Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Actually, I have no problem with this if it is seen that action values (ethics) are 2. I am more interested in whether and what Peirce saw as the basis for a universal pedagogy which I believe is implicit in his thought. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Wed, Aug 15, 2018 at 10:22 AM, Jon Alan Sch

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Charles, List: I apologize for being blunt, but we had a rather lengthy and somewhat contentious List discussion of this topic just last week, so I was hoping that a brief summary would suffice. Here are links to a few of the key exchanges for anyone interested in reviewing the details. https://

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, I don't find your blunt assertion that action is only at the level of 2ns to be responsive to my point. One utters speech in order to perform a speech act in language. Speech is a physical phonetic phenomenon that can be taken to be and is action at the 2ns level, but speech is performe

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Charles, List: No, the *action *of uttering a Sign is at the level of 2ns. As an *Instance *of the Sign, it is an *occurrence* in which a Sign-*Replica *determines some Quasi-mind to a *Dynamic *Interpretant--an *actual *feeling, exertion, or further Sign-Replica. Any language consists of such T

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

John S., List: JFS: Unless anyone can find later evidence that Peirce switched back to 'tone', I would consider 'mark' to be his final choice. It might depend on exactly which date in late December 1908 we assign to EP 2:488-489, where Peirce used "Mark" twice. The preceding *written *date is

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

John, List, I too agree with Gary f and JAS that choosing 'mark' rather than 'tone' is a judgment call. A number of weeks (months?) ago when this was first discussed on the list I also mentioned that there was perhaps some pedagogical value in having three 't's': tone/token/type. But of much gre

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

On August 14, 2018 at 3:41 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: When one performs a speech act, in the sense used by Austin, such as promising, or asserting, is that not action at the level of thirdness? Isn't the essence of the doing of something in language an act? > > > John, list > > Ther

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

John S., List: JFS: Unless anyone can find a later version, his 1908 choice of 'mark' must be considered definitive. I am inclined to agree with Gary F. that this is a judgment call. In fact, given my current concern with emphasizing that (strictly speaking) every Sign is a Type, the fact that

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

o: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary and Edwina, GF > I think it’s important to recognize your preference for “mark” > over “tone” as a term in semiotics or ontology is a strictly personal > preference (rather than a logical princi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Gary F., List: GF: But evidently you are not testing it in that way, but rather “trying it out” as a proposed *improvement over* Peirce’s actual usage, in the sense that it offers greater clarity and thus facilitates the systematic explication of what is going on whenever an event of concrete se

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; } John, list There's a difference between technical terminology and natural language. When we use words - and this includes references to Peirce's work - we don't always mean the technical term but the na

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

might have made in his last change of mind. Gary f. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa Sent: 13-Aug-18 23:22 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary F and Jon AS, Thanks for the comments. They're co

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Alan Schmidt Sent: 13-Aug-18 22:49 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary F., List: Peirce indeed referred repeatedly to Tokens as Signs, but I believe that this was a form of shorthand. Just like he acknowledged using "word" in two

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

. -Original Message- From: John F Sowa Sent: 13-Aug-18 23:22 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary F and Jon AS, Thanks for the comments. They're consistent with what I said in my previous note. Gary > the earliest t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina This isn’t a matter of suggestions. There is a massive, technical literature on the evolution of writing systems. And yes like ALL inventions Seqouia’s emerged from a cultural context. His syllabary is in fact demonstrably superior in ease of acquistion to either Chinese logographic or E

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Dan, list I suggest that Sequoia's development of a syllabary in the 19th c, for Cherokee - was quite different from the other written language and mnemonic methods used by large populations in earlier times. Sequoia was aware of the written language used by settlers - and devel

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Written language has only been invented a handful of times in world history. It was never invented for English, for example, but adapted from a pre-existing system invented by others. It was invented separately by Sequoia, for his language - Cheokee. Not a large civilization. Sequoia’s syllaba

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Gary F and Jon AS, Thanks for the comments. They're consistent with what I said in my previous note. Gary the earliest text I’ve found where Peirce uses the term “token”: CSP, late 1904 (EP2:326) including under the term “sign” every picture, diagram, natural cry, pointing finger, wink, kno

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Gary F., List: Peirce indeed referred repeatedly to Tokens as Signs, but I believe that this was a form of shorthand. Just like he acknowledged using "word" in two different senses, he also used "Sign" in two different senses. Just like embodying a Graph (Type) in a Graph-Instance (Token) is scr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

John S., List: I agree that when Peirce wrote in 1904 that "a sign is not a real thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*," he was pointing toward what he later called a Type and its Tokens, respectively. This is the basis for my interpretative hypothesis that every Sign is a Type,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

rce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing On 8/13/2018 1:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: >> JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. > > It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of > the thread is to expl

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

I also agree. To twist Ernst Haeckel's saying: ontology does not recapitulate philology, contra Derrida. Gene H On Mon, Aug 13, 2018, 3:20 PM Mary Libertin wrote: > I agree. With you, and with my interpretation of Sternfeldt. > > > On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:18 PM Daniel L Everett > wrote:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

I agree. With you, and with my interpretation of Sternfeldt. On Mon, Aug 13, 2018 at 3:18 PM Daniel L Everett wrote: > Derrida is completely wrong. Both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. > Besides doing field research on Amazonian languages that lack any form of > writing, I have written ex

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Derrida is completely wrong. Both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. Besides doing field research on Amazonian languages that lack any form of writing, I have written extensively on language evolution. I have heard Derrida’s unfortunate claim before. https://www.amazon.com/gp/aw/d/0307386120

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon A S and list, I find this discussion interesting. I have no thesis, instead just some observations for possible discussion. Peirce in EP 2:488, as previously quoted, writes that the tinge/tone/mark precedes the token/type. Are three senses possibly being alluded to: sight, sound, and touch?

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

John S., List: JFS: I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. It is a direct quote from Peirce (EP 2:303; 1904), and the point of the thread is to explicate it. JFS: Since mark is his final choice, I'll use mark instead of tinge or tone. In the referenced passage, Peirce stated

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

It also includes the consciousness (interpretant / 3n) which says, ‘That rockfall appears to be accidental,’ until further study accounts for it. Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com 303 747 4449 [cid:AE1F85A5-73CE-47F9-B178-3A6DEC85D9B0@hsd1.co.comcast.ne

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Martin- yes - I agree. That means that the interaction between two individual entities functions within both 2ns and 3ns. Sometimes it is only within 2ns, as an accidental rock-fall but even that, includes 3ns as to how the grass that the rock fell on - interprets/reacts to the falling r

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

What sets Peirce apart from analytic philosophy is his acknowledgment that the INTERaction (of individual actualities) is general/lawful, and it is real. Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD 303 747 4449 On Aug 9, 2018, at 12:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> wrote: JAS, list What is g

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Gary, List, 'Binding' and 'sense' are direct terms used in the Peirce quote cited. BTW, I was NOT claiming that action-reaction are not related to 2ns, nor are a basis for 3ns. Mike On 8/9/2018 10:30 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Mike, List: I understand your point. In fact, I used to treat "Sign-action" as a synonym for semiosis, before discovering that Peirce *never *used that particular term, at which point I stopped doing so. Since you mentioned "triadic action," I wondered if Peirce ever used *that *term; and as it

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

I believe that the subject line blurs too many issues. In various writings over the years, Peirce wrote about real possibilities. He also wrote about laws as real. In writing about modality, he distinguished three universes: the possible, the actual, and the necessitated. Actual existence is j

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Mike, Jon, Edwina, List, Mike wrote: "Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural language, including what is meant by the word 'action'." Please offer some context and some textual support for your notion that '

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, On 8/9/2018 7:11 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: Mike, List: Natural language indeed exhibits a lot of flexibility--again, all general Signs are indeterminate to some degree.  That is precisely why I advocate caref

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Mike, List: Natural language indeed exhibits a lot of flexibility--again, all general Signs are indeterminate to some degree. That is precisely why I advocate carefully selecting and defining the *technical *terms that we use in collaborative inquiry; and on the Peirce List, it seems to me that w

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Dear list, Logic is rooted in the social principle. Women were expected to have weak opinions; but the great safeguard of society and of domestic life was, that opinions were not acted on. Sane people did what their neighbors did, so that if any lunatics were at large, one might know and avo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, Edwina, List, Are not 'binding' and 'sense' expressions of action, both Peirce's words for Thirdness? There are many ways to interpret natural language, including what is meant by the word 'action'. Mike On 8/9/2018 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina, List: ET: And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action. Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8 No, he did not; at least, certainly not in the cited passage. In fact, this is a blatantly inaccurate paraphr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, Edwina, list, Jon wrote in his messaged posted just prior to this: JAS: My concern has been and remains to be faithful to Peirce's usage of terminology as we proceed with such efforts. As difficult as being "faithful to Peirce's usage of terminology" is given his tendency to modify it over

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }JAS, list And Peirce referred to cognition, to Thirdness, as an action. Synthetic consciousness, mediation, is not a passive consciousness [which is 1ns] but is active. 1.377/8 That is, semiosis as a proc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina, List: ET: I think that JAS uses the term 'interact' to refer only to an action between two actualities, two existent 'things'. Yes, and why is that? Because *Peirce* used the term "interact," as well as "act" and "react," to refer only to an action between two actualities, two existent

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina, List: ET: I acknowledge your specification of terms - though I continue to differentiate, terminologically, between the Sign [IO-R-II] and the Representamen and think it a rather important distinction. Understood, although we should also acknowledge that this is not a distinction that P

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

in the semiotic theory--especially when it comes to noticing surprising phenomena that are more accidental in character. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 - F

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina, List: The point is that according to Peirce, as demonstrated by those quotations, *only *existential particulars can interact, and *only *with other existential particulars. A general cannot interact with anything *as a general*, so it does not interact with existential particulars; inste

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

n indexical legisign (a > general type of sign) for this fellow, even if it is an erroneous sign in > some respects? > > > I raise this somewhat fanciful example because Peirce clearly holds that > most of the relations that hold between the facts in this world are, to > som

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jeff, List: My interpretative hypothesis is not intended to have any effect on Sign classification, other than a particular understanding of the one trichotomy that corresponds to the Sign itself. I am proposing that it is best conceived as a division according to the (phenomenological) "Mode of

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

rprising phenomena that are more accidental in character. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ------------- From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Wednesday, August 8,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina, List: Any word with "act" as its root implies *actuality*, which is 2ns. CSP: Let us begin with considering actuality, and try to make out just what it consists in. If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening *then* and *th

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

__ From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Wednesday, August 8, 2018 6:08 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing Gary R., List: GR: ... imagining that the word 'the' was once first spoken (or written, but more likely I think, spoken), what wa

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }JAS, list I wasn't referring at all to the difference between reality and existence - and as I said in my post, I was indeed talking about Thirdness as mediation in a Legisign role. Obviously, then, I agree that t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina, List: I suppose we can say that a Type depends on its Tokens for its *existence*, but certainly not for its *Reality*, because the mode of Being of a Type is not reaction (2ns) but mediation (3ns). Consequently, I still think we should avoid saying that a Type "interacts" with its Tokens,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Edwina, List, As an example of growth in complexity in networked connections. I have been pondering the question whether the legisign of the spoken and written forms are of one or of two types. We can observe that the tokens of the spoken forms differ from the written ones. So they do depend

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Gary R., List: GR: ... imagining that the word 'the' was once *first* spoken (or written, but more likely I think, spoken), *what* was the type that that first spoken "the" was token of, *where* does one locate *its* reality? Where does one "locate" the Reality of *any *general Type? *Every *

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon AS, Gary f, Jon wrote: JAS: I am currently adopting the specific point of view that all Signs are Types and seeing how far I can get with that interpretative hypothesis. I am tending to find myself more and more disposed toward your line of thinking, Jon, especially as articulated in your l

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Gary F., List: GF: I think the more charitable approach is to say that Peirce’s usage of terms varies with its context--as indeed it must in order to keep the focus of the argument on the same object (semiosis) while investigating various aspects of it from various points of view. I agree, and

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A Sign Is Not a Real Thing

Jon, If you choose to take Peirce’s terminology during the “New Elements” period as your baseline, and say that his usage at other times was “inconsistent” with that, I won’t try to talk you out of it. I’m just pointing out that it would be equally reasonable (and equally uncharitable) to say t