Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2017 3:19 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list:
I'll tr
Stephen - I pasted this from your link to Sheldrake's post on
morphic resonance:
---
The hypothesized properties of morphic fields at all levels of
complexity can be summari
problem of entropy is the problem of degrees of freedom. Of all
the “optional routes” that an entity (atom, molecule, cell,
animal, etc, etc) can finish up taking, why should it take the route
most favorable to life?
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [4] ]
Sent: Sunday, Dece
ui.edu [5]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below:
On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
[6] sent:
1] EDWINA>” You sa
, December 10, 2017 9:46 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Edwina Taborsky; Gary Fuhrman; Peirce-L; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
What’s so palpable about this ironic situation is that a claim is made by ones
who claim Peirce, that the ‘self’ emerges by experience
ember 10, 2017 10:09 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below:
On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Ste
Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen, list: Thanks for your comments - See my replies below:
On Sun 10/12/17 2:35 PM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:
1] EDWINA>” You say 'how a living entity, as a self, defines the thin
p of Andean
>> miners who were exploited by their boss. The condor (condor mind-body)
>> looks from the sky, at the human mind-bodies toiling away in the mines, and
>> it becomes the symbol of freedom for the miners to achieve:
>>
>> I'd rather be a sparrow than a s
ed
by interactive dynamic freedom to generate novel information.
Regards sj
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [3]]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca [4]; g...@gnusystems.ca [5];
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jaro
sand stars per galaxy. What I am
>> outlining, with my line of thinking, suggests life as inevitable, and not
>> accidental. It’s a living universe. Mine is an attempt to address the
>> entropy problem - Shannon entropy, thermodynamic entropy, entropy as the
>> tendency to dis
ty across
> time, as evident in the persistence of life across time on Earth, that is
> the deal-breaker for any kind of information determinism.
>
> Regards sj
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca ]
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
> *T
ker for any kind of
information determinism.
Regards sj
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 5:40 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Law
Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, Decemb
its saddest sound
> It's saddest sound
>
> I'd rather be a forest than a street
> Yes, I would; If I could; I surely would
>
> I'd rather feel the earth beneath my feet
> Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
>
> Regards
>
>
>
>
>
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]; peirce-l@list.iupu
2]; g...@gnusystems.ca [3];
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]; 'Mike Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Stephen - the problem I have with your hypothesis is that you
haven't explained what 'know how to be' involves. How does it exist?
Whe
ember 10, 2017 2:07 AM
*To:* g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>;
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Mike Bergman
*Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Mike, list - My reference to semiosis within the physical realm refers
to its functioning as a triadi
children, eg,
the Wild Boy of Aveyron).
Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 4:26 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; 'Mike
Bergman'; Stephen Jarosek
Subject: Re: RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws
d rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [ mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [2]]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]; Mike
Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of
Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>;
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Mike, list - My referen
;d rather feel the earth beneath my feet
Yes, I would; If I only could; I surely would
Regards
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: Sunday, December 10, 2017 2:07 AM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Mike Bergman
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Na
Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Hi List,
I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce,
Phenomenology, and Semiotics"
Mike - it's all through his work. References to both organic and
inorganic matter as expressions of the semiosic function of Mind.
"what we call matter is not completely dead, but is merely mind
hidebound with habits' 6.158
"If I make atoms swerve - as I do- I make tem
cts.”
Gary f.
From: Mike Bergman
[mailto:m...@mkbergman.com]
Sent: 9-Dec-17 18:51
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Hi Gary f
that “there is some
reason to believe that even the laws of nature are semiotic products.”
Gary f.
From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com]
Sent: 9-Dec-17 18:51
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Hi Gary f, List,
I am
: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Hi List,
I was reading Nathan
Houser's piece on "Peirce, Phenomenology, and Semiotics"
in the Routledge Companion [1] and came across this q
Symbol because its modus operandi is the
same as that by which words produce physical effects. ]]
Gary f.
From: Mike Bergman [mailto:m...@mkbergman.com]
Sent: 9-Dec-17 17:25
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature
Hi List,
I was reading Nathan Houser's pie
Hi List,
I was reading Nathan Houser's piece on "Peirce,
Phenomenology, and Semiotics" in the Routledge Companion [1] and
came across this quote:
"One of the principal realms of sign activity, or semiosis
(semeiosis), is human thought; but semiosis
Dear list:
“the fact that A presents B with gift C...”
“I cannot forget that there are the germs of the *theory of the categories*
which is (if anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child.
In it I shall live when oblivion has me — my body”
The surprising fact, *C*, is observe
List, Charles:
> On Apr 30, 2017, at 2:43 PM, Charles Pyle wrote:
>
> Many years ago linguists chewed over the issue of whether the semantic
> analysis of three place predicates can be broken down into a series of two
> place predicates and discovered that the two are not semantically or
> gr
List:
> On Apr 29, 2017, at 10:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> Re mathematical category theory: Many mathematicians believe that
> the term 'category theory' was a poor choice. The focus of category
> theory is on the mappings or morphisms. The things that are mapped
> could be mathematical str
Helmut and Jon,
HR
I think, the problem with bringing together Peirce and conventional
mathematics is, that Peirces monism is one of time / change, and the
conventional mathematical monism is one of space / permanence.
Peirce would not say that.
Charles learned mathematics from his father Ben
List,
Lest we forget. . .
1.135. Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in
order to learn you must desire to learn, and in so desiring not be
satisfied with what you already incline to think, there follows one
corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every w
> On Apr 20, 2017, at 9:32 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> After that one can consider
> the fine points of generic versus degenerate cases, and that is
> all well and good, but until you venture to say exactly *which*
> monadic, dyadic, or triadic predicate you have in mind, you
> haven't really said
Jeffrey,
That's a good guideline:
I think it will help to dispel confusion in our discussions on the
list if we spell out the texts and sources that are most on our minds
when we are trying to interpret specific passages. Or, in those cases
when we are giving an "all things considered" reading,
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
> terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
> read them *in
____
From: Edwina Taborsky
Sent: Friday, April 14, 2017 8:09 AM
To: 'Peirce-L'; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my view of
the 'umbrella ima
On 4/14/2017 10:41 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
I have to say (one more time) that if we want to understand Peirce’s
terms — especially what he means by a *triadic relation* — we need to
read them *in the context *where Peirce uses them, not lift them out
of their context and drop them into a
Sorry, Jeffrey- but I don't see how your explanation below denies my
view of the 'umbrella image' of the semiosic process. An 'existential
graph with three tails' is a mere 'kinetic' description of a 2D
diagram. It doesn't mean anything.
The phrase: 'Mother loves child' - I'm removing
ammatically?
I'll stop there for now and take up your other remarks separately.
--Jeff
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon S, List,
First, I will have to
du
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs, CSP's Procrustean Bed?
On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian
> Bed essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in
> CSP’s the
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list - yes, makes sense. Yes - I meant the internal Sign
triadAnd yes, the three correlates are in 'other Sign
relations'enables diversity
Edwina
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Supplement:
I have made a mistake with my explaining a relation with itself: If there is a set that has a relation with itself, this relation is not a subset of all tupels possibly formed by any two elements of this set, but of the set that would be formed by all tupels of the set and a copy
Edwina, List:
ET: In a triadic spot/rhema/proposition which has three 'loose ends' or
blank forms - which means, as I understand it, that it is open to being
filled by some subject.
So far, so good. The triadic Sign relation has three loose ends, which are
filled by three subjects--the Sign i
List, Edwina
> On Apr 13, 2017, at 4:18 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Now- what am I missing in this view?
I do not understand how your question(s) relate to the concept of identity.
Perhaps if you can clearly state the premises and the conclusions of your
arguments, I might be able to decip
On 4/13/2017 3:59 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
In my mind, I am left with an intractable question: Is a Procrustian Bed
essential to understanding the role of the identity relation in CSP’s
theory of logical graphs of relations? Or, is a semantic explanation
possible?
Peirce published his alge
Jerry, list - as someone with no background in chemistry, I have a
few questions:
1) I understand your analysis using the 'doctrine of valency' in
chemistry and, as you point out, Peirce was a chemist. Now, in
Robert's, p.115, he shows several figures - and figure 3 'represents
triadic
Jon, List,
You wrote, that a dyadic relation of anything to itself is simply identity. Well, I dont know, how far you can apply the mathematical "relation" to the Peircean, but in mathematics it is not so: Eg. you have the set (mouse, dog, elephant), and the dyadic relation reason is "smaller tha
Helmut, List:
That is a very interesting suggestion, and some quick Googling confirms
that Jon Awbrey has written about compositive vs. projective reduction in
the past. He even cited the Sign relation as a specific example of a
triadic relation that is "projectively reducible." I still wonder,
s obviously a
> triadic relation. The second is that a triadic relation is inexpressible by
> means of dyadic relations alone. Considerable reflexion may be required to
> convince yourself of the first of these premisses, that every triadic
> relation involves meaning.”
>
>
>
>
List:
(This post is rather technical and the contents may be intractably perplex for
many readers of this list. One purpose of this post is to crisply separate the
fundamental philosophical concept of identity from the mathematical concept of
identity. To differentiate CSP view of lines of id
Jon, List,
You wrote:
"To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations. Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that."
I have a guess about
’t be reduced to dyads. I have never found Pierce’s arguments
convincing about the irreducibility.
John
FROM: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
SENT: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
TO: Peirce-L
SUBJECT: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier
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Jon - I see your point about what we have discussed is an INTERNAL
semiosis of the Immediate Object-Representamen-Immediate
Interpretant. I agree with this - since they are all in the same
mode, then, I can understand it
Gary F- thanks for your comments, but I disagree with your
explanation.
A dyad is between TWO existential entities. A Relation, such as
between the Representamen and the Interpretant is not between two
existential entities, but is an interaction that actually enables
both to function. N
Edwina, List:
Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one
triadic relation. As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten
trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign
to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), whic
o have access to CP will take a closer look at it.
Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 12-Apr-17 16:45
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Edwina, Jon S, List,
First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina,
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:
1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's
8.335,8.337 comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object,
Relations to the Interpretant..but
Edwina, List:
ET: A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen
alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate
Interpretant? Or is it even larger - and includes the Dynamic Object?
I believe that our recent joint resolution to use "Sign" only for t
Pierce’s arguments convincing about the
irreducibility.
John
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 1:47 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier
mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>> wrote:
Edwina, Jon S, List,
First, I will have to disagree with you, Edwina, on one point since I think
the three pronged spoke *does *exactly represent a triadic relation, not
three relations (how do you figure that?) As I see it, the single node from
which the three spokes protrude make it one relation
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Yes, that's what I've been mulling over for years - where I think
that there are three relations rather than one triadic relation.
A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen
alone? Or is
> On Apr 12, 2017, at 11:21 AM, John Collier wrote:
>
> Some reductions are impossible because the functions are not computable, even
> in Newtonian mechanics.
Are you talking about the problem in mathematics of solving things like the
three body problem? That’s not quite what I was thinking
Edwina, Jon S, List,
Edwina wrote:
But what about: ."the interpretant of a proposition is its predicate"
5.474. This moves the laws, so to speak, which I have located in the
Representamen - to the Interpretant! So- I have no idea...for I tend to
see the Interpretant as a result of the actions of
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }see
my comments
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On Wed 12/04/17 1:59 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
On 4/12/2017 12:33 PM, Clark Goble wrote:
Was the computer science that developed relational databases
engaging with Peirce explicitly? Any good place to get a
primer on that history?
The theory of relational databases was originally developed
by Edgar F. (Ted) Codd at IBM Research in San Jose:
Edwina, List:
ET: BUT - to be clear, I still see this internal triad as ONE SET of three
irreducible Relations. I suspect that you don't see this internal triad as
made up of Relations, while I still see it that way - although the bond is
so tight that none of the three can be seen as 'individual
conditions, though
they are not computable if the function is not computable) on my web page. Most
have emergence in the title.
John
From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@lextek.com]
Sent: Wednesday, 12 April 2017 6:32 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
Jon, list
1) The Representamen does carry the general habits; that is, where
are these generals located in a 'thing'? I'll take the example of a
cell; its habits, which function to mould its material content and
> On Apr 12, 2017, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>
> I'm guessing an engineer would have some acquaintance with
> relational databases, which have after all a history going
> back to Peirce, and I would recommend keeping that example
> in mind for thinking about k-adic relations in general.
I d
> On Apr 12, 2017, at 8:15 AM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> CG
>> I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t
>> reducible to chemistry or physics... attempting to make the
>> reduction... did perhaps help in getting biologists to think
>> more carefully about the type of description
Edwina, List:
I remain uncomfortable with calling the Representamen a "relation" and
associating it with habits, but we can set that aside for now.
My understanding of our recent agreement on terminology was that going
forward, we would always use "Sign" to refer to the (internal) *triad *of
Imme
BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - This is part of an argument we've had before. It depends on
the terminology.
For you, the term sign refers to what I term the Representamen,
which I consider the Relation of Mediation - and, which holds the
Edwina, Jon A., Clark, list,
The issues of mapping a continuous world to a small finite
vocabulary imply that (1) there is always some residual error
in anything we say about the world, and (2) there is an open-
ended variety of ways of talking about the same phenomena from
different points of vi
List:
I was finally able to borrow Aaron Bruce Wilson's new book, *Peirce's
Empiricism: Its Roots and Its Originality*, via interlibrary loan this
week. Previously I could only access the Google preview, but from that I
could tell that the whole thing would be well worth reading. He points out
Jon A.,
I was attepting to express as understandably as possible. To offer
answers to your quest for exactness would take more time than I have at
my disposal. - Sorry for that!!
Best,
Kirsti
Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 10.4.2017 21:44:
Kirsti, List:
I am indeed exploring the hypothesis th
On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical
sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems.
I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable
tha
> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?
> What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?
I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While Peirce does have the
index,
Kirsti, List:
I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but
not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do. On the contrary,
I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in
particular--which is why I sought input from the List.
"Our existing
Jerry, List,
did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only
> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
> The surface is a vague boundary. All plants and animals have
> exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
> and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).
>
> The outer layers are always mixed with liquids
List:
The following quote deserves rigorous study. It is deeply relevant to three
critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:
1. issues that relate realism to idealism
2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and
3. issues that relate the sciences to the relatio
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John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think
that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of
these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness.
That is, compl
What an excellent post!
Just an addition to what John said on bacteria:
It seems hard to (in prevalent culture) to understand the fact that we
are not directly nourished by our intake of nutritients (food), but via
the bacteria in our digestive system. We feed the (kinds of) bacteria,
which f
John,
I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with
"laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science
with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got
angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just
some
Jon,
The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If
you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs,
and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.
"Our existing universe" does not g
Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list,
Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.
There is a continuum. The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp
boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's
atmosphere). The borders of living things are an intermediate case.
Edwina, Jon, List,
I agree, that a molecule (and an atom, a particle...) is a token. But, when something happens with this molecule due to a natural law, eg. the law of gravitation, is then the spatial section of this law that works upon the molecule a token of the law? I was thinking no, because
Helmut, Edwina, List:
HR: my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear
borders (of it´s body) ...
In this context, "embodied" does not necessarily mean that a Token "has a
body," it just means that it is existentially instantiated in some way.
The word "Token" is a Type,
Helmut, list - the molecule doesn't need to have a discrete self
with distinct borders in order to be a 'token' of a 'type'. The fact
that its composition is specific; i.e., a specific number of
electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it a distinct identity that
differentiates it from another TYPE of
Helmut,
Your idea of “self-defined bodies” is essentially the “autopoiesis” of Maturana
and Varela, and the idea of final causation being intrinsic to animate bodymind
is shared by Gregory Bateson and, I think, by Peirce. My book Turning Signs
joins these concepts with Robert Rosen’s concept
expression of the “wonder of creation.”
>
> https://religiousnaturalism.org/
>
>
>
> gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> *Sent:* 8-Apr-17 19:37
> *To:* Peirce List ; Eugene Halton <
> eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu>
> *
Subject: Re: Fwd: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs
Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often quote from
Peirce,
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
Edwina, List,
my point was, that a token is embodied, but a molecule has no clear borders (of it´s body), as it contains electrons, whose orbitals are borderless, and the gravitation (and other fields) of the molecule also is borderless. Borders in physical-chemical- world are defined by humans,
Gene, List:
Your comments are well-taken. I did not mean to imply that the growth of
knowledge is the *only *manifestation of the growth of reasonableness,
although I now can see how it came across that way.
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosoph
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Gene - I would agree with your D.H. Lawrence quote. And as I often
quote from Peirce,
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely ph
Dear Edwina,
Thanks, but it was not so perfectly. The last Peirce phrase should be
“reasonableness energizing in the world.”
Not “universe.”
I’m glad you thought my words expressed what you were trying to say, given
that I am not an atheist, perhaps something closer to a “religious
atheist,” tho
John Sowa: “But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction. An
infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the babbling,
and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.”
The expectations for communic
Gary F., List:
GF: In Baldwin’s Dictionary, Peirce defined “symbol” as “A SIGN (q.v.)
which is constituted a sign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used
and understood as such, whether the habit is natural or conventional, and
without regard to the motives which originally governed its sele
John S., Helmut, Edwina, List:
JFS: Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a
Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that embodies
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