Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology
I agree with off-list comments to Gary that the post was inappropriate, and I believe Gary acted appropriately. In my view, the post aiming to chastise John was directly inflammatory and counter-productive to the purpose of the list. -- Franklin On Jun 20, 2017 5:08 PM, "Jerry Rhee" wrote: > Dear list: > > > > I appreciate Gary and list-moderators' earnest willfulness to maintain > Ransdell’s original intention. It can be viewed as a thankless but > beautiful responsibility. > > > > With respect to kirsti’s comment: > > > > "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't > know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and > expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." > > *These remarks were seen by one lister as "denigrating" and by another as > "untoward." I agreed and wrote Kirsti off-list.* > > > I agree that it is denigrating and untoward. However, the despising, the > disgust, reveals something of our nature and for that, I am thankful. For > if only taken as denigrating and untoward, then what purpose does it serve? > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 4:03 PM, wrote: > >> Gary, list, >> >> First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and >> authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of >> anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. - >> Which I apologized. >> >> After the suprise I do feel offended. I was critisized for my tenor and >> tone. >> >> Is there anything more personal, more 'ad hominem', as that? >> >> I wish the person or persons not liking my responses would take it up on >> list, or post it to me. >> >> I do not understand how or why anything on P-list should be to anyone's >> likings. >> >> End of this dicussion in my part. >> >> Kirsti >> >> >> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 20.6.2017 23:30: >> >>> Kirsti, list, >>> >>> As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be >>> the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and >>> moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered >>> to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as >>> Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks, >>> see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit): >>> >>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM [1] >>> >>> if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I >>> highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from >>> time to time. >>> >>> In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these >>> passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these). >>> >>> CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS >>> >>> - >>> >>> It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: >>> philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed >>> and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in >>> this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not >>> to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing >>> which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself >>> by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because >>> there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it >>> is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take >>> that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect >>> intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular >>> time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should >>> be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests >>> and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to >>> rectify the problem on-list. >>> >>> GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly contacted by three members of the list who found especially this passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic: Kirsti had written: "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." THESE REMARKS WERE SEEN BY ONE LISTER AS "DENIGRATING" AND BY ANOTHER AS "UNTOWARD." I AGREED AND WROTE KIRSTI OFF-LIST. >>> >>> WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING >>> >>> - >>> >>> >>> Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt >>> to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with >>> it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral, >>> legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge >>> you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly >>> special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several reasons >>> for this: >>> >>> (1) None of us reall
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4
Gary F, Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate? That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture. -- Franklin On Oct 24, 2017 6:07 PM, "Jerry Rhee" wrote: > Gary f: > > "pet theories"? :) > > Best, > J > > On Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 3:00 PM, wrote: > >> Jerry R, list, >> >> >> >> Lowell 2.4 introduces the “conditional *de inesse,*” as Peirce calls it, >> as the most simple and basic logical form that needs to be represented in >> the system of existential graphs. It was not obvious to me at first *why* >> Peirce chose this particular form as the place to start; so in the >> presentation of Lowell 2 on my website, I inserted as a sidenote a section >> from one of his 1898 Cambridge Lectures that explains in more detail what >> the logical issue is and why the “conditional *de inesse*” is so >> important for the Peircean approach to formal logic in the Lowells. >> >> >> >> And of course, you have to understand the part formal logic and >> existential graphs play in Peirce’s whole philosophy in order to see the >> point of what he’s doing in Lowell 2. So if you weren’t following Lowell 1 >> very closely, you probably won’t follow Lowell 2 very closely either. That >> may mean you have to set aside your own pet theories and predilections to >> get on board with Peirce’s train of thought. >> >> >> >> Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de >> inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):* >> >> >> >> Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between >> two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional >> propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will >> thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was >> only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to >> this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out >> precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual >> Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position >> clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have >> been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my >> part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done >> to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there >> is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is >> lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening. >> >> Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw >> considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary >> *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex >> de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of >> possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et >> nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that >> here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but >> that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood >> range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true. >> So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that >> on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of >> nature, either it would not lighten or thunder would shortly follow. >> >> Now this much may be conceded to the Diodoran, in order that we may fit >> him out with a better defence than he has ever been able to construct for >> himself, namely, that in our ordinary use of language we always understand >> the range of possibility in such a sense that in some possible case the >> antecedent shall be true. Consider, for example, the following conditional >> proposition: If I were to take up that lampstand by its shaft and go >> brandishing the lamp about in the faces of my auditors it would not >> occasion the slightest surprise to anybody. Everybody will say that is >> false; and were I to reply that it was true because under no possible >> circumstances should I behave in that outrageous manner, you would feel >> that I was violating the usages of speech. >> >> I would respectfully and kindly suggest to the Diodoran that this way of >> defending his position is better than his ordinary stammerings. Still, >> should he accept my suggestion I shall with pain be obliged to add that the >> argument is the merest *ignoratio elenchi* which ought not to deceive a >> tyro in logic. For it is quite beside the question what ordinary language >> means. The very idea of formal logic is, that certain *canonical forms* >> of expression shall be provided, the meanings of which forms are governed >> by inflexible rules; and if the forms of speech are
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4
Gary F, If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to do with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material approach becomes problematic? -- Franklin On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, wrote: Franklin, list, The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other if-then propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and absolutely exact from a logical point of view, which removes all possible ambiguity from the interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent *except* that when the former is true, the latter is true, “never mind the why or wherefore.” This means that there is no way to falsify the conditional proposition as a whole *except* to observe that the antecedent is true *and* the consequent is false. The proposition as a whole — contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of view — remains perfectly true if *both* antecedent and consequent are in themselves false. The *significance* of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional *de inesse*. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in logic we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is impossible or in every possible case in which it is true, B is true likewise,” or in other words it means “In each possible case, either A is false or B is true.” >From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as *negation of what is inside the cut*. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the ground level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later become problematic for the gamma part of EGs, i.e. for modal logic. That’s why I’m trying to understand why Peirce felt compelled to design them in the way he did. The significance of the distinction becomes amplified, I think, as soon as we take a step beyond exact logic into metaphysics. But we’re not ready to talk about that yet. Or at least I’m not, I’m still trying to clarify exactly how EGs are supposed to work, so that their meanings become more directly visible to me. Gary f. *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] *Sent:* 25-Oct-17 14:32 *Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4 Gary F, Do you understand the significance of the distinction between regular consequentia and consequentia simplex de inesse to the conditional debate? That is not clear to me in what was stated in the excerpt from RLT, given what Peirce says in the excerpt from the second Lowell lecture. -- Franklin Here’s the 1898 excerpt that explains the importance of the “conditional *de inesse*” *(R441, RLT 125-6, NEM4 169-70):* Cicero informs us that in his time there was a famous controversy between two logicians, Philo and Diodorus, as to the signification of conditional propositions. Philo held that the proposition “if it is lightening it will thunder” was true if it is not lightening or if it will thunder and was only false if it is lightening but will not thunder. Diodorus objected to this. Either the ancient reporters or he himself failed to make out precisely what was in his mind, and though there have been many virtual Diodorans since, none of them have been able to state their position clearly without making it too foolish. Most of the strong logicians have been Philonians, and most of the weak ones have been Diodorans. For my part, I am a Philonian; but I do not think that justice has ever been done to the Diodoran side of the question. The Diodoran vaguely feels that there is something wrong about the statement that the proposition “If it is lightening it will thunder” can be made true merely by its not lightening. Duns Scotus, who was a Philonian , as a matter of course, threw considerable light upon the matter by distinguishing between an ordinary *consequentia*, or conditional proposition, and a *consequentia simplex de inesse*. A *consequentia simplex de inesse* relates to no range of possibilities at all, but merely to what happens, or is true, *hic et nunc*. But the ordinary conditional proposition asserts not merely that here and now either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true, but that in each possible state of things throughout a certain well-understood range of possibility either the antecedent is false or the consequent true. So understood the proposition “If it lightens it will thunder” means that on each occasion which could arise consistently with the regular course of nature, either it would not lighten or thund
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4
Gary F, Jeff, Mike, Thanks for the reference, Jeff. I thought that the question of consequentiae might be more complicated than being able to relate it to the terms of formal symbolic logic, but I wanted to see what your thoughts were on it, and so I do. The confirmation is much appreciated. -- Franklin On Oct 25, 2017 8:05 PM, "Mike Bergman" wrote: > Hi Jeff, > > > Thank you. The Bellucci reference is excellent and timely. I found a PDF > online at http://www.academia.edu/download/41369857/Bellucci_ > CSP_consequences.pdf; some of the Abelard quotes are translated at > http://johnmacfarlane.net/abelard.pdf. > > > Best, Mike > > On 10/25/2017 6:18 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > Franklin, Gary F, List, > > > In *Reading Peirce Reading*, Richard Smyth suggests that many logicians, > such as Quine, make the error of making assignments to the truth table > for the conditional in a rather arbitrary fashion. Peirce, on the other > hand, is developing a logical theory that seeks to explain why some > inferences that we take to be good or bad really are valid or invalid. As > such, he is setting up a semantic assignment of values to the truth table > that is not arbitrary. > > > Here, in the second lecture, he trying to show us how to set up > mathematical system of logic that will enable us to analyze examples of > reasoning more carefully and exactly. As such, he is trying to avoid the > temptation of developing a logical system that prejudges the questions > we're trying to answer in the normative theory of logic. > > > For background on the relation between these different accounts of the > conditional, it might be worth looking atFrancesco Bellucci > <http://www.tandfonline.com/author/Bellucci%2C+Francesco>'s "Charles S. > Peirce and the Medieval Doctrine of *consequentiae".* > See: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01445340. > 2015.1118338?scroll=top&needAccess=true& > > > In this article, he provides a historical reconstruction of what Peirce > was drawing from in the medieval doctrine, and how this account of the > conditional shape his understanding of the relation of implication. > > > --Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > -- > *From:* Franklin Ransom > > *Sent:* Wednesday, October 25, 2017 1:51:13 PM > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 > *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.4 > > Gary F, > > If I try to picture the Philonian and Diodoran interpretations in terms of > truth value tables, they essentially correspond to material and strict > implication, respectively. But I'm not sure how the distinction between > ordinary consequence and simplex de inesse fits in. Would that have more to > do with modal logic (possible vs...actual?), which the gamma graphs aim to > treat of, and which you are suggesting is where the Philonian or material > approach becomes problematic? > > -- Franklin > > > On Oct 25, 2017 4:22 PM, wrote: > > Franklin, list, > > > > The distinction between the conditional “simplex de inesse” and other > if-then propositions is that the “simplex” is indeed simpler, and > absolutely exact from a logical point of view, which removes all possible > ambiguity from the interpretation of it. It asserts no connection at all > between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent > *except* that when the former is true, the latter is true, “never mind > the why or wherefore.” This means that there is no way to falsify the > conditional proposition as a whole *except* to observe that the > antecedent is true *and* the consequent is false. The proposition as a > whole — contrary to the “ordinary language” usage and the Diodoran point of > view — remains perfectly true if *both* antecedent and consequent are in > themselves false. > > > > The *significance* of this distinction should become more clear as Peirce > proceeds to define the “scroll” as the diagram representing the conditional > *de > inesse*. The reading of the scroll follows from the stipulation “that in > logic we are to understand the form “If A, then B” to mean “Either A is > impossible or in every possible case in which it is true, B is true > likewise,” or in other words it means “In each possible case, either A is > false or B is true.” > > From this Peirce will derive the meaning of the cut as *negation of what > is inside the cut*. It seems to me, in hindsight, that right here on the > ground level of the whole EG system lies a design feature that will later > become problema
[PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Hello list, I just finished Vol. 2 of the Collected Papers, and had a couple of questions, if anyone is interested in helping out. Going through the material on induction towards the end of the volume, much of it seemed to be from Peirce's earlier work on induction, where hypothesis or presumption (or abduction) is conceived of as an inference having to do with inferring that a character or set of characters apply to an object or set of objects. However, the editors included a piece from 1905 that treats of crude, qualitative, and quantitative induction. My understanding is that Peirce came to believe in his later years that what he had originally identified as hypothesis is actually qualitative induction, and hypothesis or abduction is something else. But in the selected piece from 1905, Peirce is not clarifying that point and instead has some other remarks about qualitative induction. I am wondering whether Peirce was consistent about maintaining in his later work that the earlier view of abduction really should be considered qualitative induction, or if Peirce's views about this topic are more complicated. It strikes me as odd that the editors might have purposely misled readers about this point concerning hypothesis and qualitative induction, but I have difficulty seeing it otherwise. Perhaps this point is clarified in later volumes of the CP? My second question is that I recall hearing at some point that Peirce identified nine different kinds of induction, but I don't recall seeing anything by Peirce about this. I was hoping I would find something in the CP, but I'm not so sure I will find it now. Does anyone know anything about this, and where I might look for it? I'm not sure if I've asked about this before; please forgive me for not remembering if I have. -- Franklin - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
ighten me here about how I'm misinterpreting the passage, I would be thankful. In general, I find Peirce much more focused on understanding abduction from the standpoint of methodeutic in his later work (I have read some literature which makes just this point), and wonder how he could have given a fuller treatment of abduction from the standpoint of critical logic once he changed his views about how abduction and induction differ. What is the place of abduction in the theory of information, if not the induction of characters? I suspect that getting clearer about this will also help in getting clearer about induction. -- Franklin On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 12:01 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Franklin, list, > > I looked around but found nothing on the nine forms of induction. As to > abductive inference: > > I guess you've already seen CP 2.102 > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-minute-logic-chapter-i-intended-characters-treatise > > Writing in 1910, Peirce says that "in almost everything I printed before > the beginning of this century I more or less mixed up hypothesis and > induction" and he traces the confusion of these two types of reasoning to > logicians' too "narrow and formalistic a conception of inference, as > necessarily having formulated judgments from its premises." A Letter to > Paul Carus circa 1910, CP 8.227–8. See under "Hypothesis" at the Commens > Dictionary of Peirce's Terms. > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-letters-paul-carus-1 > > Also see CP 8.234 to Carus, where he says that his earlier formulation of > abduction was more quantitative induction than qualitative induction > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/entry/quote-letters-paul-carus-0 > > Generally you can look through > > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/hypothesis-%5Bas-a-form-of-reasoning%5D > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/abduction > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/retroduction > > http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/presumption-%5Bas-a-form-of-reasoning%5D > > My sense of it has been that Peirce thought that he had confused two kinds > of inference in his idea of hypothetical inference, and that one of them > was right but got confused with idea of induction in his mistaken effort to > cast hypothetical reasoning as a kind of probable or likely reasoning. In > later years he distinguishes firmly among deductive probability, inductive > likelihood a.k.a. inductive verisimilitude (the conclusion's likeness to > the premissual data), and abductive plausibility, which last he regards as > instinctual simplicity, naturalness. In his early treatments of > hypothetical inference, he pretty consistently has it occasioned by an odd > or surprising phenomenon or observation and gives it an explanatory role. > > Best, Ben > > > On 10/29/2015 6:07 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Hello list, >> >> I just finished Vol. 2 of the Collected Papers, and had a couple of >> questions, if anyone is interested in helping out. >> >> Going through the material on induction towards the end of the volume, >> much of it seemed to be from Peirce's earlier work on induction, where >> hypothesis or presumption (or abduction) is conceived of as an inference >> having to do with inferring that a character or set of characters apply to >> an object or set of objects. However, the editors included a piece from >> 1905 that treats of crude, qualitative, and quantitative induction. My >> understanding is that Peirce came to believe in his later years that what >> he had originally identified as hypothesis is actually qualitative >> induction, and hypothesis or abduction is something else. But in the >> selected piece from 1905, Peirce is not clarifying that point and instead >> has some other remarks about qualitative induction. I am wondering whether >> Peirce was consistent about maintaining in his later work that the earlier >> view of abduction really should be considered qualitative induction, or if >> Peirce's views about this topic are more complicated. It strikes me as odd >> that the editors might have purposely misled readers about this point >> concerning hypothesis and qualitative induction, but I have difficulty >> seeing it otherwise. Perhaps this point is clarified in later volumes of >> the CP? >> >> My second question is that I recall hearing at some point that Peirce >> identified nine different kinds of induction, but I don't recall seeing >> anything by Peirce about this. I was hoping I would find something in the >> CP, but I'm not so sure I will find it now. Does anyone know anything about >> this, and where
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Ben, list, Well thank you so much for the diligent researching! That is really something, about the eight forms of induction. Although, from what he said, it sounds like there are eight other forms of induction, so there would total nine or maybe ten forms, depending on how one reads what he said there. I suppose he had written about them elsewhere, but for the time being there is likely nothing published beyond the memoir, and I don't have access to the mss.; nor would I relish trying to swim in that ocean to find the drop or two I'm looking for. Hopefully as the Writings continue to be published, something will come out that addresses the nine or ten forms of induction. It's at least helpful to know that these other eight forms are supposed to be of lower forms, and my guess is that qualitative and quantitative are the two he referred to as the first two. Perhaps crude induction is supposed to represent the other eight forms in some general way. Then again, in 1883, I don't think he had changed his idea of abduction, so perhaps crude and quantitative induction are the two he meant, and qualitative somehow addresses the other eight. Well, it's all nothing but wild speculation on my part until something gets published about it. As for the paragraphs 232 and 233, I think you're right that it refers to the last clause, but then I don't understand why it's qualitative induction, and not simply induction. Even accepting your point about including evidential values, that doesn't explain why it should normally be restricted to qualitative induction in the first place. Perhaps I just need to revise my understanding of Peirce's view of scientific method, and accept that it typically involves qualitative induction, and not quantitative induction or crude induction. As for abduction, you make some interesting points. Perhaps I have attempted to too rigidly understand the tripartite classification of semiotic logic into stechiology, critic, and methodeutic. My understanding up to this point had been that critic would, well, critique inferences and/or arguments from a formal perspective. I also believed that this meant the analysis of changes in logical quantity belongs to critic, since in his 1867 paper on information, inferences play the role of representing changes in the state of information, and the various ways of changing the state of information offers a somewhat finer-grained approach to classifying inferences/arguments. Thus I would expect that abduction would still play some role in understanding changes in the state of information, because it is an inference. Maybe this is wrong headed, I'm not sure, and I should consider such changes to be restricted to induction and deduction now. Actually, since deduction doesn't technically change the state of information, perhaps it should really only be restricted to understanding forms of induction. On the other hand, you wrote: If you mean Peirce's theory of information (comprehension × extension), > Peirce said in 1902 that he had previously made the syllogistic forms and > the doctrine of comprehension and extension more fundamental than they > really are for understanding abductive inference. I notice that although they were made more fundamental than they really are, that doesn't imply that they don't play a role in understanding abductive inference at all. Even the importance of the syllogistic forms is still upheld by Peirce into his last years, and the logical quantities are discussed (though in a short way) in Kaina Stocheia, so both syllogistic forms and logical quantities possibly still have some significance for the understanding of abduction. As far as logical quantity goes, I simply have no idea how. Franklin On Sun, Nov 1, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Franklin, list, on your other questions, > > You wrote, > > [CP 8.]232. Or, what is usually the best way, he may turn to the > consideration of the hypothesis, study it thoroughly and deduce > miscellaneous observable consequences, and then return to the phenomena to > find how nearly these consequences agree with the actual facts. > > [CP 8.]233. This is not essentially different from induction. Only it is > most usually an induction from instances which are not discrete and > numerable. I now call it Qualitative Induction. It is this which I used to > confound with the second line of procedure, or at least not to distinguish > it sharply. > > [] > > [Franklin] So my difficulty is with paragraph 233. When he says "[t]his is > not essentially different from induction," I'm not sure what 'this' he > means.I would think that it refers to the subject of paragraph 232, but > paragraph 232 looks to me as though it simply describes ideal scientific > method--abduce a hypothesis, deduce its consequences, and then induce the > consequents and compare whether the consequents induced conform to the > consequents expected to follow from the antecedents. [] > [End quote] > > In 233,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
hat it was the most usual > kind of induction, and elsewhere he says that, among kinds of induction, it > has the most general utility. > > Many people would like to understand inference in terms of extension and > comprehension. For my part, extension and comprehension seem more useful in > exploring inference than in defining basic modes of inference. > > Best, Ben > > On 11/1/2015 5:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Ben, list, > > Well thank you so much for the diligent researching! > > That is really something, about the eight forms of induction. Although, > from what he said, it sounds like there are eight other forms of induction, > so there would total nine or maybe ten forms, depending on how one reads > what he said there. I suppose he had written about them elsewhere, but for > the time being there is likely nothing published beyond the memoir, and I > don't have access to the mss.; nor would I relish trying to swim in that > ocean to find the drop or two I'm looking for. Hopefully as the Writings > continue to be published, something will come out that addresses the nine > or ten forms of induction. > > It's at least helpful to know that these other eight forms are supposed to > be of lower forms, and my guess is that qualitative and quantitative are > the two he referred to as the first two. Perhaps crude induction is > supposed to represent the other eight forms in some general way. Then > again, in 1883, I don't think he had changed his idea of abduction, so > perhaps crude and quantitative induction are the two he meant, and > qualitative somehow addresses the other eight. Well, it's all nothing but > wild speculation on my part until something gets published about it. > > As for the paragraphs 232 and 233, I think you're right that it refers to > the last clause, but then I don't understand why it's qualitative > induction, and not simply induction. Even accepting your point about > including evidential values, that doesn't explain why it should normally be > restricted to qualitative induction in the first place. Perhaps I just need > to revise my understanding of Peirce's view of scientific method, and > accept that it typically involves qualitative induction, and not > quantitative induction or crude induction. > > As for abduction, you make some interesting points. Perhaps I have > attempted to too rigidly understand the tripartite classification of > semiotic logic into stechiology, critic, and methodeutic. My understanding > up to this point had been that critic would, well, critique inferences > and/or arguments from a formal perspective. I also believed that this meant > the analysis of changes in logical quantity belongs to critic, since in his > 1867 paper on information, inferences play the role of representing changes > in the state of information, and the various ways of changing the state of > information offers a somewhat finer-grained approach to classifying > inferences/arguments. Thus I would expect that abduction would still play > some role in understanding changes in the state of information, because it > is an inference. Maybe this is wrong headed, I'm not sure, and I should > consider such changes to be restricted to induction and deduction now. > Actually, since deduction doesn't technically change the state of > information, perhaps it should really only be restricted to understanding > forms of induction. > > On the other hand, you wrote: > > If you mean Peirce's theory of information (comprehension × extension), >> Peirce said in 1902 that he had previously made the syllogistic forms and >> the doctrine of comprehension and extension more fundamental than they >> really are for understanding abductive inference. > > > I notice that although they were made more fundamental than they really > are, that doesn't imply that they don't play a role in understanding > abductive inference at all. Even the importance of the syllogistic forms is > still upheld by Peirce into his last years, and the logical quantities are > discussed (though in a short way) in Kaina Stocheia, so both syllogistic > forms and logical quantities possibly still have some significance for the > understanding of abduction. As far as logical quantity goes, I simply have > no idea how. > > Franklin > > On Sun, Nov 1, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Benjamin Udell < > bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > >> Franklin, list, on your other questions, >> >> You wrote, >> >> [CP 8.]232. Or, what is usually the best way, he may turn to the >> consideration of the hypothesis, study it thoroughly and deduce >> miscellaneous observable consequences, and then re
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Ben, list, You wrote: "But can the induction of characters and qualitative induction be understood as increasing only the breadth, not the depth?" My understanding is that, since characters have to do with depth, not breadth, then it is not possible to understand the induction of characters and qualitative induction as increasing only the breadth, and not the depth. In fact, it is the other way around: They increase only the depth, and not the breadth. However, though that is my understanding, what Peirce actually says is more complicated. The following quote from "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension", sixth section or paragraph, will help: "There is, therefore, this important difference between induction and hypothesis, that the former potentially increases the breadth of one term, and actually increases the depth of another, while the latter potentially increases the depth of one term, and actually increases the breadth of another." I tried to think this out, but it is a bit complicated to work out. If I recall correctly, at this point in time Peirce hasn't really adopted the icon and index point of view on propositions. Both terms are symbols, each of the terms contributing their own breadth and depth by necessity; which, as I understand it, has to do with the cases in which the term-symbol appears as predicate and as subject in other propositions. The term-symbol's appearance as a predicate will then increase its breadth, because it is applied to a new subject, while its appearance as a subject will increase its depth, because a new predicate has been applied to it. If one thinks about it in this way, the nuances of information theory and the role of inference is in ascription of modifiers to the increase, such as actual, potential, conceived, etc. It may be helpful to consider what he said preceding the statement quoted above: Induction requires more attention. Let us take the following example:-- > S', S'', S''', and Siv have been taken at random from among the M's; > S', S'', S''', and Siv are P: > any M is P. > > We have here, usually, an increase of information. M receives an increase > of depth, P of breadth. There is, however, a difference between these two > increases. A new predicate is actually added to M; one which may, it is > true, have been covertly predicated of it before, but which is now actually > brought to light. On the other hand, P is not yet found to apply to > anything but S', S'', S''', and Siv, but only to apply to whatever else may > hereafter be found to be contained under M. The induction itself does not > make known any such thing. Now take the following example of hypothesis:-- > > M is, for instance, P', P'', P''', and Piv; > S is P', P'', P''', and Piv: > S is all that M is. > > Here again there is an increase of information, if we suppose the premises > to represent the state of information before the inferences. S receives an > addition to its depth; but only a potential one, since there is nothing to > show that the M's have any common characters besides P', P'', P''', and > Piv. M, on the other hand, receives an actual increase of breadth in S, > although, perhaps, only a doubtful one. The part that you referenced with respect to generalization is potentially illuminating, as this may show the way to understanding the new place of abduction or hypothesis in the theory of information. Thank you for pointing out this material. It is a bit unclear to me why some of the changes in information didn't seem to correspond to one of the three inferences, and perhaps they are key to thinking more about abduction from an informational perspective. You're certainly giving me much to ponder over! With respect to your recent discussions on classifying basic inference modes, I haven't been following closely, and so couldn't comment. But understanding that reference helps me understand what you meant when you said that in the previous post. Franklin On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 9:35 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Found an error of thought in my post. Corrected below with 'DELETE' and > 'INSERT' tags. Sorry. - Best, Ben > > Franklin, list, > > You wrote: > > I'm somewhat curious about the last thing you said, "[f]or my part, > extension and comprehension seem more useful in exploring inference than in > defining basic modes of inference." Would you be willing to elaborate on > that a bit? I would suppose that in order to explore inferences in that > way, one would already have to know which inferences causes changes in > which quantity and how they change it. But perhaps this is not necessarily > the case; or even if it is, some or even most of the time we don't need to > know which inferences effect which changes, so long as we can appreciate > that changes in the information of a sign occurred. Maybe you think about > it in this way? > [End quote] > > I actually haven't been exploring comprehension and extension much lately, > but I notice when others do, Pe
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Jerry, list, Yes, that is true, a change in meaning is not necessarily a change in the state of information. Peirce is clear about that in "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension". One can find at least a couple of cases of this mentioned in the sixth section or 'paragraph', in particular his definitions of generalization and descent. You wrote: Is this sentence an example speculative rhetoric or speculative grammar? By example, I take it that you mean, is this a proposition or claim (or observation) in the study of speculative rhetoric, or in speculative grammar? Actually, I believe this would belong to neither, but instead belong to the second branch of semiotic logic, i.e. logical critic, the branch that focuses on inference and its classifications. Speculative grammar, of course, plays a role: Peirce uses his newly-defined concepts from "On a New List" to understand information, in particular the concept of interpretant. But the outcome of the paper on information is an explanation of the three kinds of inference as represented by their role in changing information. Notice that in the paper, Peirce references his syllogistic approach to understanding induction and hypothesis in order to help make sense of the changes of information brought about by induction and hypothesis. But syllogistic is properly part of logical critic, not speculative grammar. With respect to speculative rhetoric, nothing is discussed in regard to questions of scientific method or of communication and semiotic community generally, though one would expect an understanding of information and the variety of changes it can undergo to prove of aid in the issues that speculative rhetoric treats of. You could argue that information theory belongs in speculative grammar after all, and I can see that. But my instinct is that discussing changes of anything isn't really the purview of speculative grammar. Grammar classifies signs, but it does not discuss their changing relations with each other--that's what inference and method do, and studies of inference and method properly belong to critic and methodeutic, respectively. Again, grammar contributes the needed classifications to understand what-contributes-what to information, but it shouldn't have to do with discussing changes in information. Franklin On Mon, Nov 2, 2015 at 10:18 AM, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > List: > > On Nov 1, 2015, at 11:43 PM, Franklin Ransom > wrote: > > In any case, change in distinctness is not change in information. > > > This assertion appears problematic. > > In particular, it appears to suggest that a change in meaning is not a > change in information. > > Is this sentence an example speculative rhetoric or speculative grammar? > > Cheers > > Jerry > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Ben, list, You wrote: If the sample is an index, as he later said, of the whole, what sort of > actual index indicates a hypothetical, potential whole? Yes, that is a good point. He must have changed his views, but I'm not sure exactly how. I just re-read the paragraph in Kaina Stoicheia where he introduces depth, breadth, and information, but there is not much there, and certainly nothing about how they relate to inference. He clearly still has the basic ideas there so many decades later, but how to apply them in light of changes to his views in semiotics? If all mental action has the form of inference, then they all must be > related to inferences in some way. Yes, exactly my thought. Franklin On Sat, Nov 7, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Franklin, list, > > Thanks for pointing out those subsequent passages and unraveling them for > us. It's been a while since I read "Upon Logical Comprehension and > Extension" from beginning to end. > > When Peirce previously in the same paper defined induction as increasing > the breadth without changing the depth, the idea seem to be that of > extending the character to a larger population which is asserted to exist, > i.e., induction's conclusion asserts an actual increase of breadth without > asserting a change of depth. But he comes to say of induction: > > [] On the other hand, P is not yet found to apply to anything but S', > S'', S''', and Siv, but only to apply to whatever else may hereafter be > found to be contained under M. The induction itself does not make known any > such thing. [] > [End quote] > > It is true that the induction does not _*make known*_ the truth of its > conclusion's claims, but in this picture the induction does not even _ > *assert*_ the existence of a larger, encompassing population, but instead > leaves it conditional and hypothetical, so the breadth increase is > potential, not assertedly actual. Moreover the conclusion isn't usually > framed like "whatever else may hereafter," it just says "Any M is P" and > this doesn't even entail that there are S's found to be M & P. This is a > question of what is the fairest way to frame an inference. You make a good > point about Peirce not bringing iconicity and indexicality much into the > account in that paper. If the sample is an index, as he later said, of the > whole, what sort of actual index indicates a hypothetical, potential whole? > You wrote, > > It is a bit unclear to me why some of the changes in information didn't > seem to correspond to one of the three inferences [] > [End quote] > > I had that thought recently too. I once tried to make a table of all the > changes in information and I found that the potential size of the table was > rather larger than I expected. If all mental action has the form of > inference, then they all must be related to inferences in some way. > > Best, Ben > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Jerry, list, Well, this turned out longer than I anticipated. You wrote: BTW, this is just another example of CSP's usage of his chemical knowledge > to ground his logical explorations. Yes, I was surprised some such reference to chemistry and its importance in influencing Peirce's work wasn't in your first post; I suppose you were winding up for the pitch. There is a very decidedly chemistry-centric direction that your posts take here on Peirce-L. I think it's important to notice that I'm not a chemistry whiz, but that I will do my best to keep up. For what it's worth, I would like to point out that I see no reason to deny your claims about the important influence of developments in chemistry on Peirce's work in logic. I just don't always see the relevance in a given discourse. What is the information content of a symbol (as a diagram, icon, index or > any term) if the change of the sign does not indicate a change in > information? > > Recent extension of the discussion point out that both "breadth" and > "depth" can be viewed as changes in the distinctiveness of the sign (or > information content.) This question needs some clarification before it can be answered. When you say "What is the information content of a symbol (as a diagram, icon, index, or any term)," it is unclear whether you mean for diagrams, icons, indices, and any term to be understood as a symbol. Strictly speaking, icons and indices cannot be symbols, a diagram is a type of icon, and terms, well, that depends on how one means term; in particular, it matters if one envisions dicisigns as involving terms (rhemes?), or whether one restricts terms to propositions proper, and then specifically the predicate term. My guess is that you understand all of this, but your wording was vague, and I wanted to be clear that we are specifically talking about symbols. If you want to include diagrams, icons, indices, and any term, then it is important to note that icons only serve content for information; indices also serve content for information, and some types of indices also convey information--i.e., dicent indices. But they do not possess information in the sense that a symbol does. Information is the ongoing relating of informed breadth and informed depth relative to one another, which is possible only in a symbol. I would also like to point out that "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension" (ULCE) only deals with terms, not propositions or arguments. I seem to recall that in his later years Peirce had specified what information would be like for propositions and arguments, but after looking around a bit, I can't find a text to cite and I don't exactly recall how it worked, only that it didn't work the same way for them as for terms. (At least in the case of propositions, I think it had to do with the possible cases in which a given proposition was applied or true, or followed validly, or some such thing.) So if we talk about the information content of a symbol, we must limit ourselves to terms. Moreover, it's not clear that the term in some sense contains anything, but rather the term's information relates to the synthetic propositions, or facts, in which it participates as either subject or predicate. So the information of a term-symbol is something that the term has relative to other terms given in synthetic propositions that collectively inform what Peirce referred to as the state of information. This idea of the state of information is important to keep in mind. Consider how in ULEC Peirce treats of the idea of distinctness (in a footnote following the quote he references the introduction of the idea of distinctness to the work of Scotus): If *T* be a term which is predicable only of *S'*, *S''*, and *S'''*, then > the *S'*'s, the *S''*'s, and the *S'''*'s will constitute the informed > breadth of *T.* If at the same time, *S'* and *S''* are the subjects of > which alone another term *T'* can be predicated, and if it is not known > that all *S'''*'s are either *S'* or *S''*, then *T *is said to have a > greater informed breadth than *T'*. If the *S'''*'s are known not to be > all among the *S'*'s and *S''*'s, this excess of breadth may be termed > *certain,* and, if this is not known, it may be termed *doubtful.* If > there are known to be *S'''*'s, not known to be *S'*'s or *S''*'s, *T* is > said to have a greater *actual* breadth than *T'*;but if no *S'''*'s are > known except such are known to be *S'*'s, and *S''*'s (though there may > be others), *T* is said to have a greater *potential* breadth than *T'*. > If *T* and *T'* are conceptions in different minds, or in different > states of the same mind, and it is known to the mind which conceives *T* that > every *S'''* is either *S''* or *S'*, then *T* is said to be more *extensively > distinct* than *T'.* > And then The depth, like the breadth, may be certain or doubtful, actual or > potential, and there is a comprehensive distinctness corresponding to > extensive distinctn
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Gary F, list,
Gary, thank you, thank you so much for finding that quote about the
information of propositions and arguments! I spent so many hours, and not
just yesterday, trying to find that quote again. I'll have to keep it
somewhere I'll be sure to find it. Btw, it's 407, not 406, at least in the
Intelex version on Past Masters.
Now, you said:
One place where Peirce uses the terms *breadth* and *depth* in reference to
> the proposition (rather than the term) is “Kaina Stoicheia” (1904), EP2:305:
> e
I'm confused. I had just read that passage again yesterday, and then again
when you quoted it. But I don't see reference to the breadth and depth in
reference to the proposition. Rather, it is still to terms, understood with
respect to the roles they play in propositions and how such roles determine
the information a given term signifies. This is just what we find in ULCE;
there is nothing new in Kaina Stoicheia. Perhaps I have misunderstood
something?
Returning to the quote from the note to CP2:407, I wonder what he meant
that "[i]n fact, every proposition and every argument can be regarded as a
term." I recall Stjernfelt said in NP, p.79, that "both Rhemes and
Dicisigns may be seen as potential or truncated Arguments rather than
autonomous figures:", and he goes on to quote Peirce:
I have maintained since 1867 that there is but one primary and fundamental
> logical relation, that of illation, expressed by *ergo*. A proposition,
> for me, is but an argumentation divested of the assertoriness of its
> premiss and conclusion. This makes every proposition a conditional
> proposition at bottom. In like manner a "term," or class-name, is for me
> nothing but a proposition with its indices or subjects left blank, or
> indefinite. ("The Regenerated Logic, 1896, 3.440)
However, this goes in the direction of arguments, not in the direction of
terms. How can every proposition and every argument be regarded as a term?
If he had said this before explaining how the concept of information
applies to propositions and arguments, I would have thought that he simply
meant they can be regarded as terms insofar as they too have information.
But since he concludes with that statement, my guess is that he meant
something more by it. But what? Or maybe I'm reading too much into it, and
he just meant to say exactly that, that like terms, propositions and
arguments also have information.
Franklin
On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 9:36 AM, wrote:
> Franklin, regarding this point:
>
> [ I would also like to point out that "Upon Logical Comprehension and
> Extension" (ULCE) only deals with terms, not propositions or arguments. I
> seem to recall that in his later years Peirce had specified what
> information would be like for propositions and arguments, but after looking
> around a bit, I can't find a text to cite and I don't exactly recall how it
> worked, only that it didn't work the same way for them as for terms. ]
>
>
>
> You may be thinking of this note to CP2:406:
>
> [[ I restricted myself to terms, because at the time this chapter was
> first written (1867), I had not remarked that the whole doctrine of breadth
> and depth was equally applicable to propositions and to arguments. The
> breadth of a proposition is the aggregate of possible states of things in
> which it is true; the breadth of an argument is the aggregate of possible
> cases to which it applies. The depth of a proposition is the total of fact
> which it asserts of the state of things to which it is applied; the depth
> of an argument is the importance of the conclusions which it draws. In
> fact, every proposition and every argument can be regarded as a term.—1893.
> ]]
>
>
>
> One place where Peirce uses the terms *breadth* and *depth* in reference
> to the proposition (rather than the term) is “Kaina Stoicheia” (1904),
> EP2:305:e
>
>
>
> [[ If a sign, *B*, only signifies characters that are elements (or the
> whole) of the meaning of another sign, *A*, then *B* is said to be a
> *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. If a sign, *A*, only denotes
> real objects that are a part or the whole of the objects denoted by another
> sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a *subject* (or *substantial part*) of
> *B*. The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of
> the characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical
> *depth*. This is the oldest and most convenient term. Synonyms are the
> *comprehension* of the Port-Royalists, the *content* (*Inhalt*) of the
> Germans, the *force* of DeMorgan, the *connotation* of J.S. Mill. (The
> last is objectionable.) The totality of the subjects, and also,
> indifferently, the totality of the real objects of a sign is called the
> logical *breadth*. This is the oldest and most convenient term. Synonyms
> are the *extension* of the Port-Royalists (ill-called *extent* by some
> modern French logicians), the *sphere* (*Umfang*) of translators from the
> German, the *scope* of DeMorgan, the *de
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Gary F, list,
I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which it
is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it is
true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a sign,
A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, that
is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a part
of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's,
characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is
something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
language) would be the very Universe."
Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the
same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact
have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs
in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying
characters. Since any sign, to be a sign, will have an interpretant, it
seems clear that whether it is a term, proposition, argument, or any sign
whatsoever, it must have breadth and depth (if it had no breadth, there
would be no object, and if it had no depth, it would signify nothing about
the object). But not only does every sign have breadth and depth, every
sign has them in the sense of denoting objects and signifying characters.
How to understand this? Do predicates and subjects simply apply to
propositions only, or do they apply generally to all signs?
Franklin
On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 1:48 PM, wrote:
> Franklin,
>
>
>
> I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician
> would gain by regarding them that way. But to me it sounds like a precursor
> of his (much later) observation that one can analyze a proposition by
> “throwing everything” into the predicate *or* by throwing everything into
> the subject. Maybe his comment in the Regenerated Logic also works in both
> directions.
>
>
>
> In the Kaina Stoicheia passage, when Peirce says that the “totality of
> the predicates of a sign” is “called its logical *depth*,” and that the
> “totality of the subjects … of a sign is called the logical *breadth,*”
> the sign he is referring to has to be a proposition, because only
> propositions include subjects and predicates. Each subject and each
> predicate can be called a “term,” but it’s the breadth and depth of the
> whole sign, the proposition, that Peirce is defining here, not the breadth
> or depth of the terms (which is what he defined in ULCE). And, as you say,
> propositions and arguments also have information (which for Peirce is the
> logical product of breadth and depth).
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The birth and death of the leaves are the rapid whirls of the eddy whose
> wider circles move slowly among the stars. [Tagore] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 12:32
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> Gary, thank you, thank you so much for finding that quote about the
> information of propositions and arguments! I spent so many hours, and not
> just yesterday, trying to find that quote again. I'll have to keep it
>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Ben, Gary F,
I like Gary's suggestion about "throwing everything" into the predicate or
into the subject. However, not quite everything gets thrown in, right?
There still needs to be some bare minimum subject if everything gets thrown
into the predicate, and some bare minimum predicate if everything gets
thrown into the subject. I'm not sure this works.
Ben, I thought to myself of that possibility, namely of erasing the subject
and letting the rhema or term remain. But I don't see how propositions and
arguments can really be like terms in this sense, since propositions
certainly require subjects and arguments do because they require premisses
in the form of propositions.
But, I was looking through Natural Propositions to make sure I understood
the "throwing everything in" idea, and I found a quote from Peirce that
Frederik included in his text that seems pertinent. NP, p.84, quoted from
"Pragmatism", 1907, 5.473:
The interpretant of a proposition is its predicate; its object is the
> things denoted by its subject or subjects (including its grammatical
> objects, direct and indirect, etc.).
So this says that the subject-term represents the object of the
proposition, while the predicate-term represents the interpretant of the
proposition. We should probably imagine that interpretants don't all come
down to being cases of predicate-terms. But if we consider that the
conclusion of an argument is the argument's interpretant, and comes in the
form of a proposition, and that such proposition itself can be interpreted
by way of its predicate, then propositions and arguments can ultimately be
interpreted as predicate terms. A term, in this way, as an interpretant,
signifies all the characters of the propositions and arguments leading to
it, while denoting, by way of its determination from such determining
signs, the object(s) of the determining signs. What do you think?
Franklin
On Sun, Nov 8, 2015 at 2:14 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Gary F., Franklin,
>
> Gary, you wrote,
>
> I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician
> would gain by regarding them that way.
> [End quote]
>
> In "Kaina Stoicheia" III. 4. (EP 2:308), 1904,
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/stoicheia/stoicheia.htm
> Peirce says:
>
> [] If we erase from an argument every monstration of its special
> purpose, it becomes a proposition; usually a copulate proposition, composed
> of several members whose mode of conjunction is of the kind expressed by
> "and," which the grammarians call a "copulative conjunction." If from a
> propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately
> denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a *rhema*; but I
> shall take the liberty of calling it a *term*. Thus, from the proposition
> "Every man is mortal," we erase "Every man," which is shown to be
> denotative of an object by the circumstance that if it be replaced by an
> indexical symbol, such as "That" or "Socrates," the symbol is reconverted
> into a proposition, we get the *rhema* or *term* "_ is mortal." []
> [End quote]
>
> Somewhere Peirce also notes that a proposition is a medadic term.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> On 11/8/2015 1:48 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> Franklin,
>
> I’m not sure what Peirce meant by saying in 1893 that every proposition
> and every argument can be regarded as a term, or what advantage a logician
> would gain by regarding them that way. But to me it sounds like a precursor
> of his (much later) observation that one can analyze a proposition by
> “throwing everything” into the predicate *or* by throwing everything into
> the subject. Maybe his comment in the Regenerated Logic also works in both
> directions.
>
> In the Kaina Stoicheia passage, when Peirce says that the “totality of the
> predicates of a sign” is “called its logical *depth*,” and that the
> “totality of the subjects … of a sign is called the logical *breadth,*”
> the sign he is referring to has to be a proposition, because only
> propositions include subjects and predicates. Each subject and each
> predicate can be called a “term,” but it’s the breadth and depth of the
> whole sign, the proposition, that Peirce is defining here, not the breadth
> or depth of the terms (which is what he defined in ULCE). And, as you say,
> propositions and arguments also have information (which for Peirce is the
> logical product of breadth and depth).
>
> Gary f.
>
> } The birth and death of the leaves are the rapid whirls of the eddy whose
> wider circles move slowly among the stars. [Tagore] {
>
>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Ben, Jerry, In general, I ditto Ben's interleaved remarks from his post. In particular, I will note a couple of differences: Jerry wrote: Consider the sentence: > Harry fought Peter and contrast it with it's "twin", Peter fought Harry. > Does it have the same logical meaning as the first sentence? > Ben replied: BU: It has a different meaning. I'm not sure what you mean by "logical > meaning." The word "fought" has the same meaning in both sentences. Taken _ > *separately*_, each sentences has the logical form 'c fought d.' Maybe > that is what you mean by "same logical meaning." But if they're taken > together, (for example as in "Harry fought Peter or Peter fought Harry") > then one letter needs to be assigned to Peter in both sentences and the > other letter needs to be assigned to Harry in both sentences. I would consider "_ fought _" to be commutative, and there is no change in logical meaning, so long as the subjects are the same; in this case, Peter and Harry. With respect to "Cain kills Abel", this would not be commutative. It depends upon the predicate. It should be kept in mind though that logical meaning with ideas like commutative and associative and such typically refer to syncategorematic terms like logical addition, logical multiplication, etc. as we see Peirce describe in his improvement on Boole's Calculus of Logic, or in logical operators like conjunction and disjunction in modern symbolic logic. Another exchange: [JC] More broadly, one can ask the question, what is the role of the > concept of ORDER in grammar in contrast with its roles in logics and > mathematics. > BU: I don't know. I would say, one can ask the question, but in order to answer it, one would have to define one's concept of order. If by order in grammar, you mean syntax, that is pretty clear. And if you said the same for logic, that is pretty clear. And likewise for mathematics. If we're talking about syntax. But in mathematics, at least, order could probably be considered as something other than syntax; there's a lot going on in mathematics. In logic, at least, I know Josiah Royce defined logic as the science of order, and I'm sure one could say a lot about that. Anyhoo, what's the point of all this, Jerry? It's a vague statement you are making. Jerry wrote: Also, compare this usage with CSP's description of the mapping of an icon > to a rhema in which it compares the generative relation of this map to > chemical radicals! Where is this description in CSP's texts? Jerry wrote: In my view, a clear and distinct meaning for the relationships among > relatives necessarily requires a clear and distinct cognitive stance with > respect to the identity of the term. [ergo, a "family tree" of meanings of > terms] > In this regard, contrast with 3.420-421 wrt relative rhema. (see The > Existential Graphs of CSP, D. Roberts, p.21-25 for discussions). I'm not sure what you mean by "the identity of the term", nor do I follow your "ergo." I read 3.420-421, but I don't understand what I'm supposed to contrast it with. I don't happen to have a copy of Roberts's book, so you'll have to help me out here. I can summarize this line of thought by a general proposition for the logic > of terms as units of meaning as in the "Quali-sign-Sin-sign-legi-sign, > icon-index-symbol, rheme, dicisign, argument" format for logic by CSP, but > now expressed in mereological terms of parts of the whole: > "The union of the units unifies the unity." [ergo, a fight, ergo, > beta-graphs.] > In a metaphysical LOGIC: > "The union of the units unifies the unity of the universe." [ergo, > existence] Jerry, I'm afraid this is all quite over my head. I almost feel as though I'm reading something straight out of Hegel at his most abstruse, and that is saying a lot. Now, setting aside the general confusion I feel from having read your post, it seems to me that you are all along trying to get at the issue of the meaning of terms. I don't understand at all why you felt the need to go to grammar, especially since you don't appear to mean speculative grammar. Or at least, when you reference grammatical nouns, it seems clear. I am somewhat wondering whether you waffle back and forth between the grammar of a natural language and speculative grammar. The discussion of logical quantities, in particular with respect to the meaning of terms, is, I think, a way of getting at the logic of terms. I'm not sure, but my guess is that you want to contrast the idea of a term as a unit of measure (or meaning?) with the idea that terms have logical quantity, or what? Some clarification would be helpful. Btw, at least according to Whately in his Elements of Logic, the Introduction (edition I am reading is from 1853, available through Google books), it was Antisthenes who introduced simple terms, along with propositions and arguments, and the Stoics picked up the distinction from him between simple terms, propositions, and arguments. I would not be surprised to
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Jeff, Gary F, Ben, I like Jeff's suggestion very much. It seems to me a a more developed interpretation of the point that Ben had suggested, taking it in the other direction--instead of showing how propositions and arguments can be turned into terms through erasure, we assume instead that propositions and arguments already admit of at least one more blank left to be determined, and they would be like rhemes in this respect. I don't really have time at the moment to get into the deeper analysis shown in the attachments. I'll say something later if I find the time to dig into it. -- Franklin On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:48 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Gary F., Ben, Franklin, List, > > Off the top of my head, I would think that there is a straightforward way > of interpreting the passage: “every proposition and every argument can be > regarded as a term”. What is, at one stage of inquiry, a fully formed and > isolated proposition (i.e., medadic in form), can be, a later stage, a > term-like part of a larger proposition. It will function as a rheme when > the medadic proposition gains a new bonding site and is then connected to > other things in a larger proposition or argument. The same is true for an > argument. Whole arguments can be embedded as parts in a larger proposition > and thereby function as rhemes in relation to the other parts of a > proposition. Doesn't this take place, for instance, when a number of > perceptual judgments are colligated into a single premiss in a larger > argument? Each perceptual judgement is initially expressive of a > proposition. Later, when they are colligated into a single premiss, each > perceptual judgment is really functioning as a rheme in a larger > proposition--which is really a premiss in a larger argument. > > Or, let's put the point more precisely in the terms of the mature sign > theory. Every triadic relation that is formed between qualisign, immediate > object and immediate interpretant is, as a triad, something that can (as a > token) function as an indexical sinsign in relation to a dynamical object > and dynamical interpretant. Together, these two connected and nested > triads compose a perceptual judgment. In turn, a number of these perceptual > judgments can be colligated together to form the content of the symbolic > legisign that is brought into relation to the dynamical object and final > interpretant in an argument. > > Putting things in such terms doesn't always help to make the points much > clearer. As such, I've attached a couple of diagrams that I'm using to > think about the relations between the signs, objects and interpretants in > the classification of the 66 different kinds of signs and sign relations. > My suggestion is that the triad on the left is joined to the triad in the > middle by serving as the sign term, and the same holds true for the > relation between the triad in the middle and the triad on the right. I've > tried to picture this in the second diagram using colored and dashed > circles to show that the triad one the left is serving as the sign in the > triad to its right. The process I've sketched by nesting the dashed > circles is an overly simplified version of the more complex relations that > must obtain when we consider all the different types of signs and sign > relations that are needed for the process of interpretation to be possible. > > This way of diagramming sign relations is different from the way these > relations have been represented by other interpreters of the texts (e.g., > Nadin, Merkle, Johansen and Lizka). As far as I can see, this set of > diagrams more faithfully represents the kinds of relations Peirce is > describing in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my > categories from within," the essays on the nomenclature and division of > dyadic and triad relations, the discussion of dichotomic and trichotomic > relations in "The Simplest Mathematics," The Logic of Relations (CP 3.456), > The Reader is Introduced to Relatives in The Critic of Arguments (CP > 3.415), etc. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
that Harry and Peter exhibit
> symmetrical/complementary behavior. Making this assumption explicit
> permits its accuracy to be tested, and its other implications to be deduced.
> The commutative verb conceals any difference between Harry's logic and
> that of Peter -- as though no relevant difference could exist between two
> people.
>
> (I offer empirical evidence against the commutative verb: Long ago in high
> school, a fellow named Jack decided to fight me. He threw two punches,
> while I threw none. Instead, I talked to him (in a persuasive manner).
> Jack fought Tom, but Tom did not fight Jack.)
>
> Now, if both Peter and Harry are fighting, when the observer uses 'fought'
> after one name instead of the other ("Harry fought Peter"), that phrasing
> may indicate (or hint) to a listener that Harry initiated the fight. It
> may also reflect an affiliation between Harry and the observer, the
> outcome of the fight, or the observer's belief about the loyalties of the
> listener.
>
> If the battle is mutually engaged in by Harry and Peter, and if the
> observer is informed and impartial, then neither "Harry fought Peter" nor
> "Peter fought Harry" would be incorrect, but neither would provide a
> faithful, unambiguous account of the 'transaction' between Harry and Peter.
> "Harry and Peter fought each other" is a neutral description.
>
> A recent comment by Jerry about the evolution of Peirce's thinking is
> pertinent to this discussion. As Jerry noted, early in Peirce's career,
> the will (logic) of the chemist dominated each compounding 'transaction'
> that occurred in lab: "I add two parts of hydrogen to two parts of oxygen
> to make water." The only Pragmatic logic was that of the (purposeful)
> chemist, while atoms were perceived and manipulated within a semiotic
> context: A+2B = 2B+A = C.
>
> Later, as Jerry noted, the new analysis and notation meant that each atom was
> modeled as obeying its own logic. Then, chemical reactions were described
> as optimizing (Pragmatic) responses by the various atoms to a change in
> their environments. The logic of the principal actors -- atoms -- became
> paramount; the logic of the chemist-observer moved to the sidelines. "In
> close proximity their valence electrons synchronize, causing one hydrogen
> atom to combine with two oxygen atoms, and they become water."
>
> If "Harry fought Peter," then only Harry is known (from the statement) to
> behave purposely. Peter is present, but not animated by any known logic.
> That is the old, non-Pragmatic chemistry.
>
> Regards,
> Tom Wyrick
>
>
>
> On Nov 9, 2015, at 7:46 PM, Franklin Ransom
> wrote:
>
> Ben, Jerry,
>
> In general, I ditto Ben's interleaved remarks from his post. In
> particular, I will note a couple of differences:
>
> Jerry wrote:
>
> Consider the sentence:
>> Harry fought Peter and contrast it with it's "twin", Peter fought Harry.
>> Does it have the same logical meaning as the first sentence?
>>
>
> Ben replied:
>
> BU: It has a different meaning. I'm not sure what you mean by "logical
>> meaning." The word "fought" has the same meaning in both sentences. Taken _
>> *separately*_, each sentences has the logical form 'c fought d.' Maybe
>> that is what you mean by "same logical meaning." But if they're taken
>> together, (for example as in "Harry fought Peter or Peter fought Harry")
>> then one letter needs to be assigned to Peter in both sentences and the
>> other letter needs to be assigned to Harry in both sentences.
>
>
> I would consider "_ fought _" to be commutative, and there is no change in
> logical meaning, so long as the subjects are the same; in this case, Peter
> and Harry. With respect to "Cain kills Abel", this would not be
> commutative. It depends upon the predicate. It should be kept in mind
> though that logical meaning with ideas like commutative and associative and
> such typically refer to syncategorematic terms like logical addition,
> logical multiplication, etc. as we see Peirce describe in his improvement
> on Boole's Calculus of Logic, or in logical operators like conjunction and
> disjunction in modern symbolic logic.
>
> Another exchange:
>
> [JC] More broadly, one can ask the question, what is the role of the
>> concept of ORDER in grammar in contrast with its roles in logics and
>> mathematics.
>> BU: I don't know.
>
>
> I would say, one can ask the question, but in order to answer it, one
> would have to define o
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Gary F, list,
I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I think
I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am in
part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about the
informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and because in
KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions information
and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to terms, and not
propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further in KS how these
ideas apply to propositions specifically.
-- Franklin
On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, wrote:
> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>
> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and
> not signs?
>
>
>
> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition
> which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part
> III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first
> defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and
> subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still
> undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can
> only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its
> parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can *be* a predicate (or
> “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t *have* a
> predicate.
>
>
>
> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
> Bateson] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>
>
>
> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which
> it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it
> is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
> explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
>
>
>
> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a
> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose,
> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a
> part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's,
> characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is
> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
> element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
> express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
> language) would be the very Universe."
>
>
>
> Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the
> same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact
> have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs
> in KS have breadth and depth, as denoting objects and signifying
> chara
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
List,
I think it would be best to move any further discussion to a separate
thread, since no one is in any way discussing "Vol. 2 of CP, on Induction"
anymore in this thread. I'm starting a new thread titled "Terms,
Propositions, Arguments", which I hope is sufficiently vague as a
description of any further discussion of our issues.
-- Franklin
-
On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 6:30 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Gary F, list,
>
> I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I think
> I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am in
> part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about the
> informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and because in
> KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions information
> and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to terms, and not
> propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further in KS how these
> ideas apply to propositions specifically.
>
> -- Franklin
>
> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, wrote:
>
>> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>>
>> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and
>> not signs?
>>
>>
>>
>> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
>> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
>> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition
>> which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part
>> III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first
>> defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and
>> subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still
>> undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can
>> only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its
>> parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can *be* a predicate (or
>> “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t *have*
>> a predicate.
>>
>>
>>
>> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
>> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
>> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
>> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
>> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
>> Bateson] {
>>
>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
>> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary F, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
>> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
>> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
>> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
>> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
>> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>>
>>
>>
>> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
>> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
>> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
>> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
>> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
>> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which
>> it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it
>> is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
>> explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
>>
>>
>>
>> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
>> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
>> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a
>> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose,
>> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a
[PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
udgment
is a determination of the man-symbol to have whatever interpretant the
judgment has, in turn "[a]ssertion is the determination of the man-symbol
to determining the interpreter, so far as he is interpreter, in the same
way" (ibid). That is, the man-symbol now acts like a proposition in
communicating the interpretant of the judged proposition to the
interpreter, though the man-symbol is not properly a proposition but a
term; but despite normally being considered a term, in this case it
expresses a fact, which is properly what a proposition does.
--Franklin
---
On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, wrote:
> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>
> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions and
> not signs?
>
>
>
> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the Proposition
> which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311), and in part
> III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the proposition by first
> defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e. predicate and
> subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term which is still
> undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and depth, he can
> only be referring to the breadth and depth of the proposition, not of its
> parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can *be* a predicate (or
> “essential part”) of a sign (namely a proposition), but it can’t *have* a
> predicate.
>
>
>
> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
> Bateson] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>
>
>
> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>
>
>
> Gary F, list,
>
>
>
> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>
>
>
> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to which
> it is applied" and "the aggregate of possible states of things in which it
> is true", respectively, that is certainly very different from what is being
> explained in KS. Did he change his views here?
>
>
>
> Then there's an earlier part in KS, p.304 of EP 2, to consider: "But, in
> the third place, every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same
> object with the same signification or *meaning*. Any sign, B, which a
> sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose,
> that is, in accordance with the "Truth," even though it, B, denotes but a
> part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies but a part of its, A's,
> characters, I call an *interpretant* of A. What we call a "fact" is
> something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an
> element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
> express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
> as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
> Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
> language) would be the very Universe."
>
>
>
> Note that *every* sign determines another sign (the interpretant) of the
> same object with the same signfication, and the interpretant does in fact
> have breadth and depth, and in the same sense that terms in UCLE and signs
&g
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction Role of Units of thought on inductive logic
Jerry, list, Responses interleaved. On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 4:29 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > Frank, Ben, List: > > > On Nov 11, 2015, at 4:52 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > This is all to say that I'm not entirely sure what Jerry want to get at > with talking about "units of measure", and if by that he means something > other than the information conveyed by signs; and in particular, terms. > > > As is often the case, communication between different disciplines often go > awry. *In this case, my comments reveal a deep split in the concept of > units (and union of units).* I am referring to systems of logical > thought and the symbols that were used by CSP to bridge pragmatism to > mathematics. (These symbols are artifacts of thought.) > > [FR] What deep split? And which systems of logical thought and symbols used by CSP to bridge pragmatism to mathematics? > For the philosophical context of the units, I recommend: > Aristotelian-Thomistic Philosophy of Measure and the International System > of Units (SI): Correlation of International System of Units With the > Philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas > by Peter A. Redpath > <http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=dp_byline_sr_book_1?ie=UTF8&text=Peter+A.+Redpath&search-alias=books&field-author=Peter+A.+Redpath&sort=relevancerank> > (Author) > > The concept of units of measure is of one of the fundamental concepts of > the natural sciences and related applied mathematical subjects, such as > economics. > This topic is of particular concern to CSP philosophy as he spent several > years working on measuring gravitational units and their integration into > physical unit systems in the 1870 - 1880s. The concept of discrete units > is the unstated pre-supposition underlying CSP Graph theory. > > [FR] I don't really understand how one can make the claim that the concept of discrete units is the unstated pre-supposition underlying CSP's graph theory. My understanding is that Peirce is motivated in part by the development of topology (which has much more to do with continuity), in which metrical concerns drop out of sight. The graphs take no concern for measurement. I take it, of course, that by discrete units you mean discrete units of measurement. As for discrete individuals, of course these are accounted for in the existential graphs, and there is no reason to claim that the concept of discrete individuals is an "unstated pre-supposition" of the graphs. > A unit is a measure of one thing relative to other things. While units > have proper names, systems of units relate these proper names in > well-defined ways such that the calculations are consistent, complete > (hopefully) and generate an exact decision. * Very, very often, CSP > writes in terms of "units" rather than in terms of mathematical variables > or modern set theory*. > > [FR] I'm not sure where CSP writes in terms of "units." Since the claim is that they appear "[v]ery, very often," would it be possible to offer textual support for this claim? > The basic physical system of units are all related to one another. (Think > metric system) They are: mass, distance, time, temperature, brightness of > light, electricity and mole. Physical calculations are all based on these > units or further definitions of relations among these units. > see: http://physics.nist.gov/cuu/Units/units.html > > The basic logical chemical units are the the individual chemical > elements. All chemical calculations are based on these units. The related > chemical units include molecules, molecular weight, molecular formula, > molecular structure and molecular number. (I introduced the logical term > "molecular number" for the logical operators linking (connecting) atomic > numbers, valence (electricity) and graph theory (mathematics)) > > The basic biological units are individual species and Linnaeus's hierarchy. > > [FR] I am somewhat confused by whether a unit is some individual or particular, or something general, a type or kind. Clearly an individual species will be something general. Are units (of measurement) always types? And I'm really lost as to how Linnaeus's hierarchy is supposed to be a 'unit of measurement'. > In set theory, each element is a unit of a set (except for the empty set ) > and > a union of units is a set or class. > That is, a union unites the elements. (Think Venn diagrams.). > The class resulting from the union is a unity. > > Thus, the assertion: > "The union of the units unites the unity" > is a statement about forms of symbolic addition. > > *In particular, this assertion applies to arithmetic addition as well as > addition of atoms
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Helmut, I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is partly rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the dynamical object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical object there is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized/objectivated from itself." I don't know what it means that the sign is externalized from itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an object that is independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object is supposed to be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd almost guess that you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, but I don't know much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested in it. Moreover, I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting with what you already understand so that we can find a common ground for discussing these ideas. -- Franklin - On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Franklin, Gary, list, > I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object > concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what > kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there > is not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized / > objectivated from itself to make itself understandable. An argument > transports the outside respect with its argumentative character, and the > inside respect with its proposition- and term- character. I have written > such a thing before about legi-, sin- and qualisign, it is a bit crude, > just a guess, maybe you can do something with it, maybe Im wrong, I dont > know, you tell. I do not want to confuse anybody. > Best, > Helmut > 13. November 2015 um 21:01 Uhr > "Franklin Ransom" wrote: > > Gary F, list, > > Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on > Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, > of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. > > I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" > instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that > Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. > > But I have a thought about what is going on in the text that may explain > the way in which he is discussing signs, though I suppose it might be > somewhat unorthodox. Consider that we have just been discussing cases where > Peirce remarks that propositions and arguments may be regarded as terms, > and alternatively that terms and propositions may be regarded as arguments. > Perhaps in KS, what we have is Peirce suggesting that terms and arguments > may be regarded as propositions. > > In the case of arguments, Peirce makes the point explicit: "That a sign > cannot be an argument without being a proposition is shown by attempting to > form such an argument" (EP2, p.308). > > In the case of terms, this requires a little argumentation. It is clear > that terms have logical quantity. In particular, natural classes like "man" > have informed logical quantity; or more simply, information. Although it is > true that Peirce says "[b]ut 'man' is never used alone, and would have no > meaning by itself" (ibid, p.309-310), it is also true that in ULCE, the > information of a term is determined by the totality of synthetic > propositions in which the term participates as either predicate or subject;* > its informed depth and breadth is due to the cases in which the term is not > used alone, but with respect to other terms in propositions*. In the case > of being used as predicate, it increases in informed breadth; in the case > of subject, it increases in informed depth. Note that when the term appears > as a subject, the predicate of the proposition is predicated of the term, > and that when the term appears as a predicate, it has the subject of the > proposition as its subject. > > Now if we consider the term as a proposition, this would simply amount to > supposing its logical depth given as predicate and its logical breadth > given as subject in a proposition. So we could say of man, "All men are > such-and-such-and-such", and by this we would denote all real objects that > are men and all the characters that man signifies. This is not a very > practical thing to do, but it is theoretically possible. It also satisfies > what Peirce says in the passage when he
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction Role of Units of thought on inductive logic
Jerry, I appreciate the time you have taken to respond with your thoughts up to this point, and I also appreciate the reference of works that you believe would prove helpful for my understanding. I am sad to see that we cannot find common ground to discuss the issues. But again, I am grateful for the care you have taken to respond. I hope that in any possible future discussion, we can arrive at a more fruitful outcome. Sincerely, Franklin - On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 11:39 PM, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> wrote: > > List: > > On Nov 13, 2015, at 8:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > > [FR] I don't really understand how one can make the claim that the concept > of discrete units is the unstated pre-supposition underlying CSP's graph > theory. > > > I suggest you consult an undergraduate text on Graph Theory. It is an > abstract mathematical form of the logic of relations that underlies > algebra. Each graph node is distinct and carries mathematical information. > > But really, what does this all have to do with the relation between > distinctness and information anymore? > > > Frankly, your responses infer that you miss the essential points of the > distinctness of discrete mathematics from the continuum, the welding > together of a seamless whole such that any mark mars it. In other words, > the nature of algebra. > > I suspect that you will find it necessary to develop new levels of > abstraction to make sense out of my posts. I wrote a paper on Algebraic > Biology (in Axiomathes) several years ago which may be helpful to you, but > I doubt it. > > If you wish to learn more about these issues, I recommend works on > mereology and the philosophy of mathematics, such as: > > The Applicability of Mathematics in Science (Sorin Bangu) > or > Mereology and Location (Shieva Kleinschmidt). > > As well as Category theory. > > You are, of course, perfectly free to believe whatever you wish. I do not > have either the time or interest to attempt to change your belief system. > If you are extremely motivated, it may be an interesting journey. > > At his finest, CSP reaches extra-ordinary levels of abstract that takes > years to sort out. At least, that is my experience. As one mathematician > noted, "There is no Royal Road to Geometry", you got to figure it out for > yourself. > > Cheers > > Jerry > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
t an existing object: '...the Interpretant represents a real existential relation, or genuine Secondness, as subsisting between the Dicisign and the Dicisign's real object.' (*Syllabus*, 1903, EPII, 276; 2.310) This leads Peirce to the surprising conclusion that--since the object of the interpretant is the same as that of the sign itself--this existential relation between Dicisign and object forms, *in itself*, part of the object of the Dicisign. Consequently, the Dicisign has *two* objects; one, primary, is the object referred to--another, secondary, is the very reference relation claimed to exist between the Dicisign and that object: 'Hence this same existential relation [between Sign and Object] must be an Object of the Dicisign, if the latter have any real Object. This represented existential relation, in being an Object of the Dicisign, makes that real Object, which is correlate of this relation, also an Object of the Dicisign. This latter Object may be distinguished as the *Primary Object*, the other being termed the *Secondary Object*.' (*Syllabus*, 1903, EPII 276; 2.310) What is here called Primary/Secondary object is what is later developed into the doctrine of Dynamic/Immediate Object, cf. below. Correspondingly, the predicate part describes some character of the Primary Object--at the same time as it depicts the indexical relation which the Dicisign claims to hold between itself and its object. This is, in short, the truth claim of the proposition--which can be analyzed as the Dicisign saying there exists indeed an indexical relation between itself and its object. This is why the Dicisign, in its interpretant, is represented as having two parts, one referring to the object, and the other--the predicate--referring to the relation between the sign itself and the object." So perhaps, Helmut, you might be looking for the concept of the Immediate Object, which, in being defined, is distinguished from the concept of the Dynamic Object. The Dynamic Object is external to the sign, while the Immediate Object is internal to the sign. I hope this helps. -- Franklin --- On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 11:11 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Franklin, > I have read the three volumes by Pape, and read a lot in the commens > dictionary, and secondary literature, but I agree, that I should read more > before taking part here in the future. Just now, to what I have meant by > this second kind of dynamical object: It is the sign class, which the sign > belongs to, and therefore a concept outside of the sign. "externalized, > objectivated" is confusing, I agree. I meant something like > self-representation of the sign, like: "I am an argument", which is a > proposition, and "argument" or "proposition", which are terms. I took > "proposition" synonymous with "dicent", and "term" with "rheme", so the > talk about sign classes. It was all about the sign identifying itself as a > special kind of sign, nothing Hegelian. So- see you later, when I will have > read much more by Peirce. > Best, > Helmut > > 14. November 2015 um 04:10 Uhr > "Franklin Ransom" wrote: > > Helmut, > > I'm sorry, I don't think I can help you here. What you have said is partly > rather vague, and partly rather confusing. You mention both "the dynamical > object concerning an external meaning" and "[t]he dynamical object there is > not the external meaning, but the sign itself, externalized/objectivated > from itself." I don't know what it means that the sign is externalized from > itself, and I'm not sure if you think there is an object that is > independent of the sign (which is what the dynamical object is supposed to > be, at least in CSP's theory; maybe not in yours?). I'd almost guess that > you are attempting some sort of Hegelian dialectic here, but I don't know > much about that stuff, and am not particularly interested in it. Moreover, > I am somewhat unclear as to whether you are interested in discussing > Peirce's work. If you might oblige, would you be able to say how acquainted > you are with CSP's writings? Perhaps we could begin from there, starting > with what you already understand so that we can find a common ground for > discussing these ideas. > > -- Franklin > > - > > On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 6:06 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: >> >> >> Franklin, Gary, list, >> I guess that a sign has an outside respect (of the dynamical object >> concerning an external meaning) and an inside (self, eigen) respect of what >> kind of sign it is, which class it belongs to. The dynamical object there >> i
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Jeff, list, I changed the subject. I hope that is not objectionable, in the case that any reply is made to what I have to say. After looking at the two attachments more carefully, I have some comments. I would, however, like to emphasize that I have not been thinking much about this subject for awhile, and certainly am not as well acquainted with the subject matter as Jeff. I'm just offering my two cents here. One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such. After all, since we are talking about nested signs here, and the I-relation (if I may so call it) is shown as part of the third triad, then it does not seem like we can have a rheme and a dicent in the other two triads, since neither of those include the I-relation. So some explanation is required to make sense of these bracketed identifications. A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual judgment. There is the percept and then there is the perceptual judgment which judges the percept. If we look to "Telepathy" from the seventh volume of the CP (I googled and got a pdf from commens.org that collects the statements about percipuum), we find such statements as the following: "Perhaps I might be permitted to invent the term percipuum to include both percept and perceptual judgment." (7.629) "...I propose to consider the percept as it is immediately interpreted in the perceptual judgment, under the name of the 'percipuum.'" (7.643) It's not clear that the percipuum acts as medium between percept and perceptual judgment, or exactly how the percipuum could be understood as a medium. In the diagram, it is asserted to be a sinsign, but does this really make sense? The percipuum, in its Secondness, serves as medium between the percept and the perceptual judgment? I don't find this intuitive. I'm not saying that I necessarily have a better idea of how to think of percept and perceptual judgment. But it is true that in EP2, "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction," Peirce compares the perceptual judgment to an abductive inference, so that the perceptual judgment would be considered the interpretant of an argument sign, and thus of a legisign, not sinsign. A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation. I could be wrong here, but I thought I should mention it. In general, I'm not sure the diagrams are a fair depiction of the idea in question. I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own. But I'm not convinced that the diagrams really show how this might work. I don't think rhemes typically deal with the immediate object and immediate interpretant while a dicent typically deals with the dynamic object and dynamic interpretant, and so on. Rather each one will have to account for each of the ten trichotomies. I guess that the idea in, for instance, making a rheme nest in a dicent that way, is to suggest that the dynamic object and/or the dynamic interpretant fulfill the role of filling in the blanks (or new bonding sites), while when a proposition or group of propositions is nested into an argument, the (new?) dynamic object and/or the final interpretant fulfills that role of filling in or new bonding. It seems to me that this is probably wrong. But, if something else was meant to be shown, it would be helpful if some further explanation were offered. Otherwise, I'm missing it. Having said all this, I still very much approve of the original idea. It is simply its explication through the proposed diagrams that I find problematic. -- Franklin - On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 5:14 PM, Franklin Ransom < pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jeff, Gary F, Ben, > > I
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Vol. 2 of Collected Papers, on Induction
Jeff,
Again, just to note in case you didn't see my other post, I thought it
better to move discussion to a more appropriately titled thread, in case
you are interested in responding.
On Fri, Nov 13, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Franklin Ransom <
pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> List,
>
> I think it would be best to move any further discussion to a separate
> thread, since no one is in any way discussing "Vol. 2 of CP, on Induction"
> anymore in this thread. I'm starting a new thread titled "Terms,
> Propositions, Arguments", which I hope is sufficiently vague as a
> description of any further discussion of our issues.
>
> -- Franklin
>
>
> ---------
>
> On Wed, Nov 11, 2015 at 6:30 PM, Franklin Ransom <
> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Gary F, list,
>>
>> I don't find myself entirely convinced of your argument, Gary, but I
>> think I should re-read KS all the way through again before commenting. I am
>> in part resistant because it would seem to change what he had said about
>> the informed depth and informed breadth of propositions in 1893, and
>> because in KS he also makes a point of referencing ULCE when he mentions
>> information and area as applicable, though these ideas were applied to
>> terms, and not propositions, in UCLE, and he does not explain any further
>> in KS how these ideas apply to propositions specifically.
>>
>> -- Franklin
>>
>> On Tue, Nov 10, 2015 at 11:00 AM, wrote:
>>
>>> Franklin, concerning the passage from Kaina Stoicheia (EP2:305), you ask,
>>>
>>> If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them propositions
>>> and not signs?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think the context answers this question. At this early stage in “New
>>> Elements” Peirce is still defining his terms, and he doesn’t arrive at his
>>> “true definition of a proposition” until EP2:307. “It is the
>>> Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium” (EP2:311),
>>> and in part III.2, Peirce is working toward the definition of the
>>> proposition by first defining its “essential” and “substantial” parts (i.e.
>>> predicate and subject), using the general term “sign” rather than the term
>>> which is still undefined at this point, “proposition.” As for breadth and
>>> depth, he can only be referring to the breadth and depth of the
>>> proposition, not of its parts (predicate or subject). A rhema, or term, can
>>> *be* a predicate (or “essential part”) of a sign (namely a
>>> proposition), but it can’t *have* a predicate.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Terms can have breadth and depth, but a predicate only has *potential*
>>> breadth until it’s used in a proposition, and a subject term has only
>>> *potential* depth until it’s actually used to fill in the blanks in a
>>> rhema. As Peirce puts it (EP2:309-10), a word like *man* “is never used
>>> alone, and would have no meaning by itself.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> } The creature that wins against its environment destroys itself. [G.
>>> Bateson] {
>>>
>>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com]
>>> *Sent:* 8-Nov-15 15:27
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary F, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I confess that I am finding myself somewhat confused about this passage
>>> from KS. If he meant specifically propositions, why not call them
>>> propositions and not signs? Then again, he doesn't call them terms either,
>>> so that doesn't help my view either. I'm wondering if there is something
>>> deliberately vague here about what predicates ("essential parts") and
>>> subjects ("substantial parts") apply to.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In the quote from 1893, it's clear that the logical breadth and depth of
>>> propositions is not the same as that of terms from ULCE. But in KS, the way
>>> depth and breadth are presented as relating to characters and real objects
>>> is exactly how they are presented in ULCE when applied to terms. If Peirce
>>> still held to the view that the depth and breadth of propositions had to do
>>> with "the total of fact which it asserts of the state of things to
>>> which it is applied"
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Jerry, I am referencing the diagrams that Jeff attached to his last post, under the subject thread "Vol. 2 of CP, On Induction" and never meant to be saying anything theoretical about diagrams in general.. -- Franklin On Sat, Nov 14, 2015 at 4:05 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > Franklin: > > > > On Nov 14, 2015, at 2:55 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > I understand that the diagrams are an attempt to show how rhemes are > incorporated into dicents, and then how dicents are incorporated into > arguments, and thus to show that just as a rheme can be nested in a dicent > by the filling in of its blank, so a dicent or set of dicents can be nested > in an argument and become part of it by filling in a blank of their own. > > > The concept of a diagram is far wider than what you allude to. > > See: > >- Greaves, M., 2002, *The Philosophical Status of Diagrams*, Stanford: >CSLI Publications. > > > This is an extraordinary book. Places CSP's diagrams is a modern and wider > a logical framework. > > Cheers > > Jerry > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
es, and with the word "so", and so on. In this > self-presenting signification of the sign, the dynamical object is the > sign-class this sign belongs to, and the immediate object is the sign > itself. So the sign is self-referring in the way, that it is its own > immediate object. It has to say: "I am an argument", to be understood as > such. It for instance has to contain a term of conclusion like "so" or > "therefore". So an argument contains a term. This is quite trivial, I have > only mentioned it, as I was thinking of in what manner might an argument > imply a proposition and a term. In the other thread it was about the > question, whether every sign contains inference, yes, because you can tell > eg. that a sign is not an argument, when it is a string of letters without > a spacing. Then it is a word, which cannot be an argument, and this > consideration is a deduction. Phew- as I said, I donot want to cause a > confusion- but I cant help to do, sorry. > Best, > Helmut > > 14. November 2015 um 19:13 Uhr > "Franklin Ransom" wrote: > > Helmut, > > I'm not aware of the three volumes of Pape or what they contain. Looking > it up just now, I see it seems to all be in German? So it's hard for me to > gauge the work. Are these translations of Peirce's papers, or is it > original work by Pape that discusses CSP's philosophy, or both? > > I am not so much trying to suggest reading more before taking part (though > reading more is always good), as I am trying to get a grasp of your > interest in Peirce, and what you've taken time to familiarize yourself with > in his philosophy. I usually find each person has their own way into > Peirce, and then gradually each of us gets to understand the bigger picture > over time and we help each other along with that. I myself came by way of > interest in W James, epistemology, and logic. Please don't feel a need to > read a lot more before participating. > > I'm not sure about the idea of self-representation of a sign. In EP1, > "Grounds for the Validity of Logic", p.74, Peirce concludes that a > proposition cannot imply its own truth. If a sign could represent itself, > this would seem to imply that it could imply its own truth. Besides this, > if I understand Peirce rightly, a sign, in order to be a sign (or for that > matter, for any representation to be a representation), it cannot be the > thing signified or represented. This is the importance of understanding a > sign as a medium between an object and an interpretant that constitutes a > triadic relation. If you should find an example of a sign which perfectly > represents its object in every respect so as to be indistinguishable from > the object, and so see the object as representing itself, I should say that > there is no sign at all, but simply the object. It is part of the logic of > representation that a representation must somehow be unlike what it > represents, because it cannot be the thing itself. A sign which represents > its object completely, perfectly, is no sign at all, but simply the object > itself. To put it another way, if a sign were to represent itself, it would > be its own object. But this is absurd, because it would be no sign at all > then, but simply the thing itself. > > But I might be wrong about this. For instance, in EP2, "New Elements", > p.321, Peirce writes: > > "It is, of course, quite possible for a symbol to represent itself, at > least in the only sense in which a thing that has no *real being* but > only *being represented*, and which exists in *replica*, can be said to > be identical with a real and therefore individual object. A map may be a > map of itself; that is to say one replica of it may be the object mapped. > But this does not make the denotation extraordinarily direct. As an example > of a symbol of that character, we may rather take the symbol which is > expressed in words as "the Truth," or "Universe of Being." Every symbol > whatever must denote what this symbol denotes; so that any symbol > considered as denoting the Truth necessarily denotes that which it denotes; > and in denoting it, it *is* that very thing, or a fragment of it taken > for the whole. It is the whole taken so far as it need be taken for the > purpose of denotation; for denotation essentially takes a part for its > whole." > > Sooo, maybe I'm wrong. But I think what he is saying here is more nuanced > than that a sign can self-represent. Every symbol has replicas, and he is > saying the object represented may itself be considered a replica of the > symbol. This doesn't make it the symbol though. I also think that in this >
Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Helmut, You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you. I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a word of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more complicated or 'higher-level' in understanding than those letters, and much of what is going on there is highly experimental for Peirce. I understand the sentiment to want to jump in right there (I did that myself some years ago), but it's not a good place to begin. The primary benefit of those letters (so it seems to me) is their suggestiveness of ideas. but that's not very helpful if one doesn't have a more basic understanding in place to test. It's sort of like the common layman attempt to talk about abstract theoretical physics without knowing any of the basic ideas of physics, how they're defined, and how calculus applies to them. Many people can't help it, because everyone experiences time and space and such, and so each person thinks they have a sense of the subject matter and can kind of grasp what's being said (no matter how abstract the idea and the real need for understanding the mathematics that goes with it). But really, a layman's understanding is no understanding, and sometimes directly contradicts the truth. I would say it is similar with the semiotics discussed in the letters. We all think about signs and meaning, so we can't help wanting to understand it all right away; but if one isn't well-prepared, it won't be very helpful, and may actually prove harmful, for genuine understanding. Even those early papers I suggested can be challenging (especially "On a New List of Categories)", but at least they're not so experimental as the letters to Welby, and they will make clear certain elementary ideas in Peirce's semiotic, because that is the purpose of those papers. Well, just a word of caution regarding the letters. If you think you can handle it, by all means, have at it. But if you start feeling the need for some rules of navigation to help you out on that open sea, I would just suggest the same papers I already have. If you would like to discuss any of them in a thread, I'll be happy to participate, with the exception of the letters to Welby; I learned the hard way to avoid those for now. -- Franklin On Sun, Nov 15, 2015 at 3:26 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > Franklin, > thank you. Yes, it was very helpful, and a bit shocking for me to see, how > many things I have been misunderstanding. My line of misunderstandings was > based on not knowing, that the immediate object is about the sign itself > too, as you have written. I will have to read more before taking part on > this list. Beside the papers you have recommended, Letters to Lady Welby > are good for me, I think, because there are many examples given. > Best, > Helmut > > 14. November 2015 um 23:52 Uhr > "Franklin Ransom" > > Helmut, > > I'm not familiar with those volumes, and when looking around I was unable > to locate an English equivalent by Kloesel. Yes, I agree, the Collected > Papers are expensive; I was fortunate to get them from Intelex before they > stopped selling them to individuals. There is also a copy of the CP going > around in an electronic version on the internet. I got a copy of that for > under $3. It's not the best way, because images are lacking, which is very > unfortunate for Vol.4 especially, and then also many symbols aren't > portrayed well. Still, not bad for the price that I found it at. The > commens is certainly helpful. The Guide for the Perplexed is secondary > literature. I'm not familiar with Noth or Ort. > > If you are inclined, I would suggest Essential Peirce, vol. 1 and 2 (there > are only those two volumes). Also, it is a good idea to keep in mind that > if you visit cspeirce.com, you will find at the top of the home page a > link to writings by Peirce that have been made available online. I myself > usually go there to reference the ULCE paper. If you have not had a chance > to read the following papers yet, I highly recommend "The Fixation of > Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear". "On a New List of Categories" is > important for deeper understanding. Probably "Questions Concerning Certain > Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities" > would be good. I don't think these are writings that would typically be > thrown in with semiotics (except for "On a New List"), but they are > invaluable for understanding the basic perspective and understanding that > Peirce brings to his theory of semiotic. > > Now with respect to your substantive remarks, I think there are a number > of things to say. &g
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Helmut, To clarify the point about common knowledge and the dynamical object: The idea there is that in order to understand a sign, we need some sort of collateral information, which means we need to have had some experience of the things being signified. To put it more plainly, we need to have had some sort of experience of the dynamical object in order to understand what the sign signifies. In some cases, we can do this indirectly through experience of other objects related to the dynamical object. Knowledge itself won't be the dynamical object, but when we consider the information we have and try to interpret it, we will look to the informed breadth, or the facts of all the real objects we have experienced, in order to determine the dynamical object being signified. This is important for the index, which is supposed to point out the object.Sometimes, we are not in a position to interpret the index because we have not experienced the object and have no indirect experience of it through objects already experienced. When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the collateral information--or common knowledge--that is required to accurately interpret the index. Otherwise, the index points, be we don't understand. If we were talking about a symbol, it would be different, because a symbol cannot be a symbol unless it is interpreted as such. But an index will be an index regardless of whether or not it is ever interpreted; it simply requires some sort of physical connection with the object it denotes or points to. So for instance, a disease has symptoms that are expressed by the human body. But if we have never experienced a given disease before, we don't know how to interpret the symptoms; perhaps the symptoms seem to be normal at first, such as an occasional dry cough. Only later do we realize the symptoms were significant of something more, and that they pointed to something we hadn't experienced before, because we see the result later through new symptoms that have pointed to other diseases in our previous experience, or someone who has experienced the disease before recognizes the symptoms and communicates to us that there is a disease. Through this collateral information, we come to grasp that we are dealing with a disease, and now recognize the symptoms as pointing to it. Another case is when we ask for directions to a place we have never been before. In order to understand the dynamical object, i.e. the place signified, we have to understand it indirectly through other places we have been before. The giving of directions will typically refer to the kinds of objects we have experienced before, like certain kinds of landmarks and signs. So our collateral information, or common knowledge, gives us an indirect experience of the place by its connection with other objects, like certain kinds of landmarks and signs, that we have experienced before, and when we come upon those landmarks and signs, we will understand their physical connection to the place. And that understanding will begin with the giving of directions, which references one's starting point as having certain physical connections to follow to those landmarks and signs, that will in turn lead to the place. Once we have visited the place, it will now be a part of the real objects we have experienced; and when we learn new information about the place, we will now have the direct collateral experience or information to understand which object the new information is about. To put the point more generally, there are all manner of physical connections in nature. But we are not in a position to understand each and every one of those connections, because there are many things we have not experienced. As we gain experience of more things, we become able to interpret physical connections we were not able to before. And this is not true of us simply as individual interpreters, but as a community of inquiry, or scientific community. -- Franklin --- On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:28 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Franklin, > right! For example, the idea, that a common knowledge can be a dynamical > object I had thought to have gotten from a letter to Lady Welby. My idea of > self-refering sign, I think, comes from aspects of other theories, like > autopoiesis, re-entry, and so on. And to find this aspect subsumed under > the idea of the immediate object, whose function I have been understanding > as another... well, not start again. See you later, and thank you very much > for your friendly counseling! > Best, > Helmut > 15. November 2015 um 23:55 Uhr > "Franklin Ransom" wrote: > > Helmut, > > You're welcome, and I'm glad it was so helpful to you. > > I wish you the best of luck with the letters to Welby, and I express a > word of caution regarding them. It probably doesn't get more compl
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Helmut, The unicorn issue is one that I am uncertain about. There's not much more to say about it at this point, as I don't recall what CSP had to say about such things, and I haven't put much thought into it with respect to the semiotic point of view. One thing I could mention is that Peirce distinguished between natural classes and artificial classes, and I think it is safe to say that unicorn is an artificial class. This leaves in doubt whether there is any genuine information about it, or whether there is a dynamical object. I don't really like the suggestion that there is no dynamical object in this case, but I suppose it's something to consider. In any case, it is possible to have logical quantity--intension and extension--without it being informed logical quantity. To be candid with you though, these are just some stray thoughts, and I don't have a considered answer at this time. It's quite possible that Peirce gave a considered answer, but I don't recall it at this time. The argument becoming a proposition when understood or believed is an idea that might be worth considering. I wouldn't exactly say that it becomes a proposition. It has already been mentioned in recent discussions in the recent discussion on the list that an argument can be considered as a proposition, and how that would work. Whether there is some special consideration with respect to the argument becoming understood or believed, I remain hesitant to say. I'm not sure what you meant about the "level of source of collateral information" and how it relates to the definition of the dynamical object, or the possible connection with the final interpretant. -- Franklin - On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 2:43 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > > Supplement: Please dont care too much about my below text, I think I have > confused the dynamical object with the final interpretant, besides many > other things with each other. > Franklin, > I remember having had the wrong idea, that some signs donot have a > dynamical object, and have mentioned the example of a unicorn, and then > Clark Goble wrote, that in the unicorn-case the dynamical object is the > concept of unicorn, that exists (if I remember it correctly). Of course, > this is neither a knowledge about unicorns, nor a belief in them, at least > not nowadays, but a character in myths and fairytales, or something like > that. Maybe we can call it an intension without an extension. But an > intension of an existing extension may also be wrong, for example, people > thought that all storks were white, before black ones were spotted in > Australia. Or, that electrons circle around atom cores, before orbitals of > the form of double-clubs were depicted. So it is hard to decide, I thought, > whether the dynamical object is a character in a myth, or an affair in real > nature. Or maybe, it is both? When a physicist, who is well-skilled about > aerodynamics, hears the argument: "Penguins have very small wings, so they > cannot fly", maybe the dynamical object is rather the real affair in > nature. But when a child who has just gotten able to speak, hears this > argument, then for this child the dynamical object may either be a > knowledge, grown-ups have (in this case, for the child, maybe it is not an > argument, but a proposition? Does an argument, once it is understood or > even just believed, become a proposition?-On-Topic!), or this is the > immediate object, and the affair in nature the dynamic. But this topic is > easily getting complicated: What, if a grown- up tells a child, that > electrons circle around atom cores, that all storks are white, or that > there is a father christmas? It is about collateral information. But at > which level of source of collateral information does the definition of the > dynamical object stop? If there was not a stop, it would not be the > dynamical object, but the final interpretant, isnt it? Or the answer might > be: The dynamical object is an affair in real nature, and if it is a > character in a myth, then this character and this myth is the affair in > real nature. I think, all this is very difficult, please donot feel obliged > to answer all this, I think, it is my turn now, to try to understand it by > reading some more papers. Lest you like this topic, and think, that it is > good also for everybody else in this list. > Best, > Helmut > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Sungchul, list, First of all, I want to point out that in the post I am replying to, it said "Franklin, lists", but it turns out the email was only sent to one list, Peirce-L. At least, that's what I see. Just thought I'd point that out. Second of all, I think I should be perfectly frank with you, Sungchul. Your reply to me seems to be on topic and just the sort of thing that I am inclined to consider and respond to. But, I have seen many, many of your posts, and almost always I simply move on as soon I see that it is from you. I have noted from reading previous discussions you have had on the list that you seem to have a couple of problems. One is that you haven't really read much of Peirce, and don't seem inclined to correct this problem. The other is that you have a funny way of constantly quoting yourself, and have a habit of adding attachments to your posts. I don't know if you have changed your ways and actually dug into some of Peirce's texts; if you have, great, and you can disregard what I have said about that. I just want to be perfectly clear and open here with you: If I sense that what you have to say is the result of willful ignorance on your part by choosing to not read Peirce, I will not reply. If you start adding quotes from previous posts of yours from years ago, I will not reply (which means, of course, if you do it again, I will not reply). If you start adding attachments, I will not reply. I don't want to be rude, but I'm not here to discuss the philosophy of Sungchul. I'm here to engage in meaningful dialogue with others who have a sincere interest in Peirce's philosophy. So long as I observe that to be in evidence, I will be more than happy to discourse with you. Moving on... I don't really like these two lines: Sinsign = "A sinsign may be index or icon. As index it is 'a sign which > would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were > removed, but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant." > > Legisign = "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign > if there were no interpretant." My problem is that I am given to understand that Peirce wanted to use the term 'interpretant' to cover the possibility that a sign might not be interpreted. So the idea is that even if the sign were not actually being interpreted at just this moment, it would still have an interpretant. I can only guess that you got your quotes from Peirce, somewhere, somehow, although you don't mention specifically where. All I can say is that sometimes Peirce says things that I find upsetting, and this is one of those cases. I maintain the view that the interpretant is there, regardless of whether the sign is interpreted or not. There is no sign that does not have an interpretant. In the case of a symbol needing to be interpreted, I would say that so long as a symbol has been interpreted, it does not need to be interpreted at just this moment in order to have an interpretant. It is enough that the symbol has already been interpreted and has the real possibility of being interpreted again. I find your distinction between elementary and composite signs unfortunate and undesirable. The nine 'elements', as you identify them, are not signs in their own right. When we discuss a sign from the point of view of the determination of a particular trichotomy, it is because it is not important to consider other aspects of the sign class for the purpose of a given analysis. If there were 'elementary' signs, it would probably have to be those signs which other signs require in order to allow them to signify, as when rhematic icons and rhematic indices are required by a dicentic symbol (a proposition) in order to signify at all. This might be somewhat misleading though, since as Stjernfelt points out in Natural Propositions (p.77-78) with respect to terms, propositions, and arguments, a 'compositional' theory of signs is probably counter to what Peirce had in mind. Now as for the confining of the discussion, I disagree. So far as I see it, the issue of the presentative aspect of the sign is not at issue. Would it be possible to have a finer grained discussion if we discussed the ten classes? Certainly. It would also be possible to have an even finer grained discussion if we discussed the sixty-six classes. But what's the point? I don't see it. If you think there is a point to discussing the matter in such detail, then it is up to you to show the relevance of the finer points introduced by considering the ten classes. If you can do that, I would certainly be thankful. But I have only so much intellectual effort I can expend, and I'd rather not waste my time and effort unless a consideration is given that shows it is not a waste of time. -- Franklin -- On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 3:15 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > Franklin, lists, > > You wrote: > > "When we do successfully interpret an index, it is because we have the > collateral i
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
pler signs; and if you don't mind, would you please be so kind as to offer a page reference for me that makes the point? > In the “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations” (1903) Peirce > defines a “sign” as “a representamen of which some interpretant is a > cognition of a mind.” FR: I'm not sure what the point was of quoting the definition of a sign as "a representamen of which some interpretant is a cognition of a mind." > Then in 1909 he writes that: > “The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the > nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living > intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as > of the knowledge of such reality. It is the *entelechy*, or perfection of > being” (CP 6.341, 1909). > What kind of sign joins a predicate to a subject? Do we really want to say > that all signs do that, or that “terms” do that? FR: The kind of sign that joins a predicate to a subject is pretty clearly the proposition. I have no argument with that. But observe that the sign that is a predicate of another sign, does not require that it be attributed to that other sign in order to be its predicate, according to the passage that we are discussing; likewise for a subject. Moreover, just because a proposition is the kind of sign that attributes a predicate to a subject, that does not make it any less true that a term can have something predicated of it, or that it can have subjects of which it is predicated (and thus have subjects). A proposition simply makes explicit the process by which this happens. I want to make sure to state that I do not think propositions and terms are the same thing. I have concerns about what he said in KS in comparison to statements made elsewhere regarding the logical quantities and information, and I am attempting to make sense of it all in a way that, well, makes sense. I have to admit some lasting concern about what he has had to say about signs and predicates and subjects. You have been arguing strenuously that by signs he means propositions, but I would very much prefer to believe it did not refer to propositions at all, because this would contradict what he said in 1893, and I found that statement highly suggestive. At the same time, after putting a lot of thought into this reply, I have to admit that I can't deny a proposition must denote and signify, and consequently must have predicate and subject in the sense in which they are discussed in the passage. In fact, it is hard to see how any sign could have no object or signify nothing about the object, in virtue of being a sign. I guess this just amounts to the conclusion that yes, Peirce meant to apply the statements to every sign, whatsoever. -- Franklin ------- On Mon, Nov 16, 2015 at 10:42 AM, wrote: > Franklin, my responses inserted below. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 13-Nov-15 15:02 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 > *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments > > > > Gary F, list, > > > > Seeing as how discussion has gotten far away from "Vol.2 of CP, on > Induction," I feel it is best to change the subject, and thus the thread, > of the discussion. Hopefully the subject is sufficiently vague. > > > > I have re-read KS through. With respect to Peirce's use of the word "sign" > instead of "proposition" in the paragraph at issue, I still think that > Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply propositions. > > GF: In the paragraph at issue, Peirce is clearly *defining* two kinds of > signs as parts of other signs: “If a sign, *B*, only signifies characters > that are elements (or the whole) of the meaning of another sign, *A*, > then *B* is said to be a *predicate* (or *essential part*) of *A*. If a > sign, *A*, only denotes real objects that are a part or the whole of the > objects denoted by another sign, *B*, then *A* is said to be a *subject* > (or *substantial part*) of *B*.” Do you not agree that these are > definitions of *predicate* and *subject*? > > > > Peirce then proceeds to define *depth* and *breadth* in terms of > predicates and subjects: > > “The totality of the predicates of a sign, and also the totality of the > characters it signifies, are indifferently each called its logical *depth*. > … The totality of the subjects, and also, indifferently, the totality of > the real objects of a sign is called the logical *breadth*.” Now, when > you say that “Peirce was deliberately including all signs, and not simply > propositions”, are you claiming that all signs have depth and breadth? > According to Peirce’s definition here, a sign can have dept
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Jeff, list, Thank you for taking the time to look at the two diagrams that were > attached to the email. The diagrams are, of course, quite incomplete. > There are a large number of divisions that need to be considered, and the > labels on the diagrams I've offered only contain underdeveloped suggestions > about how we might understand a relatively small number of the different > classes of signs/. Oh, certainly. The task is really monumental, and you have my sympathy and support with trying to get it all worked out. My purpose in offering those diagrams (which are just working notes) was to > ask how the relations between sign-object-interpretant at one level of > cognition are related to those at another higher level of cognition. As > such, I asked how the relations between the percept, qualisign and > immediate interpretant on the left part of the diagram fit with the > relations between the sinsign, dynamical object and dynamical interpretant > in the middle, and I then ask the same kind of question about the relations > between legisign, dynamical object and final interpretant on the right. I'm not entirely sure what you mean by 'higher' level of cognition. Do you mean a cognition, more fully developed? Or do you mean two cognitions occurring at the same time, in which the lower one somehow is serving or participating in the higher one? I wonder about that because of the way you split things up. I am somewhat curious about it and why you did it the way you did. But then I see you go on to remark about that. In doing so, was trying to ask the following question: When an > interpretant at a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level, > is it only the interpretant that is functioning as the sign, or is it the > whole complex of sign-object-interpretant that is serving the function of > the sign? One reason I have for thinking that it can be the latter is that > the interpretant itself involves the triadic relation between its object > and the sign it is interpreting. As such, if only the interpretant is > serving as the sign at the next higher level, then we are leaving out of > the picture an essential part of what makes the interpretant the kind of > thing it is. This is tricky. We know that the (original) sign is supposed to determine the interpreter to be determined in such a way as to be in relation to the object in the way in which the sign is itself determined by the object. So there is a question there: If the interpreter becomes so determined, is there any necessity for the original sign now? Since the interpreter (new sign) is determined to the object in the same way the original sign was, perhaps this is enough, and the interpreter doesn't need the original sign. To take an example for explaining this, we could consider how often we hear arguments in favor of a certain conclusion, the conclusion becomes adopted, we now act upon that conclusion as a proposition believed, but then we forget about the arguments that originally brought us to this believed proposition. Also consider the case of perceptual judgment. Typically, we just won't remember all the various percepts that determined the judgment in us; we just remember the judgment. It simplifies things, and it's supposed to, because such simplification facilitates the work of thought, and consequently action. Now, I take it you are suggesting that from the standpoint of conscious awareness, this might all be true; but really, the original signs never go away. That might be a tough argument to make. Could you come up with some examples that make this case seem likely? I could see one making an argument from continuity, perhaps. Perhaps. It's not clear to me. Going back to the point about the "interpretant at a lower level is made the sign for the next higher level," I'm still not sure what this amounts to. I would think this means the fuller development of a cognition. But, when I observe your diagrams, and your remarks above regarding the diagrams, I feel as though something else is going on. I don't understand why you think there are these three triads, in which one is contained in the other, and the other in the last, or what this has to do with the interpretant still having the original sign as part of the interpretant's functioning as its own sign. If I were to hazard a guess, the immediate interpretant becomes a sign with a dynamic interpretant, and then then the dynamic interpretant becomes a sign with a final interpretant. But because, as you suggest, the interpretant must involve the whole previous sign-object-interpretant relation, it's not simply the immediate interpretant, but the whole thing, that becomes the sign with a dynamic interpretant, and then not just the dynamic interpretant, but the whole relation yet again, which becomes the sign with a final interpretant. So far as I can tell, this is what you are up to, from the diagram and what you just remarked about it. Well, what I have to say to t
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Jeff, list, Jeff, you asked: What does this tell us about the way the different kinds of > sign-object-interpretant triads might be related as parts of a larger > semiotic process of interpretation? I believe I ascertain the point of the question. Let me explain it as I understand it, to ensure we are on the same page here. It comes down essentially to the idea that, rather than ideas being originally presented separate and then being brought together by the mind, something is presented which in itself has no parts, but which is nevertheless analyzed into separate ideas, and thereafter synthesis occurs between the separated ideas when we think over them. So, there is a step that occurs first that Kant doesn't recognize, namely the original presentation of something and its separation into different ideas by analysis. I take it to mean that given Peirce's idea, we don't begin with the manifold of sense impressions as Kant averred. Perhaps it is the perceptual judgment that we begin with, and then analyze into separate ideas? Or perhaps you want to suggest it is the percipuum that we begin with and separate into percept and perceptual judgment? Well, if you have something to say about that, I'm all ears. Let's get to the point about the triads and their role in the larger semiotic process. You think of how Kant's account of representations combined in synthetic judgments relates to semiosis. Since there is the difference mentioned above between Kant's view and Peirce's view, we should consider that rather than, say, semiosis being something that occurs by beginning with separate ideas and producing a synthesis from them, it begins with something which is then separated into ideas or parts, and thereafter synthesis (or interpretation?) occurs. Perhaps, however, we could still take into consideration Kant's three levels of cognition: the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, synthesis of reproduction in imagination, and the synthesis of recognition in the concept. These will be understood a little differently in Peirce's semiotic, but something like that is taking place. So, as a first brush on it, we could say the first triad, sign-immediate object-immediate interpretant, has to do with the synthesis of apprehension in intuition. This synthesis having been accomplished, the result contributes to the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, which involves the second triad, the sign-dynamical object-dynamical interpretant. Then this second synthesis having been accomplished, the result contributes to the synthesis of recognition in the concept, which works out the third triad, sign-dynamical object-final interpretant. Given this process, it becomes clearer what you mean by 'higher levels of cognition' because the second synthesis is higher than the first and the third higher than both. Interestingly, there is a likeness between the relations of these syntheses to how Peirce's three categories relate to each other, and we should not find it surprising that of the three triads you discuss, the first seems to have to do with Firstness in the semiotic process, the second triad seems to have to do with Secondness, and the third triad seems to have to do with Thirdness. So not surprisingly, the first triad is discussed as a qualisign and a rheme, the second triad as a sinsign and dicent, and the third triad as legisign and argument. Now, I said at first brush. On further reflection, perhaps we shouldn't consider each synthesis in just the way Kant identified them, especially since we begin with something that is then analyzed into parts, prior to any synthesis, contra Kant's view. How to understand this? One possibility is that we begin with the semiotic process as a whole, considered from the ten-trichotomy approach. We begin, then, not with the rheme, but the argument. From the argument, we can analyze it into parts, which gives us the dicent (or dicents), and from there we can analyze the dicent(s) into rhemes. Having analyzed into parts, we can now consider the three-level synthesis that took place to deliver us the highest level of cognition, the semiotic process as argument. Another possibility is that you think of the first triad as what is originally given, it is analyzed into parts--sign, immediate object, immediate interpretant--and then synthesis occurs with the parts of other first triads, such that we get to the second triad. The second triad also appears as something, and then is differentiated into parts--sign, dynamic object, dynamic interpretant--and the parts are synthesized with parts from other second triads to get to the third triad. And then this third triad appears as something, which is then differentiated into parts--sign, dynamic object, final interpretant--that can by synthesized with parts of other signs, which is not hard to see because an argument can be interpreted as a proposition in a larger argument. Perhaps you want to consider both of the possibilities I have supposed.
Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Jeff, list, > > Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title. I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy". Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post: Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902 and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just thought I'd ask. I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend. -- Franklin Franklin, List, Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your earlier questions wasn't sent. Let me send it now, along with some additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum." Your questions are in quotes. Short responses follow. A. "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such." Point made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce: "That said, let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In all cases, the divisions are between kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes. Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant. In my efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and 66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict here. After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis. B. "A second thing I noticed is the somewhat questionable example used for the second triad, in which we have the percept, percipuum, and perceptual judgment." I should have made it clearer that I was trying to point out that the percipuum that is immediate interpretant of the qualisign is, taken as a token instance, the sinsign that stands in relation to the dynamical interpretant. The curved line was meant to show that it is carried over--along with its relation to qualisign and immediate object (percept) into the open blank. C. A third thing that I wonder about is the immediate interpretant in the first triad, and in particular I mean the identification of it as a schema in imagination. Now I'm going to guess that I'm simply ignorant here, and something Peirce says is probably the reason for this identification, but I thought a schema was essentially a diagram. If I'm right about this, than it would be identified not based on the immediate interpretant but through a mix of G, D, and probably some other relation." There are diagrams at work in many places. In the case of the immediate interpretant in relation to the antecept, it is a vague diagram of future possibilities. In relation to the ponecept, it is a diagram of past memories of those qualities we notice in the qualisign. The immediate interpretant of the percept is a limiting case of what I actually see now--as that is interpreted in relation to the near past and present. As such, it is a skeleton set of skeleton sets (i.e., a diagram of diagrams). I have reasons for thinking that this way of diagramming the basic relations between signs, objects and interpretant is a reasonable approach--and that is more enlightening than other kinds of diagrams that have been offered in the secondary literature. That, however, will require a longer explanation. With that much said, let's turn to the interpretation of the term "percipuum." Here are the definitions of the Latin terms: 1. Praecipio: to advise, give counse
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Jon, Yes, I agree, even though I haven't read through it. It was my plan to be getting to Vol. 3, which includes the LOR, next. Then after starting Vol. 3, I decided reading precursors like Boole and De Morgan would be a good idea. Anyway, I've been sidetracked for the moment with conversations on Peirce-L. With respect to Jeff's ideas, I'd like to offer as much as I can to thought for now, before I get back to my reading. -- Franklin On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 9:36 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Re: http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17582 > Re: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/17626 > > Franklin, Jeff, all ... > > In order to understand what Peirce is saying one has to understand > what he is talking about. When it comes to the logic of relatives > and the mathematics of relations, my personal recommendation for > the best place to start would be the 1870 Logic of Relatives. > There Peirce is writing for people who already inhabit the > space he is talking about and his task reduces to that of > giving them better maps and microscopes and telescopes > for exploring and describing the territory in view. > That is by no means an insignificant assignment but > it's still more tractable than starting from zip. > > My study of the 1870 LOR, as far as I've got for now, is here: > > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce's_1870_Logic_Of_Relatives > > Regards, > > Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
ure and division of dyadic and triadic > relations (1903) > 11. Telepathy (1903, CP 7.597-688) > 12. "Consciousness" from "Some Logical Prolegomena", in "On Topical > Geometry, In General" (CP 7.524-558) > > A.B. Kempe on the mathematical theory of relations : > a. 1886 A Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form > b. 1887 Note to a Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form > c. 1889-90 “On the Relation between the Logical Theory of Classes and the > Geometrical Theory of Points” > d. 1890 “The Subject Matter of Exact Thought” > e. 1894 “Mathematics” > f. 1897 “The Theory of Mathematical Form. A Correction and Explanation” > > Peirce’s notes and responses to Kempe > g. Notes on Kempe 1889-90 (MS 1584) > h. Notes on Kempe’s Paper in Vol XXI… (MS 709)(undated) > i. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MS 710: 2-8) > j. Notes on Kempe’s Paper (MSS 711: 2-5, 712: 2, 712s :2-3; 713:2-3) > k. Notes on Kempe’s Paper on Mathematical Form (MS 714) > l. Reply to Mr. Kempe” (MS 708: 2-19) > m. Notes on “A.B. Kempe, ‘On the Relation Between the Logical Theory of > Classes and the Geometrical Theory of Point’” (MS 1584: 17-24) > n. Annotations in his copy of Kempe 1886. > > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > > From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, November 17, 2015 11:58 PM > To: PEIRCE-L > Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8945] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, > Arguments > > Jeff, list, > > Well, I guess this proves that just because it has the same title as a > thread already underway, that doesn't mean the post will end up in that > thread. I've brought it back to the main thread with the subject title. > > I don't have anything substantive to say at this time. I think I will need > to spend some time thinking about what you've had to say Jeff, taking in > your last two posts. Perhaps I really should take a look at "On Telepathy". > Actually, that brings me to a question I had meant to ask in my last post: > Would you be willing to offer some references for the works from 1896-1902 > and others that you have been drawing from, with respect to relations? In > particular, you had said "I'm trying to pay particular attention to the > details of what he says about the way relations are formed between other > relations in the essays (written circa 1896-1902) leading up to the more > extended discussions of phenomenology in 1903." If not, that's fine, just > thought I'd ask. > > I'll try to get a substantive response in no later than this weekend. > > -- Franklin > > > > Franklin, List, > > Looking back, I now see that a response that was written to some of your > earlier questions wasn't sent. Let me send it now, along with some > additional thoughts about the meaning of the term "percipuum." Your > questions are in quotes. Short responses follow. > > A. "One thing I noticed in the first attachment is that the immediate > object is, in brackets, identified as a rheme, and the dynamic interpretant > is identified in brackets as a dicent, even though rhemes and dicents > belong to I. Relation of Sign to Final Interpretant, and not to B or E. I > suppose the particular examples taken are meant to be the rheme and dicent, > but it is a little confusing that they are identified as such." Point > made. I was trying to clarify the following claim by Peirce: "That said, > let us go back and ask this question: How is it that the Percept, which is > a Seme (i.e., a rheme), has for its direct Dynamical Interpretant the > Perceptual Judgment, which is a Pheme? For that is not the usual way with > Semes, certainly." (CP 4.540)In all cases, the divisions are between > kinds of signs, so I was not trying to suggest that the either the > immediate object or the dynamical objects are, in themselves, rhemes. > Rather, I was suggesting that the qualisign in its relation to a percept > that is an immediate object is a rheme under the 10-fold > classification--even though the classification of rhemes onthe 66-fold > account is based on the relation of sign to final interpretant. In my > efforts to sort these little discrepancies out (between the 10-fold and > 66-fold divisions), I've come to the conclusions that there is no conflict > here. After all, the sign-immediate object--immediate interpretant triad > is really understood to be a part of the larger sign-dynamical object-final > interpretant triad that we have separated out for the purposes of analysis. > > B. "A second
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific
James, list,
James, welcome to the list.
James wrote:
Peirce's non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian and
> Aristotelian First Principles
I should probably understand this point better, but I am wondering whether
this point might be further explained. In the case of Cartesian first
principles, we use extreme doubt to get all the way to these principles,
and then from them work out and justify the rest of all that is understood.
I find that Peirce indeed rejects this. In the case of Aristotelian first
principles, we certainly do not use extreme doubt, but work through a
variety of considerations that ultimately lead us to first principles, not
in the sense of principles which come first in understanding, but in
nature. So there is this line from Aristotle to the effect that we reason
from what is better known to us to what is better known to nature. After
having gotten to such first principles, we can understand nature better. I
am not so sure I find Peirce rejecting this. I'm sure that Peirce would
want to add that there needs to be experimentation to really put the
principles to the test. but as far as observation and deduction goes, I
find Peirce mostly in agreement with Aristotle's point of view. Perhaps I
have misunderstood what Aristotle is about, or why Peirce would have had
some important issue to take with Aristotle, other than the need for
experimentation?
Also, James wrote:
Scientific method for Peirce amounts to devising strategies for this to
> happen in the most serendipidous way - hence the logic of abduction.
I don't find that it makes sense to say that one devises a strategy for
something to happen with something happening in a serendipitous way,
Serendipity is really about some chance occasion that turns out fortunate.
Devising a strategy, in Peirce's logic of science, is something that
involves the selection of hypotheses for testing. We might say that
abduction as an inference is itself serendipitous, although I think that
there is some truth to the idea that continued observation will inevitably
result in the development of better abductions. With respect to scientific
method though, it is certainly not serendipitous, but aimed at the
strategic selection of given hypotheses according to the principles of the
economy of research, and would include deduction and induction. Hopefully
the result of the method doesn't lead us to simply hope for a serendipitous
result. Another way of putting it is that Peirce never really suggests how
we can devise strategies to come up with better abductions, only strategies
of what we can do once we have hypotheses to consider.
I myself am interested in the idea of developing strategies for inducing
better abductions, but I haven't found Peirce so interested. For him, it
seems that an abductive inference is simply uncontrolled, and we can only
begin controlled inquiry once we have already a hypothesis delivered from
an abductive inference. Perhaps he would admit that psychology could
discover something more about how we come up with the abductions that we
do. That is to say, that we come up with abductions is the purview of
logic, but why we come up with specific ones, and that some are more common
than others in human inquirers, might be something that psychology could
study. For instance, when unconscious social prejudices affect the kinds of
guesses we're prepared to make in a given social context.
-- Franklin
P.S. -- I too hope for a positive prognosis and speedy recovery for John.
--
On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 3:36 PM, James Crombie wrote:
> If rationalism is the view that the real is what-can-be-thought, then the
> arch-rationalist is Parmenides. I would agree that Descartes is a
> foundationalist rationalist - and opine that Peirce is a
> non-foundationalist rationalist - and also a non-foundationalist
> empiricist. Peirce holds that the real is definitely what-can-be-thought -
> or at least a subset of what can be thought. But Peirce also holds that
> under the influence of experience we can change what we think. Scientific
> method for Peirce amounts to devising strategies for this to happen in the
> most serendipidous way - hence the logic of abduction. Peirce's
> non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian and
> Aristotelian First Principles - and in his simultaneous rejection of
> empiricist First Sensations. See the end of Section IV in "The Fixation of
> Belief". Non-foundationalism ("no first cognition") and fallibilism go
> together very nicely.
>
> Greetings from Nova Scotia!
>
> James Crombie
>
-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Terms, Propositions, Arguments
Gary, Jeff, list, I see that the thread count got to 100, so I suppose this is why the thread (in my email account, anyway) seems to have moved over to the one started by Jeff (accidentally?) awhile ago. I would have thought a new 100 count would have started rather than the mail move to a similarly named thread that hadn't reached 100 yet. Somewhat bizarre really. With respect to the nomenclature and divisions of triadic relations, I was certainly aware that terms, propositions, and arguments are all symbols; I thought I had mentioned that at some point, maybe not. I tend to reference Liszka's book, "A General Introduction to the Semeiotic of Charles S. Peirce", which makes it easier for me to pay attention to that kind of detail. It's a fine book, especially for speculative grammar, though not so much for logical critic. Anyway, that quote and the info from Turrisi is certainly interesting, Gary. It does help somewhat, with respect to propositions. In the case of arguments, I'm not sure. Perhaps, since an argument could be considered a conditional proposition, and it could be supposed there is a conditional proposition which includes within itself two other conditional propositions as its predicate and subject, that in such a case arguments could be considered as terms. Of course, this would mean that propositions and arguments could be referred to as predicates or subjects. I'm not sure how I feel about that, and whether it would make sense to consider them as such with respect to logical quantities of characters and real objects, or whether it would make more sense with respect to what Peirce says in 1893 about the informed depth and breadth of propositions and arguments. -- Franklin On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 1:28 PM, wrote: > Jeff, Franklin, list, > > > > I haven’t had time to follow this thread in all its detail, but have come > across a couple of things that may be of use to it. > > > > In his first Harvard Lecture of 1903, Peirce introduced a new definition > of pragmatism: > > “Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible > in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose > only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a > corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having > its apodosis in the imperative mood.” Turrisi, in her edition of the > Harvard lectures, provides a note on this (p. 257) which throws some light > on the relationship between “terms” and propositions: > > > > [[*Apodosis* is, in the most conventional, contemporary sense, according > to Webster, the clause expressing the conclusion or result in a conditional > sentence, as distinguished from *protasis*, the clause that expresses the > condition in a conditional sentence. The *Oxford English Dictionary* > defines apodosis as “the concluding clause of a sentence, as contrasted > with the introductory clause, or *protasis*; now usually restricted to > the consequent clause in a conditional sentence as ‘If thine enemy hunger, > *feed > him*’.” It is important to remember that the “clause” which has evolved > in modern definitions as the grammatical form of *apodosis* was > understood initially as a “term” which was itself an entire proposition. > Richard Whateley, whom Peirce professed to have read in one sitting at the > age of twelve, discussed conditional propositions in his *Elements of > Logic*, saying, “we must consider every Conditional Proposition a > universal affirmative categorical Proposition, of which the Terms are > entire Propositions, viz., the antecedent answering to the *Subject* and > the consequent to the *Predicate*, e.g., to say “if Louis is a good king, > France is likely to prosper,” is equivalent to saying, “the case of Louis > being a good king, is a case of France being likely to prosper.” It is more > useful to think of “apodosis” in this way, as a categorical proposition of > a universal kind, as in Whateley. And it is more consonant with the meaning > of pragmatism which Peirce engenders insofar as pragmatism is a device of > logic.]] > > > > This might help to explain Peirce’s 1893 statement that every proposition > and every argument can be regarded as a term. > > > > If we move on to the ten sign types defined in Peirce’s “Nomenclature and > Divisions of Triadic Relations,” we find that the Tenth is the Argument, > the Ninth is the Proposition (i.e. the Dicent Symbol), and the Eighth, the > Rhematic Symbol, “either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a > General Term” (EP2:295). So term, proposition and argument are all symbols, > the difference among them being that the term is a Rheme, the proposition a > Dicisign, and the argument of course an Argument. > > > > Perhaps you were already aware of all this, but at least it helps to clear > up my own confusion. > > > > Gary f. > > > > } Our knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a > continuum of uncertainty and of indeter
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific
> > Thanks for the reply. > > First principles that we have to "work through a variety of considerations > to reach" are not the kind of first principles Peirce is rejecting - > although, like you, I don't pretend to speak with much authority on how to > accurately characterize Aristotle's actual position on this matter. I > grant you that Peirce often expresses sympathy with Aristotle's approaches. > > As for Descartes, we might say that he also "work[s] through a variety of > considerations" - but with a view to showing that we don't, in the end, > have to work through them since, as it turns out, on Descartes' view, the > clear and distinct deliverances of consciousness are the ultimate arbiter. > They are also examples of the kind of "first cognition" which Peirce rules > out. Peirce also rules out, on my view, anything resembling uninterpreted > sense data as the "foundation" of anything. > > There is no foundation, on Peirce's view (as I understand it), which we > can identify as the justification of our beliefs by tracing our beliefs > back to them. The Peircean truth-criterion looks forward and not backward. > > I agree with you that Peirce devotes considerable attention to how to > (deliberately) choose which abductive conclusions to investigate first. He > also - perhaps it's in the "Law of Mind" series - speculates that it's > because the mind is a historical product of the evolution of the universe > that it tends to produce abductive guesses much closer to the ultimate > truth than mere chance would account for. > > My use of 'serendipidous' was motivated by a reflection on Peirce's > definition of the scientific method in "The Fixation of Belief" - which is > perhaps not yet as clearly developed as it could be. The scientific method > is there described as a method which consists of allowing Reality to affect > the content of our opinions. To this we may object that our opinions are > always and invariably affected by the real conditions in which they emerge, > so that this definition does not tell us what is distinctive about the > scientific method. What we are talking about, then, is a *particular* way > in which Reality can be induced to affect our opinions - namely a strategy > that consists in creating situations where the observed result can be > expected to be different, depending on whether our hypothesis is true or > false. > > As for experimentation in Aristotle, I now recall the experiment of > plunging one hand into cold water, the other hand into hot water and then > both hands into lukewarm water. I was also struck by Aristotle's > observation of how drops of water on, say, a red-painted surface, appear to > be red - and by the ingenious (but in the end incorrect) hypothesis > Aristotle advances to explain this phenomenon. This discussion occurs in De > Anima, where there is a lot of reflection on how light and vision work. We > now think of this phenomenon as being explained by refraction - but > Aristotle wanted to know how it was that the drops of water could actually > "become" red. > > As for social prejudices, in "Fixation" Peirce notes as one of the > weaknesses of the a priori method that - in spite of all the deployment of > reason and argument this method involves - it turns out to be subjected to > the secular whims of fashion, passing from materialism to spiritualism and > back again in endless cycles, causing doubt to re-emerge in those who > observe that this is happening. > > A serendipidous scientific strategy, on the other hand, will produce > convergence. > > But if a controversy is not about something "real", there will be no > convergence. (Except by chance, and then only for a while.) > > Cheers, > > James > > > Le 2015-11-25 06:08, Franklin Ransom a écrit : > > James, list, > > James, welcome to the list. > > James wrote: > > Peirce's non-foundationalism is expressed in his rejection of Cartesian >> and Aristotelian First Principles > > > I should probably understand this point better, but I am wondering whether > this point might be further explained. In the case of Cartesian first > principles, we use extreme doubt to get all the way to these principles, > and then from them work out and justify the rest of all that is understood. > I find that Peirce indeed rejects this. In the case of Aristotelian first > principles, we certainly do not use extreme doubt, but work through a > variety of considerations that ultimately lead us to first principles, not > in the sense of principles which come first in understanding, but in > nature.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Rationalism : Philosophical and Scientific
James, list, Sorry, quick correction: Peirce does not discuss the relative importance of characters in "The Doctrine of Chances" (the third paper in the series), but in "The Order of Nature" (the fifth paper in the series). -- Franklin On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 7:35 PM, Franklin Ransom < pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > James, > > > Well, looking it up, I can't find serendipidous, but I found > serendipitous, which is defined as "occurring or discovered by chance in a > happy or beneficial way", which is what I noted in my last post. If you > think that a scientific strategy that occurs or is discovered by chance in > a happy or beneficial way is what will produce convergence, I must confess > that I can not see it the way you do. I believe I will have to leave it at > that. If you think you can make this connection you observe clearer, I'm > all ears (so to speak). > > There is no foundation, on Peirce's view (as I understand it), which we >> can identify as the justification of our beliefs by tracing our beliefs >> back to them. The Peircean truth-criterion looks forward and not backward. > > > This we agree upon. Of course, I take it that by looking forward, is meant > the constant readiness to submit belief to experiential, experimental test. > So if Aristotle's first principles ultimately end up not passing such > testing, then we should be prepared to give them up; their continued > adoption is dependent on how well they continue to explain the phenomena we > experience. > > With respect to your comment on social prejudices, I'm aware of what he > says about the a priori method in the Fixation of Belief article. In fact, > since our guesses can be so prejudiced, it is all the more important that > such guesses be put to inductive, experimental testing. Which brings me to > another part of the Fixation article that you refer to: > > My use of 'serendipidous' was motivated by a reflection on Peirce's >> definition of the scientific method in "The Fixation of Belief" - which is >> perhaps not yet as clearly developed as it could be. The scientific method >> is there described as a method which consists of allowing Reality to affect >> the content of our opinions. To this we may object that our opinions are >> always and invariably affected by the real conditions in which they emerge, >> so that this definition does not tell us what is distinctive about the >> scientific method. What we are talking about, then, is a *particular* way >> in which Reality can be induced to affect our opinions - namely a strategy >> that consists in creating situations where the observed result can be >> expected to be different, depending on whether our hypothesis is true or >> false. > > > Allowing Reality to affect the content of our opinions is conducted by > submitting our beliefs to inductive testing--we directly interact with the > Real to find out whether it answers to our belief about it or not, and this > is what Peirce means at this point in the Fixation article. As the series > of articles continues (of which the Fixation article is the first of that > series, "Illustrations of the Logic of Science"), Peirce goes on to explain > the need to predesignate hypotheses and the significant characters we are > looking for. This is why in the Doctrine of Chances article in that series, > he works to show that a chance universe is completely systematic, but can > never make any explanation more likely than any other, because everything > in a pure chance universe is singular and logic, being about what is > general, is impossible. But we do observe order, this means we do not live > in a pure chance universe, and that means that rather than trying to choose > characters based only upon systematic considerations, we must make our > selection with respect to some purpose and thus predesignate what we are > looking for. Hence the development of a strategy for understanding reality, > paying attention to the conditions that are conducive to bringing about the > desired result, and so forth. I'm not sure we really disagree, but I wanted > to point out that the Fixation article is the first of a six paper series > that goes on to explain in detail the logic of science and scientific > method, as Peirce says at the end of the Fixation article. So I think it's > very misleading to say that the definition of the scientific method in "The > Fixation of Belief" is perhaps not yet as clearly developed as it could be, > since it is precisely the aim of the series of papers to clarify what is > meant by the scientific method and ho
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
John, You said: The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference > in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with > Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it > that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist. I've been trying to figure this one out for myself, but am having some trouble, in particular with the "idea that the physical is just what we can experience." Would you be willing to clarify how you mean this? Is physical opposed to mental, and thus the mental is not something we can experience? And/or the spiritual? Or would you include mental and/or spiritual as subdivisions of the physical? My sense of physicalism, aside from your characterization, is that it's the idea that what is real is whatever physics discovers or says is real, which is quite different from what you are suggesting. I hope that you can understand my concern. After all, clearly an idealist could just as easily say that what is mental is whatever we can experience, and I think you can understand that idea. What's the point of calling all of experience one or the other? -- Franklin On Fri, Dec 4, 2015 at 5:02 PM, John Collier wrote: > Jerry, > > > > I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of > firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking > about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You > aren’t talking about Peirce, here when you say things like > > > > [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise > when we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. > > > > Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical > perspective. > > > > Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce’s views > on firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion). > > > > Unless you understand this you are going to be asking questions without > an answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with > my physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe). > The physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference > in meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with > Quine’s idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it > that the last is also Peirce’s view, and he is no materialist. Basically, > you err, as I see it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in > meaning, however much it might seem to. It violates Peirce’s > prope-positivism, which he uses to deflate a lot of metaphysics. > > > > Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of > experience Peirce uses, or both, in order to save your distinction. But > then you aren’t talking about Peirce’s firsts when you say they have > structure. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.
John, I don't think I have any significant disagreement with much of what you've had to say concerning Peirce's commitment to the external element in experience. I am curious though as to whether you believe you experience external minds, and if so, whether you would count them as physical? I feel as though asking this question might be somehow perceived as obnoxious, but I confess that I have a sincere desire to understand how you think about it; since what you've had to say seems to imply, so far as I can tell, that you would probably admit that you experience external minds (like my mind), but that you also have to admit that you think of the experience of my mind as of something physical, not mental (i.e., not referring to illusions, dreams, etc.), since it is something external to you. Have I ascertained your point of view rightly on this, or am I guilty of warping your meaning in some unfortunate way? -- Franklin On Sun, Dec 6, 2015 at 9:04 AM, John Collier wrote: > Dear Franklin, List members: > > > > I left out a more fundamental part of the argument that I will lay out > now. It is basically a very simple argument, though perhaps it is a bit > subtle. I left it out because the argument is fairly well known to Peirce > scholars It appears in several places in slightly different forms in > Peirce’s writings. I would argue that it is very difficult if not > impossible to accept many of Peirce’s more systematic ideas without > accepting this argument I lay out. > > > > Peirce has a specific view of experience. Meaning has to be referenced to > something, and that something cannot be internal (mental in one sense), or > we go in circles (which is acceptable to some philosophers, but not to > Peirce). Worse, from Peirce’s point of view, is that it fails the > objectivity test. Meaning has to have an objective basis or his realism has > to be given up. Now that there are experiences, including mental > experiences, is objective, but meaning cannot be referred ultimately to > mental experiences alone without making it depend on psychology rather than > objective conditions. Other than for logic, which has its own grounds for > objectivity in things that are external, the experience ultimately referred > to has to be of the senses, roughly (I would include emotions, which I see > to have a propositional or cognitive component) that also must have an > external aspect in order to support objective differences in meaning. > Peirce resolves this by setting aside a class of experiences that are of > external things. The child, he says, learns to recognize that not all > things are under his control, but must be at least in part caused by > external influences, so some experience is composed of signs of the > external. This is a very early and necessary abduction. Membership in this > class of supposed externally based experiences (which Peirce often just > identifies as “experience”) is revisable on further evidence (there are > illusions, imposed experiences – by a demon in the most extreme case – and > dreams, and the rantings of madmen, just to use Descartes’ examples – > though Decartes saw their possibility as a reason for scepticism, but > Peirce would require an additional reason for doubt over the mere > possibility – a “defeater” in terms of contemporary pragmatist > epistemology), but the basic way to check membership is whether or not they > are at least in part not under our control. This needs to be tested, as we > can be wrong about it in specific cases, but in general (or we violate the > defeater requirement). > > > > Physicalism is rather hard to define, and there are a number of > definitions floating around the philosophy and scientific world. Quine > defines the physical as that which is accessible through the senses (not > what physics tells us is physical). This won’t quite do for Peirce (or me) > since there are the afore-mentioned sensory illusions, etc. What physics > tells us is physical is a good place to start, but of course physics has > been wrong, so this is more of a control than a criterion. I think it is > safe to say, though, that everything that science has been able to study > effectively so far has a physical basis. I would think that the physical > has a number of signs, and that there is a consilience that eventually > leads to a clearer idea of what is physical. Peirce was, in fact, a kind of > idealist (the objective kind, for one thing), so there is presumably no > contradiction between his views about experience, and the physical, and at > least one form of idealism. I don’t share Peirce’s idealism, but that is > neither here nor there; it is not relevant to Peirce’s argument that I have > reconstructed here. All thought is in signs. Some thoughts (or mental > experiences, if you want) are of external things. Other than logical, > mathematical, and the like, being external is to be physical at the least. > In order to make our ideas clear we need to make ref
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F, Jeff, Jon S,
Given Gary's comments in this last post, I think it would be worthwhile to
quote the passage that is pertinent to some of what Jeff has been
discussing, and which I discussed with Jeff in our previous discussion.
From Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers:
>
> 539. The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last
> analysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with
> Pragmaticism, which holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought
> proper is Conduct. Nothing is more indispensable to a sound epistemology
> than a crystal-clear discrimination between the Object and the Interpretant
> of knowledge; very much as nothing is more indispensable to sound notions
> of geography than a crystal-clear discrimination between north latitude and
> south latitude; and the one discrimination is not more rudimentary than the
> other. That we are conscious of our Percepts is a theory that seems to me
> to be beyond dispute; but it is not a fact of Immediate Perception. A fact
> of Immediate Perception is not a Percept, nor any part of a Percept; a
> Percept is a Seme, while a fact of Immediate Perception or rather the
> Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is the Immediate Interpretant, is a
> Pheme that is the direct Dynamical Interpretant of the Percept, and of
> which the Percept is the Dynamical Object, and is with some considerable
> difficulty (as the history of psychology shows), distinguished from the
> Immediate Object, though the distinction is highly significant.†1 But not
> to interrupt our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the
> Immediate Object of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought
> makes up for that lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late
> Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a
> Perceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive thought as
> determining the original Immediate Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I
> must be understood as talking not psychology, but the logic of mental
> operations. Subsequent Interpretants furnish new Semes of Universes
> resulting from various adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe. They are,
> however, all of them, Interpretants of Percepts.
Notice that the percept, in one case, is identified by Peirce as a Seme and
that does in fact make it a sign. Of course, it is also discussed as
immediate object, and dynamical object, so one needs to be careful as to
how one interprets this passage when trying to figure out what is going on
with the percept, and how it is understood differently depending upon what
its role is in the triadic relation. In any case, it would appear that the
percept, according to Peirce, can be a sign and classified as a seme
(a.k.a., rheme), and can have its own immediate object, and have
interpretants.
For my part, I would suppose that there can be phenomena which we directly
experience (directly perceive), which can nevertheless serves as signs of
other perceptual phenomena. I directly perceive smoke. The smoke, while
perceived in itself, can also be a sign of fire, which can also be directly
perceived. Perhaps I have failed to understand what Gary meant when he said
that "it's hard to say how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept"?
-- Franklin
On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 4:25 PM, wrote:
> Jon A.S.,
>
>
>
> IF (I say *If*!) we can consider the percept as the subject of the
> perceptual judgment, then I think *rhematic indexical sinsign* is
> probably how I would classify it. However, I think we can just as well
> (maybe better) consider the percept as the *object* of the sign (the
> perceptual judgment). If we consider the *percept* as a sign, then it
> must have an object of its own, and it’s hard to say how any phenomenon
> could be the object of a percept.
>
>
>
> Remember we’re talking logic/semiotic here, not the *psychology* of
> perception, which would probably locate the percept in the brain/mind and
> its object in the external world. But that analysis makes all kinds of
> metaphysical assumptions that phenomenology eschews. If we stick to
> phenomenology, we can say that the percept *appears*, i.e. it is a
> *phenomenon*, but it does not appear to mediate between some *other*
> phenomenon and a perceiver, as a sign does. It certainly doesn’t *mean*
> anything.
>
>
>
> I think your questions are *nice*, in the sense used by Peirce when he
> wrote in NDTR (CP 2.265):
>
> “It is a nice problem to say to what class a given sign belongs; since all
> the circumstances of the case have to be considered. But it is seldom
> requisite to be very accurate; for if one does not locate the sign
> precisely, one will easily come near enough to its character for any
> ordinary purpose of logic.”
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> } Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen] {
>
> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* g
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F, A perceptual judgment must take the form of a dicisign, so I would say the identification that "that right there is smoke" would be a perceptual judgment, but smoke itself is not a perceptual judgment, but would have to be the percept (supposing the percept has been rightly judged as smoke). Supposing that the percept has been rightly identified as smoke, then it would serve as a sign of fire, which would be another percept, that could be judged in a perceptual judgment as "that right there is fire". That's the way I think of how percept and perceptual judgment are related. -- Franklin On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 11:35 AM, wrote: > Franklin, > > > > Yes, this excerpt from Peirce’s “Prolegomena to an Apology for > Pragmaticism” demonstrates that according to the purpose of the analysis, a > percept can be considered either as an object or a sign. (And of course > signs can be objects of other signs, otherwise we could say nothing about > semiosis!) Your example does show that maybe it’s not *that* “hard to say > how any phenomenon could be the object of a percept” — although I could > argue that smoke is not a percept but a perceptual judgment. But personally > I’m going to leave for later (or for others) the consideration of > perception in terms of triadic relations. At least until I have a better > handle on NDTR and its classification of signs, and how that relates to the > phenomenological categories. > > > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* 9-Dec-15 18:00 > > > > Gary F, Jeff, Jon S, > > > > Given Gary's comments in this last post, I think it would be worthwhile to > quote the passage that is pertinent to some of what Jeff has been > discussing, and which I discussed with Jeff in our previous discussion. > From Vol. 4 of the Collected Papers: > > > 539. The Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last > analysis, the Percept. This doctrine in no wise conflicts with > Pragmaticism, which holds that the Immediate Interpretant of all thought > proper is Conduct. Nothing is more indispensable to a sound epistemology > than a crystal-clear discrimination between the Object and the Interpretant > of knowledge; very much as nothing is more indispensable to sound notions > of geography than a crystal-clear discrimination between north latitude and > south latitude; and the one discrimination is not more rudimentary than the > other. That we are conscious of our Percepts is a theory that seems to me > to be beyond dispute; but it is not a fact of Immediate Perception. A fact > of Immediate Perception is not a Percept, nor any part of a Percept; a > Percept is a Seme, while a fact of Immediate Perception or rather the > Perceptual Judgment of which such fact is the Immediate Interpretant, is a > Pheme that is the direct Dynamical Interpretant of the Percept, and of > which the Percept is the Dynamical Object, and is with some considerable > difficulty (as the history of psychology shows), distinguished from the > Immediate Object, though the distinction is highly significant.†1 But not > to interrupt our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the > Immediate Object of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought > makes up for that lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late > Dynamical Interpretant of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a > Perceptual Universe that is represented in instinctive thought as > determining the original Immediate Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I > must be understood as talking not psychology, but the logic of mental > operations. Subsequent Interpretants furnish new Semes of Universes > resulting from various adjunctions to the Perceptual Universe. They are, > however, all of them, Interpretants of Percepts. > > > > Notice that the percept, in one case, is identified by Peirce as a Seme > and that does in fact make it a sign. Of course, it is also discussed as > immediate object, and dynamical object, so one needs to be careful as to > how one interprets this passage when trying to figure out what is going on > with the percept, and how it is understood differently depending upon what > its role is in the triadic relation. In any case, it would appear that the > percept, according to Peirce, can be a sign and classified as a seme > (a.k.a., rheme), and can have its own immediate object, and have > interpretants. > > > > For my part, I would suppose that there can be phenomena which we directly > experience (directly perceive), which can nevertheless serves as signs of > other perceptual phenomena. I directly perceive sm
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Gary F, Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is considered as a singular phenomenon? I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign. Is it your position that the perceptual judgment is not a dicisign? -- Franklin -- On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:36 AM, wrote: > Franklin, Jeff, > > > > Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To > perceive X *as smoke* is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of > that judgment, “That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting > its subject (*that*) with a predicate (*__ is smoke*), which like all > predicates is a general term (rhematic symbol). If you infer the presence > of fire from the smoke (i.e. perceive the smoke *as a sign*), then you > have an argument (whether it is expressed verbally or not). > > > > I’m going to be offline for about a week now, so you may have to continue > the thread without me for awhile ... > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Jeff, list, Peirce does say, in paragraph 539 from Vol. 4 of CP, that "[t]he Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the Percept". When you ask whether the percept is the smoke itself, or a visual impression, I think this statement from Peirce implies you are right that Peirce would lean toward the latter conclusion. However, I do not think this is necessarily a fair way to put the matter. It seems to me that while we can directly perceive the real, such perception does not mean that we immediately understand it as a whole; for that understanding, we require a concept of the real that is perceived, and perceptual judgment is an instinctual attempt at applying a concept. The way I would state the matter is that the percept, while not the whole of the real object, is at least in some sense a part of that object, which we find ourselves immediately related to by way of physiological processes, as the eye is affected by, in the supposed example, the smoke (plus light, other percepts, etc.), and so comes to visually perceive the smoke. That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be smoke. Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a whole, requires the whole work of understanding. But while the percept is not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the whole of the object, it is nevertheless as much a part of smoke as it is a part of the perceiver. -- Franklin On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 9:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hello Franklin, Gary F., List, > > If a person sees smoke billowing in the distance, is the percept the > "smoke itself," or is the percept the visual impression of the smoke? > Peirce indicates that it is the latter when he provides the following > explanation of a percept: "A visual percept obtrudes itself upon me in its > entirety. I am not therein conscious of any mental process by which the > image has been constructed. The psychologists, however, are able to give > some account of the matter. Since 1709, they have been in possession of > sufficient proof (as most of them agree,) that, notwithstanding its > apparent primitiveness, every percept is the product of mental processes, > or at all events of processes for all intents and purposes mental, except > that we are not directly aware of them;" CP 7.624 > > This fits with the definitions he provides in the Century dictionary: > > 1. Perceive: 1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of > some object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience; > in psychology, to come to know by a real action of the object on the mind > (commonly upon the senses); though the knowledge may be inferential > > 2. Perception: 1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of > the 18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the > operation or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or > resulting a construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue > of a real action of an object upon the mind. > > 3. Percept: the immediate object in perception, in the sense in which the > word is used by modern psychologists. > > Insofar as the modern psychologists are engaged in a special science that > is empirical in origin, then it would appear that Peirce is importing a > technical term from the special science into his philosophical logic, and > he is trying to articulate what is necessary for the percept to function in > the (uncontrolled) process of drawing perceptual judgments as inferential > conclusions. One might think that these kinds of inferential processes are > only of subsidiary concern if our aim is to understand the divisions Peirce > is drawing between different kinds of signs in NDTR. My assumption is that > Peirce is generalizing from way in which terms and propositions function in > self controlled arguments in order to account for these uncontrolled > processes of mind. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity
hat are also always involved in the experience. So the smoke remains part of the experience, not the whole of it; while whether we consider the smoke as experienced in part, or as a whole, depends on how experience is considered in a given context of analysis. -- Franklin -- On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > List, Frank: > > On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:16 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be smoke. > Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a > whole, requires the whole work of understanding. But while the percept is > not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the whole of the object, it is nevertheless > as much a part of smoke as it is a part of the perceiver. > > > While I concur with these sentences, I would ask further of your views: > > What is the nature of the coupling between the smoke and the "whole" of > the experience? > > If "whole work of understanding." implies a coupling of external events > with internal processes, then what is the nature of the grammar the > generates the coupling of the parts of the whole? > > Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit? > > Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in > character"? > > Just curious. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Matt, list, Matt wrote: EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts > don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a > perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., > relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", introducing the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a dicisign). Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type. But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or type, to the subject, or percept. Also, note what he says in "The Nature of Meaning", EP2 p.208: "Consequently, it is now clear that if there be any perceptual judgment, or proposition directly expressive of and resulting from the quality of a present percept, or sense-image, that judgment must involve generality in its predicate." This suggests that the type is a generalization inspired by the quality of the percept itself, and not simply introduced by the interpreting mind to make sense of the percept; the percept contributes something to the judgment that is made of it, besides its singularity as the subject of the judgment. Consider in connection with this idea the following excerpt from "The Seven Systems of Metaphysics", EP2, p.194: "Therefore, if you ask me what part Qualities can play in the economy of the Universe, I shall reply that the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living realities. Now every symbol must have, organically attached to it, its Indices of Reactions and its Icons of Qualities; and such part as these reactions and these qualities play in an argument, that they of course play in the Universe, that Universe being precisely an argument. In the little bit that you or I can make out of this huge demonstration, our perceptual judgments are the premisses *for us* and these perceptual judgments have icons as their predicates, in which *icons* Qualities are immediately presented." In a perceptual judgment, it is the quality of the percept which inspires the predicate of the judgment, and that predicate is the introduction of the general element in perception. As Peirce goes to great lengths to argue at the outcome of the series of lectures culminating in "Pragmatism as the Logic of Abduction": "The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason." -- Franklin On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:03 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > Franklin, Peircers, > > Here a distinction that I find helpful: > > EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts > don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a > perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., > relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. > > Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very > basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x > to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to > generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For > example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is > different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark > side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.' > > In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of > dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine > there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If > this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns. > > Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good > one. > > * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone > (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. > Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems > to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', > 'the dark tone' only come as a result of the distinction (this basic level > generalization). > > Matt > > > On Dec 12, 2015, at 11:35 AM, Franklin Ran
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Sung, list, Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so I'll respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice in which you participate? With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is not necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy. So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have said does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a sentence which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is a proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or an icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference. -- Franklin On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > Franklin, List, > > You wrote the following statements with quotation marks: > > > "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment >(121315-1) > is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate." > > "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", > introducing (1213`15-2) > the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a > dicisign)." > > "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type. > (121315-3) > But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or > type, to the subject, or percept." > > These fit with my understanding [1] that > > (121315-4) > In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the > vehicle of a sentence.> > > Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4): > > "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment." >(121315-5) > > Because "smoke" is a word, not a sentence. > > "A perceptual judgment is not the general element, but includes > (121315-6) > the general as its predicate." > > Again this fits (121315-4) well, since a perceptual judgement is a > sentence which includes a subject and a predicate, both could be words. > > > All the best. > > Sung > > Reference: >[1] Hjelmslev, L. (1961). *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*. The > University of Wisconcin Press, Madison, pp. 4. > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
John, list, I will become much less active for the next few months after today. I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as ineffable, and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of Sellars, I couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable though. It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and thereby give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible. If I understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between these analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical knowledge (i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly. In any case, there is the attempt to describe the given for both. I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual pragmatism', and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a priori is really a sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed. The appearances, or phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual judgments would be impossible as judgments about percepts. Note that perceptual judgments are not the result of applying a priori concepts to percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For Lewis, the pragmatic a priori can be held by the mind regardless of their truth; he insists that they are held by the mind as being useful for interpreting the given, but can never be false, because they make falsity possible in empirical knowledge; the a priori concepts can only be rejected because they cease to be useful. But for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any other judgments, can be false, and we can learn that they were false later. It is simply the case that at the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we are in no position to question its veracity or to control conduct with respect to it. I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality unique to it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis. Only this does not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not mean the quality is not like other qualities experienced, but only that it is not precisely the same as those other qualities. -- Franklin - On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier wrote: > Jon, > > It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to > many pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are > ineffable, to use Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions > because there is no need to eff them. In order to save them. The current > discussion about the nature of percepts and their distinction from > perceptual judgements is relevant here. There is nothing in appearances > alone that makes the distinction, since any qualisign must be interpreted > to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can separate the two abstractly, > however, and with distinctions, their quality implies their existence > directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self distinction (basic to using > the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction involved to the self > and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions alone we have > experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and interpretation > (thirdness) as either "this" or "that". > > John > > John Collier > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > -Original Message- > > From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:jawb...@att.net] > > Sent: Sunday, 13 December 2015 19:21 > > To: John Collier; Matt Faunce; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 > > Subject: Re: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > > > John, List, > > > > I have personally always understood “saving the phenomena” to mean > > preserving the appearances, that is, whatever explanation we come up with > > must leave the appearances invariant. > > > > I remember reading somewhere that the Greek “sozein” could mean either > > save or solve. I thought it was Ian Hacking but not sure. > > Poking around the web for it did turn up this historical comment: > > > > https://thonyc.wordpress.com/2015/07/29/%CF%83%E1%BF%B4%CE%B6%C > > E%B5%CE%B9%CE%BD-%CF%84%E1%BD%B0- > > %CF%86%CE%B1%CE%B9%CE%BD%CF%8C%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BD%CE%B > > 1-sozein-ta-phainomena/ > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > On 12/13/2015 5:28 AM, John Collier wrote: > > > Peirce List, > > > > > > Here is a link to a Peirce influenced paper that makes the basic point > Matt > > has made here. It is based on work in my PhD dissertation that I am in > the > > process of redoing 30-some years later to deal with problems of > continuity of > > knowledge through radical theory change (and across different discourses > > and cultures, for that matter). There was some brief attention to that > work at > > the time, but I was a
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
s the [biosemiotics] list has been doing. The first post > that I wrote for the [biosemiotics] list is [biosemiotics:46] dated > December 26, 2012, I believe. > > (*2*) You wrote: > > "With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is > not (121315-1) > necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A > proposition > can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it wrong to refer > to the > grammar of the English language in order to justify a logical point. > Perhaps > some of the analytic philosophers would like to agree with such an idea, > but I > am no analytic philosopher and do not think the analysis of language is > going > to get us anywhere in philosophy." > > I agree. Humans must have been making judgement long before verbal > language evolved in the human society, and all organism must be making > judgement although they do not have any sentences as we do. > But I do not see anything wrong with using human language as a model of > reasoning in both humans and non-human species. For me, human language (or > humanese for brevity) has been a useful model of reasoning in all organisms > as well as the Universe itself. In fact I am now of the opinion that there > may be two aspects to language -- (i) the language as a *type* (to be > denoted with a bold capital, *L*),and (ii) the languages as *tokens* of > *L* (to be denoted as L), leading to the following notations: > > * L*(L1, L2, L3, . . . , Ln) > (121315-2) > > where Li is the i^th language that are used (or operates) in the Universe, > including humanese, cellese, and cosmese (or cosmic language, i.e., > mathematics, geometry, quantum mechanics, etc.). It is possible that *L* can > be identified with Peircean semiotics. Do you know of any evidence to > invalidate this possibility ? > > All the best. > > Sung > > On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 3:41 PM, Franklin Ransom < > pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Sung, list, >> >> Well Sung, you didn't quote yourself at length, and it's on topic, so >> I'll respond. Your penchant for numbering every claim is a bit curious, and >> since I don't think anyone else is making use of the numbered claims, I >> wonder why you do it. Is this habit related to some professional practice >> in which you participate? >> >> With respect to the comparison with language: It seems to me that it is >> not necessary at all for a judgment to be expressed in a sentence. A >> proposition can occur without being expressed verbally, and I think it >> wrong to refer to the grammar of the English language in order to justify a >> logical point. Perhaps some of the analytic philosophers would like to >> agree with such an idea, but I am no analytic philosopher and do not think >> the analysis of language is going to get us anywhere in philosophy. >> >> So, while what I have said fits with your understanding, what you have >> said does not fit with my understanding. A perceptual judgment is not a >> sentence which includes a subject and a predicate; a perceptual judgment is >> a proposition (or dicisign) which attributes a predicate to a subject, or >> an icon to an index, as the result of an uncontrollable inference. >> >> -- Franklin >> >> >> On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 12:27 PM, Sungchul Ji >> wrote: >> >>> Franklin, List, >>> >>> You wrote the following statements with quotation marks: >>> >>> >>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment >>> (121315-1) >>> is not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate." >>> >>> "So, as I said, one must say something like "that there is smoke", >>> introducing (1213`15-2) >>> the general element in a proposition (or probably, more accurately, a >>> dicisign)." >>> >>> "Smoke, as the predicate in such a proposition or judgment, is a type. >>>(121315-3) >>> But it is not the perceptual judgment, which connects the predicate, or >>> type, to the subject, or percept." >>> >>> These fit with my understanding [1] that >>> >>> >> (121315-4) >>> In other words, to make a judgement, you need to use the >>> vehicle of a sentence.> >>> >>> Also the following statements nicely fit (12135-4): >>> >>> "Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment." >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
allibilism and also his view that all thought is in signs, he should avoid > it. > > > > I would argue that the grounds for knowledge are the topological > structures of the distinctions in our experience. This is a form of > information theoretic structure that I think Dretske, for one, has shown to > be much more productive than might seem at first. Nonetheless, it is a > pretty radical idea in epistemology at this stage. What I have called the > effability issue is the motivation for moving in this radical direction, > since it seems to rule out other kinds of ground for knowledge. > > > > John Collier > > Professor Emeritus, UKZN > > http://web.ncf.ca/collier > > > > *From:* Franklin Ransom [mailto:pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > *Sent:* Sunday, 13 December 2015 23:19 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1 > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > > > John, list, > > > > I will become much less active for the next few months after today. > > > > I would agree that the pragmatist C.I. Lewis viewed appearances as > ineffable, and the analytic philosopher Quine was probably the same way; of > Sellars, I couldn't say. Peirce does not view appearances as ineffable > though. > > > > It should be understood that C.I. Lewis has the idea of the 'given', which > together with his 'pragmatic a priori' concepts, permits the possibility of > empirical knowledge. The 'pragmatic a priori' concepts are not themselves > empirical, but given freely by the mind to make sense of the given and > thereby give one experience, of which empirical knowledge is then possible. > If I understand Quine rightly, he was of the view that the division between > these analytic, pragmatic a priori concepts and the concepts of empirical > knowledge (i.e., synthetic concepts) is not a division that holds strictly. > In any case, there is the attempt to describe the given for both. > > > > I don't think Peirce subscribes to the view of Lewis's 'conceptual > pragmatism', and the need for the pragmatic a priori. The pragmatic a > priori is really a sort of Kantian move that Peirce would have eschewed. > The appearances, or phenomena, are indeed effable, or else perceptual > judgments would be impossible as judgments about percepts. Note that > perceptual judgments are not the result of applying a priori concepts to > percepts, at least not in Lewis's sense. For Lewis, the pragmatic a priori > can be held by the mind regardless of their truth; he insists that they are > held by the mind as being useful for interpreting the given, but can never > be false, because they make falsity possible in empirical knowledge; the a > priori concepts can only be rejected because they cease to be useful. But > for Peirce, perceptual judgments, like any other judgments, can be false, > and we can learn that they were false later. It is simply the case that at > the time of the perceptual judgment occurring, we are in no position to > question its veracity or to control conduct with respect to it. > > > > I would like to point out though that every phenomenon has a quality > unique to it which is, strictly speaking, ineffable, being sui generis. > Only this does not make the phenomenon itself ineffable, and it does not > mean the quality is not like other qualities experienced, but only that it > is not precisely the same as those other qualities. > > > > -- Franklin > > > > - > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 1:20 PM, John Collier wrote: > > Jon, > > It intends to mean saving the appearances, but appearances, according to > many pragmatists (C.I. Lewis, Quine, Sellars, probably Peirce) are > ineffable, to use Lewis's term. We (Konrad and I) went to distinctions > because there is no need to eff them. In order to save them. The current > discussion about the nature of percepts and their distinction from > perceptual judgements is relevant here. There is nothing in appearances > alone that makes the distinction, since any qualisign must be interpreted > to be a sign, implying a judgement. We can separate the two abstractly, > however, and with distinctions, their quality implies their existence > directly. Even with the mentioned self/non-self distinction (basic to using > the Pragmatic Maxim) there is a necessary abduction involved to the self > and non-self classes. But in the case of distinctions alone we have > experiences that imply both existence (secondness ) and interpretation > (thirdness) as either "this" or "that". > > John > > John Collier > Professor
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Matt, list, So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. This is still a poor way of stating the matter. The token is not a type; but your statement, as worded, suggests that it is. There is smoke as a token, and there is smoke as a type. The token and the type are not the same thing. The token, in being related to other tokens, is not thereby a type. The token is an instance of a type, and the type is what refers to all the instances. A token, rightly, only refers to the 'here and now', and not to other tokens like it, which are other 'here and now's'. But your point is taken: "I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a perceptual judgment." -- Franklin -- On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 3:17 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > On 12/13/15 9:38 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > > Matt wrote: > > EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts >> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a >> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., >> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. > > > Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is > not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. > > > I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a perceptual judgment. I hoped > that would've been understood from the context, e.g., my clause "relating > to *other instances* of smoke," as an instance is a token, not a > generality. As usual, I could've written it better. Then I continued to > give my argument for the fact that there can be no token in perception > without that token being of a type, concluding with "If this is correct > then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns." Let me add bracketed > insertions to my first paragraph to clarify what I meant: > > EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas > percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you > have a perceptual judgment. So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as > understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is > a perceptual judgment. > > I continued... > > Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very >> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x >> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to >> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For >> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is >> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark >> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.' >> >> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of >> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine >> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If >> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns. >> >> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good >> one. >> >> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone >> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. >> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems >> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', >> 'the dark tone' only comes as a result of the distinction (this basic level >> generalization) >> > Matt > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Matt, list, Can you give your source for this? I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did not mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific terminology" is thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today, in the state in which scientific terminology has actually developed to the point it has. Obviously not every human language in history has developed to the point of having the terminology that the sciences today command. For example, the use of Latin words for developing terms identifying species in biology, and the whole host of such terms that have been developed. Or the development of mathematical language to the point where physical theories like the general and special theories of relativity can be articulated. I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the things that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in a given language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only that language won't be able to say things about it without going through the work of developing a system of terminology in order to say things about it, or by translating from another language. My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter of logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because there is so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a universal human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised concerns about Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for representing reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would have to admit that there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each human language, and logic would cease to be a general science of reasoning, and would become indistinguishable from linguistics. -- Franklin On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 5:08 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the > things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the > development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific > terminology is not a development shared by every human language. > > Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from > two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for > the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda > writes > > " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity." > > "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology > speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly > industrialized society. *There are no primitive languages*. Virtually > no linguist today would disagree with this statement." > > -- > Matt > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, list, I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far as all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language determines signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means that language determines (some) thoughts. That doesn't mean that every thought anyone ever has is determined by a given language. It does mean that to a significant extent, our thoughts are determined by the language in which we express many of our thoughts, because those thoughts are to a great extent interpretants of that language. I find it absurd that my position has been represented as 'sociolinguistic relativism or determinism'. If you read what I said in attempting to respond to Sunchul's query regarding language, I discussed the different ways in which one could mean language, which included the consideration of logic as the language of thought, as well as considering that language, taken in a very broad sense, could include all the kinds of signs there are. Moreover, I never agreed that human language is an appropriate way to think of reasoning; in fact, I emphatically denied it, and was giving good reason for why logic, which does engage in the analysis of thought, could never be reduced to a study of human language. -- Franklin --- On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Franklin Ransom is using a discredited analysis of language, referred to > as sociolinguistic relativism or determinism, where language defines the > knowledge base; i.e., language determines thought. Followers of this linear > causality are such as Whorf-Sapir, and Basil Bernstein. It doesn't stand up > to empirical analysis. But it enjoyed its own limelight within the works > of various people who saw language or culture as determinant of thought, > and even, there were some who suggested that some languages should be > eradicated (eg native) because the language was defined as 'primitive' > and prevented the users from thinking 'in a modern or scientific way'. > > Instead, the human brain creates language and thus, can express anything > by coming up with new terms and expressions. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Clark Goble > *To:* Peirce-L > *Sent:* Monday, December 14, 2015 11:48 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > > On Dec 14, 2015, at 3:08 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the > things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the > development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific > terminology is not a development shared by every human language. > > Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from > two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for > the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda > writes > > " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity." > > "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology > speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly > industrialized society. *There are no primitive languages*. Virtually > no linguist today would disagree with this statement." > > > I don’t know about that quote in particular. However a decade or so back > Michael Tomasello had a fascinating book on the evolution of language in *The > Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. *While he doesn’t speak of it in > Peircean terms he creates a model where it appears a certain kind of > thirdness in terms of interpretation of signs develops. Once that evolves > then he sees language’s capabilities as being largely there and develops > fast. It’s been a while since I read it but I think he keeps the > traditional dating of the evolution of language to around 80,000 - 100,000 > years. The evolution after that is really developing the language and > culture once you have the capability. > > I know he has a newer text based upon some lectures he gave called *The > Origins of Human Communication* although I’ve not read that one. > > -- > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Jeff, Gary F, list, It's nice to see some clear textual proof for the presence of Firstness in the percept. However, and then something like a diagram (what he will later call a percipuum) > comes in as the interpretant of the qualisign. Where does Peirce refer to the percipuum as a diagram? Or to a diagram as an interpretant of a qualisign? The latter case should be impossible, following the modal determination of the aspects of the sign; a qualisign can only be determined, and in turn determine, at the level of Firstness in each aspect, though a diagram is clearly representing relations, not qualities. If one wants to turn to the ten-trichotomy classification, I think it inadvisable to use the term qualisign, since it is unclear that in the ten-trichotomy system, a qualisign could not have a dynamical object that is in the mode of Secondness or Thirdness, and consequently that the immediate object is in such modes, prior to the determination of the sign in the aspect in which it is apprehended, which is properly the aspect of the qualisign (though Gary F's comments with respect to this identification are important to keep in mind). -- Franklin -- On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 9:12 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > List, > > GF: There is no vagueness in a percept; it’s a singular. So I don’t see > how the concept of qualisign can serve the purpose you suggest here. I > think the qualisign is simply a necessary result of Peirce’s introduction > of the trichotomy of signs based on the sign’s mode of being in itself. It > has to be First in that trichotomy. > > Peirce does say that percepts are, in some respects, vague. Here is one > place in "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmatism: "But not to interrupt > our train of thought, let us go on to note that while the Immediate Object > of a Percept is excessively vague, yet natural thought makes up for that > lack (as it almost amounts to), as follows. A late Dynamical Interpretant > of the whole complex of Percepts is the Seme of a Perceptual Universe that > is represented in instinctive thought as determining the original Immediate > Object of every Percept.†2 Of course, I must be understood as talking not > psychology, but the logic of mental operations. Subsequent Interpretants > furnish new Semes of Universes resulting from various adjunctions to the > Perceptual Universe. They are, however, all of them, Interpretants of > Percepts. CP 4.539 I.e., A complex of percepts yields a picture of a > perceptual universe. Without reflection, that universe is taken to be the > cause of such objects as are represented in a percept. Though each percept > is vague, as it is recognized that its object is the result of the action > of the universe on the perceiver, it is so far clear." CP 4.539 Fn 2 p 425 > > Here is a place where he says that percepts have a singular character: > "the reader questions, perhaps, the assertion that conclusions of reasoning > are always of the nature of expectations. "What!" he will exclaim, "can we > not reason about the authorship of the Junius Letters or the identity of > the Man in the Iron Mask?" In a sense we can, of course. Still, the > conclusion will not be at all like remembering the historical event. In > order to appreciate the difference, begin by going back to the percept to > which the memory relates. This percept is a single event happening hic et > nunc. It cannot be generalized without losing its essential character. For > it is an actual passage at arms between the non-ego and the ego. A blow is > passed, so to say. Generalize the fact that you get hit in the eye, and all > that distinguishes the actual fact, the shock, the pain, the inflammation, > is gone. It is anti-general. The memory preserves this character, only > slightly modified. The actual shock, etc., are no longer there, the quality > of the event has associated itself in the mind with similar past > experiences. It is a little generalized in the perceptual fact. Still, it > is referred to a special and unique occasion, and the flavor of > anti-generality is the predominant one." CP 2.146 > > For the sake of understanding the division in NDTR between signs based on > the mode in which they are apprehended (i.e., qualisign, sinsign, > legislgn), I do think it would help to spell out the manner in which each > of these types of signs is determined by its object. For example, in the > Minute Logic, which was written in 1902 (one year before NDTR), Peirce says > the following about the relation between the percept and the perceptual > jugment: "The most ordinary fact of perception, such as "it is light," > involves precisive abstraction, or prescission. But hypostatic > abstraction, the abstraction which transforms "it is light" into "there is > light here," which is the sense which I shall commonly attach to the word > abstraction (since prescission will do for precis
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
r conclusion that not every human language can 'articulate > scientific terminology' seems to me the same conclusion in this post. > > I note again, that you refer to the 'rules of construction' and suggest > that in certain languages, these rules prevent scientific expression. How? > > My view is that ALL peoples have the SAME cognitive abilities, the same > logical capabilities - and they can adapt their languages to express ANY > thought. That includes new terms (we didn't refer to telephones 1,000 years > ago). Therefore - a language, such as, eg, that of the Dobe !Kung, can > readily either adapt and use the same word (telephone) or come up with > their own term. BUT - *cognitively and logically, since we all are the > same species* - then, we can all think the same way. Language - either in > its grammar or its words - does not confine or define us. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Franklin Ransom > *To:* Peirce-L > *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 2:48 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Edwina, list, > > I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far as > all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and > signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language > determines signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means that > language determines (some) thoughts. That doesn't mean that every thought > anyone ever has is determined by a given language. It does mean that to a > significant extent, our thoughts are determined by the language in which we > express many of our thoughts, because those thoughts are to a great extent > interpretants of that language. > > I find it absurd that my position has been represented as 'sociolinguistic > relativism or determinism'. If you read what I said in attempting to > respond to Sunchul's query regarding language, I discussed the different > ways in which one could mean language, which included the consideration of > logic as the language of thought, as well as considering that language, > taken in a very broad sense, could include all the kinds of signs there > are. Moreover, I never agreed that human language is an appropriate way to > think of reasoning; in fact, I emphatically denied it, and was giving good > reason for why logic, which does engage in the analysis of thought, could > never be reduced to a study of human language. > > -- Franklin > > --- > > On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > >> Franklin Ransom is using a discredited analysis of language, referred to >> as sociolinguistic relativism or determinism, where language defines the >> knowledge base; i.e., language determines thought. Followers of this linear >> causality are such as Whorf-Sapir, and Basil Bernstein. It doesn't stand up >> to empirical analysis. But it enjoyed its own limelight within the works >> of various people who saw language or culture as determinant of thought, >> and even, there were some who suggested that some languages should be >> eradicated (eg native) because the language was defined as 'primitive' >> and prevented the users from thinking 'in a modern or scientific way'. >> >> Instead, the human brain creates language and thus, can express anything >> by coming up with new terms and expressions. >> >> Edwina >> >> - Original Message - >> *From:* Clark Goble >> *To:* Peirce-L >> *Sent:* Monday, December 14, 2015 11:48 AM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations >> >> >> On Dec 14, 2015, at 3:08 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: >> >> On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: >> >> Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the >> things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the >> development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific >> terminology is not a development shared by every human language. >> >> Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from >> two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for >> the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward >> Vajda writes >> >> " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity." >> >> "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology >> speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly >> industrialized soc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Franklin - thanks for your reply. Please see my comments below: > > - Original Message - > *From:* Franklin Ransom > *To:* Peirce-L > *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 2:53 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Edwina, > > I will quote myself from the response I gave to Matt Faunce right before > replying to you. > > "Matt, list, > > Can you give your source for this? > > > 1) I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did > not mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific > terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the > development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific > terminology" is thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today, > in the state in which scientific terminology has actually developed to the > point it has. Obviously not every human language in history has developed > to the point of having the terminology that the sciences today command. For > example, the use of Latin words for developing terms identifying species in > biology, and the whole host of such terms that have been developed. Or the > development of mathematical language to the point where physical theories > like the general and special theories of relativity can be articulated. > > EDWINA: I don't think that 'language' develops as a language and then > possibly at some time, this development enables it to 'develop scientific > terminology'. Indeed, I don't know what you mean by 'development of a > language'. You seem to be suggesting that there is something in the grammar > that must develop!? > I think that the* terms* used to 'name scientific issues' can be created > in any language. I don't see what has to develop in a language to render it > then and only then, capable of 'articulating scientific terminology'. > > 2) I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human > languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the > things that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in > a given language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only > that language won't be able to say things about it without going through > the work of developing a system of terminology in order to say things about > it, or by translating from another language. > > EDWINA: Of course a language can develop a new system of terminology! The > English and other modern-use languages have all developed such a capacity > for 'discussing projective geometry'. Any language can and does develop new > terms. All the time. That's the nature of thought, and thus, of language - > its openness to new terms. > > 3) My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to > human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter > of logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because > there is so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a > universal human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised > concerns about Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for > representing reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would > have to admit that there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each > human language, and logic would cease to be a general science of reasoning, > and would become indistinguishable from linguistics." > > EDWINA: I agree with you that language should not be used as a model for > representing reasoning or logic, since - although language IS logically > ordered - this doesn't mean that its logical order is *also* a model for > logical reasoning. Peirce repeats that 'reasoning is of a triadic > constitution' (6.321) - and this doesn't fit in with the constitution of a > language. As he also says, logic is 'independent of the structure of the > language in which it may happen to be expressed" 3.430.And I also reject, > as do you, that there are 'different kinds of reasoning, one for each human > language'. But the very FACT that 'the world is chiefly governed by thought > [1.349] means that it includes ALL three modal categories. Not just > Thirdness, habit, a 'frozen language'. > > 4) If you think this statement does not clarify my position well enough, > please let me know what specifically you feel continues to be an important > issue. If it helps, by saying that human languages differ with respect to &
Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, I don't see this discussion as beneficial for either of us, and think it's time to let it go. I appreciate your clearly very spirited attempt to correct my misunderstanding and ignorance, and I'm sorry that we can't understand one another on this issue. -- Franklin - On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 5:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Franklin - briefly, I don't see language as 'just grammar' and therefore, > disagree with your description of me: > > I suppose that you have somehow gotten stuck on the idea that the > development of a language must be a development of its grammar. > > I don't see that the development of the knowledge base of a society > requires a 'development of the grammar' of its language! [From what to > what] Just as I don't see that the words/terms must be in place BEFORE > the thought - as you seem to believe. I believe the opposite - the thought > is expressed by a slew of new words or, using old words, by giving them new > meanings. > > I see a language as a grammar and words - and the words can change their > meaning, and also, new words can be created. But - I don't equate the > cognitive nature of a group with their language. You seem to do this. > > Of course a word, since it is purely a symbol, only means what the human > mind has defined it to mean. But - does man think only in words? Of course > not - as Peirce noted, man uses both words and other external symbols (eg, > graphs, diagrammes, mathematics) to articulate his thoughts. > > No, I don't pit Firstness versus Thirdness and I didn't say that it > 'erases' Thirdness. Remember, that Thirdness is about generalities and it > can, as such, permit multiple versions and meanings of the same symbol. Nor > did I say that the human mind is independent of language - and wonder how > you came up with both these conclusions about my views. BUT, MIND, as a > natural axiom of the universe, IS independent of language - As I pointed > out - it appears in the work of bees, of crystals. The human mind, with > very little innate knowledge, is not independent of symbolic communication > - which, in one format, language, operates within a grammatical structure > expressed in 'bits' or words. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Franklin Ransom > *To:* Peirce-L > *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 4:40 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > Edwina, > > My point is that ANY peoples, - since they have the capacity for thought - >> and thus, ANY language, can achieve such a result - and it doesn't require >> any 'development of the language'. > > > It certainly does require that the language has developed the terms that > allow more complex thoughts to be articulated. > > I suppose that you have somehow gotten stuck on the idea that the > development of a language must be a development of its grammar. As I had > been saying to Sungchul originally, language is a term than can be taken in > a wider sense, and it depends in what sense that term is meant. Clearly, > you want to identify language and grammar as the same thing. I believe that > the vocabulary of a language is also part of what that language is, and the > development of a language's available vocabulary is a development of that > language. Shakespeare, for example, is commonly understood to have > transformed the English language and made it much more expressive in terms > of its vocabulary. Whether one should include the culture and history that > goes with a language as being part of the language, is also a matter for > consideration. I'm not trying to say that one should think of language in > that way, only that this is one way to think about the meaning of the term; > and one needs to get clear about what is meant by the term 'language' when > discussing language. I said that at the outset, and I would have > appreciated it if you read the original discussion and understood that > before accusing me of erroneous views based on your own presumption as to > what language is and what must be meant by its development. I attempted to > clarify that by a language being capable of articulating scientific > terminology, I did not mean that it required a change in its general > grammar to do so, but that there is a community of thought, expressed in > that language, that has developed in that language to express scientific > concepts and understanding. Not every human language has come to develop in > this way with respect to every science there is as of today, and there will > no doubt be sciences in the future that langu
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of the units unifies the unity
of the object and the object as it is in itself." Correspondence, then, is just the fact that the object responds in the way we predict it will, when we interact with it. If it does not, then our idea of the object fails to correspond with the object. I can't recall if Peirce ever explicitly puts it in this way. I am fairly certain I remember John Dewey putting it in this way. While I disagree with much that Dewey says in logic and epistemology, I have found this way of thinking about correspondence as an apt way to put the matter and that it is in harmony with Peirce's point of view about correspondence. Would you be thinking of a triad: reception, perception, conception? This is another case in which I should quote myself from the passage to which you were responding: "[W]e could consider the initial experience as one of perception only, then the experience of seeing the smoke and coming to recognize it as smoke, and then the experience later of interacting with the fire that is the source of the smoke" So the triad would be: perception, conception, interaction. Or maybe: perception, conception, conduct. I am sorry to say this, but I have decided to devote all of my time for the next few months to some intensive reading of logic texts, which includes Vol. 3 and 4 of CP; and before them, some logic texts that I see as important precursors to Peirce's work. Once I am done with that project, I will be back and probably have some questions to pose for the Peirce-L community. For now, I will not be posting again and will not respond to any posts. This is nothing personal, Jerry. I just have to commit myself to this, and it requires all of the intellectual effort I can muster to get through it. But I do look forward to future dialogue with you. -- Franklin On Mon, Jan 4, 2016 at 9:33 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: > (This post was found in my email "Draft Box”. This response was drafted on > Dec. 13 th, 2015. > > Franklin, Matt, List: > > Some short responses to your concerns and further questions are raised. > On Dec 12, 2015, at 4:10 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Jerry, list, > > Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went. > > Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit > I'm not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling' > and 'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something like what the > original meaning of 'atom' meant, as something basic and indivisible from > which other, more complex things can be built up out of. > > > The terms "coupling" and "grammar" are used in the senses of CSP. > Coupling referring to CSP's paper on the logic of Copula. Grammar in the > typical sense that that one may find in the classical text by Otto > Jesperson, *The Philosophy of Grammar *or in CSP's writings*.* > "Unit" being a term of one-ness, such as the 7 basic units of physics > (mass, distance, time, temperature, light, electricity and "mole". Or > integers as numbers. Equally applicable to the basic units of chemistry (92 > different logical structures with names) and biology (cells, etc). Take > you pick for meaningfulness of the term for you and for your personal > philosophy. > > > I've decided to answer the questions in the order reverse to the order in > which they were presented. > > Do you consider this part - whole coupling to be "mereological in >> character"? > > > I'm not sure what that means, but since it's a part-whole relation, and > mereology is a study concerned with such relations, it would seem almost > tautological that it is "mereological in character". But there are > different and competing theories in mereology, and I don't want to be taken > as supporting any one of them specifically. > > > But, you wrote: > Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a > whole, requires the whole work of understanding. > > This is what motivated my questions: > In what sense are your using "whole-ness" where the suffix -ness infers > changing an adjective into a noun -in the grammatical sense of the > wholeness of the smoke or the sense of the wholeness of interpretation? > > > Is smoke a unit? Is a precept a unit? > > > I take it you meant "percept", not precept. I would say it depends on the > context; in one context, we could take percepts as our basic elements, or > units, while in another context of analysis we might try to break it down > more, as presumably someone in experimental psychology might try to break > down sense impressions to the physical operations of the body and the thing >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
Cathy, list, I was hoping to post sooner, but just got around to it; I'm sorry for the late contribution. First of all, I find myself in agreement with Frederik's proposed view of the Kandinskys, namely that they form a part of Peirce's analysis of natural classes in the manuscript, and probably should have been included in the publication of the manuscript. Second, I noticed that on p.255, when enumerating the definitions of natural classes given from Ms. 725, Frederik writes for the third definition: "3) classes without an Area". Compare with p.239, where Frederik quotes the paragraph from Ms. 725: "In other words *cow* is a term which has an area; *red cow* has no area, except that area which every term has, namely that it excites a particular emotion in the mind." The third definition has to be a typo on Frederik's part; it should read "3) classes with an Area". Of course, Frederik goes on to argue that this way of defining natural classes is untenable, because artificial classes must have area too, on Frederik's view. I would like to discuss this problem of defining natural classification further below. But first, Cathy, you said above: "I think what the snippet shows is that it's worth bearing in mind that Peirce's paper on logical comprehension and extension was very early - 1867 - and here he is still working in a 'finitist' tradition in metaphysics and logic, which he manages to shake himself free of in his later synechism. Under synechism every real object has an infinite number of attributes, and every meaningful predicate or general term effectively has an infinite number of aspects, so a simple multiplication of B x D is pointless." Are you making a criticism of the position that Frederik defends in Chapter 9, arguing that his interpretation does not adequately take into account the influence of Peirce's synechism on later accounts of his theory of information? Consider p.236, where Frederik says: "In the geometrical metaphor adopted from Hamilton, Peirce consequently names this information concept 'Area': Breadth x Depth = Area = Information This formula is a formalization of the common sense intuition that if a sign says a lot of things about a lot of objects, it contains much information, but it does not yield to explicit quantification because of the issue of quantifying intensions (depth). A quarter of a century later, in the 'Kaina Stocheia' (1904), Peirce retains this theory: 'Besides the logical depth and breadth, I have proposed (in 1867) the terms *information* and *area* to denote the total fact (true or false) that in a given state of knowledge a sign embodies' (EP II, 305)." On my view, this means that a multiplication of B x D is anything but pointless. While it is true that Frederik goes on to say that area cannot be sufficient for identifying natural classes, this is not the same as saying that area definitions are "pointless". The definition of a natural class does not exhaustively identify a thing's attributes, but it does form the basis of further inquiry, wherein the information identified with the natural class can increase throughout the course of inquiring into that natural class; whereas this cannot really be true for an artificial class, which has its area decided by fiat, or so Frederik would have to aver. So the difference between a natural class and an artificial class is not that one has area and the other does not; rather it is that a natural class's area can change and increase over time, while an artificial class's area cannot. This means that breadth x depth = area = information is still very much at play and basic to Peirce's theory of logical quantity; in other words, the multiplication of B x D is not pointless, but still forms the basis of analyzing the meaning of a term (or proposition, or argument), as well as forms the basis of its synthesizing with new findings in continuing inquiry. It seems to me that you, Cathy, do recognize that a natural class is one into which we can continue to inquire and learn more about the class, but I find your analysis then gets confused in rejecting the idea of information as the product of breadth and depth; this formula is never really rejected by Peirce, and I don't find that Frederik rejects it either. It only becomes more nuanced and part of a more complex analysis over the years, or so I find. Now, having accepted it for the sake of argument above, I would actually like to take issue with Frederik's notion that the class *red cows*, or any artificial class, has an area. In OLEC, Peirce clearly states the following (see 6th paragraph, "The Conceptions of Quality, Relation, and Representation, applied to this Subject", available online at Arisbe; italics in original): "1st, The informed *breadth* of the symbol; 2d, The informed *depth* of the symbol; 3d, The sum of synthetical propositions in which the symbol is subject or predicate, or the *information* concerning the symbol. By breadth and depth, with
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims
Yogi, Gary, list(s), I'm not on the biosemiotics list, so I can't send my reply there. If someone wants to forward it for me, that would be nice; or if I should join that list-serv, please me know that I should do so and how. On the subject of the pragmatic maxim, Yogi says: "A sign’s immediate meaning is the “sum of all the obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the dynamic meaning of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the final meaning of that sign “compris[es] all implications of it in the state of knowledge” at its ideal limit” (p. 295). Stjernfelt is right to stress Peirce’s “important tension” between the given incomplete current regarding of a sign, and the sign understood from a place of perfect knowledge (p. 296)." In Frederik's text, it seems to me that he identifies the pragmatic maxim and a sign's immediate meaning as one and the same. He writes: "As a meaning theory, it may be compared to the mature Peirce's idea that the immediate meaning of a sign is the sum of all the obvious logical implications of that sign (to be distinguished from the dynamic meaning of the sign, inferable from the context of utterance, on the one hand, and the final meaning of the sign, on the other, comprising all implications of it in the state of knowledge in the limit)" (p.295). This suggests that Frederik does identify the two as one and the same. But in various places in his writings, Peirce distinguishes logical analysis from pragmatic analysis; logical analysis has to do with analyzing the implications of a definition. Also, I'm not so sure the immediate interpretant of a sign is its obvious logical implications; after all, Peirce did introduce the idea of the logical interpretant, not as an alternative to the immediate interpretant, but as associated with the final meaning of the sign. And besides that, I'm not so sure that the pragmatic maxim has to do with logical implications, or at least not all of them; I would suppose the pragmatic maxim limited to logical implications involving subjunctive conditionals or counter-factuals, given what Peirce says in his later writings. So I have some concerns with Frederik's depiction of the pragmatic maxim from the standpoint of semiotic. Overall the chapter seems fine to me in showing how the maxims inter-relate and work together. What I don't really understand is the preoccupation with the Enlightenment, and trying to talk about it as something that predates humanity; that strikes me as a bit bizarre. "Before man, this implies that the process of Enlightenment was already brewing in organic nature" (p.304). And earlier, a statement is made which I'm not sure how to make sense of: "The growth of symbols, then, is the Enlightenment process of self-evolving semiotic systems approaching reality in the limit" (p.297). Why is this an Enlightenment process? Doesn't this seem to be stretching what was a particular historical period in Western history into a cosmic process? Why is this necessary to do? -- Franklin On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 10:10 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > List, > > I'm certain Yogi meant to send this post to peirce-l as well as to the > biosemiotics list. > > Best, > > Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: yogi hendlin > Date: Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 6:04 PM > Subject: [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 > Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > > > Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 “Strategies of Research: Peirce’s > Enlightenment Maxims” > > > > Dear List, returning to the final part of Natural Propositions, we can > finish the discussion of the book. In Stjernfelt’s closing chapters, he > assembles what he calls Peirce’s three Enlightenment maxims. > > According to “The Pragmatic Maxim,” which states that “all sorts of > metaphysical ideals which do not have any ‘practical bearings’ or ‘effects’ > (1878), any ensuing ‘imperative practical maxims’ (1903), are null and > void” (p. 295). For biosemiotics, this puts hypostatic abstraction in an > interesting position of only being “real” insofar as such abstractions make > “marks on bodies” in the world (to take Karen Barad’s (2007) quote of Niels > Bohr as the reference point of Bateson’s “differences that make a > difference”). This concretization of the ideational creation of hypostatic > abstraction means that such abstractions are only graspable to the extent > they are translated into something in the world observable to and having > effects on others. A sign’s *immediate* meaning is the “sum of all the > obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the *dynamic* meaning > of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the > *final* m
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims
Thanks Gary F., although I contributed to discussion only on Ch.9. I actually have no idea what happened to discussion of Ch.10, and was hoping someone could illuminate for me when it happened and how to find it. -- Franklin On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 1:16 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote: > Yogi, Cathy L., lists, > > > > This is quite an admirable and thought-provoking summary of the concluding > chapters of NP. I think Stjernfelt has opened some new doors to the fuller > comprehension of Peircean semiotics and its contribution to cenoscopy, and > your post in turn opens some doors to the fuller comprehension of > Stjernfelt’s work. I wish I had time right now to address some of the > specific points you’ve made, but at the moment there are other doors I have > to get through before they close on me … Thanks also to Frank R. for > carrying forward Cathy’s discussion of Chapters 9/10, something else I > haven’t found time to do. Thanks in advance to the others who will follow > up these threads before I can do so (as I hope to, some day …). > > > > gary f. > > > > *From:* yogi hendlin [mailto:hend...@philsem.uni-kiel.de] > *Sent:* 29-Mar-15 6:05 PM > *To:* biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > *Subject:* [biosemiotics:8132] Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 > Strategies of Research: Peirces Enlightenment Maxims > > > > Natural Propositions: Chapter 11/12 “Strategies of Research: Peirce’s > Enlightenment Maxims” > > > > Dear List, returning to the final part of Natural Propositions, we can > finish the discussion of the book. In Stjernfelt’s closing chapters, he > assembles what he calls Peirce’s three Enlightenment maxims. > > According to “The Pragmatic Maxim,” which states that “all sorts of > metaphysical ideals which do not have any ‘practical bearings’ or ‘effects’ > (1878), any ensuing ‘imperative practical maxims’ (1903), are null and > void” (p. 295). For biosemiotics, this puts hypostatic abstraction in an > interesting position of only being “real” insofar as such abstractions make > “marks on bodies” in the world (to take Karen Barad’s (2007) quote of Niels > Bohr as the reference point of Bateson’s “differences that make a > difference”). This concretization of the ideational creation of hypostatic > abstraction means that such abstractions are only graspable to the extent > they are translated into something in the world observable to and having > effects on others. A sign’s *immediate* meaning is the “sum of all the > obvious logical implications of that sign,” while the *dynamic* meaning > of the same sign is “inferable from the context of the utterance,” and the > *final* meaning of that sign “compris[es] all implications of it in the > state of knowledge” at its ideal limit” (p. 295). Stjernfelt is right to > stress Peirce’s “important tension” between the given incomplete current > regarding of a sign, and the sign understood from a place of perfect > knowledge (p. 296). Pragmaticism, however, requires not eliding this > tension and alleging perfect knowledge (metaphysics) when all one has is > incomplete knowledge. > > Although Stjernfelt accepts the scientific optimism of Peirce, Tejera > (1996) points out that this optimism is far from a foregone conclusion, and > may in fact be in part a misreading of Peirce, at least as far as the > discourse ethicists Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas are concerned. > > According to Peirce’s second maxim, “Symbols Grow,” Stjernfelt can be seen > as extending the commentaries of Heidegger regarding the world, > Wittgenstein vis-à-vis language games, and Habermas in terms of the > lifeworld. What I mean is that this maxim acknowledges that there is a > world of signs that all beings are born into, and that in becoming, they > too become signs that will influence others in ways that persist after they > are gone. This evolution of signs is, according to Hoffmeyer (2008) > (following Sebeok), at least, coextensive with the evolution of > life. Hence, this biosemiotic extension from the creative way in which > signs disclose themselves dynamically in relation to their objects and > interpretants brings us to a more relational, less serial, semiotics. > > Building on the notion that “indicatives are concealed conditional > imperatives” (p. 296), the dynamic movement of signs links the advent of > signs with the advent of thought (“as soon as you have signs giving rise to > other signs, however simple, you have thought” p. 297). But the dynamism of > thought/signs transcends the agental approach of willful subject/passive > object, and instead, signs themselves become part of the natural selection > process of the survival of the fittest signs, and the evolution of signs > into highly diverse and differentiated interacting (and growing) > manifestations. Despite the diversity of thought and signs, the ideal state > for Peirce then acts as an “attractor” that shepherds signs and though to > certain ends despite path dependency (p.299). This flow towards > perfectionist ends
[PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Hello lists,
As Gary Fuhrman posted two weeks ago, I will be leading discussion on
Chapter 10 of NP. I am sorry for posting a week later than planned.
In what follows, I will treat each section of the chapter, partly to
summarize the important points up for discussion, and partly to remind
listers of the contents of the chapter. Afterwards, I will finish with some
issues and questions regarding the chapter. Next week, I will post on the
relationship between this chapter and the other chapters of the book.
10.0
"The truth, however, appears to be that all deductive reasoning, even
simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, deduction
consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose parts
shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of
reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of
observing the result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among
the parts" ("On the Algebra of Logic", 1885, 3.363) (p.268 of NP)
All deduction makes use of diagrams. A diagram is defined as an icon which,
by analogy, represents relations between objects. This means that diagrams
do not necessarily have to be graphic, visual representations, but can
include a much larger variety of representations, including even algebraic
formulas.
Mathematics is the science that has to do with drawing necessary
conclusions regarding hypotheses about the forms of relations of objects.
As Frederik restates it, mathematics has to do with hypothetical abstract
objects. In order to access such objects, a two-step process involving
diagrams is required:
First, a given diagram is stripped of its accidental qualities, in a way
similar to how everyday ordinary objects are stripped of their qualities in
order to grasp natural kinds. More formally, it is the process of
prescission, in which a token's accidental qualities are abstracted away so
that all that is left is what is essential to the type of which the token
is an instance. The diagram token, with extraneous considerations removed,
reveals only the essential relations between the objects involved in the
diagram, and thus reveals the diagram type of which it is a diagram token.
Second, the diagram token may be experimented upon according to certain
types of transformations that preserve truth through logical steps. By
experimenting on the diagram token, information can be garnered about the
diagram type. In this way, by manipulating the forms of relations of
objects according to rule-governed transformations that preserve logical
validity, we can learn about hypothetical abstract objects--the subject
matter of mathematics.
According to Peirce's system of the sciences, every other science borrows
principles from mathematics. In considering the relation between
mathematical diagrams and applied diagrams, this means that applied
diagrams, whether having to do with a science or with everyday reasoning,
employ mathematics either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, all deductive
reasoning, whether scientific or everyday, involves mathematical
diagrammatic reasoning. The following discussion about theorematic
diagrammatic reasoning is not only of significance then for mathematics,
but for epistemology as well. Recalling the quote from Peirce given above,
Stjernfelt notes that "[t]he 'unnoticed and hidden' relations obtainable by
diagram observation, of course, are what are later taken to require
theorematic deduction, in addition to mere inference from definitions"
(p.268).
The section finishes with introducing the corollarial/theorematic
distinction. However, the next section details the distinction more
precisely.
10.1
In this section is covered the various definitions given by Peirce over
time about what theorematic reasoning is.
Peirce's five definitions of theorematic reasoning:
1. Theorematic reasoning is not reducible to inferences from conceptual
definitions, i.e. conceptual analysis, in the way that corollarial
reasoning is (though both require observation).
2. Theorematic reasoning involves the introduction of new elements to the
premises, whether new individuals or foreign ideas, abstractions or
non-abstractions.
3. Theorematic reasoning involves performing an action that manipulates the
diagram as part of diagram experimentation.
4. Theorematic reasoning requires complex, or specially constructed,
schemata, as opposed to simple schemata in corollarial reasoning; a matter
of difference in degree of complexity.
5. Theorematic reasoning requires a new point of view of the problem.
"To sum up Peirce's different descriptions of theorematic reasoning, we can
say they exceed the mere explication from the combination of definitions by
introducing something further, be it new elements (particular or general),
be it experiments by diagram manipulation, be it the substitution of
schemata for words, or be it the gestalt shift of seeing the whole problem
from another point of view." (p.280)
10.2
The
Fwd: [biosemiotics:8342] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
-- Forwarded message -- From: Franklin Ransom Date: Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 5:11 PM Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8342] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee Ben, lists, Thank you, Ben, for a post that is (clearly) on topic. Frederik notes, in the fourth definition of theorematic reasoning, that it involves schemata rather than words. Actually, he qualifies this claim, noticing that Peirce says even words are schemata, but rather simple schemata. Theorematic reasoning typically involves then complicated schemata. It is really a matter of degree or gradation though, as corollarial reasoning typically involves simpler schemata and theorematic reasoning typically involves complicated schemata, relative to each other. In the text, p.276-7, Frederik seems to associate schemata with diagrams, so that corollarial reasoning makes less use of diagrams and theorematic reasoning makes greater use of diagrams. If I recall correctly, this is all that is really mentioned about complexity or complication. Otherwise, there is the discussion in the chapter regarding the possibility that some theorematic reasoning, using a different logic system (by this, meaning a different set of axioms and rules), may be reworked as corollarial reasoning, because not needing to include something new or foreign to the premises and conclusion as the other logic system would have required. I believe that is in p.280-3. As I understand it, what Frederik takes to be most essential is the introduction of something new or foreign to the reasoning, and not so much the relative simplicity or complexity of the reasoning. This is probably due to the flexibility of some reasonings as being capable of classification under either head, depending upon the logic system at work. With respect to nontriviality or depth, this isn't really discussed in the chapter. The point of the chapter is less about the value of theorems than it is about explaining what theorematic diagrammatic reasoning is and what its significance is. In fact, the significance seems to be less about the importance of theorematic reasoning in mathematics and more about the importance of theorematic reasoning for epistemology, i.e. for knowledge whether of the scientific sort or of the everyday sort. My concern about corollarial reasoning is that, since corollarial reasoning does involve experimentation, what should be the point of experimentation if nothing unnoticed or hidden ever appeared as a result? I don't doubt that theorematic reasoning is better for the purpose, I just don't think that it's a hard-and-fast line to be drawn between theorematic and corollarial reasoning. Perhaps my concern would be better answered though if it were made clearer what the role of these reasonings is in the context of scientific method, which would allow for a clearer account of the Holm example. -- Franklin On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 2:05 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Franklin, lists, > > I agree with Jon, thanks for your excellent starting post. > > You wrote, > > [] Why can't corollarial reasoning, which involves observation and > experimentation, reveal unnoticed and hidden relations? After all, on > p.285-6, Frederik mentions the work of police detective Jorn "Old Man" Holm > and his computer program, which Frederik describes as a "practical example > of corollarial map reasoning" (p.285). In this example, Holm uses the > corollarial reasoning to reveal information about the whereabouts of > suspects. Doesn't the comparison of the map reasoning with suspects' > testimony end up revealing unnoticed and hidden relations? > > There's a distinction that some make between complexity and mere > complication. Corollarial reasonings may accumulate mere complications > until the result becomes hard to see, although it involves little if any > complexity in, more or less, the sense of depth or nontriviality. > > I don't know whether there's a theorematic approach to Jørn Holm's > diagrammatization that would show its result in a nontrivial aspect, and > anyway its diagrammatic, pictorial presentation already leaves one in no > doubt that a pattern is revealed. A good example involving alternate proofs > that seem corollarial and theorematic is the Monty Hall problem, a popular > puzzle based in probability theory. I remember reading an essentially > corollarial proof of the answer, and seeing a round diagram that showed how > alternatives lead inevitably to the conclusion in the diagram's center. The > answer to the Monty Hall problem remains, however, notoriously > counter-intuitive to people; the essentially corollarial but multi-step > proof - in words, even with the round diagram - often leaves people with >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8352] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial
Gary, list, Sorry, I noticed that Steven and Edwina had not been posting to Peirce-L, so I thought I should leave that discussion in the biosemiotics list. -- Franklin On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 4:31 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > I am taking the liberty of forwarding Frank's note to peirce-l which was, > I assume, inadvertently sent only to the biosemiotics list. I agree with > his principal point that it might be a good idea to return to the > discussion of Chapter 10 of NP. Certainly other topics can be given new > Subject lines. Best, Gary > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 4:23 PM, Franklin Ransom < > pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Steven, Edwina, list, >> >> I'm not entirely sure what the discussion between Steven and Edwina has >> to do with the content of the chapter that is the topic of the thread. >> Hoping this gets back to that somehow, I would like to say a couple of >> things. >> >> First, it is not only the ideas about mathematics drawing necessary >> conclusions and other sciences borrowing principles from mathematics that >> are at work here--it is important that the subject matter of mathematics >> has to do with hypotheses concerning forms of relations. Without that idea, >> the other ideas could not deliver the results that Frederik discusses for >> the significance of diagrams for mathematics and epistemology. >> >> Second, of course Charles Peirce did not originate every idea of which he >> made use. Just about the thing I love most about him and his work is the >> way he works to carry forward the work of others, in the genuine spirit of >> community of inquiry. And I don't see why, because Benjamin Peirce >> developed certain ideas, that this somehow lessens what is at stake in Ch. >> 10 of NP. Are we supposed to judge of the merit of an idea based upon the >> character of the person who first introduced it? I admit that in certain >> limited situations, this may be true, but I don't see that in this context, >> a context which is guided by an interest in scientific inquiry. >> >> Which brings me to my third point: Even if we give due credit to Benjamin >> Peirce, how does that affect the argument that is up for discussion in the >> chapter? Is this really just about saying that Frederik should have said >> that Charles got a couple of those ideas from his father? Frederik already >> made a point of mentioning that mathematics as the science of drawing >> necessary conclusions comes from Benjamin. >> >> So, why are we talking about this here? >> >> -- Franklin >> >> On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 3:33 PM, Edwina Taborsky >> wrote: >> >>> You are missing the point of 'la longue duree' - with your changing it >>> to a long-term Result. You are reducing complex causality to a singular >>> linear 'what comes after some individual comes up with a new idea'..and are >>> describing individuals who advocate, copy, echo. That's not what 'la >>> longue duree' is about nor is it what I am talking about...that 'community >>> of scholars' that develops knowledge. >>> >>> Your insistence that Benjamin Peirce originated an idea and that Charles >>> Peirce merely copied it - and your question of - so what is new' about what >>> Peirce said - fits in with your answer, that one individual comes up with >>> the idea and others simply copy it. That's not what I'm talking about. >>> >>> I'm talking about the development of knowledge. You claim that it's all >>> based on 'individuals' - which I call The Great Man theory. I reject that >>> and claim that knowledge and its development is based within a >>> community-of-knowledge, with individuals in that community working within a >>> societal complex (population, economic mode, societal beliefs, technology, >>> power-politics etc)..and these individuals as a network develop new >>> knowledge. One individual may articulate that new knowledge but it never >>> appears unattached to the deeper community-of-knowledge and the societal >>> complex. >>> >>> I suggest we stop this interaction, as we each have our point of view, >>> and each of us remains unconvinced by the arguments of the other. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>>
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8354] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial
Steven, list, Steven, if I tried to do that, I might as well start with the Ancient philosophers and mathematicians and move my way up; and I don't see you trying to champion the cause of Euclid. In any case, my post is not a published work in scholarship; it's an attempt to discuss the work. In the work itself, credit is given where it should be. My aim was to discuss the ideas, which are partly Benjamin's, partly Charles's, and partly Frederik's. Since it is assumed that participants have read, or are reading, the book, and there is quite a lot going on in the chapter, I aimed to grasp what is most essential and (re)present it. But I appreciate your point about Benjamin's contributions, along with Euclid's. If Benjamin's take on these ideas is of some further relevance for the subject of the chapter, please continue and communicate the relevance for diagrammatic experimentation. -- Franklin On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 4:38 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: > > No mention of Benjamin is made in your original post and it reads as if > all from Charles, giving new readers especially a false idea concerning his > contributions. When his individual contribution should be positioned in the > community of scholars. > > This is why the discussion is relevant. > > Regards, > Steven > > > -- > Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith, Los Gatos, California. +1-650-308-8611 > http://iase.info > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
Cathy, lists, Well, look at this way: It is possible for there to be objects in the senses which are yet not perceived, because we do not yet have any idea of what it is to which we are looking. It takes a hypothesis to introduce a new idea to us to explain what it is, which hypothesis we can then put to the test. In order to do so, we must determine what kinds of characters to look for (deduction helps here) and then look for existent objects (induction) to learn whether the purported relations between characters obtain in fact, and in this way we come to understand the thing which we are experiencing. It is of course induction which gives us more information; abduction simply gives us the idea which needs to become informed, and deduction is merely explicative, based on relating the idea to other ideas and previously gathered information regarding those ideas. Obviously, we cannot conduct induction without end, because that is a practical impossibility. Our 'sum', as you put it, far from being always an infinity, will very likely never be an infinity in practice, in whatever sense you mean to understand the application of infinity to a 'sum' of information. Of course, as an ideal, where science, the community of inquiry as such, continues to investigate, it is possible for the information of an idea to reach a much greater 'sum' than would otherwise be possible for individuals such as you or me. But it is a commonplace of science that ideas that work and continue to work are understood more thoroughly in their relations to other ideas over the course on inquiry. This means of course that not only the breadth, but also the depth of the idea continues to grow. As a result, typically, rather than tending to make comparisons moot, we start to see a hierarchy of ideas and related sciences appear. Consider this passage: "The former [Cows] is a natural class, the latter [Red Cows] is not. Now one predicate more may be attached to Red Cows than to Cows; hence Mr. Mill's attempts to analyze the difference between natural and artificial classes is seen to be a failure. For, according to him, the difference is that a real kind is distinguished by unknown multitudes of properties while an artificial class has only a few determinate ones. Again there is an unusual degree of accordance among naturalists in making Vertebrates a natural class. Yet the number of predicates proper to it is comparatively small" (NP, p.238, quoting Peirce). We can see here that further simplifications are introduced, so taking what is learned about various vertebrates, a new idea, that of vertebrates, appears which simplifies the characters involved. Conversely, species under vertebrates will become much more determinate in terms of their characters, but be simplified with respect to their extension. You said above: "Under synechism every real object has an infinite number of attributes, and every meaningful predicate or general term effectively has an infinite number of aspects, so a simple multiplication of B x D is pointless." And yet natural kinds appear, in which certain attributes, predicates, or aspects appear significant, and others do not. It is precisely the work of abduction to simplify what is observed so that what is essential is grasped, and not simply a never-ending multitude of characters. Such simplification is always with respect to a purpose. With respect to natural kinds, such purpose, or telos, is objective, and we see nature all around us selecting certain characters over others as more significant. If this were not true, natural science would be impossible. As to real objects, yes they have an infinite number, but not all of them are relevant to the purpose of interaction with the real object. Certain meaningful attributes are selected for in attention in order to aid conduct with respect to some purpose at hand. Information relevant to that purpose is what is sought for. I do have a couple of questions for you: For one, would you explain the idea that propositions can't be counted? I would suppose that when conducting an experiment, the number of times a fact is determined relates to developing a frequency ratio, which means that propositions can be counted in this case, when they are instances of the same kind or type, or close enough. But if we are talking about propositions which are all different from each other, than I can see the point, because that is like trying to count qualities, which isn't very helpful for comparison. But of course, that's not the same thing as having so many propositions that they go to infinity and thus can't be counted for that reason. Is this what is meant, that there are supposed to be so many propositions that they go to infinity? Perhaps it would be helpful if you referenced the text where Peirce mentions this. For two, you said "Even an artifically generated term such as 'red' and 'cow' will still partake of the surprisingness of 'cow' and 'red' taken on their own." What do
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10. Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Jon, I look forward to learning from your reflections. -- Franklin On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 10:24 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Re: Franlin Ransom > At: http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/16188 > > Franklin, > > Thanks for your very able and helpful survey of the chapter. > This is a field of questions to which I have devoted much > reflection over the years and I hope to find some time to > spend on it this week. But I was in hospital last week > for some minor surgery and may be slow catching up, > plus I need to finish up one or two other lines of > inquiry that were interrupted in the interval. > > Regards, > > Jon > > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [biosemiotics:8358] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
Ben, lists, The connection you drew between the first and the fourth definitions of theorematic reasoning is quite interesting; I had not thought of conceptual analysis in quite that way. At least, though, the complexity of the diagram or icon is likely more complicated in the case of theorematic reasoning than in corollarial reasoning. I suppose I somehow think that a theorematic reasoning is often a previous corollarial reasoning but with something novel introduced, which would make the theorematic reasoning straightforwardly more complicated than the corollarial reasoning. Part of my concern about the relationship between theorematic reasoning and abductive inference is that Frederik isn't just attempting to discuss mathematics when treating of theorematic diagrammatic reasoning. Rather, the significance is for all knowledge. Because the mathematical-diagrams are ubiquitous, and because Frederik takes the mathematical diagrams to be a priori, this means that all knowledge includes the a priori as a constituent element. This is a very Kantian move, repeated by C.I. Lewis in his *Mind and the World-Order*. I am quite wary of this move. I think it very important the way you put the following: "The conclusions are aprioristically true only given the hypotheses, but the hypotheses themselves are not aprioristically true nor asserted to be true except hypothetically, and this hypotheticality is what allows such assurance of the conclusions, although even the hypothesis is upended if it leads to such contradictions as render the work futile". And then part of your quote from Peirce: "Mathematics merely traces out the consequences of hypotheses without caring whether they correspond to anything real or not. It is purely deductive, and all necessary inference is mathematics, pure or applied. Its hypotheses are suggested by any of the other sciences, but its assumption of them is not a scientific act." There are two things to be said about this. The first is that the hypotheses are originally suggested by experience. The second is that, even once assumed, a hypothesis could lead to a contradiction, which is a kind of experience, or so it seems to me; there is a sense of brute fact, or Secondness, about a contradiction. For hypotheses that continue to work, and turn out to apply to everyday experience and sciences other than mathematics, it is the application which proves the ultimate efficacy of the hypotheses and the necessary conclusions drawn from them, and thus makes them a posteriori, a matter of being really accepted as knowledge only when proved in application. Here's an example of Frederik's take on a priori reasoning from p.287-8, discussing Jared Diamond's *Guns, Germs, and Steel*: "Domestication presupposes the presence of easily domesticated species and the stable human settlement over many generations in the environment favoring the survival of these species. But local domestications only get the ability to deeply influence the development of human civilization if they are able to spread from there to other areas and cultures...Most favourably it spreads in the overall East-West direction, along isotherms, keeping climate conditions approximately constant--as opposed to traveling in the North-South direction where climate changes drastically with latitude. By this piece of a priori diagram reasoning--based on the combination of biogeographical ontology and the ontology of human culture development--Eurasia stands out as a privileged site for the original domestication of agricultural species...Empirical findings subsequently corroborate this piece of theorematic reasoning". The biogeographical ontology and the ontology of human culture development cannot themselves be a priori, but rather the deliverance of scientific inquiry. A whole host of information is brought forward, which is inadequately reflected in the reference to two ontologies rather than to two fields of scientific inquiry, which understanding as dealing not simply with ontologies but with sciences would make not only ontology but also the previously gathered information acknowledged as relevant. The diagrammatic reasoning cannot be considered as an a priori affair. It is, so far as I understand Peirce's placement of deduction in the order of inquiry, a deductive development of ideas received through hypotheses, as would occur in the typical abduction-deduction-induction approach to scientific method. I don't doubt that pure mathematics is possible. I only doubt that it is somehow to be conceived as reasoning which happens prior to all experience. That's just not true. What is true is that its conclusions do not immediately have to do with reality; for that, experiment in experience is required. I guess this is all related to my wondering about how diagrammatic experimentation relates to experimentation generally, and the place of the mathematical diagrammatic reasoning in the context of scientific method. It seems to me that Fre
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
Cathy, Frederik, lists, Yes, Frederik, that makes sense to me. As I mentioned in my previous post, counting qualities or characters doesn't seem to be helpful. Although it should be possible to enumerate them, to a point, for the purpose of some inquiry. As I recall, Jon Awbrey in the last month or two referenced a text from Peirce about the multiplication of breadth and depth using symbols like 1, 0, and the infinity loop, to distinguish cases such as essential depth and breadth, substantial depth and breadth, the idea of nothing, the idea of being, etc. If infinity was indeed used then, Peirce had certainly contemplated infinite depth and infinite breadth, although perhaps not simply in the sense of counting with no end, but in the direct sense of being that which is without limit, so depth without limit or breadth without limit. -- Franklin On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > Dear Franklin, Cathy, Lists - > > A small clarification: Peirce's *BxD=A* idea, I think, should not be > taken a device for the arithmetic calculation of exact information size - > it is rather the proposal of a general law relating Breadth and Depth. His > idea comes from the simple idea that when intension is zero, there is no > information, while when extension is zero, there is also no information - > and that is the relation of the two factors in a product. (It is a bit > like his first Boole-inspired definition of universal quantification as a > product - he defines truth as 1, falsity as 0, then, in order to be true, > each single case of a universal proposition should be true - if any single > one of them is false, the total product of them all will be zero.) > The BXD=A idea allows him to investigate what happens if intension or > extension are in- or decreased, etc. - even if not being able to express > that in precise numbers. > > Best > F > > > Den 20/04/2015 kl. 01.14 skrev Franklin Ransom < > pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>: > > Cathy, lists, > > Well, look at this way: It is possible for there to be objects in the > senses which are yet not perceived, because we do not yet have any idea of > what it is to which we are looking. It takes a hypothesis to introduce a > new idea to us to explain what it is, which hypothesis we can then put to > the test. In order to do so, we must determine what kinds of characters to > look for (deduction helps here) and then look for existent objects > (induction) to learn whether the purported relations between characters > obtain in fact, and in this way we come to understand the thing which we > are experiencing. It is of course induction which gives us more > information; abduction simply gives us the idea which needs to become > informed, and deduction is merely explicative, based on relating the idea > to other ideas and previously gathered information regarding those ideas. > > Obviously, we cannot conduct induction without end, because that is a > practical impossibility. Our 'sum', as you put it, far from being always an > infinity, will very likely never be an infinity in practice, in whatever > sense you mean to understand the application of infinity to a 'sum' of > information. Of course, as an ideal, where science, the community of > inquiry as such, continues to investigate, it is possible for the > information of an idea to reach a much greater 'sum' than would otherwise > be possible for individuals such as you or me. But it is a commonplace of > science that ideas that work and continue to work are understood more > thoroughly in their relations to other ideas over the course on inquiry. > This means of course that not only the breadth, but also the depth of the > idea continues to grow. As a result, typically, rather than tending to make > comparisons moot, we start to see a hierarchy of ideas and related sciences > appear. > > Consider this passage: "The former [Cows] is a natural class, the latter > [Red Cows] is not. Now one predicate more may be attached to Red Cows than > to Cows; hence Mr. Mill's attempts to analyze the difference between > natural and artificial classes is seen to be a failure. For, according to > him, the difference is that a real kind is distinguished by unknown > multitudes of properties while an artificial class has only a few > determinate ones. Again there is an unusual degree of accordance among > naturalists in making Vertebrates a natural class. Yet the number of > predicates proper to it is comparatively small" (NP, p.238, quoting > Peirce). We can see here that further simplifications are introduced, so > taking what is learned about various vertebrates, a new idea, that of > vertebrates, appears which simplifies the characters involved.
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8369] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10:
Frederik, lists, I'm not sure, but this appears in my email as a separate thread, having copied posts that I sent to the other thread. Since Frederik replied to my posts on this one, I suppose I'll reply here for now. If this doesn't appear as a new thread to anyone else, then please ignore my comment. Just to be clear, I think that this will definitely be a case of "we will just have to agree to disagree". Frederik, you are clearly professionally committed to the a priori; I am constitutionally committed to radical empiricism. Now that you are forewarned about that, I'll say a couple of things about my point of view. I'm not so sure that empiricists like myself have an "a priori fear of the a priori". When I look at the philosophy of transcendentalism and its results, the fear strikes me as quite experience-based. One can also think about Peirce's remarks in "The Fixation of Belief" about the method of the a priori. I'm not, as an empiricist, particularly impressed with logical positivism as a form of empiricism. I believe it a commonplace in classical pragmatism that the theory of experience at play in pragmatism is not the atomistic approach of the British empiricists or their inheritors in logical positivism/empiricism. My understanding is that whether we are talking about Peirce, James, or Dewey, experience is not conceived on the model of a series of distinct, discrete sense impressions or sense-data. Instead, experience is much more complex, in which conjunction and continuity are just as much found in the experience as are disjunction and discreteness--we do not require some outside source to make our experiences appear connected for us in the first place. Certainly the mind works to bring connection and continuity to its experiences. But it does not do this ex nihilo; such connections and continuities work to extend in novel ways connections and continuities already experienced--the mind generalizes what it has been given to work with. So far as I see it, this is the empiricism that classical pragmatism is based upon, and is part of what my take on empiricism amounts to. I'm not entirely sure what is meant by "dependence structures of objectivity". I also find your ascription of fallibilism to a priori knowledge as bizarre. Rather than discuss what you have had to say further (this post would become inordinately long), I think it would be best to simplify the matter. Suppose I have a surprising experience, and then develop a hypothesis to explain that experience. Once I have the idea in hand from the hypothesis, I deduce consequences from this hypothesis to the point that I now know how to put the hypothesis to inductive experimentation. Now, at this point, I have not yet conducted any inductions. Is this process, from the gaining of a hypothesis to the deduction of consequences, altogether a priori on your account? -- Franklin On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:22 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > Dear Franklin, lists - > > Sorry for having rattled Franklin's empiricist sentiments with > references to the a priori! > Empiricists seem to have an a priori fear of the a priori … but no > philosophy of science has, as yet, been able to completely abolish the a > priori - even logical positvism had to admit logic as a remaining a priori > field (reinterpreting that as tautologies, that is true). > I should probably have given a note here to my own stance on the a priori > - for the interested, I wrote a bit about it in ch. 8 of Diagrammatology > (2007). My take on it there comes more from the early Husserl than from > Peirce: the a priori has nothing to do with Kantian subjectivity, rather, > it consists in dependence structures of objectivity - this makes it subject > to fallibilism - the a priori charts necessities - these come in two > classes, formal ontology and material ontology - the former holds for all > possible objects, the latter for special regions of reality (like physics, > biology, society) - no discipline can function without more or less > explicit conceptual networks defining their basic ideas - being > fallibilist, a priori claims develop with the single scientific disciplines > … > > I happen to think this Husserlian picture (for a present-day version, > see Barry Smith) is compatible with Peirce's classification of the sciences > where, as it is well known, the upper echelon is taken to be a priori in > the sense of not at all containing empirical knowledge while the lower, > "positive" levels inherit structures from those higher ones, co-determining > the way they organize and prioritize their empirical material. > So, it is in this sense of "material ontology" that I speak of > biogeographical ontology and and the ontology of human culture development > involved in Diamond's argument. Given these assumptions, Diamond's > argument, so I argue, is a priori. His conclusion that Eurasia privileges > the spread of domesticated animals does not depend on the empirical > investi
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
Jon, Ben, lists, Whoops! Sorry about that! I guess it just struck me as a "Jon" kind of thing to do, with the slow reads going on about Peirce's earlier logical works. I apologize for the mistake! -- Franklin On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 7:42 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Franklin, List, > > I think that was Ben Udell. > > Regards, > > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > On Apr 20, 2015, at 7:30 PM, Franklin Ransom > wrote: > > Cathy, Frederik, lists, > > Yes, Frederik, that makes sense to me. As I mentioned in my previous post, > counting qualities or characters doesn't seem to be helpful. Although it > should be possible to enumerate them, to a point, for the purpose of some > inquiry. > > As I recall, Jon Awbrey in the last month or two referenced a text from > Peirce about the multiplication of breadth and depth using symbols like 1, > 0, and the infinity loop, to distinguish cases such as essential depth and > breadth, substantial depth and breadth, the idea of nothing, the idea of > being, etc. If infinity was indeed used then, Peirce had certainly > contemplated infinite depth and infinite breadth, although perhaps not > simply in the sense of counting with no end, but in the direct sense of > being that which is without limit, so depth without limit or breadth > without limit. > > -- Franklin > > On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt > wrote: > >> Dear Franklin, Cathy, Lists - >> >> A small clarification: Peirce's *BxD=A* idea, I think, should not be >> taken a device for the arithmetic calculation of exact information size - >> it is rather the proposal of a general law relating Breadth and Depth. His >> idea comes from the simple idea that when intension is zero, there is no >> information, while when extension is zero, there is also no information - >> and that is the relation of the two factors in a product. (It is a bit >> like his first Boole-inspired definition of universal quantification as a >> product - he defines truth as 1, falsity as 0, then, in order to be true, >> each single case of a universal proposition should be true - if any single >> one of them is false, the total product of them all will be zero.) >> The BXD=A idea allows him to investigate what happens if intension or >> extension are in- or decreased, etc. - even if not being able to express >> that in precise numbers. >> >> Best >> F >> >> >> Den 20/04/2015 kl. 01.14 skrev Franklin Ransom < >> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>: >> >> Cathy, lists, >> >> Well, look at this way: It is possible for there to be objects in the >> senses which are yet not perceived, because we do not yet have any idea of >> what it is to which we are looking. It takes a hypothesis to introduce a >> new idea to us to explain what it is, which hypothesis we can then put to >> the test. In order to do so, we must determine what kinds of characters to >> look for (deduction helps here) and then look for existent objects >> (induction) to learn whether the purported relations between characters >> obtain in fact, and in this way we come to understand the thing which we >> are experiencing. It is of course induction which gives us more >> information; abduction simply gives us the idea which needs to become >> informed, and deduction is merely explicative, based on relating the idea >> to other ideas and previously gathered information regarding those ideas. >> >> Obviously, we cannot conduct induction without end, because that is a >> practical impossibility. Our 'sum', as you put it, far from being always an >> infinity, will very likely never be an infinity in practice, in whatever >> sense you mean to understand the application of infinity to a 'sum' of >> information. Of course, as an ideal, where science, the community of >> inquiry as such, continues to investigate, it is possible for the >> information of an idea to reach a much greater 'sum' than would otherwise >> be possible for individuals such as you or me. But it is a commonplace of >> science that ideas that work and continue to work are understood more >> thoroughly in their relations to other ideas over the course on inquiry. >> This means of course that not only the breadth, but also the depth of the >> idea continues to grow. As a result, typically, rather than tending to make >> comparisons moot, we start to see a hierarchy of ideas and related sciences >> appear. >> >> Consider this passage: "The former [Cows] is a natural class, the >> latter [Red Cow
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
Jon, Yes, that is exactly it, thank you so much! -- Franklin On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:30 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Franklin, > > This looks like the post you had in mind: > > BU: > article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15796/match=breadth+depth > > BU:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15796 > > Regards, > > Jon > > > On 4/20/2015 8:21 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > >> Jon, Ben, lists, >> >> Whoops! Sorry about that! I guess it just struck me as a "Jon" kind of >> thing to do, with the slow reads going on about Peirce's earlier logical >> works. I apologize for the mistake! >> >> -- Franklin >> >> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 7:42 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >> >> Franklin, List, >>> >>> I think that was Ben Udell. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com >>> >>> On Apr 20, 2015, at 7:30 PM, Franklin Ransom < >>> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Cathy, Frederik, lists, >>> >>> Yes, Frederik, that makes sense to me. As I mentioned in my previous >>> post, >>> counting qualities or characters doesn't seem to be helpful. Although it >>> should be possible to enumerate them, to a point, for the purpose of some >>> inquiry. >>> >>> As I recall, Jon Awbrey in the last month or two referenced a text from >>> Peirce about the multiplication of breadth and depth using symbols like >>> 1, >>> 0, and the infinity loop, to distinguish cases such as essential depth >>> and >>> breadth, substantial depth and breadth, the idea of nothing, the idea of >>> being, etc. If infinity was indeed used then, Peirce had certainly >>> contemplated infinite depth and infinite breadth, although perhaps not >>> simply in the sense of counting with no end, but in the direct sense of >>> being that which is without limit, so depth without limit or breadth >>> without limit. >>> >>> -- Franklin >>> >>> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt >>> wrote: >>> >>>Dear Franklin, Cathy, Lists - >>>> >>>> A small clarification: Peirce's *BxD=A* idea, I think, should not be >>>> >>>> taken a device for the arithmetic calculation of exact information size >>>> - >>>> it is rather the proposal of a general law relating Breadth and Depth. >>>> His >>>> idea comes from the simple idea that when intension is zero, there is no >>>> information, while when extension is zero, there is also no information >>>> - >>>> and that is the relation of the two factors in a product. (It is a bit >>>> like his first Boole-inspired definition of universal quantification as >>>> a >>>> product - he defines truth as 1, falsity as 0, then, in order to be >>>> true, >>>> each single case of a universal proposition should be true - if any >>>> single >>>> one of them is false, the total product of them all will be zero.) >>>> The BXD=A idea allows him to investigate what happens if intension or >>>> extension are in- or decreased, etc. - even if not being able to express >>>> that in precise numbers. >>>> >>>> Best >>>> F >>>> >>>> >>>> Den 20/04/2015 kl. 01.14 skrev Franklin Ransom < >>>> pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com>: >>>> >>>> Cathy, lists, >>>> >>>> Well, look at this way: It is possible for there to be objects in the >>>> senses which are yet not perceived, because we do not yet have any idea >>>> of >>>> what it is to which we are looking. It takes a hypothesis to introduce a >>>> new idea to us to explain what it is, which hypothesis we can then put >>>> to >>>> the test. In order to do so, we must determine what kinds of characters >>>> to >>>> look for (deduction helps here) and then look for existent objects >>>> (induction) to learn whether the purported relations between characters >>>> obtain in fact, and in this way we come to understand the thing which we >>>> are experiencing. It is of course induction which gives us more >>>> information; abduction simply gives us the idea which needs to become >>>> informed, and deduction is merely
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
And thanks to you too, Ben! On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:31 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: > Franklin, Jon, lists, > > Yep, that was me with Peirce's ∞'s and 0's of breadth and depth, March 8, > 2015, at the link: > https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@list.iupui.edu/msg03282.html > > - Best, Ben > > On 4/20/2015 7:42 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Franklin, List, > > I think that was Ben Udell. > > Regards, > > Jon > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > > On Apr 20, 2015, at 7:30 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Cathy, Frederik, lists, > > Yes, Frederik, that makes sense to me. As I mentioned in my previous post, > counting qualities or characters doesn't seem to be helpful. Although it > should be possible to enumerate them, to a point, for the purpose of some > inquiry. > > As I recall, Jon Awbrey in the last month or two referenced a text from > Peirce about the multiplication of breadth and depth using symbols like 1, > 0, and the infinity loop, to distinguish cases such as essential depth and > breadth, substantial depth and breadth, the idea of nothing, the idea of > being, etc. If infinity was indeed used then, Peirce had certainly > contemplated infinite depth and infinite breadth, although perhaps not > simply in the sense of counting with no end, but in the direct sense of > being that which is without limit, so depth without limit or breadth > without limit. > > -- Franklin > > On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: Fwd: [biosemiotics:8342] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams
heorematic to a schoolchild may well seem > corollarial to a mathematician. Peirce generally discusses reasoning and > inquiry in the context of discovery rather than in the context of > justification, as Frederik pointed out; and we never entirely depart the > context of discovery even when we're focused on justification. Anyway, > corollarial reasoning that is not manifestly redundant (redundant like ' > *pq*, ergo *p*') does provide some jot of novelty or nontriviality; the > categorical syllogisms (such as All A is B, all B is C, ergo all A is C) > are deductive forms designed to assure some modicum of novelty in > corollarial conclusions; and massive, brute-force corollarial computation > may bring things to light that we couldn't find otherwise (it still plays a > big role in the proof of the four-color theorem). What Peirce says is that > sometimes corollarial deduction won't suffice, and that then theorematic > deduction is needed in order to bring something to light. > > Whew. I'm not sure I've addressed all in your post, but I'll let it stand > for now and retract who knows what tomorrow. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/19/2015 5:12 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > > -- Forwarded message -- > From: Franklin Ransom > Date: Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 5:11 PM > Subject: Re: [biosemiotics:8342] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Ch. > 10: Corollarial and Theorematic Experiments with Diagrams > To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee > > > Ben, lists, > > Thank you, Ben, for a post that is (clearly) on topic. > > Frederik notes, in the fourth definition of theorematic reasoning, that > it involves schemata rather than words. Actually, he qualifies this claim, > noticing that Peirce says even words are schemata, but rather simple > schemata. Theorematic reasoning typically involves then complicated > schemata. It is really a matter of degree or gradation though, as > corollarial reasoning typically involves simpler schemata and theorematic > reasoning typically involves complicated schemata, relative to each other. > In the text, p.276-7, Frederik seems to associate schemata with diagrams, > so that corollarial reasoning makes less use of diagrams and theorematic > reasoning makes greater use of diagrams. > > If I recall correctly, this is all that is really mentioned about > complexity or complication. Otherwise, there is the discussion in the > chapter regarding the possibility that some theorematic reasoning, using a > different logic system (by this, meaning a different set of axioms and > rules), may be reworked as corollarial reasoning, because not needing to > include something new or foreign to the premises and conclusion as the > other logic system would have required. I believe that is in p.280-3. > > As I understand it, what Frederik takes to be most essential is the > introduction of something new or foreign to the reasoning, and not so much > the relative simplicity or complexity of the reasoning. This is probably > due to the flexibility of some reasonings as being capable of > classification under either head, depending upon the logic system at work. > > With respect to nontriviality or depth, this isn't really discussed in > the chapter. The point of the chapter is less about the value of theorems > than it is about explaining what theorematic diagrammatic reasoning is and > what its significance is. In fact, the significance seems to be less about > the importance of theorematic reasoning in mathematics and more about the > importance of theorematic reasoning for epistemology, i.e. for knowledge > whether of the scientific sort or of the everyday sort. > > My concern about corollarial reasoning is that, since corollarial > reasoning does involve experimentation, what should be the point of > experimentation if nothing unnoticed or hidden ever appeared as a result? I > don't doubt that theorematic reasoning is better for the purpose, I just > don't think that it's a hard-and-fast line to be drawn between theorematic > and corollarial reasoning. Perhaps my concern would be better answered > though if it were made clearer what the role of these reasonings is in the > context of scientific method, which would allow for a clearer account of > the Holm example. > > -- Franklin > > On Sun, Apr 19, 2015 at 2:05 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote: > >> Franklin, lists, >> >> I agree with Jon, thanks for your excellent starting post. >> >> You wrote, >> >> [] Why can't corollarial reasoning, which involves observation and >> experimentation, reveal unnoticed and hidden relations? After all, on >> p.285-6, Frederik mentions the work of police det
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
e it out and I drifted to other > subjects. My point is that Peirce was remarkably productive at a > philosophical-logic level with the ideas of breadth and depth. Okay, I > don't know that nobody before him had attempted that sort of thing. But > it's like walking into a room full of candy bars. > > I'm not sure whether he stuck with that definition of determination. > > Best, Ben > > On 4/20/2015 8:38 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > And thanks to you too, Ben! > > On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 8:31 PM, Benjamin Udell > wrote: > >> Franklin, Jon, lists, >> >> Yep, that was me with Peirce's ∞'s and 0's of breadth and depth, March 8, >> 2015, at the link: >> https://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@list.iupui.edu/msg03282.html >> >> - Best, Ben >> >> On 4/20/2015 7:42 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >> >> Franklin, List, >> >> I think that was Ben Udell. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com >> >> On Apr 20, 2015, at 7:30 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: >> >> Cathy, Frederik, lists, >> >> Yes, Frederik, that makes sense to me. As I mentioned in my previous >> post, counting qualities or characters doesn't seem to be helpful. Although >> it should be possible to enumerate them, to a point, for the purpose of >> some inquiry. >> >> As I recall, Jon Awbrey in the last month or two referenced a text from >> Peirce about the multiplication of breadth and depth using symbols like 1, >> 0, and the infinity loop, to distinguish cases such as essential depth and >> breadth, substantial depth and breadth, the idea of nothing, the idea of >> being, etc. If infinity was indeed used then, Peirce had certainly >> contemplated infinite depth and infinite breadth, although perhaps not >> simply in the sense of counting with no end, but in the direct sense of >> being that which is without limit, so depth without limit or breadth >> without limit. >> >> -- Franklin >> >> On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 11:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: >> >> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
Jeff, lists, I certainly agree that speculative grammar is important for understanding information in his mature semiotic theory, and that of course the analysis of triadic relations must play a big role in that. I am merely lamenting that, despite the rich analyses of triadic relations that Peirce develops in his mature theory, he makes no detailed account of the consequences for information theory based upon those analyses. For instance, and in particular, how we can update the part of OLEC that Ben quoted, regarding the classification of inferences as changes in logical quantity--depth, breadth, and area or information. -- Franklin On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 4:23 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Frank, Lists, > > You say: "That's why I find it so frustrating to not see an updated > account in the context of his mature semiotic theory..." > > From the discussion of modal dyadic relations: > > CP 3.608 Dyadic relations between symbols, or concepts, are matters of > logic, so far as they are not derived from relations between the objects > and the characters to which the symbols refer. Noting that we are limiting > ourselves to modal dyadic relations, it may probably be said that those of > them that are truly and fundamentally dyadic arise from corresponding > relations between propositions. To exemplify what is meant, the dyadic > relations of logical breadth and depth, often called denotation and > connotation, have played a great part in logical discussions, but these > take their origin in the triadic relation between a sign, its object, and > its interpretant sign; and furthermore, the distinction appears as a > dichotomy owing to the limitation of the field of thought, which forgets > that concepts grow, and that there is thus a third respect in which they > may differ, depending on the state of knowledge, or amount of information. > To give a good and complete account of the dyadic relations of concepts > would be impossible without taking into account the triadic relations > which, for the most part, underlie them; and indeed almost a complete > treatise upon the first of the three divisions of logic would be required. > > So, I would think that "Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations" > should be read in light of these remarks. > > --Jeff > > Jeff Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > NAU > (o) 523-8354 > > From: Franklin Ransom [pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, April 20, 2015 7:17 PM > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 1; > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9 > > Ben, lists, > > With respect to what you just noted about what he does with the breadth, > depth, and information work, I would like to point out that what you note > has to do with the work of inference upon a given state of information. > What I was referring to has to do with defining different states of > information as such. In fact, Peirce does some of that in the OLEC as > well--such as his logical treatment of the concepts of being and nothing, > substantial depth and breadth, etc. > > "When I first saw that years ago, I promptly made it into a table with > fields, and was only a little disappointed to find that Peirce had not > classified all possible combinations of increase / decrease of > comprehension and of extension. He was using the ideas of comprehension and > extension to classify logical acts already named in logical tradition, and > I thought, I'll figure out what logic acts correspond to the remaining > combinations, but I didn't soon figure it out and I drifted to other > subjects. My point is that Peirce was remarkably productive at a > philosophical-logic level with the ideas of breadth and depth. Okay, I > don't know that nobody before him had attempted that sort of thing. But > it's like walking into a room full of candy bars." > > Haha, yes, I agree with the sentiment that it's like walking into a room > full of candy bars (well, if I liked candy bars, anyway). That's why I find > it so frustrating to not see an updated account in the context of his > mature semiotic theory, a continuation of that remarkable productivity, > especially considering how productive he was otherwise in his mature > semiotic work. "Kaina Stocheia" does that a bit, but I would have hoped for > something more detailed and robust. > > "I'm not sure whether he stuck with that definition of determination." > > I had also been wondering that about the definition of determination. > > -- Franklin > > > On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 9:15 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com>> wrote: &g
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Stjernfelt: Chapter 9
Cathy, Jeff, lists, Jeff has taken an interesting approach to trying to meet the issue, but I will try my own take here. Cathy, I note that you specify quantifying the information in a proposition, although this is not the point of the OLEC--that paper has to do with the information of a symbol, which is something quite different. Yes, Peirce says that we can also apply information to propositions and to arguments. But information will not apply to propositions and arguments in the same way that it does to symbols. (Moreover, I'm not sure it's right to think of the information as being "in" a symbol, proposition, or argument.) In the case of the symbol, the information has to do with the sum of propositions in which it appears as either subject or predicate. It's true that quantifying every exact instance can be tedious. But in a scientific inquiry, in which one is conducting experiments and publishing a report of the results, one should hope that this quantifying is exactly what is being accomplished and communicated to future inquiry. As for your objection to applying a metric that brings in a linear scale from less to more information: Peirce is attempting to do away with the thinking that the logical quantities are always inversely proportioned, and proposes instead that a symbol can grow in overall determination. If this were not possible, we can not talk about learning and the development of symbols in inquiry. When we treat of the growth of the symbol, this growth can be viewed both in terms of the objects to which it applies and in terms of the qualities or characters that apply to it. One or the other increases. We don't have some outside point of view to decide how close we are to a perfect state of information, or what Peirce refers to as the substantial depth and breadth of a symbol. But we can still count the objects, and we can still enumerate and weigh the characters, and the amount of objects might increase, and the characters which are deemed applicable might increase too. I confess I do not see why you find this objectionable just because we can't quantify in a way that tells just how close we are to total information. I notice that your quotes show that counting logical depth doesn't work out, because qualities or characters (or possibilities, which are what qualities as Firsts are from the modal point of view) can't be counted. I myself said this in previous posting on this thread. But Peirce supposes that they can be weighed instead, which means there is some kind of measuring of depth as a quantity. -- Franklin On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 8:01 AM, Catherine Legg wrote: > Hi Franklin, > > Thanks for your reply. I was not objecting to *comparisons* being made > between the breadth and depth of various scientific terms, of the richness > you so ably describe. My objection was to applying a *metric* to that, > which effectively puts it on a linear scale of more or less > information. For that, it seems one must require some way of > quantifying the information in a proposition, say, between zero (no > information) and 1 (total information). And I can't see how that could be > done. > > The claim that propositions themselves can't be counted I took > from Peirce. I just had a look through the CP but couldn't locate it, but I > did find the quotes below which are related. > > You also asked: "Even an artifically generated term such as 'red' and > 'cow' will still partake of the surprisingness of 'cow' and 'red' taken on > their own." What does surprisingness have to do with what we're discussing? > > Just the fact of continued inquiry that you were talking about, which runs > on abduction, which runs on surprise. > > Cheers, Cathy > > 2.706: If I am permitted the extended sense which I have given to the word > > "induction," this argument is simply an induction respecting qualities > instead of > > respecting things. In point of fact *P*', *P*'', *P*''', etc., constitute > a random sample of the > > characters of *M*, and the ratio *r *of them being found to belong to *S*, > the same ratio of > > all the characters of *M *are concluded to belong to *S*. This kind of > argument, however, > > as it actually occurs, differs very much from induction, owing to the > impossibility of > > simply counting qualities as individual things are counted. Characters > have to be > > weighed rather than counted. Thus, antimony is bluish-gray: that is a > character. > > Bismuth is a sort of rose-gray; it is decidedly different from antimony in > color, and > > yet not so very different as gold, silver, copper, and tin are. > > > also in 5.169 he says: > > "mere possibilities are not capable of being counted" > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIR
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8387] Re: Natural Propositions, Ch. 10:
irce is saying in the quoted passage? -- Franklin On Tue, Apr 21, 2015 at 4:45 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > Dear Franklin, lists, > > You're probably right we'll have to agree in disagreeing. > > But my notion of the a priori has nothing to do with transcendentalism > (see the refs. in my answer to Howard). And I would not say I am > "professionally" committed to it, whatever that means. It is not in my > university contract. > Peirce vacillated as to the a priori. I know his 1878 rejection in > "Fixation"; later in life, he described his own logic and semiotics as an a > priori doctrine of signs. > > Your notion of empiricism as you define it, is obviously more > sophisticated than the crude "sense data+logic" variant. I take note of you > mentioning "conjunction and continuity" in experience - later you say these > are the work of the mind. But indeed Peirce's claim would be that they are > already present in reality and not merely the product of the mind. > In your abduction-deduction-induction example, I do not think a priori and > empirical stuff can be nicely separated. > > But all this comes down to us discussing two different notions of the a > priori - you the Kantian one which you (rightly, I think) refuse, I the > Husserlian one of objective dependence relations which we may only > gradually come to know (hence fallibilism). Take biology. It is now > accepted that life involves the interdependent notions of metabolism, > replication, adaptation, evolution, etc. These are the ontological > structures underpinning empirical biological research. Earlier ontological > assumptions of "elan vital" and the like have been given up. So, the > discussion will depend upon the interpretation of such basic concepts in > the single sciences. Can there be given a convincing empiricist account of > such concepts? I do not think a mentalist idea that such concepts are > merely psychical constructions of the mind would work. Neither would > Peirce, cf. his realism about universals. But such realism about > universals, to me, is tantamount to apriorism in the sense mentioned. > > You're right, these mails grow long and we might get away from the > discussion of ch. 10 of my book … > > Best > F > > Den 21/04/2015 kl. 02.18 skrev Franklin Ransom < > pragmaticist.lo...@gmail.com> > : > > Frederik, lists, > > I'm not sure, but this appears in my email as a separate thread, having > copied posts that I sent to the other thread. Since Frederik replied to my > posts on this one, I suppose I'll reply here for now. If this doesn't > appear as a new thread to anyone else, then please ignore my comment. > > Just to be clear, I think that this will definitely be a case of "we > will just have to agree to disagree". Frederik, you are clearly > professionally committed to the a priori; I am constitutionally committed > to radical empiricism. Now that you are forewarned about that, I'll say a > couple of things about my point of view. > > I'm not so sure that empiricists like myself have an "a priori fear of > the a priori". When I look at the philosophy of transcendentalism and its > results, the fear strikes me as quite experience-based. One can also think > about Peirce's remarks in "The Fixation of Belief" about the method of the > a priori. > > I'm not, as an empiricist, particularly impressed with logical > positivism as a form of empiricism. I believe it a commonplace in classical > pragmatism that the theory of experience at play in pragmatism is not the > atomistic approach of the British empiricists or their inheritors in > logical positivism/empiricism. My understanding is that whether we are > talking about Peirce, James, or Dewey, experience is not conceived on the > model of a series of distinct, discrete sense impressions or sense-data. > Instead, experience is much more complex, in which conjunction and > continuity are just as much found in the experience as are disjunction and > discreteness--we do not require some outside source to make our experiences > appear connected for us in the first place. Certainly the mind works to > bring connection and continuity to its experiences. But it does not do this > ex nihilo; such connections and continuities work to extend in novel ways > connections and continuities already experienced--the mind generalizes what > it has been given to work with. So far as I see it, this is the empiricism > that classical pragmatism is based upon, and is part of what my take on > empiricism amounts to. > > I'm not entirely sure what is meant by "dependence structures of >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8389] Re: Natural Propositions,
Frederik, Tommi, lists, Frederik, thank you for sending this off-list exchange to the lists. I think Tommi explicated more fully my own concerns regarding abduction and the a priori, and your response is very helpful for understanding your view. I can hardly believe that you deny Peirce is an empiricist, but I suppose I will have to accept it and let it go at that. I too share Tommi's concerns. It seems to me that most folks here don't understand that you view theorematic reasoning as the road to identifying natural kinds, although it is clear from your concluding paragraphs in Ch. 9 that this is exactly what you believe; indeed, that was the entire point of writing that chapter, was it not? "But in the realm of such forms, we are back to diagrams and diagrammatical reasoning. And here, again, it remains central to Peirce that such diagrams may give occasion of 'theorematic reasoning' whose aim it is exactly to discover properties of their objects which were not mentioned in the explicit construction of the diagram--corresponding to the definition of the class. "So the idea of the additional, hidden properties to be deduced kept their place in Peirce's doctrine, so that the 'system of forms' of the 'Minute Logic' may give rise to natural classes for the same reasons sketchily outlined in MS. 725. So, the strange drawings at the end of that Ms. may have put him on an important track, realizing that the fascinating diagrammatic experiments with Cows and Red Cows were originally motivated by a red herring." (NP, p.257) In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find in the quoted passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of natural kinds is that they are "classes which have more properties than their definition" (NP, p.255). I also gave in that post a response to a statement made on the same page, "It is hard to see why Red Cows should not have an Area in the simple b x d sense defined in the OLEC"; as defined in the OLEC, it makes perfect sense because artificial classes cannot involve synthetic propositions, only analytic logical quantity of breadth and depth. The position that natural kinds must have an area, or information, is still important, as is the point that area or information has to do with synthetic propositions, and not merely the analytical ones found in deductive reasoning, including theorematic diagrammatic reasoning. Theorematic reasoning cannot be the way we get to natural kinds. -- Franklin On Sat, Apr 25, 2015 at 8:01 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > Dear Lists - > The below exchange jumped off lists, but here it is > F > > > Start på videresendt besked: > > *Fra: *Tommi Vehkavaara > *Emne: **Vedr.: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:8389] Re: Natural Propositions,* > *Dato: *26. apr. 2015 00.09.36 CEST > *Til: *Frederik Stjernfelt > *Cc: *Tommi Vehkavaara > > > Dear Frederik > > Thank you for your patient explication, that cleared a lot - it is just > that my understanding is too loaded on Kantian distinction of a priori and > a posteriori (although that seems to be a distinction that cannot be > clearly made) that my mind rebels against this kind of definition - why > these "necessary relations" should be called "a priori" (compare Peirce's > ethics of terminology). But obviously they are just two different concepts > that are referred by the same word and if there is any meeting point it is > in mathematics (and perhaps in logic too). > > However, it is still not clear to me does this your a priori concern > concepts or directly objects, the necessity here, at least seems to be some > kind of metaphysical (or just physiological in case of food?) necessity and > not the logical/cognitive one. > What bothers me that at least in my reluctant mind this seems to lead back > to some kind of metaphysical priorism or even foundationalism. > > Yours, > > Tommi > > BTW, you sended your reply only to me, not to lists, and therefroe I too > replied to you only though it could have gone to lists. > > Lainaus Frederik Stjernfelt : > > Dear Tommi, lists - > > I have been busy all day and see the discussion has already run several > rounds. But let me try to answer Tommi's question about P's "two gates" > criterion. > > The same question could be posed not with "food" as an example, but > pertaining to Peirce's characteristics of the whole apparatus of his own > logic and semiotics as "the A Priori theoy of signs" which I quoted a few > days ago. How could that be compatible with the passports-at-both gates > claim which you quote? > > Obviously, A Priori could not mean "prior to senses" as you say. But that > was not the definition I was discussing. I was discussing a definition > which meant describable in terms of necessary relations. As the great quote > which Jon cited from Ketner a couple of posts ago, "necessity" here should > be understood as necessary in terms of relations between aspects of the > object - not necessary in the sense that everybody thinking abou
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,
Frederik, Gary F, lists, I concur with Gary that Frederik's post was a very informative post, particularly the last part of it. "Depends upon how you define "empiricist". I do not deny that Peirce strongly emphasized the role of empirical knowledge!" And what definition of empiricist do you think would apply to Peirce? Simply someone who "strongly emphasized the role of empirical knowledge", while nevertheless advocating non-empirical knowledge as well? "I would not say it was the entire point. The initial point was simply to find out what in the world those "Kandinskys" were really about ..." In a post in the Ch.9 thread, I noted that I agreed with you about the Kandinskys, that they should have been included in publication of the Ms. However, after going through the chapter, you ended up saying that it was all a red herring, and ultimately led to theorematic reasoning as the way to take instead towards hidden properties and natural kinds. In the context of the book as a whole, which is explicitly aimed at introducing and defending the dicisign idea in order to advance your work from Diagrammatology, I think it clear that the overall take-away point of the chapter is its significance for diagrammatic reasoning, and theorematic reasoning in particular. But yes, I overstated it when I said that it was "the entire point". I apologize for overstating my case. I had said: "In the thread for Ch. 9, I already noted that I couldn't find in the quoted passage from Peirce where he says that a definition of natural kinds is that they are "classes which have more properties than their definition" (NP, p.255)." You replied: "It is in the OLEC - Writings vol. 1, page 418. I think there is an error in the ref. saying 419, sorry for that." This is really confusing. Unfortunately, I don't have a copy of the Writings. What I do have is your book and the online copy of ULEC at cspeirce.com. In your book (p.234, 2nd fn), you noted that OLEC is published as ULEC in Writings vol. 2, not vol.1, and the pages are 70-86; so they do not include 418 or 419. As to any mention of Writings vol. 1 and p.419, I do not see that anywhere in Ch.9. Is there a different version published in W 1 as well, which includes discussion of natural kinds? The ULEC copy at cspeirce.com contains no such reference to natural kinds. Furthermore, you say on p.255 the following: "In the brief paragraph preceding the graphical experiments of Ms. 725, Peirce proposes no less than three different definitions of natural classes, two of them negative: they are 1) classes which are not mere intersections of simpler natural classes, 2) classes which have more properties than their definition, 3) classes without [sic] an Area." As to the "brief paragraph" you quote in full that is an addendum discussing natural kinds, I can find no reference regarding "classes which have more properties than their definition". Please help me out here? "But analytic quantities are also quantities - so you can also multiply them to give an area?" Looking at paragraph 6 of the ULEC at cspeirce.com, we can see that Peirce would say we cannot. Introducing the "multiplication" of breadth and depth is preceded by this statement in the text: "By breadth and depth, without an adjective, I shall hereafter mean the informed breadth and depth." This will of course include the breadth and depth mentioned in the "multiplication". The "analytic" quantities, as I called them, would be referred to by Peirce as "essential breadth" and "essential depth", as shown in paragraph 5 that they encompass what is given in a definition. Of course, this doesn't stop you from disagreeing with Peirce. I suppose he would say that when we manipulate the breadth and depth of analytic term-symbols, it's always an inverse relation, so that an increase in depth means a decrease in breadth, and vice versa, as per the traditional doctrine of the logical quantities that he discusses earlier in the paper. Information allows us to get past the inverse relation with term-symbols, but, given that he distinguishes natural from artificial kinds by the use of area, I suppose that only natural classes can involve the synthetic propositions that inform the term-symbol. To me, this makes intuitive sense. If induction worked for artificial kinds, they wouldn't seem to be so artificial anymore. "Peirce's point in theorematic reasoning is that there are deductive reasonings which are not analytic - in the sense that they give access to theorems which do not lie directly (as corollaries) in the definition of terms (cf. the example with Euclid's proof of the angle sum of the triangle which can not be conceptually deduced from the triangle definition)...Here are some important consequences. One is that the theorematic type of deductive reasoning process involves an abductive trial-and-error phase (in order to find the right "new elements" to add or manipulations to make with your diagram)." This admission that abduction pl
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8549] Re: Natural Propositions,
Dear Frederik, lists, Frederik: "Something like that. P seldom used the word "empiricist". Sometimes he refers to the British empiricists, sometimes to James' "radical empiricism" which he equated with pragmatism. I do not remember seeing him using it about himself. Of course the later version of empiricism a la Vienna (sense data + tautological logic) had not seen the light of day at the time so he could not refer to that (and he was definitely not an empiricist in that narrow sense) … " Franklin: Well, I can't really agree to that; it seems to me that he is certainly an empiricist. But what you have to say is food for thought, and I'll try to keep it in mind when reading Peirce. Frederik: "I suggest P gave up the "Kandinskys" graphical experiment because he realized it led nowhere in its present shape - in that sense it was a red herring. I guess he realized that in order to address real kinds, such figures would have to be made up of graphical properties with formal dependency relations between them - which was not the case in the graphical formalism he was experimenting with in that case. But if that is the case, that was no small result, and I think the whole development of the notion of icon, diagram, and of theorematic reasoning comes out of that train of thought in P" Franklin: That's interesting. I hadn't quite taken away the idea from Ch.9 that the Kandinsky's were a failed graphical experiment, and that the diagrammatic reasoning represents an advance beyond that failure in terms of graphical representation. Now that's insightful. I wish you had made that point clearer in the conclusions drawn at the end of the chapter, but it's good to see it that way now. Not that I necessarily agree, but nevertheless that is possibly a much more fruitful idea to consider. Frederik: "Frankly, I am away in a summer house right now so I cannot consult my Writings copies either. The ref. in ch. 9 is to W 1, 418 and the year is given there as 1866, is it not? As far as I can find on the internet, this ref. is correct, and the text referred to is not the OLEC, but the fourth Lowell lecture. So the error is not in that reference, but rather in the sentence you quote where I ascribe that position to MS. 725 as well. " Frankliln: Ah, I see that now, p.236 of NP. Thank you for that clarification! Frederik: "You are indeed right, that is Peirce's position. I do not claim it is not. But I claim I cannot see that position is consistent. " Franklin: Well, I can't see what is inconsistent about it, so I suppose we'll just have to agree to disagree about that one. Frederik: "Certainly, but his idea is to go to beyond term-symbols to proposition-symbols where b and d are independent - " Franklin: My guess is that you mean in a proposition-symbol, the breadth and depth are distinguished from each other as subject and predicate, which is not true in the case of a term-symbol. At least, that's the only way I can understand your statement as reasonable. I'm not sure what that has to do with what I said about analytic term-symbols involving an inverse relation of increase and decrease in logical quantity. Frederik: "I think you here again confuse procedural necessity of reasoning with logical necessity of the result. Peirce knew very well that theorematic reasoning was not algorithmic and required the creative selection of additional elements - but still he stably classified it as deduction, because of the logical necessity of the conclusion." Franklin: Okay, I see your point about the logical necessity of the conclusion. But still, if I were to consider how abductive, deductive, and inductive inference work together in inquiry, it's not as if the inquiry as a whole is an inference (contra IBE). Instead, it's different inferences drawing conclusions that contribute to the inquiry as a whole. In the case of theorematic reasoning, it seems to me that both abductive and deductive inferences are at work, so the reasoning as a whole is not simply deductive, but constitutes an inquiry that involves more than one kind of inference. It is recognizing the inclusion of abductive inference that to me shows why the conclusions of mathematics can only concern hypotheses. The difference between corollarial and theorematic then would be whether, during a series of deductive inferences, another abductive inference occurred, rather than before the deductive reasoning altogether. Yes, the conclusion is logically necessary. But there is still an abduction conducted during the reasoning process, and I find it misleading to call the whole thing overall deductive. Well, that's what I think, but I recognize that I am in disagreement with both you and Peirce on this one, which makes me leery of my thoughts on it. Frederik: "Getting to natural kinds are among the main purposes of all the different disciplines of the sciences - so all of the machinery of observation, experiment, epistemology, logic, ontology etc. etc. are involved in thei
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8566] Re: Natural Propositions,
Frederik, lists, It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal structure > af abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a matter of > necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain B) does not > explain why A should be chosen over infinitely many other propositions with > the same property. (see e.g. Michael Hoffmann's papers on abduction) Though Peirce did address this issue in terms of Galileo's il lume naturale, with the qualification that it has to do with a natural instinct. I have my own ideas about why we can happen upon the right hypotheses, but this is not the thread for such a discussion. And this is where the trial-and-error phase of theorematic reasoning > differs from ordinary abduction. The latter is standardly seen as a step in > empirical research, from data to hypothesis. But all P's examples of > theorematic reasoning are non-empirical, there is no data, for the whole > problem considered is purely formal (like when selecting the right > auxiliary lines in the triangle proof). That is a trial-and-error thing > without procedural necessity - you may have to experiment with different > lines until you find the right ones permitting you to conduct the proof. > In that sense it is an "abductive" phase of theorematic reasoning. But it > is not abductive in the sense that its starting point is data and its > conclusion is a hypothesis. The right auxiliary lines are not at all a > hypothesis explaining anything. For that reason, I do not think the > proposal of saying that theorematic reasoning is just trivial deduction > interspersed with abduction is satisfactory. I'm not sure about abduction being characterized as a move from data to hypothesis. Peirce's early account of abduction is somewhat close to that idea, but not so much his later account. Rather, it is typified by the move from a surprising fact, something which does not fit available data, to a hypothesis explaining the surprising fact. Suppose a case where the conclusion of the theorematic proof is considered the first premiss of an abductive argument, and the second premiss is the introduction of a hypothesis that would explain the conclusion of the theorematic proof. Then the conclusion of such an abduction would be the theorem introduced into the proof. So the "data" is simply the desired conclusion itself. In later discussions of abduction, Peirce does put it as something like this: There is a surprising fact. But if A were true, then the surprising fact would be a matter of course. Therefore A is true. Peirce admits though that not every case of abduction involves a surprising fact, but simply something that calls for explanation. I would suggest in this case that the desired conclusion is what is in need of explanation. It should be noticed that the way mathematicians make new discoveries is not typically through mathematical demonstrations; rather, the demonstrations are produced after the fact to communicate and prove the discovery to the satisfaction of other mathematicians. Considered in the larger context of the difference between discovery and demonstration in mathematics, it may very well be the case that every such major theorem in theorematic reasoning started off as a hypothesis to explain a desired conclusion, and the demonstration was produced after the fact. Of course, it would be very difficult to prove this as a general rule. But it is an alternative explanation which bears merit. It should also be noticed that all of this doesn't change the necessity of the conclusion in the theorematic reasoning, once proven. I suppose it could be replied that nevertheless, diagram experimentation would be required to develop the hypothesis. Well, my suggestion would be that, having certain propositions already, and a desired conclusion, but not being able to reach that conclusion from the given propositions alone, the diagram is put on hold while the mathematical mind starts thinking about what would explain the conclusion. -- Franklin On Sat, May 2, 2015 at 4:41 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > Dear Franklin, lists - > OK, we're getting closer to agreeing about what to disagree about, at > least! > > Frederik: "Hm, I am not sure. How could we know this? This is a bit of a > catch-22 because one of the classic riddles of abduction is exactly how to > select the better hypothesis among many possible. So to say the hypothesis > should already be there is begging the question, as far as I can see - " > > Franklin: I'm not sure how much of a riddle it is. > > > It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal > structure af abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a > matter of necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain > B) does not explain why A should be chosen over infinitely many other > propositions with the same property. (see e.g. Michael Hoffmann's papers on > abduction) > > Peirce did introduce
[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:8574] Re: Natural Propositions,
Frederik, lists, That is a general explanation attempt of why humans are capable of > abduction - that does not say anything about particular cases such as > Wegener's. Hmm. I'm not sure what you could be looking for here. In general, any semiotic being capable of abduction must have a natural instinct. In particular, any given abduction will be the result of that natural instinct meeting with the observation of given phenomena. On the other hand, if you mean it seems that with this idea we can't really get into a detailed analysis of just how this hypothesis was achieved and none of the others, I too share some such frustration, and would try to offer a more robust account than Peirce offered. You are right that discoveries are often seen or suspected prior to > demonstration - but it is too little to say demonstrations are only for > communication and persuasion purposes. Yes, you are right, it is too little to say. Certainly it helps to check one's work to be really convinced of the idea, and make sure it doesn't turn out somehow self-contradictory or incoherent. But I stand by the contention that the method of discovery of the idea is typically separate from its demonstration in the context of mathematical research. Certainly - and that is where P argues that theorematic deduction is called > for - Yes, I know, though of course I am saying instead that this is when abduction is called for. Theorematic reasoning should describe the whole process, both abductive and deductive, in my opinion. But I think that this is as far as we will get in discussion about it. I'll just have to agree to disagree with Charles on this one. -- Franklin On Sun, May 3, 2015 at 3:55 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote: > Dear Franklin, lists - > > > It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal >> structure af abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a >> matter of necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain >> B) does not explain why A should be chosen over infinitely many other >> propositions with the same property. (see e.g. Michael Hoffmann's papers on >> abduction) > > > Though Peirce did address this issue in terms of Galileo's il lume > naturale, with the qualification that it has to do with a natural instinct. > I have my own ideas about why we can happen upon the right hypotheses, but > this is not the thread for such a discussion. > > > That is a general explanation attempt of why humans are capable of > abduction - that does not say anything about particular cases such as > Wegener's. > > > And this is where the trial-and-error phase of theorematic reasoning >> differs from ordinary abduction. The latter is standardly seen as a step in >> empirical research, from data to hypothesis. But all P's examples of >> theorematic reasoning are non-empirical, there is no data, for the whole >> problem considered is purely formal (like when selecting the right >> auxiliary lines in the triangle proof). That is a trial-and-error thing >> without procedural necessity - you may have to experiment with different >> lines until you find the right ones permitting you to conduct the proof. >> In that sense it is an "abductive" phase of theorematic reasoning. But it >> is not abductive in the sense that its starting point is data and its >> conclusion is a hypothesis. The right auxiliary lines are not at all a >> hypothesis explaining anything. For that reason, I do not think the >> proposal of saying that theorematic reasoning is just trivial deduction >> interspersed with abduction is satisfactory. > > > I'm not sure about abduction being characterized as a move from data to > hypothesis. Peirce's early account of abduction is somewhat close to that > idea, but not so much his later account. Rather, it is typified by the move > from a surprising fact, something which does not fit available data, to a > hypothesis explaining the surprising fact. > > > Correct, and that fact is a part of data. > > > Suppose a case where the conclusion of the theorematic proof is > considered the first premiss of an abductive argument, and the second > premiss is the introduction of a hypothesis that would explain the > conclusion of the theorematic proof. Then the conclusion of such an > abduction would be the theorem introduced into the proof. So the "data" is > simply the desired conclusion itself. In later discussions of abduction, > Peirce does put it as something like this: There is a surprising fact. But > if A were true, then the surprising fact would be a matter of course. > Therefore A is true. Peirce admits though that not every case of abduction > involves a surprising fact, but simply something that calls for > explanation. I would suggest in this case that the desired conclusion is > what is in need of explanation. > > It should be noticed that the way mathematicians make new discoveries is > not typically through mathematical demonstrations; rather, the > demo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 1
Jon, Do you mean to pursue this in further posts, or is this simply a one-time post meant to attract notice to previous work? -- Franklin On Tue, Jun 23, 2015 at 10:00 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > Post : Survey of Semiotic Theory Of Information • 1 > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/05/17/survey-of-semiotic-theory-of-information-%e2%80%a2-1/ > > Peircers, > > This is a Survey of previous blog and wiki posts on > the Semiotic Theory Of Information. All my projects > are exploratory in essence but this line of inquiry > is more open-ended than most. The question is: > > • What is information and how does it impact the spectrum of activities > that answer to the name of inquiry? > > Setting out on what would become his lifelong quest to explore and explain > the “Logic of Science”, C.S. Peirce pierced the veil of historical > confusions > enclosing the issue and fixed on what he called the “laws of information” > as > the needed key to solving the puzzle. This was in 1865 and 1866, detailed > in his lectures at Harvard College and the Lowell Institute. > > Fast forward to the present and I see the Big Question as follows. Having > gone > through the exercise of comparing and contrasting Peirce's theory of > information, > however much it remains in a rough-hewn state, with Shannon's paradigm > that so > pervasively informs the ongoing revolution in our understanding and use of > information today, I have reason to believe that Peirce's idea is root and > branch more general and has the potential, with due development, to resolve > many mysteries that still bedevil our grasp of inference, information, and > inquiry. > > C.S. Peirce on the Laws of Information and the Logic of Science > === > > • Information = Comprehension × Extension > ( > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Information_%3D_Comprehension_%C3%97_Extension > ) > > Excursions > == > > • Semiotic Information > ( http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Semiotic_Information ) > > • Peirce's Logic Of Information > ( > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Peirce%27s_Logic_Of_Information > ) > > Reference > = > > • Peirce, C.S. (1867), “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension” > ( http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_06/v2_06.htm ) > > Regards, > > Jon > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
