Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry, list: The technical report, "Applied Natural Language Relationships," is available on Research Gate at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332594223_Applied_Natural_Language_Relationships There are a number ideas addressed in this paper, including higher-order logic and the logical

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry, List: Version 2.0 of the Augmented Model-Exchange Isomorphism (AMEI 2.0) is available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332186969_Augmented_Model-Exchange_Isomorphism_v20 A new scope concept has been added to this version of the document. Another technical report, "Applied

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List: The topic of this comment is p.23 f of the transcript of Gary F. and the moving picture of thought in relation to the System of Existential Graphs. The System of Existential Graphs may be characterized with great truth as presenting before our eyes a moving picture of thought. Provided

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry: There are a number of conditions that are postponing a detailed response to your questions and comments. The primary issue is the fact that we are now in the process of updating AMEI from Version 1.1 to Version 2.0. The AMEI revision should be done in about two weeks, but we have a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

(List, This a both a correction of typos and an significant extension of the original post. As I continue to work on the Bedrock paper and the plethora of implications for modern scientific re-interpretations of CSP deep encoding of the semiotics of the chemical sciences, I plan to post

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, GaryF, Jon, John, Steven, Joseph S.: > On Mar 2, 2019, at 7:07 PM, Stephen Curtiss Rose wrote: > > "But this is not what I mean, nor what is generally meant, by a collection of > absolutely independent members. What I mean by that expression is that every > member is distinguished from

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry: It appears that the content of any reply that I created at this point in time, would not be compatible with typical Peirce List content. Take care, be good to yourself and have fun, Joe On Fri, Mar 22, 2019 at 9:45 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Joe,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Joe, List: > On Mar 21, 2019, at 6:43 PM, joseph simpson wrote: > > John Sowa's statements were given in the context of 'proposition analysis.' > > From the "Handbook of Discrete and Combinatorial Mathematics," page 5: > > "logically equivalent propositions: compound propositions that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry: Well, we are now making some minor progress, not precise progress but rough progress. You wrote: " JAS We simply prefer different but equally valid (and equally Peircean) analyses of a proposition--you throw everything possible into the predicate, leaving only an indicated subject; I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Joseph, List: O! It appears that I misread your question and that my statement was slightly ambiguous. Let us distinguish two meaning. Without going into my personal philosophy of mathematics, I offer the following: 1. Roughly speaking, a mathematical equivalence relation is defined

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry: It is a trivial question. You made the following statement: "Logical equivalence has a precise mathematical meaning." I asked: "What is the precise mathematical meaning of "logical equivalence?"" This should not present any undue stress on your ability to answer. It does not appear

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, Joseph: Exactly what is an equivalence relation? Is it possible for any two “instants” to be exactly the same as one another? Are we dealing with reality or merely mathematical jargon? Joseph Simpson post is very strange… Is he for or against the concept of “exact equivalence

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry: You wrote: "Logical equivalence has a precise mathematical meaning. No such equivalence relationship is possible, linguistically, either logically, propositionally, syntactically or semantically." What is the precise mathematical meaning of "logical equivalence?" Take care, be good to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, John > On Mar 20, 2019, at 8:34 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > JAS >> We simply prefer different but equally valid (and equally Peircean) >> analyses of a proposition--you throw everything possible into the >> predicate, leaving only an indicated subject; I throw everything >> possible into

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, John: > On Mar 21, 2019, at 10:07 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Peirce's terminology for EGs evolved over the years from 1897 to 1911. I believe that this judgment is a extraordinary shallow and incomplete view of the bedrock of CSP’s philosophy and particularly in the origin of his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, John > On Mar 20, 2019, at 3:14 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > On 3/20/2019 11:37 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: >> I thought a Medad was (by definition) a graph with no loose ends. > > NEM 3:164 (or p. 4 of eg1911.pdf) says > "A graph or graph instance having 0

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

I raise the matter because it has implications for phaneroscopy as well as EGs. Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa Sent: 20-Mar-19 16:15 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism On 3/20/2019 11:37 AM, <mailto:g...@gnusystems

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

On 3/20/2019 11:37 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: I thought a Medad was (by definition) a graph with no loose ends. NEM 3:164 (or p. 4 of eg1911.pdf) says "A graph or graph instance having 0 peg is a Medad." There are many places were Peirce says that a line of identity, by itself asserts

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Jon AS and Gary F, JAS > We simply prefer different but equally valid (and equally Peircean) > analyses of a proposition--you throw everything possible into the > predicate, leaving only an indicated subject;

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

John, List: It appears that our disagreements about all of this are and will remain intractable. We simply prefer different but *equally valid* (and equally Peircean) analyses of a proposition--you throw everything possible into the predicate, leaving only an indicated subject; I throw

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F, Francesco, and Jon AS, The puzzle is solved. I thank all three of you for forcing me to consider more passages by Peirce. They show how and why EGs are the Bedrock that determines where the stones fit in the mosaic. I took a fair amount of time to write this note because I plan to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, John: > On Mar 12, 2019, at 7:41 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Anything can be classified in an open-ended variety of ways for an > open-ended variety of reasons. This remark is rather strange for scientific pragmaticism. How one forms categories of thought is an extremely important

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

John, List: Not surprisingly, I agree completely with Francesco, but I still want to address a number of specific points for the record. JFS: Claim #1: He later rejected that term [quasi-predicate] because he changed his mind. He decided that 'Seme' should be defined as "subject or predicate"

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Francesco and Jerry LRC, Thanks for both of your comments. They are critical for resolving these issues. FB > In R 295, a draft of the "Prolegomena", Peirce says: > > CSP: The first member of the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Francesco and Jerry LRC, Thanks for both of your comments. They are critical for resolving these issues. FB In R 295, a draft of the "Prolegomena", Peirce says: CSP: The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

John, List may I be permitted to offer some further arguments in support of JAS's view of semes. In R 295, a draft of the "Prolegomena", Peirce says: The first member of the triplet, the “Seme,” embraces the logical Term, the Subject or Object of a sentence, everything of any kind, be it a man

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, John: > On Mar 11, 2019, at 7:53 AM, John F Sowa wrote: > > the word 'Term', which means 'predicate'. If my memory serves me correctly, the word “term" derives from the middle ages, perhaps Peter of Spain? It is a shortened form of the word “terminal” which simply represents the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F and Jon AS, GF Peirce’s classification of sciences is itself ambiguous... Hence the significance of Peirce claiming that logicians will have to study “the physiology of signs” simply because nobody else is going to do it (R 499 as quoted by Bellucci). This complicates the traditional

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

This makes some sense and I should have been clearer. Signs are a substance and the study of signs is the academic effort to understand them. Semiotics to me is vastly more than an academic effort to parse signs. I think the effort to parse Peirce is illustrative. Peirce is much more than I have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: Again, my point about Speculative Grammar is that it is a branch of Semeiotic, which is coextensive with the Normative Science of logic (in what you have called "the broader sense"). Whether Speculative Grammar as "Formal Semeiotic" is considered prescriptive or descriptive--I

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jon, the question of whether speculative grammar is properly normative may be irrelevant to your “bottom line”, but it is quite relevant to any practitioner of the science, because it determines whether his practice is prescriptive or descriptive. On the “Seme” issue I agree with you, but I

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., John, List: I will refrain from further debate about Peirce's classification of the sciences, since I find it incontrovertible that in CP 1.191 he explicitly equated the Normative Science of Logic with Semeiotic, including *all three* of its branches--Speculative Grammar, Critic, and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F and Jon AS. GF As for [the disputes], rather than taking sides on the issue, I prefer to attribute the dispute itself to the ambiguity of the words “phenomenology” and “semeiotic.” I agree. I'm writing a longer note that gets into some important issues that André De Tienne raises his

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

three Normative sciences. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 10-Mar-19 18:55 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > I acknowledge the ambigui

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

: 10-Mar-19 18:55 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary F., List: I acknowledge the ambiguity of words like "logic," "phenomenology," and "semeiotic" in Peirce's writings taken as a whole, and (especially) in ph

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: I acknowledge the ambiguity of words like "logic," "phenomenology," and "semeiotic" in Peirce's writings taken as a whole, and (especially) in philosophical discourse generally. However, the current topic of discussion is really quite narrow--where Semeiotic is situated in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jon Alen, Gary F, list, In general I agree with your response to John, just a small remark on your comment on Gary F. GF: Peirce never says that Semeiotic is a Normative Science ... there is no single context in Peirce where he applies all three of the words Normative, Logic and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 10-Mar-19 16:35 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary F., List: My reply to John Sowa addresses most of the points that you raised, but I will touch on a couple of items anyway. GF: “Normative laws

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: My reply to John Sowa addresses most of the points that you raised, but I will touch on a couple of items anyway. GF: “Normative laws” are those which determine whether a reasoning procedure is (1) good or bad, or (2) subserves an end or fails to do so, where (1) and (2) are

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

John, List: JFS: Peirce's 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 - 202) is his last complete version. I used it as the specification for nearly every solid and dotted line in the attached cspsci.png. Apparently not. What does that specific passage tells us quite plainly about

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Slight correction: Peirce does use the broader sense of “Logic” in CP 1.191 (EP2:260), in the later part of his “Classification,” but he does not distinguish between the two senses, nor does he refer to the broader sense as “Semeiotic” (as he does elsewhere). This confuses the two senses, and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa Sent: 10-Mar-19 04:00 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary R, Jon AS, and Gary F, Peirce's 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 - 202) is his last complete version. I used

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary R, Jon AS, and Gary F, Peirce's 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 - 202) is his last complete version. I used it as the specification for nearly every solid and dotted line in the attached cspsci.png. I took into account some of his earlier writings in order to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

On 3/9/2019 3:24 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: After all, Peirce sometimes suggests that the quasi-equivalent to pragmatism in 'ordinary' speech and thinking is critical-common sense. And, indeed, pragmaticism itself would seem to depend on it. I agree. Homo saps and their ancestors have existed

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

ral physiology of the non-logical >>> signs except the logician, who is obliged to do so, in some measure. ] R >>> 499 ISP 17-19, 1906 ] >>> >>> Peirce says here that it is up to logicians to study cenoscopic >>> meneiotics — not that semeiotics replaces logic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary R., List: Are you sure that you are in full agreement with this statement? JAS: There are "facts of phenomenology," but as soon as we begin analyzing these "familiar phenomena"--especially with respect to their "conformity ... to ends which are not immanent within" them--we are engaging in

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

eneral physiology of the non-logical >>> signs except the logician, who is obliged to do so, in some measure. ] R >>> 499 ISP 17-19, 1906 ] >>> >>> Peirce says here that it is up to logicians to study cenoscopic >>> meneiotics — not that semeiotics

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

term such as “theory of signs,” in connection with Logic as a normative science. “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” is a chimera of your own invention, Jon. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 8-Mar-19 22:30 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4] Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneat

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

gt;> classification, Semeiotic *replaces* Logic as a normative science. It is >> more accurate to say that Logic in the broad or “general” sense is >> coterminous with Semeiotic, and Logic in the narrow sense (Critic) is the >> normative part of that. None of the passages t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jon, Gary f, list, I have nothing at present to add to what Jon has written and only wish to note that I am in full agreement with him. Best, Gary R *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sat,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: GF: A *normative *science for Peirce (and as far as I know, for anyone who uses the word regularly) is one whose essence is to *make dualistic judgments* distinguishing good from bad, true from false, right from wrong, etc. Peirce quite explicitly *did not* define "normative

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

erm such as “theory of signs,” in connection with Logic as a > normative science. “Normative Logic as Semeiotic” is a chimera of your own > invention, Jon. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 8-Mar-19 22:30 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re:

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Sorry about the typo I missed (“meniotics”, fixed below). I should also add that normative logic (not formal logic) must be deployed by all sciences (including semeiotic) in the stage of their inquiry where they are obliged to test the truth of the inferences they make against their

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

r-19 22:30 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism John, List: JFS: Formal semeiotic is an application of logic to semeiotic. That application establishes for phenomenological categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns and their use in analyzing an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

John, List: JFS: Formal semeiotic is an application of logic to semeiotic. That application establishes for phenomenological categories of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns and their use in analyzing any whatever for the purpose of mapping the results to logic. I agree with the first sentence, but not the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

John, list, I do not see that semiotic has any place in Peirce's descriptions of and explications of phenomenology. See, for example: 1902 [c.] | Minute Logic: Chapter II. Section II. Why Study Logic? | CP 2.120 If this be so, and if the scheme of classification of the sciences that has been

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary R and Jon AS, Two comments on your comments. GR I would deeply question your placing semeiotics below phaneroscopy in such a diagram--applications of normative logic can occur in any science save mathematics. That's true. But all the data of *every* science comes from some observation

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

John, List: Just a brief response this time. No, really! :-) JFS: Peirce's classification of the sciences is fundamental for both the Bedrock thread and for the proposition thread. I revised the attached cspscience.png, which can be used as a map of the Bedrock. The diagram shows *Sowa's

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jon, Gary f, John, list, Formal logic represents an aspect of 'the simplest mathematics', the first branch of mathematics as John outlines it in his diagram (John, your extremely rich post arrived just as I was completing this message, and so I have only had a chance to quickly read through it

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

, but not all positive sciences are normative! Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 8-Mar-19 13:11 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary F., List: Where did you get that idea? Again, Semeiotic is a generalization of Normative Logic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: Where did you get that idea? Again, Semeiotic is a generalization of Normative Logic, not formal/mathematical logic. The latter is limited to necessary reasoning (*logica utens*) from ideal hypotheses, and thus lacks the "hard dualism" of the former. CSP: Now the mathematician

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

the general object of that attention, the Universe of Discourse.” Normative Logic? Formal? Neither? Or both? Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 8-Mar-19 09:54 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary F., List: As John Sowa has rightly

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: As John Sowa has rightly pointed out in the past, *formal *logic is not normative; Peirce situated it within Mathematics as "the science which draws necessary conclusions" from "proposition[s] imagined to be strictly true of an ideal state of things" (CP 3.558; 1898). As he put it

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

in a terminological dispute.) I was simply observing some differences between “The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism” and “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God”. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 7-Mar-19 12:44 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: Let me say at the outset that this post is not intended to engage in a terminological dispute, but rather simply to explain my own current usage. GF: To me, Peirce’s term “Logic as Semiotic” refers mainly to speculative grammar (and rhetoric) and not to normative Logic--although

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

of it, varies from person to person — but again, this is not something I’m prepared to argue for or against. It doesn’t matter that much to me. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 6-Mar-19 19:48 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary R., List

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: I am posting this separately because it does not bear directly on anything that we have been discussing so far under the thread topic. You used the quote from Peirce that I retained below to set the table for explaining how Cuts are not as iconic and analytical as Peirce initially

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary R., List: As Gary F. recently (and astutely) observed, I have a strong inclination toward attempting to *regularize *Peirce's terminology. It is part of my general process of seeking to understand his ideas better by trying to arrange them into a systematic framework--not necessarily

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: GF: From 1908 on, as far as I can tell, his presentations of EGs used the cuts for negation only, and dropped the issue of modality altogether. I agree; I suspect that Peirce eventually realized that the only "modality" capable of adequate *iconic *representation on a

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

up with a satisfactory answer to it. Maybe one will turn up later … Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 5-Mar-19 19:59 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary F., List: Upon further consideration, I would like to make two

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F, Jon, John, list, I have just recently returned from a trip abroad where I had little Internet access, and so I have only today read through once all the posts in this thread. I have found yours, Jon's and John's of particular interest. Your post today was especially valuable in helping to

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List, Peirce’s most complete draft of “The Bed-Rock Beneath Pragmaticism” (http://gnusystems.ca/Bedrock.htm) includes a long section beginning on p. {31} about the problems with Selectives as components of the system of Existential Graphs. Selectives were introduced in the 1906 Prolegomena at

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

List: I wish to thank John for his truly remarkable comments (below). >From your personal history, John, and the extra-ordinarily professional >credentials of both you and your esteemed colleague, and your extensive >training and experience in multiple disciplines, I congratulate you, on your

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

On 3/5/2019 4:15 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: the newly transcribed Bedrock manuscript concerning the role of subjects and predicates in the Bedrock as contrasted with the Artificial Intelligent Interpretations of John Sowa. There is much more to say about the Bedrock, but I just wanted to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

t; I look forward to reading what you have to say about Cuts, especially > given your claim that it "spells trouble for the whole system of EGs." Are > you perhaps referring to Peirce's remarks in R 300 about the inadequacy of > representing "the concept of *Sequence*" as &quo

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jerry - thanks for your very interesting and insightful outline. Edwina On Tue 05/03/19 4:15 PM , Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com sent: Gary F., List: Gary, thank you very very much for your transcription of Bedrock text. When time permits, I may comment in

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Am I alone in thinking the list has been hijacked by dialog that is simply too repetitive to attend to. If we cannot have a discussion on which there is agreement on any issue then there is no discussion. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 4:15 PM Jerry LR Chandler <

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: Gary, thank you very very much for your transcription of Bedrock text. When time permits, I may comment in greater detail on the chemical aspects, since these aspects play a deep role in the necessity of embedding CSP logical style either within the logical style of organic

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

gards, Jon S. On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 7:35 AM wrote: > Jon, my responses inserted. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt > *Sent:* 4-Mar-19 18:05 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism > > >

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jon, my responses inserted. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: 4-Mar-19 18:05 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary F., List: GF: Is it not remarkable that after working with EGs for over 10 years, including lecturing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: GF: Is it not remarkable that after working with EGs for over 10 years, including lecturing and publishing about them, he should be so unsure of his ability to describe the System or even state its purpose? I suspect that it was quite clear in his own mind, and the struggle was

RE: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Jon, list, I will quote below the specific text to which I was referring as the one in which Peirce explains the relationship between his Existential Graphs and his phenomenological “categories” or experiential Universes, with a few ellipses and my comments interspersed. [[ in regard to the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Gary F., List: GF: I finally found (just as I was on the point of giving up) a text in which Peirce explains the relationship between his Existential Graphs and his phenomenological “categories” (or experiential Universes, as he calls them there). As mentioned in several recent posts, I have

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

"But this is not what I mean, nor what is generally meant, by a collection of absolutely independent members. What I mean by that expression is that every member is distinguished from every other by possessing some one or another elementary and definite non-relative character which that other does

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism

Dear Peirce and list, If in the past, you could only say walking upon a bog, this ground seems to hold for the present- but now is transformed into ‘Bed-rock beneath Pragmaticism’; then I must conclude you did converge in your opinion and have come to truly believe it. Granted, the genius