Dear list:
“the fact that A presents B with gift C...”
“I cannot forget that there are the germs of the *theory of the categories*
which is (if anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child.
In it I shall live when oblivion has me — my body”
The surprising fact, *C*, is observe
List, Charles:
> On Apr 30, 2017, at 2:43 PM, Charles Pyle wrote:
>
> Many years ago linguists chewed over the issue of whether the semantic
> analysis of three place predicates can be broken down into a series of two
> place predicates and discovered that the two are not semantically or
> gr
List:
> On Apr 29, 2017, at 10:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> Re mathematical category theory: Many mathematicians believe that
> the term 'category theory' was a poor choice. The focus of category
> theory is on the mappings or morphisms. The things that are mapped
> could be mathematical str
Helmut and Jon,
HR
I think, the problem with bringing together Peirce and conventional
mathematics is, that Peirces monism is one of time / change, and the
conventional mathematical monism is one of space / permanence.
Peirce would not say that.
Charles learned mathematics from his father Ben
List,
Lest we forget. . .
1.135. Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in
order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be
satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one
corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every w
> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> After that one can consider
> the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is
> all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which*
> monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you
> haven't really said
Jeffrey,
That's a good guideline:
I think it will help to dispel confusion in our discussions on the
list if we spell out the texts and sources that are most on our minds
when we are trying to interpret specific passages. Or, in those cases
when we are giving an "all things considered" reading,
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
> terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
> read them *in
____
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 8:09 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my view of
the 'umbrella ima
On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
read them *in the context *where Peirce uses them, not lift them out
of their context and drop them into a
Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my
view of the 'umbrella image' of the semiosic process. An 'existential
graph with three tails' is a mere 'kinetic' description of a 2D
diagram. It doesn't mean anything.
The phrase: 'Mother loves child' - I'm removing
ammatically?
I'll stop there for now and take up your other remarks separately.
--Jeff
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon S, List,
First, I will have to
du
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?
On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian
> Bed essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in
> CSP’s the
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}Jon, list - yes, makes sense. Yes - I meant the internal Sign
triadAnd yes, the three correlates are in 'other Sign
relations'enables diversity
Edwina
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Supplement:
I have made a mistake with my explaining a relation with itself: If there is a set that has a relation with itself, this relation is not a subset of all tupels possibly formed by any two elements of this set, but of the set that would be formed by all tupels of the set and a copy
Edwina, List:
ET: In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or
blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being
filled by some subject.
So far, so good. The triadic Sign relation has three loose ends, which are
filled by three subjects--the Sign i
List, Edwina
> On Apr 13, 2017, at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Now- what am I missing in this view?
I do not understand how your question(s) relate to the concept of identity.
Perhaps if you can clearly state the premises and the conclusions of your
arguments, I might be able to decip
On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian Bed
essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in CSP’s
theory of logical graphs of relations? Or, is a semantic explanation
possible?
Peirce published his alge
Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a
few questions:
1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in
chemistry and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in
Robert's, p.115, he shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents
triadic
Jon, List,
You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller tha
Helmut, List:
That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms
that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in
the past. He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a
triadic relation that is "projectively reducible." I still wonder,
s obviously a
> triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by
> means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to
> convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic
> relation involves meaning.”
>
>
>
>
List:
(This post is rather technical and the contents may be intractably perplex for
many readers of this list. One purpose of this post is to crisply separate the
fundamental philosophical concept of identity from the mathematical concept of
identity. To differentiate CSP view of lines of id
Jon, List,
You wrote:
"To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations. Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that."
I have a guess about
’t be reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments
convincing about the irreducibility.
John
FROM: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
SENT: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
TO: Peirce-L
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier
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Jon - I see your point about what we have discussed is an INTERNAL
semiosis of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant. I agree with this - since they are all in the same
mode, then, I can understand it
Gary F- thanks for your comments, but I disagree with your
explanation.
A dyad is between TWO existential entities. A Relation, such as
between the Representamen and the Interpretant is not between two
existential entities, but is an interaction that actually enables
both to function. N
Edwina, List:
Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one
triadic relation. As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten
trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign
to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), whic
o have access to CP will take a closer look at it.
Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon S, List,
First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina,
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Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:
1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's
8.335,8.337 comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object,
Relations to the Interpretant..but
Edwina, List:
ET: A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen
alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate
Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object?
I believe that our recent joint resolution to use "Sign" only for t
Pierce’s arguments convincing about the
irreducibility.
John
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Edwina, Jon S, List,
First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think
the three pronged spoke *does *exactly represent a triadic relation, not
three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from
which the three spokes protrude make it one relation
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Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think
that there are three relations rather than one triadic relation.
A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen
alone? Or is
> On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
> Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even
> in Newtonian mechanics.
Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the
three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking
Edwina, Jon S, List,
Edwina wrote:
But what about: ."the interpretant of a proposition is its predicate"
5.474. This moves the laws, so to speak, which I have located in the
Representamen - to the Interpretant! So- I have no idea...for I tend to
see the Interpretant as a result of the actions of
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }see
my comments
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On Wed 12/04/17 1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
On 4/12/2017 12:33 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
Was the computer science that developed relational databases
engaging with Peirce explicitly? Any good place to get a
primer on that history?
The theory of relational databases was originally developed
by Edgar F. (Ted) Codd at IBM Research in San Jose:
Edwina, List:
ET: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three
irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as
made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is
so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual
conditions, though
they are not computable if the function is not computable) on my web page. Most
have emergence in the title.
John
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 6:32 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15
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Jon, list
1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where
are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a
cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and
> On Apr 12, 2017, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> I'm guessing an engineer would have some acquaintance with
> relational databases, which have after all a history going
> back to Peirce, and I would recommend keeping that example
> in mind for thinking about k-adic relations in general.
I d
> On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> CG
>> I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t
>> reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the
>> reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think
>> more carefully about the type of description
Edwina, List:
I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and
associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.
My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going
forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) *triad *of
Imme
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}Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on
the terminology.
For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen,
which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the
Edwina, Jon A., Clark, list,
The issues of mapping a continuous world to a small finite
vocabulary imply that (1) there is always some residual error
in anything we say about the world, and (2) there is an open-
ended variety of ways of talking about the same phenomena from
different points of vi
List:
I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, *Peirce's
Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality*, via interlibrary loan this
week. Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I
could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading. He points out
Jon A.,
I was attepting to express as understandably as possible. To offer
answers to your quest for exactness would take more time than I have at
my disposal. - Sorry for that!!
Best,
Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 10.4.2017 21:44:
Kirsti, List:
I am indeed exploring the hypothesis th
On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical
sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems.
I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable
tha
> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?
> What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?
I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While Peirce does have the
index,
Kirsti, List:
I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but
not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do. On the contrary,
I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in
particular--which is why I sought input from the List.
"Our existing
Jerry, List,
did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only
> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have
> exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
> and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).
>
> The outer layers are always mixed with liquids
List:
The following quote deserves rigorous study. It is deeply relevant to three
critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:
1. issues that relate realism to idealism
2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and
3. issues that relate the sciences to the relatio
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John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think
that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of
these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness.
That is, compl
What an excellent post!
Just an addition to what John said on bacteria:
It seems hard to (in prevalent culture) to understand the fact that we
are not directly nourished by our intake of nutritients (food), but via
the bacteria in our digestive system. We feed the (kinds of) bacteria,
which f
John,
I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with
"laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science
with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got
angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just
some
Jon,
The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If
you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs,
and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.
"Our existing universe" does not g
Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list,
Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.
There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp
boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's
atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate case.
Edwina, Jon, List,
I agree, that a molecule (and an atom, a particle...) is a token. But, when something happens with this molecule due to a natural law, eg. the law of gravitation, is then the spatial section of this law that works upon the molecule a token of the law? I was thinking no, because
Helmut, Edwina, List:
HR: my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear
borders (of it´s body) ...
In this context, "embodied" does not necessarily mean that a Token "has a
body," it just means that it is existentially instantiated in some way.
The word "Token" is a Type,
Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self
with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact
that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of
electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that
differentiates it from another TYPE of
Helmut,
Your idea of “self-defined bodies” is essentially the “autopoiesis” of Maturana
and Varela, and the idea of final causation being intrinsic to animate bodymind
is shared by Gregory Bateson and, I think, by Peirce. My book Turning Signs
joins these concepts with Robert Rosen’s concept
expression of the “wonder of creation.”
>
> https://religiousnaturalism.org/
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* 8-Apr-17 19:37
> *To:* Peirce List ; Eugene Halton <
> eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
> *
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote from
Peirce,
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
Edwina, List,
my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans,
Gene, List:
Your comments are well-taken. I did not mean to imply that the growth of
knowledge is the *only *manifestation of the growth of reasonableness,
although I now can see how it came across that way.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosoph
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Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often
quote from Peirce,
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely ph
Dear Edwina,
Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be
“reasonableness energizing in the world.”
Not “universe.”
I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given
that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious
atheist,” tho
John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”
The expectations for communic
Gary F., List:
GF: In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.)
which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used
and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
without regard to the motives which originally governed its sele
John S., Helmut, Edwina, List:
JFS: Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a
Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that embodies
John S., Helmut, List:
Of course, Peirce famously argued for the *Reality *of God, not the *existence
*of God. He explained why in one of the manuscript drafts of "A Neglected
Argument."
CSP: Thus, He is so much like a mind, and so little like a singular
Existent (meaning by an Existent, or obj
Edwina, List:
ET: Nowhere in this section does Peirce write that the purpose of Reason
is the 'growth of knowledge about both God and the universe'.
I did not suggest that this was "the purpose of Reason," but that it is
"God's purpose" as "the development of Reason." CP 1.615 (1903) continues
, the Ens necessarium/Creator God you believe in
may not be the same as the agency God that Edwina disbelieves in.
Gary f.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 8-Apr-17 14:21
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point.
I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents]
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Jon, list: And here is a key difference.
Jon wrote: "As I mentioned in the other thread, I take it to be the
summum bonum--the "development of Reason," which is the growth of
knowledge about both God and the uni
John, List,
I think so, after your proof!
Best, Helmut
08. April 2017 um 21:57 Uhr
"John F Sowa"
On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
> I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work.
I agree.
> So law is all type, there are no token
On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work.
I agree.
So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
of efficient causation. Is my guess.
For a law of science, the proposition that st
John, List,
Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate
Jon and Edwina,
Jon
I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified
Gary F., List:
There is much to digest here. As you quoted, Peirce called the universe "a
great symbol of God's purpose, working out its conclusions in living
realities" (CP 5.119; 1903). This suggests to me that "God's purpose" is
the Object of the universe as Symbol, and "living realities" cons
the Tychist supposes are continually receiving new accretions.
> Those premisses of nature, however, though they are not the perceptual
> facts that are premisses to us, nevertheless must resemble them in being
> premisses. We can only imagine what they are by comparing them with the
> pre
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Jon, list - hmm - that is interesting and I'd agree; the Dynamic
Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also Thirdness.
This enables individual organisms, when they interact with another
external organism, to
Edwina, John S., List:
JFS: Any law of science or even an informal rule of thumb that makes
reliable predictions reflects something real about the world. That real
aspect of the world is some kind of regularity. But it isn't stated as a
law until somebody states it as such.
I agree, and I am st
asking
whether the laws of nature are symbols.
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 7-Apr-17 12:04
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F - Thanks for the quotation. I have only part of the EP2 - and those
pages weren't included.
> On Apr 7, 2017, at 1:59 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> Clark
>> As John suggested we can see symmetry breaking in Peirce’s terms
>> such that non-fundamental physical laws are the somewhat chance
>> created habits. Habits in matter are thirdness.
>
> Those chance-created habits must be supported
Edwina, Gary, Clark, list,
ET
I'd say that our primary experience of these natural laws is
indexical, in that we physically connect with the RESULTS of
these laws. Intellectually analyzing them and developing
symbolic constructs - is a secondary step.
I agree with both sentences. And I would
> On Apr 6, 2017, at 1:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>
> With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis in the
> physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred to me. What
> class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we describe a
> law o
e them in being premisses. We can only
imagine what they are by comparing them with the premisses for us. As
premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]
Gary F.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
aring them with the premisses for us. As premisses they must involve Qualities. ]]
Gary F.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F - I don't q
om: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 7-Apr-17 09:53
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:
"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as constitu
Gary F - I don't quite understand your statement:
"These are clearly symbols, though not conventional, and (as
constituents of an argument) take the form of propositions. I think
John is right to call them metaphorical, as our primary experience of
these symbols is anthropomorphic"
Jon A.S., John S.,
I agree with John on this point — but see further my insertion below.
Gary F.
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 6-Apr-17 17:52
John S., List:
JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for
aspects o
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}John, list:
I think a law refers to the continuity of a type of behaviour; i.e.,
among a collective, not to a rule of behaviour in one specific
instantiation.
That is, a law would refer to the continuity
On 4/6/2017 5:51 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is
a metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.
Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature /themselves/, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What clas
John S., List:
JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor for
aspects of nature that we can only describe.
Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature *themselves*, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them. What class of Signs are
they? Obviousl
Jon and Edwina,
Jon
What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.
Edwina
But a sy
Edwina, List:
I requested that very book from the library yesterday, because I am hoping
that it will shed some light on this. Of course, a law of nature is
not *itself
*a physical or otherwise existent entity, hence a (general) Legisign. I am
mainly looking for feedback on the identity of the D
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I think that Stjernfelt's book Natural Propositions ... on
DiciSigns examines the semiosic process in these realms. There are
three types of Dicisigns. The Dicent Sinsign [ dicent indexical
sinsign]. The Dicent indexic
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