RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[gnox]

Mike,

 

There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually identify semiosis with 
Representation and thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being general 
laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there is CP 5.105, EP 
2:184):

[[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for Representation, to which 
I prefer the less colored term because its suggestions are not so narrow and 
special as those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say that a 
general principle that is operative in the real world is of the essential 
nature of a Representation and of a Symbol because its modus operandi is the 
same as that by which words produce physical effects. ]]

 

Gary f.

 

From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Hi List,

I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics" 
in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this quote:

"One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis (semeiosis), is 
human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever there is life and there is some 
reason to believe that even the laws of nature are semiotic products." 
(emphasis added)

I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551), but do not recall 
seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate nature other than crystals. Does 
anyone on the list know of others?

Thanks!

Mike

[1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The Routledge Companion 
to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 89–100.


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary f, List,
I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and
  the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question
  well. Are there passages from Peirce where he specifically
  connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than the passing
  reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely
  believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it
  anywhere stated something like that?
I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or
  semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear, though
  suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little
  more to the point, but still vague. I do like the fact this comes
  up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, pretty
  thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.

Thanks!
Mike


On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM,
  g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:


  
  
  
  
Mike,
 
There are plenty of passages in Peirce which
virtually identify semiosis with Representation and thus
with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being general
laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there
is CP 5.105, EP 2:184):
[[
Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for
Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term
because its suggestions are not so narrow and special as
those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say
that a general principle that is operative in the real world
is of the essential nature of a Representation and of a
Symbol because its modus operandi is the same as
that by which words produce physical effects. ]]
 
Gary f.
 

  
From: Mike Bergman
[mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
  

 
Hi List,
I was reading Nathan
  Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics"
  in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this quote:
"One of the principal
  realms of sign activity, or semiosis (semeiosis), is human
  thought; but semiosis prevails wherever there is life and
  there is some reason to believe that even the laws of
nature are semiotic products." (emphasis added)
I am aware of the
  reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551), but do not
  recall seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate
  nature other than crystals. Does anyone on the list know
  of others?
Thanks!
Mike
[1] Houser, N., “Peirce,
  Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The Routledge Companion to
  Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, 2010, pp.
  89–100.
  

  


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[gnox]

Mike,

 

I don’t see how it could get more specific than that, when Peirce says “All 
this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol” (CP 5.107).

 

If that’s vague, maybe that’s why Nathan Houser wrote that “there is some 
reason to believe that even the laws of nature are semiotic products.”

 

Gary f.

 

From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
Sent: 9-Dec-17 18:51
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Hi Gary f, List,

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the tendencies 
to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are there passages from 
Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than 
the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely 
believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere 
stated something like that?

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or semiosis in the 
context of my question to be unclear, though suggesting it was helpful. I read 
on and found CP 5.107 a little more to the point, but still vague. I do like 
the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, 
pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.

Thanks!

Mike

 

On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  wrote:

Mike,

 

There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually identify semiosis with 
Representation and thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being general 
laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there is CP 5.105, EP 
2:184):

[[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for Representation, to which 
I prefer the less colored term because its suggestions are not so narrow and 
special as those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say that a 
general principle that is operative in the real world is of the essential 
nature of a Representation and of a Symbol because its modus operandi is the 
same as that by which words produce physical effects. ]]

 

Gary f.

 

From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Hi List,

I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics" 
in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this quote:

"One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis (semeiosis), is 
human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever there is life and there is some 
reason to believe that even the laws of nature are semiotic products." 
(emphasis added)

I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551), but do not recall 
seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate nature other than crystals. Does 
anyone on the list know of others?

Thanks!

Mike

[1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The Routledge Companion 
to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 89–100.


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Gary f,
Well, the referent to "all this" is pretty vague and "manner in
  which the laws of nature influence matter" is pretty vague, and in
  any case, a span of applicability from the Big Bang to all the way
  up to animate life is mighty broad to hang this "specific"
  statement on. Like I said, very helpful, but still seems like thin
  gruel. :) I guess to this I could add the crystal off-hand
  reference. :)

I DO appreciate your finding the quote!
Mike


On 12/9/2017 6:21 PM,
  g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:


  
  
  
  
Mike,
 
I don’t see how it could get more specific than
that, when Peirce says “All
this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of
nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a
general formula or symbol” (CP 5.107).
 
If that’s vague, maybe that’s why Nathan Houser
wrote that “there
  is some reason to believe
that even the laws of nature are semiotic products.”
 
Gary f.
 

  
From: Mike Bergman
[mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
Sent: 9-Dec-17 18:51
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
        Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
  

 
Hi Gary f, List,
I am generally familiar with the general references for laws
  and the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my
  question well. Are there passages from Peirce where he
  specifically connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than
  the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that
  Peirce likely believed the laws of nature to be subject to
  semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something like that?
I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs
  or semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear,
  though suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107
  a little more to the point, but still vague. I do like the
  fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of
  Thirdness. Still, pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong
  as the evidence gets.
Thanks!
Mike
 

  On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:


  Mike,
   
  There are plenty of passages in Peirce which
  virtually identify semiosis with Representation and thus
  with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being general
  laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there
  is CP 5.105, EP 2:184):
  [[
  Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for
  Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term
  because its suggestions are not so narrow and special as
  those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say
  that a general principle that is operative in the real
  world is of the essential nature of a Representation and
  of a Symbol because its modus operandi is the same
  as that by which words produce physical effects.
  ]]
   
  Gary f.
   
  

  From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com]
  
  Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
  To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

  
   
  Hi List,
  I was reading Nathan
Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics"
in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this
quote:
  "One of the principal
realms of sign activity, or semiosis (semeiosis), is
human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever there is
life and there is some reason to believe that even the laws
  of nature are semiotic products." (emphasis added)
  I am aware of the
reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551), but do not
recall seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate
nature other than crystals. Does anyone on the list know
of others?
  Thanks!
  Mike
  [1] Houser, N., “Peirce,
Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The Routledge Companion
to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, 2010,
pp. 89–100.

  


  


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Mike - it's all through his work. References to both organic and
inorganic matter as expressions of the semiosic function of Mind.

"what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind
hidebound with habits' 6.158

"If I make atoms swerve - as I do- I make tem swerve but very very
little, because I conceive they are not absolutely dead. And by that
I do not mean exactly that I hold them to be physically such as the
materialists hold them to e, only with a small does of sentiency
superadded...But what I mean is, that for all there  is, is First
Feelings; Second, Effots; Third, habits - all of which are more
familiar to us on their psychical side - than on their physical side;
and that dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete
induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute
irrationality of effort to completely death'. 6.201.

See his discussion of protoplasm [admittedly it is organic] 6.250
and on..and he talks about the molecules that make up this protoplasm
as taking habits.

"The truth is that, thought the molecular explanation of habit is
pretty vagueon the mathematical side, there can be no doubt that
systems of atoms having polar orces would act substantially in that
manner and the explanation is even too satisfactory to suite the
convenience of an advocate of tychism. For it may fairly be urged
that since the phenomena of habit may thus result from a purely
mechanical arrangement, it is unnecessary to suppose that
habit-taking is a primordial principle of the universe." and he
continues on...and "presents evidence of a primordial habit-taking
tendency. Now, those who insist on the doctrine of necessity will for
the most part insist that the physical world is entirely individual.
Yet law involves an element of generality. Now, to say that
generality is primordial, but generalization not, is like saying that
diversity is primordial but diversification not...6.263. 

I would suggest that this entire section - dealing with the atoms
and molecules of the protoplasm will show you semiosis within
physical matter. 

"All mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, and
acts in a more or less regular way; so that all mind more or less
partakes of the nature of matter. Hence, it would be a mistake to
conceive of the psychical and the physical aspects of matter as two
aspects absolutely distinct'mechanical laws are nothing but
acquired habits'..6.268

In 6.269 - he talks about the action of habit - and atoms. 

In A Guess at the Riddle, 1.400 and on - he talks about the Triad in
Physics. It's obviously too long to quote - but - he says that all
three categories are operative in  this realm...'spontaneity or
lawless originality mingles...with law everywhere. 1.407 Certainly,
he explains thirdness or habit-taking in this realm...but..that
'slight aberration from the law' continues..In 1.411 - he discusses
the habits of an atom..

As I said - it's all through his work and it's difficult to find ALL
the references - but these two sections might help.

Edwina
 On Sat 09/12/17  5:25 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
Hi List, 

I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce,
Phenomenology, and Semiotics" in the Routledge Companion [1] and 
   came across this quote:
"One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis
(semeiosis), is human thought; but semiosis prevails wherever
there is life and there is some reason to believe that even the   
 laws of nature are semiotic products." (emphasis added)
I am aware of the reference to crystals and bees (CP 4.551),
but do not recall seeing Peirce references to signs in inanimate  
  nature other than crystals. Does anyone on the list know of
others? 

Thanks! 

Mike 

[1] Houser, N., “Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics,” The 
   Routledge Companion to Semiotics, P. Cobley, ed., London ; New   
 York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 89–100.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Everett, Daniel]

I agree with Stephen, to a large degree, though he states it stronger than I 
might.

I have written extensively on the absence of instincts. Two book-length studies:

https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X/ref=sr_1_5?ie=UTF8&qid=1512918473&sr=8-5&keywords=daniel+everett

https://www.amazon.com/Language-Cultural-Daniel-L-Everett/dp/0307473805/ref=sr_1_4?ie=UTF8&qid=1512918473&sr=8-4&keywords=daniel+everett


There is also this very good book by Marc Blumberg:

https://www.amazon.com/Basic-Instinct-Behavior-Mark-Blumberg/dp/1560256591/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1512918543&sr=1-1&keywords=basic+instinct+blumberg

My book in progress on Peirce’s epistemology for Oxford U Press, deals with the 
concept of “instinct” in Peirce and other earlier writers (e.g. Hume). Though 
sometimes their ideas of instinct overlapped slightly with what many 
contemporary nativists believe, in general their use of the term is quite 
different.

Dan



On Dec 10, 2017, at 10:05 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au>> wrote:

List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL 
organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems. What one 
might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than 
a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small 
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish 
behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting 
it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were that of 
a man.

And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed blueprint 
for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. 
That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not what 
"determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and 
molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body 
predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, 
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are 
the product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind my 
previously-referenced article, Quantum 
Semiotics<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>.

While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis and 
pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its 
original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean miners who 
were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) looks from the sky, 
at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol 
of freedom for the miners to achieve:

I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards


From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature


Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to its 
functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each 
of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories.

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic 
quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But 
semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a 
relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with 
another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out, 
confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both spontaneity 
[Firstness]  and also, Mind or Thirdness.

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal simply 
increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms such that Mind 
both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a key semiosic 
interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction 
is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[John Collier]

I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he came 
to realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient (especially 
input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are open-ended on this 
account and not reducible to input-output relations (they are complexly 
organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that 
there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar 
irreducibility.


I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but 
there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly 
Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.


John


On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:


List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be 
helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. 
No such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from 
their ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in 
other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options 
(analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide 
ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly 
as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it 
another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were 
that of a man.


And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed 
blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to 
atoms and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and 
subatomic forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular 
properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how 
to be", in accordance with their own mind-body predispositions... 
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, imho... and 
nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic 
forces are the */product/* of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the 
motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics 
<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>. 



While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in 
semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El 
Condor Pasa. In its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a 
group of Andean miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor 
(condor mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies 
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of freedom for 
the miners to achieve:


I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards

*From:*Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
*Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
*To:* g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Mike Bergman

*Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers 
to its functioning as a triadic process: 
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in any one 
of the three modal categories.


Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a 
basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by 
atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal 
category]. It is a relational or interactive process where one 'bit' 
of matter interacts with another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as 
Peirce frequently pointed out, confined to mechanical interactions 
[Secondness], but includes both spontaneity [Firstness]  and also, 
Mind or Thirdness.


But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a 
crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, 
are its atoms such that Mind both attracts and organizes this 
expansion. The latter is a key semiosic interaction. [though I would 
say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction is also semiosic - 
with each node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But organization of 
the results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.


Edwina



*On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com 
<mailto:m...@mkbergman.com> sent:*


Hi Gary f, List,

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and
the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question
well. Are there passages fro

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm
refers to its functioning as a triadic process:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in any
one of the three modal categories.

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a
basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by
atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal
category]. It is a relational or interactive process where one 'bit'
of matter interacts with another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as
Peirce frequently pointed out, confined to mechanical interactions
[Secondness], but includes both spontaneity [Firstness]  and also,
Mind or Thirdness. 

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a
crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are
its atoms such that Mind both attracts and organizes this expansion.
The latter is a key semiosic interaction. [though I would say that a
simple mechanical triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each
node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But organization of the
results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.

Edwina
 On Sat 09/12/17  6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:
Hi Gary f, List, 

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and
  the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question  
well. Are there passages from Peirce where he specifically  
connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than the passing  
reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely 
 believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it 
 anywhere stated something like that? 

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or  
semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear, though  
suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little 
 more to the point, but still vague. I do like the fact this comes
  up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, pretty 
 thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.
Thanks! 

Mike
 On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM,   g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
Mike, 
There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually
identify semiosis with Representation and thus with
Thirdness, and the laws of nature being general laws,
Thirdness is predominant in them. For instance there is
CP 5.105, EP 2:184): 

[[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym for  
  Representation, to which I prefer the less colored term 
   because its suggestions are not so narrow and special as   
 those of the word Representation. Now it is proper to say
that a general principle that is operative in the real world  
  is of the essential nature of a Representation and of a 
   Symbol because its modus operandi is the same as that
by which words produce physical effects. ]] 
Gary f. 
From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 
 Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature  
  
Hi List, 

I was reading Nathan   Houser's piece on "Peirce,
Phenomenology, and Semiotics"   in the Routledge
Companion [1] and came across this quote: 

"One of the principal   realms of sign activity, or
semiosis (semeiosis), is human   thought; but semiosis
prevails wherever there is life and   there is some
reason to believe that even the laws of nature are
semiotic products." (emphasis added) 

I am aware of the   reference to crystals and bees (CP
4.551), but do not   recall seeing Peirce references to
signs in inanimate   nature other than crystals. Does
anyone on the list know   of others? 

Thanks! 

Mike 

[1] Houser, N., “Peirce,   Phenomenology, and
Semiotics,” The Routledge Companion to   Semiotics, P.
Cobley, ed., London ; New York: Routledge, 2010, pp.  
89–100.

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL 
organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems. What one 
might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than 
a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small 
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish 
behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting 
it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were that of 
a man.

And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed blueprint 
for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. 
That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not what 
"determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and 
molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body 
predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, 
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are 
the product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind my 
previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics 
<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> 
. 

While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis and 
pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its 
original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean miners who 
were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) looks from the sky, 
at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol 
of freedom for the miners to achieve:

I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to its 
functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each 
of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories.

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic 
quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But 
semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a 
relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with 
another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out, 
confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both spontaneity 
[Firstness]  and also, Mind or Thirdness. 

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal simply 
increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms such that Mind 
both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a key semiosic 
interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical triadic interaction 
is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But 
organization of the results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness.

Edwina

 

On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com sent:

Hi Gary f, List,

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the tendencies 
to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are there passages from 
Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or signs to nature, other than 
the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can infer that Peirce likely 
believed the laws of nature to be subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere 
stated something like that?

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or semiosis in the 
context of my question to be unclear, though suggesting it was helpful. I read 
on and found CP 5.107 a little more to the point, but still vague. I do like 
the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of Thirdness. Still, 
pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong as the evidence gets.

Thanks!

Mike

 

On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca 
  wrote:

Mike,

 

There are plenty of passages in Peirce which virtually identify semiosis with 
Representation and thus with Thirdness, and

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is
not reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness].

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier ag...@ncf.ca sent:
I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he   
   came to realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient   
   (especially input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are  
open-ended on this account and not reducible to input-output  
relations (they are complexly organized, as Cliff Hooker and I  
call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that there are instincts that  
are thirds, then they would have a similar irreducibility. 

I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right  
now, but there are a couple of articles on this on my web page  
that are certainly Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.   
 

John
 On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek   wrote:
List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis,
it would be helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with
the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL organism's are
decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems.
What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other
animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of
options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to
"know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would
behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting it
another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if
her body were that of a man.
 And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a   
 preprogrammed blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend 
   the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. That is, the
mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not  
  what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior).
Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in
accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics,
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to
enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics 
   of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are the product
of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind  
  my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics [1]. 
 While we are discussing the role of mind-body   
 predispositions in semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded  
  of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its original
form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean
miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor  
  mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of
freedom for the miners to achieve:
 I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Away, I'd rather sail away
 Like a swan that's here and gone
 A man gets tied up to the ground
 He gives the world its saddest sound
 It's saddest sound
 I'd rather be a forest than a street
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Regards 
From:   Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]] 
   Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
   To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
[4]; Mike   Bergman
   Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
 
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical  
realm refers to its functioning as a triadic process:  
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in   
   any one of the three modal categories. 

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking   
   is a basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion   
   of such by atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [   
   which is a modal category]. It is a relational or interactive  
process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with another 'bit'
  of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out,   

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen C. Rose]

Sounds like universal agreement on choice, freedom, options and so forth.
Concur. Instinct might have some meaning but options are more real the more
consciously decisions are made and the more choices one allows oneself.
Peirce by making the triadic a sort of default effects a massive block to
notions of behavior as instinctive.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Agreed - instincts are Thirdness and thus, as you say, behaviour is not
> reducible to mechanical explanations [Firstness, Secondness].
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sun 10/12/17 11:35 AM , John Collier ag...@ncf.ca sent:
>
> I use Jean Piaget's notion of instinct, which he adopted after he came to
> realize that mechanical explanations were not sufficient (especially
> input-output rules as in behaviourism). Instincts are open-ended on this
> account and not reducible to input-output relations (they are complexly
> organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that
> there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar
> irreducibility.
>
> I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but
> there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly
> Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.
>
> John
>
> On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
>
> List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
> helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No
> such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their
> ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other
> animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a
> goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms
> have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my
> body were that of a fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a
> woman would behave if her body were that of a man.
>
> And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed
> blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms
> and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic
> forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior).
> Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with
> their own mind-body predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also
> to quantum mechanics, imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to
> enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics of chemical
> bonds and subatomic forces are the product of semiosis, and not its
> cause. Hence the motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum
> Semiotics
> <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>.
>
>
> While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis
> and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In
> its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean
> miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body)
> looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and
> it becomes the symbol of freedom for the miners to achieve:
>
> I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
>
> I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
>
> Away, I'd rather sail away
> Like a swan that's here and gone
> A man gets tied up to the ground
> He gives the world its saddest sound
> It's saddest sound
>
> I'd rather be a forest than a street
> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
>
> I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
>
> Regards
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman
> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
>
>
>
> Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to
> its functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant,
> with each of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories.
>
> Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic
> quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But
> semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a
> relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with
> another '

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 I think that Stjernfelt's book Natural Propositions  ... on
DiciSigns examines the semiosic process in these realms. There are
three types of Dicisigns. The Dicent Sinsign [ dicent indexical 
sinsign]. The Dicent indexical Legisign. The Dicent Symbolic
Legisign.

That is - the informational exchange is by direct physical
connections. But a symbol is not merely convention; it is also a
general; that is, could the interaction between the Sign triad and
Dynamic Object be not merely a descriptive existential exchange which
is indexical-iconic, but could it be a reference to the general laws
held within the Dynamic Object such that a 'shared reality' could be
developed.

 I'd agree that the Dynamic Interpretant would be a given actual
instantiation. ..and could be dicent or even more openly vague and
rhematic.

 I think that the Rhematic Indexical Legisign also plays a role in
this system - It's not part of the three Dicent examples given by
Stjernfelt -but is, I feel, a key class of semiosis in the Peircean
analysis.

Edwina
- 
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 06/04/17  3:36 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 List:
 With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis
in the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to
me.  What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to
how we describe a law of nature in human language, an equation, or
other representation of it; I am talking about the law of nature
itself, the real general that governs actual occurrences.
 As a law, it presumably has to be a Legisign.  What is its Dynamic
Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its  potential instantiations,
perhaps?  How should we characterize its S-O relation?  It is not
conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential connection (Index)? 
What is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given actual instantiation,
perhaps?  How should we characterize its S-I relation--Dicent, like a
proposition, or Rheme, like a term?
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I requested that very book from the library yesterday, because I am hoping
that it will shed some light on this.  Of course, a law of nature is
not *itself
*a physical or otherwise existent entity, hence a (general) Legisign.  I am
mainly looking for feedback on the identity of the Dynamic Object, Symbol
vs. Index, and Dicent vs. Rheme.  I am also wondering if an instantiation
of a law of nature is more properly classified as a replica (Sinsign) or a
Dynamic Interpretant.

Thanks,

Jon

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 3:40 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> I think that Stjernfelt's book Natural Propositions  ... on DiciSigns
> examines the semiosic process in these realms. There are three types of
> Dicisigns. The Dicent Sinsign [ dicent indexical  sinsign]. The Dicent
> indexical Legisign. The Dicent Symbolic Legisign.
>
> That is - the informational exchange is by direct physical connections.
> But a symbol is not merely convention; it is also a general; that is, could
> the interaction between the Sign triad and Dynamic Object be not merely a
> descriptive existential exchange which is indexical-iconic, but could it be
> a reference to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
> 'shared reality' could be developed.
>
>  I'd agree that the Dynamic Interpretant would be a given actual
> instantiation. ..and could be dicent or even more openly vague and rhematic.
>
>  I think that the Rhematic Indexical Legisign also plays a role in this
> system - It's not part of the three Dicent examples given by Stjernfelt
> -but is, I feel, a key class of semiosis in the Peircean analysis.
>
> Edwina
>
> -
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Thu 06/04/17 3:36 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List:
>
> With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in
> the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me.
> What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
> describe a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
> representation of it; I am talking about the law of nature itself, the
> real general that governs actual occurrences.
>
> As a law, it presumably has to be a Legisign.  What is its Dynamic
> Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its potential instantiations,
> perhaps?  How should we characterize its S-O relation?  It is not
> conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential connection (Index)?  What is
> its Dynamic Interpretant--any given actual instantiation, perhaps?  How
> should we characterize its S-I relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or
> Rheme, like a term?
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Jon and Edwina,

Jon

What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina

But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday".  It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for
which we have no words for describing.  In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth:  If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared:  x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits:  Planets in the solar system travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity:  A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity:  A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability.  The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe.  The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate.  But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for
aspects of nature that we can only describe.


Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature *themselves*, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs are
they?  Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general
laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs
all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs."

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon and Edwina,
>
> Jon
>
>> What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
>> /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
>> /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
>> the real general that governs actual occurrences.
>>
>
> Edwina
>
>> But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
>> to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
>> 'shared reality' could be developed.
>>
>
> That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange.
> Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
> gone on a holiday".  It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language
> game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's
> language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
> of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for
> which we have no words for describing.  In short, it's a metaphor.
>
> To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:
>
> Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth:  If you drop something
> in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
> to t squared:  x = ½ gt²
>
> Kepler's law of planetary orbits:  Planets in the solar system travel
> in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.
>
> Newton's law of gravity:  A generalization that explains the laws
> of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.
>
> Einstein's general relativity:  A generalization that explains
> all the above plus many more phenomena.
>
> Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
> domain of applicability.  The more general laws, which cover
> a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
> reality -- but each one is still a law of science.
>
> In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
> for aspects of nature that we can only describe.  The ultimate
> laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
> might be very accurate.  But when stated, they would be signs
> expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.
>
> John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:

JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is
a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.

Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs
are they?


Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
reliable predictions reflects something real about the world.
That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity.  But
it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.

For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his
neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time
he went out for his daily walk.  That is an example of law-like
behavior.  But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law
embodied in Kant's nature.  That's just the way he behaved.


Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general
laws of nature are real,


If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be
something real that makes it true.  But that something may be
as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior.
Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that
we don't understand in detail.

For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler,
Newton, and Einstein.  Then think of the thousands or millions
of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws.  Then
imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium.

An interesting joke:  "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks."

For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is
as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[gnox]

Jon A.S., John S.,

 

I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below.

 

Gary F.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52



 

John S., List:

 

JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for 
aspects of nature that we can only describe.

 

Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our linguistic 
or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs are they?  
Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general laws of 
nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs all the way 
down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
exclusively of signs."

[GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies what 
Peirce is referring to as “this universe”: 

“It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should 
leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of 
the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,— not merely the 
universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of 
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 
‘the truth,’— that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not 
composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394).

 

Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of nature 
would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out its 
conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols, though 
not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of 
propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary 
experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We ascribe these 
forms to the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”: “What we call a 
‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be 
an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express 
“fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible 
to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute 
Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very 
Universe” (EP2:304).

 

To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your question, although 
it may not use the language you are looking for.

 

Gary f.

 

Thanks,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa mailto:s...@bestweb.net> > wrote:

Jon and Edwina,

Jon

What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina

But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday".  It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for
which we have no words for describing.  In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth:  If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared:  x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits:  Planets in the solar system travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity:  A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity:  A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability.  The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe.  The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate.  But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 6, 2017, at 1:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the 
> physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me.  What 
> class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we describe a 
> law of nature in human language, an equation, or other representation of it; 
> I am talking about the law of nature itself, the real general that governs 
> actual occurrences.

My sense is that laws of nature are merely habits. As John suggested we can see 
symmetry breaking in Peirce’s terms such that non-fundamental physical laws are 
the somewhat chance created habits. Habits in matter are thirdness. 

I’m not quite sure what question you’re asking though. As you mentioned, it 
seems they are legisigns. The interesting thing is each instance of a legisign 
is a replica or sinsign. So each time matter acts according to the legisign 
that act is a sinsign. 

> What is its Dynamic Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its potential 
> instantiations, perhaps?  How should we characterize its S-O relation?  It is 
> not conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential connection (Index)?  What 
> is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given actual instantiation, perhaps?  How 
> should we characterize its S-I relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or 
> Rheme, like a term?

A Legisign is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by men. 
Every conventional sign is a legisign [but not conversely]. It is not a single 
object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant. 
Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be 
termed a Replica of it. Thus, the word “the” will usually occur from fifteen to 
twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same 
word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a Replica. The Replica 
is a Sinsign. Thus, every Legisign requires Sinsigns. But these are not 
ordinary Sinsigns, such as are peculiar occurrences that are regarded as 
significant. Nor would the Replica be significant if it were not for the law 
which renders it so. (CP 2.246)

A Symbol is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a 
law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to cause the 
Symbol to be interpreted as referring to that Object. It is thus itself a 
general type or law, that is, is a Legisign. As such it acts through a Replica. 
Not only is it general itself, but the Object to which it refers is of a 
general nature.  Now that which is general has its being in the instances which 
it will determine. There must, therefore, be existent instances of what the 
Symbol denotes, although we must here understand by "existent," existent in the 
possibly imaginary universe to which the Symbol refers. The Symbol will 
indirectly, through the association or other law, be affected by those 
instances; and thus the Symbol will involve a sort of Index, although an Index 
of a peculiar kind. It will not, however, be by any means true that the slight 
effect upon the Symbol of those instances accounts for the significant 
character of the Symbol. (CP 2.249)


So I’d say the object is the general that is the set of instantiations. Note 
that Peirce only starts distinguishing legisign from symbol in 1903. So often 
prior to that when discussing symbols he also is including legisigns. 
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Gary, Clark, list,

ET

I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is
indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of
these laws.  Intellectually analyzing them and developing
symbolic constructs - is a secondary step.


I agree with both sentences.  And I would point out that the
referent of an indexical sign may be something about which
we know very little.  For example, a finger pointing to our
destination tells us nothing about what we'll find.  Or smoke
as a sign of fire tells us very little about the fire.

The second sentence supports my point that the scientific laws
we derive from our analysis are (a) secondary and (b) fallible
approximations to whatever the real laws of nature may be.

Gary

the passage I cited from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4
"I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon
is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human
reason is analogous..."


Thanks for the quotation.  Peirce's word 'analogous' supports
my term 'metaphor'.  A metaphor is an analogy that uses the
terminology of one subject to explain an analogous subject.

Clark

As John suggested we can see symmetry breaking in Peirce’s terms
such that non-fundamental physical laws are the somewhat chance
created habits. Habits in matter are thirdness.


Those chance-created habits must be supported by some sign-like
things that are interpreted by some kind of quasi-minds.

An example is DNA, which is a sign-like chemical produced by
evolution.  Each cell of an organism has a quasi-mind that
interprets the DNA as a sign to produce as interpretants
other chemicals that serve as signs:  hormones, enzymes, RNA,
and more DNA.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 7, 2017, at 1:59 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Clark
>> As John suggested we can see symmetry breaking in Peirce’s terms
>> such that non-fundamental physical laws are the somewhat chance
>> created habits. Habits in matter are thirdness.
> 
> Those chance-created habits must be supported by some sign-like
> things that are interpreted by some kind of quasi-minds.
> 
> An example is DNA, which is a sign-like chemical produced by
> evolution.  Each cell of an organism has a quasi-mind that
> interprets the DNA as a sign to produce as interpretants
> other chemicals that serve as signs:  hormones, enzymes, RNA,
> and more DNA.

Yes, the tokens are sinsigns. There’s an intrinsic indexical between the cell 
and the DNA within the cell. The other chemicals then are rhematic iconic 
sinsigns.
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Jon and Edwina,

Jon

I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting entirely of Signs.


Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark.  Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat.  Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads.   As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication.  Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina

the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
with another external organism, to informationally connect with
the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
own [or both sets of] laws.


I agree.  But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list,

Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.
There is a continuum.  The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp
boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's
atmosphere).  The borders of living things are an intermediate case.

HR

In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface.


The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have
exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).

The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from
all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject
to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental
(e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming
themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water).

Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions
of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some
of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health.

HR

I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous)
by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily...


Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk.
The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm.
We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground,
but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of trunks.

ET

The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e.,
a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it
a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE
of chemical.


Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl)
rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are
organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms
of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions.

ET

in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique
from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is,
a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different
in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE
particular Type/Breed of dog...


There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and
species.  Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with
coyotes.  Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats.
The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as
gene transfers that occur naturally.

Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing
throughout life.  Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary
for maturation.  Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral.
And many can be inherited.  The only reason why DNA remains
relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are
constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors.

ET

in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar.
This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability.


The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations
called laws of physics):  conservation of mass-energy, momentum,
angular momentum, charge, etc.

But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting.
Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of
years.  But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in
a camera, they change.

Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most
other particles are highly unstable.  In quantum electrodynamics,
the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are
constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the
borderline of existence.

JAS

biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than
most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is
not reducible to chemistry and/or physics.


I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first
quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness
(purpose, goals, or intentions).

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

Jon,

The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the 
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If 
you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, 
and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.


"Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws  of nature". 
The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if 
so and so...). So they are about the future, just as well.


It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian 
question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no 
short and simple way!

That much is shown beyond doubt by today.

Best, Kirsti Määttänen


Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:51:

John S., List:


JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a
metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.


Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature _themselves_, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs
are they?  Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that
general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe
consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:


Jon and Edwina,

Jon


What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how
we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or
other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature
/itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina


But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is
strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a
language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from
Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language
game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real"
for
which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared: x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system
travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John



Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

John,

I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with 
"laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science 
with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got 
angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just 
something unthinkable for them.


I assume something like that is still going on within computer science. 
Artificial Intelligence being notoriously unable to handle anything like 
that. - To the detriment of all of us.


You used the term in a very, vary vague sense. - The quote you were 
commenting on, nothing metaphorical was intended. You presented your 
point very nicely, by taking up a language game "gone on a holiday".


Have you given any thought on the difference between unintended and 
intended metaphors? And on kinds of metaphors which work, do the job, 
and kinds which fail?


I also thank you for the papers you have shared in the List. Truly 
admiradle, truly clear.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen





John F Sowa kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:35:


Jon

What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina

But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday".  It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for
which we have no words for describing.  In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth:  If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared:  x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits:  Planets in the solar system travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity:  A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity:  A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability.  The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe.  The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate.  But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

What an excellent post!

Just an addition to what John said on bacteria:

It seems hard to (in prevalent culture) to understand the fact that we 
are not directly nourished by our intake of nutritients (food), but via 
the bacteria in our digestive system. We feed the (kinds of) bacteria, 
which feed us. It is all mediated by the bacteria. We provide the 
bacteria, they provide us. - In other words: We cultivate the bacteria, 
which cultivates us. - See the ancient meaning of "culture"!


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 10.4.2017 04:41:

Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list,

Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.
There is a continuum.  The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp
boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's
atmosphere).  The borders of living things are an intermediate case.

HR

In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface.


The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have
exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).

The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from
all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject
to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental
(e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming
themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water).

Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions
of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some
of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health.

HR

I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous)
by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily...


Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk.
The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm.
We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground,
but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of trunks.

ET

The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e.,
a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it
a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE
of chemical.


Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl)
rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are
organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms
of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions.

ET

in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique
from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That is,
a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different
in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE
particular Type/Breed of dog...


There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and
species.  Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with
coyotes.  Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats.
The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as
gene transfers that occur naturally.

Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing
throughout life.  Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary
for maturation.  Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral.
And many can be inherited.  The only reason why DNA remains
relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are
constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors.

ET

in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar.
This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability.


The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations
called laws of physics):  conservation of mass-energy, momentum,
angular momentum, charge, etc.

But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting.
Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of
years.  But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in
a camera, they change.

Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most
other particles are highly unstable.  In quantum electrodynamics,
the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are
constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the
borderline of existence.

JAS

biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than
most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is
not reducible to chemistry and/or physics.


I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first
quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness
(purpose, goals, or intentions).

John



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have
> exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
> and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).
> 
> The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from
> all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject
> to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental
> (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming
> themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water).
> 
> Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions
> of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some
> of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health.

This seems right, although the word vague in a Peircean sense might not quite 
fit. I think not well defined is a better way to put it.

I especially like the point you and Kirstima make about non-human cells. Our 
body is very much a symbol in a certain sense that when examined closely does 
not have the type of unity we like to imagine. Even ignoring the issue of the 
human biome, we’re finding that even the DNA of our food can end up in odd 
places of our body, potentially interacting in more complex ways than we can 
yet determine. In the bodies of mothers the remnants of their children’s DNA 
can remain and have effects. Lines become blurry and complex. Even the very 
notion of inside and outside fail us. (Is the digestion system ‘inside’ and if 
so when?)

> Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl)
> rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are
> organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms
> of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions.

And the very notion of atoms and molecules when examined more technically is 
better seen as a quantum field which is itself a type of potentiality.

We simplify both because we have to in order to reason about these things, but 
also because our simplifications work most of the time. Even if we could create 
a gigantic complex Hamiltonian to express the field of salt crystal, it 
wouldn’t necessarily help us.

> I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
> But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first
> quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness
> (purpose, goals, or intentions).

I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t reducible to 
chemistry or physics. Although for all the problems philosophy of science 
created here in the 50’s through 70’s attempting to make the reduction, I think 
it did perhaps help in getting biologists to think more carefully about the 
type of descriptions they make.





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Kirsti, List:

I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but
not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do.  On the contrary,
I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in
particular--which is why I sought input from the List.

"Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future,
but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds."

How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?
What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:29 AM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
> presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you
> look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and
> you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.
>
> "Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws  of nature".
> The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if so
> and so...). So they are about the future, just as well.
>
> It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian
> question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no short
> and simple way!
> That much is shown beyond doubt by today.
>
> Best, Kirsti Määttänen

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?  
> What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?

I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While Peirce does have the 
index, he doesn’t require firm ground to use the index. It’s signs all the way 
down due to the way he conceives of signs. 

> "Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future, 
> but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds."

Not sure what you mean by that. 



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

Jon A.,

I was attepting to express as understandably as possible. To offer 
answers to your quest for exactness would take more time than I have at 
my disposal. - Sorry for that!!


Best,

Kirsti

Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 10.4.2017 21:44:

Kirsti, List:

I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified,
but not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do.  On the
contrary, I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one
in particular--which is why I sought input from the List.

"Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the
future, but it obviously does not include any other universes or
"Platonic worlds."

How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an
sich'?  What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out
of" it?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]

On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:29 AM,  wrote:


Jon,

The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. -
If you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of
signs, and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.

"Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws of
nature". The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will
happen (if so and so...). So they are about the future, just as
well.

It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the
Kantian question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. -
There is no short and simple way!
That much is shown beyond doubt by today.

Best, Kirsti Määttänen



Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, *Peirce's
Empiricism:  Its Roots and Its Originality*, via interlibrary loan this
week.  Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I
could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading.  He points out
in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a *relation*, which leads me to pose a
new question--can a relation be a Sign?  Again, I am referring to the
relation *itself*, not its representation in verbal, diagrammatic, or other
form.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Jon A., Clark, list,

The issues of mapping a continuous world to a small finite
vocabulary imply that (1) there is always some residual error
in anything we say about the world, and (2) there is an open-
ended variety of ways of talking about the same phenomena from
different points of view and for different purposes.

ET

I don't think that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent
networking of these differences that is the basis of complexity
to vagueness.


I chose the word 'vague' because I was thinking of Peirce's point:

It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme. Only, one
must commonly surrender all ambition to be certain. It is equally
easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague. It is
not so difficult to be pretty precise and fairly certain at once
about a very narrow subject.  (CP 4.237)


ET

the development of differentiation of Form, which implies boundaries
to that Form, and a severance of This from That, and thus enables
Secondness, is a reality in our universe.


Yes, but those forms, which determine the types we express in
our languages (natural and artificial) are of the same nature
as laws of science:  To the extent that they enable us to make
reliable predictions, they express something real.  But like
anything in science, they can be "pretty precise and fairly
certain at once about a very narrow subject."

JA

we do not take the whole actual universe U as our starting point,
but begin by constructing concrete examples of systems


CG

We simplify both because we have to in order to reason about these
things, but also because our simplifications work most of the time.


Yes.  Jon's "concrete examples" are sometimes called mental models,
which represent some aspects of the world as we interpret it.  They
also correspond to Peirce's diagrams, which we can make as precise
as we please in order to talk about them with mathematical precision.
But "one must commonly surrender all ambition to be certain" that
they are true of the real world.

CG

I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t
reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the
reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think
more carefully about the type of descriptions they make.


You could say the same about "reducing" meteorology to computational
physics.  Weather predictions today are far more reliable than they
were 50 years ago.  But it's good to have an alternate date when
you're planning a picnic.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> CG
>> I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t
>> reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the
>> reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think
>> more carefully about the type of descriptions they make.
> 
> You could say the same about "reducing" meteorology to computational
> physics.  Weather predictions today are far more reliable than they
> were 50 years ago.  But it's good to have an alternate date when
> you're planning a picnic.

Yes that’s the exact way I think about it. It’s a practical issue not a 
metaphysical one. Further non-linear dynamics (not always at work) can make 
some reductions as difficult as some predictions. A little error can sometimes 
spiral out of control such as with a double pendulum.





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> I'm guessing an engineer would have some acquaintance with
> relational databases, which have after all a history going
> back to Peirce, and I would recommend keeping that example
> in mind for thinking about k-adic relations in general.

I didn’t know that. Was the computer science that developed relational 
databases engaging with Peirce explicitly? Any good place to get a primer on 
that history?



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John Collier]

Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even 
in Newtonian mechanics. The set of computable functions is a miniscule 
(infinitesimal) subset of the set of functions. I have several papers on the 
dynamical basis of this (necessary and sufficient dynamical conditions, though 
they are not computable if the function is not computable) on my web page. Most 
have emergence in the title.

John

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 6:32 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs


On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote:

CG

I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t
reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the
reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think
more carefully about the type of descriptions they make.

You could say the same about "reducing" meteorology to computational
physics.  Weather predictions today are far more reliable than they
were 50 years ago.  But it's good to have an alternate date when
you're planning a picnic.

Yes that’s the exact way I think about it. It’s a practical issue not a 
metaphysical one. Further non-linear dynamics (not always at work) can make 
some reductions as difficult as some predictions. A little error can sometimes 
spiral out of control such as with a double pendulum.





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

On 4/12/2017 12:33 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

Was the computer science that developed relational databases
engaging with Peirce explicitly? Any good place to get a
primer on that history?


The theory of relational databases was originally developed
by Edgar F. (Ted) Codd at IBM Research in San Jose:
Codd, E.F. (1970). A Relational Model of Data for Large Shared
Data Banks. Communications of the ACM. 13 (6): 377–387.

Biography: http://amturing.acm.org/award_winners/codd_1000892.cfm

Codd's version of relational algebra was equivalent in expressive
power to first-order logic.  It also has some resemblance to Peirce's
relational algebra.

Interesting coincidence:  Codd earned his PhD at the U. of Michigan,
where Arthur Burks was a professor.  I asked Burks whether Codd had
been influenced by Peirce's relational algebra.  Burks replied that
Codd had taken some of his courses, but that he had not mentioned
Peirce's algebra in any of them.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier  wrote:
> 
> Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even 
> in Newtonian mechanics.

Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the 
three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking of rather I was more 
thinking that any solution is approximate and the errors can propagate in weird 
ways.

But that’s true of almost any real phenomena which is more complex than we can 
calculate. It’s not just an issue of reduction although it clearly manifests in 
the problem of reduction and emergence.





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John Collier]

Three body problem is computable for any finite amount of time (like all 
conservative systems). To get problems the end state must be reached in a 
finite time. This can happen in dissipative systems.

There are many cases where you can’t even get approximate solutions, though you 
can get probabilities of various solutions. For example, Mercury is in a 3/2 
rotation to revolution rate around the Sun. It was expected to be 1:1 like the 
Moon around the Earth. A bit of a surprise, since the 1-1 ratio is the lowest 
energy one. However, everything near the 3/2 state is higher energy, so it is 
stable. Now the interesting thig is that the boundaries between the attractors 
are such that there are regions in which any two points in one attractor has a 
point in the other attractor between them. So no degree of accuracy of 
measurement can allow predicting which attractor the system is in. So Frances 
Darwin’s explanation of why the Moon always faces the Earth is incomplete, and 
can never be fully completed. There is about 50% likelihood of 1-1 capture, 33% 
for 3-2 capture, and the rest take up the remaining chances. Note that the end 
states aren’t just a little bit different, but a lot different. Things get much 
more complicated in evolution and development, where more factors are involved. 
I argue that information dissipation (e.g., through death eliminating genetic 
information) works the same way. I first published on this as the first paper 
in the journal Biology and Philosophy n 1986.

The main point is the problem is not one of our limited calculation capacity. 
It holds in principle. Even Laplace’s demon, if they are like a regular 
computer, but arbitrarily large, could not do the calculations. Basically, 
there are far more functions that are not Turing computable than are, and many 
of these give widely different possible solutions. It’s really just another 
case of the number of theorems being aleph 1, but the number of possible proofs 
is only aleph 0.

I call systems like the Mercury –Sun system reductively explainable, but not 
reductive. Physicalism is not violated, but reduction is not possible. But we 
can get a good idea of what is going on, after the fact (though our first guess 
in the Mercury-Sun case was wrong).

Personally, I think all thirds are of this nature, which is why they can’t be 
reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments convincing about the 
irreducibility.

John

From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs


On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier 
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:

Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even 
in Newtonian mechanics.

Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the 
three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking of rather I was more 
thinking that any solution is approximate and the errors can propagate in weird 
ways.

But that’s true of almost any real phenomena which is more complex than we can 
calculate. It’s not just an issue of reduction although it clearly manifests in 
the problem of reduction and emergence.





-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[gnox]

Gary R, Edwina, Jon S, list,

 

I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to say (one more 
time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms — especially what he means 
by a triadic relation — we need to read them in the context where Peirce uses 
them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into a scheme of our own 
invention.

 

Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is something 
like  a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from this that there 
are THREE spokes or Relations in that image.” But in its context, that image is 
NOT a diagram of the S-O-I relation, the essential “sign relation.” That image 
is in fact an existential graph with three “tails.” 

The context, CP 1.343-9, is “From the “Lowell Lectures of 1903,” III, vol. 1, 
3d Draught.” The larger context is the Lowell lectures (pieces of which are 
unfortunately scattered here and there in the CP) and the Syllabus which Peirce 
wrote to accompany them. The Syllabus of course includes the “Nomenclature and 
Divisions of Triadic Relations”, which ought to be the go-to text for Peirce’s 
explanation of the triadic relations involved in semiosis. 

 

But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean some of 
Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight acquaintance with 
existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at 1.347, the lines (Peirce calls 
them “tails” here) are lines of identity each representing that something 
exists. The relation is represented in the graph by the labelled spot to which 
they are all attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In propositional 
terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three subjects, (i.e. 
with a “valency” of three). To read the lines in the graph as relations is to 
misread the graph. The graph is itself a diagrammatic sign, but there is no 
attempt to represent its object(s) or its interpretant on the sheet of 
assertion. In fact, I have never seen, anywhere in Peirce’s writings, an 
attempt to represent the basic triadic sign relation in a single diagram. I 
think the reason is simple: that kind of triadic relation cannot be represented 
that way. But if someone can show me a text where Peirce has done that, I’ll 
happily retract that claim. 

 

This would explain, by the way, why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize' what 
'one triadic Relation' would look like or how it would function.” If you 
represent relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent dyadic 
relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of (dyadic) 
relations.

 

Gary’s point about the time dimension is crucial here: existential graphs are 
“moving pictures of thought” in which semiosis is represented by 
transformations of the graphs. I think an attentive reading of CP 1.343-9 
should clarify why it is that the essential sign relation, and the Thirdness of 
semiosis, cannot be adequately represented in a single image. In that passage, 
Peirce is trying to give an experiential account of Thirdness and triadic 
relations to his audience. CP 1.345:

“I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of 
quality and reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that every 
genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a triadic 
relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by means of 
dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to convince 
yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic relation involves 
meaning.”

 

If anyone wants to study this passage from the Lowell lectures but doesn’t have 
access to the Collected Papers, let me know and I’ll provide you with a copy. 
Or post it here, if there’s enough interest. But I hope that at least those who 
do have access to CP will take a closer look at it.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 

Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think the 
three pronged spoke does exactly represent a triadic relation, not three 
relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from which the 
three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.

 

But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've 
discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and 
duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis. 

 

For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present 
anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in 
"Peirce's Logic of Information" http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html 
(a paper, btw, which I find both intriguing, but have som

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one
triadic relation.  As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten
trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign
to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), which
divides the Sign "As to the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" (EP
2:490) into Instinct/Experience/Form.  Hence the spokes *themselves *are
all in the *same *mode, even though the *correlates *at their ends and the
*dyadic* *relations *between those correlates can be in *different *modes.

By contrast, the three trichotomies of 1903 are for "the sign in itself" as
Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, "the relation of the sign to its Object" as
Icon/Index/Symbol, and how "its Interpretant represents it" as
Rheme/Dicent/Argument (EP 2:291-292).  Peirce subsequently characterized
the latter as "the Relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant" (EP
2:483), but I have been suggesting recently that it should be associated
instead with the relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant.

To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely *triadic*, I have
never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis
of one correlate and two *dyadic *relations.  Perhaps others on the List
can shed some light on that.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:
>
> 1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's 8.335,8.337
> comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object, Relations to the
> Interpretant..but the reason is that each of the three 'spikes' so to
> speak, can be in a different modal category. So, in a rhematic indexical
> legisign, the Representamen spoke can be in Thirdness; the relation to the
> Dynamic Object in a mode of Secondness; the relation to the Dy.
> Interpretant in a mode of Firstness. That's why I refer to relations in the
> plural. These interactions most certainly are NOT independent - and my use
> of the plural of RelationS doesn't imply their independence. Instead, it
> implies their modal differentiation within this singular semiosic
> interaction.
>
> 2) The problem I have with the linear image of the movement from DO to
> DI...and Peirce often uses it, which is one relation with three correlates,
> is that I also am interested in the morphological result of the semiosis.
> Not simply in the passing of X via Y to Z. But the physiological FORM.
> That is - referring to my oft-quoted 4.551 'Mind ..in crystal, in the work
> of bees'...etc... I am considering that the Sign, that triad, takes on a
> FORM. This FORM is the full Sign. So, a cell - let's say a single cell - is
> the semiosic Form, a Sign. This is the result of the interaction of the
> Representamen HABITS interacting with many Dynamic Objects [water,
> nutrients, chemicals, etc etc]...which are then transformed via the HABITS
> held within the Representamen into the Dynamic Interpretant - that CELL.
> BUT - all three parts of this whole FORM/SIGN must be operative in this
> semiosic process:   The input from the various multiple Dynamic
> Interpretants.transformed via the general rules held by the
> Representamenresulting in the Dynamic Interpretant FORM of the whole
> system...that particular cell.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Wed 12/04/17 6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen
> alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate
> Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object?
>
>
> I believe that our recent joint resolution to use "Sign" only for the
> internal Oi-R-Ii triad could go a long way toward clearing up this
> particular terminological difficulty.  The external Dynamic Object is not
> part of the Sign itself, it is something distinct that is in a single
> triadic relation with both the Sign and the external Dynamic Interpretant.
>
> ET:  My problem is that I can't figure out what ONE triadic Relation
> means. I can understand the 'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is
> something like  a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from
> this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image.
>
>
> Lake Gary R., my understanding of that particular diagram is that its
> spokes do not correspond to three distinct relations; instead, it
> represents one triadic relation with three distinct subjects (correlates).
> The three-pronged shape is intended to convey that none of the correlates
> is in an independent relation with either of the other correlates; the triadic
> relation is not reducible to multiple dyadic relations.  The basic idea
> is the same as when the triadic Sign relat

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

John,

Thanks a lot! A most interesting post. I'll look up your paper.

Even though I have approached these questions from a  different angle , 
I wholly agree with your conlusion views on  the nature of thirds. And 
on the arguments offered  by Peirce. - It has seemed to me, too, that he 
did not solve these issues, but he pointed the ways on how to get on 
solving them.


I do lack expertice on the topics you deal with. Still, I have been 
groping  for undestanding the connections between triadic thinking, 
three-body problem & dissipative systems for a long time.


So,thanks & my very best regards,

Kirsti

John Collier kirjoitti 12.4.2017 23:45:

Three body problem is computable for any finite amount of time (like
all conservative systems). To get problems the end state must be
reached in a finite time. This can happen in dissipative systems.

There are many cases where you can’t even get approximate solutions,
though you can get probabilities of various solutions. For example,
Mercury is in a 3/2 rotation to revolution rate around the Sun. It was
expected to be 1:1 like the Moon around the Earth. A bit of a
surprise, since the 1-1 ratio is the lowest energy one. However,
everything near the 3/2 state is higher energy, so it is stable. Now
the interesting thig is that the boundaries between the attractors are
such that there are regions in which any two points in one attractor
has a point in the other attractor between them. So no degree of
accuracy of measurement can allow predicting which attractor the
system is in. So Frances Darwin’s explanation of why the Moon always
faces the Earth is incomplete, and can never be fully completed. There
is about 50% likelihood of 1-1 capture, 33% for 3-2 capture, and the
rest take up the remaining chances. Note that the end states aren’t
just a little bit different, but a lot different. Things get much more
complicated in evolution and development, where more factors are
involved. I argue that information dissipation (e.g., through death
eliminating genetic information) works the same way. I first published
on this as the first paper in the journal _Biology and Philosophy_ n
1986.

The main point is the problem is not one of our limited calculation
capacity. It holds in principle. Even Laplace’s demon, if they are
like a regular computer, but arbitrarily large, could not do the
calculations. Basically, there are far more functions that are not
Turing computable than are, and many of these give widely different
possible solutions. It’s really just another case of the number of
theorems being aleph 1, but the number of possible proofs is only
aleph 0.

I call systems like the Mercury –Sun system reductively explainable,
but not reductive. Physicalism is not violated, but reduction is not
possible. But we can get a good idea of what is going on, after the
fact (though our first guess in the Mercury-Sun case was wrong).

Personally, I think all thirds are of this nature, which is why they
can’t be reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments
convincing about the irreducibility.

John

FROM: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
 SENT: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
 TO: Peirce-L 
 SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs


On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier 
wrote:

Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not
computable, even in Newtonian mechanics.


Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things
like the three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking of
rather I was more thinking that any solution is approximate and the
errors can propagate in weird ways.

But that’s true of almost any real phenomena which is more complex
than we can calculate. It’s not just an issue of reduction although
it clearly manifests in the problem of reduction and emergence.



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

assertion from the first and the second parts of the 
facts. Look at what Peirce says in his remarks about the diagram about the 
"possible space time continuity with several such phenomena to which it is 
related in the same way" (see Roberts, 20-6). How might this diagram inform our 
understanding of the different ways that  a possible space time continuity 
might be represented diagrammatically?


I'll stop there for now and take up your other remarks separately.


--Jeff



From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs



Edwina, Jon S, List,



First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think the 
three pronged spoke does exactly represent a triadic relation, not three 
relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from which the 
three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.



But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've 
discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and 
duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis.



For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present 
anticipating the future. Andre de Tienne quotes Mihai Nadin on this in 
"Peirce's Logic of Information" http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html 
(a paper, btw, which I find both intriguing, but have some reservations 
about--but not regarding the present point). De Tienne comments and then quotes 
Nadin, who here concentrates on 'anticipation' and Peirce's notion of 'final 
cause' (and teleology).



In a remarkable programmatic paper titled "Anticipation: A Spooky Computation" 
Mihai Nadin has written that "every sign is in anticipation of its 
interpretation". He explains (NADIN 2000: §5.1.1):

Signs are not constituted at the object level, but in an open-ended infinite 
sign process (semiosis). In sign processes, the arrow of time can run in both 
directions: from the past through the present to the future, or the other way 
around, from the future to the present. Signs carry the future (intentions, 
desires, needs, ideals, etc., all of a nature different from what is given, 
i.e., all in the range of a final cause) into the present and thus allow us to 
derive a coherent image of the universe. Actually […], a semiosis is 
constituted in both directions: from the past into the future, and from the 
future into the present, and forward into the past. […] The two directions of 
semiosis are in co-relation. In the first case, we constitute understandings 
based on previous semiotic processes. In the second, we actually make up the 
world as we constitute ourselves as part of it. This means that the notion of 
sign has to reflect the two arrows.

De Tienne's comments just following this quotation relate directly to a 
consideration of the nature of the growth of symbols (" as having the nature of 
a law, symbols are partly general, partly vague enunciations of what could 
happen in the future given certain antecedent conditions that they spell out to 
some degree"), as I remarked in an earlier post. Thus they have this living 
quality--"symbols grow" Peirce says.



Anticipation is a process through which the representation of a future state 
determines a present semiotic event, and this implies a teleological dimension, 
not of an Aristotelian, but of a Peircean kind. Put briefly, one simply needs 
to remember that for Peirce every symbol is teleological in the sense that, 
being preoccupied with its own development into new interpretants, some of 
which are dynamic and thus anchored in an experience they modify, it adopts a 
conditional (would-be) form that orients it toward the future.



As legisigns, thus as having the nature of a law, symbols are partly general, 
partly vague enunciations of what could happen in the future given certain 
antecedent conditions that they spell out to some degree. Such an evolving, 
self-correcting outlook toward the likely future is structurally embedded 
within symbols and distinguishes them from other types of signs. In addition, 
all symbols are signs that seek to "replicate" themselves, since there is no 
law that governs no event. Replicated symbols are a special kind of sinsigns: 
they are rule-bound semiotic events whose instantiation occurs under the rule’s 
guidance. Each instantiation thus anticipates the rule that it replicates, and 
in doing so it anticipates the future: the instantiation takes it into account, 
and thus is determined by it, although that determination is, as Nadin says, in 
the range of a final cause rather than of an efficient cause.



Semiotic events are vectorized, they happen not at random but within an 
inferential continuum that ensures that propositions tha

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:

I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
read them *in the context *where Peirce uses them, not lift them out
of their context and drop them into a scheme of our own invention.


For any particular text, that principle is quite reasonable.
But Peirce's life included a very wide range of contexts --
all of which were lurking in the back of his mind while
he wrote.  Note the frequent digressions in his writings.

And note the dates.  He wrote his 1870 article on relations
while he was working on physics and engineering (measuring
gravity and designing instruments).

He wrote his 1880, 1883, and 1885 work after he edited his
father's book on linear algebra and while he was teaching
logic at Johns Hopkins.

He wrote his articles and MSS on existential graphs *after*
he had written or edited thousands of definitions for the
_Century Dictionary_.


not ... drop them into a schemeof our own invention.


But I would add "not choose one aspect of Peirce's work
to the exclusion of others."

In short, we should consider his writings on chemistry
when we analyze his graph logic.  But we should not forget
his other work, especially his algebraic logic and his more
recent work on lexicography.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

John S., List,

I agree. Having said that, I think it will help to dispel confusion in our 
discussions on the list if we spell out the texts and sources that are most on 
our minds when we are trying to interpret specific passages. Or, in those cases 
when we are giving an "all things considered" reading, then to say so. 

For Peirce, the mathematical and logical ideas and systems were so familiar to 
him that he was able to move between systems (e.g., Boole, De Morgan, Jevons, 
Schröder, his own, etc.)  with incredible ease.  In my own particular case, the 
algebraic ideas are harder for me to see with much clarity or depth. As such, I 
appreciate it when you, Jon A, and others explain the relevance of various 
developments in the algebraic systems of logic for the philosophical questions 
he is trying to answer--and especially when you offer nice, clear (i.e., 
diagrammatic) ways of understanding what is involved in a particular set of 
algebraic relations.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: John F Sowa 
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 8:54 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
> terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
> read them *in the context *where Peirce uses them, not lift them out
> of their context and drop them into a scheme of our own invention.

For any particular text, that principle is quite reasonable.
But Peirce's life included a very wide range of contexts --
all of which were lurking in the back of his mind while
he wrote.  Note the frequent digressions in his writings.

And note the dates.  He wrote his 1870 article on relations
while he was working on physics and engineering (measuring
gravity and designing instruments).

He wrote his 1880, 1883, and 1885 work after he edited his
father's book on linear algebra and while he was teaching
logic at Johns Hopkins.

He wrote his articles and MSS on existential graphs *after*
he had written or edited thousands of definitions for the
_Century Dictionary_.

> not ... drop them into a schemeof our own invention.

But I would add "not choose one aspect of Peirce's work
to the exclusion of others."

In short, we should consider his writings on chemistry
when we analyze his graph logic.  But we should not forget
his other work, especially his algebraic logic and his more
recent work on lexicography.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Jeffrey,

That's a good guideline:


I think it will help to dispel confusion in our discussions on the
list if we spell out the texts and sources that are most on our minds
when we are trying to interpret specific passages. Or, in those cases
when we are giving an "all things considered" reading, then to say so.


John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> After that one can consider
> the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is
> all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which*
> monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you
> haven't really said that much at all.

Glad I’m not alone in thinking that. 



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Lest we forget. . .

1.135. Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in
order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be
satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one
corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the city
of philosophy:

Do not block the way of inquiry.

136. Although it is better to be methodical in our investigations, and to
consider the economics of research, yet there is no positive sin against
logic in *trying *any theory which may come into our heads, so long as it
is adopted in such a sense as to permit the investigation to go on
unimpeded and undiscouraged. On the other hand, to set up a philosophy
which barricades the road of further advance toward the truth is the one
unpardonable offence in reasoning. . .
Best,

Gary R





[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 12:57 AM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

>
> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
>
> After that one can consider
> the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is
> all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which*
> monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you
> haven't really said that much at all.
>
>
> Glad I’m not alone in thinking that.
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

Helmut and Jon,

HR

I think, the problem with bringing together Peirce and conventional
mathematics is, that Peirces monism is one of time / change, and the
conventional mathematical monism is one of space / permanence.


Peirce would not say that.

Charles learned mathematics from his father Benjamin, he edited
his father's book on linear algebra, and he added some important
theorems to it.  They both made a clear distinction between pure
mathematics and applied mathematics.

Peirce's use of mathematical relations in semiotic is not a theory
of mathematics.  It's an application of mathematics to analyze and
represent signs and patterns of signs.

JA

My guess is that Peirce's category theory, when taken at its full
promise and broadest historical perspective, will find its place
in a line of inquiry extending from Aristotle's Categories up
through category theory in its present-day mathematical sense


No.  They are different in kind.  Aristotle's categories were
inspired by the kinds of words in Greek.  When Theophrastus was
asked whether A's categories classified what exist or the ways
of talking about what exists, he replied "both".  He claimed
that Aristotle believed that the things that exist fall into
the same hierarchical patterns as the words that describe the
things that exist.

Kant developed his 12 categories as a replacement for Aristotle's.
And Peirce discovered his triads by analyzing systematic patterns
in Kant's table of 4 x 3.  In short, Peirce's categories are
patterns of patterns -- metalevel patterns.

For examples, see the slides on "Patterns of logic and ontology":
http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/patolog1.pdf

That was for a 5-day short course I taught in 2013.  Slides 13 to 22
summarize Aristotle's ontology.  Note slide 17, which shows how each
category has a characteristic question.  When applied to a particular
individual, such as George Washington, each question leads to an
answer that describes one aspect of GW.

The slides in patolog4.pdf go into more detail about a wider range
of ontologies.  Slides 21 to 27 survey the developments from the
Scholastics to John Wilkins (1668).  Slide 28 shows Kant's table,
and slide 29 discusses Peirce's observations about Kant's table.

Then slide 30 is a revised version of Wilkins' categories (slide 26).
The top node is Being, the left branch is labeled Signs, and the
right branch is labeled Physics.  The text below the diagram explains
how the signs on the left are related to the things on the right.

Summary:  Peirce's categories classify signs, Aristotle's categories
classify aspects of the world, and Slide 30 shows how the two
classifications are related.

Re mathematical category theory:  Many mathematicians believe that
the term 'category theory' was a poor choice.  The focus of category
theory is on the mappings or morphisms.  The things that are mapped
could be mathematical structures of any kind.  Some mathematicians
call it a "theory of arrows" -- the symbols that represent the maps.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Apr 29, 2017, at 10:41 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Re mathematical category theory:  Many mathematicians believe that
> the term 'category theory' was a poor choice.  The focus of category
> theory is on the mappings or morphisms.  The things that are mapped
> could be mathematical structures of any kind.  Some mathematicians
> call it a "theory of arrows" -- the symbols that represent the maps.

John’s assertions here are spot on.
If anything, these assertions are rather weak relative to what could be said. 

And, I will add a simple example to John’s semantic framework.
Pure mathematics is an artificial idealization of symbols constructed by human 
minds.
Such mathematical symbols must be free of any encumbering significations of 
nature because the scientific (real) significations of nature are antecedent to 
natural consequences of nature.

And, I will add a simple caveat to John’s assertion that: 
> The things that are mapped
> could be mathematical structures of any kind.

The mappings may represent a vast range of mathematical structures and be 
constrained to oriented graphs.

Cheers

jerry 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Charles:

> On Apr 30, 2017, at 2:43 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:
> 
> Many years ago linguists chewed over the issue of whether the semantic 
> analysis of three place predicates can be broken down into a series of two 
> place predicates and discovered that the two are not semantically or 
> grammatically equivalent.
> 
> ‘Bob gave a book to Sue' is not equivalent to e.g. ‘Bob caused Sue to have a 
> book’
> 
> I am not sure how this would impact the argument in formal logic, since 
> ordinary language and formal logic often part ways (e.g. ‘Bob is not unhappy’ 
> does not equal ‘Bob is happy’), but it seems relevant in evaluating Peirce’s 
> claim.
> 
Yes, and CSP recognized this in his views on graph theory. 

And, it further necessary to separate the structures of the grammar.

The arrangements of the order of the terms is crucial in determining the 
meaning.
Three particular nouns can form three dyadic relations - “John gives John to 
John” (Roberts, Fig. 5 p.25).
Or, 
Four nouns can be arranged in linear order by syncategormatic terms:
John sells a book to Susan for a dollar. (For CSP, this is represented by four 
blanks (loose ends)  in the sentence structure)

Or, more interestingly, is the possibility of a branched structure in CSP’s 
example of the four atoms of ammonia (Roberts, Fig. 6, p.25).  In the branched 
graphic structure of the four atoms of ammonia, one atom is in relation to the 
other three atoms.  In other words, the nitrogen atom is in direct dyadic 
relation with each of the three hydrogen atoms. 

In summary, 
1. No simple rules of grammar exist between integer numbers and icons of 
relations, as you noted. 
2. And, the grammatical role of syncategormatic words can play a decisive role 
in how the dyadic relations are formed.
3. The logic of the concept of a relation is extra-ordinary difficult to 
express exactly because the grammatical meaning of the categorical terms is 
changed by the syncategormatic terms. This was illustrated by the two figures 
in Robert’s book.  Other examples abound.
 
John S.’s examples are equally relevant.

Cheers
Jerry

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:

“the fact that A presents B with gift C...”



“I cannot forget that there are the germs of the *theory of the categories*
which is (if anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child.
In it I shall live when oblivion has me — my body”



The surprising fact, *C*, is observed;
But if *A* were true, *C* would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that *A* is true.  (CP 5.189)

___



Three dyads:

C is B

A is C

B is A;  (middle term C)



Converting and then ordering gives:



middle term *A* (Rule/Result/Case- C B *A*) or,

middle term *B* (Result/Rule/Case- C A *B*)



So, choose:



C A *B* or C B *A *



(triadic relations = three dyads).



Hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Sun, Apr 30, 2017 at 4:43 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Charles:
>
> On Apr 30, 2017, at 2:43 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:
>
> Many years ago linguists chewed over the issue of whether the semantic
> analysis of three place predicates can be broken down into a series of two
> place predicates and discovered that the two are not semantically or
> grammatically equivalent.
>
> ‘Bob gave a book to Sue' is not equivalent to e.g. ‘Bob caused Sue to have
> a book’
>
> I am not sure how this would impact the argument in formal logic, since
> ordinary language and formal logic often part ways (e.g. ‘Bob is not
> unhappy’ does not equal ‘Bob is happy’), but it seems relevant in
> evaluating Peirce’s claim.
>
> Yes, and CSP recognized this in his views on graph theory.
>
> And, it further necessary to separate the structures of the grammar.
>
> The arrangements of the order of the terms is crucial in determining the
> meaning.
> Three particular nouns can form three dyadic relations - “John gives John
> to John” (Roberts, Fig. 5 p.25).
> Or,
> Four nouns can be arranged in linear order by syncategormatic terms:
> *John* sells a *book* to *Susan* for a *dollar. (For CSP, this is
> represented by four blanks (loose ends)  in the sentence structure)*
>
> Or, more interestingly, is the possibility of a branched structure in
> CSP’s example of the four atoms of ammonia (Roberts, Fig. 6, p.25).  In the
> branched graphic structure of the four atoms of ammonia, one atom is in
> relation to the other three atoms.  In other words, the nitrogen atom is in
> direct dyadic relation with each of the three hydrogen atoms.
>
> In summary,
> 1. No simple rules of grammar exist between integer numbers and icons of
> relations, as you noted.
> 2. And, the grammatical role of syncategormatic words can play a decisive
> role in how the dyadic relations are formed.
> 3. The logic of the concept of a relation is extra-ordinary difficult to
> express exactly because the grammatical meaning of the categorical terms is
> changed by the syncategormatic terms. This was illustrated by the two
> figures in Robert’s book.  Other examples abound.
>
> John S.’s examples are equally relevant.
>
> Cheers
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you
haven't explained what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist?
Where? How does it evolve? It seems to be a synonym for 'instinct'!

What is a 'mind-body' predisposition?

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 10:05 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct.
No such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices
from their ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as
instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon
of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl
instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A
fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a
fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would
behave if her body were that of a man.
 And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed
blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to
atoms and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and
subatomic forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular
properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know
how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, imho... and
nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic
forces are the  product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the
motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics
[1]. 
 While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in
semiosis and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El
Condor Pasa. In its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about
a group of Andean miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor
(condor mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of freedom for
the miners to achieve:
 I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Away, I'd rather sail away
 Like a swan that's here and gone
 A man gets tied up to the ground
 He gives the world its saddest sound
 It's saddest sound
 I'd rather be a forest than a street
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]] 
 Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]; Mike
Bergman
 Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm
refers to its functioning as a triadic process:
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in any
one of the three modal categories. 

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a
basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by
atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal
category]. It is a relational or interactive process where one 'bit'
of matter interacts with another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as
Peirce frequently pointed out, confined to mechanical interactions
[Secondness], but includes both spontaneity [Firstness]  and also,
Mind or Thirdness.  

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a
crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are
its atoms such that Mind both attracts and organizes this expansion.
The latter is a key semiosic interaction. [though I would say that a
simple mechanical triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each
node [O-R-I]  in a mode of Secondness. But organization of the
results of contact - involves Mind or Thirdness. 

Edwina
 On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com [5] sent:

Hi Gary f, List,

I am generally familiar with the general references for laws and the
tendencies to them. I guess I did not address my question well. Are
there passages from Peirce where he specifically connects semiosis or
signs to nature, other than the passing reference to crystals? I
believe we can infer that Peirce likely believed the laws of nature
to be subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something like
that? 

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs or
semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear, though
suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP 5.107 a little more
to the point, but still vague. I do like th

RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

Hi Edwina

No, knowing how to be is not a synonym for instinct. It is an expression of 
pragmatism, and how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter. 
It particularly relates to firstness and self. Knowing how to be incorporates 
the self into pragmatism. I suppose one might say, in this context, that a 
proper appreciation of firstness needs to factor in the role of self, and the 
self’s relationship to the world, in the context of its needs. By taking this 
approach, we attain a different and more compelling perspective on the role of 
imitation, particularly in the context of pragmatism. By factoring in 
imitation, we obtain a greater appreciation of the nuances that motivate a self 
to imitation… for example, fear. Fear motivates selves to imitate the current 
Bitcoin craze… the fear of missing out, versus the fear of loss when people 
begin to flee the market. The comfortable known versus fear of the unknown.

Mind-body predisposition… again, relates to pragmatism. The body provides the 
“tools” that predispose us to how we define the things that matter… as per Mark 
Twain’s famous aphorism, ‘A man whose only tool is a hammer will perceive the 
world in terms of nails’.

There are different layers to pragmatism, for example:

1)  There are the mind-body predispositions;

2)  There is imitation.

 

Imitation sometimes overrides mind-body predispositions, for example, in the 
domestication of animals or in the feralization of humans (feral children, eg, 
the Wild Boy of Aveyron).

Regards

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 4:26 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike 
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 


Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you haven't explained 
what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist? Where? How does it evolve? 
It seems to be a synonym for 'instinct'!

What is a 'mind-body' predisposition?

Edwina
 

On Sun 10/12/17 10:05 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:

List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No such thing. ALL 
organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their ecosystems. What one 
might typically categorize as instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than 
a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small 
bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A fish 
behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, putting 
it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were that of 
a man.

And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed blueprint 
for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms and molecules. 
That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are not what 
"determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and 
molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body 
predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, 
imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to enabling semiosis to take 
place at that level. The mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic forces are 
the product of semiosis, and not its cause. Hence the motivation behind my 
previously-referenced article, Quantum Semiotics 
<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> 
. 

While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis and 
pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In its 
original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean miners who 
were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body) looks from the sky, 
at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol 
of freedom for the miners to achieve:

I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Away, I'd rather sail away
Like a swan that's here and gone
A man gets tied up to the ground
He gives the world its saddest sound
It's saddest sound

I'd rather be a forest than a street
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would

I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would

Regards

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca 
 ] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
 ; 
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
 ; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to its 
functioning as a triadic process: Objec

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

condor  
  mind-body) looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies
toiling away in the mines, and it becomes the symbol of
freedom for the miners to achieve:
 I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Away, I'd rather sail away
 Like a swan that's here and gone
 A man gets tied up to the ground
 He gives the world its saddest sound
 It's saddest sound
 I'd rather be a forest than a street
 Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
 I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
 Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
 Regards 
From:   Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
   Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
   To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike 
 Bergman
   Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
 
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical  
realm refers to its functioning as a triadic process:  
Object-Representamen-Interpretant, with each of these nodes in   
   any one of the three modal categories. 

Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking   
   is a basic quality in the physical realm [see his discussion   
   of such by atoms]. But semiosis is not simply habit-taking [   
   which is a modal category]. It is a relational or interactive  
process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with another 'bit'
  of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out,   
   confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes 
 both spontaneity [Firstness]  and also, Mind or Thirdness.   
  

But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does   
   a crystal simply increase its size by simple mechanical  
contact or, are its atoms such that Mind both attracts and  
organizes this expansion. The latter is a key semiosic  
interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical  
triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I]
   in a mode of Secondness. But organization of the results of
  contact - involves Mind or Thirdness. 

Edwina
   On Sat 09/12/17 6:50 PM , Mike Bergman m...@mkbergman.com 
   sent:

Hi Gary f, List,   

I am generally familiar with the general references for
laws and the tendencies to them. I guess I did not address   
 my question well. Are there passages from Peirce where he
specifically connects semiosis or signs to nature, other
than the passing reference to crystals? I believe we can
infer that Peirce likely believed the laws of nature to be   
 subject to semiosis, but is it anywhere stated something
like that?   

I found the connection of CP 5.105 'law of nature' to signs 
   or semiosis in the context of my question to be unclear,   
 though suggesting it was helpful. I read on and found CP
5.107 a little more to the point, but still vague. I do like 
   the fact this comes up in his discussion of the reality of 
   Thirdness. Still, pretty thin gruel. Maybe that is as strong   
 as the evidence gets.   

Thanks!   

Mike   
On 12/9/2017 5:02 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: 
 

Mike, 
There are plenty of passages in Peirce which
virtually identify semiosis with Representation and
thus with Thirdness, and the laws of nature being
general laws, Thirdness is predominant in them. For
instance there is CP 5.105, EP 2:184): 

[[ Thirdness, as I use the term, is only a synonym
for Representation, to which I prefer the less
colored term because its suggestions are not so
narrow and special as those of the word
Representation. Now it is proper to say that a
general principle that is operative in the real world
is of the essential nature of a Representation and of
a Symbol because its modus   operandi is the same as
that by which words produce physical effects. ]] 
   
Gary f. 
From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com] 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen C. Rose]

ions (they are complexly
>> organized, as Cliff Hooker and I call it). Surely if Peirce thinks that
>> there are instincts that are thirds, then they would have a similar
>> irreducibility.
>>
>> I'm just preparing to fly to Canada, so I can't say more right now, but
>> there are a couple of articles on this on my web page that are certainly
>> Peirce influenced if not specifically Peircean.
>>
>> John
>>
>> On 2017/12/10 5:05 PM, Stephen Jarosek wrote:
>>
>> List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
>> helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. No
>> such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices from their
>> ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as instinct, in other
>> animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon of options (analogous to a
>> goldfish living inside a small bowl instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms
>> have to "know how to be." A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my
>> body were that of a fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a
>> woman would behave if her body were that of a man.
>>
>> And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed
>> blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to atoms
>> and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and subatomic
>> forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular properties (behavior).
>> Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know how to be", in accordance with
>> their own mind-body predispositions... that's why semiosis is relevant also
>> to quantum mechanics, imho... and nonlocality (entanglement) is integral to
>> enabling semiosis to take place at that level. The mechanics of chemical
>> bonds and subatomic forces are the product of semiosis, and not its
>> cause. Hence the motivation behind my previously-referenced article, Quantum
>> Semiotics
>> <http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63>.
>>
>>
>> While we are discussing the role of mind-body predispositions in semiosis
>> and pragmatism... I am reminded of Simon and Garfunkel's El Condor Pasa. In
>> its original form, it was a Peruvian folk song about a group of Andean
>> miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body)
>> looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and
>> it becomes the symbol of freedom for the miners to achieve:
>>
>> I'd rather be a sparrow than a snail
>> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
>>
>> I'd rather be a hammer than a nail
>> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
>>
>> Away, I'd rather sail away
>> Like a swan that's here and gone
>> A man gets tied up to the ground
>> He gives the world its saddest sound
>> It's saddest sound
>>
>> I'd rather be a forest than a street
>> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
>>
>> I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
>> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
>>
>> Regards
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>> Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
>> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman
>> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
>>
>>
>>
>> Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers to
>> its functioning as a triadic process: Object-Representamen-Interpretant,
>> with each of these nodes in any one of the three modal categories.
>>
>> Certainly, as in the quotes from my other post - habit-taking is a basic
>> quality in the physical realm [see his discussion of such by atoms]. But
>> semiosis is not simply habit-taking [ which is a modal category]. It is a
>> relational or interactive process where one 'bit' of matter interacts with
>> another 'bit' of matter. This is not, as Peirce frequently pointed out,
>> confined to mechanical interactions [Secondness], but includes both
>> spontaneity [Firstness]  and also, Mind or Thirdness.
>>
>> But - the focus is on the results of these interactions. Does a crystal
>> simply increase its size by simple mechanical contact or, are its atoms
>> such that Mind both attracts and organizes this expansion. The latter is a
>> key semiosic interaction. [though I would say that a simple mechanical
>> triadic interaction is also semiosic - with each node [O-R-I]  in a mode of
&

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list: 

I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e.,
among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.

That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of
chickens, which have an ability to reproduce their type via
eggs-to-chickens. It would refer to the continuity of the type of
flower - which has the ability to reproduce that type year after year
in particular form after form.

A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that
particular individual and does not continue on after that individual.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 07/04/17  9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: 
 > JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is 
 > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. 
 > 
 > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not
our 
 > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of
Signs 
 > are they? 
 Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes 
 reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. 
 That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity.  But 
 it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. 
 For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his 
 neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time 
 he went out for his daily walk.  That is an example of law-like 
 behavior.  But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law 
 embodied in Kant's nature.  That's just the way he behaved. 
 > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general 
 > laws of nature are real, 
 If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be 
 something real that makes it true.  But that something may be 
 as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior. 
 Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that 
 we don't understand in detail. 
 For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, 
 Newton, and Einstein.  Then think of the thousands or millions 
 of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws.  Then 
 imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium. 
 An interesting joke:  "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks." 
 For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is 
 as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries. 
 John 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:

"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic"

As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula
or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO
metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My
view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant
is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I
don't see this as metaphorical but as real.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 07/04/17  9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Jon A.S., John S.,
 I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion
below.
Gary F.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
 Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52
John S., List:
JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a
metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs
are they?  Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that
general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe
consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs." 

[GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which
specifies what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”: 

“It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that
a sign should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning;
but the explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the
entire universe,— not merely the universe of existents, but all
that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part,
the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as ‘the
truth,’— that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394). 
Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the
laws of nature would have to be the “leading principles” which
are “working out its conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193).
These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We ascribe these forms to
the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”: “What we call
a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition, but
supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of
every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an
interpretant which would be the  perfect Truth, the absolute Truth,
and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very
Universe” (EP2:304).
To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your
question, although it may not use the language you are looking for.
Gary f.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman 

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]
On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa  wrote: 

Jon and Edwina,
 Jon

What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
 /describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
 /representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature
/itself/,
 the real general that governs actual occurrences. 
 Edwina

But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
 to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
 'shared reality' could be developed.
 That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is
strange.
 Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
 gone on a holiday".  It takes a phrase "general laws" from a
language
 game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from
Peirce's
 language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
 of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real"
for
 which we have no words for describing.  In short, it's a metaphor.
 To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:
 Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth:  If you drop something
 in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
 to t squared:  x = ½ gt²
 Kepler's law of planetary orbits:  Planets in the solar system
travel
 in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each elli

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[gnox]

Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign cannot 
be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption.

 

For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from Peirce’s 
Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and this passage 
was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here:

 

[[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception.” I 
reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis 
that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and 
that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human 
convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth 
of the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there 
is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in 
shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe. 

Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the 
Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great 
symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now 
every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions 
and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these 
qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe,—that 
Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make 
out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for 
us and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which 
icons Qualities are immediately presented. But what is first for us is not 
first in nature. The premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent 
uncaused elements of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the 
necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the 
world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions. 
Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual facts 
that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. 
We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. 
As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]

 

Gary F.

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 


Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:

"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an 
argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them 
metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic"

As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol" 
5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because WE 
experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our experience of 
them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form individual 
instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical but as real.

Edwina


-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM ,  <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Jon A.S., John S.,

 

I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below.

 

Gary F.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52

 

John S., List:

 

JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for 
aspects of nature that we can only describe.

 

Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our linguistic 
or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs are they?  
Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general laws of 
nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs all the way 
down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed 
exclusively of signs." 

[GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies what 
Peirce is referring to as “this universe”: 

“It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign should 
leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the explanation of 
the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,— not merely the 
universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of 
existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 
‘the truth,’— that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not 
composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394). 

 

Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of nature 
would

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, John S., List:

JFS:  Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real
aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a
law until somebody states it as such.


I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real
aspect/regularity as a Sign *itself*, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting *entirely *of Signs.

ET:  I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e.,
among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.


I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law of
nature is the *continuum *of its *potential *instantiations (3ns), not the
(discrete) *collection *of its *actual *instantiations (2ns).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, list:
>
> I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e., among
> a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific instantiation.
>
> That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of chickens,
> which have an ability to reproduce their type via eggs-to-chickens. It
> would refer to the continuity of the type of flower - which has the ability
> to reproduce that type year after year in particular form after form.
>
> A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that
> particular individual and does not continue on after that individual.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Fri 07/04/17 9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
> > JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is
> > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
> >
> > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our
> > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs
> > are they?
>
> Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
> reliable predictions reflects something real about the world.
> That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But
> it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.
>
> For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his
> neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time
> he went out for his daily walk. That is an example of law-like
> behavior. But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law
> embodied in Kant's nature. That's just the way he behaved.
>
> > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general
> > laws of nature are real,
>
> If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be
> something real that makes it true. But that something may be
> as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior.
> Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that
> we don't understand in detail.
>
> For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler,
> Newton, and Einstein. Then think of the thousands or millions
> of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws. Then
> imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium.
>
> An interesting joke: "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks."
>
> For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is
> as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries.
>
> John
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
"John F Sowa"  wrote:
 

Jon and Edwina,

Jon
> I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> reality as consisting entirely of Signs.

Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina
> the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> own [or both sets of] laws.

I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .



 




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think
that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of
these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness.
That is, complexity, which operates via both  differentiations and
commonalities, is a key factor in the ability of the universe to
prevent entropy. 

Therefore, the development of differentiation of Form, which implies
boundaries to that Form, and a severance of This from That, and thus
enables Secondness, is a reality in our universe. Just as is the
vagueness of Firstness and the commonalities of Thirdness.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sun 09/04/17  9:41 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, 
 Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.

 There is a continuum.  The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp 
 boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's 
 atmosphere).  The borders of living things are an intermediate case.

 HR 
 > In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin
surface. 
 The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have 
 exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) 
 and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). 
 The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from 
 all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject 
 to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental 
 (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming 
 themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water). 
 Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions

 of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some 
 of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health. 
 HR 
 > I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous)

 > by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily... 
 Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk. 
 The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm. 
 We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground, 
 but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of
trunks. 
 ET 
 > The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e., 
 > a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it 
 > a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE 
 > of chemical. 
 Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl) 
 rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are 
 organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms 
 of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions. 
 ET 
 > in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique 
 > from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That
is, 
 > a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different 
 > in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE 
 > particular Type/Breed of dog... 
 There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and 
 species.  Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with 
 coyotes.  Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats. 
 The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as 
 gene transfers that occur naturally. 
 Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing 
 throughout life.  Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary 
 for maturation.  Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral. 
 And many can be inherited.  The only reason why DNA remains 
 relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are 
 constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors. 
 ET 
 > in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar.

 > This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. 
 The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations 
 called laws of physics):  conservation of mass-energy, momentum, 
 angular momentum, charge, etc. 
 But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting. 
 Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of 
 years.  But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in 
 a camera, they change. 
 Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most 
 other particles are highly unstable.  In quantum electrodynamics, 
 the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are 
 constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the 
 borderline of existence. 
 JAS 
 > biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than 
 > most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is 
 > not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. 
 I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics. 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on
the terminology.

For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen,
which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the
habits developed within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of
Firstness or Secondness]. 

I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object
can be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential.
But, it remains a triad.

And - what does the term relation mean? 

So- "can a relation be a Sign'?  It depends what you mean by each
term. 

For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the
semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I
consider that there are three key relations within the triad; that
between the R-O; between the  R-I, and the Representamen in itself.
The Representamen -in-itself is, in my view, a Relation, seeking out
its habits of organization and linking them to the object and
transforming them into the interpretant.

So- at first thought, I'd say that A single relation can't be a
Sign, since the Sign requires a networked set of triadic Relations. 

But  - is a law of Nature a Relation I'd say, yes, since the Law of
Nature operates as the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 12/04/17 10:14 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 List:
 I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, Peirce's
Empiricism:  Its Roots and Its Originality, via interlibrary loan this
week.  Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from
that I could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading. 
He points out in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a relation, which
leads me to pose a new question--can a relation be a Sign?  Again, I
am referring to the relation  itself, not its representation in
verbal, diagrammatic, or other form.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and
associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.

My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going
forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) *triad *of
Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would
always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a *triadic
relation* in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other
two (external) correlates, such that every Sign *must *be determined by a
Dynamic Object, and every Sign is *capable *of determining a Dynamic
Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the same
page here?

My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign
from a logical standpoint as a *subject*, rather than a relation.  Every
Sign *has *relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external
(Od-S-Id).  We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation," usually
meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign, Dynamic Object, and Dynamic
Interpretant are the three correlates.  What I am asking now is whether
there is such a thing as a Sign that *is itself *a relation.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on the
> terminology.
>
> For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen, which I
> consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the habits developed
> within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of Firstness or
> Secondness].
>
> I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object can
> be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential. But, it
> remains a triad.
>
> And - what does the term relation mean?
>
> So- "can a relation be a Sign'?  It depends what you mean by each term.
>
> For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the semiosic
> process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I consider that there
> are three key relations within the triad; that between the R-O; between
> the  R-I, and the Representamen in itself. The Representamen -in-itself is,
> in my view, a Relation, seeking out its habits of organization and linking
> them to the object and transforming them into the interpretant.
>
> So- at first thought, I'd say that A single relation can't be a Sign,
> since the Sign requires a networked set of triadic Relations.
>
> But  - is a law of Nature a Relation I'd say, yes, since the Law of Nature
> operates as the Representamen, in a mode of Thirdness.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Wed 12/04/17 10:14 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List:
>
> I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, Peirce's
> Empiricism:  Its Roots and Its Originality, via interlibrary loan this
> week.  Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I
> could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading.  He points out
> in chapter 2 that a law of nature is a relation, which leads me to pose a
> new question--can a relation be a Sign?  Again, I am referring to the
> relation itself, not its representation in verbal, diagrammatic, or other
> form.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Gary F- thanks for your comments, but I disagree with your
explanation.

A dyad is between TWO existential entities. A Relation, such as
between the Representamen and the Interpretant is not between two
existential entities, but is an interaction that actually enables
both to function. Neither exists per se on their own - and therefore
- this is NOT a dyad. A dyadic interaction would be a rock hitting
the water. Two existential 'things'; rock and water. That is NOT a
RELATION.

I have said repeatedly that I do NOT consider these interactions to
be dyads. So - why keep bringing it up?

The Peircean 'spoke' is not a triad of dyadic interactions. But, to
me, a model showing how ONE semiosic process, the Sign [capital S]
functions as a whole within three - not one- but three Relations. The
Relation between the Representamen-Object; that between the
R-Interpretant; and the R in itself. Each of them can be in a
different categorical mode.

"Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic relationships and
three monadic characters" 6.331

BUT - "every triad is either monadically degenerate, dyadically
degenerate or geuine. A monadically degenerate triad is one which
results from the essence of three monads, its subjects" 1.473. NOTE -
this is what you, Gary F, seem to be suggesting - with your comments
on 'subjects'...

Peirce continues: "A dyadically degenerate triad is one which
results from dyads" 1.473. NOTE: This - is what you, Gary, seem to be
suggesting is my view.

Peirce continues: "A genuine triad is one which cannot be resolved
in any such way..." 1.473.  NOTE: And the genuine triad introduces
the mediation of generalization among its interactors - and THIS is
what makes the triadic interaction 'genuine'.."the genuine triad
must involve generality" 1.477

Then, Peirce goes on to explain the nature of 'it involves a sign,
or representamen, of some kind outward or inward, mediating between
an object and an interpreting thought" 1.480.

And I referenced Peirce's writing on Relations - 8.335-7. I won't
repeat them.

My point is that the triad is a complex process of transformation of
information. That is why I cannot see it as ONE Relation but as a
complex one; of three Relations bonded irreducibly together.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 13/04/17  9:14 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R, Edwina, Jon S, list,
 I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to
say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms
— especially what he means by a triadic relation — we need to
read them in the context where Peirce uses them, not lift them out of
their context and drop them into a scheme of our own invention.
Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which
is something like  a three spoked umbrella: -

Links:
--
[1] http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon - I see your point about what we have discussed is an INTERNAL
semiosis of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant. I agree with this - since they are all in the same
mode, then, I can understand its being ONE Relation split into three
sectors. BUT, the point is, that this Internal Triad is not all there
is to semiosis. If there were - then frankly, semiosis wouldn't
exist...nor would anything else [i.e., matter/concepts]. 

The point is that this strictly internal complexity is necessarily
linked to the external world, in the basic case: with a Dynamic
Object. And possibly generating a Dynamic Interpretant. It is this
image that I am considering is the three-spokes.

The trichotomies are not relevant to this; they are simply
sets-of-three modes.

I'd agree with your suggestion that the rheme/dicent/argument might
work with the Dynamic Interpretant - considering that the Final
Interpretant has a more powerful function 'in the future', so to
speak.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Thu 13/04/17  9:40 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents
one triadic relation.  As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten
trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the
Sign to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP
2:483), which divides the Sign "As to the Nature of the Assurance of
the Utterance" (EP 2:490) into Instinct/Experience/Form.  Hence the
spokes themselves  are all in the same mode, even though the
correlates at their ends and the dyadic relations between those
correlates can be in different modes.
 By contrast, the three trichotomies of 1903 are for "the sign in
itself" as Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, "the relation of the sign to
its Object" as Icon/Index/Symbol, and how "its Interpretant
represents it" as Rheme/Dicent/Argument (EP 2:291-292).  Peirce
subsequently characterized the latter as "the Relation of the Sign to
the Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), but I have been suggesting
recently that it should be associated instead with the relation of
the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant. 
 To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I
have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on
the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others
on the List can shed some light on that.
 Regards,
 Jon S. 
 On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:

1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's
8.335,8.337 comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object,
Relations to the Interpretant..but the reason is that each of the
three 'spikes' so to speak, can be in a different modal category. So,
in a rhematic indexical legisign, the Representamen spoke can be in
Thirdness; the relation to the Dynamic Object in a mode of
Secondness; the relation to the Dy. Interpretant in a mode of
Firstness. That's why I refer to relations in the plural. These
interactions most certainly are NOT independent - and my use of the
plural of RelationS doesn't imply their independence. Instead, it
implies their modal differentiation within this singular semiosic
interaction.  

2) The problem I have with the linear image of the movement from DO
to DI...and Peirce often uses it, which is one relation with three
correlates, is that I also am interested in the morphological result
of the semiosis. Not simply in the passing of X via Y to Z. But the
physiological FORM.  That is - referring to my oft-quoted 4.551 'Mind
..in crystal, in the work of bees'...etc... I am considering that the
Sign, that triad, takes on a FORM. This FORM is the full Sign. So, a
cell - let's say a single cell - is the semiosic Form, a Sign. This
is the result of the interaction of the Representamen HABITS
interacting with many Dynamic Objects [water, nutrients, chemicals,
etc etc]...which are then transformed via the HABITS held within the
Representamen into the Dynamic Interpretant - that CELL. BUT - all
three parts of this whole FORM/SIGN must be operative in this
semiosic process:   The input from the various multiple Dynamic
Interpretants.transformed via the general rules held by the
Representamenresulting in the Dynamic Interpretant FORM of the
whole system...that particular cell. 

Edwina

-- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [2] 
 On Wed 12/04/17  6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[3] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the
representamen alone? Or is it th

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

You wrote:


"To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that."

 

I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following:

A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for some triadic relations.

Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).

My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).

It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate.

Best,

Helmut


 

 13. April 2017 um 15:40 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Edwina, List:
 

Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one triadic relation.  As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), which divides the Sign "As to the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" (EP 2:490) into Instinct/Experience/Form.  Hence the spokes themselves are all in the same mode, even though the correlates at their ends and the dyadic relations between those correlates can be in different modes.

 

By contrast, the three trichotomies of 1903 are for "the sign in itself" as Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, "the relation of the sign to its Object" as Icon/Index/Symbol, and how "its Interpretant represents it" as Rheme/Dicent/Argument (EP 2:291-292).  Peirce subsequently characterized the latter as "the Relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), but I have been suggesting recently that it should be associated instead with the relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant.

 

To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that.

 

Regards,

 

Jon S.






 




 

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:

1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's 8.335,8.337 comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object, Relations to the Interpretant..but the reason is that each of the three 'spikes' so to speak, can be in a different modal category. So, in a rhematic indexical legisign, the Representamen spoke can be in Thirdness; the relation to the Dynamic Object in a mode of Secondness; the relation to the Dy. Interpretant in a mode of Firstness. That's why I refer to relations in the plural. These interactions most certainly are NOT independent - and my use of the plural of RelationS doesn't imply their independence. Instead, it implies their modal differentiation within this singular semiosic interaction.

2) The problem I have with the linear image of the movement from DO to DI...and Peirce often uses it, which is one relation with three correlates, is that I also am interested in the morphological result of the semiosis. Not simply in the passing of X via Y to Z. But the physiological FORM.  That is - referring to my oft-quoted 4.551 'Mind ..in crystal, in the work of bees'...etc... I am considering that the Sign, that triad, takes on a FORM. This FORM is the full Sign. So, a cell - let's say a single cell - is the semiosic Form, a Sign. This is the result of the interaction of the Representamen HABITS interacting with many Dynamic Objects [water, nutrients, chemicals, etc etc]...which are then transformed via the HABITS held within the Representamen into the Dynamic Interpretant - that CELL. BUT - all three parts of this whole FORM/SIGN must be operative in this semiosic process:   The input from the various multiple Dynamic Interpretants.transformed via the general rules held by the Representamenresulting in the Dynamic Interpretant FORM of the whole system...that particular cell.

Edwina

--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Wed 12/04/17 6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:


Edwina, List:
 


ET:  A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant? 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 to read them in the context where
> Peirce uses them, not lift them out of their context and drop them into a
> scheme of our own invention.
>
>
>
> Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which is
> something like  a three spoked umbrella: -<.but one can see even from
> this that there are THREE spokes or Relations in that image.” But in its
> context, that image is NOT a diagram of the S-O-I relation, the essential
> “sign relation.” That image is in fact an existential graph with three
> “tails.”
>
> The context, CP 1.343-9, is “From the “Lowell Lectures of 1903,” III, vol.
> 1, 3d Draught.” The larger context is the Lowell lectures (pieces of which
> are unfortunately scattered here and there in the CP) and the Syllabus
> which Peirce wrote to accompany them. The Syllabus of course includes the
> “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations”, which ought to be the
> go-to text for Peirce’s explanation of the triadic relations involved in
> semiosis.
>
>
>
> But even from the fragment published in CP 1.343-9, one can glean some of
> Peirce’s key insights on the subject, given some slight acquaintance with
> existential graphs. In graphs such as the one at 1.347, the lines (Peirce
> calls them “tails” here) are lines of identity each representing that 
> something
> exists. The relation is represented in the graph by the labelled spot to
> which they are all attached, and the three “tails” are the relata. In
> propositional terms, the graph represents a predicate (the spot) with three
> subjects, (i.e. with a “valency” of three). To read the lines in the
> graph as relations is to misread the graph. The graph is itself a
> diagrammatic sign, but there is no attempt to represent its object(s) or
> its interpretant on the sheet of assertion. In fact, I have never seen,
> anywhere in Peirce’s writings, an attempt to represent the basic triadic
> sign relation in a single diagram. I think the reason is simple: that
> kind of triadic relation cannot be represented that way. But if someone can
> show me a text where Peirce has done that, I’ll happily retract that claim.
>
>
>
> This would explain, by the way, why it is that Edwina “can't 'imagize'
> what 'one triadic Relation' would look like or how it would function.” If
> you represent relations as lines (or “spokes”), you can only represent
> dyadic relations. Then Peirce’s graph can only appear to you as a triad of
> (dyadic) relations.
>
>
>
> Gary’s point about the time dimension is crucial here: existential graphs
> are “moving pictures of thought” in which semiosis is represented by
> transformations of the graphs. I think an attentive reading of CP 1.343-9
> should clarify why it is that the essential sign relation, and the
> Thirdness of semiosis, cannot be adequately represented in a single image.
> In that passage, Peirce is trying to give an experiential account of
> Thirdness and triadic relations to his audience. CP 1.345:
>
> “I will sketch a proof that the idea of meaning is irreducible to those of
> quality and reaction. It depends on two main premisses. The first is that
> every genuine triadic relation involves meaning, as meaning is obviously a
> triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by
> means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to
> convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic
> relation involves meaning.”
>
>
>
> If anyone wants to study this passage from the Lowell lectures but doesn’t
> have access to the Collected Papers, let me know and I’ll provide you with
> a copy. Or post it here, if there’s enough interest. But I hope that at
> least those who do have access to CP will take a closer look at it.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
>
>
>
> Edwina, Jon S, List,
>
>
>
> First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I
> think the three pronged spoke does exactly represent a triadic relation,
> not three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node
> from which the three spokes protrude make it one relation, not three.
>
>
>
> But for a moment I'd like to refer to Peirce's notion of time--which I've
> discussed in the past as having some relationship to Bergson's flow and
> duration (durée)-- as a kind of analogy of the three 'moments' of semiosis.
>
>
>
> For Peirce there is a continuous melding of the past into the present
> anticipating the future. Andre d

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms
that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in
the past.  He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a
triadic relation that is "projectively reducible."  I still wonder,
though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise
explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications?

By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first
guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S).  The reason why Peirce never discusses the
(O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation.  The
first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides
the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of
anything to itself is simply *identity*.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, List,
> You wrote:
> "To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely *triadic*, I
> have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the
> basis of one correlate and two *dyadic *relations.  Perhaps others on the
> List can shed some light on that."
>
> I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about
> relation reduction something like the following:
> A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot
> compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional
> reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of
> reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind
> of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for
> some triadic relations.
> Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to
> (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).
> My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction:
> (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).
> It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would
> say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the
> representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate.
> Best,
> Helmut
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my
view of the 'umbrella image' of the semiosic process. An  'existential
graph with three tails' is a mere 'kinetic' description of a 2D
diagram. It doesn't mean anything. 
The phrase: 'Mother loves child' - I'm removing the 'All' and 'Some'
, or 'X loves Y' ..which seems to be, as noted a dyadic relation
doesn't seem, to me, to fit the triad. It's a rhema with two blanks;
a dyad. Roberts p 115.  So- I'm confused about your point.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 14/04/17 10:41 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
 Gary, F, Gary R. Edwina, John S., List,
 Gary F. has made a clear and interesting set of interpretative
points about the “ 'umbrella  image' of the triad. While I agree
with much of what he says, let me insert some questions and offer
some qualifications. 
 I probably shouldn’t intervene in this discussion, but I have to
say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s terms 
— especially what he means by a triadic relation — we need to
read them  in the context where Peirce uses them, not lift them out
of their context and drop them into a scheme of our own invention. 
Or, to put the point in different terms, let's make our aims clear.
If our goal is to interpret Peirce's texts, then we need to pay
particular attention to the context of  any given passage in a given
essay, and the context of a given essay as part of a larger projected
work or series of essays. What is more, we need to be clear about the
aims  that are guiding Peirce's inquiries and the methods he is using
to answer the questions at hand. For these scholarly purposes, for
instance, it probably makes sense to focus on the diagrams that
Peirce actually used in his writings and refrain from developing  our
own.  
Having said that, if we are drawing on Peirce's ideas for our own
purposes for the sake of using them to engage in our own lines of
inquiry, then it may be productive to  insert some of his ideas into
different frameworks (some of our own making) or to draw on different
diagrammatic systems or even to develop our own diagrams. If we don't
really understand what Peirce was doing with those ideas, then we run
the risk of misunderstanding  them and using them poorly. As such,
many of us who want to put the ideas to work in our own inquiries
also want to ensure that we're doing a responsible job of trying to
understand what Peirce is doing with those ideas. 
 Edwina refers to an “'umbrella image' of the triad [1.347], which
is something like  a three spoked umbrella: -

Links:
--
[1] http://www.unav.es/gep/SeminariodeTienne.html

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, List,


One point I ways trying to make is that the various diagrams Peirce uses to 
characterize a branching line (e.g., branching trees, branch in a roadway) have 
a number of different sources--and Peirce explored the use of these different 
diagrams for more than a decade before he developed the EG. As such, I was 
agreeing with Gary F. that the particular use of the branching line in CP 
1.343-9 should be interpreted in light of the rules for the beta system of the 
EG as Peirce was formulating them at the time of the Lowell Lectures of 1903. 
As the same time, I was point out that we have a considerable range of diagrams 
to consider as we try to understand what Peirce was doing (e.g., between 1886 
and 1896) when he was developing the conception of a triadic relation prior to 
the formulation of the alpha and beta systems of the EG.


In fact, we should consider a wide range of different sort of diagrams that 
involve branching lines as we try to understand what is involved in the notion 
of a triadic relation and what might be evolved from such a formal element of 
thought. These diagrams involving branching relations should be interpreted in 
light of his notes and responses to the works of Euler, Sylvester, Kempe, 
Listing, etc. For my part, I'm particularly interested in some of the 
objections he raises to Kempe's thesis in the Memoir that all mathematical 
relations can be "reduced" to dyadic relations between spots and lines. I'd 
like to interpret his response in light of his discussion of the categories and 
the topological notion of a furcation in a continuous line in MS 717.


In response to your remark that loving is a dyadic relation, I'll start by 
saying that--in general--I agree. Having said that, your earlier rejoinder to 
Gary F. that genuine dyadic relations are, on Peirce's account, always 
reactions between two actual, discrete objects misses the mark. In "The Logic 
of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within," Peirce 
develops a rich classification of different sorts of dyadic relations. The 
dyadic relation A loves B is a materially and formally ordered dynamical dyad 
of diversity. A single actual, discrete object is also classified as a genuine 
dyad by Peirce (e.g., in comparison to a essential dyad or a inherential dyad). 
For instance, an individual object that has changed in some characteristic 
(e.g., the aspen leaf turned from green to yellow) can be classified as a 
qualitative dyad of diversity.


With that much said, the reason I'm engaging with these questions about 
Peirce's account of triadic relations is that I'm particularly interested in 
exploring the differences between the classes of monadically degenerate triads, 
dyadically degenerate triads, genuine triadic relations and thoroughly genuine 
triadic relations. A number of the points made recently in various discussions 
on the Peirce-List seem to ignore the differences between the latter two 
classes.


In saying that, I'm getting ahead of myself, so let me return to the example of 
 "Every mother loves some child of hers." In focusing on the dyadic character 
of A loves B, you set to the side "Every", "some", and "of hers." The relations 
involved in putting those together in this proposition are not simple. We have 
two different quantifiers, and a fact with two parts. In my remarks, I was 
trying to draw attention to the fact that Peirce is focusing on the "possible 
space time continuity with several such phenomena to which it is related in the 
same way" (see Roberts, 20-6). Without yet worrying about how the space-time 
continuity might be represented in different sorts of diagrams, let me just ask 
how we might represent the references to "several such phenomena to which it is 
related in the same way." How does Peirce represent the reference to the range 
of phenomena that might be observed in this diagram in chapter 7 of the Grand 
Logic.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354


____________
From: Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 8:09 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs


Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my view of 
the 'umbrella image' of the semiosic process. An  'existential graph with three 
tails' is a mere 'kinetic' description of a 2D diagram. It doesn't mean 
anything.


The phrase: 'Mother loves child' - I'm removing the 'All' and 'Some' , or 'X 
loves Y' ..which seems to be, as noted a dyadic relation doesn't seem, to me, 
to fit the triad. It's a rhema with two blanks; a dyad. Roberts p 115.  So- I'm 
confused about your po

Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Stephen, list:
 I think that this is a vastly different perspective from one that
includes Mind and Thirdness.

You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that
matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the
'things that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own
self, learn which insects are food and which are poisonous, or is
there an innate stored knowledge base that provides such information
to the collective, of which that single bird is merely one example?

As for 'imitation' - this sounds similar to the old 'diffusion'
explanation of human behaviour, where it was assumed that a new
technology was invented once and then, diffused by imitation to other
populations. But this didn't explain how different isolated
populations developed the same technology or mode of
behaviour/belief.

You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that the FORM
of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the organism as
to its behaviour. So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly
- but that's not an analysis in my view.

Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It
seems to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use
these Peircean categories within its framework.

It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the
collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness]. 

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 11:19 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
Hi Edwina
 No, knowing how to be is not a synonym for instinct. It is an
expression of pragmatism, and how a living entity, as a self, defines
the things that matter. It particularly relates to firstness and self.
Knowing how to be incorporates the self into pragmatism. I suppose one
might say, in this context, that a proper appreciation of firstness
needs to factor in the role of self, and the self’s relationship to
the world, in the context of its needs. By taking this approach, we
attain a different and more compelling perspective on the role of 
imitation, particularly in the context of pragmatism. By factoring in
imitation, we obtain a greater appreciation of the nuances that
motivate a self to imitation… for example, fear. Fear motivates
selves to imitate the current Bitcoin craze… the fear of missing
out, versus the fear of loss when people begin to flee the market.
The comfortable known versus fear of the unknown.
 Mind-body predisposition… again, relates to pragmatism. The body
provides the “tools” that predispose us to how we define the
things that matter… as per Mark Twain’s famous aphorism, ‘A man
whose only tool is a hammer will perceive the world in terms of
nails’.
 There are different layers to pragmatism, for example:

1)  There are the mind-body predispositions;

 2)  There is imitation.
Imitation sometimes overrides mind-body predispositions, for
example, in the domestication of animals or in the feralization of
humans (feral children, eg, the Wild Boy of Aveyron).
 Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [1]] 
 Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 4:26 PM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca [2]; g...@gnusystems.ca [3];
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
 Subject: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
 Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you
haven't explained what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist?
Where? How does it evolve? It seems to be a synonym for 'instinct'! 

What is a 'mind-body' predisposition?

Edwina
 On Sun 10/12/17 10:05 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
[5] sent:

List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be
helpful, I believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct.
No such thing. ALL organism's are decision-makers, making choices
from their ecosystems. What one might typically categorize as
instinct, in other animals, is nothing other than a reduced horizon
of options (analogous to a goldfish living inside a small bowl
instead of a wide ocean). ALL organisms have to "know how to be." A
fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a
fish. Or, putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would
behave if her body were that of a man.
 And once we do away with this notion of instinct as a preprogrammed
blueprint for behavior, so too we might extend the same reasoning to
atoms and molecules. That is, the mechanics of chemical bonds and
subatomic forces are not what "determine" atomic and molecular
properties (behavior). Rather, atoms and molecules must also "know
how to be", in accordance with their own mind-body predispositions...
that's why semiosis is relevant also to quantum mechanics, imho... and
nonlocality (e

RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. 
>But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that 
>matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which 
>insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored 
>knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that 
>single bird is merely one example?”

My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. 
Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance 
theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my 
article, Quantum Semiotics 
<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> 
. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is 
somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is 
conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces 
another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in 
the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the 
‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic 
brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself).

>”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same 
>technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”

Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these 
different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected 
but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions 
in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. 
Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human 
mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to self-evident inventions like 
fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts and even pottery, across 
most cultures, even when they are isolated from one another.

>”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the 
>organism as to its behaviour.”

The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when he 
attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html

>”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not an 
>analysis in my view.”

What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident observation… 
like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge), and a 
winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly. Furthermore, in many 
species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their parents. That is, they 
learn to apply their winged predispositions, from their parents. So again, 
imitation plays an important role, despite the physiological predispositions.

>”Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems to 
>focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these Peircean 
>categories within its framework.”

Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of thinking. I was addressing 
that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and imitation - that is best characterized 
in the context of firstness and secondness. What is it that motivates an 
organism to imitate (the associations that become habits)? That’s a question, 
in the first instance, of Firstness.

>”It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the collective 
>[i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].”

Again, as per preceding point, I am addressing that aspect of semiosis – 
pragmatism and imitation – that most immediately takes place at the level of 
the self. There is, of course, the collective that provides the recursion of 
behaviors that manifests as habit, or Thirdness, but that’s beyond the point 
that I wanted to emphasize.

Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my line of thinking. 
There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies throughout the universe, 
with a couple hundred-thousand stars per galaxy. What I am outlining, with my 
line of thinking, suggests life as inevitable, and not accidental. It’s a 
living universe. Mine is an attempt to address the entropy problem - Shannon 
entropy, thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the tendency to disorder. By 
contrast, the notion of instinct as stored information, as with the 
NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, are inconsistent with the reality of entropy. 
It is the persistence of complexity across time, as evident in the persistence 
of life across time on Earth, that is the deal-breaker for any kind of 
information determinism.

Regards sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@li

Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Jerry Rhee]

 to emphasize.
>
> Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my line of
> thinking. There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies throughout
> the universe, with a couple hundred-thousand stars per galaxy. What I am
> outlining, with my line of thinking, suggests life as inevitable, and not
> accidental. It’s a living universe. Mine is an attempt to address the
> entropy problem - Shannon entropy, thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the
> tendency to disorder. By contrast, the notion of instinct as stored
> information, as with the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, are inconsistent
> with the reality of entropy. It is the *persistence* of complexity across
> time, as evident in the persistence of life across time on Earth, that is
> the deal-breaker for any kind of information determinism.
>
> Regards sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca ]
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu;
> 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
> *Subject:* Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
>
>
>
> Stephen, list:
>
>
> I think that this is a vastly different perspective from one that includes
> Mind and Thirdness.
>
> You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'.
> But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that
> matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which
> insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored
> knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which
> that single bird is merely one example?
>
> As for 'imitation' - this sounds similar to the old 'diffusion'
> explanation of human behaviour, where it was assumed that a new technology
> was invented once and then, diffused by imitation to other populations. But
> this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same
> technology or mode of behaviour/belief.
>
> You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that the FORM of
> matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the organism as to its
> behaviour. So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but
> that's not an analysis in my view.
>
> Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems to
> focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these Peircean
> categories within its framework.
>
> It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the
> collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *On Sun 10/12/17 11:19 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
>  sent:*
>
> Hi Edwina
>
> No, *knowing how to be* is not a synonym for instinct. It is an
> expression of pragmatism, and how a living entity, as a self, defines the
> things that matter. It particularly relates to firstness and self. *Knowing
> how to be* incorporates the *self* into pragmatism. I suppose one might
> say, in this context, that a proper appreciation of firstness needs to
> factor in the role of self, and the self’s relationship to the world, in
> the context of its needs. By taking this approach, we attain a different
> and more compelling perspective on the role of *imitation*, particularly
> in the context of pragmatism. By factoring in *imitation*, we obtain a
> greater appreciation of the nuances that motivate a self to *imitation*…
> for example, fear. Fear motivates selves to imitate the current Bitcoin
> craze… the fear of missing out, versus the fear of loss when people begin
> to flee the market. The comfortable known versus fear of the unknown.
>
> Mind-body predisposition… again, relates to pragmatism. The body provides
> the “tools” that predispose us to how we define the things that matter… as
> per Mark Twain’s famous aphorism, ‘A man whose only tool is a hammer will
> perceive the world in terms of nails’.
>
> There are different layers to pragmatism, for example:
>
> 1)  There are the mind-body predispositions;
>
> 2)  There is imitation.
>
>
>
> Imitation sometimes overrides mind-body predispositions, for example, in
> the domestication of animals or in the feralization of humans (feral
> children, eg, the Wild Boy of Aveyron).
>
> Regards
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 4:26 PM
> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu;
> 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
> *Subject:* Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
>
>
>
>
> Stephen - the problem I have with your hypo

Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Jerry Rhee]

s? It seems
>> to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these
>> Peircean categories within its framework.”
>>
>> Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of thinking. I was
>> addressing that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and imitation - that is
>> best characterized in the context of firstness and secondness. What is it
>> that *motivates* an organism to imitate (the associations that become
>> habits)? That’s a question, in the first instance, of Firstness.
>>
>> >”It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the
>> collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].”
>>
>> Again, as per preceding point, I am addressing that aspect of semiosis –
>> pragmatism and imitation – that most immediately takes place at the level
>> of the self. There is, of course, the collective that provides the
>> recursion of behaviors that manifests as habit, or Thirdness, but that’s
>> beyond the point that I wanted to emphasize.
>>
>> Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my line of
>> thinking. There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies throughout
>> the universe, with a couple hundred-thousand stars per galaxy. What I am
>> outlining, with my line of thinking, suggests life as inevitable, and not
>> accidental. It’s a living universe. Mine is an attempt to address the
>> entropy problem - Shannon entropy, thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the
>> tendency to disorder. By contrast, the notion of instinct as stored
>> information, as with the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, are inconsistent
>> with the reality of entropy. It is the *persistence* of complexity
>> across time, as evident in the persistence of life across time on Earth,
>> that is the deal-breaker for any kind of information determinism.
>>
>> Regards sj
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca ]
>> *Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
>> *To:* tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu;
>> 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
>> *Subject:* Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
>>
>>
>>
>> Stephen, list:
>>
>>
>> I think that this is a vastly different perspective from one that
>> includes Mind and Thirdness.
>>
>> You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'.
>> But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that
>> matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which
>> insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored
>> knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which
>> that single bird is merely one example?
>>
>> As for 'imitation' - this sounds similar to the old 'diffusion'
>> explanation of human behaviour, where it was assumed that a new technology
>> was invented once and then, diffused by imitation to other populations. But
>> this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same
>> technology or mode of behaviour/belief.
>>
>> You seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that the FORM of
>> matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the organism as to its
>> behaviour. So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but
>> that's not an analysis in my view.
>>
>> Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and Thirdness? It seems to
>> focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness - if I may use these Peircean
>> categories within its framework.
>>
>> It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self] rather than the
>> collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *On Sun 10/12/17 11:19 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
>>  sent:*
>>
>> Hi Edwina
>>
>> No, *knowing how to be* is not a synonym for instinct. It is an
>> expression of pragmatism, and how a living entity, as a self, defines the
>> things that matter. It particularly relates to firstness and self. *Knowing
>> how to be* incorporates the *self* into pragmatism. I suppose one might
>> say, in this context, that a proper appreciation of firstness needs to
>> factor in the role of self, and the self’s relationship to the world, in
>> the context of its needs. By taking this approach, we attain a different
>> and more compelling perspective on the role of *imitation*, particularly
>> in the context of pragmatism. By factoring in *imitati

RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

Jerry, my outline does not deny the role of chance (tychism). For example, 
discovery or invention… such as the discovery of America by Columbus or the 
invention of penicillin by Fleming. Discovery, whether accidental or planned, 
can have huge implications for cultural evolution. But one must distinguish 
between the chance events of tychism versus the principles and axioms that 
provide the foundations for one’s axiomatic framework… Information determinism, 
as a general principle or axiom, does not address entropy properly.

 

From: Jerry Rhee [mailto:jerryr...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 9:46 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Edwina Taborsky; Gary Fuhrman; Peirce-L; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

What’s so palpable about this ironic situation is that a claim is made by ones 
who claim Peirce, that the ‘self’ emerges by experience, while at the same 
time, denying accident in life.  Does not tychism also belong to the river of 
pragmatism?

 

That is, what does it matter what woman is for man when the purpose is always 
the child?

 

Predispositions?  I forget predispositions!

 

It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions. Should I not 
have to be a cask of memory, if I also wanted to have my reasons with me?

 

Best,
Jerry Rhee

 

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:

Dear list:

 

“List, in the interests of the universality of semiosis, it would be helpful, I 
believe, to do away entirely with the notion of instinct. “

 

“A fish behaves exactly as I would behave if my body were that of a fish. Or, 
putting it another way… a man behaves as a woman would behave if her body were 
that of a man.”

 

__

 

"Such is the language of all fish," saidst thou; "what they do not fathom is 
unfathomable.”

 

“There is a strong tendency in us all to be sceptical about there being any 
real meaning or law in things.  This scepticism is strongest in the most 
masculine thinkers.”

 

Hth,

Jerry Rhee

 

On Sun, Dec 10, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that matter'. 
>But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things that 
>matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which 
>insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored 
>knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that 
>single bird is merely one example?”

My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for birds. 
Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance 
theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my 
article, Quantum Semiotics 
<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> 
. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is 
somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is 
conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces 
another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in 
the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the 
‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic 
brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself).

>”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations developed the same 
>technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”

Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are these 
different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once connected 
but later become isolated from one another, will share the same predispositions 
in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies and beliefs. 
Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to mind-bodies. A human 
mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to self-evident inventions like 
fire and the wheel, or even mud huts and tree huts and even pottery, across 
most cultures, even when they are isolated from one another.

>”that the FORM of matter, i.e., a particular body-shape predisposes the 
>organism as to its behaviour.”

The late Tomas Sebeok’s line of thinking basically parallels my own, when he 
attributes an ape’s inability to speak to the absence of vocal chords:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/02/us/thomas-sebeok-81-debunker-of-ape-human-speech-theory.html

>”So - the wings of a bird will predispose it to fly - but that's not an 
>analysis in my view.”

What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a self-evident observation… 
like an axiom. Experience wires the neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge), and a 
winged animal is predisposed to wiring its brain to fly. Furthermore, in many 
species of birds, young birds learn to fly from their parents. That is, they 
learn to app

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

I think there are two signs we are talking about: The law formation sign, and a law application (instantiation?) sign.

In the law formation sign, it depends on ones belief, which kind of interpretant the law is: Does the law not change anymore, then the interpretant is final, and the immediate and the dynamical interpretants are the same like it. Is the law still changing (tychism), then the interpretant is immediate, I guess, because it is internal to the sign, which is taking the space of the whole universe.

To define a law application sign , that is to draw a line around it, is an arbitrary action, if you are eg. talking about two masses in space attracting each other, because they are attracted by all other masses in the universe as well.

But, if you do, you have a sign with a blurred border, and for this, I would say, the law is the immediate object, if the law is still  changing, and, if the law is not changing anymore, both the immediate and the dynamical object, both being the same then.

The representamen is the situation at the beginning of the sign, the interpretant the situation at the end of the sign, becoming the representamen for the next sign, and the duration of each sign is infenitisimally short, I would say.

Best,

Helmut

 

07. April 2017 um 16:53 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption.

 

For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem to use EP2, and this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll copy it here:

 

[[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the successes of science in its applications to human convenience are witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of God and in shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions of the universe. 

Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions. Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]

 

Gary F.

 

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 


Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:

"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic"

As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical but as real.

Edwina


--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:


Jon A.S., John S.,

 

I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below.

 

Gary F.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52

 


John S., List:


 




JFS:  In sum

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and
those pages weren't included. I do prefer the CP collection.

No- I am not assuming that the object of a metaphorical sign isn't
real. I am sure that it can be/IS real. That's not my point. - which
was to question first, the nature of these natural laws, which are
symbolic but not in the human sense of symbolic. And second, to
question that our primary experience of these natural laws is
metaphorical.

 I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is
indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of these
laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing symbolic
constructs - is a secondary step. As Peirce said - "every scientific
explanation of a natural phenomenon". I'm talking about prior to the
scientific explanation which, since it suggests Reason functioning
within the natural world - can be 'anthropomorphic' [if we define
Reason as particularly human]. But I consider our analysis of these
laws irrelevant. My focus is on the natural laws themselves, in
themselves, and how they operate.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Fri 07/04/17 10:53 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, you appear to be assuming that the object of a metaphorical
sign cannot be real. I don’t subscribe to that assumption.
For Peirce’s explanation of this point, see the passage I cited
from Peirce’s Harvard Lecture 4, EP2:193-4. Since you don’t seem
to use EP2, and this passage was apparently omitted from CP, I’ll
copy it here:
[[ I hear you say: “This smacks too much of an anthropomorphic
conception.” I reply that every scientific explanation of a natural
phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in nature to which
the human reason is analogous; and that it really is so all the
successes of science in its applications to human convenience are
witnesses. They proclaim that truth over the length and breadth of
the modern world. In the light of the successes of science to my mind
there is a degree of baseness in denying our birthright as children of
God and in shamefacedly slinking away from anthropomorphic conceptions
of the universe.  

Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy
of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast
representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have,
organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of
Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play
in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe,—that
Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I
can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are
the premisses  for us and these perceptual judgments have icons as
their predicates, in which icons Qualities are immediately presented.
But what is first for us is not first in nature. The premisses of
Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements of
facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the
necessitarian supposes to have been all in existence from the
foundation of the world, but which the Tychist supposes are
continually receiving new accretions. Those premisses of nature,
however, though they are not the  perceptual facts that are premisses
to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being premisses. We can only
imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As
premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]
 Gary F.
From:  Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
 Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:

"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic" 

As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula
or symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO
metaphorical because WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My
view is that our experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant
is how these laws form individual instantiations of matter - and I
don't see this as metaphorical but as real.

 Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [1] 
 On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [2] sent: 

Jon A.S., John S.,
I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion
below. 
  

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list - hmm - that is interesting and I'd agree; the Dynamic
Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also Thirdness.
This enables individual organisms, when they interact with another
external organism, to informationally connect with the external
organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their own [or both sets
of] laws.
 -- 

Edwina
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17 12:58 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, John S., List:
 JFS:  Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that
makes reliable predictions reflects something real about the world.
That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it
isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such.
 I agree, and I am still trying to figure out how to classify that
real aspect/regularity as a Sign  itself, if in fact it is legitimate
to treat reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 ET:  I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour;
i.e., among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.
 I agree, which is why I suggested that the Dynamic Object of a law
of nature is the continuum of its potential  instantiations (3ns),
not the (discrete) collection of its actual instantiations (2ns).
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
John, list: 

I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e.,
among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.

That is, a law would refer to the continuity of the species of
chickens, which have an ability to reproduce their type via
eggs-to-chickens. It would refer to the continuity of the type of
flower - which has the ability to reproduce that type year after year
in particular form after form.

A rule of conceptual behaviour is not a law and refers only to that
particular individual and does not continue on after that individual.


Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca [4] 
 On Fri 07/04/17  9:02 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net [5] sent:
 On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: 
 > JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is 
 > a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe. 
 > 
 > Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not
our 
  > linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of
Signs 
 > are they? 
  Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes 
 reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. 
 That real aspect of the world is some kind of regularity.  But 
 it isn't stated as a law until somebody states it as such. 
 For example, Immanuel Kant's habits were so regular that his 
 neighbors said that they could set their clocks by the time 
 he went out for his daily walk.  That is an example of law-like 
 behavior.  But it doesn't imply that there was a specific law 
 embodied in Kant's nature.  That's just the way he behaved. 
 > Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general 
 > laws of nature are real, 
  If a law we state makes reliable predictions, there must be 
 something real that makes it true.  But that something may be 
 as elusive as whatever caused Kant's predictable behavior. 
 Calling it a law is a convenient metaphor for something that 
 we don't understand in detail. 
 For examples, think of the laws discovered by Galileo, Kepler, 
 Newton, and Einstein.  Then think of the thousands or millions 
 of books, articles, and commentaries about those laws.  Then 
 imagine what scientists might discover in the next millennium. 
 An interesting joke:  "Gravity is a fraud. The earth sucks." 
 For predicting the way we walk in our daily lives, that joke is 
 as useful a metaphor as any of those scientific commentaries. 
 John 


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[4] http://www.primus.ca
[5]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'s...@bestweb.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/p

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

hese qualities play in an argument that, they of course,
> play in the universe,—that Universe being precisely an argument. In the
> little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our
> perceptual judgments are the premisses for us and these perceptual
> judgments have icons as their predicates, in which icons Qualities are
> immediately presented. But what is first for us is not first in nature. The
> premisses of Nature's own process are all the independent uncaused elements
> of facts that go to make up the variety of nature which the necessitarian
> supposes to have been all in existence from the foundation of the world,
> but which the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions.
> Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual
> facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being
> premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the
> premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]
>
>
>
> Gary F.
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
> Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
>
> Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:
>
> "These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constituents
> of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think John is right to
> call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of these symbols is
> anthropomorphic"
>
> As Peirce wrote: "A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or
> symbol" 5.107. I don't understand how a symbol is ALSO metaphorical because
> WE experience them in an anthropomorphic way. My view is that our
> experience of them is not relevant. What is relevant is how these laws form
> individual instantiations of matter - and I don't see this as metaphorical
> but as real.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Fri 07/04/17 9:25 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Jon A.S., John S.,
>
>
>
> I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below.
>
>
>
> Gary F.
>
>
>
> From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
> Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52
>
> John S., List:
>
>
>
> JFS:  In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
> for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
>
>
>
> Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature themselves, not our
> linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs are
> they?  Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that general
> laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe consists of Signs
> all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is
> not composed exclusively of signs."
>
> [GF: ] This quote is very often taken out of the context which specifies
> what Peirce is referring to as “this universe”:
>
> “It seems a strange thing, when one comes to ponder over it, that a sign
> should leave its interpreter to supply a part of its meaning; but the
> explanation of the phenomenon lies in the fact that the entire universe,—
> not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe,
> embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are
> all accustomed to refer to as ‘the truth,’— that all this universe is
> perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs” (EP2:394).
>
>
>
> Now, “that Universe being precisely an argument” (EP2:194), the laws of
> nature would have to be the “leading principles” which are “working out its
> conclusions in living realities” (EP2:193). These are clearly symbols,
> though not conventional, and (as constituents of an argument) take the form
> of propositions. I think John is right to call them metaphorical, as our
> primary experience of these symbols is anthropomorphic (EP2:193). We
> ascribe these forms to the greater Universe just as we do with “facts”:
> “What we call a ‘fact’ is something having the structure of a proposition,
> but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of
> every sign is to express “fact,” and by being joined with other signs, to
> approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would
> be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may
> use this language) would be the very Universe” (EP2:304).
>
>
>
> To me, this implies the most straightforward answer to your question,
> although it may not use the language you are looking for.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is
the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its
Interpretant, since that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP
2.95; 1902).  As constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature
would presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself.  Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum
bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in some sense *represent *the
development of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them
"something in nature to which the human reason is analogous."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 7:47 AM,  wrote:

> Edwina, Jon S.,
>
>
>
> As John has already pointed out, the key idea in the Peirce quote I
> supplied is “that there is something in nature to which the human reason
> is analogous.” If all thought is in signs, all reasoning and all knowledge
> is in signs. If we ask what kind of sign the laws of nature are analogous
> to, those laws are dynamic objects of the signs we are now using to
> describe them. If we agree that those objects are themselves signs, that
> the real Universe is a vast representamen, “precisely an argument,” any
> knowledge we can have of them must be both *in* signs and *of* signs
> which are real. It follows that the real signs we are talking about are
> analogous to the signs we are using to talk about them, which are
> propositions (symbolic dicisigns as well as legisigns).
>
>
>
> But one thing we know about the symbols we use is that they cannot supply
> acquaintance with their dynamic objects. Only by collateral experience can
> we know anything about those objects, the signs we call “the laws of
> nature.” If you assert that they are symbols, your assertion is meaningless
> unless you call upon your collateral experience of symbols to indicate the
> dynamic object of the symbols we are using. Your collateral experience
> consists of having done the sort of thing we are doing right now,
> participating in an ongoing argument. Our hypothesis that the “laws of
> nature” are symbols participating in an argument is empty of content unless
> those laws, those signs, are analogous to the signs in which our thought
> about them is expressed. Our thought is thus metaphorical insofar as it
> deploys that analogy.
>
>
>
> In short, my claim was not “that our primary experience of these natural
> laws is metaphorical.” My claim was that our primary experience of
> *symbols* and of *propositions* is our own use of them to participate in
> arguments. Unless your use of the word “symbol” differs from the
> conventional use well formulated by Peirce, our acquaintance with its
> dynamic object can only be drawn from the *commens*, and only by analogy
> with that can we mean something definite by asking whether the laws of
> nature are symbols.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work.


I agree.


So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
of efficient causation. Is my guess.


For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
be a token.

For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.

But does that mean no token can exist?  What would existence mean
for such a thing?  Perhaps you could call it logos.  As John the
Evangelist said, "The logos is God."  Does God exist?

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

I think so, after your proof!

Best, Helmut

 

08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr
 "John F Sowa" 
 

On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work.

I agree.

> So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
> of efficient causation. Is my guess.

For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
be a token.

For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.

But does that mean no token can exist? What would existence mean
for such a thing? Perhaps you could call it logos. As John the
Evangelist said, "The logos is God." Does God exist?

John




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point.

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law
in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming
you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the
laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual
molecule is a token of the type/law.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17  2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that
there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they
have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the
instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at
work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed
systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with
all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs
either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient
causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
 "John F Sowa"  wrote:
   Jon and Edwina,
 Jon
 > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
 > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
 > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
 could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
 Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
 or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
 tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
 "A cat on a red mat".
 All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with
just
 monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
 to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
 The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
 which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
 observations.
 Edwina
 > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
 > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
 > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
 > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
 > own [or both sets of] laws.
 I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
 Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
 An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
 babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
 John
 -
 PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe
PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm [1] .


Links:
--
[1] http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[gnox]

Jon Alan,

 

The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In 
Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is 
constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and understood 
as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to 
the motives which originally governed its selection.”

 

Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here 
(EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):

“That thoughts act on the physical world and conversely, is one of the most 
familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories are 
stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible for us, in 
the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very promising 
guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be made which 
suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of ultimate solution.

 

All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing 
thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but 
even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically 
determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature 
general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any 
participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great 
problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a 
century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite 
incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or 
resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or 
subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up 
Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the 
advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond 
that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.”

 

But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in His 
essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since 
there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely 
the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some 
visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness” (CP6.489). Yet 
he had earlier referred to God as a “vast consciousness.” I don’t want to get 
into theological issues, but I think it’s possible that, given the necessary 
vagueness of its terminology, the Ens necessarium/Creator God you believe in 
may not be the same as the agency God that Edwina disbelieves in.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 8-Apr-17 14:21
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

 

Gary F., List:

 

There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a 
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities" 
(CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the 
universe as Symbol, and "living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since 
that is what the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902).  As 
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would presumably have the 
same Object ("God's purpose") and the same relation to that Object (Symbol) as 
the universe itself.  Besides the still-difficult (for me) notion of a 
non-conventional Symbol--which obviously applies to the universe itself, not 
just the laws of nature within it--this raises the question of what Peirce 
meant by "God's purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be 
the summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge 
about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP 
1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in some sense represent the development 
of Reason, which is perhaps the very basis for calling them "something in 
nature to which the human reason is analogous."

 

Regards,




Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>  
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> 

 


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., Helmut, List:

Of course, Peirce famously argued for the *Reality *of God, not the *existence
*of God.  He explained why in one of the manuscript drafts of "A Neglected
Argument."

CSP:  Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular
Existent (meaning by an Existent, or object that Exists, a thing subject to
brute constraints, and reacting with all other Existents,) and so opposed
in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely say that He is a
Spirit, or Mind. (R 843; 1908)


He also addressed this a couple of years earlier.

CSP:  ... I myself always use *exist *in its strict philosophical sense of
"react with the other like things in the environment." Of course, in that
sense, it would be fetichism to say that God "exists." (CP 6.495; c. 1906)


As for "the *logos *is God," consistent with the possible connection
between the beginning as an indeterminate symbol (EP 2:322) and John 1:1, I
think that this is 3ns (reality) rather than 2ns (existence)--at least,
until "the *logos *became flesh and dwelt among us."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:05 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> John, List,
> I think so, after your proof!
> Best, Helmut
> 08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr
>  "John F Sowa" 
>
> On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> > I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> > but the law itself at work.
>
> I agree.
>
> > So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
> > of efficient causation. Is my guess.
>
> For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
> be a token.
>
> For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.
>
> But does that mean no token can exist? What would existence mean
> for such a thing? Perhaps you could call it logos. As John the
> Evangelist said, "The logos is God." Does God exist?
>
> John
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., Helmut, Edwina, List:

JFS:  Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.


Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a
Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that embodies it--right?

JFS:  The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.


I agree, except that I would substitute "reality" for "existence," since
the law itself is 3ns while its instantiations are 2ns.

HR:  ... I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work ...So law is all type, there are no tokens of it
in inanimate world of efficient causation.


Given my agreement with John S. above, it seems to me that a type
(3ns) can *only
*be experienced through its tokens (2ns).  We then use
reason--retroduction, deduction, induction--to formulate, explicate, and
evaluate the hypothesis that what we are observing is the manifestation of
a real law.

ET:  A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.


Yes, the law as a *type *governs an inexhaustible continuum of
*potential *cases;
its instantiation as a *token *is any *actual *case that it governs.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that
> law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a
> general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure
> of your point.
>
> I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the
> inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the
> physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a
> hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the
> type/law.
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> John, List,
> Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws
> existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed
> by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there
> are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not
> interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are
> no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
> type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation.
> Is my guess.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
> "John F Sowa" wrote:
> Jon and Edwina,
>
> Jon
> > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
>
> Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
> could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
>
> Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
> or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
> tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
> "A cat on a red mat".
>
> All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
> monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
> to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
>
> The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
> which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
> observations.
>
> Edwina
> > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> > own [or both sets of] laws.
>
> I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
> Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
> An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
> babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
>
> John
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF:  In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.)
which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used
and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.”


This is very helpful.  My mistake has been thinking of the Sign-Object
relation as conventional for a Symbol, rather than more broadly habitual.

CSP:  Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in
the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate,
is a Deity relatively to us.


So, just as ideas or resolutions in a human mind result in actions by a
human body, likewise the laws of nature have existential effects within the
universe.

GF:  But note also that a few years later, Peirce wrote that “Since God, in
His essential character of *Ens necessarium*, is a disembodied spirit, and
since there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is
either merely the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at
all events some visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no
consciousness” (CP6.489).


I think that there is some equivocation on "consciousness" between the two
passages.  In the earlier one, it seems to me that Peirce may have chosen
that word mainly to avoid repeating "mind."  In the later one, he clearly
associated consciousness with bodily sensation and therefore 2ns or
existence, which (as I just mentioned in another post) he did not consider
to be applicable to God.

GF:  I don’t want to get into theological issues, but I think it’s possible
that, given the necessary vagueness of its terminology, the *Ens
necessarium/Creator* God you believe in may not be the same as the *agency *God
that Edwina disbelieves in.


That is an interesting suggestion, although I have a hard time seeing how
God could be the Creator *without *possessing agency.  I am reminded of
these remarks by Peirce.

CSP:  "God" is a vernacular word and, like all such words, but more than
almost any, is *vague*. No words are so well understood as vernacular
words, in one way; yet they are invariably vague; and of many of them it is
true that, let the logician do his best to substitute precise equivalents
in their places, still the vernacular words alone, for all their vagueness,
answer the principal purposes. This is emphatically the case with the very
vague word "God," which is not made less vague by saying that it imports
"infinity," etc., since those attributes are at least as vague. (CP 6.494;
c. 1906)


Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 4:17 PM,  wrote:

> Jon Alan,
>
>
>
> The notion of a non-conventional symbol shouldn’t be too difficult. In 
> *Baldwin’s
> Dictionary,* Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.) which is
> constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and
> understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
> without regard to the motives which originally governed its selection.”
>
>
>
> Here’s another piece of that same Harvard lecture that seems relevant here
> (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):
>
> “That thoughts act on the physical world and *conversely*, is one of the
> most familiar of facts. Those who deny it are persons with whom theories
> are stronger than facts. But how thoughts act on things it is impossible
> for us, in the present state of our knowledge, so much as to make any very
> promising guess; although, as I will show you presently, a guess can be
> made which suffices to show that the problem is not beyond all hope of
> ultimate solution.
>
>
>
> All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature
> influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or
> symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not
> merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The
> general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But
> it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not
> in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the
> thing. Here we have that great problem of the *principle of individuation*
> which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible
> analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.
> Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the
> mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a
> Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and
> Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the
> advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that
> beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific
> service.”
>
>
>
> But 

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Eugene Halton]

John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”



The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of
the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than
inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial,
communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s
upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally
engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the
toddler as a symbolizer.



Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the *summum
bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).”



Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth
of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation.
Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the
living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal
to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation
through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to
which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements
that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is
the *summum bonum*,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.”



Gene Halton

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gene, List:

Your comments are well-taken.  I did not mean to imply that the growth of
knowledge is the *only *manifestation of the growth of reasonableness,
although I now can see how it came across that way.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 5:30 PM, Eugene Halton 
wrote:

> John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
> Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction. An
> infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
> and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”
>
>
>
> The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
> instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of
> the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than
> inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial,
> communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s
> upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally
> engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the
> toddler as a symbolizer.
>
>
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by
> "God's purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the 
> *summum
> bonum*--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create
> (CP 1.615; 1903).”
>
>
>
> Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth
> of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation.
> Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the
> living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal
> to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation
> through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to
> which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements
> that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is
> the *summum bonum*,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
> universe.”
>
>
>
> Gene Halton
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate).

Best, Helmut

 

 08. April 2017 um 22:20 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 


Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure of your point.

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the type/law.

Edwina
--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




John, List,

Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
"John F Sowa" wrote:
 

Jon and Edwina,

Jon
> I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> reality as consisting entirely of Signs.

Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina
> the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> own [or both sets of] laws.

I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .



 










-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[gnox]

Helmut,

 

Your idea of “self-defined bodies” is essentially the “autopoiesis” of Maturana 
and Varela, and the idea of final causation being intrinsic to animate bodymind 
is shared by Gregory Bateson and, I think, by Peirce. My book Turning Signs 
joins these concepts with Robert Rosen’s concepts of “anticipatory systems” and 
the Uexkullian “Innenwelt” as internal model, and identifies all this with 
semiosis (drawing very heavily on Peirce, of course). The central idea is that 
living beings are self-guided, relatively autonomous, and incorporate semiosic 
“guidance systems.” For more on this see especially my Chapter 3, 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/gds.htm.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de] 
Sent: 9-Apr-17 00:32



 

Edwina, List,

my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of 
it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the 
gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in 
physical-chemical- world are defined by humans, eg. "75% probability of 
electron presence". In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin 
surface. Their body contains their needs-affairs of final causation. So maybe, 
if a token is embodied, it only appears in self-defined bodies, that would be 
in animate world of final cause? (...But, if in the supposedly inanimate 
physicalchemical world, there obviously is a token-type-relation, like 
law-logos, this again would mean, that the "inanimate" world is not inanimate).

Best, Helmut

  


-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list

1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where
are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a
cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and
its interactions with other cells - are, as I understand it,
operative within  Thirdness and  carried within the Representamen.

So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it
for now.

2) I agree with your second paragraph.  - just a few quibbles..

JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was
that going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the
(internal) triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate
Interpretant; and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense
as the first correlate of a  triadic relation in which the Dynamic
Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external)
correlates, such that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic
Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the
same page here?"

EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE
SET of three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this
internal triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way
- although the bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as
'individual relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.  I agree with
its being the first correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the
other two external correlates in addition to this basic Internal
triad. These two external correlates are not bonded within the triad,
as the interactions are within the Internal Triad. That leaves them
open. I agree with the necessary determination of the DO, and the
Sign [that internal triad] being capable of determining a DI - but
not necessarily doing so.

So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble
with that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and
probably operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able
to differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the
three 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant] can have any actuality except within that internal
bond.

3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking
about - but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation"
and associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.
 My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that
going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal)
triad of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant;
and we would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first
correlate of a  triadic relation in which the Dynamic Object and
Dynamic Intepretant are the other two (external) correlates, such
that every Sign must be determined by a Dynamic Object, and every
Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic Interpretant (but might
never actually do so).  Are we still on the same page here?
 My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a
Sign from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation. 
Every Sign  has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and
external (Od-S-Id).  We also sometimes talk about "the Sign
relation," usually meaning the triadic relation of which the Sign,
Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three correlates. 
What I am asking now is whether there is such a thing as a Sign that
is itself a relation.
 Thanks,
 Jon S.  
 On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 9:56 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on
the terminology.

For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen,
which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the
habits developed within Thirdness [it can, of course, be in a mode of
Firstness or Secondness]. 

I consider the triad, Sign [capital S] - to be the triad of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant - and acknowledge that the Object
can be the Immediate Object and the Interpretant can be potential.
But, it remains a triad. 

And - what does the term relation mean? 

So- "can a relation be a Sign'?  It depends what you mean by each
term. 

For me - the interactions, i.e., relations, are vital within the
semiosic process [which I see as an active process anyway]. I
consider that there are three key relations within the triad; that
between the R-O; between the  R-I, a

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three
irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as
made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is
so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual relations';
i.e., not as THREE Relations.


Peirce ultimately did not distinguish between the Immediate
Object/Interpretant and their relations to the Representamen when making
the longer lists of trichotomies for Sign classification, and we now agree
that the three of them together (as a triad) constitute the Sign.  As such,
I am inclined to think of them as more analytic than actual; specifically,
as constraints on *how *the Sign *can *represent its Dynamic Object and
determine a Dynamic Interpretant.

ET:  As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about -
but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.


Probably so.  Peirce seems to have used "relation" as a close synonym of
"predicate," but I would welcome further suggestions for what it means to
say that a law of nature is a relation and/or that a relation is a Sign.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 11:32 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
wrote:

> Jon, list
>
> 1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where are
> these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a cell; its
> habits, which function to mould its material content and its interactions
> with other cells - are, as I understand it, operative within  Thirdness and
>  carried within the Representamen.
>
> So- I see this action as a Relation . But -agreed, we'll leave it for now.
>
> 2) I agree with your second paragraph.  - just a few quibbles..
>
> JON> "My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that
> going forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad
> of Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we
> would always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a 
> triadic
> relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the
> other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined
> by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
> Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the same
> page here?"
>
> EDWINA: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of
> three irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal
> triad as made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the
> bond is so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual
> relations'; i.e., not as THREE Relations.  I agree with its being the first
> correlate of a larger triadic Set, made up of the other two external
> correlates in addition to this basic Internal triad. These two external
> correlates are not bonded within the triad, as the interactions are within
> the Internal Triad. That leaves them open. I agree with the necessary
> determination of the DO, and the Sign [that internal triad] being capable
> of determining a DI - but not necessarily doing so.
>
> So- most of your outline I agree with; I'm just still having trouble with
> that Internal Triad - which although I agree is ONE set - and probably
> operates within ONE modal category - I still want to be able to
> differentiate each 'node' so to speak - even though none of the three
> 'nodes' [ Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate Interpretant] can have
> any actuality except within that internal bond.
>
> 3) As to your last question - I think I see what you are talking about -
> but, I think the term 'relation' needs more unpacking.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Wed 12/04/17 12:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and
> associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.
>
> My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going
> forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) triad of
> Immediate Object, Representamen, and Immediate Interpretant; and we would
> always characterize a Sign in this sense as the first correlate of a triadic
> relation in which the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Intepretant are the
> other two (external) correlates, such that every Sign must be determined
> by a Dynamic Object, and every Sign is capable of determining a Dynamic
> Interpretant (but might never actually do so).  Are we still on the same
> page here?
>
> My question comes up because we (or at least I) typically think of a Sign
> from a logical standpoint as a subject, rather than a relation.  Every
> Sign has relations, of course, both internal (Oi-R-Ii) and external
> (Od-S-Id).  We also sometimes talk about "the Sign relation,"

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller than", then the relation is ((mouse,dog), (mouse, elephant), (dog, elephant)). The dyadic relation is a subset of all couples (tupels) that can be formed out of the elements of the set. If you have two sets, then the dyadic relation is a subset of tupels, each containing one element from one set, and one from the other.


In the case of representamen relation, mathematics transferred, the one set is the representamen (or sign), and there are three possible relation reasons/relations: Qualisign, sinsign, legisign.

I think, that the "proper" kind of projectional reduction is applied by Ogden/Richards, but Peirce did it differently, for some reason, and he also, for some reason, used the term "sign" for both representamen and triad. I guess, because projectionally (in his way) reduced, there is no difference: In eg. "Rhematic indexical legisign" the first two words are adjectives, traits, of the legisign, the representamen.

About the dynamical object, the dynamical and final interpretant: They are, spatially and/or temporally, outside of the sign as irreducible triad. But not outside of the projectionally-reduced-to-dyads-sign. Because indication towards something located outside, and anticipation into the future may both be called projections, I guess. But I am just guessing all the time..

Best,

Helmut


13. April 2017 um 22:26 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 


Helmut, List:
 

That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in the past.  He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a triadic relation that is "projectively reducible."  I still wonder, though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications?

 

By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S).  The reason why Peirce never discusses the (O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation.  The first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity.

 

Thanks,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

You wrote:


"To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that."

 

I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following:

A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for some triadic relations.

Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).

My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).

It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate.

Best,

Helmut








- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement:

I have made a mistake with my explaining a relation with itself: If there is a set that has a relation with itself, this relation is not a subset of all tupels possibly formed by any two elements of this set, but of the set that would be formed by all tupels of the set and a copy of this set, meaning:

A tupel may contain same elements, like in the relation "same size as": ((mouse,mouse), (dog,dog), (elephant, elephant)).

I am afraid, by this attempt to be correct, I only have confused you, so if so, ignore.

 




Jon, List,

You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller than", then the relation is ((mouse,dog), (mouse, elephant), (dog, elephant)). The dyadic relation is a subset of all couples (tupels) that can be formed out of the elements of the set. If you have two sets, then the dyadic relation is a subset of tupels, each containing one element from one set, and one from the other.


In the case of representamen relation, mathematics transferred, the one set is the representamen (or sign), and there are three possible relation reasons/relations: Qualisign, sinsign, legisign.

I think, that the "proper" kind of projectional reduction is applied by Ogden/Richards, but Peirce did it differently, for some reason, and he also, for some reason, used the term "sign" for both representamen and triad. I guess, because projectionally (in his way) reduced, there is no difference: In eg. "Rhematic indexical legisign" the first two words are adjectives, traits, of the legisign, the representamen.

About the dynamical object, the dynamical and final interpretant: They are, spatially and/or temporally, outside of the sign as irreducible triad. But not outside of the projectionally-reduced-to-dyads-sign. Because indication towards something located outside, and anticipation into the future may both be called projections, I guess. But I am just guessing all the time..

Best,

Helmut


13. April 2017 um 22:26 Uhr
Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 


Helmut, List:
 

That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in the past.  He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a triadic relation that is "projectively reducible."  I still wonder, though--did Peirce ever write anything along these lines, or otherwise explaining this aspect of his Sign classifications?

 

By the way, I suspect that the proper "projective reduction" is your first guess--(S,O), (O,I), (I,S).  The reason why Peirce never discusses the (O,I) relation is that it is always the same as the (S,O) relation.  The first of the three 1903 trichotomies (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign) divides the Sign itself as a correlate, not a relation; the dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity.

 

Thanks,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Apr 13, 2017 at 2:45 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:





Jon, List,

You wrote:


"To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that."

 

I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following:

A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for some triadic relations.

Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).

My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).

It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate.

Best,

Helmut








- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY

Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Edwina Taborsky]

 STEPHEN; What do you mean that it’s not an analysis? It’s a
self-evident observation… like an axiom. Experience wires the
neuroplastic brain (Norman Doidge), and a winged animal is
predisposed to wiring its brain to fly. Furthermore, in many species
of birds, young birds learn to fly from their parents. That is, they
learn to apply their winged predispositions, from their parents. So
again, imitation plays an important role, despite the physiological
predispositions.

EDWINA;  An observation [induction] is not an analysis; it is simply
an observation. I also disagree that the bird learns to fly from its
parents. It has an instinctive capacity-to-fly. It doesn't need to
watch some other bird in order to figure out that a wing can enable
flight; that wing, on its own, enables flight. The brain is already
'wired to fly'. The bird doesn't fly and then, 'wire its brain'. 

Are not 'winged predispositions' the same as instinct?

-
 5; EDWINA; >”Am I correct that your analysis excludes Mind and
Thirdness? It seems to focus primarily on Firstness and Secondness -
if I may use these Peircean categories within its framework.”
 STEPHEN; Absolutely not. Thirdness is integral to my line of
thinking. I was addressing that aspect of semiosis - pragmatism and
imitation - that is best characterized in the context of firstness
and secondness. What is it that motivates  an organism to imitate
(the associations that become habits)? That’s a question, in the
first instance, of Firstness.

EDWINA; So- where is Thirdness in your line of thinking? You seem to
define Firstness as Will. Is that the case - that you define Firstness
as Will? But genuine Firstness has no predisposition. It is
independent. And therefore - where is Reason or Mind in your theory?


---
 6]EDWINA>”It also seems to focus on the individual [as Self]
rather than the collective [i.e., that exclusion of Thirdness].”
 STEPHEN; Again, as per preceding point, I am addressing that aspect
of semiosis – pragmatism and imitation – that most immediately
takes place at the level of the self. There is, of course, the
collective that provides the recursion of behaviors that manifests as
habit, or Thirdness, but that’s beyond the point that I wanted to
emphasize.

EDWINA: I see. But isn't the individual self networked to the
collective? Indeed - an articulation of the collective?


---
 STEPHEN; Just a final comment on what I am trying to achieve with my
line of thinking. There are now estimated to be trillions of galaxies
throughout the universe, with a couple hundred-thousand stars per
galaxy. What I am outlining, with my line of thinking, suggests life
as inevitable, and not accidental. It’s a living universe. Mine is
an attempt to address the entropy problem - Shannon entropy,
thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the tendency to disorder. By
contrast, the notion of instinct as stored information, as with the
NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, are inconsistent with the reality
of entropy. It is the  persistence of complexity across time, as
evident in the persistence of life across time on Earth, that is the
deal-breaker for any kind of information determinism.

EDWINA;  I agree with you that life is/was inevitable - and
functions to prevent entropic dissipation of energy. I don't agree
that stored information is inconsistent with the reality of entropy.
After all, entropy operates along with 'far-from-equilibrium complex
systems that 'fight' entropy. The two work together. I also reject
the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, for I reject that randomness [a
mechanical action] can function as a successful method of adaptation. 

EDWINA; I would argue that it is not only the persistence of
complexity but the increased complexity of systems [CAS, complex
adaptive systems] that supports a universe based around information
DYNAMICS. That is - I am seeing the universe as a complex information
system, which operates semiosically.  This is NOT information
determinism which does indeed suggest mechanical rigidity , but
information dynamics, where stability-of-type is maintained within
stored information - and adaptation and change of type.. is enabled
by interactive dynamic freedom to generate novel information. 
 Regards sj
From:  Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [3]] 
 Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca [4]; g...@gnusystems.ca [5];
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
 Subject: Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list:
 I think that this is a

RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, before we can proceed further, let us address one of my core 
assumptions. Norman Doidge, in his 2007 book The brain that changes itself, 
introduced the notion that experience “wires” the neuroplastic brain. His 
interpretation was heavily dosed with deterministic reductionism, and in this 
context, he interprets neural plasticity as a add-on to a basically genocentric 
reductionism. But at least he started something important.

In the context of our debate, now, this is important because I am of the view 
that neural plasticity is a comprehensive principle. It’s not a mere “add-on” 
as  Doidge would interpret it. In other words, there is no DNA blueprint that 
specifies the functional specializations in the brain. It is experience and 
only experience that “wires” the brain. To this end, I wrote my 2013 article, 
Pragmatism, neural plasticity and mind-body unity 
<https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12304-012-9145-5>  that provides 
ample and compelling evidence, by way of references, in support of my thesis. 
The bottom line is that there is no information determinism, there is no 
centralized, top-down directive based on a DNA blueprint that directs how the 
brain should wire itself. The skull containing the brain is much more like a 
bucket of bugs or an ant colony or a swarm of bees or a city of people, than a 
computer.

If we cannot come to an agreement on my bucket-of-bugs interpretation, here, 
then further progress on our debate will be limited. Having gotten that 
formality out of the way, let’s address each of your points in my next post.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike 
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below:



On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:

1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the things that 
matter'. But how does the 'self' emerge? Exist? How does it KNOW the 'things 
that matter'. After all - does a bird have to, via its own self, learn which 
insects are food and which are poisonous, or is there an innate stored 
knowledge base that provides such information to the collective, of which that 
single bird is merely one example? ”

STEPHEN; My position on this is that imitation plays just as vital a role for 
birds. Furthermore, I am also receptive to Rupert Sheldrake’s morphic resonance 
theory, because it is consistent with the DNA nonlocality that I discuss in my 
article, Quantum Semiotics 
<http://journals.sfu.ca/jnonlocality/index.php/jnonlocality/article/view/64/63> 
. The idea that knowledge of which insects are food and which are poisonous is 
somehow stored in the genetic code, in the sense of information determinism, is 
conjectural. The question of morphic resonance (and DNA nonlocality) introduces 
another subconscious level of choice-making, as an alternative to instinct in 
the sense of information determinism. And what do you mean by “How does the 
‘self’ emerge?” It emerges by experience, and experience wires the neuroplastic 
brain (Norman Doidge, The Brain that Changes Itself).

EDWINA: I] Essentially, you seem to be saying that there is no such thing as 
stored knowledge - which can be stored both genetically and epigenetically. You 
seem to be saying, if I understand you correctly, that continuity of behaviour 
exists only by imitation, where, I presume, the young imitate the elders. This 
is equally a hypothesis/conjectural. I would guess that your species introduces 
new behaviour..by accident?...and if it is successful..others imitate it? I 
wouldn't agree to that accidental hypothesis..

 Your idea of 'morphic resonance' [could you explain it simply?]...seems to be 
rather similar to instinct/ communal knowledge, i.e., stored general knowledge 
within the species.  

 How does the self emerge? How does a newborn antelope know how to suckle from 
its mother? How to run? It has no experience of either action. How does a leaf 
'know' how to expand; how does a flower 'know' how to turn to the sun?

--

2] EDWINA; >”But this didn't explain how different isolated populations 
developed the same technology or mode of behaviour/belief.”

STEPHEN; Examples? I can’t really comment without specifics. HOW different are 
these different, isolated examples? For example, communities that were once 
connected but later become isolated from one another, will share the same 
predispositions in cultural logic, to go on to create the parallel technologies 
and beliefs. Predispositions are as relevant to cultures as they are to 
mind-bodies. A human mind-body (hands, vocal-cords) is predisposed to 
se

RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

[Stephen Jarosek]

knows has been obtained not 
from lone cerebral smarts, but from the accumulated experiences of culture. 
Imitation, in other words.
An example of smart crows: 
https://arstechnica.com/science/2017/10/scientists-investigate-why-crows-are-so-playful/
Feral children (children raised by wild animals): Insofar as we can 
accept rare evidence at face value, feral children do not appear to possess a 
superior human intelligence that enables them rise above and beyond the 
creatures that raised them.


4) EDWINA;  An observation [induction] is not an analysis; it is simply an 
observation. I also disagree that the bird learns to fly from its parents. It 
has an instinctive capacity-to-fly. It doesn't need to watch some other bird in 
order to figure out that a wing can enable flight; that wing, on its own, 
enables flight. The brain is already 'wired to fly'. The bird doesn't fly and 
then, 'wire its brain'.

STEPHEN: No, the brain is not wired to fly… not at all. The body is predisposed 
to fly, and it is that predisposition that plays the most important part in 
wiring the brain:
http://blogs.bu.edu/bioaerial2012/2012/10/09/nature-vs-nurture-how-do-baby-birds-learn-how-to-fly/

Are not 'winged predispositions' the same as instinct? No, the 
predispositions relate to physiology. If an entity has the tools, it will be 
motivated to use them. This is how living entities define the things that 
matter (pragmatism). And it is the usage of them that wires the brain.


5) EDWINA; So- where is Thirdness in your line of thinking? You seem to define 
Firstness as Will. Is that the case - that you define Firstness as Will? But 
genuine Firstness has no predisposition. It is independent. And therefore - 
where is Reason or Mind in your theory?

STEPHEN: I take your point. However, I think that there are some primal 
motivators that relate to all creatures. The known versus the unknown, for 
example. And that primal “fear of the unknown” provides the impetus for a lot 
of decision-making… and hence, the importance of imitation. The “desire to be” 
is another primal motivator… another dimension of the “fear of the unknown”.


6) EDWINA: I see. But isn't the individual self networked to the collective? 
Indeed - an articulation of the collective?

STEPHEN: Yes, I agree. In my paper The law of association of habits, I refer to 
Peirce’s “The man is the thought” and extend this to “The culture is the 
thought”. I’m not sure that we have all that much to disagree with here (but 
I’m waiting on you to find something J).


7) EDWINA;  I agree with you that life is/was inevitable - and functions to 
prevent entropic dissipation of energy. I don't agree that stored information 
is inconsistent with the reality of entropy. After all, entropy operates along 
with 'far-from-equilibrium complex systems that 'fight' entropy. The two work 
together. I also reject the NeoDarwinian theory of evolution, for I reject that 
randomness [a mechanical action] can function as a successful method of 
adaptation. 

EDWINA; I would argue that it is not only the persistence of complexity but the 
increased complexity of systems [CAS, complex adaptive systems] that supports a 
universe based around information DYNAMICS. That is - I am seeing the universe 
as a complex information system, which operates semiosically.  This is NOT 
information determinism which does indeed suggest mechanical rigidity , but 
information dynamics, where stability-of-type is maintained within stored 
information - and adaptation and change of type.. is enabled by interactive 
dynamic freedom to generate novel information. 

STEPHEN: I was a fan of CAS for a while. Indeed, chaos theory, systems theory, 
etc, are still relevant to my way of thinking. But because of the entropy 
problem, I’ve revised my thinking along these lines, and semiosis has some 
considerable part to play. I no longer accept that purely materialistic CAS can 
adequately account for life and evolution.

The problem of entropy is the problem of degrees of freedom. Of all the 
“optional routes” that an entity (atom, molecule, cell, animal, etc, etc) can 
finish up taking, why should it take the route most favorable to life?





From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 10:09 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike 
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature

 

Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below:



On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:

1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a

Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list: And here is a key difference.

Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903)."

I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you,
Jon, as a theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a
contentious issue.

Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can
never have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General,
of Reason, is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's
actually governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason,
consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of
Reason is such that its being never can have been completely
perfecfed. It always must be in a state of incipiency, of growth.
...So, then, the development of Reason requires as a part of it the
occurrence of more individual events than can ever occur. ...This
development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that
is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is going on
today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".

Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES
write that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning
universe' by ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the
same thing.

My own view is that the universe was not created 'by God' and God
does not continue to create it. My view is that the universe, which
is an act of Reason - is a creation of transforming energy to matter
- by 'governing individual existentialities/events' which function
according to habits, laws and thus, prevent entropic dissipation of
that same matter. 

Certainly, Peirce uses many metaphors to describe this continuous
nature of the transformative embodiment of Reason: - that it is a
"vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities.The Universe as an argument is
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem" 5.119 which can be
even compared with a painting..

But WHY is the universe? Since I reject the notion of agency [God],
then, I'd prefer the articulation of Mind, that energy-to-matter
function, where "the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we
strive to express in calling them reasonable. 5.433

And since "5.427 "the rational meaning of every proposition lies in
the future" - then, this suggests to me, that there is no a priori
purpose [i.e., God's purpose]. 

---

I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary
support and therefore, not really debatable. 

I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical
and biological semiosis within it.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 08/04/17  2:21 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary F., List:
 There is much to digest here.  As you quoted, Peirce called the
universe "a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its
conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to
me that "God's purpose" is the Object of the universe as Symbol, and
"living realities" constitute its Interpretant, since that is what
the conclusion of any Argument must be (CP 2.95; 1902).  As
constituents of that Interpretant, the laws of nature would
presumably have the same Object ("God's purpose") and the same
relation to that Object (Symbol) as the universe itself.  Besides the
still-difficult (for me) notion of a non-conventional Symbol--which
obviously applies to the universe itself, not just the laws of nature
within it--this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the 
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the universe that He has created and
continues to create (CP 1.615; 1903).  Hence the laws of nature in
some sense represent the development of Reason, which is perhaps the
very basis for calling them "something in nature to which the human
reason i

Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'.


I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is
"God's purpose" as "the development of Reason."  CP 1.615 (1903) continues
beyond what you quoted.

CSP:  Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our
little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward
rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to
us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed that knowledge is
reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be to follow such methods
as must develope knowledge the most speedily.


So it seems to me that Peirce *equated *knowledge and reasonableness, such
that the growth of one *is *the growth of other.  I would also suggest that
this is the *summum bonum* precisely because choosing to pursue it aligns *our
*purpose with *God's *purpose.  In other words, we have the opportunity to
participate voluntarily in God's still-unfolding creative activity.

I see no conflict between this interpretation and what you quoted from CP
5.433 (1905), especially since Peirce added in that same passage, "In its
higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through
self-control, and this gives the pragmaticist a sort of justification for
making the rational purport to be general."  We contribute to evolution,
the growth of reasonableness, by exercising self-control.  In fact, right
after stating what you quoted from CP 5.427 (1905), Peirce went on to
explain what he meant.

CSP:  It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the
proposition becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those
special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design,
but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every
situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning in
future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to
self-control.


Meaning is in the future, but purpose is in the present as the end that *guides
*our future self-controlled conduct.  And since God (or Mind, as you
prefer) "has its being outside of time" (CP 6.490; 1908), its purpose is
neither *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, but simply eternal.

ET:  I do NOT think that this is a topic to argue about, since the basic
premises [theism vs atheism] are beliefs outside of evidentiary support and
therefore, not really debatable.


I agree that ultimately this is not a topic to argue about on the List.
However, I am not convinced that either theism or atheism is completely
devoid of evidentiary support.  Many people adopt one or the other for
various reasons that they consider well-grounded, but often they differ on
what *counts *as evidence, as well as *how *it should be evaluated.

ET:  I am only outlining how I see the universe - and my interest in the
'reasonable nature' and  'reasoning function' of the  physic-chemical and
biological semiosis within it.


I continue to share this interest and appreciate being able to set aside
our differences to discuss it.

Thanks,

Jon

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list: And here is a key difference.
>
> Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum
> bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create
> (CP 1.615; 1903)."
>
> I don't see that the development of Reason is 'the growth of knowledge
> about both God and the universe'. I am aware that for you, Jon, as a
> theist, and myself, as an atheist, this can be a contentious issue.
>
> Peirce writes, in 1.615, about Reason: "..it is something that can never
> have been completely embodiedthe very being of the General, of Reason,
> is of such a mode that this being consists  in the Reason's actually
> governing eventsThe very being of the General, of Reason, consists in
> its governing individual events. So, then, the essence of Reason is such
> that its being never can have been completely perfecfed. It always must be
> in a state of incipiency, of growth. ...So, then, the development of Reason
> requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than can
> ever occur. ...This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
> embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which
> did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 BC, but is
> going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason".
>
> Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason is
> the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'. He DOES write
> that we can conduct ourselves better, in this 'reasoning universe' by
> ourselves being 'reasonable people'..but that's not the same thing.
>
> My own view is 

Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Eugene Halton]

Dear Edwina,

Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be
“reasonableness energizing in the world.”

Not “universe.”

I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given
that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious
atheist,” though that doesn't quite get it either. I find D.H. Lawrence
gets closer to it, the idea of "immersed in creation,"from his 1924
description of attending an Apache ritual:

“There is, in our sense of the word, no God. But all is godly.
There is no Great Mind directing the universe. Yet the mystery of creation,
the wonder and fascination of creation shimmers in every leaf and stone, in
every thorn and bud, in the fangs of the rattle-snake, and in the soft eyes
of the fawn. Things utterly opposite are still pure wonder of creation, the
yell of the mountain lion, and the breeze in the aspen leavesThere is
no God looking on. The only god there is, is involved all the time in the
dramatic wonder and inconsistency of creation. God is immersed, as it were,
in creation, not to be separated or distinguished. There can be no Ideal
God”

Gene


On Apr 8, 2017 6:39 PM, "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:

Gene - thanks. Your last paragraph on knowledge says what I was trying to
say and I didn't express it very well  - you've said it perfectly.

Edwina

-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Sat 08/04/17 6:30 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu sent:

John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc.  Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”



The expectations for communicative dialogical babbling are already
instinctively and musically embedded in the subcortical affirmative mind of
the infant. The dialogue facilitates the observational process rather than
inaugurates it through observation. We are born to be wild intersocial,
communicative abductors! The dialogue continues over time as the infant’s
upper brain starts to come online, becoming more vocally-gesturally
engaged, eventuating in both the birth of symboling and a rebirthing of the
toddler as a symbolizer.



Jon Alan Schmidt:  “this raises the question of what Peirce meant by "God's
purpose."  As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the summum
bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of knowledge about
both God and the universe that He has created and continues to create (CP
1.615; 1903).”



Surely the development of reasonableness is far more than the mere growth
of knowledge/knowledge about, or being a kind of spectator of creation.
Those are ideas from a civilization that has divorced itself from the
living spontaneity, as though true living would have as its ultimate goal
to become a know-it-all. True living involves participation in creation
through the primacy of affirmative mind, in bodying forth and learning, to
which knowing is at best secondary. That is how I take Peirce’s statements
that “the continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is
the summum bonum,” one involving a “reasonableness energizing in the
universe.”



Gene Halton

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .