Michael,
Congratulations. The topic of sociolinguistics reminds me of
a comment by Frank Anshen, a linguist who was visiting the U.
of Hawaii, where he taught a course on sociolinguistics.
At one point, Frank was talking about ethnic slurs, which
usually contain guttural sounds with Ks and Gs.
A PDF file with the MSS for Peirce's Logic Notebook is available
from Researchgate:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334525645_Discovering_the_Future_5-19
It has 677 pages in 169 MB.
John
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY
On 7/29/2019 9:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Do you have a different link for the Logic Notebook manuscript?
Oh?!? Mary K. sent me a note with the link in it. I clicked on the
link, and it immediately started to download the MSS. But it also
opened a page at Researchgate for her book.
I wen
In an earlier note, I said that it's possible to teach first-order
logic in one hour. That led to an offline note with a skeptical
question: "How?" Here's the answer:
Modern textbooks on logic are written by mathematicians for students
who plan to become mathematicians. As a math major at MIT
Susan Haack posted an article on Researchgate:
"From the Chain to the Cable: Peirce’s Theory of Inquiry through his
Metaphors"
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334749355_From_the_Chain_to_the_Cable_Peirce%27s_Theory_of_Inquiry_through_his_Metaphors_20172020
It begins with a quotation fr
On 8/1/2019 7:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
After all - you can't have matter without Mind, i.e., without an
organizational pattern - even of the basic atom; and certainly, I reject
any concept of Mind as an a priori reality and/or as existing without
being articulated as Matter.
I agree.
De
My first note about the MSS for Peirce's Logic Notebook included
the wrong URL. I later uploaded it to LogicNB.pdf on my website.
But following is the URL for the "mother lode": all the MSS
that can be browsed or downloaded from the Houghton Library:
https://hollisarchives.lib.harvard.edu/repos
Gary and Edwina,
GR
following Peirce's view--objective idealism--I see mind as primordial.
Seeing matter as primordial Peirce terms 'materialism', a view which
he rejects as "repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense
ET
To say that 'matter is effete mind' does NOT mean that Mind is
pr
Gary R,
There are two distinct issues, and I admit that I should have
clearly distinguished them: (1) What did Peirce write? And
(2) What position is "sufficiently vague" to be certain?
JFS
Finally, the question of whether matter or mind came first is
meaningless. Time is only defined in a
Jon,
There are many philosophers and theologians of various persuasions
who agree with that equation at a "sufficiently vague" level.
JFS: I would answer with a statement that is sufficiently vague to
be certain: Theos = Logos = Tao = Dharma = Natura = God of Spinoza,
Einstein...
JAS: Each of
Jon and Jeff,
This is an important thread that clarifies many of the debates.
JAS
The new subject line is the title of the paper by Matthew E. Moore...
Thanks for those references. The concluding paragraph at the end
of MEM's 2012 paper summarizes the issues:
MEM
We wind up with an attitud
On 8/4/2019 3:30 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Again, the Cantorian pseudo-continuum has turned out to be an adequate
/model /of continuity for many (most?) mathematical, scientific, and
practical purposes; but it does not satisfy the criteria that Peirce
established for the conception of a /true
On 8/5/2019 6:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
JFS: Peirce developed outstanding theories of logic and semeiotic
with just a topological version of continuity. There is no evidence
that anything more would be significantly better. I agree with MEM.
JAS: I concur with the first two sentences, but
Jon, Edwina, and Helmut,
JFS: The only implications derivable by quoting Peirce are about
his texts. The pragmatic implications for our perceptions and
actions must take into account 21st c. science, philosophy, and life.
JAS: Sure, and I will likewise repeat my fundamental point--in order
t
On 8/10/2019 10:37 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I have /never /claimed, let alone insisted, that /my /interpretation
is the /only /valid one
A claim that any of your statements is a clarification of
something Peirce wrote is presumptuous. It implies that you have
some special power to state his
I came across an article by Dan Everett, which has a good
summary of Peirce's career and contributions:
https://aeon.co/essays/charles-sanders-peirce-was-americas-greatest-thinker
Most subscribers to Peirce-L know most of these points, but Dan
put them together in an impressive summary. It's a
On 8/21/2019 1:18 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
I suggest that [Peirce] could have offered an argument against
[the Big Bang] -- in fact, against any theory that posits a finite
age and definite beginning of the universe...
No. Peirce insisted on following the evidence. An amazing event
occurre
Jon and Gary R,
I had some work that kept me from spending time
on email. But that
delay gave me some time to put these issues into
perspective. I
realized that Jon is constantly looking for Peirce's
"considered"
answers. But Peirce didn't have final
answers. He developed a
scientific framewo
I had some problem with my email, and I'm using a different system that
has terrible formatting. I attached a better copy of my previous
note.
John
Jon and Gary R,
I had some work that kept me from spending time on email. But that
delay gave me some time to put these issues into perspective.
Intuitionistic logic was founded by the Dutch mathematician L. E. J.
Brouwer. He objected to "nonconstructive" proofs by
contradiction.
Many mathematicians have been sympathetic, but they
were reluctant to use Brower's logic because it made many legitimate
theorems more difficult to prove.
For
Ben, Jon, List,
See the attached file for my
response.
John
Ben, Jon, List,
Everyone has the right to express their own opinions. What bothers
me are claims that somebody's opinion is what Peirce really meant,
intended, or considered as final.
April 2014 was a stopping point. Nobody knows wh
I came across an interesting factoid about Wikipedia:
If you go to
any Wikipedia page and click on the first link highlighted in blue and
repeat, you eventually get to the Philosophy page.
John
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
Orin,
That point is true of any hierarchy that has a unique top.
> This suggests to me that Philosophy features as the top
node in the
> Wikipedia ontology, and is thus viewed as the most
general form of
> knowledge.
WordNet was carefully
designed by linguists and lexicographers as an acy
Jeff and Jon,
JD to JAS
> It appears that we are
talking past each other in a number of places.
That is an
understatement that is true of most of the emails on Peirce-L that mention
any version of continuity or synechism -- Cantor's, Peirce's, or the many
versions developed during the 20th and
Ben, Jon, List
That is an important distinction:
BU: Peirce
adopted the old distinction between /logica docens/ and /logica
utens/ and made no notable modification in it. Logica docens is formal
and systematic, while logica utens is informal and is not systematically
studied.
Yes. 'docens' wou
I formatted my previous note ery nicely, but this email handler
scrambled it. I'll just repeat the conclusions. The previous note shows
that they are consistent with what Peirce wrote and with 21st c
terminology..
That produces three version of logic: (1) the
logic of mathematics, which is t
Gary R and Jon AS,
I'm writing a longer note about these
issues in reply to Ben. But I just wanted to make one point about the
comments below: Peirce acquired his bias toward mathematics at his
father's knee. It dominated everything he wrote. And it's the reason
why he put mathematics at
Ontologies, taxonomies, and dictionaries involve related issues about
words, meanings, definitions, and methods for analyzing documents to
derive definitions.
There is a free on-line course on
dictionaries that is taught by four researchers who have backgrounds in
linguistics, lexicography, and
Jon, List
Common sense is what a child learns before the age
of six. The innovations of one generation become the common sense of the
next generation.
The common sense of European culture is
based on a version of Plato-Aristotle
that has been absorbed into the European languages and life.
Helmut and Gene,
The point I was trying to make is that
diagrammatic reasoning is the basic method of reasoning in all aspects of
life. It includes the most abstract methods of mathematics and the most
mundane aspects of everyday life.
If the diagrams are based
on formally defined patterns
Jon AS, Gary R, List
There is much more to say about
continuity. But a preliminary discussion of the role of mathematics is
essential. I changed the subject line to a quotation from NEM, p.
4.x:
CSP: Philosophy requires exact thought, and all
exact thought is mathematical thought. Especial
Jon Awbrey, List
I completely agree with your summary of
the issues:
JA: Best I recall, Peirce's point was that
mathematical thought can be exact precisely because it is entirely
hypothetical. It operates purely relative to its own frame of
reference, taking place wholly within its own c
Jeff BD,
I completely agree with your reply to Jon A.
(copy below). I would just add three points.
1. All human
reasoning above the level of a knee-jerk reaction is diagrammatic. It
involves matching some previously learned pattern (AKA image, percept,
diagram, or icon) to something in the
I was just watching and listening to a PBS program about Bach and his
music, and it shows why mathematicians love Bach. He exhibits the
ultimate in diagrammatic reasoning in a way that integrates perception and
action with all the experiences in the phaneron -- that includes the
experiences of
Gary,
I browsed through some of Siegel's writings and
listened to one of his YouTube talks. They reminded me of the PBS
program about Bach, which I mentioned in a note on Friday. J. S. Bach is
an excellent example of a man with a brilliant mind that was integrated
with every aspect of the b
Gary R, List,
I came across a review by Olivia Goldhill
of Siegel's book (see excerpts below). It has a good description of the
relational view of mind, which is consistent with Peirce's relational view
of reasoning: Relations (1ns, 2ns, and 3ns) are the foundation of all
reasoning, both
Identity, as expressed by the symbol '=' or by Peirce's line of
identity, is fundamental for mathematics, logic, and theories of
ontology. But the criteria for determining whether two occurrences of
similar things may be considered "identical" depend on the
relevant context. A baby and an adu
Jon,
> whether I might be comparing apples and
oranges in lumping philosophical and mathematical categories under the
same head... there are many differences in the categorical paradigms
different observers developed over the centuries.
There are
two kinds of people: lumpers and splitters.
Jeff,
When I mentioned the distinction between lumping and
splitting, I wasn't making a value judgment.
>From the
Wikipedia article on "lumpers and splitters": "The
earliest known use of these terms was by Charles Darwin, in a letter to J. D.
Hooker in 1857: It is good to have
hair-splitt
Mike,
> But this is your framing, John, not the framing
Jeffrey is pursuing. I think his recent posts are some of the most
thoughtful of recent months.
I agree. I wrote that note in
support of Jeff. I quoted Darwin, who said that we need both kinds of
thinking and an analysis of the tradeoff
Jon A, List
I strongly agree with your emphasis on
Peirce's mathematics and logic, which were the foundation for his way of
thinking, writing, and research from early childhood to the end. But we
should also emphasize that all exact thinking in every field is
diagrammatic and mathematical. T
Jon A, List
I very strongly agree with the following two
points:
JA 1> There appears to be some sort of
disagreement, or maybe just failure to communicate, but I'm still having
trouble putting my finger on what the source of the issue might
be.
I believe that the source of the problem lies i
Jon A, List,
On the following point, we are in complete
agreement:
JA> as far as my personal usage goes, I've
always suggested there is a place for descriptive semiotics, whether of
not that was Peirce's way of drawing the distinctions.
The
great logician Frank Ramsey used the term 'human lo
Jon A, List,
I strongly agree with those two points:
JA
1> It's been my observation over many decades that people invoke the
"ethics of terminology" mainly to inveigh against everyone's
innovations but their own
Yes indeed. I have experienced that kind
of criticism. That's why I'm using Peir
Jon A, List,
I replaced the subject line with a very
specific question.
That question is closely related to the
question "How can we raise ethical children? he logical positivists
destroyed philosophy by rejecting value judgments. Carnap was a very
intelligent, but emotionally stupid positivi
Jon A, List,
Pure mathematics is the study of pure
form (i.e., diagrammatic reasoning) without any admixture of emotion,
sentiment, or value judgments about Beauty, Goodness. and Truth. Boolean
algebra computes the values 1 and 0. But the assumption that 1 and 0
correspond to what we mean by
Jon AS, List
I've been writing a paper with a tight
deadline and haven't had time to write longer emails. And this subject
gets into too many issues to be discussed briefly.
JAS>
For whatever reason, Peirce more commonly employed "mathematical
logic," "logic of mathematics," or "mathematic
Peirce used the practice in biology and chemistry as a guideline for
his ethics of terminology. The basic idea is that the person who first
discovers a new species or chemical element has the right to name it. But
that policy can have unintended consequences. URL and excerpts
below.
John
--
Jon,
JA> It's a common mistake to confound infinite
with unbounded. A
process can continue without end and still be "bounded in a
nutshell".
So a sign process can pass from sign to interpretant sign to next
interpretant sign ad infinitum without ever leaving a finite set of
signs.
That's not a
Ben,
I agree that space and time in quantum mechanics are
continuous. But there is one issue that Peirce understood very well: the
discrete lines in the spectrum of any chemical element that is heated on
earth or in any distant star.
In the so-called "black
body" radiation, the filament of an
Helmut,
That is true: "But an actual incandescent
tungsten wire emits a continuous spectrum? I would say, this is a pseudo-
or secondary continuity caused by blending of many discrete photons or
frequencies."
But Peirce was working on spectra in
chemistry and astronomy long before Einstein
Jeff, Jon, Dan...
For the past few months, I have been busy with
some critical deadlines and activities that limited my participation in
email discussions. But I'd like to comment on the many possible views of
reality.
Two points by Peirce:
1. Reality is independent of
anything we may think abo
Edwina,
I agree with that point, and I believe that Peirce would
too:
> we have to consider that some models more accurately
represent this external reality than others - and also, Peirce did feel
that we could, among the 'community of scholars', over time - reach a more
and more accurate repres
Edwina,
When I was talking about model-relative theories of reality, I
was definitely *not* advocating a kind of cognitive relativism.
> we have to consider that some models more accurately represent this
external reality than others - and also, Peirce did feel that we could,
among the 'communi
Michael,
I very strongly agree with the intro to your forthcoming
book. In 2015, I presented the following slides about natural logic:
http://jfsowa.com/talks/natlog.pdf
Since then, I've published a
couple of articles on these topics, and I updated and revised some of the
points. I'll say mo
Edwina and Michael,
I agree with the following point, and I
suspect that Peirce and Schelling would also agree.
ET> I also
like your [Michael's] use of 'objectified idealism' rather than 'objective
idealism'. Exactly right.
John
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Cli
Edwina and Jon,
Throughout his life, Peirce maintained a
consistent fallibilism. He insisted that many of the things that we
believe are true are indeed true to the extent that they have been
tested. It's even possible that some of them may be absolutely true. But
we can never be certain whet
Auke and Jon AS,
I strongly agree with Auke's analysis. I would
also like to comment on the following point:
AvB> God or the
conception of god do not deliver valid arguments in semiotics. My interest
is systematical not biographical.
A biographical analysis can be
useful for clarifying what Pe
In some theories of ontology, the focus on scientific principles tends
to omit or downgrade the importance of goals, intentions, and feelings.
Such issues are often deprecated as "anthropomorphic". Other
systems, which emphasize neuroscience, downgrade any kind of memory or
reasoning that is n
Jon,
I have no desire to rehash our earlier debates about the
following issue:
JAS> Accordingly, what I *have *suggested
previously is that semeiotic is sufficiently robust to prompt the
plausible hypothesis of God as the real and independent object that
determines the entire universe as a sign.
Edwina,
That's an important point:
ET >I agree with
Gary's comments - however, specifically, I don't see that the 'minute
semiotic analysis' is even a semiotic analysis; it's a terminological
analysis. Semiosis is a dynamic process and a focus on terms ignores this
actuality.
The great tra
Edwina,
Peirce insisted that every theory of science, philosophy, or
common sense is fallible. He maintained that much of what we believe is
true to the extent that we have tested it. But he also maintained that we
can never be certain that any belief is absolutely true.
He applied
that prin
Auke,
I support your decision, for the same reasons I wrote in my
response to Edwina:
AvB> As a consequence of a suitable dash
of indifference on both sides, we didn't get into outright conflict, but
we also did not reach agreement on the goal, and thus also not about the
means in reaching it.
I just wanted to add a few comments about Peirce's positions on related
issues, but I don't want to get into a quotation war.
First
point, he said that science "walks on a bog," not
"bedrock."
"Indeed, out of a contrite
fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of knowledge, and
Gary,
As I said before, I believe that JAS has been trying to
force Peirce's writings into a rigid box. Peirce repeatedly said that his
ideas were constantly growing. In fact, that is why he was unable to
finish his many book projects: as he starts writing, he gets so many new
ideas that earl
Gary,
That sentence up to the comma is my primary objection to
Jon's writings. As for the substance, my second objection is Jon's claim
that his conclusion is what Peirce intended:
GR> Your arguments
*contra* Jon Alan Schmidt have been consistently methodological, not at
all substantive.
Jon ha
x27;s slides linked below are a good example> of> this, translating some of
Peirce's ideas into the concepts and terminology> of modern logic. Why is such an approach acceptable for him> in a conference presentation, but not for me in an e-mail list discussion?> Again, *why the
Jerry,
I was not talking about translating natural languages. I
was talking about translating one mathematical or logical notation to
another. The question whether two mathematical structures are isomorphic
(have precise one-to-one translations to and from each other) is
determined by a formal
Jon,
I have never initiated any criticisms of your notes. But I do
respond to criticisms that you initiate of my notes or of notes by other
authors who I believe are on the right track.
JAS> the
allegations against me, which instead are grounded entirely in
transparently uncharitable interpretat
Jerry,
The short quotation from that book showed that the author is
a mathematician. There is no way that she would disagree with my
point.
JFS> I am certain that the issues in that book you
cited are unrelated to what I was doing.
JLRC> To draw a
conclusion without reading the proposition
Jon, List
I'd like to point out that sometimes I agree with one
of Jon's notes. I believe that Peirce's three "universes of
discourse" constitute the best resolution of the debates between
Plato and Aristotle: the universe of pure possibilities (mathematics);
the universe of actuality (everyt
Jon,
De Morgan introduced the term 'universe of discourse', and
Peirce adopted it for his three universes. Every logician since then,
both Platonists and non-Platonists, have related logic to whatever they
call a universe of discourse in the same way as Peirce. They all use an
existential qua
Jerry LRC and Gary R,
The point I'm making is true of every
branch of experimental science and engineering practice. That includes
chemistry, which is the first branch that Peirce studied in detail.
JFS> Whenever logicians talk about anything x that exists in
any universe of discourse, they wr
Jon and Robert,
This issue illustrates an important point about
Peirce's development. His ideas were constantly "growing"
(Peirce's own word), and he kept revising his terminology as he continued
to find new ways of relating his ideas to one another and to the common
vocabulary of his day (muc
Auke and Jon,
Peirce developed his semeiotic as a tool for
analyzing the many kinds of signs and their use in science and everyday
life. Unfortunately, Peirce did not provide enough examples to clarify
exactly how his terminology could be applied in all the many
variations.
The following excerpt
Edwina,
I strongly agree. And as I wrote in the thread
"Tree structure", I believe that the best way to analyze and
explain the issues is to illustrate them with actual examples. He used
more examples in his lectures and letters to actual people. But his MSS
to himself had very few examples t
Jon AS, Gary F, and Auke,
Jon's recent note shows a serious failure
in communication:
JAS> To be honest, none of this [a quotation by
Auke] makes much sense to me, which is not to say that it is
incorrect--again, I suspect that it simply reflects my different purpose,
different standpoint, and
Edwina, Gary F, Jon AS,
ET> My question about
'pure theorizing' so to speak, also arises from the quote below: "Now
the whole process of development among the community of students of
those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the
truths which must hold good of
all signs u
Edwina and Jon,
Induction always begins with data -- a set of
observations about some subject. By finding analogies and commonalities
among the observations, it derives a probable hypothesis about the
subject matter. Further testing is necessary to increase the probability
and generalize the
Gary R and Jon AS,
Peirce's ethics of terminology is important.
But he made an important distinction: If an author's term is adopted and
used by other authors, then the person who coined that term has an
obligation to continue using it in the same sense in which it is being
used. But if nobod
Edwina and Mary L,
I agree with the points that both of you
have made.
ET> It is extremely difficult to come to a final
conclusion about which meaning is 'right'.
For an essay or book
about Peirce, it's important to discuss his original terminology and not
claim that any of the 21st c. terms ar
Jon,
When Peirce called a theory 'fallible, he did not mean
"free to make adjustments". There is a huge difference between
"free to apply to new areas" and "free to adjust (i.e.
change) the theory itself"', The first (new applications) is
"normal science" in Kuhn's terms. But the second is a
Robert and Jon,
As a mathematician, I appreciate the power of
category theory. But I also spent 30 years working on reseach &
development proejcts at IBM, where I had to present many mathematical
issues in ways that engineers could appreciate. That gives me quite a bit
of sympathy for Jon's rea
Jon,
Peirce was using the word 'category' in rhe tradition from
Aristotle to Kant. That tradition is still alive and well in
philosophy.
It's unfortunate that the 20th c mathematicians used the
same term for a different kind of mathematical theory. But as Robert M.
hass been saying, it's possi
Edwina, I strongly agree with that point:
ET> Helmut - your own
experiences in 'the real world' are what you should be trying to
understand - semiosically.
Abstract theories are useless, unless
they can be applied to something useful. Chess and Go, for example, are
mathematical theories w
Gary,
That is the most anti-Peircean statement
imaginable:
GR> It would once again appear
that Edwina and John expect everyone to have always and only the same
interests as they do. Edwina, for example, characterizes anything else,
notably, theorizing, as "an irrelevant exercise" undertaken on
Jon ,
On the following point, we agree. And since Gary R takes
your side in all these issues, I wish you would tell him to accept
it.
JAS> I find it extremely inappropriate to make sweeping
judgments about who
is (or is not) capable of understanding Peirce's writings and discussing
them intell
Jon,
Charity is an important virtue in dealing with people. What
made me angry is Gary R's attitude that he is an authority who is capable
of making blanket judgments about the accuracy of anybody else's
arguments. He has the right to point out what he belives are mistakes,
but he has an oblig
Jon,
The principle of charity in philosophy does *not* require
the listener/reader to assume that the statements by the speaker/author
are true. Its only requirement is to assume that other participants in
the discussion are rational human beings who are making meaningful
statements, which the
Jon, Michael, Edwina, Robert M, and Gary R,
Peirce's range of
interests, talents, and research was so broad that there is no single best
method for studying and interpreting his writings. For different aspects
of his work, some methods are better than others. But even for those
areas where
Jon, et al.
I just want to emphasize one point: It's extremely
rare for anybody to approve or be satisfied with anybody else's summary or
paraphrase of what they said or wrote. If it's highly favorable, they
probably won't complain. But even then, they realize that the paraphrase
is not what
Mike,
MB> Please stop.
Excellent advice. I stated all
the issues in my previous note, and I have no desire to
continue.
MB> Despite Gary R telling me offline to resign from
the list, I will
continue to monitor. I am curious to see if the human animal has
the capacity to learn and g
Gary R,
As Mike said, please stop.
GR>To be perfectly
clear, in my estimation this horrible 'harangue'
began about a year ago, shortly after John Sowa joined the list and
began harassing Jon Alan Schmidt, not on any substance of any of
his post, but on his methodology.
Thank you for providing
m
Michael,
I strongly agree:
MCJM> What we should be
doing IMO is not so much "agreeing to differ" as leaving our
ideas on the table for continued evaluation (at everybody's leisure). If
we don't want to agree do we have to say more than "I shall think
about it" or even just stay momentarily sil
Robert and Auke,
I agree with the points you made. But I believe that a
good way to put an end to the "false debate" is to broaden the
dichotomy to an open-ended diversity. Every branch of the sciences (i.e.,
every branch in Peirce's 1903 classification) has methods that are
specialized for the
Auke,
The point I was trying make: Either/Or debates are a waste
of time. There is an open-ended number of different ways of perceiving,
thinking, talking, reasoning, and acting. In the abstract, there is no
reason to debate whether method M175 is better or worse than method
M837926.
AB> I
Jerry and Jon,
In mathematics -- including mathematical logic -- the
notation is absolutely precise. Two different notations that are
isomorphic (one-to-one mappings in both directions) have identical
semantics, independent of any words used to describe them.
JLRC> I suggest that CSP was cons
Robert M, Gary F, Jon AS, List
For quotations by Peirce on
these issues, see the attached file, science.txt.
Also note the last
quotation by Edward Moore:
ECM> Peirce has left us, not any kind
of final word, but a work in progress, one eminently worth carrying on, in
the spirit of the one who
Original Message
Subject: Re: [Peirce-L] To put an
end to the false debate on the classification of signs
From:
"John F. Sowa"
Date:Tue, May
19, 2020 10:05
To: "Peirce-L"
Robert M, Gary
Robert,
Your summary of the issues is very good, and I strongly
agree with the need for examples.
In a search for examples, I went
back to _Photometric Researches_, which I believe is essential for
understanding the development of Peirce's philosophy. It's not an
accident that it was publishe
801 - 900 of 990 matches
Mail list logo
