on reasoning, this can be done in valid, or not, way. But when you bet on some theory, if you throw out the theory at a first problem, you might never solve that first problem. If physicists would have abandoned Newton each time it was contradicted, they would never have found relativity and the quantum. Löbianity allow a sort of arithmetical valid way to beg the question, but, here, I allude to something slightly different (yet related). There must be an explanation if my theory is right. can be put: let us assume P and we see that we have that problem. But that is the whole point: comp leads to a very interesting problem, formulable in the arithmetical language, and look, machines like PA and ZF can already provide unexpected incredible light on that subject. I am the guy who say that there is a problem, and who show
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 Jun 2015, at 03:48, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au LizR wrote: I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/. I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument is a /reductio/ on the physical supervenience thesis, It seemed to me that the argument was directed against the notion of primitive physicalism, rather than just the supervenience thesis. MGA alone is a reductio ad absurdo of the physical supervenience, but not of comp supervenience. I do not remember Bruno explicitly denying supervenience. Only physical supervenience (called supervenience by most (materialist) philosophers). It would be strange if he did, since brain replacement by a computer at the appropriate substitution level is the beginning of the argument. No doubt. But, as I have argued, the argument against primitive physicalism fails because nothing is introduced that actually depends on primitive physicalism. That is why the whole enterprise appears to backfire. ? What you say does not make sense. I introduce both comp and primitive physicalism to get the contracdition. Physicis does not rely, indeed, on primitive physicalism, and that'w why there is no prblem with physics at all. The problem is for the computationalist only: they have to retrieve physics from machine self-reference. Then I show PA has already done the job at the propositional part. assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains). But there are other assumptions. Showing a contradiction only shows that your starting point is inconsistent (assuming that all the other stages of the reasoning are correct). It doesn't point to *which* assumption is at fault. That comes down to metaphysics, so it is all irrelevant for understanding the real world of experience. I just show a problem for the computationalist, and to avoid people makes easy conclusion, i show how machine as clever as PA can already debunk the use of such result to argue that comp is false. Then I am strike by the functional morphism between neoplatonism and the discourse of the machine introspecting itself. The point is that with comp, metaphysics can be proceeded with the scientific way, without any metaphysical ontological commitment, but the terms of the theory. It seems to me that you are the one doing a metaphysical commitment, if not, why would you like comp false, or useless, etc. Bruno Bruce You don't like my metaphsysics? That's all right -- I have a whole draw full of alternative metaphysics available... ** With apologies to Groucho Marx. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 Jun 2015, at 03:06, LizR wrote: On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?) Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they jump to the conclusion that it must involve magic or the supernatural. It is not possible that we might simply not yet know everything? Just illustrative. The other available alternatives to reality being computable are oracles, hypercomputers, the physical existence of a continuum, and maybe a few other things this margin is too small to contain. I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/. I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument is a reductio on the physical supervenience thesis, assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains). I think that's correct. I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I've misunderstood. It is correct. The idea is that I make comp clear, even if at first using the physical image (doctor, real artificial brain, etc.), then when making clear the physical supervenience thesis, we get the contradiction. At that stage, people can still be materialist, but have to abandon computationalism. yet, in AUDA, I illustrate that such a move can also be premature, because, when asked, the machine illustrates that self-reference does put non trivial constraints on the knowable and bettable (observable). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:00, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Samya did not invoke God as an explanation! Usually she (to easily) make that understanding beyond human comprehension. (Which is true, but might be of the type G* minus G.) What is the need to invoke a universe when we might perhaps be on an explanation of where the appearance of the universe, and consciousness/ knowledge come from, in a testable way? I know that there is bad news, like some amount of math, and then a sequence of more and more complex questions. Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, That does not follow. Something non computable can emulate something computable. It has too, if we want universal machine and brain there. which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. yes, we inherit each time the normality of our neighborhood. (I find this a bit frightening but then God know which theory is true, isn't it?) With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable notion, a priori. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. OK. (But then there is no problem). There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated becomes meaningless and you've only shown that consciousness supervenes on brains. ? Only the Sigma_1 truth is emulated. The Pi_1 and Sigma_2 truth and above are not mechanically emulable. You can define corresponding divine being capable of emulating them, but that is not logically necassery. yet those are well defined truth (even definable in PA) approximating the non definable, by PA, union of all those truth. Yes, what Gödel, Turing, Church results illustrate is that the computable lives in a complicated relation with the non computable. In philosophy of mind (and matter) this is doubly so due to the FPI, which makes us confronted with infinities at the border of our Turing emulable parts. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 Jun 2015, at 01:47, LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 20:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively. Meaning you can point to it, but have no idea what it is. OK. Er, you are not answering me here. It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account? It isn't me who wants it. You said consciousness supervenes on the brain so I assumed you knew what you were talking about. I see you are ware of that, but the quote above suggests differently. We agree of course. What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it. You should read Maudlin's paper (and Bruno's of course) they aren't very long, and then you will be up to speed on the arguments being employed. Both these arguments are against physical supervenience, in different ways. But Bruce made clear that he is not interested in the problem. It is bizarre that some people tarnish the effort of people working in some field, and admits not being interested in the question. may be Bruce just confuse physics and metaphysical physicalism. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:24, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics. It has obviously something to do. Everett use it in the context of self-superposition. What I said is that they are different notions, not that they are not related. Normally, the FPI shopuld lead to the quantum MWI, when taken from the material points of view. No, it has nothing to do with it. You are arguing that since my dog has four legs, and my cat also has four legs, then my dog is a cat. Not at all. You abstract yourself from the UDA. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:00, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. Not really. It is a sequence of states brought by a universal machine (and then by infinities of such universal machines). With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. Any sequence of physical state can be made into any computation, by changing the universal machine. computation is a relative notion. you need to make precise the universal machine you talk about when mentioning a computation. This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. That does not follow. With computationalism, almost everything is NOT a computation. The computable part of arithmetic is only a tiny part of arithmetical truth. That play some role in the measure problem. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 20:43, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered from the computations of the dovetailer? By the FPI on all computations continuing the here-and- now (defined indexically with the DX=XX method). Physics might be based on real numbers, and that would occur if the winner is given by infinite sequence of diophantine polynomial approximations. The first person invariance for the UD delays play a crucial role here. But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable. Exactly, that is why we can derive physics from the self- referentially correct machine theory. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:20, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. Exactly. Bruno Quentin This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:21, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. So they use comp by default, You mean that work on the basis that conscious supervenes on the physical brain, Not really. At least conscious supervenes on the physical brain is ambiguous. No, I meant the idea that what is relevant in the brain for consciousness does not invoke actual infinities, nor non computable elements so that we can survive with a brain/body computer. and that that brain operates according to regular physical laws. That will do, as those laws are computable, as far as we know. You don't have to accept comp, even unknowingly, to believe that. Once you believe that, modula the prcision I just gave, this is equivalent with comp1, and this ential comp2. except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non-computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is false. And I have given such an account, many times. I have not seen them. Please give a link, or make a summary. In any case, I can criticize comp without having to provide an alternative. One can say that general relativity and QM are mutually incompatible without having to solve the problem of quantum gravity. Like we can show that computationalism and physicalism is incompatible. Fair enough. But I have missed your argument against comp1 (and I have show the flaw in your argument that comp1 does not lead to comp2). I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp. And what did you find? The truth is that you have not tested any of these ideas in practice, In practice? I just prove theorems. I am a theoretician. There is no practical application, except learning that science has not yet really begun, given that we use incompatibe theological ideas, like comp and the beliefs in a primitive physical reality. The practice of this needs theology to come back in academy. nor have you produced a conscious program or computer. Here is one: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x + for all F first order arithmetical formula: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x). That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is the one interviewed on the theological and physical question in the work. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 13:44, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- commutation? For the yes-no operator in general. What quantum operator is that? Frequency operator, a bit like in some paper by Graham, Hartle, but recasted in the Z and X logic. I can do that tnaks to work done in quantum logic (Dalla Chiara, Goldblatt, Bell, ...). And with what other quantum operator does it fail to commute. Other yes-No question/operator. I don't want to explain this right now. I need you first to understand the UDA. They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are more interested. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. You claim that physics emerges from the UD, I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from the UD. but you just happen not to be sure about time and space.? because time and space might be a geographical notion. What, in your opinion then, is physics? A set of dynamical laws describing the behaviour of material objects in time and space, or what? Yes, laws, which have to be true everywhere, for all machines. But comp cannot explain geographico-historical happenings (nor do the physical law; that is why geography is not physics). If the modalities of the material hypostases would have collapsed, like most people thought a long time ago, then physics might have become, assuming comp, entirely geographical, and this would have lead to a continous multiverse, incarnating all physical/geographical laws. But now, the modalities do not collapse, and we know (with comp) that there is a genuine physical reality. You need to be a bit more precise about what you consider to be geographical (contingent) and what you consider to be derivable physics. You need to understand the way I proceed. I start from comp, and show only that physics is derivable, so we will see clearly what is genuinely physical and what is contingent. The contingencies are differnet for each material hypostases, and described by 0, 1, 2, 3, in arithmetic. Physics is often taken to be a set of dynamical laws together with some boundary conditions. The hope of some is that we can subsume more and more of the boundary into the dynamics, so that a true TOE is only physics, with no boundary conditions, geography, or contingencies at all. You need to come clean on what the dovetailer can actually give -- What precisely. you have shown that you don't know what a computation is, so I doubt that you can assess what has already be done, to be frank. we have to be ably to check this against observable physics in order to verify it, after all. This has been done. It is, like for any theory on reality, an infinite task, and the problem now is to solve open question in computer science/mathematical logic. the quantum proposition physics has already been extracted. But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux. Comp does not explain why there is consciousness, it assumes it. It assumes it in UDA, but we got the complete explanation in AUDA, up to something which is explained as being not explainable for logical reason. And what is more, it doesn't actually tell us anything useful about consciousness. It explains completely why consciousness is not a computation, nor matter can be computable. According to your recent statements, consciousness is not even a computation. Yes, that is an example of application of comp. Also, there is no requirement for me to offer any theory of consciousness, as I have explained in detail elsewhere. So, you have just a negative tone, but you have neither find a flaw in comp and its consequences, nor propose any alternative. I am not sure what is your goal. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. So they use comp by default, except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non- computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is false. I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp. But you only assume it instantiates your consciousness because it instantiates all possible Turing computations. So it's validation of your theory depends on assuming your theory. But I am not defending the idea that comp is true at all. I was obviously assuming comp. I work in that theory. You know that since the start. I tell only consequence of that theory. I only show the problem (UDA), and the machine's solution (AUDA), which I compare to the human solution (the Plato-type one, and the Aristotle type one). I think you made a sort of straw man thing here. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 6:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: nor have you produced a conscious program or computer. Here is one: 0 ≠ s(x) s(x) = s(y) - x = y x+0 = x x+s(y) = s(x+y) x*0=0 x*s(y)=(x*y)+x + for all F first order arithmetical formula: (F(0) Ax(F(x) - F(s(x))) - AxF(x). That programs is as much conscious than you and me. Indeed, it is the one interviewed on the theological and physical question in the work. That seems more absurd than the reductio of the MGA. One must ask of what is the program conscious?...all theorems of PA? That's not only very different from what I am aware of, it's also infinitely greater. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/12/2015 6:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You claim that physics emerges from the UD, I claim only that IF comp is true, then physics HAVE to emerge from the UD. But I don't think you've shown that. Comp1 doesn't imply that all possible computations exist. That's a separate assumption you slip in that all computations or all arithmetic exists. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. So they use comp by default, You mean that work on the basis that conscious supervenes on the physical brain, and that that brain operates according to regular physical laws. You don't have to accept comp, even unknowingly, to believe that. except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non-computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is false. And I have given such an account, many times. In any case, I can criticize comp without having to provide an alternative. One can say that general relativity and QM are mutually incompatible without having to solve the problem of quantum gravity. I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp. And what did you find? The truth is that you have not tested any of these ideas in practice, nor have you produced a conscious program or computer. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non-commutation? For the yes-no operator in general. What quantum operator is that? And with what other quantum operator does it fail to commute. They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are more interested. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. You claim that physics emerges from the UD, but you just happen not to be sure about time and space.? What, in your opinion then, is physics? A set of dynamical laws describing the behaviour of material objects in time and space, or what? You need to be a bit more precise about what you consider to be geographical (contingent) and what you consider to be derivable physics. Physics is often taken to be a set of dynamical laws together with some boundary conditions. The hope of some is that we can subsume more and more of the boundary into the dynamics, so that a true TOE is only physics, with no boundary conditions, geography, or contingencies at all. You need to come clean on what the dovetailer can actually give -- we have to be ably to check this against observable physics in order to verify it, after all. But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux. Comp does not explain why there is consciousness, it assumes it. And what is more, it doesn't actually tell us anything useful about consciousness. According to your recent statements, consciousness is not even a computation. Also, there is no requirement for me to offer any theory of consciousness, as I have explained in detail elsewhere. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. Quentin This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics. It has obviously something to do. Everett use it in the context of self-superposition. What I said is that they are different notions, not that they are not related. Normally, the FPI shopuld lead to the quantum MWI, when taken from the material points of view. No, it has nothing to do with it. You are arguing that since my dog has four legs, and my cat also has four legs, then my dog is a cat. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:00 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively. It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account? What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it. Good! Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning. So a computer computing without us, is not computing The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence of state + a transition table relating the states. As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ? Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
2015-06-10 15:13 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning. So a computer computing without us, is not computing The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence of state + a transition table relating the states. As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ? A computation can be regarded as a mapping between inputs and outputs. A Turing machine has a transition table relating the states -- that has to be provided to define the machine, as you say. You can do this with the rock, you map each rock state to the necessary computational state, and that mapping makes the interpretation in the same way as for any other computer. That's what I said... you need the mapping and the rock... the rock alone is not sufficient... So instead of repeating what I said... in what sense the rock *alone* is computing anything relevant relatively to you without the mapping ? Quentin Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning. So a computer computing without us, is not computing The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence of state + a transition table relating the states. As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ? A computation can be regarded as a mapping between inputs and outputs. A Turing machine has a transition table relating the states -- that has to be provided to define the machine, as you say. You can do this with the rock, you map each rock state to the necessary computational state, and that mapping makes the interpretation in the same way as for any other computer. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 00:51, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here. You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories... I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable. These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable consequences. In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a branch of machine theology. Sure. OK. So your claim is that physics is recoverable from the computations of the dovetailer, and that if any of the physics so recovered contradicts physics as developed by the usual methods of science -- and tested by observation and experiment -- then that disproves comp. But then, later we have Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered from the computations of the dovetailer? By the FPI on all computations continuing the here-and-now (defined indexically with the DX=XX method). Physics might be based on real numbers, and that would occur if the winner is given by infinite sequence of diophantine polynomial approximations. The first person invariance for the UD delays play a crucial role here. I am not at all clear what you mean by physics not being Turing emulable. Is this simply to do with the fact that Turing machines are digital, and physics assumes continuous variables -- real and complex numbers? That can play some role, yes. But some non computable oracle can also, a priori, play some role. the random oracle can be shown to have some role in the measure. Keep in mind that my goal is just to make that problem precise. When starting the thesis, I did not expect to solve the propositional case. Or is it, as you have said somewhere, that a machine cannot predict what result you will see when you perform a quantum experiment? ? Only when you perform a self-duplication experience. I cannot use the quantum here. As things stand, you do have a conflict here. You have not yet really grasp the step 7. We will come back on this. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. So they use comp by default, except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non- computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is false. I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 05:16, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics. It has obviously something to do. Everett use it in the context of self-superposition. What I said is that they are different notions, not that they are not related. Normally, the FPI shopuld lead to the quantum MWI, when taken from the material points of view. You said that you had only ever raised MWI as an illustration to help those who were familiar with Everettian quantum mechanics to understand the concept of FPI. That can help, to avoid a frontal shock with the self-multiplication idea. This list is absed in part to an acceptation of Everett formulation of QM. FPI in the teleportation scenarios, and later in the UDA, have nothing to do with the MWI of quantum mechanics, and one cannot be used to support or justify the other. The one in the QM MW use the general idea defining the classical FPI. And UDA shows that the one of the QM MW, if the quantum is physical (s it seems to be), must be retrieved from the FPI, in the material hypostases. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed. UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of some observable is already proved. OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non- commutation? For the yes-no operator in general. They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are more interested. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. To be sure, I have some conjecture which would entail that space and time existence belong to the physical. I have explained this, but this needs Temperley Lieb algebra, the braid group, and some relation with the comp Quantum Logic. But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:19, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip [i] i~p, for [i] being a material hypostase. ?? What role does i play in the above? Are you assuming i implies p? i is for 1, 2, 3 in [1]p = []p p [2]p = []p t [3]p = []p t p = [2]p p The quantization makes sense only in the material hypostases (and, unexpectedly, in the knower). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable notion, a priori. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. OK. (But then there is no problem). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 4:00 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:41, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! How? The physicist in me is pretty sure that there is no K, nor S, in the physical core. But I could agree that with pebble, we can argue that we can implement an approximation of K. But not of much more complex program. If you believe that, you will first need to show me how you read and retrieve the information for the rock, and how the rock computes. Digital computation is just a sequence of states. With the rock, as we warm it gradually (by the sun, or in the fire), it passes through a sequence of states. We identify these correctly to give whatever computation you want. This is the basic pan-computationalism thesis -- everything is a computation, and everything is a computer. Which is why I think we need interaction with the world in order to ground a computation relative to that world. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 1:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered from the computations of the dovetailer? By the FPI on all computations continuing the here-and-now (defined indexically with the DX=XX method). Physics might be based on real numbers, and that would occur if the winner is given by infinite sequence of diophantine polynomial approximations. The first person invariance for the UD delays play a crucial role here. But the existence of a first person viewpoint depends on a stable physics. The two are not separable. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 1:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 02:33, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. So they use comp by default, except Penrose. Comp is a weak and general hypothesis, given that if we except the wave collapse, we don't know in nature any process which is not Turing emulable. Some believe that with a black hole we might be able to implement non-computational stuff, but it is far fetched and controversial. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I was asking for a non mechanist account as you are the one saying that comp is false. I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? The UD does it. I wrote it in Lisp. But you only assume it instantiates your consciousness because it instantiates all possible Turing computations. So it's validation of your theory depends on assuming your theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 1:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non-commutation? For the yes-no operator in general. They are given and construct from the quantization ([]A) in the logic Z1*. It is rather long to describe, and you have shown no interest for the small amount of technic needed to make sense of the material hypostases. We can come back on this later, if you are more interested. I'm interested. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test That is not entirely obvious. It might be possible that time and space are more geographical than physical notion, in which case, time and space would not be derivable. Hamiltonian with gravity and space-time structure might be contingent. Open problem. To be sure, I have some conjecture which would entail that space and time existence belong to the physical. I have explained this, but this needs Temperley Lieb algebra, the braid group, and some relation with the comp Quantum Logic. Where have you explained it? On this list? But, anyway, UDA shows first the *necessity* of all this. I am still waiting your non-comp explanation of consciousness. Comp explains already why there is consciousness, and why there might be matter (in a testable way) capable of stabilizing the consciousness flux. If the stability of consciousness is not explained then consciousness is not explained. It's no good saying, There must be an explanation if my theory is right. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable notion, a priori. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. OK. (But then there is no problem). There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated becomes meaningless and you've only shown that consciousness supervenes on brains. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 5:41 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 14:11 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2015-06-10 13:40 GMT+02:00 Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au Quentin Anciaux wrote: Then the computation will be in the mapping which is the interpreter... the rock itself is missing the machine interpreting the state and relating all the sequence of states of the rock... The rock and the interpreter is a computation, the rock alone is not. What is the interpreter in Platonia? The transition function relating the states. A computation is not a sequence of states, it is a sequence of states and the relation between them. The relation between them is given by the sequence order. You are the one who 'interprets' that sequence, gives it meaning. So a computer computing without us, is not computing The mapping is what makes the interpretation. A computation is a sequence of state + a transition table relating the states. As you can map the rock states with an adhoc mapping to any computations, it doesn't mean the rock computes everything, it just means the rock states are not enough, you forget the mapping ie: the interpreter. The rock on itself could compute anything, but relatively to you, it can compute meaningfully only if you have the correct mapping... and if to produce such a mapping that would make sense relatively to you, it asks you to do the computation you want to map to the rock states... in what sense can you say the rock is computing relatively to you in any meaningful sense ? I agree except Quentin doesn't go all the way to the end. Bruce might have a mapping from the rock states to propositions in English, but what gives meaning to the English? Ostensive definitions, actions and reactions in the world. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Do you ever get the feeling that this is all going round in circles? That 'comp' is going nowhere? Comp appears to go somewhere quite specific. What go round in circles tend to be the arguments against it, which get repeated regularly. I listed them somewhere (on this forum) so we could have a handy reference, but I'm not sure where now. (Unfortunately none of them are rigorous enough to show that comp is actually wrong, though they do show that it strikes some people - including me when I first came across it - as absurd). I will have a quick look and let you know if I can find the list. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 20:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively. Meaning you can point to it, but have no idea what it is. OK. That's what an ostensive definition is. You seem to be after something along the lines of Kant's 'ding an sich'. I can't give you that. It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account? It isn't me who wants it. You said consciousness supervenes on the brain so I assumed you knew what you were talking about. You asked me what actually is consciousness? so I assumed that it was you who wanted to know. I certainly know what I mean when I say consciousness supervenes on the brain. Don't you understand what that means? What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it. You should read Maudlin's paper (and Bruno's of course) they aren't very long, and then you will be up to speed on the arguments being employed. Both these arguments are against physical supervenience, in different ways. OK, so outline the argument in your own words. Even in Bruno's theory, consciousness supervenes on brains -- he just has some different ideas about what brains and consciousness might be. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?) Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they jump to the conclusion that it must involve magic or the supernatural. It is not possible that we might simply not yet know everything? I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?) Why is it that when ever someone doesn't understand something they jump to the conclusion that it must involve magic or the supernatural. It is not possible that we might simply not yet know everything? Just illustrative. The other available alternatives to reality being computable are oracles, hypercomputers, the physical existence of a continuum, and maybe a few other things this margin is too small to contain. I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/. I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument is a *reductio* on the physical supervenience thesis, assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains). I think that's correct. I'm sure Bruno will correct me if I've misunderstood. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable notion, a priori. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. OK. (But then there is no problem). There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated becomes meaningless and you've only shown that consciousness supervenes on brains. Do you ever get the feeling that this is all going round in circles? That 'comp' is going nowhere? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 4:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. With comp, it cannot be computable, as the universe, if it exists, is not a computable notion, a priori. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. OK. (But then there is no problem). There is a problem, because when everything is emulated emulated becomes meaningless and you've only shown that consciousness supervenes on brains. Do you ever get the feeling that this is all going round in circles? That 'comp' is going nowhere? Yes, because comp is metaphysics. But the part that interests me is the engineering aspect. How in consciousness related to intelligence? I think it's a kind augmentation via running internal simulations and I think Bruno's theory may have something to say about proof and belief. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 June 2015 at 13:03, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/10/2015 4:55 PM, LizR wrote: I suspect that physics is not computable is the *end* result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a *reductio* on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. But I don't see that it leads to that result. His argument of step 7 and the MGA purport to reach a *reductio* from comp1. Those arguments are still assuming that thought is a computation. But it is only after he introduces the idea of all possible computations and the UD that he then asserts that consciousness (and physics) is not computable but is rather some kind of statistic mechanics of computational threads. That's a separate point. I was only explaining why Bruno says that physics isn't computable (or trying to, at least). So when Bruno comes on line you should ask him at which point in the argument the reversal is supposed to occur. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 June 2015 at 20:38, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively. Meaning you can point to it, but have no idea what it is. OK. It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account? It isn't me who wants it. You said consciousness supervenes on the brain so I assumed you knew what you were talking about. What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it. You should read Maudlin's paper (and Bruno's of course) they aren't very long, and then you will be up to speed on the arguments being employed. Both these arguments are against physical supervenience, in different ways. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?) I suspect that physics is not computable is the *end* result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a *reductio* on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/10/2015 4:55 PM, LizR wrote: On 11 June 2015 at 11:38, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2015 1:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2015, at 01:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Are you sure it is not the interaction with God? Dunno, Samiya seems to the expert on what God does. Can you explain why such interaction is not computable? No, I was relying on your assertion that physics is not computable - which would entail that brain processes are not computable, which would imply that comp1 is false. Except there's a loophole: if comp1 means replacement by a physical object then the physics of that object is not computable either and so it might work. Yes, that does seem to follow. And the brain replacement might happen to work, but we'd have no idea how (magic? supernatural?) I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. But I don't see that it leads to that result. His argument of step 7 and the MGA purport to reach a /reductio/ from comp1. Those arguments are still assuming that thought is a computation. But it is only after he introduces the idea of all possible computations and the UD that he then asserts that consciousness (and physics) is not computable but is rather some kind of statistic mechanics of computational threads. Brent Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: On 11 June 2015 at 12:20, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au LizR wrote: I suspect that physics is not computable is the /end/ result of Brnuo's argument (comp2) - which is supposed to be a /reductio/ on the notion of comp1. So comp1 assumes that physics is computable, and that assumption leads to the result that it isn't. Which is taken as an argument against physical supervenience of consciousness on brains, although it could equally be an argument against brains performing computations. If that is the line of reasoning, then it would help if it were made more explicit. I expect that the reason that it is not more explicit is that it is actually incoherent. If comp1 leads to the conclusion that comp1 is false, then comp1 is inconsistent. Not just false, *inconsistent*. And as Brent is fond of saying, /ex falso quodlibet/. Or better, /ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet/. I think it is made explicit. Bruno has often claimed that his argument is a /reductio/ on the physical supervenience thesis, It seemed to me that the argument was directed against the notion of primitive physicalism, rather than just the supervenience thesis. I do not remember Bruno explicitly denying supervenience. It would be strange if he did, since brain replacement by a computer at the appropriate substitution level is the beginning of the argument. But, as I have argued, the argument against primitive physicalism fails because nothing is introduced that actually depends on primitive physicalism. That is why the whole enterprise appears to backfire. assuming I've got that right. He is trying to show that the assumptions of comp1 lead to a contradiction (and one of the assumptions of comp1 is that consciousness supervenes on brains). But there are other assumptions. Showing a contradiction only shows that your starting point is inconsistent (assuming that all the other stages of the reasoning are correct). It doesn't point to *which* assumption is at fault. That comes down to metaphysics, so it is all irrelevant for understanding the real world of experience. Bruce You don't like my metaphsysics? That's all right -- I have a whole draw full of alternative metaphysics available... ** With apologies to Groucho Marx. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. What? Reference? You mean the brain is not Turing emulable? Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Consciousness is not a computation, when we assume computationalism. So what is it then? A mental, subjective, state. A first person view. Indeed the one at the base of all the others that we can be aware of. Consciousness supervenes of the physical brain, and if that brain is replaced by a computer, then it supervenes on that physical computer. If consciousness is not a computation, does it merely supervene on a computation? Or is the whole theory hopelessly confused? The theory is that a (generalized) brain is Turing emulable, at a level such that I remain conscious (and feel no difference by introspection). You can say in that case that it merely supervene on the activity of the brain, but not necessarily on the physical activity of the brain, which can be shown arbitrarily variate. It is only contingently related to consciousness. Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. A computation cannot be conscious. Only a (first) person can be conscious. It is a category error to believe that something 1p can be identified with some 3p thing. So a physical person with a physical brain is not conscious? Consciousness is something that has intersubjective aspects -- we can all agree that x, y, and z are conscious. We do not have direct first-person experience of anyone's consciousness other than our own, but that does not mean that we cannot know that another person is conscious. To say otherwise is simple solipsism. We cannot know as such, or for sure,, but this does not entail that e cannot know in the larger Theaetetus' sense indeed. We can believe that others are conscious, and they might be conscious. But then it is the person in Platonia which is conscious, not the one we see (in our indexical time) as this one is a construction of our brain: it does not exist literally. That is counter-intuitive, but not more than SR. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. With toilet papers, and pebbles, yes. You still need to play the role of the processor. Now, a rock does not emulate an arbitrary turing machine. Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. With comp, rock are not even object, but map of accessible continuations. I expose only the mind body problem, and show that the machine's solution fits QM and neoplatonism. I don't defend any truth or religion, just the right to do those things with some rigor. But computationalism does not even give any new insights into the nature of consciousness, I think AUDA shows on the contrary a lot of new insight. We get a complete theory of qualia, and explanation of souls which fits with both QM and all neoplatonist researchers. In the seventies it predicted the rise of Artificial Intelligence and ... the possibility of quantum computing. It explains easily why physics is based on math, and it gives some light on the possible after-life etc. much less give any useful results for physics. No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all. You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea. You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of math). I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without adding non-comp magic). Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows that this is
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:24, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. The block universe idea is just a picturesque way of describing the way space and time are 'mixed up' (within the bounds of the light cone) by Lorentz transformations in special relativity. As I have said before, the important feature of the SR structure is that there is an absolute separation between spacelike and timelike surfaces or world lines. The subjective experience of time is not part of the relativistic model -- time is given by the behaviour of clocks, and specifically, clocks are physical systems that obey the laws of physics. The oscillations of certain defined transitions in the caesium atom are used to define the standard for physical time. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. The 'time capsule' idea is a recent proposal by Julian Barbour. Special relativity says nothing about such things. SR is, in fact, completely indifferent to the direction of time -- the equations are time symmetric. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. Well, maybe comp can do this, but it seems to me that it is more important to extract the behaviour of caesium atoms (physical clocks). The 1p experience of time comes from the fact that we are physical creatures embedded in a physical world that has a well- defined concept of time, given in terms of dynamical physical processes. Either comp can give this, or comp is totally useless. Comp is just the statement that there is no magic operating in the brain. If you have a different theory of mind, please give it to us. What, in the brain, would be not Turing emulable. Matter? Then we agree, but you need to abandon all known theory of matter, except the collapse of the wave, which does not make sense to me. But my point was not more than that: comp entails a MWI, and we can test it by comparing it with the MWI of nature. The 1p experience has to relate to intersubjective agreement (the 3p picture), or it cannot reproduce physics. Of course. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) You should not get your physics from science fiction stories -- they are seldom a reliable source. The validity of a reasoning does not depend on the paper on which it is written. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 02:15, LizR wrote: What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) It is proved in the frame of comp, and we don't have there any problem with time and memory, as we get them easily from computer science. See the book of Matiyasevich to see how a diophantine number polynomial relation can simulate a conventional Turing machine. It can simulate a Von Neuman type of computer, with register memory, etc. In my opinion, comp is the *only* satisfactory explanation of why the reality looks quantum, and why there is a difference between quanta and qualia. Physicists take the physical reality for granted, because their goal is to do physics; not cognitive science. Physics fails to explain the origin of matter, without assuming matter of course, and physics does not address the problem of consciousness, afterlife, etc. The problem is only for the aristotelian believers who want a primitive matter, and physicalism. But, if they find a non-comp theory of mind, and if it works, why not. But such theory does not even exist today. So it might be premature. Let us test comp, and see. Up to now, we get starling quantization exactly where UDA shows them to be necessary. So comp is not only not yet refuted, but it really does seem to explain both consciousness and matter, and I don't know any theory which does that (without adding magic or fairy tales). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico- arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. That last seems incoherent. If comp leaves physics untouched that implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be no test of comp. I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via anempirical prediction? It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of physics (IF true).. You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test. I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false. That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution. ? (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. That last seems incoherent. If comp leaves physics untouched that implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be no test of comp. I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via an empirical prediction? It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of physics (IF true).. You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test. I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false. That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution. ? (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.). As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here. You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories... These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable consequences. If comp does change the content of physical theories, then it might become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp. Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable consequences for physical theories. I think we have previously argued at length about the MGA. Because that argument does not address metaphysics, but the actual physics of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical hypothesis -- it actually refutes comp itself. This, as has been pointed out, is because the movie graph argument applies equally to physics as emulated by comp and physics as investigated by the physicists, independent of any metaphysical overtones. I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means. Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others, but none is empirically testable. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. What? Reference? You mean the brain is not Turing emulable? Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Consciousness is not a computation, when we assume computationalism. So what is it then? Consciousness supervenes of the physical brain, and if that brain is replaced by a computer, then it supervenes on that physical computer. If consciousness is not a computation, does it merely supervene on a computation? Or is the whole theory hopelessly confused? Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. A computation cannot be conscious. Only a (first) person can be conscious. It is a category error to believe that something 1p can be identified with some 3p thing. So a physical person with a physical brain is not conscious? Consciousness is something that has intersubjective aspects -- we can all agree that x, y, and z are conscious. We do not have direct first-person experience of anyone's consciousness other than our own, but that does not mean that we cannot know that another person is conscious. To say otherwise is simple solipsism. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. With toilet papers, and pebbles, yes. You still need to play the role of the processor. Now, a rock does not emulate an arbitrary turing machine. Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. With comp, rock are not even object, but map of accessible continuations. I expose only the mind body problem, and show that the machine's solution fits QM and neoplatonism. I don't defend any truth or religion, just the right to do those things with some rigor. But computationalism does not even give any new insights into the nature of consciousness, much less give any useful results for physics. You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness. By consistent do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that no event can be nomologically inconsistent? That is the same as denying there is any such thing as laws of physics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 07:06, meekerdb wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. That last seems incoherent. If comp leaves physics untouched that implies that comp makes no difference to physics and so there can be no test of comp. I meant, IF comp is true. Indeed, the test of comp is done by physics! If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. Instead you seem to imply that physicalism, a metaphysical hypothesis, is testable - but how if not via an empirical prediction? It is via an empirical prediction. I was in the frame of supposing comp true. It does not change physics, guven that it is at the origin of physics (IF true).. You say it is false if comp is true; but that's not a test. I say that the idea that we need to assume a physical reality is false. That's like the creationists who, when asked what evidence supports creationism, cite deficiencies in evolution. ? (you lost me). I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories, so let us do the test, or work toward it (like optimizing G*, the Z and X logics, etc.). As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here. You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories... I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable. These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable consequences. In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a branch of machine theology. Sure. If comp does change the content of physical theories, then it might become testable, but so far you have given no hint as to what physical content might be changed, or what theories might be in question, you merely note that physics will take precedence over comp. Well that is the result. Then the logic of the observable has been derived, and tested. Merely talking about metaphysics does not lead to testable consequences for physical theories. Unless that metaphysics is derived from comp, which leads to a theology which include physics, and so get testable. Anyway, I derive this from comp. I think we have previously argued at length about the MGA. Because that argument does not address metaphysics, but the actual physics of brain processes, it does not refute some metaphysical hypothesis -- it actually refutes comp itself. ? This, as has been pointed out, is because the movie graph argument applies equally to physics as emulated by comp and physics as investigated by the physicists, independent of any metaphysical overtones. Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. I think that you will find that metaphysical assumptions are not amenable to either verification or falsification by empirical means. Some metaphysics might be more useful and productive than others, but none is empirically testable. Good, so let us not doing metaphysics, but only cognitive science. Then a theorem is that if the brain is Turing emulable then physics is a branch of machine theology, and the physical reality is recovered through a notion of persistent and stable appearances. Thanks to Gödel, Löb and Solovay, we can axiomatize completely the propositional part of the theology, including the propositional part of physics, and compare it to the logic of the observable. Up to now, it fits (at a place where many have thought this cannot happen, because this marry symmetry and antisymmetry at a deep level, without collapsing the logic. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. and I can emulate that with a rock. Like with the pebble. For that matter, show me an arithmetical computer in Platonia computing the prime numbers. .. much less give any useful results for physics. No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all. You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea. Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine totally useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp! ? You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of math). I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without adding non-comp magic). Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows that this is premature, especially that QM confirms both the comp many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum tautologies (until now). Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM. Exact. Comp implies trivially the many-dreams. It is QM which confirms the many dreams aspect, and so use of it to get the measure right. You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed. UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of some observable is already proved. Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. Again, I am not proposing a new theory, I show that two old antic theories, often confused or used simultaneously are incompatible. Then I show that appearance of matter is already justified at the propositional level, so comp is not yet refuted. My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem, but for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental science. If that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory of mind. That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, Only if you add some amount of magic in both the brain and matter: which one. I ask the theory, the math, not religious mantra like consciousness supervenes on the physical brain. Today materialist believe that consciousness sueprvenes on the rbain *because*
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 09 Jun 2015, at 18:53, meekerdb wrote: On 6/9/2015 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 19:45, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Everything (consistent) happens in the mind of some machines, but the laws are in the relative measure, provided notably by the logical intensional nuance brought by incompleteness. By consistent do you mean logically consistent; thus implying that no event can be nomologically inconsistent? That is the same as denying there is any such thing as laws of physics. A set of beliefs is consistent if it does not lead to a proof of a statement and its negation. By completeness we can say that a set of belief is consistent if there is a world satisfying those beliefs. It can be nomonological or not. And it has a different semantics according to which theory, or which intensional nuance of a provability predicate it is applied. We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip [i] i~p, for [i] being a material hypostase. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 12:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: As Brent has suggested. You simply contradict yourself here. You say It [comp] does not change physics, and If comp change the content of physics, and nature follows physics, it will be comp which has to be abandoned. The you say I show that comp has testable consequence in the content of the physical theories... I see how you make appear a contradiction. As I said, comp is true and then is confirmed by physics, or comp is refuted by physics, and on both case comp does not change physics. Just that comp is testable. These statements are mutually contradictory. If comp does not change the content of physical theories, then it will have no testable consequences. In *that*sense, comp change so much physics that it makes it into a branch of machine theology. Sure. OK. So your claim is that physics is recoverable from the computations of the dovetailer, and that if any of the physics so recovered contradicts physics as developed by the usual methods of science -- and tested by observation and experiment -- then that disproves comp. But then, later we have Comp makes physics NOT emulable by any machine a priori. Now if physics is not emulable by any machine, how is it to be recovered from the computations of the dovetailer? I am not at all clear what you mean by physics not being Turing emulable. Is this simply to do with the fact that Turing machines are digital, and physics assumes continuous variables -- real and complex numbers? Or is it, as you have said somewhere, that a machine cannot predict what result you will see when you perform a quantum experiment? As things stand, you do have a conflict here. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/9/2015 11:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You say that comp is useless, but what is your theory of mind. What is not Turing emulable in the brain? Its interaction with the universe. Of course that may be Turing emulable too, if the universe is. But in that case you've just emulated everything, and emulated consciousness supervenes on emulated brains. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/9/2015 11:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: We might defined nomological inconsistency by [i] ip [i] i~p, for [i] being a material hypostase. ?? What role does i play in the above? Are you assuming i implies p? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: On 10 June 2015 at 01:11, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain So (a) what actually is consciousness?, and (b) what is the answer to Maudlin and the MGA? Consciousness is that which you lose under anaesthesia, or a sufficiently severe blow to the head. Like many things, it is defined ostensively. It is not clear what you mean when you as what it actually is? Do you want a fully mechanistic account? Or a philosophical account? Or a neurological account? Or a personal account? What is the question of Maudlin and the MGA? Is a recording conscious? Produce one of the required type (a complete and accurate recording of normal conscious brain activity) and ask it. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. The neuro-science are based on comp. Unless you believe like Penrose that the neuron use a non computable ability to reduce the wave packet? is that the case? Is your theory Penrose theory? No, I don't believe that the neuron 'reduces the wave function'. But your claim that the neurosicences are based on comp is something of an overreach. The neurosciences are based on the study of the physical brain. Like most scientists, they do not have any particular metaphysical prejudices, and those that they do have seldom get in the way of their science. You seem to be asking me to provide a detailed mechanism for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is not my area, so I do not feel myself under any obligation to provide such a mechanistic account. I do feel, however, that I have the reciprocal right to ask you to produce the fortran program that instantiates your personal consciousness. You claim that it exists, so why not produce it? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers Easy but tedious, and distracting exercise. Show me how to emulate just K, that is the function which send (x, y) to x. it is not obvious this can be done, because y is eliminated, you need a black hole for it, and a proof that it does not evaporate. You are becoming a physicalist, Bruno! You seem to be concerned by Landauer's principle, and the difficulty of eliminating physical information. This is not a problem for a Turing machine. It is a finite state machine, so define one state as (x,y) and another as (x). Then the operation when the machine finds itself in the state (x,y) is to move to the state (x). Not a problem. Even a rock can do it! Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 09:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: Why not? If it can emulate a specific purpose Turning machine, it can emulate a universal Turing machine. I think Putnam's argument for unlimited pancomputationalism implies this. I am not convince by that argument. Show me a rock program computing the prime numbers. Show me a Turing machine that can compute the prime numbers and I can emulate that with a rock. For that matter, show me an arithmetical computer in Platonia computing the prime numbers. .. much less give any useful results for physics. No new one should be expected soon, but that was not the purpose at all. You can't blame a coffee machine for not doing tea. Well, if I drink only tea then I would consider a coffee machine totally useless and discard it without further thought! So for comp! You can do things with all the rigour you want, but if you can't extract any useful results, you are wasting your time. Perhaps this is the irreconcilable difference between the physicist and the mathematician. Yes, I am interested in a theory of everything, which means to me mainly a theory which does not eliminate consciousness. I saw that physicists avoid the question, but a bridge is born between math and cognitive science, thanks to theoretical computer science (a branch of math). I am not sure I see your point. Comp is not useless, comp is the actual theory of the materialists, and I show that contrary to a widespread belief: materialism and computationalism are incompatible (without adding non-comp magic). Comp is not presented as a solution, but as a problem. In the second part, I show the propositional solution, but you need to understand the problem before. Actually, I think that you have seen the problem, but want to conclude to much quickly that comp is false. The math part shows that this is premature, especially that QM confirms both the comp many-worlds/dreams, but also the quantum tautologies (until now). Comp does not confirm the many-worlds interpretation of QM. You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed. My feeling is that you are not interested in the mind-body problem, but for some reason want to keep physics as *the* fundamental science. If that is the case, you have to produce a non-comp theory of mind. That is less difficult that you might think. Consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, and was produced by evolution over the course of time by completely natural processes. The details of the operation of the brain, and its effect on consciousness, are the realm of study of the neurosciences. Computer scientists only ever confuse themselves over these quite simple matters. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Jun 2015, at 15:11, Bruce Kellett wrote: You appear to want to draw this conclusion from FPI. But in a discussion with Liz a while back, I challenged this interpretation of your teleportation thought experiments leading to FPI. It was readily shown that such thought experiments were completely orthogonal to quantum mechanics and the MWI. No, You stopped at step 4 (which is already better than John Clark). You need AUDA to get the math of the FPI, and to compare it to physics. We have answered this, but you come back again on what has already been explained in detail: please reread the posts. As I recall the discussion, you agreed that FPI in the teleportation experiments had nothing to do with MWI of quantum mechanics. You said that you had only ever raised MWI as an illustration to help those who were familiar with Everettian quantum mechanics to understand the concept of FPI. FPI in the teleportation scenarios, and later in the UDA, have nothing to do with the MWI of quantum mechanics, and one cannot be used to support or justify the other. Similarly for your attempt to bring quantum logic to your cause. Quantum logic was devised by von Neumann in the context of the collapse interpretation of QM, together with the use of projection operators. In Everettian many-worlds interpretations, there are no projection operators, and quantum logic does not have a footing. In fact, it has been pointed out that there is no such thing as a specifically quantum logic -- there is just ordinary predicate logic and a theory in which some operators do not commute. When you can derive the non-commutation of the position and momentum operators from comp, I might be a little more impressed. UDA formulates the problem, and by the way, the non-commutation of some observable is already proved. OK. For what set of quantum operators have you demonstrated non-commutation? Of course position and momentum are not yet derived, and it is not clear if they will be derived. If they are not, comp fails a crucial test Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6/8/2015 3:24 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Observation can't prove anything wrong about a theory that says everything happens in some universe. ;-) Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 08 Jun 2015, at 15:13, Bruce Kellett wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. No, it is not false. Even with comp. If the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension, than that structure is essential, whether it comes from primitive materialism or from comp, it cannot be avoided. If for no other reason than that is what we see when we look around us. I agree, if the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension. In that case it would have to follow from computationalism. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self- reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. So then why do we get too many aberrant dreams? You contradict yourself. If the necessary structure drops out easily from comp, then show it, and show why we see what we see and not the white rabbits. But that is what I have done. It *is* the entire subject of my enterprise. To show that at first sight comp looks crazy, with an inflation of dreams, and then to show that the theoretical computer science constraints are enough to put a structure giving sense to the normal measure. This means that comp does explain, today, both consciousness (A large part of it), and matter, as a stable appearance. Now, it would be astonishing that the first machine interview get the physics right, but u to now, it works. Not for doing physics (that has never been the goal), but for explaining where physics come from, in frame where consciousness is not eliminated. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. Is there a difference? There might be. We just cannot equate those things by decision. It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. In other words, you don't have a clue either. ? I am the one formulating the problem. Making it mathematical. Then the clues toward the solution is the object of the second part of the sane04 paper (or other papers, or the thesis). If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. If you don't get physical time, then your theory is a failure. Only if you have a proof of the existence of time. Then your theory is known to be a failure on consciousness, souls, intelligence, etc. And my theory is believed by everyone, if not by default most of the time. the negation of comp needs actual infnities, of very special sorts. That theory does not yet even exists. Evolution theory, molecular biology, quantum computing, all that relies on computationalism. I am not of the type of proposing new theories. I show that comp leads to a curious view of reality, but that up to now, Physics confirms it, including in its most weird aspect. Those are results. Unless you find a flaw, you have to deal with them. Getting subjective or mental time is not enough, since clocks do not run according to our subjective impression of the passage of time. Nor does the best clock ever: 0, 1, 2, 3, Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical,
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On Monday, June 8, 2015, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. No, it is not false. Even with comp. If the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension, than that structure is essential, whether it comes from primitive materialism or from comp, it cannot be avoided. If for no other reason than that is what we see when we look around us. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self-reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. So then why do we get too many aberrant dreams? You contradict yourself. If the necessary structure drops out easily from comp, then show it, and show why we see what we see and not the white rabbits. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. Is there a difference? It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. In other words, you don't have a clue either. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. If you don't get physical time, then your theory is a failure. Getting subjective or mental time is not enough, since clocks do not run according to our subjective impression of the passage of time. Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. On that last point, the conclusion is either that computationalism is false or the physical supervenience part of computationalism is false, as Bruno claims. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: What comp - or any theory of physics - has to show is that observers will experience the passage of time. SR for example posits a block universe, which at first sight might not seem to allow for us to experience time. But of course it does, even though the whole 4D structure is already there in some sense. The block universe idea is just a picturesque way of describing the way space and time are 'mixed up' (within the bounds of the light cone) by Lorentz transformations in special relativity. As I have said before, the important feature of the SR structure is that there is an absolute separation between spacelike and timelike surfaces or world lines. The subjective experience of time is not part of the relativistic model -- time is given by the behaviour of clocks, and specifically, clocks are physical systems that obey the laws of physics. The oscillations of certain defined transitions in the caesium atom are used to define the standard for physical time. Not because we crawl up world-lines as Weyl poetically put it, but because each moment along our world-line contains a capsule memory of earlier moments, but not later ones. The 'time capsule' idea is a recent proposal by Julian Barbour. Special relativity says nothing about such things. SR is, in fact, completely indifferent to the direction of time -- the equations are time symmetric. (The later ones are just as already there as the earlier ones, according to the theory, but the laws of physics are structured in a way that means they aren't accessible.) Similarly, comp needs to show that observer moments will contain memories of other observer moments, but only those that existed earlier in the sequences of computations that gave rise to the current moment. This isn't physical time, whatever that is, but it does involve that certain laws apply to computation. Well, maybe comp can do this, but it seems to me that it is more important to extract the behaviour of caesium atoms (physical clocks). The 1p experience of time comes from the fact that we are physical creatures embedded in a physical world that has a well-defined concept of time, given in terms of dynamical physical processes. Either comp can give this, or comp is totally useless. The 1p experience has to relate to intersubjective agreement (the 3p picture), or it cannot reproduce physics. None of this is known, or proven, of course, but the concept is well understood (as fro example in October the First is too Late) You should not get your physics from science fiction stories -- they are seldom a reliable source. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: You started with Tegmark's idea that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes. In fact that's what I said, too, so I'm hardly going to argue. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? Or whatever TOE underlies it, yes. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Of course. I hope we all agree that the finger isn't the Moon. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: LizR wrote: On 6 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that is still being debated. Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to this. In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold, and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this structure. This is not true. Causality is still a fundamental consideration in SR, and that carries over into the basic structure of quantum field theory. Even within the block universe model, the light cone structure of spacetime is fundamental. The light cone encapsulates the fundamental insight of SR that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the speed of light -- the light cone is the limiting extent of causal structure. The laws of physics consistent with this structure in SR and beyond are have a (local) Lorentz symmetry, which preserves the causal structure between different Lorentz frames. The distinction between time-like and space-like separations of events is aa fundamental tenet of physical law. None of this contradicts what I said. All I am concerned with is that SR indicates that events are embedded in a 4D continuum. Describing how they're embedded doesn't change that. You started with Tegmark's idea that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. Something proved to be the case, well before, in the case we assume computationalism. In that case, there is no more choice in the matter. tegmark assumption becomes (well was already before) a theorem of computationalist cognitive science. My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self-reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. Bruno Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: On 8 June 2015 at 13:30, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. No it isn't, not in the sense being used here. The concept that is relevant in this case is ontological priority. If you think emergence is temporal then you will get very confused by discussions of the MUH (or even of how the universe arises as a 4D manifold from the laws of physics) Which law of physics gives rise to the 4D manifold? It is my understanding that a 4D pseudo-Riemannian manifold was a basic postulate underlying general relativity -- if that hypothesis emerged from anything, then it came from the fact that space-time was observed to be a 4 dimensional structure. So the 4D manifold is not actually derived from anything other than observation. Kant made the mistake of thinking that Euclidean space was a necessary law of thought. Observation proved him wrong. Maybe observation also proves the MUH wrong? Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2015, at 03:30, Bruce Kellett wrote: My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- Well, this is doirectly false with comp, in the sense that all you need is the emulation of a brain of a person believing in time, and those exists all in the block mindscape constituted in a tiny part of arithmetic. No, it is not false. Even with comp. If the block universe is to have an inherent time dimension, than that structure is essential, whether it comes from primitive materialism or from comp, it cannot be avoided. If for no other reason than that is what we see when we look around us. we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. Yes, but that occurs easily, as we need only the brain emulation. The problem is that we get too much aberrant dreams, and thus an inflation of possibilities. But the math parts shows that self-reference put the eaxct constraints required to have a measure on the consistent continuations, even a quantum one. So then why do we get too many aberrant dreams? You contradict yourself. If the necessary structure drops out easily from comp, then show it, and show why we see what we see and not the white rabbits. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? It does not have to exist in arithmetic, it needs to be recoverable from the FPI in arithmetic. Is there a difference? It might exist in arithmetic, and not have the right measure. it might also not exist in arithmetic, but recoverable from the FPI. or both case can be true: it exists in arithmetic, and is recoverable from the FPI. In that case the measure would be computable, and I doubt this is possible, but fundamentally, it is an open problem. of course, approximation of it exists in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains all simulations of all physical phenomena, with 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, ... 100^100, ... decimals exact. In other words, you don't have a clue either. If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. We need only the dital time to get the digital brain emulation, to get the arithmetical mindscape. If a physical time emerges or not remains to be seen. Note that S4Grz1 and X1* logic already brought a subjective time. If you don't get physical time, then your theory is a failure. Getting subjective or mental time is not enough, since clocks do not run according to our subjective impression of the passage of time. Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Yes. Quite important. Even after the reversal, although physics is made purely arithmetical, it is only through machine's psychology and theology that this happens, and the science physics are explained to be different from the mathematical science. For example mathematical (arithmetical) existence is some thing like ExP(x), but physical existence is [2]2Ex [2]2P(x). Physics remains untouched by comp., except it is put on logico-arithmetical grounds. What change is physicalism in metaphysics. It becomes testable, and false if comp is true. But comp is false, as has been demonstrated by many observations. Strong AI, or the possibility that part or all of your brain can be emulated by a computer does not entail that consciousness is only a computation. Nor does it entail that only computations can be conscious. In fact, it is quite difficult to come up with a definition of computation such that only computers and brains perform computations. The structure of a Turing machine can be emulated by a rock, for instance. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: On 6 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that is still being debated. Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to this. In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold, and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this structure. This is not true. Causality is still a fundamental consideration in SR, and that carries over into the basic structure of quantum field theory. Even within the block universe model, the light cone structure of spacetime is fundamental. The light cone encapsulates the fundamental insight of SR that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the speed of light -- the light cone is the limiting extent of causal structure. The laws of physics consistent with this structure in SR and beyond are have a (local) Lorentz symmetry, which preserves the causal structure between different Lorentz frames. The distinction between time-like and space-like separations of events is aa fundamental tenet of physical law. None of this contradicts what I said. All I am concerned with is that SR indicates that events are embedded in a 4D continuum. Describing how they're embedded doesn't change that. You started with Tegmark's idea that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. My point was that in order for time to emerge from a block universe certain structure was necessary -- we need a 4-dim manifold with a local Lorentzian metric, and physical events must be arranged with a particular structure on this manifold -- they cannot just be arranged at haphazard. So the way events are embedded is in fact crucial. The question is then whether this 4 dimensional manifold with a local Lorentzian metric exists in arithmetic? If not, there is no possibility for a time variable in arithmetic per se, and consequently nothing can 'emerge' from arithmetic, since emergence is a temporal concept. Note that it is important to distinguish between structures that can be described mathematically and the structure of arithmetic or mathematics themselves. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
On 6 June 2015 at 11:26, Bruce Kellett bhkell...@optusnet.com.au wrote: LizR wrote: This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that is still being debated. Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to this. In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold, and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this structure. This is not true. Causality is still a fundamental consideration in SR, and that carries over into the basic structure of quantum field theory. Even within the block universe model, the light cone structure of spacetime is fundamental. The light cone encapsulates the fundamental insight of SR that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the speed of light -- the light cone is the limiting extent of causal structure. The laws of physics consistent with this structure in SR and beyond are have a (local) Lorentz symmetry, which preserves the causal structure between different Lorentz frames. The distinction between time-like and space-like separations of events is aa fundamental tenet of physical law. None of this contradicts what I said. All I am concerned with is that SR indicates that events are embedded in a 4D continuum. Describing how they're embedded doesn't change that. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
LizR wrote: This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that is still being debated. Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to this. In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold, and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this structure. This is not true. Causality is still a fundamental consideration in SR, and that carries over into the basic structure of quantum field theory. Even within the block universe model, the light cone structure of spacetime is fundamental. The light cone encapsulates the fundamental insight of SR that causal influences cannot propagate faster than the speed of light -- the light cone is the limiting extent of causal structure. The laws of physics consistent with this structure in SR and beyond are have a (local) Lorentz symmetry, which preserves the causal structure between different Lorentz frames. The distinction between time-like and space-like separations of events is aa fundamental tenet of physical law. Bruce Presumably the arrangement has abstract reasons (i.e. what we call the laws of physics, whatever they turn out to be). So even in SR, causality in effect takes a back seat, becoming the result of how observers are embedded in a timeless structure. Of course in this case, time still exists as a dimension, as it was in Newtonian physics. But even in Newtonian physics, Laplace imagined the past and future would be already there as far as a sufficiently godlike intellect was concerned. So Newton and Einstein imagined that events were embedded in a physical structure, but that they were already there in the sense of being emergent from the laws of physics plus initial conditions. ISTM that moving causation into a purely abstract realm is just one more step in this process, and a logical one (though obviously one that needs to be tested against reality). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Notion of (mathematical) reason
This is true if events have an existence apart from maths. However, that is still being debated. Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis suggests that time and events are emergent from an underlying timeless mathematical structure. To take something that is (hopefully) less contentious, the block universe of special relativity already suggests something similar to this. In relativity, all chains of events are embedded in a space-time manifold, and hence causation comes down to how world-lines are arranged within this structure. Presumably the arrangement has abstract reasons (i.e. what we call the laws of physics, whatever they turn out to be). So even in SR, causality in effect takes a back seat, becoming the result of how observers are embedded in a timeless structure. Of course in this case, time still exists as a dimension, as it was in Newtonian physics. But even in Newtonian physics, Laplace imagined the past and future would be already there as far as a sufficiently godlike intellect was concerned. So Newton and Einstein imagined that events were embedded in a physical structure, but that they were already there in the sense of being emergent from the laws of physics plus initial conditions. ISTM that moving causation into a purely abstract realm is just one more step in this process, and a logical one (though obviously one that needs to be tested against reality). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.